Ladakh: Changing the Posts

Chinese tents in Galwan area

On July 12, 1962, India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru landed at Palam airport; he was back from a family holiday in Kashmir.
The National Herald described thus the scene: “Pandit Nehru returned by a special plane from Kashmir after a week's holiday. He was accompanied by Mrs Indira Gandhi, Mrs Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit and his two grandsons. The Prime Minister was looking better after the rest.

The presspersons literally jumped on the Prime Minister: Chinese troops had encircled an Indian picket in a remote unknown place of Ladakh, the spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) had just told the scribes: "There has been no change in the situation caused by encircled Indian post in the Galwan river valley in Ladakh by Chinese intruders.” But, the Prime Minister was cool: “no conflict had occurred so far between the Indian and Chinese personnel at the Galwan outpost in Ladakh.”

An Old Tendency

The tendency to minimize Chinese intrusions is not new; that day at the airport, Nehru explained that “some time or the other the Chinese would have to end their encirclement of the Indian outpost to avoid an armed clash.”
A correspondent dared pointing out that according to the latest Indian protest note the situation was serious; the Prime Minister agreed: "Yes. They are pitched in a high key. Anyhow, so far as I know nothing has happened: no conflict has occurred.” Nehru added: “Some time or the other the [Chinese] will have to [end the encirclement]."

Nehru remained cheerful, he even joked when the correspondents trooped around him, laughingly asking: "Are you now encircling me?"

They accuse us and we accuse them

Two days later, before departing for Bangalore, the Prime Minister spoke again to the pressmen, “while there was a risk of clash between Indian and Chinese forces at Galwan post in Ladakh, I do not think there will be any major clash;” he further observed: “Well, they accuse us and we accuse them. It is very difficult to say what will happen. …There is a risk of a clash, but not a major one.”
The MEA Annual Report explained India’s position: “In July 1962 Chinese troops encircled an Indian post in the Galwan Valley, [the Indian government has] indicated their willingness to enter into discussions on the India-China boundary question …as soon as the present tensions have been eased and a suitable climate for talks and discussions is created.”
The Chinese troops eventually withdrew from the area.
This background is interesting when one looks, when at the present situation in Ladakh where the PLA troops are facing the Indian troops in a similar manner.
The summer 1962 incident sent a false message to the government, in particular to the arrogant Defence Minister Krishna Menon, who was on his way to Geneva to meet Marshal Chen Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister; but it made many Indian officials, including BN Mullick, the Intelligence Bureau Director, believed that the Chinese would never attack or if they attack, it would be a minor clash.

We know what happened three months later, when a totally un-prepared Indian Army had to face the onslaught of the Chinese Army.

Remember the History

This history should not be forgotten when one looks at the present events in Ladakh, though the ‘establishment’ today, like yesterday, will say that nobody should worry and that the issue will be sorted out through talks, negotiations (today they speak of agreed ‘mechanisms’); it may not happen like that.
Ambassador RS Kalha in his book, India-China Boundary Issues recalled: “Nehru seemed to be convinced that the Chinese would not make any major incursion into Indian held territory. Perhaps Krishna Menon had convinced him so. Nehru told General Thapar [then Army Chief] that he had ‘reliable information that the Chinese would not offer resistance if there was a show of force to make them vacate the check-posts’. The events in the Galwan valley seemed to confirm Nehru's thesis, when Chinese troops advanced right up to the Indian post, surrounded it, but did not open fire and eventually withdrew.”
The Ambassador added: “This was not the message that the Chinese wished to convey. They intended it as a warning that they could eliminate any Indian post at any time, but Nehru misread it and reached the opposite conclusion that China would not fight.”
Galwan remained quiet till October 20, the day the PLA launched a massive attack; as a result, 36 of the Indian soldiers were killed and the remaining 32, mostly wounded, were taken prisoners in Tibet.

Maj Gen PJS Sandhu, the author of 1962: A View from the Other Side of the Hill recently commented: “unlike in NEFA, the Chinese did not withdraw even an inch in Ladakh. They stayed put where they had reached, i.e. their 1960 Claim Line. In Ladakh, they had claimed about 33,500 sq km of Indian territory; by the end of the War, they had taken control of most of it, except about 450 sq kms of area which remain till today as a few disputed pockets.”

A Serious Situation

What makes the present situation extremely serious is that, though there are twelve disputed pockets along the Lac where opinion differs in Ladakh, Galwan is not one of the them. The Indian and Chinese perceptions of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) were the same till beginning of May, when the PLA started intruding into Indian territory.
What makes things worse, is that nobody is exactly sure why China decided to advance at that particular place, at this particular time when Beijing should be worried at the consequences of its virus spreading all over the planet.
Very few in India today realize that China has always refused to inform India of its LAC perceptions.
In 2000, both sides agreed that they would initiate a process for the clarification and determination of the LAC in all sectors of the boundary; a first meeting took place in March 2000, where maps of the middle sector were exchanged.
On June 17, 2002, both sides met again and maps of the Western sector were seen by both sides for about 20 minutes, during the meeting itself the maps were withdrawn since it was felt that they represented maximalist positions for both sides.

In these circumstances, it is high time for India to not only insist on immediate exchange of maps of the LAC, but also to select a few points of pressure which could be painful for Beijing, i.e. Tibet, Taiwan or Hong Kong and if necessary, to start applying pressure.

Chinese 'Perceptions' of the border in Ladakh

Main battle tanks (MBTs) and infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs)
practicing somewhere else on the plateau

Trespass on Barahoti: We had it coming

My article Trespass on Barahoti: We had it coming appeared in The Asian Age/Deccan Chronicle.

Here is the link...

An improved infrastructure should be provided to the Indian Army and the paramilitary forces to man the area.

