The Case of Shipki la

After looking at the ‘dispute’ in Chuva-Chuje area, I shall continue eastward and study the case of Shipki la (pass), also in Himachal Pradesh.

This is another tenuous claim from China, with no historical, cartographical or geographical backup. Presently it is a dormant claim, but with Beijing in the mood to claim Tajikistan’s Pamir Region and Vladivostok (and Ladakh), it is worth looking into the facts.

The First Incursion

The first Chinese incursions inside India’s northern border, in Barahoti in June 1954; took place hardly two months after the signature of the Agreement on Tibet. I shall come back to it in a later post.
In a way, Barahoti could be explained by the fact that Indian negotiators omitted to insist on Tunjun-la as a pass notified in the 1954 Tibet Agreement. This gave an opportunity to the Chinese to claim an area south of the border pass.

But what happened two years later, cannot be justified under the same principle. It was plain violation of the Indian territory, without any justifications.

The Chinese claim the territory between the blue and red lines

1956: Chinese Intrusion South of Shipki-la
On September 8, 1956, India had to deliver a note verbale to the Chinese Charge d’Affaires in India; one week earlier, some Chinese troops had trespassed in an area south of a pass notified in Article IV of the 1954 Agreement.
The note verbale read thus: “The Government of India have received a report that on the 1st September 1956, a party of about 10 Chinese Army personnel entered and took up position about 2 furlongs  from Hupsang Khad   on the Indian side of Shipki-la pass. The Party withdrew after the Officer-in–Charge of the Indian Border Police pointed out to the captain-in-command of the Chinese military personnel that the Indian territory extends up to the Shipki-la pass.”
This is one of the first notes published by the Ministry of External Affairs in the Volume 1 of the Notes, Memoranda and letters Exchanged and Agreements signed between The Governments of India and China 1954 –1959 (known as the White Papers), the first ones being about Barahoti.
It was observed: “The crossing of the Shipki-la pass by the Chinese Army personnel without visas and passports violates the Sino-Indian Agreement of April 29, 1954, in which the Shipki-la pass has been recognised as the border between India and Tibet region of China at that place.”
There was of course no question of ‘visas’ as the Chinese had deliberately crossed into Indian territory, though Delhi still hoped for a mistake: “[we] presume that the Chinese Army personnel crossed into Indian territory by mistake and not deliberately.”
The note concluded by requesting Beijing “to issue strict instructions to the authorities concerned that no unauthorised persons should cross into Indian territory in this manner in future, as otherwise there is danger of breach of peace.”

Delhi was still living in a dream world; it wanted action be taken against the offenders and to be ‘informed of the action taken’.

More Reports of the Border Incident
Two weeks later, this time it was an aide-mémoire which was given to the Chinese embassy in Delhi. It stated that since the handing over of the note to Fu Hao, the Chinese Chargé d’ Affaires, Delhi had received two more reports about the serious situation that had developed “between the Chinese and Indian border patrols in the region of Shipki-la Pass on the Indo-Tibetan border.”
The first incident occurred on September 10, “a party of Indian border Police on its way to the Shipki-la pass sighted a party of Chinese military personnel on the Indian side of the frontier,” the report stated before continuing: “The Chinese Party was commanded by a captain and consisted of at least ten persons. The Indian Patrol signalled the Chinese Party to withdraw, but the latter did not do so. Thereupon, on the Indian patrol trying to advance, the Chinese personnel threw stones at it and threatened to use their grenades.”
In the evening, the Indian Party approached the Chinese and discussed with them. According to the aide-mémoire, during the encounter, the Chinese commander said that he had “received instructions from the Tibetan Government that the border extended up to Hupsang Khad and that Indian personnel should accordingly not advance beyond Hupsang Khad.”
The Indian Commander argued that the border was at the Shipki-la pass; he further suggested that the Chinese should accordingly withdraw.
However, the Chinese troops refused to listen, “as the following morning, they were again soon on the ridge above the roadway on the Indian side of the pass.” The standoff continued the next day.
The Ministry’s aide-mémoire told the Chinese Government “[you] will no doubt agree that in throwing stones and threatening to use hand grenades, the Chinese patrol offered such provocation as could easily have resulted in serious and regrettable incidents.”
An even more serious development “likely to cause an ugly situation” soon followed, said the mémoire.
It described the facts thus: “on September 20 at 4:45 am, a party of 27 Indians Border Security Force came face to face with a party of 20 Chinese soldiers and officers two miles on the Indian side of the Shipki-la pass. The Indian Commanding Officer asked the Chinese Officer to withdraw his troops.”
The Chinese captain said that he had received no communication from his Government, but he added that his instructions were clear, “namely to patrol right up to Hupsang Khad, and in carrying these out he was prepared to face the consequences. He concluded that if the Indian Party went beyond Hupsang Khad he would oppose it with arms.”
The Indian Ministry stated that it was pained and surprised at the conduct of the Chinese Commanding Officer, adding: “It is not difficult to visualise that the natural and direct result of such attitudes, if continued in, may be one of clash of arms.”

The Border Agreed in 1954
Delhi reiterated that the pass was clearly the border, as acknowledged in the Sino-Indian Agreement of April 1954: “the Government of India consider any crossing of this border pass by armed personnel as aggression which they will resist.”
Beijing was told that India had ordered the Border Security Police Force “not to take any action for the present in repulsing this aggression and to await instructions which they hope the Central People’s Government will issue immediately.”
The State Force was however instructed that on no account they should withdraw from their position or permit Chinese personnel to go “beyond where they are even if this involves a clash”.
Delhi requested immediate action from China: “Otherwise there might be an unfortunate clash on our border which will have undesirable results.”
The situation had become hot.

The Prime Minister on the Chinese Incursions
Once Nehru realized that the Chinese had entered Indian territory, his attitude changed. On September 21, 1956, the Prime Minister wrote to the Foreign Secretary: “This is a serious matter and we cannot accept this position.”
The Prime Minister instructed his officials: “We should, of course, protest in emphatic language both to the Chinese Embassy here and to the Chinese Government through our Ambassador in Peking.”
Moreover, he thought that was not quite enough: “The question arises as to what directions we should give to the Himachal Pradesh Government which they can pass on to their police force at the border. From the telephone account it appears that our party consists of 27 persons of the Border Security Police and the Chinese party consists of 20 officers and men. Thus, the numbers on both sides are small and there is a slight advantage on our side.”
He ordered the Indian troops that: “on no account [they should] withdraw from their present position, which appears to be between the Shipki-la pass and Hupsang Khad.”
The Prime Minister’s stand was rather firm: “They must remain there even at the cost of conflict. For the present, they should not force their way beyond this place, as this would presumably mean a conflict with the Chinese. But it must be made clear that they must remain where they are and if the Chinese advance further, they should be checked.”
India considered the crossing of the Shipki-la without permission as improper and an aggression. He asserted that the Chinese should go back: “We would not permit them to go any further and if they did not go back, we would have to take further steps in the matter. We are not doing so immediately because the matter has been referred to Delhi and Peking and because of our friendly relations we should like to avoid a clash. But if there is any further aggression, a clash is inevitable.”
The Prime Minister suggested that Himachal Pradesh Government should immediately send more troops or the Border Security Police to the pass.
He also mentioned that in the Indian protest to the Chinese Embassy, it should be stated that “in view of the fact that Shipki-la is clearly the border and is acknowledged as such even in our agreement with China, we consider any crossing of armed forces without our permission as aggression and we have to resist it.”
He added: “…we attach great importance to this matter and request immediate action by the Chinese Government. Otherwise there might be an unfortunate clash on our border which will have undesirable results.”
The orders were “on no account to retire from their position or to permit the Chinese forces to go beyond where they are, even if this involves a clash”.
Delhi had started realizing that the good days of eternal friendship with China were over; darker clouds were gathering.

