China’s New War over Internet

Swearing on Internet

My article China’s New War over Internet appeared in NitiCentral.


Here is the link...

Beijing irredentism is not restricted to the China Seas, Beijing also wants to be the leader in cyberspace and impose its own law.
President Xi Jinping in his keynote speech at the World Internet Conference (WIC), recently asserted that the world needs new rules for cyberspace; he strongly defended the Middle Kingdom’s internet controls.
The three-day conference was held in Wuzhen in Zhejiang province. The Chinese media said that some 2,000 senior global technology company executives and ‘world leaders’ from more than 120 countries and regions had come to discuss the ‘future of Internet’.
The foreign leaders who attended the conference included Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, Pakistani Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister Karim Massimov, Kyrgyzstan’s Prime Minister Surrey Aliyev, and Tajikistan’s Prime Minister Kokhir Rasulzoda.
The WIC website affirmed that the Conference was part of Beijing’s effort to ‘assume the responsibility of a great network power’. Beijing may have some reasons to believe that China has become ‘the leader’.
According to the China Internet Network Information Centre, China has some 668 million internet users, 594 million using their mobile phones.
The same source says that in 2014, Chinese mobile users spent an average of 158 minutes every day using their smartphones for entertainment.
I wonder if anybody has similar stats for India.
But …China has the strongest and most sophisticated censorship machinery of the planet. According to GreatFire.org, more than 5,000 websites are officially blocked on the mainland. In actual fact, it may be much, much more. This writer’s blog has been blocked for the past 5 years. Why? Just because I analyze the situation in Tibet from time to time. Among the ‘famous’ websites and networking platforms blocked are Twitter, Facebook and Instagram.
At the same time, e-payment is growing fast. China Internet Watch Mobile believes that the amount paid through internet in China reached US$4.19 trillion during the second quarter of 2015, up 445 per cent from the same period last year. Some 650 million Chinese use Tencent’s mobile messaging app WeChat; out of which 60 per cent use the app’s built-in WeChat Wallet service.
And then e-commerce! It may reach US$ 672 billion this year, more than 40 per cent of the world e-commerce. On November 11, on the occasion of Singles Day shopping, Chinese spent a record US$14.3 billion online on websites such as Alibaba’s Taobao Taobao and Tmall.
Does this give China the right to dictate the world’s Internet policy?
No, especially with the Chinese State becoming more and more assertive in the way it controls the use of the Internet. The Party considers the present ‘struggle’ as a war, on whose outcome would depend the fate of the Communist Party. Many believe that if ‘western views’ would prevail, the Party could soon lose its central place in China.
Qiao Mu, a communication expert at the Beijing Foreign Studies University told The South China Morning Post: “Over the past few years, Beijing has gone from passive defence to active offence in its internet security. Staging the conference is a way for China to showcase the legitimacy of its internet governance.”
In his address to the Conference, Xi Jinping asserted: “The internet should be regulated to protect countries’ core interests”, while presenting his vision for a new system of cybersecurity governance.
Xi noted that control was important to find ‘a balance between order and freedom of expression’; he asserted that ultimately each country has the right to choose their own set of rules: “Cyberspace is not a place beyond the rule of law. While respecting internet users’ rights to exchange ideas and express their views, efforts should be made to build a sound cyberspace order under the law so as to protect the legitimate rights and interests of all internet users”.
Though not openly, Xi’s attack was directed at the United State, especially when he said “There should be no internet hegemony”; he also spoke of no “interference in another country’s internal affairs.”
It was rather ironic as it is a fact that the Chinese hackers have been involved in attacks on other countries’ institutions more than once.
Was Xi really serious when he spoke of not ‘tolerating or supporting internet activities that damage another country’s national security’?
While Lu Wei, China’s ‘cyberspace minister’ promised to “build a multilateral, democratic, transparent international Internet governance system that will better benefit the whole world,” The New York Times was barred from this year’s Conference.
The China Daily reported quoted Lu saying China ‘only welcomes friends’, though he denied there was any censorship in the country.
Today, China has one of the most comprehensive Internet censorship apparatus in the world to suppress dissidence and any information considered ‘unsafe’ for the ruling Communist Party.
A Xinhua article explained: “A stabilized China is in line with global interests, which is especially true comparing China's security, prosperity and vibrancy with chaos in some places around the world.”
It is not said if India is counted in the chaotic countries …in any case, there is no doubt that the freedom in India brings far more stability than the ‘order’ in China, which seems caught in a vicious circle.
Last year, a Central Leading Group for Internet Security and Informatisation was created to monitor the Internet and in July this year, the National People’s Congress, China’s legislative body, published the draft of the first internet security law, under which law enforcement agencies will be authorised to ban access to the Internet during times of social unrest and will have the legal powers to obtain whatever information they require from telecom providers.
A year ago, when several well-known bloggers were convicted on various charges, including ‘picking quarrels and provoking trouble’, others became silent; that is to ‘kill a few chickens to scare the monkeys’, in Maoist parlance.
One of the ‘chickens’ is human rights lawyer, Pu Zhiqiang, who was detained in May 2014 while attending a private seminar to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the Tiananmen crackdown. He was charged of writing microblog commentaries critical to the Party.
In November, in an article in the People’s Daily, Huang Kunming, the Party’s deputy propaganda chief, use the word ‘battlefield’ to describe the ideological struggle facing the Communist regime over internet security. He spoke of “strengthening the building of the online battlefield of thoughts and culture”.
Internet security has become an increasingly important priority for a nervous Communist Party over the past two years.
To give another example of the regime’s uneasiness, on October 21, the Party published new Disciplinary Regulations; it included a new violation item which referred to officials who make improper comments about, or criticize the Party's decisions.
The People's Forum, a subsidiary under The People's Daily, explained the regulation: Party members are still allowed to have individual opinions which can be different from the Party's position, but they have to express them through proper channels. The new regulation is to prevent officials from making improper comments or criticizing the Party Central's key decisions in a public forum.
Internet security may have become an increasingly important priority for the Communist Party, but the free world does need to follow Beijing’s lead or China’s law and lose its freedom in the process.

Legitimacy of Communist Party of China

My article Legitimacy of Communist Party of China appeared in NitiCentral.

Here is the link...