According to PTI, on June 3, two helicopters of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) hovered over the Barahoti bowl in Chamoli district in Uttarakhand.
The news agency repotted that the choppers, which returned to the Chinese side after about five minutes, “could have carried out aerial photography of Indian ground troops during what was possibly a reconnaissance mission.”
The choppers were identified as the Zhiba (WZ-9) attack helicopters.
Incidentally, on the same day, Lt Gen He Lei, vice president of the PLA’s Academy of Military Science addressed the plenary session of the 16th Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore.
Representing China, Gen He affirmed in front of his colleagues from Asia and the West: “China has always worked to maintain, build and contribute to international and regional peace and has firmly followed the path of peaceful development although it is faced with multiple security challenges.”
Whether it is in the South China Sea (SCS) or Barahoti, the Chinese break the rules that they pretend to uphold; intruding areas, occupying them and later telling the other stakeholders: “let us discuss”. Opponents, placed in front of a fait accompli, are most of the time unable to give a fitting answer (this is even the case of Donald Trump in the SCS).
In the present situation, Chamoli’s Superintendent of Police, Tripti Bhatt told The Hindustan Times that the helicopter(s) entered the Indian airspace from Tibetan side; however, she refused to confirm that it was a Chinese helicopter. This raises several questions.
First, for such sensitive issues, there should be only ONE spokesperson, whether from the Defence Ministry or the Indo-Tibet Border Police (ITBP) who gives factual infor
mation to the press.
Then, photos or videos should be provided to the media, which hopefully can help the Indian public to better understand what China does.
Then an improved infrastructure should be provided for the Indian Army and the paramilitary forces to man the area. This is the result of the neglect of the Himalayan frontier with China for the past 60 years.
Finally, there are no ‘minor’ issues when the Indian borders are concerned. Barahoti, which witnessed the first Chinese intrusions on Indian soil in 1954 is indeed a telling case.
Every summer, the Indian media cries foul: “The Chinese have come again”. “The Chinese Dragon struck again”, scream reports originating from this ‘inaccessible’ part of Uttarakhand.
Last year, The Times of India reported: “It all began on July 22, when an Indian team of 19 civilians led by a Sub Divisional Magistrate first entered into the area in Barahoti. …Three days later for the first time, China sent a helicopter to the area.”
The Government of India, as usual, played down the incident. As a result, this year, two choppers have come …in June and next year more will come.
Last year another serious issue cropped up, as per an agreed protocol signed in 2005 and reiterated in 2013 with China, the ITBP personnel were not carrying firearms, while Chinese were carrying arms and wearing uniforms.
But how did the story start?
In July 1952, in a secret note, the Intelligence Bureau described the topography of the Himalaya in this area: “The Garhwal-Tibet border can only be crossed through the Mana and Niti Valleys where there are open places and habitation, while the rest of the border area consists of snow-covered mountains studded with glaciers. …There are four passes between Niti Valley and Tibet”. One of them was Tunjun-la, north of Barahoti.
A couple of years earlier, some Tibetans officials had entered the tiny bowl of Barahoti. The IB explained the background of the so-called dispute: “About the end of last century the Tibetans had established a Customs Post at Hoti Plain. To stop this practice, the British Government had to send out a detachment of Gurkhas along with the Deputy Collector in 1890. This had a salutary effect and the Tibetans removed their post. It appears that for some time past the Tibetans have again been establishing a Police-cum-Customs post at Hoti during the trading season.”
As in most areas in the Himalaya, the access is far easier from the Tibetan side than from the Indian. Over the years, this greatly facilitated the Chinese intrusions.
The 1952 IB note continued: “It is quite possible that if the Tibetans are not stopped from establishing their post at Hoti Plain, they might eventually claim it to be their own territory.” The IB then recommended: “It is, therefore, essential that the Govt. of India should make it clear to the Govt. of Tibet and its Dzongpon [District Commissioner] that the Hoti Plain is Indian territory and the Tibetans have no right to establish any Customs post there.”
At that time, the Uttar Pradesh Government asserted that no case of “encroachment has so far been reported though at one or two places tax collectors from Tibet did come in but were persuaded to go back.”
The above incident was enough for China to claim the area as ‘hers’. It happened as soon as the negotiations for the Panchsheel Agreement, (which only deals with trade and pilgrimage between Tibet and India) were completed in April 1954. It was soon obvious that the Indian diplomats had goofed up, they had ‘forgotten’ to discuss the Indo-Tibet border.
Though the ‘smart’ Indian negotiators in Beijing had been sent a complete list of the Himalayan passes, they believed that by naming six passes only, they had delineated a border.
As a result of India not insisting on all the passes, China started claiming several areas south of the watershed, in particular the area south of the Tunjun-la pass, where Barahoti is located.
It is only much later that South Block understood the meaning of Premier Zhou En-lai’s opening remarks, at the time of signature: “there are bound to be some problems between two great countries like India and China with a long common border… but we are prepared to settle all such problems as are ripe for settlement now”.

China did not know that Barahoti was south of Tunjun-la in 1958

Less than two months after the signature, India discovered that all problems had not been solved: the first Chinese incursion in the Barahoti area of Uttar Pradesh occurred in June 1954. This was the first of a series of incursions numbering in the hundreds which culminated in the attack of October 1962
Correspondence went on for four years and in 1958 a conference was held to sort out the issue. China refused to admit that the watershed marked the frontier and that Tunjun-la pass had for centuries been the traditional border.
After the failure of the 1958 talks, the Foreign Secretary Subimal Dutt wrote: “Each side has put forward its arguments in favour of its case. The Chinese are contesting our arguments and we are, of course, contesting theirs. The only positive suggestion made by the Chinese is that there should be a joint local enquiry.”
But India refused when it discovered that was just a pretext for China to find out the exact location of the place. They thought that Barahoti (they call it Wuje) was north of Tunjun-la. It seems a joke; unfortunately, the Chinese intrusions still continue today.
More than 60 years later, the case of Barahoti shows that for the Chinese, there is no big or small issue, every inch is a victory, and the second lesson is that there is no short cut to building a proper infrastructure.
And India should not hesitate to send drones to the area if and when required.

For a few tanks more

The Chinese are not happy!
Last week, they were furious after the announcement of the verdict of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). The International Tribunal in The Hague had given its ruling on a reference by the Philippines over the South China Sea (SCS): China has no historic ‘rights’ over the natural resources in most of the areas of the SCS; further any right must not exceed what’s permitted by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Now, China is upset again.
This time, it is because the Indian press reported the deployment of T-72 battle tanks in Ladakh.
Quoting official sources, The Tribune, whose correspondent visited Ladakh, spoke of a possibility for China and Pakistan to launch a collusive two-front war against India: “In the past four-five years, ground troops have been added to pre-positioned locations along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), or the de facto border, that is not marked on the ground.”
Since the past 36 months, ground forces and artillery guns have been backed by T-72 Russian-origin tanks and another tank unit is slated to move to Eastern Ladakh facing China: “This adds a new dimension to any future war in the area that is marked by an average height of 14,000 feet, where oxygen is scarce,” says The Tribune.
According to The Daily Excelsior published from Jammu, for the Indian Army “the move is part of the winter drill to validate the capability of the tanks at such heights and is not an inimical move against China.”
Colonel Vijay Dalal, Commanding Officer of the tank regiment explained: “What we have done is that we have procured special additives and lubricants for high altitude terrain such as winter grade diesel and additives for the lubrication system, which prevents it from freezing in the tank.''
The Colonel added: “While the tanks and crew have acclimatised, they have not been able to test their fire power in the heights here due to lack of firing ranges. There is a need to verify their firing capacity at higher altitudes.”
The Global Times objected to this move: “Deploying tanks on Indo-China border hinders potential for Chinese investment.”
How can protecting the Indian borders ‘hinder’ Chinese investments?
Are the Chinese doing India a favour by investing?
The Global Times links the deployment of the Indian forces on the border to Chinese business investments in India: “A media report stating that nearly 100 Indian tanks have been positioned near the Indo-China border to counter any possible threat grabbed people's attention as more Chinese firms are looking to increase their investment in India.”
Then it quotes statistics of the China’s Ministry of Commerce: “Chinese outbound investment [in India] increased by 58.7 percent in the first half of the year, as the country [India] has sought to further integrate itself into the world economy.”
Probably referring to the announcement by Delhi of a new foreign direct investment (FDI) policy, opening up several sectors, including defense, to 100 per cent equity, The People's Daily says: “the Modi administration has recently promoted a second round of reforms to attract more overseas investment by allowing foreign firms to increase their shareholding in local enterprises.” It however adds that “it is puzzling that while deploying tanks near China's border, India still strives to woo Chinese investment.”
What have the tanks to do with the investment policy?
You may call this ‘logic with Chinese characteristics’, especially at a time China is behaving badly and illegally the South China Sea.
Though it sounded like a threat, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Lu Kang was more courteous; Lu just said: “There have been a series of significant agreements and consensus reached between China and India on upholding stability of the border area. …The two countries should abide by relevant agreements and consensus, work in concert to maintain peace and tranquillity of the border area and create a favourable environment for improving bilateral mutual trust and bolstering the proper settlement of the boundary question.” He further pointed out: “The China-India border area has long been peaceful and stable.”
To come back to The Global Times article, it paternalistically explains: “In an index on the ease of doing business, from the World Bank, India currently ranks 130 out of 189. Despite India's stated goal to rise to within the top 100 this year, the nation has its work cut out for them.”
In other words, it tells Delhi, ‘forget about your borders, make business easier for us’.
What is amazing is that China has developed its dual-use infrastructure on the Tibetan plateau at a very rapid pace during the last few decades, but now it objects to India occupying its own territory and taking necessary measures to defend its borders.
Further, China recently raised the level of the Tibet Military Command's (TMC) authority. China Military Online admitted: “China continues to strengthen its military presence in the autonomous region and aims to allow the military command to shoulder more combat assignments. …The TMC's political rank will be elevated to one level higher than its counterpart provincial-level military commands, and will come under the leadership of the PLA Army.” It added that the promotion marks a "new journey for the Tibet military command's construction."
Zhao Zhong, deputy director of the Political Work Department of the TMC told the PLA website: “The elevation of the authority level is not only an improvement for the troops' designation, but also an expansion of their function and mission.”
Song Zhongping, a Beijing-based military expert, told The Global Times that the TMC “bears great responsibility to prepare for possible conflicts between China and India, and currently it is difficult [for the TMC] to secure all the military resources they need.”
So why make so much fuss for a few Indian tanks at a time when China moved its 15th Airborne Corps to Tibet?
The Global Times’ conclusion is that deploying tanks near the Indo-China border “may hit a nerve within the Chinese business community, causing investors to weigh the threat of political instability when they make investment decisions.”
According to the same principle, Delhi should stop doing business with China because Beijing has illegally (according to the La Hague Tribunal) occupied most of the South China Sea, where it has built mega infrastructures, even on ‘rocks’?
This is one more example of Chinese double standards.
But Delhi has probably touched a raw nerve.
After the announcement of the verdict of the PCA, a PLA commentator wrote: “The great rejuvenation of Chinese nation is an unstoppable historical trend that won't be diverted by the will of any individual country or person.”
A rejuvenated China is bound to bully its neighbours and economic partners.
India has to take all measures to counter the Chinese tactics, investment or no investment.