A Meeting at the Ministry of External Affairs
On October 3, 1956, a meeting of representatives of Ministries of External Affairs, Defence and Home, and the Himachal Pradesh Government, was held in Delhi to consider the Chinese activities on the Indo-Tibetan border (mainly in Himachal Pradesh).
TN Kaul, who chaired, gave an account of the recent events in the Shipki-la area; he pointed out that during previous weeks the Chinese had transgressed into Indian territory on three occasions. He informed the participants about the notes handed over to the Chinese Embassy in Delhi on September 8 and 22, while the matter had also been taken up by the Indian embassy with the Chinese Foreign Office in Beijing.
Kaul reiterated the Prime Minister’s concerns; it was a serious issue and it was not enough to lodge a protest with the Chinese: “He had instructed that specific directions should be given to the Government of Himachal Pradesh to be passed on to the border checkposts and that these checkpost personnel should on no account withdraw from their present position.”
The meeting was told that Nehru had decided to let the Chinese know that “any further aggression into Indian territory would lead to unhappy results.”
Kaul noted that this meeting was called “to make specific recommendations to meet the present situation and future eventualities.”
However, according to the representatives from the Himachal Pradesh government, the Chinese had already withdrawn from the posts and they were not likely to return to this area during the present season.
The information was confirmed by SK Roy, the SOFA; Roy had been touring in Western Tibet and he had just crossed back into India via Shipki-la. For the State government, the issue was not immediate, but it was necessary to formulate “a definite line of action to meet eventualities in the spring.”

The Recommendations
The meeting made four recommendations:

1. Since the Chinese troops had withdrawn it was not necessary at present to send our troops to this area, but a few Army officers may be sent to make a reconnaissance right up to Shipki-la and suggest ways and means of meeting a possible threat from Chinese troops next spring and draw up plans accordingly.
2. A permanent police outpost should be established at Namgia village with an increased strength.
3. India’s border personnel should be in physical possession of Shipki-la pass before the April 1 next and earlier, if possible. For this purpose, a permanent party, even though of a very small size, should be posted at the pass itself, or, if not possible, as close to the pass as possible. Construction of cave shelters and aluminum huts should be taken up immediately and these should be ready before March 1957.
4. Constant patrolling from Namgia up to the pass should be done from now on as often as possible, weather permitting.

It was also felt that since Chinese were likely to trespass into the Indian territory in other areas, therefore reconnaissance “should be made of all the disputed areas by Army personnel who should make specific recommendation about the places, as close to the frontier as possible, where border police posts could be established.”
These resolutions had little chance to be implemented in view of the apathy of the Indian bureaucracy.

Another Note from the Prime Minister
On October 8, 1956, the Prime Minister sent another note to the Foreign Secretary: “There is no question of sending any troops to the Shipki-la now,” Nehru wrote “even in the spring next year, I do not envisage the necessity of sending troops. The fate of Shipki-la is not going to be decided by fighting or by a large show of force.”
He however agreed that it was desirable, “for some Army officers to reconnoitre and see the place at a suitable time now or early next year.”
He concluded: “The main thing to do is to have a Police outpost there and that our personnel should be in physical possession of the Shipki-la when the snows melt. Also, it is desirable for us to investigate the other passes.”

One problem faced by India from the first years of Independence was, who should be responsible for the border areas. It was eventually delegated to the Ministry of Home Affairs, which unfortunately had neither the capacity nor the training to defend the borders …and lacked the strategic vision to do so.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Traditional and Customary Basis of the Indian Alignment in the Middle Sector
The Report of the Officials of India and China of 1961 is the best source to understand the different contentions.
In the Report, the Indian stand is described thus: “…The boundary throughout lies along the main watershed in the region between the Spiti River and the Pare chu (river), between the tributaries of the Sutlej and between the Ganges and the Sutlej basins. In this sector the Chinese alignment are conformed for the most part to the traditional Indian alignment. Only in four areas did it diverge from the watershed to include certain pockets of Indian territory in China-the Spiti are (Chuva and Chuje), Shipki pass, the Nilang-Jadhang area (Sang an Tsungsha) and Barahoti (Wu-je), Sangchamalla and Lapthal. In this sector, therefore, it would be sufficient to prove the traditional and customary basis of the Indian alignment in these four areas.”
Regarding Shipki La (pass), it was noted that it part of the Zanskar range, a well-defined watershed frontier, forms the boundary between Tibet and India on which the Shipki la is located: “The Shipki pass had been the traditional and customary boundary between the States of Bashahr (now part of the Himachal Pradesh State of India) and Guge which was incorporated in Tibet in 1720. This fact that Shipki Pass was always a part of Bashahr has been attested by travellers.
In 1821, Alexander Gerard visited the area. He stated in this Account of Koonawar in the Himalaya, London 1841:
"October 12, Marched to Shipki, nine miles. The road ascended a little, and then there was a steep descent into the bed of the Oopsung. Here the rocks were more rugged than any we had yet seen: they were rent in every direction, piled upon one another in wild disorder, in a most extraordinary manner not to be described, overhanging the path and threatening destruction to the traveller. From the Oopsung the road was a tiresome and rocky ascent, to the pass which separates Koonawur from the Chinese dominions, 13,518 feet above the level of the sea."
Oopsung is Hupsang Khud, and Gerard stated that the boundary lay at Shipki Pass, at the top of Hupsang Khud.
He later confirmed: “This is the line of separation between Busahir and Chinese Tartary, and there could scarcely be a better-defined natural boundary. …From hence to Shipki was two and a quarter miles, by an excellent road upon the hill slope at an angle of 15°, on gravel and frangible red granite, like a good turnpike-road."
Twenty years later Dr Ch Gutzlaff, a corresponding member of the Royal Geographical Society, visited Shipki area, and gave a report of his journey to the Royal Geographical Society, in February 1849, he confirmed the location of the border. Other travelers who visited later said the same thing; the pass is the border.
The Report observed: “The Indian side then brought forward, and supplied photostats of, some unofficial maps published in various countries to show that the traditional boundary in this sector lay along Shipki pass.”
All this evidence showed that the traditional and customary alignment in this area lay where Indian maps were now showing it.
As mentioned earlier, the main principle for delineating a border is the terrain, and first and foremost the watershed; in which case, the top of a pass is the best way to have an agreed border.

China did not agree to this basic principle.

The Namgia Village on the way to the pass

Treaty Basis of the Indian Boundary Alignment
The Report of the Officials explains further: “The traditional boundary from Shipki pass to the tri-junction of India, Nepal and Tibet was also confirmed in the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between India and the Tibet Region of China signed in April 1954 (also known as Panchsheel Agreement); Article IV stated: "Traders and pilgrims of both countries may travel by the following passes. (1) Shipki La Pass, (2) Mana Pass, (3 Niti Pass, (4) Kungribingri Pass, (5) Darma Pass and (6) Lipu Lekh Pass."
Geographically the Zanskar Range formed the watershed between the eastern and western tributaries of the Sutlej; and the other five passes in the Central Sector lie on the watershed dividing the Sutlej and Ganges basins.
In the original Chinese draft presented on 1 March 1954, Article IV read: “The Chinese Government agrees to open the following mountain passes in the Ari (Ngari) District of the Tibet Region of China for entry by traders and pilgrims of both parties.”
Tibetan traders crossing Shipki la entered India and vice-versa, Indian traders or pilgrims walked into Tibet, on the other side of the pass.
It was also the route used by decades by the Indian Trade Agen in Gartok. It had never been objected by the Tibetans who agreed on the principle.

In 1960, the Indian conclusion was: “The Indian side brought forward clear and conclusive evidence to show that the alignment as shown by them in the Middle Sector had, throughout its length, a traditional and customary basis reaching back through many centuries, and that, in addition, this boundary had been recognised by Chinese Government and been confirmed through diplomatic exchanges, treaties and agreements. The Chinese side had now claimed certain areas south of the watershed boundary - the Spiti "area, Shipki Pass, the Nilang-Jadhang area and Barahoti, Sangchamalla and Lapthal. They were, however, unable either to bring forward any real documentary evidence to substantiate these claims, or to refute the evidence brought forward by the Indian side.”

