Building synergies

The Dakpa Shelri (The Pure Crystal Mountain)

My article Building synergies appeared in the Edit Page of The Pioneer

The re-opening of new pilgrimage routes can strengthen people-to-people contacts between India and China. The present scope of the Kailash-Manasarovar Yatra must be extended

Here is the link...

A first meeting of the newly constituted India-China High Level Mechanism on Cultural and People-to-People Exchanges will be held on December 21 in New Delhi. It will be co-chaired by External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj and Wang Yi, State Councillor and Chinese Foreign Minister. The decision to establish this new mechanism arose during the post-Doklam encounter between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping in Wuhan this April.
Both sides are now keen to build a greater synergy through people-to-people ties in order to enhance “exchanges in areas such as tourism, art, films, media, culture, sports and academic and youth exchanges.” This sounds good; though in the past, India has been put to sleep by promises of ‘greater synergy.’ New Delhi should certainly not forget the fact that China relentlessly enhances its presence on the Indian frontiers, particularly north of Arunachal Pradesh and near Ladakh.
A report tabled in the Lok Sabha by the Parliamentary Committee on External Affairs pointed to the dichotomy: “It comes as a matter of concern to the committee that even when India is overtly cautious about China’s sensitivities while dealing with Taiwan and Tibet, China does not exhibit the same deference while dealing with India’s sovereignty concerns.”
For the committee, given China’s muscular approach, it is difficult “to be content with India continuing with its conventionally deferential foreign policy towards China.” But the mandarins of South Block are absolutely unable to see this. It has been one of the greatest tragedies of modern India. There are, however, ways for India and China to build the trust long-cherished by Indian leaders.
Since the end of the 1950s, the Tibet issue has been an impediment to better relations between the two countries. Why is it so? There are many reasons but the most obvious one is simply because before the occupation of Tibet by the People’s Liberation Army in 1950/51, India had a special bond with that region which had different facets: One religious (the Buddha dharma is born in India); one cultural (the Himalayan belt in India shares many values and affinities with the northern neighbours); another is economic (for centuries India and Tibet traded across the passes).
Pilgrimage played an important role in this special relationship. New pilgrimage routes can strengthen people-to-people contacts and become a true Confidence Building Measure (CBM) between China and India. For this, the present scope of the Kailash-Manasarovar Yatra (KMY) needs to be extended. The 1954 Panchsheel Agreement lapsed in April 1962 and six  months later, India and China fought a bitter war over Tibet, the main subject of the agreement. The objective of the accord was to regulate trade and pilgrimage from India to Tibet and vice-versa.
The agreement specified a few points of entry into Tibet: “Traders and pilgrims of both countries may travel by the following passes and routes: Shipki-la pass, Mana pass, Niti pass, Kungri Bingri pass, Darma pass and Lipulekh pass.” Apart from the first one located in Himachal Pradesh, the other passes lie in today’s Uttarakhand.
It is only in the early 1980s that Beijing officially agreed to reopen the KMY. Since then, the yatra is being organised every year by the Ministry of External Affairs. Yatris have to walk via Pittoragarh district before crossing into Tibet at Lipulekh pass. In 2014, a second extremely long route was opened via Nathu-la pass in Sikkim. As a CBM, other traditional yatras could be reopened — one of them is the Tsari pilgrimage.
In the Tibetan psyche, Tsari has always been synonymous with a ‘sacred place’. With the Mt Kailash and the Amye Machen in eastern Tibet, the pilgrimage around the Dakpa Shelri, the ‘Pure Crystal Mountain’, has for centuries been one of the holiest of the Roof of the World. The ‘Pure Crystal Mountain’ lies at 5,735 metres above the sea, north of today’s Upper Subansiri district of Arunachal Pradesh.
The yatra has the particularity to cross over from Tibet to Arunachal Pradesh and return to Tibet. Toni Huber, one of the foremost scholars on the subject, wrote: “The large-scale, 12-yearly circumambulation of Tibetan Buddhist pilgrims around the mountain known as the Rongkor Chenmo had the character of a state ritual for the Ganden Phodrang [Tibetan Government] …Pilgrims in this huge procession crossed the McMahon Line below the frontier village of Migyitun in Tsari district.”
After crossing the Tibet-India border, the pilgrimage proceeded southwards along the Tsari Chu (river) and then turned westwards to follow the Subansiri, to finally cross back into Tibet to reach the first frontier village in Chame county. The southern leg of the Rongkor procession used to pass through the tribal Tsari/Subansiri areas.
Despite the fact that it crossed into India, New Delhi always facilitated the Tsari pilgrimage on the Indian side of the border till 1956. Today, with no solution in sight to solve the border dispute between China and India, the re-opening of the Rongkor pilgrimage could be a significant CBM between India, China and the Tibetan Buddhist population from both sides of the border.
Regarding the logistics, it should be much easier since India has been working on infrastructure in the area, while China has already undertaken development on its side, particularly in Yumed region.  Another area of possible contact is between Ladakh and western Tibet. For centuries, the trade and pilgrimage route for the Kailash-Manasarovar region followed the course of the Indus, passed Demchok, the last Ladakhi village, and then crossed the border to reach the first Tibetan settlement, Tashigang, some 15 miles inside Tibet.
A way forward could be to re-open this route for the KMY pilgrims in a first step; the next one should be to re-open the border for trade. Remember the skirmishes at the end of the 1960s in Sikkim! When the Nathu-La pass was officially re-opened to trade in July 2006, it had the effect of ‘fixing’ the border, drastically reducing tensions in the area. Considering the ‘Nathu-La’ effect, re-opening the Demchok route could be an efficient CBM between India and China.  There would be an additional benefit — it would stop smuggling between China and Ladakh, which poses serious security risks of infiltration for India. We could add to the list the re-opening of the KMY via Mana in Uttarakhand — it would probably be the easiest route. If China is interested in creating a good feeling among the Indian population, it should agree to this small gesture.

New Airports on India’s Borders

On June 9, the Civil Aviation Administration of China and the Tibetan Autonomous Region’s (TAR) government announced that Tibet will soon have three new airports. A communiqué said: “Construction of the three airports, all above the altitude of 3,900 meters, should begin in 2019.”
Xinhua gave the rationale: “Tourist travel will be more convenient, and economic development in Tibet's agricultural and pastoral areas will also be assisted.”
The announcement came during Conference Civil Aviation System Supporting Tibet Airport Construction Development held in Lhasa on June 8.
The entire project is called '3+1' because the Lhasa Gongkar airport will get a second runaway. the scheme comes under Tibet's 13th Five-year Plan (2016-20) with a planned investment of 16.7 billion yuan ($ 2.6 billion).
The Chinese-language press gave more information about the location of the three airports; one will be located in Lhuntse in Lhoka (called Shannan by the Chinese) area, north of the Upper Subansiri and Tawang districts of Arunachal Pradesh, the second will be between Tingri and Lhatse counties of Shigatse City, north of Zangmu, the border post with Nepal, and the last in Purang, near the trijunction Nepal-Tibet-India, north of Pittoragarh district of Uttarakhand (on the yatris’ route to Mt Kailash).
While Tingri airport is near the Nepali border, the two other (Lhuntse and Purang) are at a short distance from the Indian border.
Xinhua said that Capital Airport Holding Company will be the contractor of the Lhoka, while Shanghai Airport Authority will be responsible for the airport in Shigatse and the West Airport Group will take care of Purang: “The three companies are scheduled to transfer the airports to local operators after one or two years' operation.” The airports should be completed in 2021; by then, there will be eight airports in the TAR (plus three close to the Indian border in Xinjiang, i.e. Kashgar, Hotan and Yarkand).
The news agency added: “At present, the preparatory work for the three airports is underway. The preferred sites have been determined, and the construction of temporary weather stations at each site is completed.”
The three airports will be high altitude airports; they will be operated by companies including Air China, China Eastern Airlines or Sichuan Airlines already involved in Tibet.
Let us not forget an important element; by law, these new airports will be for ‘dual use’; in other words, they will have to be built to suit both the civilian and military standards. The People’s Liberation Army may use them when required.
The Conference was a very-high level affair. Apart from Wu Yingjie, the TAR’s Party secretary, it was attended by Feng Zhenglin, China’s Civil Aviation Administration’s secretary, Che Dalha, the TAR Governor (as well as director of the TAR Border Defense Committee), Ding Yexian, Zhuang Yan, two powerful deputy secretaries, but perhaps more importantly, by Lt Gen Xu Yong, the commander of the Tibet Military District. Three other PLA officers were on the dais (see picture above).
The level of the participants shows the importance of these three new airports for Beijing, particularly after the post-Doklam ‘reset’ of the bilateral relations with India.
India should not fall back into a Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai mood, even if a ‘reset’ of the bilateral relations was necessary, Delhi should realize that Beijing is working hard to be prepared if a new Doklam erupts anywhere on the 4,000km long border.
It is not the time for complacency.
Though as a way to really 'reset' the bilateral relations, Prime Minister Modi should ask President Xi Jinping during their next meeting to open a regular flight  between Dehra Dun and Purang. It will allow thousand of elderly Indians to do the Kailash Yatra.