Roads to the Border?

My article Roads to the Border appeared in The Statesman

Here is the link...

Is the Indian Government slowly waking up from its slumber?
It seems so, but it is wise to not celebrate too early.
Union Road and Transport Minister Nitin Gadkari announced that his government was “hopeful of completing by next April the construction of highways through Uttarakhand for Kailash-Mansarovar to make it easy for people to visit the abode of Lord Shiva. “
The Minister told PTI: “Kailash-Mansarovar is the identity of our rich ancient culture and heritage. …We are cutting rocks through Himalayas to make a new alignment of highways through Uttarakhand for going to Mansarovar.”
Though this sudden interest in India’s borders is welcome, it is not clear if the minister is aware that ‘Shiva’s abode’ is not located in India, but in China; Mr Gadkari claimed: "We can reach Mansarovar directly through Uttarakhand,” it is not certain that Beijing, in its present mood, will agree to receive hordes of Indian pilgrims.
Though it did not receive the same publicity than the Lipulekh road, the Jammu & Kashmir government last month ‘approved’ the construction of the 150 km long Chushul-Demchok road. It was a positive move, though the proposal has now been sent to National Board for Wildlife for clearance!
And as usual in India, ‘final clearance’ may take years …and the construction decades.
In 2013, Thuptsan Chhewang, the MP for Ladakh, had advised Delhi: “If we say Ladakh is our territory then why anyone who wants to go beyond Pangong, has to get permission from New Delhi.” He had suggested that Demchok, the border village with Tibet, should be opened for tourists: “That would make our claim strong and help in the development of border areas.”
It would certainly go a long way to improve the lives of the local population.
But has Delhi the guts and foresight …and simply the time, to look into the issue?
The Echo of India, being a daily publication from Siliguri, understands better the reality of the border issue. In an editorial, it points out: “Chinese troops making occasional incursions into Arunachal Pradesh and then going back on their own is not something new. Each time such an incursion took place, whether under the UPA rule or under the NDA rule, the official explanation of New Delhi was that it was a matter of ‘perception’ of the line of actual control and where exactly it lies.”
Early this month, ‘transgressions’ happened again in the Kameng district of Arunachal and one minister stated that it was not so serious: after being involved in a ‘hand-to-hand fight’ with Indian soldiers, some 250 Chinese troops distributed chocolates. The Government seems satisfy with the chocolates distribution.
The Daily concludes: “New Delhi must spell out its policy clearly: whether it wants to avoid a military confrontation with China anyhow, or whether it intends to defend the territorial integrity of the country, come what may. A policy of appeasement will only tempt China to be bolder and more aggressive.”
To solve the problem, there is one solution: to build proper infrastructure to the border.
During a visit in Uttarakhand, Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh declared that all-out efforts should be made to ensure prosperity in the State by “creating employment opportunities for the local youth so that the growing ‘forced migration’ from the resource-crunched state could be checked.”
Singh also spoke of the mountain region’s sensitivity as a border state: in other words, build road, provide telecom facilities, open schools and hospitals.
It is what Nehru had understood and planned to do in the early 1950s.
Unfortunately nothing happened during the following decades.
One can only hope that it will be different this time, but it is not obvious.
For example, it was recently announced that some 73 roads in border areas are ‘way behind schedule’.
While the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has recently approved 27 new roads to the border (at an estimated cost of Rs 1,937 crore for a length of 805 km), the Ministry of Defence has given its ‘operational clearance’ for 55 roads.
According to The Deccan Herald (DH), both the home and defence ministries are finding it tough “to complete the roads already approved by the government following the recommendations of the China Study Group under the Prime Minister’s Office, which identified 73 such roads.”
The Border Roads Organisation was asked to build 61 of the 73 roads with a total length of 3,417 km; they were to be completed by 2012, but the completion schedule has now been pushed back to 2020: “The roads to be constructed are located in high altitude areas between 9,000 to 14,000 feet. Oxygen depletion limits working capacity of labourers. Other constraints are air support, hard rock, natural calamities and limited working season,” says the document accessed by the DH.
What is making India’s situation more critical is that on the other side of the Himalayan slopes, a deluge of Chinese tourists are arriving. Last year, more than 20 million visited the Tibetan Autonomous Region.
According to Lhasa’s Tourism Bureau, this year Lhasa received 176,100 tourists during the May Day holiday (April 30-May 2).
Bayi, located north of the Indian border of Arunachal Pradesh, received more than 174,000 tourists from January to March in 2016, up by 53 percent. Incidentally, Bayi (or ‘8-1’) means that the area belongs to the People’s Liberation Army whose anniversary falls on 8-1 or August 1.
At the same time, Western Tibet (opposite Ladakh) has seen a five-fold increase in visitors over a year.
In order to welcome millions of tourists, Beijing develops at a fast pace the infrastructure on the plateau.
The Economist recently wrote: “A COLOSSAL roller-coaster is how a senior engineer described it. He was talking about the railway that China plans to build from the lowlands of the south-west, across some of the world’s most forbidding terrain, into Tibet.”
Xinhua also mentions the importance of Chinese ‘tourism’ to defend the borders with India; about National Highway 219, known in India as ‘the Aksai Chin road’ it speaks of a ‘heavenly road bringing the high life to Tibetan Plateau’.
Xinhua remarks: “It is the melon season in neighboring Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, fresh fruit is stacked up at the roadside, waiting to be ferried through the Kunlun Mountains and up to the plateau along the Xinjiang-Tibet Highway.”
This road has not only linked the two most strategic (and restive) provinces of China (Tibet and Xinjiang) but also helped to tremendously cut the cost of the PLA ‘defending the Indian border’.
According to the Chinese news agency: “With a safe, modern highway, transportation costs from Yecheng [in Xinjiang] to Ngari [in Tibet] have fallen by 55 percent, leading to cuts of about 40 percent in the price of commodities in the Tibetan town. Better yet, the number of tourists in Ngari has surged five-fold.”
In other words, China’s ‘Indian front’ will get its supplies faster and cheaper.
Border infrastructure is particularly important at a time when China has undertaken deep military reforms; one of the most important is that the two fronts facing India (in Ladakh and Arunachal), have been merged into one Western Theater Command (formerly Lanzhou and Chengdu Military Regions), greatly improving the management of the borders with India.
But all this does not deter the Indian Government from its archaic policies: an antiquated ‘Inner Line Permit’ dating from the Raj still prevails in border areas; will this ever change? It was recently announced that it may change soon, but here again, one has to see it to believe it.