The Shipki Pass
The Chinese claim to the Shipki Pass area was sustained by only one evidence and even “this solitary item of evidence was found to be irrelevant,” said the Indian Report.
The Chinese claimed that the people of Shipki village had constantly used the pastures west of the Shipki Pass and that these areas belonged to them: “But no proof of such ownership had been brought forward. Even proof of use of these pastures had not been provided, although mere use of pastures, even if the assertion be true, could prove nothing. For the route from India through Shipki La to Tibet was one of the main routes in this area, and as sheep were used in this part as pack animals, people of both countries used the pastures besides the route. ln fact, Indian citizens used the pastures lying between Shipki La and Shipki village, and even beyond.”
It has to be pointed out that sending yaks to graze, cannot be the proof of ownership, as often in the Himalaya lease or other agreements existed between villagers/herders from both side of the border.

Evidence of Indian Administration and Jurisdiction of the Areas claimed by China
In the next section, the Officials studied the ‘administrative’ evidence for Shipki la; the Shipki Pass was part of the village of Namgia, a small village in the Chini Tehsil of Bashahr State (now Himachal Pradesh). The village is, situated above Nako in the upper Kunawar valley; Namgia village has regularly been assessed for land revenue which included forest and grazing dues to the Bashahr authorities. Assessments for land revenue in the area were made at the Settlements of 1853, 1854, 1856, 1859, 1876 and 1894 (shown in the Bashahr State Gazetteer in 1910): “Old records of the erstwhile Rampur (Bashahr State) show that the Tibetans recognised that the frontier lays at Shipki-la. In fact, Shipki villagers migrated from Namgia and were at that time subjects of Bashahr State. That it was well-known that Indian administration extended upto the Shipki Pass is shown by the saying common in Tibet, Pimala Yanchhod Bod-Gialbo, Pimala Ranchhod Khuno Gialbo:  "The territory above Pimala belongs to the Raja of Tibet and below to the Raja of Bashahr."
‘Pima-la’ in Tibetan means "common pass".
The area was surveyed during 1882, 1897, and 1904-1905. Very detailed surveys were carried out in 1917 and 1920-1921.
Another evidence was that the famous Hindustan-Tibet Road had been constructed and maintained by the Public Works Department of the Government of India, till the top of the pass; Tibet never objected.
Regarding the Middle Sector, the Indian Officials affirmed that they “brought forward a large amount of representative evidence, relating to different aspects of administration, to show that Indian governments had exercised full, continuous and uninterrupted control over all the areas right upto the traditional alignment. The Chinese side were unable to disprove the conclusive nature of this evidence. As for the material submitted by them with regard to the areas south of the watershed now claimed by them, the Indian side established that they constituted no proof of administration having ever extended to these areas.”
The final word was that the Indian officials “had shown conclusively that Indian administration had throughout extended right upto the Shipki Pass, across which lay the traditional and customary boundary between India and Tibet.”

The Chinese Refused to Agree
As usual, the Chinese officials denied every piece of Indian evidence: “The boundary in the middle sector has also not been formally delimited by any treaty. As to the treaty basis of this sector of the boundary, the Indian side has submitted few new evidences, and its arguments had for the most part been put forward in the past and refuted by the Chinese side. No matter how the Indian side has defended its own stand, it can in no way change this basic fact, that is, as in the case of the western sector, the Indian side cannot advance any treaty basis whatever which could prove that the middle sector of the boundary has been formally delimited.”
But denying an evidence does not create an evidence.
 
The LAC Claim
In the 1980s, like for Chuva and Chuje, the LAC depicted by the Chinese maps has conceded “the entire territory claimed by India except in the Barahoti area as lying within India’s actual control. In the Barahoti area administrative and army personnel of the two sides are not being permitted,” wrote SN Gopalkrishnan, Senior Research Officer of the Historical Division in August 1980.

It does not mean that Beijing has dropped the territorial claim over the area south of Shipki la.

The Namgia village

To conclude, I am posting some questions raised by India and China in 1960 during the Meetings of the Officials

Chinese Questions for the Shipki la area (with Indian Answers)
It has to be noted that while the Indian Officials were forthcoming by details and coordinates, it was not the case with their Chinese counterpart who often did not answer the questions.

Q 4: The Indian side stated that their alignment crossed the Siang-chuan (Sutlej) river at its bend. What were the co-ordinates of the crossing? What were the geographical features followed by the Indian alignment from Peak Leo Pargial to Shipki Pass?

A: The Indian alignment crossed the Sutlej at approximately Long 78° 44' E and 32° 52' N. From Peak Leo Pargial, the alignment descended along a spur, crossed the Sutlej and again mounted the spur on the opposite bank of the river to the Shipki Pass.

Q 5: Were there other passes along the Indian alignment from Shipki Pass to Thaga Pass besides Raniso and Shimdang Passes mentioned by the Indian side?

A: Between Shipki Pass and Thaga Pass, apart from the Ramso and the Shimdang Passes mentioned earlier, the Khimokul (Gumrang) Pass (Long. 78° 49' E and Lat. 31° 26'N) also lay on the boundary.

Indian Questions for the Shipki la area (with the Chinese Answers)

Q 17: Would the Chinese side give the co-ordinates of the point at which the alignment crossed the Sutlej river? It was said to be west of Shipki Pass. How for west of Shipki Pass?

A: At a place (there was a small river called the Hupsand Khud there) about 6 to 7 kilometres west of Shipki Pass, the boundary crossed the Siangchuan River. North-east of this point the boundary passed through Peak 6791 (approximately) 78° 45'E. Long, 31° 54'N. Lat.)

Q 18: The Chinese side stated that the alignment crossed the Sutlej at a place 6 to 7 kilometers west of Shipki Pass. The Indian side would like to have the co-ordinates of this point.

A: No Answer

Q 19: The Chinese side stated that west of Shipki there was a small river called the Hupsand Khud. Did the alignment cross the Sutlej west or east of the junction of the Sutlej with the Hupsang Khud?

A: No Answer

Q 20:
The Chinese side stated that north-east of the crossing of the Sutlej the alignment passed through Peak 6791. The Indian side would like to have the heights of other peaks and a description of the natural features followed by the alignment in this segment.

A: No Answer

Q 21: The description given by the Chinese side stated that after the crossing of the Sutlej river the alignment continued southward along the watershed. The Indian side would like to have details of heights of peaks and names of passes on this watershed, as well as the co-ordinates of these points.

A: South of this point, the boundary passed through Peak 5642 (approximately .78°50'E. Long. 31°37 N. Lat.).

Q 22: The Chinese side stated that south of the Sutlej, crossing the alignment passed through peak 5642. The Indian side would like to have the heights of other peaks and a description of the natural features in this segment.

A: From Height 6791, the alignment ran along a spur in a southerly direction, and crossed the junction of the Siangchuan river and the Hupsang Khud river. It then ran along the ridge passing through Height 5642 and Gumrang Pass (approximately 78° 49'E. Long., 31°25' N. Lat).

Q 24: The Indian side would like to have the co-ordinates of Shipki and Puling Sumdo which were marked on the map

A: Shipki was a village in China Puling Sumdo was located at approximately 79° 08' E. Long. 31° 18' N. Lat.)

Mr Wang, Reopen Demchok

In my previous post, I mentioned the railway lines which will soon reach Purang/Taklakot, north of Pithoragarh district of Uttarakhand and Yatung in the Chumbi Valley, sandwiched between Sikkim and Bhutan.
In this connection, The China Daily published a couple of days ago, an intriguing article entitled Tibet envisioned as hub of Himalayas.
What does it mean?
Is China unilaterally planning to open/reopen the Himalayan passes which were closed in 1962, without informing India?
Today, only three passes have been reopened for trade: Shipki-la in Himachal Pradesh, Lipulekh-la in Uttarakhand, and Nathu-la in Sikkim.
According to The China Daily: “Tibet could become the cultural, economic and humanitarian hub of the Himalayas and so build a peaceful, cooperative relationship with its South Asian neighbors.”
It conveniently quotes some ‘experts’ who attended the Sixth International Forum on Tibetan Studies in Beijing.
Note that it has never been difficult for Beijing to find ‘experts’.
The article explains:

Sandwiched between the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, Tibet plays a significant role in connecting both initiatives, making it an ideal place for cultures to meet.