Dual use of airport at Shigatse

The Happy People of Ngari?

Ngari or Western Tibet has been in the Chinese news in recent weeks.
It looks like a concerted effort from the Communist propaganda to promote the region bordering Ladakh, Himachal and Uttarakhand.
And first of all 'promote' the happiness of the people in these borders areas.

Happy Old People
On May 18, Xinhua published an article about The Happy life of a senior in Ali Prefecture of Tibet. ‘Ali’ is ‘Ngari’ (as the Chinese have difficulties to pronounce the ‘Ng’, it becomes ‘A’). 
The Chinese news agency mentions “a two-story house equipped with all kinds of household appliances where Cama Ciren [Karma Tseten], a 72-year-old Tibetan and his wife live.”
Karma stays there for the past 34 years, says the article.
Interestingly, the village is located in Tashigang in Gar County of Ngari Prefecture, near the Indian border (on the other side is Demchok in Ladakh).
The pattern of developing 'well-off border villages' seems the same as in Lhoka and Nyingchi Cities of Southern Tibet, (north of Arunachal Pradesh), whose fast-track development has been often been mentioned on this blog.
As reported earlier, Beijing wants the Tibetan populations living in the border areas to become: “the guardians of the sacred land and the builders of happy homes”.
This seems to me a worrying trend for India, when one think at the post-Dalai Lama era (though India was never worried, having more important political and cricket issues to follow or bother about).
Karma told Xinhua: “The village was actually isolated from the outside world in the 1980s and 1990s. There were only two or three households. Without a tent, we built a rock wall to shelter us from the wind. All of our clothes were scrabbled by hands.”

A few households, like in Yume in a couple of years ago (or less), mushroom into a large township.
Tashigang is the last village in Tibet; on the other side of the border is Demchok in Ladakh.
One has to remember that whenever villagers in Demchok have undertaken small development work, like laying a water pipe, the Chinese PLA/Border Forces immediately stepped onto the Indian territory, to object to ‘development in a disputed area’.
It is a blatant double standard!  Demchok has always been in Ladakh and Tashigang in Tibet.
Xinhua admits that on the Chinese side: “things have changed over the years. By 2012, the village was already a well-off village where each family lived in new house and a newly-built road connected the village with the outside world.”
To give these villages a ‘well-off’ status, China is building ‘model townships’, like it did in Tsona, Lepo, Marmang, Yume, or Metok in Southern Tibet.
The News Agency observed that Karma and his wife “are not supposed to labor for a living;” due to their old age, “they lead a comfortable life owing to the government subsidy policy.”
Karma told Xinhua: “The subsidies we receive each year exceed 20,000 yuan;” further, they enjoy full medical reimbursement.
The village has three college graduates; one of them is Karma’s daughter.
Even for the children, food, accommodation, and tuition fees are covered by the government.  “A happier life awaits us in the future,” Karma concludes.
Everybody seems to be happy in Tashigang.

A Happy Married Couple
Xinhua in another article reported The Happy life of married couple in Ngari Prefecture of Tibet.
One Luo Qiming came from the Mainland (Qinghai province) to the village in 2010; he met his wife, a Tibetan Niji Lhamo; she was then running the village's only commodities store.
The News Agency says “They fell in love at first sight and soon got married.”
At first, Luo thought of moving back to Qinghai with Lhamo, but “everything went on fine for the young couple,” the store does a good business, as it is supported by the local government.
Lhamo has got subsidized loans and has expanded her store: “their little store became a mini supermarket selling a variety of commodities. Their business thrived and all their loans were paid off.”

As Lhamo also works at the Gar County’s Agricultural Bank, she gets thousands of yuans extra: “Our income has increased a lot while our expenditure has not.”
And to make life happier, their children enjoy 15-year ‘free compulsory’ education: “Instead of paying anything for my elder daughter’s kindergarten education, we’ve received a lot of subsidies from the school.”
Compulsorily free education.

Happy Life in Purang
Let us move on the other side of the Ngari Prefecture.
An article on the China Tibet Online website speaks of Happy life on yaks' back in Ngari.
The website explains: “When one thinks of livestock carrying cargo, the first thought is often poverty, yet in Gangsha Village of Baga [?] Township, part of Pulan [Purang] County of Ngari Prefecture, people have used this way to overcome poverty and become prosperous.
Purang is at the trijunction between India (Pithoragarh district of Uttarakhand), Nepal and Tibet). Also known as Taklakot, it is the first town in Tibet territory for the pilgrims on their way to the Kailash-Manasarovar (after crossing the Lipilekh pass or flying by helicopter from Nepal).
China Tibet Online says: “Gangsha Village is an essential stop on the route to renowned holy mountain, Mt. Kangrinboqe [Kang Rinpoche for the Tibetans or Kailash]. Since Mt. Kangrinboqe has an average altitude of 4,700 meters, so many tourists couldn't make it past this point and need help carrying cargo and luggage. Starting in the 1980s and 1990s, Gangsha villagers have begun to provide yak-transport service for visitors.”
Since 2010, the villagers have organized a yak-transport service association: “Whenever a tourist ordered the service, the center would organize the appropriate yak, horse, and manpower.”
Jigme Dorje, the village headman explained: “we have clear prices for hiring guides and animals; one yak is 240 yuan (37.8 US dollars), and one guide is 260 yuan (40.9 US dollars), and our service is very popular. We have already made tens of thousands of yuan in profit this year, and the peak tourism season hasn't even started yet.”
In recent years, the ‘yak-transport service’ has greatly expanded its operation; the association has used part of its income, along with Chinese government subsidies, to open supermarkets, tea houses, and inns.
The village Party Secretary Dorje Pema: "We predict that we'd have more than three million yuan (0.47 million US dollars) in income this year in just those supermarkets, tea houses, and inns. We have also hired college grads, and we hope to take online orders in three years."
While the number of Indian pilgrims trekking via Lipulekh La under the Ministry of External’s scheme remains small, pilgrims visiting Kailash Manasarovar through Nepalgunj and Simikot is increasing exponentially. 
Nepali tour operators admit that some 20,000 pilgrims have booked trips to the sacred mountain and lake as of mid-May this year.
Last year, some 12,900 Indian pilgrims visited the holy place using the Nepalgunj-Simikot-Hilsa route in western Nepal.
This makes the tour operators and the yak owners happy.