While India is debating the interference by one of the 3 pillars of democracy into another’s domain, China does not face such problems as all the pillars of governance, i.e. judiciary, legislative, executive and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have to obey the diktats from the Communist Party of China (CPC), namely the Politburo of its Central Committee.
It is a fact that for nearly 7 decades, discussing the legitimacy of the Party’s supremacy has been forbidden in China.
However, with the changing economic scenario and as the cadres prepare to hold the 5th Plenum of the 18th Party Congress next week, we may soon witness changes.
The South China Morning Post (SCMP) recently reported: “Open discussion by top graft-buster Wang Qishan about the legitimacy of the ruling Communist Party - a topic long deemed unquestionable - has raised the eyebrows of some commentators.”
While addressing the Party and World Dialogue 2015 in Beijing last month, Wang, a member of the Politburo’s Standing Committee asserted: “The legitimacy of the Communist Party of China derives from history, and depends on whether it is supported by the will of the people; it is the people's choice."
It is a new discourse, especially in front of a gathering which included overseas participants.
Though the Hong Kong newspaper said that many analysts did not agree with Wang's interpretation of ‘legitimacy’, it indeed marked a change of wind. The SCMP quoted Zhang Lifan, a Beijing-based commentator, who believed that Wang's remarks mark “a shift of attitude in the party as a result of intensified social conflicts and increasing pressure from an underperforming economy.”
Zhang added: “In the past, the issue was not allowed to be discussed, because the Party thinks its rule is justified unquestionably.”
Many China watchers believe that since Mao’s death and the advent of Deng Xiaoping at the end of the 1970s, the Party's legitimacy mainly relied on economic growth, which was supposed to suffice for the masses. That was the ‘to get rich is glorious’ policy of Deng.
Earlier, during the Great Helmsman’s days, political power grew out of the barrel of a gun. Today, China cannot depend anymore on the ‘gun’ to impose its rule over the masses and with the power of Xiaoping’s mantra receding with the economic slowdown, is the Party’s ‘legitimacy’ fading away?
It is where India has a great advantage over the Middle Kingdom, and this, despite the dysfunctional ups and downs of the democratic process.
In March, the Qiushi, the CPC’s organ mentioned that development has brought about new challenges for the Party to maintain its relationship with the public. It listed some of these challenges.
One is income disparity which increased the public's complaints: “If not resolved, these complaints will weaken confidence and trust in the Party,” the article says.
Then, the open market economy has brought “laissez-faire and a multicultural ideology”, and the Party’s publication concludes: “This has weakened and diluted the Party's education of the public.”
Further, the plurality in the social structure makes it difficult to lead and guide the people, asserts the Qiushi, while, “economic globalization and the Internet make it easier for the West to achieve a cultural infiltration of China.”
It is always easier to blame a ‘foreign hand’, but it does not change the fact that the Party is facing more and more problems of ‘legitimacy’.
The Party organ also quotes the disintegration of some regimes (‘coloured’ revolutions), “all have had a disturbing psychological impact on the people of China,” before concluding: “some people no longer trust and follow the propaganda of the Party the way they used to.”
And what about the large scale corruption in the Party and in the PLA?
Many feel that the possibility of a revolution could not be ruled out in China today. The situation in the Armed Forces is particularly worrying for the leadership in Beijing.
In April, Xinhua reported that Xi Jinping, Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), approved a Notice titled, “Opinion to Develop a Political Team of Cadres That Will Demonstrate Absolute Loyalty to the Party, Has a Strong Capability to Fight in Wars, and Displays a Good Work Style and Image.”
When this type of ‘order’ is issued in China, it usually means that the opposite is happening; in other words, senior officers are no more loyal to the Party.
The Notice directed that all levels within the PLA should focus on “strengthening the ideology work to build a strong Party spirit; strictly abide by the political rules and requirements; display devotion to the Party; and ensure absolute obedience to the Party’s directions, to the PLA’s Political Department, and to Chairman Xi.”
The anti-corruption campaign has targeted scores of PLA officers (more than 50 generals are said have been investigated).
In June, Reuters quoted the PLA Daily affirming that ‘enemy’ forces were trying to infiltrate the ranks to push for the ‘de-politicisation’ of the military and reduce the Party's role in the Army.
The PLA publication admitted: “With a changing society, younger officers were now entering the forces without a proper understanding of the party's role and its discipline requirements.”
It cited Mao: “When political discipline is firm, then the ruling party prospers; when political discipline is weak, the ruling party falls … Liberalism has always been the great enemy."
The military is deeply shaken with two former CMC’s deputy chairmen Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou being charged with corruption.
In a separate analysis, the SCMP affirmed, “Without a more durable basis for power, challenges loom.”
It cites some facts of history: 3,000 years ago, the House of Zhou overthrew the Shang dynasty in the battle of Muye and became the Middle Kingdom’s new ruler. At that time, the Duke of Zhou came up with the concept of the Mandate of Heaven: a bad ruler will be thrown away by Heaven and replaced by a virtuous one: “but the new king, whose legitimacy came from heaven, must have good conduct for it to continue endorsing his status as the rightful ruler.”
Historically, dynasties which have not been able to deliver the goods to the masses have been overthrown. Rebellions or revolts are a sign that the divine approval was been withdrawn and that it is time for the Kingdom to give way for a new dynasty, which will have Heaven’s legitimacy.
Sensing the changing winds in the midst of China’s economic difficulties, Wang Qishan decided to break the taboo and mention the Party's legitimacy: “For things to work in China, we have to see whether the people are happy or not, satisfied or not, whether they would approve of our work”, he said.
At the same time, Xinhua reported that President Xi Jinping's push for reforms has “come up against unimaginably fierce resistance.”
The news agency said that “the in-depth reform touches the basic issue of reconfiguring the lifeblood of this enormous economy and is aimed at making it healthier …the scale of the resistance is beyond what could have been imagined.”
Reuters, which reproduced the article, commented: “the commentary suggested the reforms had not achieved the desired results and were opposed by various factions.”
According to Xinhua, the strength of the CPC is still growing, it would have gained 1.1 million members last year, taking the Party’s membership to some 88 million, (more than the population of Germany), but, at the same time, disillusion has also exponentially grown amongst the masses.
Xinhua may speak of the strengthened vitality of the Party under Xi, but the fact remains that in China today, less and less ‘aam aadmi’ believe that the Communist Party can solve the issues facing the Chinese Nation.
A rather worrying challenge for the Party and its current leadership.

Has China decided the Future of Tibet?

China celebrates the 50th Anniversary of the Tibet 'Autonomous' Region

My article Has China decided the Future of Tibet? appeared in NitiCentral.


Here is the link...

Though it escaped the Indian (and the world) media, a crucial event occurred in Beijing: the Sixth Tibet Work Forum was held on August 24 and 25.
A Tibet Work Forum usually decides the fate of the Roof of the World for the next 5 to 10 years. India should be concerned, as it also defines China’s western borders policies.
The previous Forum was held in Beijing in January 2010. Before that, four Tibet Work Conferences were organized in 1980, 1984, 1994 and 2001.
But what is exactly a Work Forum on Tibet?
It is a conference attended by several hundreds of officials, including the entire Politburo, the People’s Liberation Army, representatives from different ministries, as well as local satraps.
The 6th Tibet Work Forum was presided over by President Xi Jinping, who pleaded for more efforts to promote economic growth and bring about inclusive social progress in Tibet and Tibetan-inhabited areas.
Note that the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) and Tibetan-inhabited areas of four provinces (Sichuan, Gansu, Qinghai and Yunnan) have been clubbed together as far as Beijing’s policy for Tibet is concerned.
Xi vowed to take sustainable measures and continue preferential policies for the mountainous region which, “has entered a critical stage toward fulfilling the country's [China] goal of building a moderately prosperous society in a comprehensive way.”
The Chinese President asserted: “Development, which aims to improve living conditions for various ethnic groups and beef up social cohesion, should be advanced in a prudent and steady manner, and all measures taken should be sustainable.”
The dual objective of improving the ‘local conditions’ and ‘beefing up social cohesion’ pervaded the speech of the President
Xi also affirmed, “efforts should also be made to incorporate education on ‘socialist core values’ into courses in schools at various levels, popularize the national commonly-used language and script, and strive to foster Party-loving and patriotic builders and successors of the socialist cause.”
Will the Tibetans accept these ‘core values’?
Imposition of Chinese language could have severe backlashes on the Tibetan plateau. The unrest in March/April 2008 has already been a sign of rejection of the imposition of a new Tibetan culture with Chinese characteristics.
Premier Li Keqiang was also present at the Forum. He affirmed that “it will be an arduous task for Tibet to build a ‘moderately prosperous’ society over the next five years,” though this is a component of the Chinese Dream, so dear to President Xi.
Li also pledged to increase financial aid to Tibet and build further infrastructure which means more roads, airports, railway lines and dams. For India, it is certainly a cause of worries.
The entire politburo, including the seven members’ Standing Committee, was in attendance.
Behind these promises, the Forum focused on China’s main worry, namely the ‘instability’ of the Land of Snows, or in other words, the ‘nationalist’ aspirations of the people of Tibet.
According to the official news agency, President Xi Jinping mentioned “national and ethnic unity as the key plans for Tibet, vowing a focus on long-term, comprehensive stability and an unswerving anti-separatism battle.”
It is ‘an obligatory task’ said Xi. It shows that China is still trembling, more than 60 years after Tibet was ‘liberated’.
Xi reiterated his theory about the ‘border areas’: "governing border areas is the key for governing a country, and stabilizing Tibet.”
Tibet’s main border is with India. Does it mean that China is afraid of India?
Xi also urged “the promotion of Marxist values in people's views on ethnics, religion and culture.” Party’s officials should “keep pace with the CPC Central Committee in their thoughts and deeds, telling them to ‘cherish unity as if it was their eyes’,” said Xi.
Will Tibetans one day cherish unity with Han Chinese as if the latter were their own eyes? It may never happen.

An important Politburo meeting
Already on July 30, a meeting of the Politburo had discussed Tibet affairs. Xinhua had then announced: “Chinese leaders met to discuss economic and social development in Tibet, and how to ensure the autonomous region achieve prolonged stability.”
President Xi Jinping said the solution for Tibet was to “maintain national religious policies and promote patriotism in Tibet.”
The July Politburo meeting, 4 weeks before the Forum, raises a serious issue. Why to have a full meeting of the Politburo to ‘prepare’ the Tibet Work Forum?
When people had speculated about the possibility of the Party holding meetings at the summer resort of Beidaihe, Xinhua argued: “Not long ago, the CCP Central Politburo met twice, on July 20 and on July 30, which was unusual. They have already discussed ‘The Thirteenth Five-Year Plan’, the CCP Fifth Plenary Session, economic strategies, the ‘anti-tiger campaign’, and other important issues.”
The article, though it does not mention the Tibet issue, asked: "Is it meaningful, necessary, or possible to talk about these issues again in Beidaihe several days or ten days later?”
So why have a Politburo meeting on Tibet (even if ‘Tibet’ was just a topic on the agenda of the July meeting), to discuss the same things 4 weeks later?
A plausible explanation could be that there was some serious disagreement amongst the leaders on the Tibet issue.
The air had to be cleared (or the positions fine-tuned) before calling for the much larger forum which is usually attended by 200 or 300 cadres.
Since the time of the so-called ‘liberation’ in 1950, the leadership has always been sharply divided on the direction to take for the Roof of the World.
The situation seems the same today.
Around the same time, former President Jiang Zemin was targeted.
It was insinuated that ‘a highly positioned cadre’, when he was in power, arranged for his trusted aides to be in the top positions for the purpose of being able to manipulate power in the future. Jiang was asked to stop interfering in China’s affairs.
Could it be that some members of the Jiang faction were trying to derail Xi’s policy of development in Tibet? It is a possibility.