The situation is not gloomy, the borders are safe

Dr Sampuranand was a freedom-fighter and educationist.
Born on 1 January 1891 at Benaras, he participated in the Non-cooperation Movement and edited Maryada, a Hindi monthly with Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya.
In 1922, he was elected to the All-India Congress Committee, and later became provincial Minister for Education in the Uttar Pradesh cabinet and then Minister in the Union Government from 1951 to 1954.
He held several portfolios such as education, finance, and home labour; from April 1962 to April 1967, he was Governor of Rajasthan.
On October 28, 1951, hardly a month after the first Chinese troops entered Lhasa, the Tibetan capital, Dr Sampuranand sent a letter to the Prime Minister from Lucknow. It was marked ‘Secret’.
Reading this letter, one realizes that several prominent politicians were aware of the Chinese threat on the Northern borders of India.
What the Government  has done for the last 65 years on such warnings is another matter.
Here is the letter from Dr Sampuranand.

My dear Jawaharlalji,
I am writing this personal letter to you because this seems to me to be the only way to unburden myself of what has recently become one of my principal worries. Of course, you know all about the events on our Indo-Tibetan border, but my study of what is happening in that region makes me feel that the question has not received that serious attention which it deserves. I do not mean to suggest that anyone across the border is intending to engage in aggressive activities against India in the near future, but history shows that negligence shown in the matter of what appears to be trifling at the moment may lead to disastrous consequences in times of trouble.
I am basing my observations on the reports received from time to time from the local authorities and on the verbal report of the Inspector General of Police who has been on an extensive tour in that region. The Chinese have reduced prices considerably, so much so that rice in that comparatively inaccessible area is selling at a cheaper rate than obtains in the rice- producing areas in the plains. The prices of sugar and other necessaries have also been brought down. We have no roads leading upto the border. The State P.W.D. has prepared an estimate for 2.5 crores, which is taking its leisurely course among the files of some department of the Government of India. On the other hand, the Tibetan side of the border line has evidently fairly good roads and good barracks have been provided for the Chinese troops and the Tibetans whom they are training in modern methods of war. They are also apparently raising some kind of a local militia. Here the Government of India have not thought it necessary to post a single soldier and, in any case, there are no buildings where soldiers could stay if they were posted there. Among other reasons, the utter absence of barracks has prevented the U.P. Government from posting any unit of the P.A.C. which, as you know, can efficiently do part of the work which might otherwise have to be entrusted to the Army. My own feeling is that, in such cases, barracks should be built first and an estimate prepared later. The check-posts, we are maintaining, will have to be broken up very soon because there is no arrangement for shelter or for regular supply of food, fuel and other necessities in that area during the ensuing cold weather. At the most, the men can be kept there for about a fortnight. The local Bhotias also move inland in this season and there will be nothing to prevent the infiltration or Tibetans and Chinese into our territory. I am asking the Inspector-General to see if he can recruit some local men for the police but it is difficult to be quite sure of the loyalty of these men. Racial, linguistic and religious ties will probably make them lean towards the men on the other side; their loyalty to India cannot but be of a most tenuous nature. I might also point out that we are short or wireless sets; the Chinese, on the other hand, seem to be very well equipped in this respect. The Government of India have not yet agreed to our request for wireless sets. Probably, this question is also under consideration by somebody somewhere.
Some Tibetans, it is said under the inspiration of their Chinese mentors, are believed to say that Tibetan suzerainty extends over that part of the U.P. which reaches upto Moradabad. The claim is, of course, fantastic and is not being put forward from any responsible quarter. But we have to remember that such fantastic claims have elsewhere led to international wars in recent years. Anything can provide the spring-board for people who are spoiling for a fight. There is also the curious convention which allows Tibetan officials to collect certain taxes within Indian territory. The amount involved is very small, but the principle involved is very dangerous. Even if the practice is put an end to now, its memory may be revived some day as a proof of the shadowy sovereignty exercised by the Tibetan over certain territory in the U.P.
It may be that I am exaggerating the importance of these little things, but it seems to me that it will do us no harm to take all necessary precautions; a strategic road, good winter barracks for soldiers, a small military outpost and a few well equipped police check-posts will amply repay the expenditure involved.
Yours sincerely,
Sampurnanand.

On October 31, 1951, the Prime Minister replied  that it was no “need take a too gloomy a view of the situation.”
The first ‘official’ Chinese incursions occurred in Barahoti in June 1954.
India was not ready; nothing had been done to correct the issues raised by Dr Sampuranand.
This will continue during the following years/decades.
Here is Nehru's answer:

My dear Sampurnanand,
Thank you for your letter of October 28th.
We have not been entirely negligent about our Tibetan border. Full enquiries have been made by air and on land and we are considering reports of these enquiries. Some steps have already been taken on the lines of the recommendations made.
While I agree with you that all necessary steps, within our resources, should be taken as soon as possible, I do not think that we need take a too gloomy view of the situation.
I am a little surprised to learn that prices of rice and sugar etc., have been brought down considerably. Could you send me some further information on this subject?
Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

Nearly 8 years later, on September 8, 1959, Dr Sampuranand wrote again to the Prime Minister from Lucknow.

My dear Jawaharlalji,
There is a very important matter about which I wanted to speak to you, but as we were very busy, it was not possible for me to do so. People in the State, particularly those living near the Indo-Tibetan border, are greatly disturbed by news of Chinese infiltration in Indian territory. The matter has been raised in the Legislature also.
Today's papers carry the news of the Chinese having entered a part of Punjab somewhere on the Lahaul side. This may or may not be correct; even if it is a rumour, it is enough to add to the already existing alarm. It is felt that the strength of our police on the border is not sufficient and that, in any case, there is nothing to prevent infiltration during the winter months when the police retires from its forward positions. You might remember that some time ago, you had yourself suggested that all-the-year-round police arrangements should be made in that area and we had been asked to prepare a scheme for that purpose. We did so and received the assurance that it would be sanctioned in its entirety. I do not know what has happened to it as I have not heard anything about it for the last several months.
The idea was roughly this: It may not be possible for the police to remain in the winter season in places which it occupies in other parts of the year as the area is swept by snow and blizzards and remains completely cut off for weeks together, but a little further back a line of check-posts can be maintained. This area also is not particularly attractive from the point of view of the weather - there are heavy snow-falls-but with proper arrangements it can be held. Expenditure will have to be incurred, however, on putting up buildings and making such arrangements as will ensure a steady flow of supplies during the worst weather. That scheme was to cost about 50 lakhs. We had prepared it on the assumption that, if it was sanctioned, it would come into operation next year. But if it is felt that, in the conditions obtaining at present, this area has to be policed at all costs to prevent possible infiltration, it might be possible to do something in the few weeks remaining till winter actually sets in. It requires your immediate attention. I do not know which department of the Government, External Affairs, Defence, Home or Finance is studying the matter. But I thought the best thing would be to write to you personally.
I cannot say, of course, what the Chinese intend to do, but if their idea is to infiltrate and gain footholds in those parts of our territory which they claim to be their own, it seems to me that the winter months would provide the most suitable opportunity, because that is the time when our frontiers remain completely unguarded.
Yours sincerely,
Sampurnanand

On September 9, 1959, Nehru replied to Dr Sampuranand: “I do not think it does anyone any good to be alarmist.”
By that time, the Chinese had already entered in Longju in Subansiri Frontier Division as well as in Ladakh.
Here is Nehru’s response.

My dear Sampuranand,
I have your letter of the 8th September.
Our relations with China are strained and are likely to remain so for some considerable time. You must have seen the White Paper we issued and you would probably see further correspondence in the press soon.
While this is so, and we have to be vigilant, I do not think it does anyone any good to be alarmist. The news appearing in the press is often based on rumour and without foundation. I do not think any Chinese have entered any part of the Punjab, in Lahaul or elsewhere. Nor do I think there is much chance of the Chinese rolling across the U .P. border with Tibet. It may well be, however, that when your police detachment is withdrawn from Hoti, the Chinese will come and sit there as they did once previously.
The scheme to which you refer, that is putting up buildings at a cost of Rs. 50 lakhs, obviously cannot be given effect to, quickly. What is more important, I should imagine, is a good road to these places.
Anyhow I am having this matter looked into.
Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

What is the moral of the story?
It is good to be optimist, but one should always be ready for the worst.