This surprising statement comes at a time when not only the Chinese ‘transgress’ into Indian territory in Chamoli district of Uttarakhand, but also adamantly refuse to reopen the main traditional route leading to the Kailash-Manasarovar, namely the Demchok-Tashigang route between Ladakh and Tibet.
Blissfully ignorant ‘experts’ like Lai Shanglong, chief economic commissioner of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs affirms:

With its beautiful thangka (Buddhist-themed paintings on cloth) and unique clothing, Tibetan culture is very attractive in the Himalayan region. Its influence can radiate through mountains and connect with other South Asian countries.

The Buddhist culture did not wait for Mr Lai to radiate in the Indian side of the Himalaya.
Mr Lai should visit the Tawang monastery, village gompas in Ladakh, Spiti or Kinnaur? Or Sikkim and Bhutan. He will realize the Buddhist culture flourishes on the Southern slopes of the Himalaya too.
The China Daily article remarks that in June [2015], “China opened a new land route along Himalayan Nathu La Pass for Indian pilgrims to visit the holy sites of Mount Kailash and Lake Manasarovar in Tibet, considered sacred by Hindus and Buddhists. The initiative was universally hailed.”
It may have been universally hailed in China, but not in India: the Nathu-la route is several times longer than the traditional route in Ladakh (via Demchok).
Why are the Chinese so quiet about the demand from the people in Ladakh to reopen the old caravan road?
It is a mystery.
After all, for centuries it has been the main (and the easiest) route to the Holy Mountain.
One of the reasons could be the proximity of the National Highway 219, infamously known as the Aksai Chin road, cutting across the Indian territory in Northern Ladakh.
Mr Lai, with his poor knowledge of the region, amazingly argues:

if China expanded its humanitarian aid projects in Tibet to other South Asian countries - providing practical services such as teaching, repairing buildings and medical treatment - that initiative would also earn praise. …This would strengthen goodwill toward China in South Asian communities, improve China's image and increase support from neighboring countries.

He does not mention Demchok nor Shipki-la or Mana-la (Uttarakhand) routes?
Let us not forget that when the government of Himachal Pradesh appealed to Delhi to make Shipki-la one of the routes to the Kailash, it was immediately blocked by China.
Liu Zhifu, director of the South Asia Research Institute at Xizang Minzu University told the Beijing Forum that “trade routes have facilitated economic and cultural interaction for centuries”.
It is true, but just look at the map of the scheme One Belt One Road.
One notices that China is ready to open new routes or corridors, but only with its friends (Pakistan, i.e. the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and Nepal in Zham and Kyirong).
Liu Zhifu added that the Belt and Road Initiative “is breathing new life into Purang (trijunction Tibet-Nepal-India), Kyirong, Zham and other ports.”
This 'new life' will only help accelerate the process of the integration of Nepal in the Middle Kingdom.
Di Fangyao, executive deputy director of the Institute commented: “It's high time that Tibet increase its exports of locally produced goods”; he complained that the trade market in Yatung opens only for only six months “before the harsh winter sets in”.
It is perhaps true, but China is not sincere in its approach.
It should first reopen Demchok.
Let us hope that Ms Swaraj will ask her Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, when he visits Delhi Next week: why are you so adamant to let the people and goods flow again over the Himalaya. Let the devotees wanting to visit the abode of Lord Shiva use the easiest road: Demchok or Shipki-la.
Pilgrims and traders, instead of using a long and tortuous route, could take the Ladakh or Shipki-la routes as it was done for centuries.
Incidentally, China still claims Demchok as theirs.
It would be interesting to refer the case of Demchok to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA).
What right does have Beijing to claim Demchok?
None!
For centuries it has been part of the kingdom of Ladakh and remains so after the Himalayan region was integrated  into the Dogra State during the 19th century.
China was nowhere to be seen.
Like in the South China Sea and other places at the periphery of the Middle Kingdom, it is an invented claim without historical basis.
Is it this that Beijing does not want to admit?
Otherwise, why this double speak?

Chinese Incursions: 60 years ago

The way to Shipki La

Following the recent Chinese incursion in Burtse in Ladakh and the quick ‘answer’ from the Indian forces who dismantled the structure built by the Chinese, it is interesting to look at what happened nearly 60 years ago at Shipki La, the pass between Himachal Pradesh and Tibet.
At that time too, it started with some Chinese incursions.
Soon after the PLA entered for the first time on Indian territory, a Note Verbale was given to the Chinese Charge d’Affaires in India on September 8, 1956. The Note said:

The Government of India have received a report that on the 1st September 1956, a party of about 10 Chinese Army personnel entered and took up position about 2 furlongs [1/2 kilometre] from Hupsong Khad on the Indian side of Shipki La Pass. The Party withdrew after the Officer-in–Charge of the Indian Border Police pointed out to the Captain in command of the Chinese Military Personnel that the Indian territory extends up to the Shipki La Pass.
The crossing of the Shipki La Pass by the Chinese Army Personnel without visaed Passports violates the Sino-Indian Agreement of April 29, 1954, in which the Shipki La Pass has been recognised as the border between India and Tibet region of China at that place. The Government of India presume that the Chinese Army Personnel crossed into Indian territory by mistake and not deliberately.

In fact, the Chinese troops had deliberately crossed the pass and soon after they started claiming areas located a few kilometres, south of Shipki La as Chinese territories.
Let us remember that according the Article IV of the Panchsheel Agreement of 1954 ('Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India'):

Traders and pilgrims of both countries may travel by the following passes and route:
(1) Shipki La pass, (2) Mana pass, (3) Niti pass, (4) Kungri Bingri pass, (5) Darma pass, and (6) Lipu Lekh pass.
The agreement also mentioned the Ladakh route: “the customary route leading to Tashigong along the valley of the Shangatsangpu (Indus) River may continue to be traversed in accordance with custom.

The intrusions meant that for China, passes such as Shipki La were not border passes, but located within China’s territory. Beijing’s interpretation of Article IV was: ‘the passes are only an indication of the route through which traders could enter India”.
Amazing logic!
Let us continue with the story.
On September 24, Delhi had go a step further and send an Aide-Mémoire to China:

Since the handing over of the last informal note to Charge d’ Affaires Fu Hao on the 8th September, the Government of India have received two reports of serious situations that recently developed between the Chinese and Indian border patrols in the region of Shipki La Pass on the Indo-Tibetan border.

It then gives some details about the incidents:

On 10th September, when a party of Indian border Police on its way to the Shipki La Pass sighted a party of Chinese military personnel on the Indian side of the frontier. The Chinese Party was commanded by a Captain and consisted of at least ten persons. The Indian Patrol signalled the Chinese Party to withdraw, but the latter did not do so. Thereupon, on the Indian Patrol trying to advance, the Chinese personnel threw stones at it and threatened to use their grenades.
Towards the evening, the Indian Party approached and held conversations with the Chinese. During this conversation, the Chinese commander intimated that he had ‘received instructions from the Tibetan Government that the border extended up to Hupsang Khad and that Indian Personnel should accordingly not advance beyond Hupsang Khad’.”

Note that, like many other parts of the Indo-Tibetan frontier, the Chinese hid behind so-called earlier Tibetan claims
The note continues:

The Indian Patrol Commander pointed out that the border was in fact situated at the Shipki La Pass and suggested that the Chinese should accordingly withdraw. However, it does not appear that the Chinese troops withdrew, as the following morning (11th September) they were again soon on the ridge above the roadway on the Indian side of the Pass. The Position remained the same on the 12th September.

Delhi reacted, what the Chinese had done was not nice:

The Chinese Government will no doubt agree that in throwing stones and threatening to use hand grenades, the Chinese patrol offered such provocation as could easily have resulted in serious and regrettable incidents. However, a development even more likely to cause an ugly situation was soon to follow.

A worse incident occurred on September 20 (see White Paper No 1)
Delhi was ‘pained and surprised’: "It is not difficult to visualise that the natural and direct result of such attitudes, if continued in, may be one of clash of arms.”
The Indian Government reminded the Chinese of the Panchsheel Agreement: “Shipki La is clearly the border and is acknowledged as such in the Sino-Indian Agreement of 29th April 1954, the Government of India consider any crossing of this border pass by armed personnel as aggression which they will resist."

Nehru was in a dilemma: how to react?
He wrote to the Foreign Secretary: "I agree with [your] suggestion …it would not be desirable for this question to be raised in the Lok Sabha at the present stage."
Nehru decided to keep the matter secret but discretely mention it to the Chinese officials: "I think that if this question is raised in our Parliament at this stage, this might prove embarrassing from the point of view of the negotiations between Burma and China."
The Indians MPs being unpredictable, they may raise a hue and cry, better to keep it secret and eventually ‘speak’ to Beijing.


A Meeting to discuss the issue
A meeting was however held on October 3, 1956 to consider how to handle the Chinese incursion.
It was chaired T.N. Kaul, then Joint Secretary in the MEA. His colleagues Col. P.N. Luthra, Special Officer Frontier Areas and Dr. Gopalachari, the Deputy Director of the Historical Division were in attendance.
So were H.C. Sarin, the Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Defence; he was accompanied by Maj Gen M.S. Wadalia, Chief of General Staff and Brig. K.H. Katoch, Director of Military Operations. The Home Ministry was represented by a Joint Secretary (N. Sahgal) and a Deputy Secretary (Rajkumar).
The Chief Secretary to the Government of Himachal Pradesh and the Inspector General of Police had also come.
Kaul gave a brief account of the events. He said:

The Prime Minister had directed that this was a serious matter and that it was not enough to lodge a protest with the Chinese. He had instructed that specific directions should be given to the Government of Himachal Pradesh to be passed on to the border checkposts and that these checkpost personnel should on no account withdraw from their present position.

The representatives from Himachal Pradesh informed the meeting that the Chinese had withdrawn due to the coming winter season, but they were likely to return in 1957: “it was necessary to formulate a definite line of action to meet eventualities in the spring.”The meeting discussed:

1. the desirability of sending some troops in adequate strength to Namgia and if possible to Shipki La Pass before the pass closes;
2. the question of making arrangements for the next spring so that our border security force are in position in Shipki La Pass before the Chinese come, and
3. the building of certain aluminum huts, cave shelters and other allied matters were then discussed in detail.

The Himachal Pradesh government was in favour of “a permanent police outpost at Namgia [below the pass] and some cave shelters and aluminium huts were constructed as near Shipki La as possible before the next spring.”
The meeting therefore recommended:

• Since the Chinese troops had withdrawn it was not necessary at present to send our troops to this area, but a few Army Officers may be sent to make a reconnaissance right up to Shipki La and suggest ways and means of meeting a possible threat from Chinese troops next spring and draw up plans accordingly.
• A permanent police outpost should be established at Namgia with increased strength.
• Our personnel should be in physical possession of Shipki La pass before the 1st of April next and earlier, if possible. For this purpose, a permanent party, even though of a very small size, should be posted at the pass itself, or, if that is not possible, as close to the pass as possible. Construction of cave shelters and aluminium huts should be taken in hand immediately and these should be ready before March 1957.
• Constant patrolling from Namgia up to the pass should be done from now on as often as possible, weather permitting.
• The Himachal Pradesh representatives raised the question of increase in the strength of the border police and also the issue of rations to them. It was agreed.

And what happened then?
Four days later, on October 10, the Prime Minister sent a note to the Foreign Secretary. It reads:

There is no question of sending any troops to the Shipki La now. In fact, even in the spring next year, I do not envisage the necessity of sending troops. The fate of Shipki La is not going to be decided by fighting or by a large show of force.

Nehru however agreed: “It might be desirable, however, for some Army officers to reconnoiter and see the place at a suitable time now or early next year.”
Just compare with what happened in Burtse in Ladakh, where the Indian forces dismantle the Chinese structure and send them back on their side of the LAC and only then, discussed the issue during 2 flag-meetings (after the Chinese said that nothing had happened) and what happened in Shipkila in 1956.
The moral of the story is that a 'show of force' always helps to prepare 'talks' with Chinese. It may be unfortunate, but it is a fact.
The Indian Army (and their political bosses) seem to have understood the lesson during the past decades.

Confusing our frenemy with a genuine friend

The top Communist leadership in Tibet visited India in July 2006
to 'inaugurate' the Nathu-la border post
Beijing is again betting on Nathu-la

My article Confusing our frenemy with a genuine friend appeared on Thursday in the Edit page of The Pioneer.


Here is the link...

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s plans to open the Nathu la route for the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra is hardly a goodwill gesture. It offers few benefits to Indian pilgrims and only furthers Beijing’s expansionist plans

New Delhi is getting ready to receive Chinese President Xi Jinping on his maiden trip to India. It will, no doubt, be a significant visit, especially after Prime Minister Narendra Modi journeyed to Japan and met with old friend Shinzo Abe. Many looked at the Tokyo trip as a preparation for the Chinese President’s Delhi visit. The Global Times even threatened that India was getting close to Japan “at its own peril”. But ultimately, both India and China, keeping their own interests in mind, will probably find a consensus on economic and other issues, while some confidence building measures may be taken by the two neighbours.
The Press Trust of India has already reported about a ‘political gesture’ from Beijing. It said that the Chinese President may announce the opening of a new route, via Nathu la in Sikkim, for Indian pilgrims to go on the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra. The question is: Will this be a boon or a bane for India? According to PTI, the proposal has been under serious consideration in Beijing since Mr Modi, during his first meeting with President Xi in Brazil in July, asked Beijing to propose an alternative to the Lipulekh pass (in Pittoragarh district of Uttarakhand) for the yatra. Either Demchok in Ladakh or Shipki-la in Himachal Pradesh was expected to be the new port. It made sense in terms of access and comfort.
The present Ministry of External Affairs’ yatra through the Lipulekh-Purang route, also one of the traditional trade routes to Tibet, is often damaged by floods and subsequently the pilgrimage has to be canceled. Depending on the weather, every year the scheme accommodates a maximum of 1,000 pilgrims in 18 batches (selected through a lottery system); the pilgrimage involves a 22-day arduous journey. It appears that the Chinese have now decided to open Nathu la border point in Sikkim. PTI says: “The new route, though longer, takes pilgrims from Nathu La to Shigatse… [and] from there the pilgrims could comfortably travel to Mansarovar and Kailash using well laid out highway.”
It is obviously Beijing’s rationale, not New Delhi’s interest, though PTI adds: “It would be part of the big gesture of friendship not only to strike chord with Mr Modi but also the people at large, specially the Hindus and Buddhists considering its religious importance.” But is it a gesture of friendship or a decision driven by self-interest?
The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has announced that lodging and boarding facilities for pilgrims have been improved with new hotels and additional beds with additional investments; Beijing further asserts: “Indians pilgrimage to Tibet is an important content of bilateral relations.” There is no doubt that China is interested in Sikkim (and Nathu-la), though despite the great hopes generated in 2006, when Nathu la was opened to petty trade between Yatung and Gangtok, business has been stagnating (partly due to the restricted list of items allowed to be traded).
More recently, on the occasion of the opening of the new railway sector Lhasa-Shigatse, Mr Yang Yulin, deputy director of Tibet’s railway office, announced that during the 13th Five Year Plan (2016 to 2020), the construction of a railway connecting Shigatse with Kyirong in northern Nepal and with Yatung, in the Chumbi Valley (near Nathu la) will start. Kyirong is obviously the logical extension of the line as China has extensively invested in this landport to make it the main link between Tibet and Kathmandu, (and economically invade Nepal). But why Yatung, near the Nathu la pass? Has Beijing consulted New Delhi on this or is it a unilateral decision? China is now going a step further. It is ready to let the yatris use Nathu la, as a second port of entry into Tibet.
A few months ago, Mr Wang Chunhuan, a professor at the Tibetan Academy of Social Sciences in Lhasa told The Global Times that the railway network in Tibet will play the role of a continental bridge in South Asia and promote economic and cultural exchanges with the subcontinent. For China, the Yatung-Nathu la-Gangtok route could become a trade gate to South Asia. But why should pilgrims take this extremely long route to visit the holy sites of western Tibet? One has just to look at a map to see it does not make much sense.
But there is more to the new railway development; the train has indeed another purpose. Beijing hopes that it will boost President Xi’s pet project, the New Silk Road, which he is bound to bring on the table with Mr Modi.
In September 2013 already, during a visit to Kazakhstan, the Chinese President spoke of the New Silk Road. A month later, during the Association of South East Asian Nations meet, he added a 21st century Maritime Silk Road plan. For Beijing, there are various ideological and economic reasons for re-opening these terrestrial and maritime routes. According to Xinhua, President Xi’s proposal of ‘one belt and one road’ brought “a new connotation for the old Silk Road, and new vibrancy for the cooperation among pan-Asia, Asia and Europe.” Beijing believes that the new strategy will help reproduce the spirit of the old route while promoting economic cooperation, cultural exchanges and friendly relationships. It may not be fully true, though it will certainly boost China’s energy prospects in Central Asia.
In New Delhi, Mr Xi is bound to play on India’s cultural fibre: Ages ago, Buddhism transited through this route. But while Beijing speaks of a link between the New Silk Road and South Asia, the Chinese leadership has systematically refused to re-open the old Tibet trade routes, such as Demchok in Ladakh, Kibithoo and Tuting in Arunachal Pradesh and the Mana pass in Uttarakhand. During Mr Modi’s recent visit to Jammu & Kashmir, the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council presented a memorandum to him, requesting the re-opening of the Demchok road as an alternative route to the Kailash  Mansarovar: “Demchok in Ladakh provides the easiest and the safest access to Kailash Mansarovar. From here, pilgrims can approach the holy mountain and the sacred lake in two days. This would also give the much needed fillip to the local economy.”
But it appears that Beijing has once again vetoed the project. Why then try to entice India into a New Silk Road project, when all the passes to Tibet and Xinjiang (the main traditional pass was the Karakoram pass, near the disputed Depsang plains) remain closed?
The logical step should be to progressively re-open the Himalayan passes to trade and human exchanges (and, why not to tourism?). Once the Himalayan belt has recovered its vitality, India may think of participating in projects such as the New Silk Road. For the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra, opening Shipki-la (already opened for petty trade) or Demchok will be a much shorter route and the pilgrims will travel in far greater comfort.