Two high-level visits to the Roof of the World
Following the July Politburo meeting, two members of the over-powerful body were sent to Tibet on ‘inspection’ (a few days before the Forum was held).
Wang Yang, vice-premier of the State Council ‘inspected’ Lhasa and Nagchu between August 13 and 15. Xinhua said that he “investigated relevant work [linked to] poverty alleviation and development, animal husbandry, tourist industry and meteorological services.”
This indicates the direction in which the Forum went a week later.
Wang is said to have concluded: ‘We are proud of the great achievements made for the development of Tibet, Tibet has a precious natural and cultural heritage; it should be cherished.”
It was a prelude to the 6th Tibet Work Forum.
On August 13, Xinhua reported that Xu Qiliang, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), another member of the 25-member Politburo, visited Tibet (and Chongqing). He urged the military forces posted for defense of the border [with India] “to make down-to-earth efforts and build a strong army”.
Xu pleaded for better management and control of the borders “as well as innovation with ideological work at military forces to shore up the morale of servicemen for border defense.”
Xu’s exhortation was reflected in Xi’s speech during the Forum.
Xi reiterated his theory about the ‘border areas’: "governing border areas is the key for governing a country, and stabilizing Tibet is a priority for governing border areas.”
In the years to come, the ‘stability’ of Tibet and the borders with India, irrespective of economic and other issues, will remain crucial for the Beijing leadership to survive.
It was perhaps worthwhile to have 2 meetings!
And of course, “the Central Government did not in the past, nor is now and will not in the future accept the [Dalai Lama's] Middle Way solution to the Tibet issue,” said an article penned by an official the United Front Department after the Forum.
Here too, the hard line has prevailed once again.

China visit and after – Undoing Nehru’s folly

In May, I wrote an article China visit and after – Undoing Nehru’s folly which appeared in NitiCentral.
It was about Nehru's rejection of a seat for India in the UN Security Council.
It occurred twice.
The first time in 1950, when the State Department made the offer and a few years later, when the Soviets were ready to sponsor India for a seat.
Both times, Nehru refused.

Since then, I got a copy of a letter from Nehru addressed to his sister, Vijaya Lakshi Pandit, then the Indian Ambassador in the United States, in which he justifies his refusal.
Here is Nehru's letter.

To Shrimati Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit,
Embassy of India,
Washington, D.C., USA.

SECRET 

PERSONAL

New Delhi,

August 30, 1950.

I have your letter of August 24th. Also Einstein’s new letter.
As far as I can see at present, I shall not be going to Lake Success, But of course there is always a possibility of some new development which might induce me to go there. I am quite sure that my going there casually will do no good to anyone. Einstein and people like him, with their simplicity and good-heartedness, think that some magic might result by a personal intervention. We can hardly plan for magic. Frankly, I do not want to make myself cheap and to get entangled in the internal controversies and debates of Lake Success.
Living in the United States, you are naturally oppressed by the atmosphere there at the present moment. You dislike it and you criticize it. Nevertheless, your view of the world situation is necessarily influenced by your environment. That environment and what happens there is of very great importance because, as you put it, the issue of war and peace may depend upon it.
It is clear that the world outlook today of the British people is markably different from that of America, even though they might be functioning more or less as allies. Western Europe again is also different in its own way. If you travel further to Russia, you are of course in a new world entirely. With new fears, new apprehensions, new ambitions. Here in India though there may not be much intelligent thinking on international affairs, there is nevertheless an instinctive reaction to them which is not at all favourable to the US.
It is no easy matter to deal with this complicated situation where each group thinks differently and where perhaps the only common feature is some kind of fear. Only today I received a letter from Panikkar from Peking together with a report on the present-day China. Both the letter and the report are very interesting and I am therefore enclosing a copy of them for you. Here also you will see an entirely different world with its own way of thinking on problems. What a vast difference there is between this and the US view of China as a stooge of Moscow!
Panikkar is a man of extraordinarily acute intelligence and powers of observation. In fact, his mind is so keen that it over-shoots the mark and goes much further ahead than facts warrant. But his analyzing the situation, apart from the time factor, is usually good. What will happen to China during the next few years is anybody’s guess. But it is a complete misunderstanding of the China situation to imagine that they function like a satellite State of Russia. Only one thing will push them in that direction to some extent. And even then this cannot go far. That one thing is isolation from the rest of the world. The US policy is the one policy which will make China do what the US least want. That is the tragedy or comedy of the situation. We grow blindly to achieve something and get something entirely different.
There can be little doubt that the Chinese Government is trying its best to be friendly to us. Apart from present day conflicts and in the long run, I am sure that it is of great importance to Asia and to the world that India and China should be friendly. How far we shall succeed in this endeavour, I cannot say.

In your letter you mention that the State Department is trying to unseat China as a Permanent Member of the Security Council and to put India in her place. So far as we are concerned, we are not going to countenance it. That would be bad from every point of view. It would be a clear affront to China and it would mean some kind of a break between us and China. I suppose the State Department would not like that, but we have no intention of following that course. We shall go on pressing for China’s admission in the UN and the Security Council. I suppose that a crisis will come during the next sessions of the General Assembly of the UN on this issue. The Peoples’ Government of China is sending a full Delegation there. If they fail to get in there will be trouble which might even result in the USSR and some other countries finally quitting the UN. That may please the State Department, but it would mean the end of the UN as we have known it. That would also mean a further drift towards war.
India, because of many factors, is certainly entitled to a permanent seat in the Security Council. But we are not going in at the cost of China.
Meanwhile, the continuance of the Kuomintang representative in the Security Council becomes more and more Gilbertian. Here is a Permanent Member of the Security Council with power of veto supposed to be a great power. In fact what we have is a Representative of the Government of Formosa having this authority and power at Lake Success. That Government of Formosa too is practically protected by a foreign power, the US.

Pakistan is busy building up a big case against us. There is of course Kashmir. They are now demanding from us a reference to the International Court at The Hague of the canal water dispute. Obviously they are going to raise this matter in the UN and are likely to do so directly on the ground that this might involve a breach of peace between the two countries. They have also written to me after many months about my proposal for a “No War” declaration in the simple and general form which I have originally proposed and which Pakistan had not accepted them.
As regards canal waters, I have not answered them yet, but I shall do so in the course of the next week. I do not propose to agree to The Hague tribunal. But we are prepared for arbitration, that is each party to nominate an arbitrator and a third to be chosen by them.
I am thinking of going to Assam for two or three days soon to confer with people there and to fly over the earthquake areas. We do not yet know the full extent of the earthquake and the damage it has caused. Many areas are completely isolated and people are marooned. It is said that the landscape of upper Assam has changed considerably. Some hills have disappeared and rivers are following new courses. Fortunately that area is not a heaily populated one, or else the damage would have been colossal.

Sd/- Jawaharlal Nehru.

China visit and after – Undoing Nehru’s folly
Here is the link of my May article....