India is soft on Chinese intrusions (cont.)

As the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has done it again in Ladakh, I republished an old post of 2013.
According to PTI, earlier this week, the Chinese troops entered almost 6 kilometer deep inside the Indian territory in the Panggong lake area.
This led to a stand-off between the Indo-Tibetan Border Force (ITBP) and the PLA: “The incident occurred on March 8 when a platoon of at least 11 PLA men led by a colonel-rank officer crossed over the Line of Actual Control at ‘Finger VIII’ Sirjap-I area close to the Pangong lake,” says PTI.
The Chinese soldiers came with four vehicles - two light, one medium and one heavy - from across border post and reached 5.5 km deep inside the Indian territory.
The Indian sources said the Chinese soldiers were soon ‘countered and engaged’ by a patrol of the ITBP.
The confrontation lasted for a few hours “after which the situation got defused and the other side retreated.”
The Chinese intruders were led by a colonel-rank officer and two majors.
Apparently, China has managed to construct a road up to Finger-IV area which also falls under Sirijap area and is five-km deep into the LAC.
When will it stop?
Not soon, considering that Beijing does not even want to exchange maps of the LAC.
 

My September 2013 post
Making a statement in the Parliament on the reported Chinese intrusions in Ladakh, Defence Minister AK Antony asserted that there is "no question of India ceding any part of its territory to China".
The Opposition parties had rightly demanded that the government should clarify some media reports on an official note from the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) which had been submitted to the Prime Minister's Office. 
The NSAB is said to have alleged (though it was denied later) that Indian troops are not being allowed to patrol the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and that 640 sq km of Indian territory has been occupied by China.
Mr. Antony is right in the sense that the LAC, in fact the LACs (there are today one the 'perceived' Indian and one 'perceived'  Chinese LAC) have never been defined or demarcated.
So, where is the Indian territory and where is the Chinese territory?
The Minister has however forgotten to mention that the NSAB Report pointed out that an LAC was agreed by Zhou Enlai in his letter to Nehru on November 8, 1959. 
Have the Chinese changed their views since?
The fact that China refuses to exchange maps of 'their' today's perceptions tends to show that the Chinese perceptions have greatly move since 1959 (and continue to move south-westernwards).
Five years ago, I had interview for Rediff.com, Thupstan Chhewang, then the Member of Parliament for Ladakh, intrusions were already happening. It continues the same way, except for the fact that yesterday's grazers have been replaced by regular Chinese soldiers.

India is soft on Chinese intrusions
Rediff.com
March 27, 2008
In 1995, after years of protests, the people of Ladakh were finally granted a special status with the formation of the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council. This resulted in some degree of autonomy.
From 1995 to 2004, Thupstan Chhewang, 60, was chairman of the council, trying to lead the erstwhile Buddhist kingdom into modernity, without losing its traditional roots. Since 2004, Chhewang represents Ladakh in the Lok Sabha as an independent member.
Claude Arpi met him to find out the progress of education and development in the Himalayan region, and also about the Chinese incursions in the border areas, the state of the environment and the effects of global warming in Ladakh and the relations between the Muslim and Buddhist populations of this most strategic part of Jammu and Kashmir.

There has been a lot of reports of Chinese intrusions in Arunachal Pradesh, are you facing the same problem in Ladakh?

Yes, off and on. Of course, it is much worse in Arunachal. But in Ladakh also we consistently have Chinese incursions; some of them very serious. For example, the Chinese started building a road on the other side of the Pangong Lake on Indian territory. It was only after the construction had started that it came to the notice of the government of India. It has now been stopped and we have constructed a road right up to the border.

There are reports of incidents with speed boats on the Pangong Lake. Where is the LAC (Line of Actual Control) across the lake? How do you determine the line?

Both sides have speed boats to man the border. The lake is about 120 km long, some 40-45 km are with us, the rest with China. It means some 30 percent of the lake is Indian. The lake is very narrow, I am not very sure how the LAC is determined on the lake, but it is close to the shore.

Are the Chinese entering Indian territorial waters?

Once a Chinese patrol chased an Indian party four or five kilometers inside the Indian side of the lake. They captured the crew of the Indian boat, and took them prisoner.

When was it?

It happened some three to four years ago.

I was told that in Arunachal the Chinese send grazers and if the Indian side does not react, they occupy the place. Is the same thing happening in Ladakh?
We have the same problem in Ladakh in places like Chumur and Skagjung which are very rich in pasture and preserved as a winter pasture for the Changpa tribals. There is also a place called Dungti where a motorable bridge was constructed to take cattle and animals for grazing on the other side of Indus which is well within our borders. It was removed because China objected to it. Skagjung is the main pasture where the entire nomad population of the Changthang area comes. The nomads depend on this pasture for their survival. The Chinese used to intrude in winter. In Chumur sector, the Chinese object to grazing our cattle claiming the area is theirs, which is not true.

Why is the government of India not saying anything?

They are very soft. Like in Chumur, the Chinese send their cattle for grazing, though it is very much Indian territory. When they are asked to go away, the Chinese say it is their territory. Our government agencies do nothing. Instead of encouraging nomads from Changthang to go there (it is legitimately our territory), they advise them to stay away. This is the type of situation that we are facing.

Do you mean to say that while the Indian Army is asking Ladakhi nomads not to go, the Chinese are encouraging theirs to go there?

Yes, exactly.

It is the same pattern as in Arunachal.

Yes, it is the same.

Five years ago, you mentioned that you were lobbying to get the border post in Demchok opened which will allow Indian pilgrims to go to Kailash/Mansarovar by road.

A delegation from Ladakh recently met the prime minister, the home minister and the leader of the Opposition to request them to take up the matter with China. During these meetings, we also objected to plans to cede to China any territory under Chinese occupation, places like Aksai Chin or Lingzinthang. We requested the prime minister to allow the Demchok road to be opened for the Kailash Yatra as well as trade and commerce. Some trade is already illegally taking place, but we want it to be legalised. China has already set up a market near Demchok.

When Premier Wen Jiabao came in April 2005, some guidelines to solve the border issue were agreed upon. It stated that uninhabited places could be exchanged. Does it mean that the government is ready to exchange Aksai Chin?

Exactly, but it is not acceptable to us. We cannot accept that just because some parts of Ladakh are uninhabited, they can be given away. There are many places elsewhere which are uninhabited, if the Chinese claim them, are we going to give them away? Ladakh is a large area; just because there is so much vacant land, do you think that we should cede these areas? We don't agree to these guidelines.

In the Ngari region of western Tibet, a lot of Chinese have settled recently. Is it one of the reasons why the Chinese refuse to open the Demchok road?

I don't know, but in any case, why should the Chinese not allow tourists? We are ready to accept whatever control (they would like to put in place). There is the existing LAC, we always abide by this line as the international border. Today, China is opening to trade and international commerce in a big way. Why not Demchok road? If it is opened for tourism, lakhs of people, especially Hindus, will use the road to go on pilgrimage to Kailash. The road can go right to the base of Kailash. The present road (through Uttarkhand) is very tedious. Old people can't go. It will not be the case with Demchok road. Hindus will benefit, but China will also benefit. They will get a lot of revenue from the pilgrims and also earn goodwill.

Why do they refuse?

Earlier there were some reservations from the Indian side, but now India has agreed, the only reservation is from the Chinese side. But I am told that during the last meeting (between the Indian National Security Advisor and his Chinese counterpart) before the visit of Dr Manmohan Singh to Beijing, it was discussed by the two sides in Delhi and the Chinese might be more inclined to accept.