Happiness in Ngari
In conclusion, everybody seems ‘happy’ in Ngari.
In the meantime, for the people of Ladakh, who for decades have been asking to reopen the traditional route from Ladakh to the Kailash via Demchok, it remains a far-away dream.
Beijing adamantly refuses and Delhi is not pushing to hard for it.
Recently, the Himalayan Buddhist Cultural Association (HBCA) has urged the Prime Minister to fulfill the long pending demands of Ladakhi, particularly the inclusion of Bhoti language in 8th Scheduled of Indian Constitution and opening of Kailash-Manasarovar route from Leh to Demchok and Tashigang.
HBCA President Tashi Targais observed during a press conference in Leh that the Kailash Mansarovar road is not only holy place for Buddhists but also for Hindus and Jain community and the route from Ladakh is the shortest route and its reopening would also boost the economy of Ladakh region.
China is not ready to listen.
If the people in Ngari are so happy, where is the risk for Beijing?
But China remains nervous.

The Indian Village in Tibet

I am posting an interesting report from the Special Officer appointed by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir to visit Minsar, the Indian enclave in Tibet in Summer 1950. After the report is a historical note on Minsar.

On August 26, 1950, the Government of Jammu and Kashmir (Prime Minister’s Secretariat - External Affairs Department) writes to the Ministry of States in New Delhi to inform it  about the circumstances of the Special Officer’s visit to Tibet.
The communication is entitled: ‘Village Minsar in Western Tibet'.

...the State Government have already deputed a Civil Officer, Mr. N. Rigzen Ghagil Kalon, with an escort of armed police to visit Minsar village. From the last report received from Mr. Kalon it appears that the Tibetan Govt have put restrictions on people entering their territory with arms. His report further indicates that he reached Rudok on 3rd June, 1950 leaving the police escort behind at Chuchhol [Chushul] a border village on the side of the Jammu and Kashmir State.
At Rudok the Civil Officer was informed by the Tibetan Govt officials that he could proceed to Minsar without an armed escort. Subsequent report from the Chief administrative Officer Leh shows that the Civil Officer along with some constables in civilian dress and without arms are on their way to Minsar.

Follows the report from Rigzen Ghagil Kalon, the Special Officer (Minsar) to the Chief Administrative Officer (Leh). It is dated September 13, 1950, a few weeks before the entry of the Chinese in Western Tibet.
The report is entitled: “Note on condition of the inhabitants of Kashmir Village Minsar in Western Tibet”. Note that Demchok is clearly the last border village in Ladakh; it is now 'disputed' by China.

In compliance to your orders I left Leh on 22-6-50 and reached village Minsar on 24-7-50. The route lies via Rudok. It is ten days journey from Demjok [Demchok] to Minsar. Demjok is the last boundary of the Tehsil Ladakh from which begins the Chhangthang Plateau of Lhasa Tibet. The route from Demjok to Minsar passes through Gartok which is the headquarters of Garpons (Administrative Officers of Lhasa Government). The village Minsar is situated to east of Gartok and about 32 miles west of Mount Kailasas [Kailash]. It is a broad valley with vast plains in it.
There are 68 families with 271 souls of which 120 are males and the rest females and are all adherents of Buddhism.
The entire population depends on livestock which is the only source of subsistence and deal in the trade of sheep, wool, and pashmina. The economic condition of the people is neither much satisfactory nor so much frustrated.
On my way I interviewed Garpons at Rudok and exchanged my ideas with them regarding taking my Police Constables to Minsar and installation of a Chowki [guardian] there. They told me that it would create some consternation in Minsar and its suburbs, if the whole quota of six constables along with rifles were permitted to accompany me and so two constables were permitted to accompany me and the rifles were kept concealed under our saddles. I directed the other four constables to stay at Demjok. I also came across with the traders of Kulu [in Himachal Pradesh] and Leh there. They came with an application to me saying that Tibetan Officials were demanding Custom Duty for their livestock and goods which was not supported by any Rule or Regulation in this behalf. I accordingly went to see the Tibetan Officials and discussed the point with them. They were fully convinced by my arguments that the practice was illegal and they agreed to stop it in future.
The various passengers who had met me on way had already intimated to the people of the village Minsar about me and had accordingly arranged a Tumboo (tent of Yak hair) for my lodging. The Numberdar [hereditary title for powerful families of zamindars of a village or town] and few distinguished persons of the place received me heartily. On the following day I had a discourse with the inhabitants of the place and we exchanged our ideas. I found there a few Garhwal tradesmen who did a lot of propaganda in my favour among the people telling them that I belonged to the National Government of Jammu and Kashmir which is a part of India. It proved a great help to me. I asked for the recovery of revenue and the people told me that they had not the least hesitation in paying the amount to the State Govt., but they had a few grievances against our Government which despite their several representations made at Leh, were not heeded to and no action was taken. They expressed that this attitude of our Government had extremely disgusted them and they wanted an immediate redress before payment of revenue. The grievances are as follows:-

1. No help was extended to them at the time of the incursion of the Kazaks. The Kazak raid had wholly ravaged their villages and looted and ruined their monasteries. The figures of personal properties of the people leaving aside the monastic wealth were cash Rs. 25000/-, horses 140, yaks 404, and sheep 4889.
2. The people are subjected to the payment of puggur dues (goods sold by the Tibetan Officials to their subjects at exorbitant price) which is a gross injustice of the Tibetan Government on the people. A few days before my arrival there a Tibetan Official called Urkoo had sent goods such as tea etc worth Rs. 672/- to the village for forced sale for which the villagers had to pay Rs. 1548/- as cost price to Urkoo.
3. An Official from our Government should stay there annually at least for three months in summer who will look after the general situation of the place.
4. The people have to supply free transport to the Tibetan officials. The transport engaged by the Tibetan for other purposes such as carriage of goods etc are paid at normal wages of three pice for 32 miles per pony.

In respect of items 2 and 4 it is requested that the Tibetan Government be contacted to stop this mal-practice forthwith which will go a long way in mitigating the troubles and the people will welcome our Government and do whatever we ask them to do.
I contacted the Urkoo who had sent his goods to Minsar and told him to postpone the sale of goods to people for the present till I submit my report to my Government and the requisite orders whether the sale of goods should be made or not are conveyed to his Government by my Government.
I saw on my way orders of the Tibetan Government affixed on all stages to the effect that no Puggur dues and free transport should be demanded. On my return journey I discussed this point with the high Garpon at Gartok and asked him as to how these mal-practices were in vogue in contravention to the clear and explicit orders in this behalf. Garpon told me in reply that as Minsar virtually formed a part of Government of Lhasa and so the Tibetan Officials were right to enforce their laws in the said territory. He also said that Kashmir Government was only to collect revenue annually from the village as done heretofore and for all other administrative purposes the village constitutes a part of Lhasa Government. I asked him to give it in writing to which he showed reluctance and I could easily infer that he had no such document with him by which he was justifying his action.
From the foregoing observations it transpires that our Government has not so far taken any steps in setting up our administration there. It is submitted that speedy measures may please be taken to alleviate the trouble and miseries of the people of this forgotten place which will assure the loyalty of subjects.
No other political condition worth mention needs to be incorporated in the report.