A few months ago, a European diplomat confidentially told me, ‘in fact, the job of Modi is just to undo the knots in which the UPA tied up India in the past’. He was probably thinking of the complex Defence Procurement Policy (DPP) put in place by A.K. Antony, the UPA’s Defence Minister, who made the DPP so complicated that it became impossible for India to arm itself or even ‘make arms in India.’ This is the sad story of the Rafale deal; finally, during his recent visit to France, Prime Minister Modi had cut the MMRCA ‘bind’ and buy a few airplanes ‘off-the-shelf’.
Unfortunately, it is not only in defence issues that the previous governments have entangled India into insolvable predicaments.
The case of a seat in the United Nations’ Security Council is a stark one.
After Modi’s meetings with President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang, I was curious to see what the Joint Statement would say on this issue and if China’s position had moved. I thought that if Beijing is truly keen to enhance the trust between India and China, it should make a gesture and sponsor India’s candidature to the Security Council. Unfortunately, it did not happen.
The Joint Statement says: “The two sides support a comprehensive reform of the United Nations, including recognizing the imperative of increased participation of developing countries in UN’s affairs and governance structures, so as to bring more effectiveness to the UN. China attaches great importance to India’s status in international affairs as a large developing country, and understands and supports India’s aspiration to play a greater role in the United Nations including in the Security Council.”
It does not say that India should have a permanent seat with veto power, like China has. This is really ingratitude from China’s side.
One remembers the 1955 Soviet offer to sponsor India’s case for a permanent seat.
Sarvepalli Gopal wrote in his 3-volume biography of Nehru: “He [Jawaharlal Nehru] rejected the Soviet offer to propose India as the sixth permanent member of the Security Council and insisted that priority be given to China’s admission to the United Nations.”
Now some ‘experts’, like A.G. Noorani have argued that Nehru did the right thing as ‘the offer was unlikely to materialize’.
Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin had told the Indian Prime Minister: “We propose suggesting at a later stage India’s inclusion as the sixth member of the Security Council”; Nehru had replied: “This is to create trouble between us and China. We are, of course, wholly opposed to it. Further, we are opposed to pushing ourselves forward to occupy certain positions because that may itself create difficulties and India might itself become a subject to controversy.”
In another letter, Nehru elaborated about India’s position and the reasons to reject the ‘proposals’: “We have, therefore, made it clear to those who suggested this that we cannot agree to this suggestion. We have even gone a little further and said that India is not anxious to enter the Security Council at this stage, even though as a great country she ought to be there. The first step to be taken is for China to take her rightful place and then the question of India might be considered separately.”
But there is more. Recently, a young scholar, Anton Harder, working on his PhD at the London School of Economics, went through the Vijayalakshmi Pandit Papers kept at the Nehru Memorial Museum & Library in Delhi.
Harder found that in August 1950, Mrs. Pandit, then posted as Ambassador to the US, wrote to her brother: “One matter that is being cooked up in the State Department should be known to you. This is the unseating of [Nationalist] China as a Permanent Member in the Security Council and of India being put in her place. …Last week I had interviews with [John Foster] Dulles and [Philip] Jessup, reports of which I have sent to Bajpai. Both brought up this question and Dulles seemed particularly anxious that a move in this direction should be started.”
Five years before the Soviet offer, Washington was ready to sponsor India for a seat in the Security. A few days later, Nehru answered to Pandit: “You mention that the State Department is trying to unseat China as a Permanent Member of the Security Council and to put India in her place. So far as we are concerned, we are not going to countenance it. That would be bad from every point of view. It would be a clear affront to China and it would mean some kind of a break between us and China.”
The Indian Prime Minister added: “We shall go on pressing for [Communist] China’s admission in the UN and the Security Council. …The people’s government of China is sending a full delegation there. If they fail to get in there will be trouble which might even result in the USSR and some other countries finally quitting the UN.”
Thus whole background is all the more shocking as at that particular time, China was preparing to invade Tibet; a position in the UN would have helped India’s prestige and influence. K.M. Panikkar, India’s Ambassador to China knew about the communists’ intention: on August 15, 1950, it had been reported from Hong Kong that Chinese troops had begun advancing towards Tibet’s borders. Nehru too was aware of the impending ‘liberation’: “This invasion of Tibet might well upset the present unstable equilibrium and let loose dangerous forces. Some of our border States will be affected. But I am more concerned with the larger issues which this involves,” he wrote.
What were the larger issues? One of them was the Chinese admission to the UN!
On October 25, when the news of the Chinese invasion became known, Nehru was unhappy, he frankly told Panikkar: “Our views regarding [the] threatening invasion of Tibet and its probable repercussion should have been communicated to them clearly and unequivocally. This has evidently not been done.”
One can still regret India’s inaction even today and though Modi can’t officially admit it, India has been suffering due to this ‘lapse’ for the past 65 years. But in October 1950, for the then Prime Minister: “The Chinese Government's action has jeopardised our persistent efforts to secure the recognition of China in the interests of world peace have suffered a serious setback.”
What to say? The rest is history, sad history.
As Prime Minister Modi arrived in Xi'an, the first leg of his high profile visit to China, I was wondering if he would speak with the Chinese leadership about Tibet. Apparently, he has not!
The ‘T’ word appears only once in the Joint Statement, when the Kailash yatra is mentioned: “The Indian side appreciated the support and cooperation by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the local government of Tibet Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China to Indian pilgrims for the Kailash Manasarover Yatra …the Chinese side would launch the route for the Yatra through Nathu La Pass in 2015.”
Note that Beijing always speaks of ‘Tibet Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China’! Delhi never speaks of ‘Tamil Nadu of the Republic of India’ or ‘West Bengal of India’. Perhaps it shows that Beijing is still unsure about the legal ground of its ‘presence’ in Tibet.
Apart from this reference, nothing on 'T'.
The fact remains that in the years to come. Narendra Modi will have a lot of work to untie the many knots left by Jawaharlal Nehru and his advisors like K.M. Panikar and V.K. Krishna Menon.
As for the Chinese, the least that one can say is that they have shown little gratitude towards India; Indian leaders should know that till today, Beijing has been unable to appreciate kindness and generosity.

Xi Jinping is a Worried Man

My article Xi Jinping is a Worried Man appeared in NitiCentral.

Here is the link...

During the BRIC and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summits at Ufa, the capital of the Russian Federation’s Republic of Bashkortostan, President Xi Jinping of China looked tired.
True, he spoke of a new international order, of a multi-polar world while asking his colleagues from the BRICS and SCO to look at their relations from a ‘strategic and long-term perspective’, but the Chinese President had certainly China’s difficult internal situation in mind, while delivering his speeches of the New Silk Road and other Chinese mega projects.
The state of affairs in the Middle Kingdom is indeed worrisome, most immediately, because of the collapse of the Chinese stock exchange. But that is not all.
On July 2, 2015, several overseas Chinese websites published an article which had appeared in the Cheng Ming Monthly magazine in Hong Kong on the possible collapse of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
It argued that the Party is “so corrupt that it has come to the verge of disintegration. Even top Party leaders could not avoid speaking of the possibility of the death of the Party.”
Accordingly to the same source, mid-June, the Politburo’s Standing Committee held a two-day expanded meeting to discuss the stern political and economic situation facing the Party.
Though it is difficult to confirm the information contained in the article, it appears that the Standing Committee was joined by the State Councilors (cabinet ministers), senior members of the Central Committee’s Secretariat, members of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and the People's Political Consultative Conference, members of powerful Central Military Commission and top bureaucrats of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), responsible for the anti-corruption campaign; in other words, the cream of the Party.
Xi Jinping asserted, "We must have the courage to face, acknowledge, and accept the harsh reality that the Party has become so corrupt and degenerated that it could trigger the Party's downfall."
The same source said that a report was distributed during the meeting. The research listed six ‘crises’ in the fields of politics, economy, society, faith (religion), which could lead to the Party' collapse.
The report showed that only 25% of the senior officials of the Central Committees and local governments have successfully gone through the CCDI's review; 90% of Party committees at grass-roots or county levels have failed in the review of their performance and needed to be ‘reorganized’, whatever that means.
The next day, China Gate, a Chinese website based in the US, republished another article from Cheng Ming Monthly magazine, this time about the power struggle between different factions within the CCP.
Apparently former President Jiang Zemin and his close associate, Zeng Qinghong, will be the next target of Xi Jinping's and Wang Qishan’s anti-corruption campaign. Once Zhou Yongkang, the former Security Tsar was arrested, the unspoken rule, that no punishment could be imposed on members of the Politburo’s Standing Committee, did not exist anymore.
All this comes at the time of the worse crack in the short history of the Chinese stock exchanges. The South China Morning Post in a commentary said: ‘Future shock: China's market turmoil poses a challenge for Xi Jinping’, adding that “the market instability threatens to be a major setback for President Xi Jinping and his authority.”
The Hong Kong daily rightly argued “stock market crashes inevitably lead to unwanted consequences” and it quoted the Black Tuesday in Wall Street on October 29, 1929 which sent the US into the Great Depression and the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, which left deep scars on the economy of the Asian nations involved.
The SCMP asserted: “Analysts cannot accurately assess the damage that the mainland's stock market turmoil will cause while it continues to roil despite the government's rescue efforts. Yet they all agree that it will have a profound impact on the future of the nation's economy, society and politics.”
Since the stock market started crashing, the loss has been evaluated at $3 trillions; it means that some 30% was lost since June 12, when the exchange was at its peak value.
One of China’s problems is that it is not the institutional investors which hold most of the shares; the stock market is dominated by small individual investors, holding more than 80 % of shares.
The SCMP reported: “It is believed that many of the 90-million-strong investors were burned because they often increased their stakes when prices were high. …Some might well have lost their entire life savings as they used margin loans to bet on the wild market.”
This explained why Xi is a worried man; economic instability could bring along political instability, the ‘investing’ middle-class on which the leadership was banking to bring economic, political and social stability in the Middle Kingdom, may become dissatisfied with the regime; after losing most of their life-earnings in the present crash, will they invest again?
The deep-rooted corruption, the vested interests in the Party and the dissatisfaction of the masses, could make an explosive cocktail.
Today, sorting out the economy in a sustainable manner will need much more than a reform here and there: the future of the Party is indeed at stake.
The Wall Street Journal sees the crash triggering ‘rare backlash’ for President Xi: Jeremy Page explains: “Vibrant stock markets are at the center of Mr. Xi’s plans for an economic makeover, intended to help companies offload huge debts, reinvigorate state enterprises and entice more foreign investment. …Investors talked of ‘the Uncle Xi bull market.’ …the government appearing to panic in its response to the drop, some people are starting to voice doubts about Mr. Xi’s autocratic leadership style.”
And this is happening at a time when Xi faces resistance in the anti-corruption campaign and a serious slowdown of the economy.
Chinese-language news portal Aboluowang commented: “China's struggling stock market could turn into a major collapse …If China's stock market continues to nosedive, it could spark a chain reaction that may lead to a political crisis threatening the authority of the Communist Party and the stability of the country's top leadership.”
It is too early to predict what will happen in the months to come, but the situation is perilous, even if the latest news speaks of a stabilization of the markets.
A compounded element is the new draconian national security law which creates fears among foreign companies; it was openly mentioned by Michael Clauss, the German ambassador to China in a recent interview.
On July 1, the National People's Congress passed a controversial national security law defining threats to the Chinese State's power and sovereignty. For example, a vetting scheme will be introduced to scrutinize any foreign investment that posed a risk to national security’. The NPC is also debating three other laws on foreign investment, cyber security, and foreign NGOs.
Clauss explains that “foreign companies feared the laws might be used to keep certain overseas competitors out of the market. …In China the notion of national security [covers] a very wide range - from culture, technology, food safety up to religion. You can hardly find a field that is not relevant to national security concerns.”
This too does not help to create an atmosphere of trust, which China needs so desperately, if it wants to be a ‘normal’ country.

Ajit Doval reminds China of History on border issue

My article Ajit Doval reminds China of History on border issue appeared in NitiCentral.