What is the progress on Union territory status for Ladakh?

It will take a long time. It might come only with a solution of the Kashmir issue. We can only try to persuade the government. The present Congress government is not inclined at all to grant UT status to Ladakh.

Can't the people of Ladakh build more pressure?

As you know, the Indian system is based on electoral politics. We have a small population. Only the large states with large populations are heard today. Although Ladakh is a very strategically located area, nobody listens to us because our population is small. But we will not give up, we will continue our efforts.

The rest of the interview is  available on Rediff.com

Chinese Incursions: 60 years ago

The way to Shipki La

Following the recent Chinese incursion in Burtse in Ladakh and the quick ‘answer’ from the Indian forces who dismantled the structure built by the Chinese, it is interesting to look at what happened nearly 60 years ago at Shipki La, the pass between Himachal Pradesh and Tibet.
At that time too, it started with some Chinese incursions.
Soon after the PLA entered for the first time on Indian territory, a Note Verbale was given to the Chinese Charge d’Affaires in India on September 8, 1956. The Note said:

The Government of India have received a report that on the 1st September 1956, a party of about 10 Chinese Army personnel entered and took up position about 2 furlongs [1/2 kilometre] from Hupsong Khad on the Indian side of Shipki La Pass. The Party withdrew after the Officer-in–Charge of the Indian Border Police pointed out to the Captain in command of the Chinese Military Personnel that the Indian territory extends up to the Shipki La Pass.
The crossing of the Shipki La Pass by the Chinese Army Personnel without visaed Passports violates the Sino-Indian Agreement of April 29, 1954, in which the Shipki La Pass has been recognised as the border between India and Tibet region of China at that place. The Government of India presume that the Chinese Army Personnel crossed into Indian territory by mistake and not deliberately.

In fact, the Chinese troops had deliberately crossed the pass and soon after they started claiming areas located a few kilometres, south of Shipki La as Chinese territories.
Let us remember that according the Article IV of the Panchsheel Agreement of 1954 ('Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India'):

Traders and pilgrims of both countries may travel by the following passes and route:
(1) Shipki La pass, (2) Mana pass, (3) Niti pass, (4) Kungri Bingri pass, (5) Darma pass, and (6) Lipu Lekh pass.
The agreement also mentioned the Ladakh route: “the customary route leading to Tashigong along the valley of the Shangatsangpu (Indus) River may continue to be traversed in accordance with custom.

The intrusions meant that for China, passes such as Shipki La were not border passes, but located within China’s territory. Beijing’s interpretation of Article IV was: ‘the passes are only an indication of the route through which traders could enter India”.
Amazing logic!
Let us continue with the story.
On September 24, Delhi had go a step further and send an Aide-Mémoire to China:

Since the handing over of the last informal note to Charge d’ Affaires Fu Hao on the 8th September, the Government of India have received two reports of serious situations that recently developed between the Chinese and Indian border patrols in the region of Shipki La Pass on the Indo-Tibetan border.

It then gives some details about the incidents:

On 10th September, when a party of Indian border Police on its way to the Shipki La Pass sighted a party of Chinese military personnel on the Indian side of the frontier. The Chinese Party was commanded by a Captain and consisted of at least ten persons. The Indian Patrol signalled the Chinese Party to withdraw, but the latter did not do so. Thereupon, on the Indian Patrol trying to advance, the Chinese personnel threw stones at it and threatened to use their grenades.
Towards the evening, the Indian Party approached and held conversations with the Chinese. During this conversation, the Chinese commander intimated that he had ‘received instructions from the Tibetan Government that the border extended up to Hupsang Khad and that Indian Personnel should accordingly not advance beyond Hupsang Khad’.”

Note that, like many other parts of the Indo-Tibetan frontier, the Chinese hid behind so-called earlier Tibetan claims
The note continues:

The Indian Patrol Commander pointed out that the border was in fact situated at the Shipki La Pass and suggested that the Chinese should accordingly withdraw. However, it does not appear that the Chinese troops withdrew, as the following morning (11th September) they were again soon on the ridge above the roadway on the Indian side of the Pass. The Position remained the same on the 12th September.

Delhi reacted, what the Chinese had done was not nice:

The Chinese Government will no doubt agree that in throwing stones and threatening to use hand grenades, the Chinese patrol offered such provocation as could easily have resulted in serious and regrettable incidents. However, a development even more likely to cause an ugly situation was soon to follow.

A worse incident occurred on September 20 (see White Paper No 1)
Delhi was ‘pained and surprised’: "It is not difficult to visualise that the natural and direct result of such attitudes, if continued in, may be one of clash of arms.”
The Indian Government reminded the Chinese of the Panchsheel Agreement: “Shipki La is clearly the border and is acknowledged as such in the Sino-Indian Agreement of 29th April 1954, the Government of India consider any crossing of this border pass by armed personnel as aggression which they will resist."

Nehru was in a dilemma: how to react?
He wrote to the Foreign Secretary: "I agree with [your] suggestion …it would not be desirable for this question to be raised in the Lok Sabha at the present stage."
Nehru decided to keep the matter secret but discretely mention it to the Chinese officials: "I think that if this question is raised in our Parliament at this stage, this might prove embarrassing from the point of view of the negotiations between Burma and China."
The Indians MPs being unpredictable, they may raise a hue and cry, better to keep it secret and eventually ‘speak’ to Beijing.


A Meeting to discuss the issue
A meeting was however held on October 3, 1956 to consider how to handle the Chinese incursion.
It was chaired T.N. Kaul, then Joint Secretary in the MEA. His colleagues Col. P.N. Luthra, Special Officer Frontier Areas and Dr. Gopalachari, the Deputy Director of the Historical Division were in attendance.
So were H.C. Sarin, the Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Defence; he was accompanied by Maj Gen M.S. Wadalia, Chief of General Staff and Brig. K.H. Katoch, Director of Military Operations. The Home Ministry was represented by a Joint Secretary (N. Sahgal) and a Deputy Secretary (Rajkumar).
The Chief Secretary to the Government of Himachal Pradesh and the Inspector General of Police had also come.
Kaul gave a brief account of the events. He said:

The Prime Minister had directed that this was a serious matter and that it was not enough to lodge a protest with the Chinese. He had instructed that specific directions should be given to the Government of Himachal Pradesh to be passed on to the border checkposts and that these checkpost personnel should on no account withdraw from their present position.

The representatives from Himachal Pradesh informed the meeting that the Chinese had withdrawn due to the coming winter season, but they were likely to return in 1957: “it was necessary to formulate a definite line of action to meet eventualities in the spring.”The meeting discussed:

1. the desirability of sending some troops in adequate strength to Namgia and if possible to Shipki La Pass before the pass closes;
2. the question of making arrangements for the next spring so that our border security force are in position in Shipki La Pass before the Chinese come, and
3. the building of certain aluminum huts, cave shelters and other allied matters were then discussed in detail.

The Himachal Pradesh government was in favour of “a permanent police outpost at Namgia [below the pass] and some cave shelters and aluminium huts were constructed as near Shipki La as possible before the next spring.”
The meeting therefore recommended:

• Since the Chinese troops had withdrawn it was not necessary at present to send our troops to this area, but a few Army Officers may be sent to make a reconnaissance right up to Shipki La and suggest ways and means of meeting a possible threat from Chinese troops next spring and draw up plans accordingly.
• A permanent police outpost should be established at Namgia with increased strength.
• Our personnel should be in physical possession of Shipki La pass before the 1st of April next and earlier, if possible. For this purpose, a permanent party, even though of a very small size, should be posted at the pass itself, or, if that is not possible, as close to the pass as possible. Construction of cave shelters and aluminium huts should be taken in hand immediately and these should be ready before March 1957.
• Constant patrolling from Namgia up to the pass should be done from now on as often as possible, weather permitting.
• The Himachal Pradesh representatives raised the question of increase in the strength of the border police and also the issue of rations to them. It was agreed.