News Passes to open for CBMs with China

Colombo Conference Map (1963)
The 6 passes named in the 1954 Agreement are shown

The Indian media recently reported that some major steps were taken by India and China to prevent border skirmishes.
Apparently concrete steps were agreed after an Indian delegation headed by the Joint Secretary (East Asia) visited Beijing earlier this week.
A few days before,  Lieutenant General Qi Jianguo, the Chinese deputy chief of general staff (Operations) headed a PLA delegation to India, where he met his Indian counterpart, the Director General of Military Operations (DGMO).
New CBMs were agreed during the visit.

Last October already, when the Indian Prime Minister went to Beijing, India and China signed a Border Defence Cooperation Agreement to avoid dangerous face-offs along the LAC between the troops of the two countries. It included mechanisms to maintain peace and tranquility along the 'actual' boundary.
At the DGMO level, new CBMs have now been added.
The Indian DGMO will be connected to his Chinese counterpart through a hotline in order to tackle immediate, 'hot' issues and resolve 'misunderstands' at an early stage, before the situation could escalate into a serious conflict.
Further, it was decided to have four new locations for flag meetings in Ladakh - Track Junction, Panggong Tso (lake), Demchock and Chumur.
In recent month, these places have witnessed several intrusions/incursions by Chinese troops, leading to an increased tension on the 4,000-km long LAC.

During the Joint-Secretary level in Beijing, the number of locations for scheduled annual meetings between senior field officers, called Border Personnel Meetings, was increased from two to four.
Kibithoo in Anjaw district of Arunachal Pradesh and Mana Pass in Uttarakhand are the 2 new locations.
Earlier Nathu-la in Sikkim and Bum-la in Arunachal (Tawang district) were the only meeting points.
During these Border Personnel Meetings, the troops of both countries meet at least four times a year to mark the national days of their respective countries and celebrate other national festivals; on these occasions, Indian and Chinese soldiers play games together (volley-ball, tug-of-war, for example) and socialize. The Chinese troops are said to be very fond of Gold Flakes cigarettes.
All this does not stop India to strengthen its defences in Ladakh.
Since lats year's stand-off in Depsang, India has moved an additional infantry brigade of 3,000 troops into Ladakh to secure the Sub-Sector North, which includes the Depsang plains. India has also, for the first time, moved a regiment of tanks to support the existing deployment.
What is interesting is that are  very few places along the LAC where these Border Personnel Meetings can take place.
A location needs to be deserved by a proper road (from both sides) and the border pass or location should not be 'disputed', which is not the case of Demchok or Shipki-la, where China claims areas which have never been hers (or even part of Tibet) in the past.
Historically, India was fooled by China in 1953-54, when the (in)famous Panchsheel was negotiated.
I am posting here, the Indian version of the facts.
The Chinese version is different.
By designating 6 passes in the Middle Sector, P.N. Kaul (another Nehru's blue-eyed Kashmiri Pandit), thought he was cleverly 'fixing' the border.
It was not so, said the Chinese; it is merely 6 passes through which traders or pilgrims of both countries can transit.
The Indian delegation was surprised by this interpretation, but the Chinese reiterated their position again and again.
Though they were right the 1954 Agreement was not about fixing borders, but designating trade 'routes', they shamelessly fooled the Indians who could have used the occasion to bring the border issue on the negotiating table. It was not done; the Indian diplomacy was too enamoured of the lofty Principles.
Soon after the signature of the 1954 Agreement, Shipki-la, one of the designated pass, was claimed by China. It is still so today.
The case of Demchok too, was not taken seriously by T.N. Kaul, though for centuries, DEmchok had been the first village in Ladakh for the Tibetan traders and pilgrims traveling from Western Tibet (Tashigang village was the last village in Tibet).
Now, China says that Demchok is Chinese.
Once again, a sad tale of poor Indian diplomacy.


Extracts from the Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the Peoples’ Republic of China on the Boundary Question  (1961)

...On none of these occasions did the Tibetan Government object to the alignment as described, and shown on maps, by the Indian Government.
So they all constituted formal acceptances of the Indian alignment.
On 21 August 1950, the Foreign Minister of China handed a note to the Indian Ambassador in which it was stated, among other things that the Chinese Government "is happy to hear the desire of the Government of India to stabilise the Chinese Indian border". This assumed that the boundary was well-known and recognised by both sides, because only such a fixed boundary can be stabilised. The Government of India made this even clearer in their reply, handed to the Foreign Minister of China by the Indian Ambassador on 24 August 1950. For there the Government of India stated clearly "that the recognised boundary between India and Tibet should remain inviolate."
The traditional boundary from Shipki pass to the tri-junction of India, Nepal and Tibet was also confirmed in the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between India and the Tibet Region of China signed in April 1954 Article IV of the Agreement stated:

"Traders and pilgrims of both countries may travel by the following passes. (1) Shipki La Pass, (2) Mana Pass, (3 Niti Pass, (4) Kungribingri Pass, (5) Darma Pass and (6) Lipu Lekh Pass."

Shipki Pass lies on the Zanskar Range which forms the watershed between the eastern and western tributaries of the Sutlej; and the other five passes lie on the watershed dividing the Sutlej and Ganges basins. In the original Chinese draft presented on 1 March 1954, Article IV read:

"The Chinese Government agrees to open the following mountain passes in the Ari District of the Tibet Region of China for entry by traders and pilgrims of both parties:
(1) Shipki, (2) Mana, (3) Niti, (4) Kungribingri (5) Darma and (6) Lipu Lekh.''

The Indian delegate, Mr. T.N. Kaul, contended that these were Indian passes. At the plenary meeting held on 22 April, 1954, the leader of the Chinese delegation described these discussions and the results which followed:

"With regard to Article IV of the original Chinese Draft Agreement, it was stated that "the Chinese Government agrees to open the following passes".

Mr. Kaul expressed the difference of opinion with regard to this point. Now we have changed it to read that 'Traders and pilgrims of both countries may travel by the following passes.' This was the fifth concession on our part."

This was an acceptance by the leader of the Chinese Delegation that the Chinese Government had agreed to re-draft this article in such a manner as to make clear that they were border passes. The use of these six passes did not involve ownership because they were border passes.
At the 17th meeting at Peking, the Chinese side stated that the negotiations and Agreement of 1954 did not involve at all the question of delimiting the boundary between the two countries. This was a correct statement of the facts. Certainly the Indian side had no intention of seeking fresh definition of a boundary which had already been delimited by historic process, and was a natural, traditional and customary boundary, well-recognized for centuries; by both sides. But this did not mean that the negotiations and Agreement had no bearing on the boundary question. If the Chinese Government were at all serious about their claims to what have always been parts of Indian territory, and shown as parts of India on Indian maps, they would have, during the negotiations, at least made references to these claims, if not discussed them. When at the first meeting of the delegations Premier Chou En-lai said that the relations between China and India were becoming closer every day and that from among the outstanding questions, the two sides could settle questions which were ripe for settlement, the Indian Ambassador immediately pointed out that there were only small questions pending between India and China, and he wished to see nothing big or small remaining outstanding between the two countries.
Premier Chou En-lai replied that two large countries like India and China with a long common frontier were bound to have some questions, but all questions could be settled smoothly. In the context in which Premier Chou En-lai made this last statement it could not be inferred that he had in mind Chinese claims to large areas of Indian territory which had been shown as parts of India in official Indian maps and had been administered for centuries by the Government of India. Throughout the negotiations the Indian delegation took the line that all questions at issue between the two countries were being considered and that once this settlement had been concluded, no question remained.
In his speech of April 29, 1954, after the signing of the Agreement, the leader of the Indian delegation stated:

"We have gone through fully the questions that existed between our two countries in this Tibetan Region", 

thus indicating that according to India no dispute or question was left over.
At the meeting of 8 January 1954, the Vice-Foreign Minister of China, who was the leader of the Chinese delegation, stated:

"I recall that Premier Chou En-lai when he received the Indian Delegation on 31st December 1953, stated that the principles governing the relations between India and China should be to seek a peaceful co-existence under the principles of mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence."

The leader of the Indian Delegation, after securing a repetition of the Five Principles by the leader of the Chinese Delegation, replied:

"These were the principles which our Prime Minister had also advocated. As far as I can see these are common ground."

These Five Principles were incorporated in the Preamble of the Agreement. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity assumed clear and precise knowledge of the extent of each other's territory. Two states with a common boundary could promise such respect for territorial integrity and mutual non-aggression only if they had a well-recognized boundary. The Government of India had been showing the traditional alignment on their official maps, and stated authoritatively on many occasions that that was their boundary.
The Chinese Government had also been informed that this boundary should remain inviolate. In these circumstances; the Government of China could not have affirmed their respect for the territorial integrity of India if they did not recognize the Indian alignment and had in mind claims to large areas of Indian territory.
It was, therefore, clear that the Agreement of 1954 recognised that the six passes were border passes, that during the negotiations the Chinese made no reservations regarding this point, and that by accepting the Five Principles without any qualifications the Chinese Government had accepted that there was no dispute regarding the traditional and well-recognised Indian boundary alignment. It might be added that as the Chinese Government did not raise this issue when they had a clear opportunity and occasion to do so, under international law they were now estopped from raising such claims.

From the same report, Chinese claims

(2) The Area West of Shipki Pass
In the vicinity of Shipki Pass, the traditional customary line is at the Hupsang Khud which is west of this pass. The pastures between the Hupsang Khud and the pass have always belonged to China's Shipki village and had been places where the villagers of Shipki village had constantly pastured and mowed grass, before being occupied by India in 1957.
In the part relevant to Shipki village in the avowal of 1930 of the various districts of Tsaparang Dzong concerning the boundary, it is stated: "The boundary between the people of Shipki and the frontier people of the Kulu in the west follows the crest of the Kularatsi beyond Shipki from the north up to Tso Kam (dried lake), then along the ridge from the crest of Pashagangri to Dongtogtog; the area between the Hupsang Khud and the Siangchuan River indisputably belongs to the (Tibetan) Government."

New Roads to Tibet for 2014?

Ladakhi Traders in Gartok in the early 1900s

As the New Year starts, The People's Daily reports that during a recent Economic Working Conference of Tibet Autonomous Region, it was announced that the track-laying process for the Lhasa-Shigatse railway had been completed and the line will be opened to traffic in 2014.
The Chinese newspaper asserts: "The Lhasa-Shigatse Railway is the extension line of Qinghai-Tibet Railway which is the world's highest railway. Its construction was started in 2010 and the total length of the railway is 253 km. It is planed that the railway starts from Lhasa in the east and ends up in Shigatse, by way of several stations including Tohlung Dechen, Chushur, Nyemo, Rinbung and Panam."
The People's Daily draws a parallel with the construction of Metok highway which ended "the history of China's last [county] inaccessible by roads". The Communist mouthpiece adds: "the high-level [sic] highway connecting Lhasa and Nyingchi has been under construction." Further, the number of cities linked by air has increased from 9 to 48.
After reading this, I came across a report written in the wake of the Younghusband expedition to Tibet in 1904. The British Colonel had sent a fact-finding mission, led by Capt. C.G. Rawling, to Western Tibet, (north of today's Uttarakhand and Himachal) to explore the possibility to open 'trade routes' between British India and Tibet.
In his report, (The Gartok Expedition including the Brahmaputra, the Sutlej and Indus Valleys and that portion of Tibet which lies tot the West of Gyantse), Captain Rawling of the Somersetshire Light Infantry, describes what needs to be done by the Government of India to open up (and secure) its borders with Tibet.

Trade routes into Western Tibet from India with comparison and suggestions.
Western Tibet is by no means a closed country to the natives of the southern slopes of the Himalayas, and these people pass in and out by many paths and many passes.
The principal roads are:-
(1) From Srinagar (Kashmir) through Leh, Ladak, up the Indus Valley to Gartok, and so to Lhasa by the chief road in Tibet. This road is mainly patronised by Ladakis, Kashmiris, and men from Chinese Turkistan.
(2) From Kulu over the Shangrang La, into the Chumurti country, and from thence to Gartok.
(3) From Simla, up the Sutlej valley to Shipki, through the Chumurti country or up the Sutlej, to Gartok.
(4) From Badrinath over the Mana Pass (17,890) to Toling.
(5) From Almora through Jashinath and Niti, over the Niti Pass (17,000) to Gartok.
(6) From Almora through Milam, over the Untadhaura Pass (17,590 feet), to Gartok.
(7) From Almora. up the Kali river valley, over the Lipu Lekh 16,750. to Pu-Rang and Gartok.
As it is absolutely necessary that one or more good roads be constructed alone trade routes from India into Tibet, a comparison between each of these roads is here made in order that the best may be chosen...

Today, 110 years later, most of these roads are closed (except no 3 and 7)which have been reopened in a small way in the 1990s).
After giving more details on the trade opportunities and the length and difficulties of each route, Rawling concludes:

To sum up therefore I recommend the following:

The immediate completion of the Simla-Shipki road. This should be taken in hand at once, and should be completed before the Tibetans have time to change their minds as to the reading of the Lhasa Treaty [signed by Younghusband in Lhasa in 1904 to open up Tibet to Trade].

Crossing the Sutlej near Shipki (Sven Hedin)

II. The construction of the Almora Lipu-Lekh road. This is most important, as it strikes directly at the main road of Tibet, that between Lhasa and Gartok; besides leading straight to Manasarowar and Kailas Parbat. [the Indian pilgrims going on the Kailash Yatra will suffer again in 2014 on this road, if the  Yatra is not canceled like in 2013]

III. As soon as the two roads mentioned above are finished, the Niti Pass road should be made, and as it can be done at a small cost, it will well repay the expense. The completion of this road will enable the traders and pilgrims to enter Tibet by one route. and return to India by another.
A glance at the map will show how every district of Western Tibet will be reached with ease by traders from India if these paths are turned into roads suitable for mule transport.
The Leh road from Kashmir taps the Rudok district and the Indus valley.
The Shipki road passes into the heart of the Chumurti country.
The Lipu Lekh road runs into the Purang valley, the Manasarowar Lake basin and the head waters of the Brahmaputra.
Both for political and commercial reasons, I consider that advisable to construct these roads with as little delay as possible. for the Tibetans, since the defeat of the Kashmir General, Zorawar Singh, in 1842, have always believed themselves invincible, and though they have probably changed their opinion since the entry of the Tibet Mission into Lhasa, yet it is certain that, if there are no good communications into the country from India, the priests will attempt to shut up the country again. These roads could never be of any value to the enemies of the Empire, for the land to the north forms a far more serious obstacle to cross than any part of the Himalayas.
Post and telegraph distances to Gartok from Simla by different routes.
Simla to Gartok via the Sutlej valley and Shipki.
Simla to Poo [Kinnaur district], 18 marches. At Poo, there is a British post office with a weekly post. From Poo to Shipki, 2 marches.
From Shipki to Gartok, 12 marches. Total number of marches from Simla to Gartok, 32 marches or about 350 miles. Time for a letter to reach Gartok from Simla. about 15 days.
Srinagar to Gartok via Leh.
Srinagar to Leh 18 marches or 250 miles;
Leh to Gartok, 18 marches or about 200 miles. Total from Srinllgar, 36 marches or 450 miles.
From Simla, the post takes three days to Srinagar and five to Leh, and from Leh if a dak was arranged eight days; total from Simla 16 days. Leh, however, has a telegraph office, so with changes of ponies, a telegram would reach Gartok in seven or eight days by this route.
Gyantse to Gartok 51 marches, or a total distance of 697 miles.
This distance is covered by the Lhasa. Government's messengers in 19 days.
Gyantse, however. is distant from Simla about nine days by post, therefore a letter will take from Simla 28 days. At Gyantse, however, there is 91 telegraph office, consequently a telegram to Gartok by the route should only take 19 days.
The Gartok-Simla line via Shipki is, however, the safest of these routes for the present, but delays are likely to occur in winter on account of the passes being deep in snow. Should Thakur Jai Chand, Trade Agent at Gartok, require to forward an important communication to the Indian Government, it would be advisable to send a. duplicate letter via Gyantse. This, however, should be well sealed, for if it contains news regarding the Lhasa. Government, it will probably be tampered with on the road.

A great program!
Of course today, trade with Tibet is not the first preoccupation of Government of India, but if, for defense purpose, some of these 110-year projects could be taken up by the Border Road Organization, India would have made a Great Leap Forward to defend its border ... and eventually to reopen the old trade and pilgrimage route in Tibet.
It should not be so difficult. India and China are friends: aren't they?
In the meantime, China continues to rapidly develop the infrastructure on its side of the Himalayas.

Reopening of the Himalayas

During a seminar on "Tibet's Relation with the Himalayas" organized by the Foundation for Non-Violent Alternatives and the Sikkim University in Gangtok, a debate took place: should the natural barrier between the Tibetan plateau and the Indian subcontinent be called ‘Himalayas’ or ‘Himalaya’.
The debate can continue amongst scholars and academicians, but the fact is that for centuries (or millennia) this formidable mountain range has not been a ‘barrier’, but a space of exchange; this is no longer the case today.
The Dalai Lama always surprises when he says that there is no such thing as ‘Tibetan Buddhism’, even less ‘Lamaism’. The so-called ‘Tibetan Buddhism’, was entirely borrowed from India, he says; more precisely from Nalanda. How?
Because, by a twist of fate, Tibetan monks and lamas, as well as abbots and pundits from the Indian viharas, criss-crossed the high mountain passes and transferred India’s knowledge to the Roof of the World.
Santarakshita, the Abbot of Nalanda, not only introduced the Buddha dharma to the Land of Snows, but also ordained the first monks.
For more than a thousand of years, the Himalayas witnessed a constant flow of knowledge, experiences, traditions and goods transiting up and down from far-away places in Central Asia, China or Mongolia to the entire subcontinent.
Then, China invaded Tibet and as the ‘Liberation Army’ began to occupy the high plateau, the passes were gradually closed.
Already in 1954, the infamous Panchsheel Agreement, which for the first time denied the existence of Tibet as a separate identity, designated only 6 passes (in Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh) as the sole Himalayan land ports; myriad other routes were hastily closed. The last stroke was the short border war between India and China in 1962. All bridges were then cut between the plateau and the Indian plains; the passes have been blocked ever since.
As I attended the seminar, a question came to me: how to soften the traditional borders again? Can the age-old relation between the Tibetan plateau and India be revived? The process has started, though it is extremely slow.
In 1991, a Memorandum on Resumption of Border Trade was signed by India and China; in a first phase, an overland trade route was reopened between the Tibet Autonomous Region and Lipukekh pass in the Pithoragarh district of (today’s) Uttarakhand; since then, a mart is annually permitted for a few months. In 1994, the same facilities were extended to Shipki pass in Kinnaur district in Himachal Pradesh and later to Nathu-la (‘la’ means pass in Tibetan) in Sikkim. A series of trade agreements between India and China allowed residents of Tibet and Indians from the border districts to export goods from a selected list of 29 items such as blankets, textiles, coffee, tea, vegetable oil or gur while raw silk, yak tails, goats or readymade garments, etc could be imported from China.
In 2006, India and China decided to resume the border trade through the historic Nathu-la, located 4,545 metres above sea level and 54 kilometers from Gantok; it had been closed for the past 44 years. With Jelep-la (via Kalimpong), the pass was traditionally the most important trade passage between Tibet, China and India.
The bilateral move had also a strategic implication as analysts believed that it signaled Beijing’s implicit recognition of Sikkim as part of India. This is debatable.
Incidentally, when I applied to visit the pass, I was told that I could not go due to my ‘foreign’ origin. This is typically foolish babu-thinking: to allow visitors from India or abroad to have a quick darshan of Chumbi valley on the Tibetan side, would be the best proof that the place is a part the Indian territory, under New Delhi’s control. Security checks should of course go alongside the permission. Babus are often unable to think in India’s interests.
In 2006, it was hoped that the border trade route would give a major boost to local economies and smoothen the bilateral relations between India and China. This has not really been the case for different reasons. The border trade remains rather small in volume, though smuggling of commodity goods is flourishing.
It is perhaps time to think to reopen the Himalayan passes without restrictions. Common men can only benefit from it.
After President Xi Jinping met the Indian Prime Minister on the occasion of the BRICS meet in Durban, the Chinese leader stated that he regarded “ties with India as one of the most important bilateral relationships”. According to him, an important issue was “enhancing people-to-people exchanges and cooperation, and broadening youth exchanges.”
Why can’t both governments agree to remove the restrictions on border trade and later open the Himalayan passes to tourism?
Foremost in my mind is the Demchok route in Ladakh which would allow Indian pilgrims to reach the Kailash-Mansarovar area in a relatively short time and in fairly comfortable conditions. Is it not worth it?