A historical Note on Minsar
Before the invasion of the Roof of the World by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in 1950, India had a small territory in Tibet. This village is called Minsar.
For centuries, the inhabitants of Minsar, although surrounded by Tibetan territories, paid their taxes to the kingdom of Ladakh. During in the 19th century, when Ladakh was incorporated into Maharaja Gulab Singh’s State, Minsar de facto became a part of the Jammu & Kashmir State.
In October 1947, after Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession, Minsar became Indian territory.
This lasted till the mid 1950s.
John Bray, the President of the International Association of Ladakh Studies, who wrote about the Bhutanese and Indian (Minsar) enclaves in Tibet, noted: “Both sets of enclaves share a common origin in that they date back to the period when the Kings of Ladakh controlled the whole of Western Tibet. The link with Bhutan arises because of the Ladakhi royal family’s association with the Drukpa Kagyupa sect.”
This school of Buddhism, different of the Dalai Lama’s Gelukpa has been influential in Ladakh and Bhutan for centuries.
The rights to the small town of Minsar were inherited from the Peace Treaty between Ladakh and Tibet signed in Tingmosgang in 1684. Besides the confirmation of the delimitation of the border between Western Tibet and Ladakh, the Treaty affirmed: “The king of Ladakh reserves to himself the village of Minsar in Ngari-khor-sum [Western Tibet]”. For centuries, Minsar was a home for Ladakhi and Kashmiri traders and pilgrims visiting the holy mountain.
A report of Thrinley Shingta, the 7th Gyalwang Drukpa, head of the Drukpa school of Tibetan Buddhism, who spent three months in the area in 1748, makes interesting reading: “Administratively, it is established that the immediate village of Minsar and its surrounding areas are ancient Ladakhi territory. After Lhasa invaded West Tibet in 1684, it was agreed and formally inscribed in the Peace Treaty between Tibet and Ladakh, signed in 1684, that the King of Ladakh retained the territory of Minsar and its neighbourhood as a territorial enclave, in order to meet the religious offering expenses of the sacred sites by Lake Manasarovar and Mount Kailash.”

Minsar today

The Panchsheel Agreement
In 1953, wanting to sign his Panchsheel Agreement with China, Jawaharlal Nehru decided to abandon all Indian ‘colonial’ rights inherited from the British. Though he knew that the small principality was part of the Indian territory, he felt uneasy about this Indian ‘possession’ near Mt. Kailash in Tibet. Nehru was aware that Minsar had been providing revenue to maintain the temples around the sacred mountain and the holy Manasarovar lake, but believed that India should unilaterally renounce her rights as a gesture of goodwill towards Communist China.
He instructed the diplomats negotiating the Panchsheel accord in Beijing: “Regarding the village of Minsar in Western Tibet, which has belonged to the Kashmir State, it is clear that we shall have to give it up, if this question is raised. We need not raise it. If it is raised, we should say that we recognize the strength of the Chinese contention and we are prepared to consider it and recommend it.”
Eventually Minsar was not discussed in 1954 during the talks for the Tibet (also known as Panchsheel) Agreement and, the Bhutanese enclaves could not be brought up during the India-China talks in 1960, as China refused to deal with Sikkim and Bhutan.
It means that the fate of these enclaves has never been negotiated or settled. It remains so today.
On December 31, 1953, while opening the ‘Tibet talks’ (without the participation of the Dalai Lama’s government), Premier Zhou Enlai affirmed: “all outstanding problems between China and other countries could be solved on basis of mutual respect for territorial integrity, non aggression and non-interference in internal affairs so as to enable peaceful co-existence. I know Prime Minister Nehru Government and people of India also feel the same way. On basis of this principle all outstanding questions between us which are ripe for settlement can be resolved smoothly.”
Minsar issue was never sorted out.

The Legal Position
We should remember that treaties, conventions or agreements signed by any states, do not depend on an individual or a political party; they remain in force whoever is in power. The Chinese occupation of Tibet did not change this fact.
Further, the return of any part Indian Territory needs to be ratified by the Indian Parliament only, through an amendment of the Constitution. Therefore the so-called ‘return’ of Minsar to Tibet (and China) is still today illegal and invalid in law.
John Bray wrote: "the Sino-Indian boundary dispute remains unresolved. Since the 1960s, the attention of the two governments has focused on the demarcation of the frontier and, more recently, on the prospects for mutual trade. The status of Minsar is no more than a minor footnote to these concerns, but one that has still to be cleared up."
Nehru’s perception that old treaties or conventions could be discarded or scraped greatly weakened the Indian stand in the 1950s (and later when China invaded India). Nehru’s wrong interpretation made it easy for the Chinese to tell their Indian counterparts “look here, McMahon was an imperialist, therefore the McMahon line is an imperialist fabrication, therefore it is illegal”.

Little Bhutan in Tibet

Darchen, one of the Bhutanese enclaves in Tibet

My article Little Bhutan in Tibet appeared today in The Statesman.

Here is the link...

China quite amazingly is able to deny even the most undeniable facts.
Geng Shuang , spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was recently asked by an Indian correspondent, about the details of the meeting between President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Modi on the side of the G 20 Summit in Hamburg. Geng replied: “According to my information, the two said leaders did not hold any bilateral meetings.”
When asked by another correspondent “Are you saying this did not happen?” He answered: “The two leaders of China and India did not hold any meetings on the sidelines of any meeting in Hamburg.”
He thrice repeated his contention.
This was an event which took place only a few days earlier, with a photo tweeted all over the world; one can imagine the scenario when something occurred several decades or centuries earlier; historical events can never be in China’s disfavour.

The Doklam plateau
Moving to the Doklam plateau, the same spokesman quoted a letter written by Nehru on September 26, 1959 in which he would have acknowledges the 1890 Convention between Great Britain and China; the fact that this agreement was never implemented simply because the main stakeholders Tibet, Bhutan and Sikkim were not signatories or even represented, has been forgotten. Here too Geng has selective memory.
The same para (no 17) of Nehru’s quoted letter speaks about the Tibet-Bhutan border, the object of the present stand-off.
The Indian Prime Minister tells the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai: “It is not clear to us what exactly is the implication of your statement that the boundaries of Sikkim and Bhutan do not fall within the scope of the present discussion. In fact, Chinese maps show sizeable areas of Bhutan as part of Tibet.”
This relates in particular to Doklam plateau.
Nehru continues: “Under treaty relationships with Bhutan, the Government of India are the only competent authority to take up with other Governments matters concerning Bhutan's external relations …The rectification of errors in Chinese maps regarding the boundary of Bhutan with Tibet is therefore a matter which has to be discussed along with the boundary of India.”
Not only was the boundary line never rectified, but China has recently tried to change the status quo.
A year later (1960), the prime ministers of India and China agreed to participate in a Conference with ‘Officials’ of the two sides to sort out the boundary issue. China conveniently refused to discuss the Tibet-Sikkim and the Tibet-Bhutan borders.
The Indian Officials nevertheless filed a separate statement about Bhutan; at that time, the main issue was the eastern part of Bhutan, adjacent to Kameng Frontier Division (today’s Tawang district). The Report of the Officials stated: “As far as India and Bhutan are concerned the valid boundary in this sector is known and recognised.”

Darchen and Mt Kailash

The Bhutanese enclaves
But more interestingly, the Report mentions several Bhutanese enclaves in Tibet, it notes: “Chinese officials have illegally dispossessed the designated authorities of the Government of Bhutan in the following eight villages situated in western Tibet over which Bhutan has been exercising administrative jurisdiction for more than 300 years: Khangri, Tarchen, Tsekhor, Diraphu, Dzung Tuphu, Jangehe, Chakip and Kocha.”
Minsar, the Indian enclave in Tibet is better known, but these villages too did not belong to Tibet, they were part of Bhutan’s territory.
The Report continues: “Bhutan has for centuries appointed the officers who governed these villages, collected taxes from them and administered justice. Tibetan authorities consistently recognised that these villages belonged to the Bhutan Government. The villages were not subject to Tibetan officers and laws; nor did they pay any Tibetan taxes. There has thus been a violation of Bhutan's legitimate authority over these villages.”
On August 19 and 20, 1959, at the request of Bhutan, official Notes were sent by Delhi to Beijing, in which the Chinese Government was requested “to restore the rightful authority of the Bhutan Government over their enclaves.”
A scholar, John Bray, who is President of the International Association of Ladakh Studies, wrote a fascinating research paper on the ‘Bhutanese enclaves’ in Tibet. He explained that until the 1950s “both Ladakh and Bhutan governed small enclaves of territory in Western Tibet. Ladakh’s enclave consisted of the village of Minsar, near lake Manasarovar, and its surrounding land, while Bhutan governed the Darchen Labrang and several smaller monasteries and villages near Mount Kailash …and Bhutan continued to raise revenue there for some 300 years.”.”
For centuries, the inhabitants of Minsar, although surrounded by Tibetan territories, paid their taxes to the kingdom of Ladakh. During in the 19th century, when Ladakh was incorporated into Maharaja Gulab Singh’s State, Minsar de facto became a part of the Jammu & Kashmir State.
In October 1947, after Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession, Minsar became Indian territory. This lasted till the mid 1950s.
Bray remarked: “Both sets of enclaves share a common origin in that they date back to the period when the Kings of Ladakh controlled the whole of Western Tibet. The link with Bhutan arises because of the Ladakhi royal family’s association with the Drukpa Kagyupa sect.”
This school of Buddhism, different of the Dalai Lama’s Gelukpa has been influential in Ladakh and Bhutan for centuries.

Minsar, the Indian enclave
Regarding Minsar, the Indian principality in Tibet, the rights to this small town were inherited from the Peace Treaty between Ladakh and Tibet signed in Tingmosgang in 1684. Besides the confirmation of the delimitation of the border between Western Tibet and Ladakh, the Treaty affirmed: “The king of Ladakh reserves to himself the village of Minsar in Ngari-khor-sum [Western Tibet]”. For centuries, Minsar has been a home for Ladakhi and Kashmiri traders and pilgrims visiting the holy mountain.
In 1953, wanting to sign his Panchsheel Agreement with China, Jawaharlal Nehru decided to abandon all Indian ‘colonial’ rights inherited from the British. Though he knew that the small principality was part of the Indian territory, he felt uneasy about this Indian ‘possession’ near Mt. Kailash in Tibet. Nehru was aware that Minsar had been providing revenue to maintain the temples around the sacred mountain and the holy Manasarovar lake, but believed that India should unilaterally renounce her rights as a gesture of goodwill towards Communist China.
He instructed the diplomats negotiating the Panchsheel accord in Beijing: “Regarding the village of Minsar in Western Tibet, which has belonged to the Kashmir State, it is clear that we shall have to give it up, if this question is raised. We need not raise it. If it is raised, we should say that we recognize the strength of the Chinese contention and we are prepared to consider it and recommend it.”
Eventually Minsar was not discussed in 1954 during the talks for the Tibet (also known as Panchsheel) Agreement and, the Bhutanese enclaves could not be brought up during the India-China talks in 1960, as China refused to deal with Sikkim and Bhutan.
It means that the fate of these enclaves has never been negotiated or settled. It remains so today.
On December 31, 1953, while opening the ‘Tibet talks’ (without the participation of the Dalai Lama’s government), Premier Zhou Enlai affirmed: “all outstanding problems between China and other countries could be solved on basis of mutual respect for territorial integrity, non aggression and non-interference in internal affairs so as to enable peaceful co-existence. I know Prime Minister Nehru Government and people of India also feel the same way. On basis of this principle all outstanding questions between us which are ripe for settlement can be resolved smoothly.”
Are the forgotten Bhutanese enclaves ‘ripe for settlement’ now?
Mr Geng has probably forgotten about their existence.

The Tibet-India Railway

A 'Tibet-South Asia' promotion meeting for travel products was held in Lhasa on June 11.
The theme was ‘crossing Himalaya, rambling paradise in the clouds’.
China Tibet News, a Chinese website says that more than 100 travel agencies from inside or outside Tibet took part in the promotion meeting.
What was the objective of the gathering?
The website said to “show innovative idea of product design on Tibet’s travel, strengthen exchanges and communications with fellow traders, promote developmental directions of individuation, branding, and high-end quality in tourism industry, activate developmental vitality of folk travel organization, as well as expand upgrading of tourism product and profit space.”
This is fine.
A question however remains, why ‘Tibet-South Asia’?
Apart Nepal, Tibet has no ‘tourism’ contact with any ‘South Asian’ country.
Except for the Kailash-Mansarovar Yatra opened from Pittoragarh district of Uttarakhand and Nathu-la in Sikkim, there are no ‘tourist tours’ crossing over the Himalaya to Tibet or vice-versa.
During the meeting in Lhasa, some travel agencies made some major recommendations for outbound ('out of Tibet') tourism products for Nepal …and other South Asian countries.
It is there that the route to Chumbi Valley and Yatung (written Yadong by the Chinese) was mentioned.
The article said that the ‘Yatung border tour’ aroused everybody’s interest.
According to Qiao Zhifeng, director general of Yatung Tourism (under Shigatse City’s administration), the Yatung County has rich touristic resources and apparently, the local government has been keen “to exploit Yatung tourism since 2016.”
Quio explained that a three-day tour from Lhasa-Yatung has become “a very mature travel route, it also has attracted a lot of self-driving tourists and group tourists.”
He added: “In the future, we will continue to plan and develop colorful tourism products relying on abundant and superior tourism resources, and the market. At the same time, we will strive to improve the infrastructure construction of software and hardware to attract visitors from all over the world.”
'Improve the infrastructure' means 'bring the railway line to Yatung'?

Chinese tourists in India via Nathu-la?
Can the next step be to send Chinese tourists to India via Yatung and Nathu-la?
In July 2006, at the time of the opening Nathula pass for trade between India and China, Sun Yuxi, the then Chinese Ambassador in India told some journalists that Beijing planned to extend its railway linking Beijing to Tibet, to a newly opened border point in India's northeast and possibly link it to India's east coast.
Sun said "From Yadong, the Indian border area is only a few dozens of kilometers away. Then, anytime we feel the need we will link it. If the train got through all the way to Kolkata, that will be something. Lots of potential, opportunities will develop there.”
Nobody took Sun seriously then.
In July 2015, Ananth Krishnan wrote in The Daily Mail “Local officials in Yadong [Yatung] say a line running to the India border could transform the currently paltry $15million border trade, which relies on a small border market that is open from Monday to Thursday in Yatung.”
Krishnan then reported: “China has already upgraded the roads from Lhasa to Yatung. A 500km journey to the India border took Mail Today only seven hours.
Last year, in an article in the China Daily, Ma Jiali, a well-known Chinese ‘India expert’ and a researcher at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations explained that “a trans-Himalayan railway would be of great economic value as it could later connect China, the largest economy in Asia, with India, the continent's third-largest economy.”
But has India been consulted?

Surely not.
However Beijing seems decided to go ahead with the project of ‘connecting’ India.
Nepal, on its part, is more than willing to have “a convenient link to China because it believes that China's development will offer great opportunities for Nepal,” commented Jia last year (a map was then attached to the article).
It showed the train continuing its journey to Purang (Burang), near the tri-junction Nepal-Tibet-India and Yatung in the Chumbi Valley. The Purang leg will be a further step to connect Tibet and Xinjiang, through a railway line parallel to the Aksai Chin road (via the Indian territory).
The creation of Western Theater Command will make the process easier.
It would make two branches of the OBOR ending up at India’s gate.
The point is: can tourism alone justify the laying of a railway line to Yatung?
Certainly not.
The answer is somewhere else.
The raising of a Mountain Strike Corps on the other side of the pass?

New highway near Mt. Kailash

The Chinese Law on Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) requires the State to consult the population about any new project; it is how some information on the new highway projects in Western Tibet (Ngari Prefecture) came in the public domain.
Last week I had mentioned the construction of a 558 km-long highway connecting Xinjiang and Tibet, via Minfeng.
The deeply-worrying aspect of this project is that it crosses the highly eco-sensitive Changthang National Nature Reserve. It runs for 110 km in the main reserve, about 270 km in the buffer zone and some 100 km in the ‘experimental area’.
The new road will ultimately connect G216 to G219 highways and end up in Tibet, north of Rutok near Panggong Tso in Ladakh.

Two new highways and an one upgraded
Two new roads have also been announced through a EIA notification.
Further, the G219, the main artery connecting Tibet to Xinjiang should soon be upgraded. All this will be done during China's 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2010).
A new highway, known as G564 will connect the G219 to Purang/Taklakot located near the tri-junction Nepal-India-Tibet.
The G564 will branch off from the G219, near Mount Kailash (Tharchen) and head south, passing between Manasarovar and Rakshas lakes before continuing towards Purang/Takalkhot.
The length of the road will be 107 km, it will have a width of 12 m; it is designed for a speed of 80 km/h. The construction should take 36 months; it would have started in September 2016 and it is supposed to be completed by August 2019.
The second highway, the G365, will connect the G219 (in Kunsha/Gunsa Township) to Tholing (Zanda in Chinese). It will probably continue to the famous religious complex of Tsaparang; the ruins of the Guge Kingdom are presently being restored to bring a large number of Chinese tourists.
The length of the road is about 117 km. It will be slightly narrower than the G564, with a width of 10m. It is designed for a speed of 60km/h. Construction schedule is the same as for the G564.

Highway G564 passes between the lakes

Upgrading the G219
Some 207 km of the G219 will be upgraded between the Mt. Kailash area and Kunsha, where the new highways respectively branches to the G564 and the G565 (see map above).
The G219 will have a width of 12 m and it is designed for a speed of 80 km/h.
According to a Chinese website, the objectives of the two new highways are: “to improve the Tibet Autonomous Region road network infrastructure and improve the highway traffic conditions.”
But the main objective is clearly to develop tourism.

G219	Kailash-Kunsha	207 km
G264	Kailash-Purang	107 km
G265	Kunsha-Tholing	117 km
		431 km

The ruins of the ancient Kingdom of Guge are the main attraction around Tholing (which is incidentally very close of the Indian border – Chamoli district of Uttarakhand).
The Chinese are also planning a railway line along the G564 to Purang, hoping to develop trade with Nepal on a large scale.
Before undertaking the rail line, the section towards Kyirong (from Shigaste) will have to be extended towards Ngari. It will probably happen after 2020.
A Chinese website says the three highways (G219, G564, G565) will pass through the Mabian Yongmu (?) Wetland Nature Reserve, the Kailash National Forest Park, the Manasarovar scenic area, the Tholing Forest Nature Reserve,  the Tholing County Geological parks and the Guge scenic area (Tsaparang).
The project has been entrusted the Chongqing Design and Research Institute Co., Ltd. of the China Coal Industry Group.
The coal companies are everywhere in China.

On the Indian side of the border
In July 2016, Union Road and Transport Minister Nitin Gadkari announced that the Modi government was “hopeful of completing by next April [2017] the construction of highways through Uttarakhand for Kailash-Mansarovar to make it easy for people to visit the abode of Lord Shiva. “
The Minister told PTI: “Kailash-Mansarovar is the identity of our rich ancient culture and heritage. …We are cutting rocks through Himalayas to make a new alignment of highways through Uttarakhand for going to Mansarovar.”
Mr Gadkari claimed: "We can reach Mansarovar directly through Uttarakhand,” it is not certain that Beijing, in its present mood, will agree to receive hordes of Indian pilgrims.
In any case, let us see if the minister keeps his promise. It is doubtful.
But for sure, a highway to Mt. Kailash will be opened on the other Tibetan side by 2019.

The Construction of Sichuan - Tibet railway accelerates
In the meantime, a publication affiliated with Xinhua reported yesterday that "the epic Sichuan-Tibet railway is accelerating construction at both ends -- the section between Chengdu to Ya’an, Sichuan province, and the section between Lhasa to Nyingchi, Tibet Autonomous Region."
As mentioned earlier, the 1,900-km line starts from Chengdu and ends in Lhasa; it passes through Ya'an, Kartze, Chamdo and Nyingchi.
The same publication said: "The Jin Jiguan No.2 tunnel in Ya’an is the first tunnel from the hilly region of Sichuan to Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, and is expected to be completed in March this year."
The Chengdu-Ya’an section should be the first section opened to traffic in June 2018.
Once completed, the travel time from Chengdu to Lhasa will be reduced to 13 hours, with a speed limit of 200 km/h.

China sends a veiled threat to India

China Tibet Online published a strange photo feature titled, Sacred mountains and lakes witness of China-India relationship.
The article sounds like a warning to India.

The first photo shows the historic Kingdom of Guge in Ngari (Western Tibet). The caption says: “When coming to issues regarding the borderlands between China and India, many people will think about ‘Southern Tibet’ which actually includes Tibet’s Nyingchi, and a part of Lhoka.”
Let us remember that China’s 'Southern Tibet' engulf the entire Indian State of Arunachal Pradesh.
The caption continues: “There is a place which maybe makes India ‘feel restless’, it is the Ngari Prefecture. Many actions that the Chinese government has taken in the Ngari can lead to India’s criticism.”
Why should India feel restless?
Why should India ‘criticizes’ China’s policy in Ngari, considering that it is one areas which has received less attention from Beijing …so far.
There is however no doubt that in the years to come, Lhasa (and Beijing) will develop Western Tibet on a large, bringing millions of tourists with the attendant infrastructure close to India’s borders.

The second picture reinforces the warning.
It shows and artillery regiment practicing in Ngari sub-sector of the Tibet Military Area Command (photo may have been taken somewhere else): “From what can be observed on the map, Ngari is an important gateway in China’s southwestern borderland region. The straight-line distance from the Zhada County [Tsamda Dzong] to India’s capital city of New Delhi is just 500 kilometers, which possesses a very important strategic positioning,” says the article.
It really sounds like a threat.

The third picture shows devotees in the Ganga. The caption says: “Apart from the fact of the close distance, India’s Ganges River, the river that is crucial to India’s life and passes through the most fertile lands and the most populated areas in India, originates from Ngari. In Tibetan language, the upper reaches of the Ganges River are called the “Majiazangbu” [Mabja Tsangpo] which means ‘the peacock river’ [from the peacock’s mouth]”.

Next image shows a statue taken in front of the Kunsha Airport in Ngari “which symbolizes the landmark shapes of the four rivers. There are four big famous rivers in the Ngari area which are respectively named as ‘the Horse-spouted River’ [Brahmaputra], ‘the Lion-spouted River’ [Indus], ‘the Elephant-spouted River’ [Sutlej] and ‘the Peacock River’ [Ganga], according to the shapes of the headwater mountains.”
What is the message for India?
There is no doubt that in controlling the rivers of Tibet, China has a great advantage on the downstream nations, India in particular.
India knows it and has to live with it, while reminding China from time to time, that these rivers are ‘shared’ resources, not belonging to the upstream State only.

Then a picture a hydro-power station on the Indus, near Ngari town; the article comments: “The four big rivers are the headwaters of China’s Yarlungzangbo [Yarlung Tsangpo or Brahmaputra] River as well as India’s Ganges River and Indus River. India used to criticize China constructing hydro-power stations.”
China does not ‘criticizes’ China, but just wants to be informed on what is going on ‘shared’ rivers, which are not the unique property of China.

The next photo depicts a beautiful highway in Ngari area: “As an important passageway in the southwestern border area, Ngari has been developing rapidly in recent years. The state has continuously established infrastructure in Ngari including transportation, hydro stations, communication etc.”
There is no doubt that in the next 5 years, China will concentrate its energies in developing Western Tibet with serious implications for the security of India’s borders. I already mentioned on the blog, the improvement of the NH219, the ‘Aksai Chin road’ connecting Western Tibet and Xinjiang, which has already started.
It seems to be ‘the priority’ for the Lhasa government, now lead by Wu Yingjie, but also for a restructured PLA.
Let us not forget that the entire Tibetan plateau is now under ONE Command, the Western Theater Command and the powers of the Tibet Military Command have been greatly enhanced in the recent months.

Then there is a photo of Mount Kailash. The caption notes: “The Chinese government always advocates for a good direction for the relationship between the two countries. China and India have a long friendship history especially with exchanges in the regard of Buddhism. ‘The sacred mountain’ within Ngari, Mount Kailash, is also considered to be at the center of the world by Tibetan Buddhism, Hinduism, the Tibetan Bon religion as well as ancient Jain.”

Amazingly, one gets to see Shiva, “Kailash is the resident place of the highest god, Shiva, who is regarded as the ‘destroying god in Hinduism. The third eye on the forehead of Shiva can spit out flames that turn everything on Earth into ashes.”
Though it is good that China admits that the ‘highest Indian god’ resides in Tibet/China, it is a bit surprising to see the masala, of military, infrastructure and religious pictures in the same article.
Then there is a photo of pilgrims performing the parikrama around the Kailash “always surrounded by white clouds which makes it very difficult to see its real look. Every year the faithful Buddhist pilgrims from India, Nepal, Bhutan and Tibetan-inhabited areas in China come to the foot of the sacred mountain. They circle the mountain, knock their heads on the ground and pray, all is for the purpose of receiving providence and being able to see the mountain peak,” says the China Tibet Online.
Incidentally, the same article appeared in Chinese, but without the photos (at least the article I saw).

You can’t have Kailash without the Manasarovar; the website explains: “To the south of Mount Kailash, there is a sacred lake called Lake Manasarovar which is also considered as the resident place of gods by the religious followers. The lake water is formed by the melted snows of Mount Kailash which runs in different directions, therein forming the Horse-spouted River in the east [Brahmaputra], the Peacock-spouted River in the south [Ganga], the Elephant-spouted River [Sutlej] in the west and the Lion-spouted River in the north [Indus]."
The last picture shows Indian pilgrims at Nathu-la (Sikkim) on their way to the Holy Mountain, “after they circle Mount Kailash they will come to the lake to bath, and in this they purify their souls and wash away sins.”

This type masala (military, religion, diplomacy, etc.) is rare in the Chinese press.
The article definitively contains a veiled threat to India: China is going to develop the area on a mega scale, and India should not feel 'restless' about it and should not ‘criticize’ China.
The message is perhaps: India should feel restless.
Coincidentally, China Military Online announced that General Fan Changlong, the senior vice chairman of China's Central Military Commission (CMC) recently visited the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region and the Tibet Autonomous Region.
During his ‘inspection to frontier defense units’, he urged the PLA troops to resolutely safeguard the security and stability of China's western border areas. The general visited the troops stationed in Hotan, Ngari and Shigatse, “where he talked with soldiers, inspected defense facilities and logistics support conditions of the companies. “
Speaking to the troops, he said that with harsh natural conditions, the Western Theater Command is undertaking arduous and heavy tasks.”
He mentioned “the construction of installations and facilities for war preparation, training and living in frontier defense units should be accelerated."
He was accompanied by General Xu Fenlin, deputy chief of the Joint Staff Department, Lt Gen Liu Lei, Political Commissar of PLA Army, and Gen Zhao Zongqi, commander of the Western Theater Command. Though not mentioned Lt Gen Xu Yong, the boss of the Tibet Military Command must have been around.
Is it another message for India?

Mr Wang, Reopen Demchok

In my previous post, I mentioned the railway lines which will soon reach Purang/Taklakot, north of Pithoragarh district of Uttarakhand and Yatung in the Chumbi Valley, sandwiched between Sikkim and Bhutan.
In this connection, The China Daily published a couple of days ago, an intriguing article entitled Tibet envisioned as hub of Himalayas.
What does it mean?
Is China unilaterally planning to open/reopen the Himalayan passes which were closed in 1962, without informing India?
Today, only three passes have been reopened for trade: Shipki-la in Himachal Pradesh, Lipulekh-la in Uttarakhand, and Nathu-la in Sikkim.
According to The China Daily: “Tibet could become the cultural, economic and humanitarian hub of the Himalayas and so build a peaceful, cooperative relationship with its South Asian neighbors.”
It conveniently quotes some ‘experts’ who attended the Sixth International Forum on Tibetan Studies in Beijing.
Note that it has never been difficult for Beijing to find ‘experts’.
The article explains:

Sandwiched between the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, Tibet plays a significant role in connecting both initiatives, making it an ideal place for cultures to meet.

This surprising statement comes at a time when not only the Chinese ‘transgress’ into Indian territory in Chamoli district of Uttarakhand, but also adamantly refuse to reopen the main traditional route leading to the Kailash-Manasarovar, namely the Demchok-Tashigang route between Ladakh and Tibet.
Blissfully ignorant ‘experts’ like Lai Shanglong, chief economic commissioner of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs affirms:

With its beautiful thangka (Buddhist-themed paintings on cloth) and unique clothing, Tibetan culture is very attractive in the Himalayan region. Its influence can radiate through mountains and connect with other South Asian countries.

The Buddhist culture did not wait for Mr Lai to radiate in the Indian side of the Himalaya.
Mr Lai should visit the Tawang monastery, village gompas in Ladakh, Spiti or Kinnaur? Or Sikkim and Bhutan. He will realize the Buddhist culture flourishes on the Southern slopes of the Himalaya too.
The China Daily article remarks that in June [2015], “China opened a new land route along Himalayan Nathu La Pass for Indian pilgrims to visit the holy sites of Mount Kailash and Lake Manasarovar in Tibet, considered sacred by Hindus and Buddhists. The initiative was universally hailed.”
It may have been universally hailed in China, but not in India: the Nathu-la route is several times longer than the traditional route in Ladakh (via Demchok).
Why are the Chinese so quiet about the demand from the people in Ladakh to reopen the old caravan road?
It is a mystery.
After all, for centuries it has been the main (and the easiest) route to the Holy Mountain.
One of the reasons could be the proximity of the National Highway 219, infamously known as the Aksai Chin road, cutting across the Indian territory in Northern Ladakh.
Mr Lai, with his poor knowledge of the region, amazingly argues:

if China expanded its humanitarian aid projects in Tibet to other South Asian countries - providing practical services such as teaching, repairing buildings and medical treatment - that initiative would also earn praise. …This would strengthen goodwill toward China in South Asian communities, improve China's image and increase support from neighboring countries.

He does not mention Demchok nor Shipki-la or Mana-la (Uttarakhand) routes?
Let us not forget that when the government of Himachal Pradesh appealed to Delhi to make Shipki-la one of the routes to the Kailash, it was immediately blocked by China.
Liu Zhifu, director of the South Asia Research Institute at Xizang Minzu University told the Beijing Forum that “trade routes have facilitated economic and cultural interaction for centuries”.
It is true, but just look at the map of the scheme One Belt One Road.
One notices that China is ready to open new routes or corridors, but only with its friends (Pakistan, i.e. the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and Nepal in Zham and Kyirong).
Liu Zhifu added that the Belt and Road Initiative “is breathing new life into Purang (trijunction Tibet-Nepal-India), Kyirong, Zham and other ports.”
This 'new life' will only help accelerate the process of the integration of Nepal in the Middle Kingdom.
Di Fangyao, executive deputy director of the Institute commented: “It's high time that Tibet increase its exports of locally produced goods”; he complained that the trade market in Yatung opens only for only six months “before the harsh winter sets in”.
It is perhaps true, but China is not sincere in its approach.
It should first reopen Demchok.
Let us hope that Ms Swaraj will ask her Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, when he visits Delhi Next week: why are you so adamant to let the people and goods flow again over the Himalaya. Let the devotees wanting to visit the abode of Lord Shiva use the easiest road: Demchok or Shipki-la.
Pilgrims and traders, instead of using a long and tortuous route, could take the Ladakh or Shipki-la routes as it was done for centuries.
Incidentally, China still claims Demchok as theirs.
It would be interesting to refer the case of Demchok to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA).
What right does have Beijing to claim Demchok?
None!
For centuries it has been part of the kingdom of Ladakh and remains so after the Himalayan region was integrated  into the Dogra State during the 19th century.
China was nowhere to be seen.
Like in the South China Sea and other places at the periphery of the Middle Kingdom, it is an invented claim without historical basis.
Is it this that Beijing does not want to admit?
Otherwise, why this double speak?

Roads to the Border?

My article Roads to the Border appeared in The Statesman

Here is the link...

Is the Indian Government slowly waking up from its slumber?
It seems so, but it is wise to not celebrate too early.
Union Road and Transport Minister Nitin Gadkari announced that his government was “hopeful of completing by next April the construction of highways through Uttarakhand for Kailash-Mansarovar to make it easy for people to visit the abode of Lord Shiva. “
The Minister told PTI: “Kailash-Mansarovar is the identity of our rich ancient culture and heritage. …We are cutting rocks through Himalayas to make a new alignment of highways through Uttarakhand for going to Mansarovar.”
Though this sudden interest in India’s borders is welcome, it is not clear if the minister is aware that ‘Shiva’s abode’ is not located in India, but in China; Mr Gadkari claimed: "We can reach Mansarovar directly through Uttarakhand,” it is not certain that Beijing, in its present mood, will agree to receive hordes of Indian pilgrims.
Though it did not receive the same publicity than the Lipulekh road, the Jammu & Kashmir government last month ‘approved’ the construction of the 150 km long Chushul-Demchok road. It was a positive move, though the proposal has now been sent to National Board for Wildlife for clearance!
And as usual in India, ‘final clearance’ may take years …and the construction decades.
In 2013, Thuptsan Chhewang, the MP for Ladakh, had advised Delhi: “If we say Ladakh is our territory then why anyone who wants to go beyond Pangong, has to get permission from New Delhi.” He had suggested that Demchok, the border village with Tibet, should be opened for tourists: “That would make our claim strong and help in the development of border areas.”
It would certainly go a long way to improve the lives of the local population.
But has Delhi the guts and foresight …and simply the time, to look into the issue?
The Echo of India, being a daily publication from Siliguri, understands better the reality of the border issue. In an editorial, it points out: “Chinese troops making occasional incursions into Arunachal Pradesh and then going back on their own is not something new. Each time such an incursion took place, whether under the UPA rule or under the NDA rule, the official explanation of New Delhi was that it was a matter of ‘perception’ of the line of actual control and where exactly it lies.”
Early this month, ‘transgressions’ happened again in the Kameng district of Arunachal and one minister stated that it was not so serious: after being involved in a ‘hand-to-hand fight’ with Indian soldiers, some 250 Chinese troops distributed chocolates. The Government seems satisfy with the chocolates distribution.
The Daily concludes: “New Delhi must spell out its policy clearly: whether it wants to avoid a military confrontation with China anyhow, or whether it intends to defend the territorial integrity of the country, come what may. A policy of appeasement will only tempt China to be bolder and more aggressive.”
To solve the problem, there is one solution: to build proper infrastructure to the border.
During a visit in Uttarakhand, Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh declared that all-out efforts should be made to ensure prosperity in the State by “creating employment opportunities for the local youth so that the growing ‘forced migration’ from the resource-crunched state could be checked.”
Singh also spoke of the mountain region’s sensitivity as a border state: in other words, build road, provide telecom facilities, open schools and hospitals.
It is what Nehru had understood and planned to do in the early 1950s.
Unfortunately nothing happened during the following decades.
One can only hope that it will be different this time, but it is not obvious.
For example, it was recently announced that some 73 roads in border areas are ‘way behind schedule’.
While the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has recently approved 27 new roads to the border (at an estimated cost of Rs 1,937 crore for a length of 805 km), the Ministry of Defence has given its ‘operational clearance’ for 55 roads.
According to The Deccan Herald (DH), both the home and defence ministries are finding it tough “to complete the roads already approved by the government following the recommendations of the China Study Group under the Prime Minister’s Office, which identified 73 such roads.”
The Border Roads Organisation was asked to build 61 of the 73 roads with a total length of 3,417 km; they were to be completed by 2012, but the completion schedule has now been pushed back to 2020: “The roads to be constructed are located in high altitude areas between 9,000 to 14,000 feet. Oxygen depletion limits working capacity of labourers. Other constraints are air support, hard rock, natural calamities and limited working season,” says the document accessed by the DH.
What is making India’s situation more critical is that on the other side of the Himalayan slopes, a deluge of Chinese tourists are arriving. Last year, more than 20 million visited the Tibetan Autonomous Region.
According to Lhasa’s Tourism Bureau, this year Lhasa received 176,100 tourists during the May Day holiday (April 30-May 2).
Bayi, located north of the Indian border of Arunachal Pradesh, received more than 174,000 tourists from January to March in 2016, up by 53 percent. Incidentally, Bayi (or ‘8-1’) means that the area belongs to the People’s Liberation Army whose anniversary falls on 8-1 or August 1.
At the same time, Western Tibet (opposite Ladakh) has seen a five-fold increase in visitors over a year.
In order to welcome millions of tourists, Beijing develops at a fast pace the infrastructure on the plateau.
The Economist recently wrote: “A COLOSSAL roller-coaster is how a senior engineer described it. He was talking about the railway that China plans to build from the lowlands of the south-west, across some of the world’s most forbidding terrain, into Tibet.”
Xinhua also mentions the importance of Chinese ‘tourism’ to defend the borders with India; about National Highway 219, known in India as ‘the Aksai Chin road’ it speaks of a ‘heavenly road bringing the high life to Tibetan Plateau’.
Xinhua remarks: “It is the melon season in neighboring Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, fresh fruit is stacked up at the roadside, waiting to be ferried through the Kunlun Mountains and up to the plateau along the Xinjiang-Tibet Highway.”
This road has not only linked the two most strategic (and restive) provinces of China (Tibet and Xinjiang) but also helped to tremendously cut the cost of the PLA ‘defending the Indian border’.
According to the Chinese news agency: “With a safe, modern highway, transportation costs from Yecheng [in Xinjiang] to Ngari [in Tibet] have fallen by 55 percent, leading to cuts of about 40 percent in the price of commodities in the Tibetan town. Better yet, the number of tourists in Ngari has surged five-fold.”
In other words, China’s ‘Indian front’ will get its supplies faster and cheaper.
Border infrastructure is particularly important at a time when China has undertaken deep military reforms; one of the most important is that the two fronts facing India (in Ladakh and Arunachal), have been merged into one Western Theater Command (formerly Lanzhou and Chengdu Military Regions), greatly improving the management of the borders with India.
But all this does not deter the Indian Government from its archaic policies: an antiquated ‘Inner Line Permit’ dating from the Raj still prevails in border areas; will this ever change? It was recently announced that it may change soon, but here again, one has to see it to believe it.