And what happened then?
Four days later, on October 10, the Prime Minister sent a note to the Foreign Secretary. It reads:

There is no question of sending any troops to the Shipki La now. In fact, even in the spring next year, I do not envisage the necessity of sending troops. The fate of Shipki La is not going to be decided by fighting or by a large show of force.

Nehru however agreed: “It might be desirable, however, for some Army officers to reconnoiter and see the place at a suitable time now or early next year.”
Just compare with what happened in Burtse in Ladakh, where the Indian forces dismantle the Chinese structure and send them back on their side of the LAC and only then, discussed the issue during 2 flag-meetings (after the Chinese said that nothing had happened) and what happened in Shipkila in 1956.
The moral of the story is that a 'show of force' always helps to prepare 'talks' with Chinese. It may be unfortunate, but it is a fact.
The Indian Army (and their political bosses) seem to have understood the lesson during the past decades.

The Chinese cross again the McMahon Line

The Deccan Chronicle (DC) reported that 'Chinese PLA now targets Taksing zone in Arunachal Pradesh'.
Two years ago, I mentioned on this blog the Chinese intrusions in Chaglagam circle of Anjaw district of Arunachal Pradesh.
This time the incursions occurred in the remote circle of Taksing in Upper Subansiri district.
The DC says: "After the recent Ladakh incursions, frequent intrusions by China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in Arunachal Pradesh’s Taksing region have come to the notice of the security agencies. The villagers of Taksing circle in Upper Subansiri district took photographs of the PLA crossing over the Asa-Pila-Maya Army camps, which were Indian territory till 1962, but now under Chinese occupation."
The report continues: "Security sources also confirmed this incursion had come to their notice about a month back, but the PLA had gone back after a brief stay."
What is more surprising is that the issue was not taken up during a flag meeting held between Indian and Chinese armies at Kibithu in Anjaw district on Diwali Day. According to the DC: "security sources said this particular incursion did not come up for discussion."
The Deccan Chronicle quotes Hiwak Chader, a student from Kacha village of Taksing circle who said the local people noticed "the movement of Chinese troops in the Asa-Pila-Maya area around three months back, but the government was not aware about it before the villagers handed over photos to Army Intelligence and IB sleuths."
Interestingly, the report admits that it is the local Arunachalees who are not only keeping a close watch on Indian territory, but also acting as intelligence officer for the Indian Army and IB.
Chader affirms that it is often the local villagers of Taksing area (Tagin tribe?) who are guarding and defending Indian territory in Taksing circle. The student leader believes that "time has come that government should take a realistic approach to demarcate the land-border with China which was expanding its territory in many areas".
Easier said than done!
The fact is that there is no proper road between Limeking (the adjacent circle) and Taksing. One can only hope that it will be taken on 'war-footing' by the Central and Arunachal authorities.
Incidentally, Taksing was the last Indian village on the Dakpa Sheri (Cristal Mountain) parikrama while Tibetan pilgrims were returning to Tibet. Pilgrims used to perform the sacred Rongkor pilgrimage every twelve years.
I copied here a few paras of my book 1962: the McMahon Line Saga.
My map is not very accurate, Taksing is closer to the international border than shown.
A remarkable book has been written by Maj. S.M. Krishnatry (of the Indian Frontier Administrative Service) about the last pilgrimage in 1956, it is called Border Tagins of Arunachal Pradesh: The Unarmed Expedition of 1956.
Every Indian should read it to understand the difficulty of the terrain and the lack of progress since 1956.

Extracts from my McMahon Line Saga...

The Last Pilgrimage
Between the first wave of Chinese troops arriving in Tibet in 1950, till the next Monkey Year (1956), the time for the next Rongkor, the Chinese had begun occupying most of the strategic axis in Tibet and had come closer to the Indian border, i.e. the McMahon Line.
It has to be noted that at the time, the Tibetans were aware that the Government of India meant business, especially after Major Bob Khathing occupied the Tawang area . Elsewhere also in NEFA, the Indian administration was also pushing towards the Line.
Apparently the 1956 Rongkor and Lodzong [pilgrimage] passes off peacefully with few noticeable incidents.
According to Toni Huber:

the Lhasa government had given a satisfactory tribute payment, made them all swear the oath successfully, and performed the appropriate rituals,”

Huber adds:

However, it is almost certainly the fact that a vigorous decade of Indian administrative contacts had already either broken the spirit of the upper Subansiri tribes or made conditions too inconclusive for them to attempt any aggravation of their northern neighbors and risk a political incident during this increasingly critical period of Tibetan, Indian, and Chinese relations.

As we shall see during the August 1959 incident at Longju, the Indian Army (or Assam Rifles) had already set up posts near the not-yet disputed border.
For the first time, the 1956 Rongkor saw the presence of ‘foreigners’; the Chinese PLA camped in the Mandala Plain of Tsari from where the Pilgrimage starts. But the Chinese kept their participation rather discreet, merely providing medicines for the pilgrims.
Huber however saw their presence differently: “These apparently innocent medical teams are now seen by Tibetans as an important reconnaissance leading up to the Chinese occupation and border claims of 1959, a view not without substance.”
Only three years after the last Pilgrimage, the hostilities started, but with new actors; it was no longer the Tibetans vs. the local tribals of the Upper Subansiri and Tsari Chu, but the Indian and Chinese States.

Intrusions, trangressions and a line of perception

Local herders are always the sufferers

My article Intrusions, trangressions and a line of perception appeared yesterday in the Edit Page of The Pioneer

Here is the link...

No matter how you define it, the fact is that China has become aggressive along the Line of Actual Control. Indian troops and citizens on the border have to be equipped to deal with the challenge

‘There is nothing like that’, said the new Chief of Army Staff, General Dalbir Singh Suhag, when asked if it was true that Chinese troops had entered deep into Indian territory in Burtse sector, near Daulat Beg Oldi in north Ladakh. The media had earlier reported an intrusion by the People’s Liberation Army. Members of Parliament were explained that there was no Chinese ‘intrusion’ in Ladakh. On August 13, in a written reply to a question, Union Minister of State for Home Kiren Rijiju stated: “No intrusion has been reported or taken place on India-China border, including Sikkim, during the last five years, However, there are cases of transgression due to difference of perception of the Line of Actual Control.”
A couple of years ago, the terminology was different; ‘intrusions’ were called ‘perceptional’, now Mr Rijiju describes the Chinese walking around with banners that read ‘this is our territory’, as simple ‘transgressions’. Even if only attributed to a “mere difference in perception of the LAC between the two sides”, the Government of India admits that there has been a total 1,612 such ‘transgressions’ between January 1, 2010 and August 4, 2014. The young Minister also gave the MPs a crash course on the subtleties of both armies’ reckoning: “While ‘intrusion’ would mean that the Chinese troops crossed over to Indian side of the LAC and stayed put, ‘transgression’ implied that they had entered Indian territory only to eventually retreat to the Chinese side.”
Fine, we can adopt the new terminology, though according to Mr Rijiju, 334 cases of ‘transgression’ had taken place this year alone up until August 4, as compared to 411 in the whole of 2013, 426 in 2012, 213 in 2011 and 228 in 2010. It is clear that the number has increased over the years, though the Government has remained silent on Uttarakhand, where the phenomenon regularly occurred (in Barahoti area particularly). Does this practically means that when the Chinese cross the Indian LAC, they just ‘transgress’ it, because according to their own perceptions, they are in China? As a result, do we have two ‘perceptional’ LACs?
This raises another question: Have maps of the different ‘perceptions’ been exchanged? Apparently, the Chinese are reluctant. The question will hopefully be asked by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, when Chinese President Xi Jinping visits New Delhi next month. Mr Modi should insist: “At least, give us maps of ‘your’ LAC”.