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‘The views of the two Governments remain as far apart as before’, wrote Subimal Dutt, the Indian Foreign Secretary in April 1960.
He was addressing ‘all the Indian Missions abroad’ to inform them about the visit of the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, who had come to Delhi to discuss the Sino-Indian border issue.
Tens of hours of talks between Nehru and his Chinese counterpart led nowhere. The transcript of the discussions has recently been declassified in The Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, (Series II, Volume 60). These documents make fascinating reading, particularly in the context of Prime Minister Modi’s recent visit to China and the seemingly stuck border negotiations.
Let us return to the present. During the annual K.F. Rustamji lecture, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval (who also officiates as Special Representative for the border talks with China), affirmed that while India's relations with China ‘were looking up’, India needs to remain on a ‘very very high alert’.
Speaking on 'Challenges of Securing India’s Borders: Strategising the Response’, Doval noted: “We have got a very long border, a very difficult and mountainous terrain snow-clad... for the bilateral relations with China, border is the critical and vital issue.”
Considering that Ajit Doval admitted that ‘advancement made in the relationship with China are centred around the settlement of the border’, it makes the ‘partnership’ all the more unstable.
Doval touched upon Arunachal Pradesh: “We are particularly concerned about the Eastern sector where [Chinese] claims have been made on Tawang (in Arunachal Pradesh) which is totally in contravention of accepted principles.”
Obviously, the NSA refers to ‘Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question’ signed on April 11, 2005 between India and China.
Article VII speaks of the ‘settled population’: “In reaching a boundary settlement, the two sides shall safeguard due interests of their settled populations in the border areas.”
Ten years after the signature of the agreement, Doval reminds the Chinese that: “there is [a] settled population in these areas particularly in Tawang and other areas which have been participating in the national mainstream all through.”
But Beijing has forgotten about the 2005 Guidelines!
It is not even mentioned in the Joint Statement signed during Mr. Modi’s visit to China! It is a serious issue: if an agreement is reached after a lot of effort and time and soon after Beijing become affected by Alzheimer disease, it creates a huge problem for the co-signatory.
Doval mentioned another point: he was surprised that while China has agreed to the McMahon line being the Sino-Burmese border in 1960, the same principle was not accepted in the case of India. He added: “So, these are the ticklish issues. But these ticklish issues have to be talked about, deliberated and worked out.”
Doval also readily admitted that the Special Representative talks between India and China on the boundary issue had not made any headway so far: “Special Representative level talks …haven't reached anywhere. But it is also true that for last 30 years we have not exchanged a single bullet. But, it is also true that the number of intrusions have gone up and down. Fortunately, in the last one year the intrusions have become much less."
Beijing was quick to react to the NSA’s statements.
Foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying declared: “The Chinese side holds a consistent and clear position on the eastern section of the China-India boundary: Arunachal Pradesh is a part of Southern Tibet.”
Madam Hua explained: “The Chinese government does not recognise the McMahon Line, which is illegal,” adding: “The Chinese side is ready to work with the Indian side to resolve the boundary question through friendly consultation at an early date."
Hua did not say anything on the McMahon Line and Burma, she just noted: “it is not easy to resolve the China-India boundary question, as it is an issue left over from history."
Minus the 2005 Guidelines!!!
Incidentally, about the ‘left over from history’ theory, Morarji Desai, the then Finance Minister told Zhou Enlai during the 1960 talks, that it was wrong. China has created ‘history’ by invading Tibet: “Our attitude to Tibet has been condemned not only by our people but also by our friends abroad. They say that instead of being neutral in this dispute between Tibet and China, we should not have allowed you [Chinese] to dominate the Tibetans.”
The future Prime Minister added that India “surrendered all the privileges that we had inherited from the British. This was not entirely to the liking of our people but the Government of India and its leaders are convinced that what we did was the right thing.”
As mentioned earlier, Subimal Dutt told the Indian Missions that the Chinese and Indian views ‘remain as far apart as before’.
That was in April 1960. Unfortunately, nothing has changed since then.
After Zhou left Delhi on April 26, 1960, Dutt wrote to the Indian Ambassadors: “The Premier had seven long talks with the Prime Minister.”
Can you imagine today Modi and Xi together for a week and having 7 rounds of talks (of several hours each) on the disputed border?
What was Beijing’s position vis-à-vis China’s border with India in 1960?
It is summarized by Dutt: “The Sino-Indian boundary is not delimited and has to be settled by discussion between the two Governments.”
Delhi has always said the Eastern sector (then NEFA, today Arunachal) was settled in 1914 during the Simla Convention (i.e. the McMahon Line).
Dutt continues to quote Beijing’s views: “The Chinese will never accept the McMahon Line as a valid boundary. The NEFA area was traditionally part of Tibet and in many parts the Tibetans had been exercising jurisdiction. Indian control has extended there during the last 20 or 30 years.” Madam Hua says the same thing now!
China was (and still is) unwilling to acknowledge that in 1914, Tibet, an independent nation, was entitled to sign treaties or agreements with other countries.
According to Dutt, the next Chinese argument was: “The Ladakh area has been historically and traditionally part of Sinkiang [Xinjiang] in China and western Tibet, and has never been disputed until India tried to extend her control during the last one or two years.”
Here again, Beijing rewrites the history, and the Chinese position is as inflexible 55 years later.
Finally, Beijing equates the situation on the East (where the Chinese claim Tawang) to the West (India’s claims over the Aksai Chin) and says: “The position in Ladakh and NEFA is exactly similar in that there is a line upto which Indian control extends in NEFA and there is a line upto which Chinese control extends in Ladakh. The Indian claim to Ladakh must be treated in exactly the same basis as the Chinese claim to the NEFA.”
Dutt’s conclusion was: “We have disagreed with the Chinese stand on every single point,” however he told the Ambassadors, that it was “quite obvious that the Chinese aim is to make us accept their claim in Ladakh as a price for their recognition of our position in NEFA.”
In another words, a swap.
Today, Beijing is not even ready for a swap as it has added Tawang and the ‘populated’ area around, to its claims, in total contradiction of the 2005 Guidelines.
An Alzheimerish China is dangerous for India and Delhi ‘needs to remain on a very high alert’.

China creating a ‘Parallel’ New Asian World

Countries participating in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

My article China creating a ‘Parallel’ New Asian World appeared in NitiCentral.

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While several American ‘experts’ have started talking of the ‘cracking’ of the Middle Kingdom, Beijing does not seem much bothered: it continues with its initiative to build a ‘parallel’ new world order, centered on China and Asia.
WantChinaTimes, a Taiwanese publication mentions “new political, economic and security systems that China is setting up around the world in an attempt to realign the established international order dominated by the United States.”
Take the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA), the Asian ‘Davos’. This year, President Xi Jinping was invited to participate in the deliberations. The Forum, held in Hainan province during the last week of March, lasted 4 days.
Xi Jinping spoke on his favorite topic, the ‘one belt, one road’ initiative. Xi asserted that the scheme would ultimately benefit 'all nations'. The Chinese President used the occasion to reassure the world that China's economy remained strong and Beijing was only interested to boost old links between Asia and Europe and provide trade and investment opportunities to ‘all’.
Xi said that Beijing was keen to improve regional connectivity ‘for all’: “The programs of development will be open and inclusive, not exclusive. They will be a real chorus comprising all countries along the routes, not a solo effort for China," Xi asserted.
Xi admitted that China would continue to be a major driving force for Asia, but he qualified the new growth: “We will focus on improving quality and efficiency, and give even greater priority to shifting the growth model and adjusting the structure of development.”
The ‘One Belt, One Road’ scheme has different facets, though the main objective is clearly for China to take the leadership of Asia. One element is the Silk Road Economic Belt which would link China, Central Asia, Russia and the Baltic states on one side and China with the Gulf and Mediterranean through Central Asia and West Asia on the other; it would also connect China with Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean. Another element is the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, stretching China’s influence to Europe through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean in the West and to the South Pacific in the East.
The South China Morning Post commented: “It is the most significant and far-reaching project the nation has ever put forward, having domestic and foreign policy implications that impact the economy and strategic and diplomatic relations. Importantly, it provides an opportunity for the nation to take a regional and global leadership role.”
The Silk Road projects would add more than 60,000 kilometres of road, including 4,070 km expressways, and improve the connectivity of the existing transportation network.
The Hong Kong newspaper added: “The initiative dove-tails neatly with its Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and Silk Road Fund, creating a structure for Chinese companies to help build the roads, railway lines, ports and power grids that are sorely needed in many parts of Asia, Africa and the Middle East.”
Both new ‘silk roads’ would involve 65 countries from three continents and 4.4 billion people; according to Beijing, it would ultimately lead to a greater economic cooperation between the concerned countries. Xi spoke of an annual trade volume exceeding US $ 2.5 trillion in a decade: “cooperation and coordination of policies will be win-win for all involved”, he affirmed.
The United States are clearly left out of the scheme of the century, it is what is deeply worrying Washington.
China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), a state-run think-tank published a blue book affirming that in the years to come, China will play a bigger role in international affairs, especially with the boosting of the Asian infrastructure.
The publication entitled ‘The International Situation and China's Foreign Affairs (2015)’ highlights two major summits that China hosted in 2014 as well as the two Silk Roads projects.
The two summits were the Shanghai-hosted Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia and the Beijing-hosted Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).
Chen Xulong, the head of the CIIS’ Department for International and Strategic Studies wrote: “Last year, China played a significant role in multilateral diplomacy and contributed to solving international issues.”
Beijing’s declared objective is to build a new security system to allow ‘Asian countries to take the lead in resolving Asian affairs’.
Another much-talked about initiative is the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Beijing does not want to be subjected to US controlling or monitoring anymore.
WantChinaTimes says: “They do not exclude existing international mechanisms or challenge existing international rules …Such ‘parallel structures’ inevitably carry political significance because they allow China to break through the United States' strategic containment.”
The Chinese initiative is already considered as a success if one looks at the number of countries and territories from five continents which have applied to join the Beijing-led Bank as founding members.
Hua Chunying, the Foreign ministry spokeswoman said that 30 countries had already been approved as Prospective Founding Members (PFMs), but the exact number of PFMs would not be confirmed until April 15. The fund’s capital target is US$100 billion, according to the Chinese Finance Ministry.
Even Taiwan's application is considered. Taipei said the island would like to apply as a founding member under the title of ‘Chinese-Taipei’, a name it uses in different international organisations. Beijing did not object, though said that Taipei should use an ‘appropriate name’.
Though Japan would not be immediately joining, many Western capitals, including London have declared the intention to jump into the boat. Washington, completely taken on the wrong foot, seemed to have lost a battle with the grand success of the Chinese initiative.
The South China Morning Post wrote: “The popularity of the AIIB was a diplomatic victory for China and a setback for the United States. Even in the US, some experts are now criticising Washington for mishandling the issue.”
The Hong Kong newspaper quotes Professor Yu Xiong of Northumbria University in Britain, saying: “This may mark another historic point of China's global influence surpassing the US."
In the US, former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said that the United State has ‘screwed up’ the way it dealt with the AIIB.
Where is India in the scheme?
Xi seems to have scored a point on the Asian chess board, and though Delhi has agreed from the start to participate in the Bank, it is more reserved (with good reasons) about the 2 Silk Roads.
Another mark of China’s independence vis-à-vis the US–led world, is the launching of a new-generation satellite for Beijing’s indigenous global navigation and positioning network. This 17th satellite of the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS) is another sign of China’s ‘independence’.
The China Satellite Global Services Alliance (CSGSA) which sponsors the project even spoke of a ‘Space-based New Silk Road’, adding that it will enable the quick development of the ‘Belt and Road’ plan.
Though the start has been smooth for Xi Jinping, the difficulties of China’s initiatives may soon come to the fore, though it certainly augurs that the 21st century will be Asian. However, we will have to wait for a few years to know if India and China can cooperate, or bitterly compete. With Xi’s new gamble, China has undoubtedly taken a lead, but Narendra Modi’s ‘Make in India’ scheme could also attract of lot of energies to India (and Asia).
This is what is at stake during his forthcoming European tour.

Will China crack up?

My article Will China crack up? appeared in NitiCentral.

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Being a China watcher is a difficult job.
It can however make you rich or famous, provided you write something many in the West will enjoy: the announcement of the Middle Kingdom’s ‘coming collapse’. Unfortunately, wishful thinking is often (not to say never) followed by reality.
It is what David Shambaugh, a respected Chinese expert, who is director of the China Policy Program at George Washington University, has done in his Saturday Essay in The Wall Street Journal.
‘Coming Chinese Crackup’ was prominently circulated on social media by all those with an interest in the ‘cracking’ of China. Wide circulation was probably the objective of the Journal; that way, Shambaugh’s piece has been a success, though it may not automatically make China crack up.
What did the professor ‘prophesied’? He wrote: “The endgame of communist rule in China has begun, and Xi Jinping’s ruthless measures are only bringing the country closer to a breaking point.”
Unfortunately for those who dream of the Dragon’s demise (I am one of them), it is only a point of view and it is doubtful if the events will unfold as forecast.
Bill Bishop, the editor of the excellent Sinocism Newsletter has different views, he commented: “I think his scenario has a 10% probability, and the probability of a ‘crack-up’ may even be lower now than it was in 2011-2012. Xi's apparent control of the PLA and security services, the instruments of hard power should make it much harder for anyone to mount significant resistance in an organized way … and the support from many quarters for what Xi is doing should not be underestimated. Shambaugh does a smart job hedging by leaving the timing open-ended...”
But Bishop sees a new surge of ‘coming collapse of China’ predictions.
Matt O'Brien’s article ‘Is China’s 1929 moment coming?’ in the Washington Post is another one.
As the National People's Congress (NPC) started its deliberations in Beijing, Shambaugh saw the delegates, “participating cheerfully and parroting back official slogans.” This might be true, but it does not mean that it is the end of China.
Interestingly, the author himself admits: “Predicting the demise of authoritarian regimes is a risky business. Few Western experts forecast the collapse of the Soviet Union before it occurred in 1991; the CIA missed it entirely. The downfall of Eastern Europe’s communist states two years earlier was similarly scorned as the wishful thinking of anticommunists—until it happened.”
Ditto for the ‘color revolutions’ in Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan and the Arab Spring; who predicted them?
Shambaugh’s main argument is the following: “Despite appearances, China’s political system is badly broken, and nobody knows it better than the Communist Party itself. China’s strongman leader, Xi Jinping, is hoping that a crackdown on dissent and corruption will shore up the party’s rule.”
Nobody can deny that there something rotten in the Kingdom. During the past 2 months, 30 officers of the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) of the rank of major generals and above are said to have been ‘investigated’. It is unprecedented.
The South China Morning Post spoke of the ‘horrible corruption in the PLA: “All People’s Liberation Army ranks have a price, getting a Communist Party membership has a price, and important military positions are reserved for cronies, senior officers’ children and in-laws.”
The Hong Kong daily quotes Major General Yang Chunchang, a former deputy commandant of China’s Academy of Military Sciences, saying: “Everybody in society knows that in the PLA … you need to pay to join the party. Promotions to become leaders at platoon, company, regiment and division levels all have their own price tags.” The general added “It has affected the security of the army. …It’s too horrible, bribes are in the scale of several tens of millions [yuan].”
The fact that President Xi Jinping is “determined to avoid becoming the Mikhail Gorbachev of China, presiding over the party’s collapse”, does not make China automatically ‘crack up’, as Shambaugh suggests, even if he adds: “His despotism is severely stressing China’s system and society—and bringing it closer to a breaking point.”
Shambaugh believes that: ‘The endgame of Chinese communist rule has now begun …and it has progressed further than many think.”
There is no doubt that Communist China will crack one day; historically, it has happened to all empires and regimes, but it is worth noting that the present leadership in Beijing has carefully studied the ‘collapse’ of the Soviet Union and other authoritarian regimes and has drawn its own conclusions. Xi’s fight against corruption is just one action to avoid that end.
When Shambaugh makes the end bloody: “Communist rule in China is unlikely to end quietly. …Its demise is likely to be protracted, messy and violent,” the author does not raise the question: who will benefit from such an implosion or explosion?
Certainly not the United States or Europe which are so intimately linked, economically and otherwise, with ‘Communist’ China.
What would be more interesting to study is what would be the direct and immediate implications of a ‘collapse’ of China on the West and Asia.
Shambaugh speaks of ‘five telling indications of the regime’s vulnerability and weakness’.
Unfortunately, the author’s arguments often lack logic. Let us take the first ‘indication’: “China’s economic elites have one foot out the door, and they are ready to flee en masse if the system really begins to crumble.”
If a large number of wealthy Chinese flee to New Zealand, Canada or Australia, it has more to do with the crack-down on corruption institutionalized by Xi Jinping and his colleague Wang Qishan, than a sign of forthcoming collapse. Before ill-gotten wealth is confiscated by the all-powerful Central Discipline and Inspection Committee, corrupt officials and business people are keen to transfer their wealth to safe heavens abroad. How is it a sign on the forthcoming ‘end’ of the present regime?
In the same way, the other 4 ‘indications’ are not wrong, but conclusions are often hasty, to please the readers.
Shambaugh’s conclusion is: “These five increasingly evident cracks in the regime’s control can be fixed only through political reform.” It is certainly true, but one has to admit that China’s societal values are different from the ones of the West, and reforms do not mean the same thing in Washington and Beijing.
Looking at a recent example, has the Ukrainian revolution been a success or has the Western interference created further mess? It is a question that Shambaugh should ponder upon.
It is also surprising that the WSJ article does not mention Xi Jinping’s new theory of the ‘Four Comprehensives ‘which refer to building a moderately prosperous society, deepening reform, governing the country according to rule by law, and enforcing strict party discipline.
One can understand that the last ‘comprehensive’ is not palatable to the US, but it is not a proof of ‘collapse’.
The instability of the so-called ‘minorities’ areas (Tibet, Xinjiang, etc.) could be a more dangerous issue as it is presently wrongly handled by Beijing.
Ultimately, nobody knows if (and when) China will crack up, collapse or simply reform soon. The last would be the best alternative for China and the rest of the world.
By the way, do you think that the International Monetary Fund, many Western nations as well as some of US’s Asian allies (Australia, Japan and South Korea, etc.) would agree to participate in a Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), is China was perceived by them as ‘cracking’?

The Ethnic Faces of China

China's Panchen Lama and Hong-Kong-based
Master Kuan Yun

My article The Ethnic Faces of China appeared in NitiCentral.

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The third session of China's 12th National People's Congress (NPC) opened with fanfare at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing on March 5, 2015. Two days earlier, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) had started its deliberations.
The Two Meetings (or Two Sessions) have always been an occasion to see new faces and hear people who are not always in the news.
This is particularly the case for the ‘ethnic faces’.
Padma Choling, (alias Pema Thinley), Chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Regional People's Congress and only ‘ethnic’ Tibetan member of the CCP’s Central Committee, has recently been used by Beijing to create a flutter, widely reported in the world press; he declared: “it's not up to the Dalai Lama [to decide about his own reincarnation].”
The Tibetan official objected to the Dalai Lama’s announcement that ‘his traditional religious role should cease with his death’. Padma Choling affirmed that it was against “the Tibetan Buddhism tradition as the soul of a senior lama is reincarnated in the body of a child on his death. …[as] the move is expected to upset the reincarnation system that has been honored for hundreds of years in Tibet and destabilize the Buddhist region.”
The Central Committee member added that the process: “should follow strict historical conventions and required religious rituals of the Tibetan Buddhism …and be approved by the central government.”
For Beijing, it is for the Communist Party of China to ‘decide’ who will be the next Dalai Lama.
An atheist Party, which has unexpectedly become expert in ‘religious matters’, believes that the Dalai Lama’s claims to stop his lineage (more correctly, the institution of the Dalai Lamas) “is blasphemy against the Tibetan Buddhism.”
Poor Marx must have turned in his tomb, if he heard the uttering of his Tibetan follower? Does Padma Choling realize that when he speaks of ‘soul reincarnation’, it is a serious Marxist blasphemy?
Beijing has a few other ‘ethnic faces’, who are regularly seen (often in traditional costume) during the NPC/CPPCC deliberations.
This is also true for the People's Liberation Army (PLA), though no ‘ethnic’ officer has ever made to it to the powerful Central Military Commission or the Central Committee.
However, Beijing realizes that these 'faces' (Tibetans, Uyghurs, Mongols, Huis, etc.) are very useful to support China’s pretense of 'regional autonomy'.
In March 2014, when 33 people were killed and 130 wounded when a group of attackers dressed in black went on the rampage in Kunming railway station, we heard the voice of Saimati Muhammat.
In an interview to Xinhua, Saimati affirmed that counter-terrorism in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region had the strong backing from the PLA: “Xinjiang is at the front line struggle against 'The Three Forces’, namely terrorism, extremism and separatism,” said Saimati, a Uygur ethnic and member of the NPC.
Saimati Muhammat who is one of the first Uyghurs to be promoted as a Major General in the PLA, is presently Deputy Commandant of Lanzhou Military Command Area (MAC).
Tibet is also represented in the PLA delegation to the NPC.
Major General Ngawang (Ang Mong) Sonam, born in Jyekundo in today’s Qinghai province is today Deputy Commander of Qinghai Military District, also of Lanzhou MAC. A Chinese publication noted: “These [officers] bring pride to the rugged western China [Tibet and Xinjiang], they are absolutely honest and have defended the country's frontiers with their blood; they feel from their heart for the people,” adding: “Minority officers are dedicated to a strong army and China’s steadfast dream.”
In the religious field too, Beijing has its ‘ethnic faces’.
On March 5, China Tibet Online reported the visit of a ‘Buddhist’ delegation from Tibet to Bangladesh. Can you believe it?
Quoting the Chinese Embassy in Bangladesh, the website said: “At the invitation of the Buddhism Association of Bangladesh, the China Tibetan Buddhism delegation, led by Rinpoche Dupkang Tupden Kedup, visited Bangladesh from February 21 to 25.”
Dupkang, though Chairman of the Tibet Branch of Buddhist Association, is an nameless religious figure outside Tibet.
But, he has now been awarded the ‘2015 Atisha Peace Gold Award’ by the Buddhism Association of Bangladesh (BAB). The fact that Dupkang is not a monk anymore does not seem to have bothered the BAB.
His visit to Bangladesh however raises very serious questions for Delhi (and Dharamsala).
Why has the Dalai Lama been unable to visit Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Thailand (he went once in the 1970s) or Sri Lanka? Most of these countries (apart from Bangladesh) have a large Buddhist population. Why should a Communist rinpoche like Dupkang, non-existant in the Buddhist hierarchy, be ‘honoured’ with the ‘Atisha Award’, when the Tibetan leader has never been able to visited Bangladesh?
In Tibet, Beijing is fully using Gyaltsen Norbu, China’s Panchen Lama for political purpose. On March 4, Xinhua reported the young Lama (25) spoke about "Cultivating talent, making Tibetan Buddhism better adapted to a socialist society."
Gyaltsen Norbu is today the main ethnic face of Buddhism in China. There is no doubt that in the years to come, Beijing will continue to fully play the ‘Panchen Lama card’ and he will probably be seen around South Asian capitals as the representative of the Buddha.
Madam Cui Yuying is one of the few ‘ethnic’ Tibetans who today serves in a high position in the Central government in Beijing, thereby helping China in its ‘ethnic equality’ propaganda.
After occupying different junior posts in Tibet, she has become Deputy Director of the Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee, an important post.
But often the ethic faces are more Chinese than the Hans.
Last year, Madam Cui opened the infamous ‘2014 Forum on the Development of Tibet, China’, organized in Lhasa and attended by a few foreign fans of the Communist Party, who had no choice, but to agree to the terms dictated by the Party in Beijing. One can’t bite the hand which feeds you!
Cui Yuying, while inaugurating the ‘Forum’, used the old Communist argument that Beijing only wants modernity for Tibet. The same argument was used in the 1950s, when Mao and his colleagues pretended that the Dalai Lama did not want ‘reforms’ and therefore Tibet needed to be ‘liberated’.
Like for the PLA ‘ethnic’ officers and religious figures, the presence of ‘ethnic’ Party cadres in the government in Beijing does not help much to find a solution to the Tibetan issue, on the contrary!
It is sad, especially at a time when photos and videos have appeared in the social media networks, showing heavy security presence at the annual Monlam Prayer Festival at Kumbum monastery, in Qinghai province; the 500-old Festival is traditionally dedicated to social harmony and world peace.
Voice of America reported: “The heavy security presence with armored vehicles and troops with automatic weapons doing drills and marching through one of the major Tibetan monasteries appears to have deeply hurt the feelings of the Tibetan people in the area.”
Unfortunately, the few ‘ethnic faces’ can’t do anything about the hardening of the situation on the ground in the minorities’ areas. It is tragic.

Myanmar: Beijing‘s Dilemma

My article Myanmar: Beijing‘s Dilemma  appeared in NitiCentral.

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Beijing’s neighbours do not have it easy.
After months of conflicts with Japan, the Philippines, Vietnam and others, clashes have flared up in northern Myanmar, neighboring China’s Yunnan province.
In hardly a month, the conflict between the Burmese government and the Kokang troops have left more than 100 people dead, while some 100,000 ethnic Chinese are said to have fled across the border into Yunnan.
Who are these Kokang rebels?
Known as the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), they are based in the northern Shan state. Inhabited by ethnic Han Chinese, the area is known as the Kokang Self-Administered Zone.
Today, the rebel group prides itself of an army of about 3,000 soldiers under an ethnic-Chinese commander, Peng Jiasheng.
The MNDAA, formerly the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), a China-backed guerrilla group, signed a bilateral cease-fire agreement with the Burmese government in 1989.
The agreement collapsed in 2009 when the rebels were asked to join the paramilitary Border Guard Force under the control of Myanmar’s military; the MNDAA did not agree to the move. When government forces entered the self-administrated area, Peng escaped to China; at that time, a large number of refugees moved into Yunnan province. Peng’s return heralded fresh troubles: on February 9, serious fighting erupted in Laukkai, Kokang’s capital, between Burmese troops and the MNDAA rebel forces.
The successive US Administrations believed that Peng Jiasheng was involved in drug trafficking, first in opium and more recently in methamphetamines.
Radio Free Asia thus explains the present conflict: “While he claims to be fighting for ethnic rights, the current struggle appears to be part of a bid by the rebel leader to retake power of an area that supports lucrative trading and smuggling because of its location on the border with China,” adding “the MNDAA had been joined in the recent clashes by allies: the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Arakanese Army (AA).”
It was thus a serious issue for the Myanmar government which declared a state of emergency in the region; at the same time, it asked Beijing to prevent the rebels from using its territory to launch ‘terrorist activities’.
On February 18, quoting a Burmese official, Agence France Press reported: “Nearly 90,000 civilians in northeastern Myanmar are thought to have fled clashes …as sporadic violence hampered efforts to evacuate those still trapped in the conflict zone. …Whole towns and villages lie empty in the rugged, remote area as tens of thousands of residents have fled their homes – some on foot.”
Over half of the local population is said to be on the move.
In the meantime, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Hong Lei asserted that China respects Myanmar's sovereignty, territorial integrity and affirmed that Beijing is opposed to any acts hurting bilateral ties. Hong called for self-restraint, a cessation of conflict …affirming that China was firmly opposed to any person or organization using Chinese territory to undermine the China-Myanmar relationship.
Peng Jiasheng came to Beijing’s rescue; he told The Global Times that since 2009, his alliance has strictly forbidden Chinese citizens from entering Kokang: “We will not accept Chinese citizens participating in armed actions, as this is only harmful to us”.
An interesting aspect of the conflict is that the military regime in Myanmar suddenly became popular in its own country; it even got kudos on social media platforms such as Facebook; as Reuters puts it: “Fighting between the Myanmar army and ethnic Chinese rebels has handed the long-feared military, a public relations coup, with an explosion of praise on social media and even former political prisoners expressing grudging support.”
Mid-February, Lt. Gen. Mya Tun Oo, Myanmar's chief of military affairs security announced that the Kokang rebels were being supported ‘by former Chinese soldiers and allied minority rebel groups’.
Oo explained that his government had to defend its sovereignty; he also asserted that former Chinese officers were providing military training to the rebels.
The Associated Press also mentioned a strong Chinese ‘influence’: “China is a major political and economic supporter of Myanmar, but there is unease among many about the influence the Chinese exercise, especially in loosely controlled areas in the north.”
But Beijing sees the situation differently: the Beijing-based Sina Military believes that Myanmar has become a geopolitical battleground between China and the United States: “The ongoing strife in Myanmar, which has never really stopped in the last 60 years, is not merely an internal struggle …it has become a behind-the-scenes tussle between China and the US for greater influence in the region,” says a commentary.
Myanmar provides China with a crucial passage to the Andaman Sea and the Indian Ocean; it is an important component of Xi Jinping’s Two Silk Roads dream project (‘one Belt and one Road’).
Sina Military argues that Beijing is innocent as a conflict in the region is not in its interest: “Political stability in Myanmar is key to China's economic interests, which is why Beijing has repeatedly offered to assist in mediating peace talks.”
But the US are “keen to suppress China's rise and preventing its access to the Indian Ocean;” says Sina which quotes the new US ‘pivot’ Asian policy. To prove its point, the article says that the US strategy was to back opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi for the presidency and in order to be able to control better Myanmar; Sina particularly mentions the meetings between President Obama and the Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, explaining that it became clear that when Aung san Suu Kyi would not be able to run for the presidency - because her two children are British citizens – Washington changed its policy and used ‘civil war’ to disrupt the border stability. This is of course far-fetched.
In an interview with Voice of America (VOA) Min Zaw Oo, director of ceasefire negotiation and implementation at the Myanmar Peace Center put forth a more plausible aspect: “The involvement might not be Chinese central government policy but of some of the local government officials, even business associates, some individuals who have business interests or political interests might be involved substantially.” Oo reasoned: “Otherwise these large amounts of weapons and the large number of people recruited in a very short time would not have materialized.”
Interestingly, Beijing takes the issue seriously
According to Duowei News, the Communist Party appointed the seasoned vice commander of the Beijing armed police headquarters, Major General Li Zhigang to take over the Yunnan’s police.
The South China Morning Post reported that on February 18, on the eve of the Chinese New Year “the Yunnan party committee and provincial government visited troops stationed in Yunnan and a military hospital in the province …Vice governor Zhang Zulin visited the 14th Group Army and the Yunnan armed police headquarters, where Li Zhigang was in attendance.”
The Hong Kong daily believes that “Li's return to Yunnan may be a direct response to the heightened tensions in northern Myanmar which has seen a flood of refugees flee into Yunnan, which is threatening social stability in the province.”
One morale of the story, if China wants, as per the words of President Xi Jinping, to be a ‘normal’ State, it can’t afford anymore to take ‘revolution’ to its neighbours, like Mao did.
In the coming months, China will have to match its words and actions. It is in Beijing’s own interest.

Does Obama really want to split China?

My article Does Obama really want to split China? appeared in NitiCentral.

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When it was announced that President Barack Obama and the Dalai Lama were both going to attend the US National Prayer Breakfast, an annual ‘religious’ gathering held in Washington, Beijing went berserk.
The White House had taken care to clarify that ‘no specific meeting with the Dalai Lama’ was scheduled; the President only expressed his strong support for Tibetan culture (a very diplomatic term).
It was then not clear if the President and the monk would meet face to face; the Chinese authorities were nevertheless already ‘mad’; The Global Times thundered: “In whatever form and on whatever occasion, should a president of the United States meet with the Dalai Lama, it will unquestionably step on China's toes and therefore cast a shadow over US-China relations. This should be clear to all US politicians.”
The English mouthpiece of the Party angrily added: “So Washington seems to play a political gimmick by inviting the Dalai Lama …We have no idea whether it was the US president's idea to invite him …but whatever the reason, Obama is acquiescing to the Dalai Lama's attempt to split Tibet from China.”
Does Obama really want to ‘split’ China? It is doubtful.
Beijing explained that the reason for the Dalai Lama's flight from ‘China's Tibet’ in 1959 was because he had failed to maintain serfdom on the Roof of the World: “the majority of Tibetans were slaves leading a life of unimaginable misery.”
Unfortunately for Beijing, sixty-five years later, not only the ex-serfs, but also the ‘ethnic’ (read Tibetans) Communist Party’s cadres are still deeply unhappy to have been ‘liberated’. It explains why the Party’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection recently decided to punish Party officials who ‘take an ambiguous attitude’ and are colluding with separatist organizations.
Tibetans with relatives in India are clearly targeted by this edict.
Xinhua also reported that the regional government in Lhasa will offer up to 300,000 yuan (48,000 US $) “to whistle blowers with clues concerning violent terror attacks in a move to promote stability in the region”.
The news agency quoted a document published by the infamous Public Security Bureau (secret police): “the reward will cover tip-offs on overseas terrorist organizations and their members' activities inside China, the spreading of religious extremism, terror related propaganda, those producing, selling and owning weapons, activities that help terrorists cross national borders [read India] and terror activities via the Internet.”
Obama went ahead with the ‘prayer meeting’, though he was warned: “some politicians in the US …have even gone so far as to echo his calls for an ‘independent Tibet’. Obama should not be that unwise.”
Andrew Jacobs of The New York Times saw the situation in a realistic manner: “China and the United States have worked out a reliable pas de deux over the Dalai Lama …It goes like this: Chinese leaders warn the White House against granting the Dalai Lama a public audience, and the American president either ignores the threats of diplomatic fallout or finds a way to hold a meeting that will result in the least offense to Beijing.”
So, Obama did ‘namaste’ to the Tibetan leader, waved and even smiled at him; later in his speech, he called him ‘his good friend’, a ‘powerful example of what it means to practice compassion … one who inspired us to speak up for the freedom and dignity of all human beings’.
The ‘T’ word was not pronounced, thanks to the White House’s good drafters.
Xinhua also played its role perfectly: “This action by the U.S. to drive a nail into the hearts of the Chinese people is harmful to the political trust between the two countries.”
At the same time, The China Daily tempered China’s pain: “US President Barack Obama acknowledged the Dalai Lama but did not meet directly with him at a religious event in Washington.”
It would be wrong to conclude that the US is a great defender of Human Rights and religious freedom and that the Tibetans will now receive some vital support from Washington. Obama’s public posturing is clearly for internal public consumption.
So were his remarks about India; he stated that “Acts of intolerance [in India] that would have shocked Gandhiji.” He added that India is “a place where, in past years, religious faiths of all types have, on occasion, been targeted by other peoples of faith, simply due to their heritage and their beliefs.”
Where was Obama’s great understanding of India and the newly found Indo-US friendship?
Whether at Siri Fort, where President Obama preached: “India will succeed so long as it is not splintered along the lines of religious faith,” or in Washington, his ‘rebuff’ of India (and also China) is required for his public image.
Union Finance Minister Arun Jaitley rightly said: “Aberrations don’t alter India’s history of tolerance,” he pointed out to the great example of India’s tolerance sitting next to President Obama: “That is His Holiness the Dalai Lama. It is part of that tolerance that he found it comfortable [to stay in India since 1959].”
The Times of India termed Obama's speech ‘an embarrassing smack down’ for a country where he was received ‘with euphoria’ a few days earlier.
For Tibet, it is even sadder. It reminds me of another sad story: in the autumn of 1991, John Major, the British Prime Minister went to Beijing; he was the first Western leader to visit China after the Tiananmen events. Before leaving, Major had told the media that he would present to the Chinese leadership, a list of several hundred political prisoners prepared by Amnesty International. After meeting Premier Li Peng, Major confirmed that he had passed on the list to his Chinese counterpart; everyone praised Major’s moral courage. Later on, one of the British officials who attended the meet, admitted that Major had never shown the list to Li Peng, nor had he spoken a word about human rights; he had plainly lied.
Business was already business; it still is today.
Xinhua may call the US a ‘troublemaker’ interfering with China’s internal affairs in order to ‘contain, separate and Westernize’ the Middle Kingdom, but business will continue as usual …after a few days.
A commentator compared the present high drama to the Cham ritual dance of Tibet where different characters played different roles in a script written centuries ago (by an Indian sage). Despite the high tempo, Cham always ends up the same way.
I discovered this when I wrote my book, “The Negotiations that never were”, on the fruitless talks between Beijing in Dharamsala.
In the meantime, the Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy, an NGO based in Dharamsala published last week the report affirming: “In 2014, the human rights situation in Tibet continued to deteriorate. Human rights violations continued …The PRC cracked down against Tibetans in response to mining protests, protests against forced displays of loyalty, religious practices, and the continuation of the self-immolations protests.”
Nothing has changed since Tibet was so-called liberated in 1950.
And neither Beijing nor Washington seems interested to find a remedy to the depressing situation.
By the way, a couple of days after the famous Prayer Breakfast, Xinhua announced that President Xi will visit Washington later this year.