1959 Line, today forgotten

This situation is relatively new. In the past, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai provided India a map of Chinese claims. On December 17, 1959, after Jawaharlal Nehru asked that the Ladakh sector be treated separately, Zhou argued: “The Chinese Government is very much perplexed by the fact that Your Excellency [Nehru] put forward a separate proposal for the prevention of clashes in the sector of the border between China and India’s Ladakh.” The Premier added: “There is no reason to treat this sector of the border as a special case. The line up to which each side exercises actual control in this sector is very clear, just as it is in the other sectors of the Sino-Indian border. As a matter of fact, the Chinese map published in 1956, to which Your Excellency referred, correctly shows the traditional boundary between the two countries in this sector.”
Three years before the 1962 border war, Beijing’s positions were clear, while today it refuses to provide a map of its claims (which over the years, have obviously expanded in China’s favour). By keeping the situation unstable on the ground, the PLA can continue to prick the Indian Army as well as the local population in Ladakh.
Gen Suhag’s ‘nothing like that’ remark is certainly not good for the morale of the Ladakhis who have to face Chinese ‘transgressor’ on a daily basis; the best proof of is comes from the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson herself. Ms Hua Chunying delightedly stated: “China today appreciated the Indian Army’s response on recent reports of incursions by the PLA in Ladakh... China has noted relevant reports and the Indian position. The Indian position reflects the objective understanding and rational attitude towards the special situation.” She added that for a long time, the Indian and Chinese “have exercised restraint and have maintained peaceful coexistence.” Well, everything is relative.
But there are other issues which, though not directly related to the position of the LAC, are worrying. The Times of India recently reported: “Forces guarding the Sino-Indian border have for years been suffering lack of optimum technological, infrastructural and logistical support — something available aplenty across the border to Chinese troops.”
The article lists several aberrations such Indian GPS sets showing the Indian soldiers in Chinese territory even when the Indian troops are well within their border. Why? Because the Indo-Tibetan Border Police uses US satellite data which does not reflect Indian ‘perceptions’. On the Arunachal border, the situation is often worse as Indian troops have to walk for days without proper all-weather shoes and suitable tents, to reach the LAC. Can the Modi sarkar change this?
Another issue is the recurrent harassment of local herders and villagers by ITBT personnel who regularly stop them on one pretext or another. It is said to be one of the main reasons for migration towards Leh, Itanagar and Delhi.  In an interview to Rediff.com, Mr Rijiju had rightly pointed out: “If we manage to strengthen our forces along the border, I’m sure that it can take care of the local fear. But if we are unable to provide basic necessities to the people living the border areas, then definitely people will run away. [Today], people need basic amenities; if these basic facilities such education, health, roads, communication services, drinking water supply are not made available, people will migrate. These basic facilities should be available to those areas; if we don’t do it, someday the whole border area will be without any civilian population.”
An extreme case occurred in the Pin valley of Spiti in Himachal Pradesh where residents stated that they were not adverse to seeking help from China, if the State and Union Governments did not do something for the area. Apparently, a flood in June 2012 had damaged a bridge which connects several villages of Pin valley. Even after two years, nothing has been done by the Governments to fix it. The president of Sagnam panchayat, Mr Lobsang Tandup, (who since then has been arrested for sedition) had raised the slogan ‘Chalo China’. He told the Press: “If our Government has nothing to do with the pain and problems of its citizens, then we will not be averse in seeking help from China.”
This may be an aberration, but it reflects the unease of the local population against what they perceive as neglect by India. This should be changed on a war-footing. Let us hope that Delhi will go beyond rhetoric and start acting.

A good chess player takes the initiative?

The Hindustan Times reported today: “On June 24, four Chinese high-speed interceptor boats were spotted moving from Sirijap I posts around 8.25 am to Sirijap VIII, VI and V detachments on northern banks of the [Panggong] lake. Twenty minutes later, Indian troops on the four American - made boats moved from Thukang base and intercepted Chinese vessels. The two sides first were locked in a face-off and then conducted a so-called banner drill to remind the other side of the Line.”
Is this lake-intrusion related to the visit of Deng Xiaogang to Ngari and General Wang Jianping’s (see yesterday’s posting) to Lhasa?
Deng, the Tibetan Autonomous Region's security tsar has been touring border areas of Western Tibet for days and weeks accompanied by Maj. Gen. Gao Wanhai, the Commander of the Public Security Bureau at the Border Defence General Headquarters.
On June 24, when the intrusion occurred, Deng was in Ali, the capital of Gar Country of Ngari Prefecture. A few days earlier, he was in Rutok, in the vicinity of the Lake.
Just a coincidence?
According to South Block sources, on June 24, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) boats came 5.5 kilometres into the Indian territorial waters on the Pangong Lake (tso).
Some parts of the lake are under Chinese control in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR), while others are under Ladakh (J&K State).
The incursion lasted over two hours, involving four high-speed Chinese interceptor boats that were pushed back by Indian troops, wit their US-built interceptor vessels.
The Hindustan Times says that the picturesque lake, 134 km long and at a height of 4,350 metres above sea level, has seen 12 face-offs between Indian and Chinese troops this year alone: “In 2013, there were no less than 18 face-offs between Indian and Chinese troops in Panggong Tso due to serious difference in perception on the LAC and also due to massive Chinese infrastructure build-up close to the line,” a government official told the Indian newspaper.

Sirijap area on the Panggong tso

Moreover, let us not forget that General Wang Jianping, the Commander of the People’s Armed Police (PAPF) visited Lhasa on June 26.
He inspected the TAR’s People’s Armed Police training base, a Traffic police detachment, Tibet’s Forest Armed Police Corps, the 117 Police Division, a detachment of Ngari Police.
According to The Tibet Daily, he wanted to get a detailed understanding of the situation.
For the purpose, he called on officers and men of the People’s Armed Police.
The Chinese newspapers reported that Wang Jianping acknowledged the success achieved by the Armed Police's Tibet Corps and the Armed Police Forces in every work and asked all the armed police officers and men to understand the serious and complicated situation that they are facing at present. He told them to strengthen the police force for war preparation and continue the good job of building up (the police forces).
He said a good chess player takes the initiative.
He asked the Force to ensure the completion of every task, giving first priority to the tasks that need to be dealt with urgently, providing a strong support for Tibet’s continuous stability, long term stability and comprehensive stability.
‘Stability’ has been the motto of each and every leader coming to Tibet in the recent months.
While on the Potala Palace Square, Wang Jianping “cordially greeted and expressed sympathy to the officers and men on duty, encouraged everybody to stand guard for the Party and the people and to be on alert.”
Walking to the Potala Palace Square’s Police Station, Wang Jianping said that the police should understand in detail the work [in Tibet]; for example, the duty of the Police Station, the range of service, the promotion the urban grid management.
The Police has to strongly protect the stability of vast areas, protect people of every ethnic minority, as well as Chinese tourists and visitors from abroad. Wang spoke of the important measures taken by the Tibet Communist Party’s Standing Committee and the TAR government’s to implement the Central Government’s policies for governing Tibet.
He mentioned the unprecedented measures to strengthen [the Party] and the innovative social management introduced. He spoke of the "effective steps which promote China’s administrative system and the modernization of the administrative capability as well as the need to seriously gain experience to continuously improve the quality of [police] work in order to become a strong pillar for Tibet’s developmental breakthrough and long term peace and stability.”
Behind this Communist jargon, published by The Tibet Daily, lies the firm resolve to control Tibet (and particularly the TAR) in an always firmer hand.
This is not good omen for Tibet; the Middle Path promoted by the Tibetans in exile seems far, far away.
It remains to be seen if the visit of General Wang and Deng Xiaogang’s tour of the border areas in Western Tibet, is linked to the new aggressiveness on the Panggong tso. It is probably the case in view of the high lever delegation accompanying Deng Xiaogang in Ngari.
A few pictures of Panggong tso from the Tibet's side: