Claude Arpi on China’s Interest in Arunachal Pradesh

My interview with Sudha Ramachandran for The Diplomat: Claude Arpi on China’s Interest in Arunachal Pradesh

Here is the link...

“For Beijing, it is a bargaining chip for an eventual ‘swap’ and the recognition by India of the occupation by China of Aksai Chin.”

Sixty years ago, on November 21, China declared a unilateral ceasefire against India bringing to an end the month-long India-China border war. Of the territory it occupied in the war, China retained control of Aksai Chin in the western sector of the disputed border but, although it took control of almost all of the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) or today’s Arunachal Pradesh in the eastern sector, it withdrew 20 kilometers north of the McMahon Line. The pullback of Chinese forces north of the McMahon Line suggested that China was perhaps not serious about pressing its claims in the eastern sector. However, since the mid-1980s, it has robustly asserted claims over some 90,000 square kilometers of territory in India’s northeast, which roughly approximates the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh or what China calls Southern Tibet.

In a conversation with The Diplomat’s South Asia Editor Sudha Ramachandran, author, historian and Tibetologist Claude Arpi points out that China “has not always claimed” NEFA/Arunachal and that its assertion of claims here is to gain leverage over India in a future border settlement.

When the war ended on November 21, 1962, China retained control of Aksai Chin but pulled back from India’s Northeast. Why?

The two sectors are historically very different.
To understand, it is necessary to go back to the Bandung Conference in 1955. An apparently moderate Zhou Enlai [China’s premier] convinced [Indian Prime Minister] Nehru of the “sincerity” of the Chinese Communist rulers. Writing about his encounter with Zhou at the Conference, Nehru said: “When asked if he wanted to push communism into Tibet, Chou En-lai [Zhou Enlai] laughed and said that there could be no such question as Tibet was very far indeed from communism. It would be thoroughly impracticable to try to establish a communist regime in Tibet and the Chinese Government had no such wish.”
A few days later, the Indian prime minister told the Indian foreign secretary about a remark by the Chinese premier on the McMahon Line: “Although [Zhou] thought that this line, established by British imperialists, was not fair, nevertheless, because it was an accomplished fact and because of the friendly relations which existed between China and the countries concerned, namely, India and Burma, the Chinese Government were of the opinion that they should give recognition to this McMahon Line.”
Five years later, Zhou Enlai visited Delhi and had long talks with Nehru. In an informal encounter with Indian Defense Minister V.K. Krishna Menon,  Zhou explained that in the Western Sector (Aksai Chin) there had never been any delimitation and only an old treaty (of 1842), which did not mention any area; Aksai Chin, he affirmed, had always been part of Sinkiang (today’s Xinjiang) and the [Aksai Chin] road built by China (without India realizing it) was on Chinese territory.
Later, Zhou tested the ground for a “swap”: India would acknowledge Aksai Chin as Chinese and Beijing would recognize the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA or today’s Arunachal Pradesh) as Indian.
One has to understand that for Beijing Aksai Chin was strategically far more important than the NEFA. The road built in the early 1950s linked the two newly-acquired provinces of the People’s Republic of China, Xinjiang and Tibet.
Therefore, for Mao and his colleagues, there was never a question to return Aksai Chin to India. Further, Beijing has argued that the Communists started surveying the Aksai Chin road in 1952, the construction began in 1954/55 and it was inaugurated in 1957; during all these years India did not complain. Delhi only started objecting to Beijing in 1958. For the Chinese leadership, it was proof that the area never belonged to India.
On the opposite end, NEFA saw very few incursions from the Chinese troops south of the McMahon Line (the first one took place in Longju in August 1959). An early incursion had happened in the Walong sector in 1910, but the Chinese troops quickly returned to their barracks north of the watershed.
All this shows that both areas do not have the same strategic importance for the Chinese.
It is probably why China decided to withdraw from the NEFA in 1962.
The eastern sector of the India-China border, depicting the disputed area of the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims as Southern Tibet. Map by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Chinese claims in NEFA in 1960

Since the mid-1980s, China has been reasserting rights over Arunachal Pradesh. Why the renewed interest in this territory?

During the last few months, Beijing’s propaganda has reiterated that the entire Arunachal Pradesh is part of “Southern Tibet.”
On November 10, Xinhua published a news item: “A 5.6-magnitude earthquake jolted Medog County in Nyingchi City, southwest China’s Tibet Autonomous Region, at 1:01 pm, Beijing Time, according to the China Earthquake Networks Center (CENC). The epicenter was monitored at 28.35 degrees north latitude and 94.48 degrees east longitude, with a depth of 10 km, the CENC said.”
The area mentioned is near Likabali in Arunachal Pradesh.
In January 2022, Global Times announced new names of 15 places in Arunachal Pradesh, given with precise coordinates. Eight were residential areas, four were mountains, two were rivers, and one was a mountain pass (Sela). It was the second batch of so-called standardized names of places published by the Chinese government; the first batch of the so-called standardized names of six places in Arunachal was released in 2017. This is part of the propaganda to assert China’s claims.
For Beijing, it is a bargaining chip for an eventual “swap” and the recognition by India of the occupation by China of Aksai Chin.
It is interesting to look into the rationale of the Chinese claim over NEFA/Arunachal. The origin is linked to the creation of the Xikang province. In the 1930s, a Chinese scholar, Ren Naiqiang was encouraged by Liu Wenhui, the governor of Xikang, to produce a map of the area. Though the Chinese had never set foot in the area, the new map included NEFA in the new Chinese province.
In 1939, the Nationalist Government formally established a new province called Xikang (more or less corresponding to Tibet’s Kham province).
At the end of 1949, Ren Naiqiang met Marshal He Long, one of the senior-most generals of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and explained why his map was dependable; the Marshal was convinced and ordered the distribution of copies. On January 10, 1950, He Long sent a report to Mao Zedong strongly recommending that Ren’s map should be accepted and circulated amongst the PLA. It is after this episode that Beijing started claiming NEFA as Chinese. This shows that China has not always claimed NEFA.

Why is Tawang important to China?

Maj Bob Khathing in February 1951 in Tawang

China has never officially accepted the existence of the Tibetan exile government. If India would return Tawang to China (including the monastery), it would be a denial by Delhi that the 1914 Indo-Tibet border agreement and the McMahon Line ever existed.
The fact remains that the border agreement of March 1914 had been signed with official seals by the Foreign Secretary of India (Sir Henry McMahon) and the Prime Minister of Tibet (Lochen Shatra).
It is also true that monastic taxes in the area were being collected by Tibetan officials till February 1951, when the expedition led by Maj. Bob Khathing took over the Tawang administration.
But taxes paid by a monastery do not amount to ownership certificates. Several monasteries in the Indian Himalaya have been affiliated with large monasteries in Tibet; it does not mean that these monasteries belong to China.
Another factor is that the Sixth Dalai Lama, Tsangyang Gyatso, was born in Urgyeling, south of Tawang. It is another pretext for China to claim the area. But the fact that a religious leader is born on a foreign territory is not legally considered a valid argument to claim ownership of the country (or the area where the leader is born).
Not often mentioned are the bitter relations existing between the Monpas and the Tibetans till the arrival of Major Khathing. In 1938, when Captain Lightfoot, the Assistant Political Officer (APO) in Balipara (Assam) visited Tawang, he noted: “Our visit raised hopes that they might be relieved of the Tibetan yoke but there was grave uneasiness at our departure lest they should be punished for the help they had given us… Tibetan domination is loathed by the Monpaas and is intolerable by any civilized standards.”
The APO observed that forced labor and extortion of supplies, failure by the Tibetans to protect the Monpas, payment of tribute at rates bearing no relation to the ability of villagers to pay, and finally a brutal and unspeakably corrupt judicial system made the local Monpas believe that they were “liberated” by Major Khathing and his Assam Rifles from the Tibetan yoke in 1951.
India has improved connectivity and military infrastructure along the LAC in the eastern sector. How does it match up to infrastructure on the Chinese side?
Because of the nature of the terrain, India will never match China in terms of infrastructure, but since a few years, the mindset of the government has changed and serious efforts have been made, if not to at least “catch up” to have a decent infrastructure to the border districts/circles in India.
To give a few examples, Hollongi Greenfield Airport, also called Donyi Polo Airport, near Itanagar, serving Arunachal’s capital has recently been opened.
On November 2, a Dornier D-28 aircraft landed at the Ziro Advanced Landing Ground (ALG) in the Lower Subansiri district; commercial operations are expected to start soon. The 17-seater aircraft was operated by Alliance Air. ATR-72 and Dornier D-228 are already operational at Pasighat (Assam) and Tezu airports.
Arunachal Pradesh now has four airports (Itanagar, Ziro, Pasighat, and Tezu) and nine ALGs at Aalo, Mechuka, Pasighat, Tawang Air Force Station, Tuting, Vijaynagar, Walong, Ziro, and Daporijo. Several helipads have also been built near the McMahon Line.
While most of the existing roads have been improved, for example between Tezpur in Assam and Tawang, many new ones closer to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) have been built. Further, the traffic on the Bomdila-Tawang road will greatly improve with the opening of the tunnel under the Sela pass at the end of the year.
Even the last post in the Upper Subansiri district (in Maja), will soon be connected.
But first and foremost, what has changed is the mindset. A few years ago, one often heard: “We don’t need good roads, if the Chinese come again, they will break their vehicles on our poorly-maintained tracks.”
Today, the Arunachal Pradesh government as well as the Indian Army understand the necessity of dual-use infrastructure, not only for defending the border, but also helping the remote villages to survive.

Could you throw light on India’s “Vibrant Villages” scheme? What underlies the development of these villages?

To understand the “Vibrant Villages” scheme one has to look at the other side of the McMahon Line.
The Sixth Tibet Work Forum (TWF), held in Beijing on August 24 and 25, 2015 was a turning point for the Tibetan plateau. Tibet Work Forums are large meetings called every 5 to 10 years to discuss the Chinese Communist Party’s Tibet policies. They are attended by all the members of the powerful Politburo Standing Committee, members of the Central Committee, or senior PLA generals. The Sixth Forum decided to tackle poverty and develop Xiaokang (“moderately well-off”) villages on the plateau.
In 2017, soon after the conclusion of the 19th Congress, President Xi Jinping wrote a letter to two young Tibetan herders who had written to him introducing their village, Yume, north of the Upper Subansiri district. Xi “encouraged a herding family in Lhuntse County …to set down roots in the border area, safeguard the Chinese territory and develop their hometown.” Soon after, Yume became a model village for more than 600 Xiaokang villages, a large number located close to the Indian border.
The “Vibrant Villages” is a response to hundreds of Xiaokang villages, which have mushroomed on the Tibetan plateau. In India, they are also meant to tackle another genuine problem: large-scale migration from the border areas.
According to the Central Government’s announcement, India plans to open the villages along the Chinese border for tourists.: “The activities will include construction of village infrastructure, housing, tourist centers, road connectivity, provisioning of decentralized renewable energy, direct-to-home access for Doordarshan and educational channels, and support for livelihood generation.”
The government’s objectives are clear: “to enhance infrastructure in villages along India’s border with China, in states like Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, and Arunachal Pradesh.”
Like in Tibet, the scheme is based on the premise that the border areas will be opened to tourists, which will provide the economic backbone for the scheme. Several measures to remove/relax the Inner Line Permit system and other restrictions have already been taken, in Ladakh in particular.
If successful, it should give a boost to the local economy and benefit the populations living in these remote, largely inaccessible border areas. It will also enhance the defense preparedness of the Indian defense forces, which can use the newly created infrastructure

Doklam redux?

My article Doklam redux? appeared in the Edit Page of The Pioneer.

Here is the link...
Is China’s building of a large number of ‘model’ villages on the Tibetan side of the Indian border preparation for another stand-off? It’s time to discuss this issue with Thimphu

The 40th anniversary of “China's reform and opening up” is being celebrated across China in 2018; the Chinese propaganda affirms: “Over the past 40 years, the country has transformed itself from a largely agricultural nation into the second largest economy in the world.”
One of the most remembered events took place in 1978, when 18 farmers in Xiaogang village, in Anhui Province, signed a secret agreement to divide collectively-owned farmland into individual pieces and drop the collectivization of the Great Leap Forward (GLF), which between 1958 and 1960 resulted in some 40 million casualties; in Xiaogang itself, 67 villagers out of 120 had died of starvation between 1958 and 1960.
Forty years later, the name Xiaogang is been used for a different project, which should worry India: the building of a large number of ‘model’ villages in Tibet, along the border with India.
On October 19, China Tibet News reported that since the beginning of 2018, Tsona County, north of Arunachal Pradesh’s Tawang District, has been “vigorously promoting the construction of border ‘Xiaogang’ villages” (the literal meaning of ‘Xiaogang’ is ‘moderately well-off’).
Tsona County alone has invested 519 million yuan (US$ 74 million) in the construction projects of nine border villages, benefiting 1,961 people from 617 households. More than 40% of the project has been completed, and an investment of 2.2 billion yuan (US$ 314 million) has already been spent.
In May, China Tibet News said that Lepo, the first village in Tibet, north of the border in Khenzimane (Tawang district) boasted of a rich vegetation and clear waters: “With impressive natural scenery and unique ethnic customs, Magmang ecological civilization village is also situated in Lepo Valley, Tsona County. …The construction of Magmang ecological civilization demonstration village began on March of 2014 and was completed on December. On January of 2015, the village was inaugurated and a year later, Magmang was awarded “China's beautiful leisure village” by the Ministry of Agriculture. China has 26 national key tourist attractions; the Lepo Valley, close to the Thagla ridge, which saw the first clashes between India and China in October 1962, is one of them.
The new tourist scheme, "Slowing down the speed of tour, enjoying the sea of azaleas in Lepo Valley", prolonged the peak season, explained the Chinese authorities.
Dekyi Tsomo, a 27-year-old villager of Magmang, told the website: "Previously, houses in the village looked fairly rundown, and all roads leading to the village are muddy. Nowadays, the houses we live in are comfortable and big, with underfloor heating and hot water supply. This kind of house costs more than 400,000 yuan. We only pay 120,000 yuan, the rest is paid by the government. …we all feel grateful.”
Incidentally on March 30, 1959, the Dalai Lama spent his last night in Tibet in Magmang; he was on his way to India. The next day, he crossed the border at Khenzimane. He would certainly not recognize the hamlet.
To understand the mushrooming of Xiaogang villages, one should remember the words of the Emperor, Xi Jinping said: “Govern the nation by governing the borders, Govern the borders by first stabilizing Tibet, Ensure social harmony and stability in Tibet and strengthen the development of border regions.”

Some of the villages in Tsona County, north of Tawang district

The villages are officially linked to two themes: ‘poverty alleviation’ and ‘defense of the borders’. The local populations are said to be the ‘Guardians of the Sacred Land and Builders of Happy Homes’.
Senior Communist leaders regularly visit the new villages; whether in the Lohit sector, north of the McMahon Line, where a Memorial for the Chinese soldiers who died in the Walong sector during the 1962 War has been erected for ‘nationalist’ tourism; in Metok, near Arunachal’s Upper Siang district or in Yume, north of Takshing in Upper Subansari; all these areas have their model villages, like in Lepo.
During the last few years, Beijing has concentrated on the development of the southeastern prefectures of Nyingchi and Lhoka, bordering Arunachal Pradesh. But now, while the work on the railway line between Lhasa and Nyingchi continues at a quick pace, the development has started shifting westwards, in areas bordering Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh and Ladakh.
Beijing wants to duplicate in Ngari what has been done in Nyingchi and Lhoka areas; first and foremost, improving the infrastructure of the border and creating Xiaogang villages. Among the three new airports to be soon constructed in Tibet, Purang is located in Ngari prefecture of Western Tibet (one is near Lhuntse in Lhoka and the last one, near the Nepal border). The construction should begin in 2019 and it will be functional in 2021.
The objective of these airports is to strengthen the border's communications with surrounding areas. Let us not forget that airports and highways on the plateau legally have a dual use (civilian and military).
There is another aspect to the Communist Party’s policy on the Indian borders: recalcitrant Tibetans are relocated to places further away from the ‘sensitive’ Indian borders.
An article recently appeared in the French edition of China Tibet Online, it was titled: ‘Relocation of the villagers of Lhodrak: mission over’.
It affirmed “After a first wave of successful relocation on October 15, a second wave is now over.” Lhodrak is the legendary birthplace of Marpa, the great saint who visited India several times and translated the Buddhist scriptures in the 11th century; it is located north of the Bhutanese border.
“The villagers' relocation project represents the completion of scheme which is part of the strategy of the CPP’s Central Committee's for strengthening of the border. It is also a good example to illustrate that the Party carries the people in its heart, it provides a housing solution to families in need, and a strengthening of the masses on the borders and a strengthening of the border defence,” says the article.
Tibetans in traditional costumes, probably provided for the photo op, are seen on the accompanying pictures.
Some of the Xiaogang villages are located north of Bhutan, near the eastern trijunction between India, China and Bhutan, an area which is disputed.
Could it be in preparation of another Doklam?
There is however a difference with the western trijunction (Doklam), India has no military presence in the area; the time has perhaps come to discuss this issue seriously with Thimphu.

Some of the models villages on the Indian border in Tsona County

 

 

 

 

 

 

Avian Intrusions over the Red Line

'Civilian' pigeon?

According to The Asian Age, “Pigeons with Chinese tags lead to a stir in Arunachal Pradesh.”
The reporter mentioned that villagers caught some tagged pigeons in Anjaw district of Arunachal Pradesh.
The tags being written in Chinese created anxious moments for the villagers in the Lohit Valley.
The Anjaw district is strategically  located south of the McMahon Line
The Asian Age said: “The villagers who spotted the pigeons reported the issue to the local police and handed over the pigeons trapped by them. While it is not known if the pigeons were fitted with transmitters or spying equipment, security sources told this newspaper it had come to their notice and they are examining the tags. The sources didn’t rule out the possibility of China using these pigeons for surveillance of frontier areas and townships.”
Only after inquiry, we should know.

Chinese Markings
The Chinese markings seem to indicate that the origin of the pigeons was Rima, the first small town in Tibet, north of the McMahon (Kibithu is the last Indian village in the area).
It often happens that pigeons ‘loose’ their way, but it is strange that it has happened to so many on the same day.
Incidentally, at the same time, Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh chaired the first-ever review meeting of Sino-Indian border infrastructure in Sikkim. It was attended by the Chief Ministers and representatives of five Himalayan states bordering Tibet.
Arunachal Chief Minister Pema Khandu, who was present, raised serious concern over the migration of people away from border areas due to lack of basic facilities. It is not clear if he was aware of the avian ‘intrusion’ at that time.

An old posting
More than five years ago, I mentioned on this blog the use of pigeons for military purpose.
At that time, a Member of the French Parliament suggested boosting the use of military pigeons for the French Army. In a written question, Jean-Pierre Decool, a MP from the UMP (now Les Republicains) majority (from Northern France) asked for the return of the military pigeon as a weapon.
He forcefully spoke of "the usefulness of the pigeon in the event of armed conflict. In 2011, the Chinese army has decided to 'recruit' some 10,000 pigeons, in addition to the existing 200. Indeed, if during an armed conflict, a generalized failure of communication networks may occur. Consequently, the pigeon will remain one of the only communication tools capable of transporting messages," Decool said in the Parliament.
In his response, the French Minister of Defence stated: "historically, the pigeon presented a certain interest for military communications. Safe and reliable, it has often helped to get rid of the insecurity of the other lines of communication. The French Army has the last pigeon dovecote in Europe on the site of Mont-Valerian, near Paris. In addition, France has identified nearly 20,000 pigeon lovers, who could provide valuable assistance in case of strong 'weakening' of telecommunication networks."
In 2011, the Time Magazine spoke of "China's Most Secret Weapon: The Messenger Pigeon". The article asserted: "These military pigeons will be primarily called upon to conduct special military missions between troops stationed at our land borders or ocean borders," air force military expert Chen Hong told China Central Television after the announcement. According to reports at that time, the birds could be dispersed to communications bases across China's remote and mountainous southwestern region, particularly around the Himalayan foothills. The pigeons, flying at speeds of up to 75 miles (120 km) per hour, will be trained to carry loads of up to 3.5 oz. (100 g).

India should remain vigilant and learn from China the tricks of the Art of War.

In 1910, Chinese had 'walked' as far south as Menilkrai, near Walong
for what the British called a 'promenade'

 

The Chinese tourists arrive on the Indian border

Le (or Legbo) village north of the McMahon Line

While Delhi remains stuck with its ‘colonial’ system of Inner Line/Protected Area Permit system, China has opened its side of the frontier to hordes of tourists coming to the Mainland.
Yesterday, China Tibet News reported that “Legbo Valley creates ‘natural oxygen bar’ tourism brand.”
The catchy title is not very clear, but the location of the ‘Legbo Valley’ is speaking. ‘Legbo’ or ‘Le’ (or Lepo’) village is located just a few kilometers north of the McMahon Line (LAC) in Tawang district of Arunachal Pradesh.
One still remember the Thagla ridge, the site of the Namkha chu battle during the 1962 conflict with China.
Le village is situated on the Tibetan side of the ridge, not far from Khinzemane, the last Indian post on the Namjiang chu (river).
Today, Le village comes under the administration of Tsona County/Dzong of Lhoka City, Southern Tibet.
China Tibet News says that the area is not only renowned “as natural oxygen bar; but it is also the settlement of Monpa people with simple and unique ethnic customs.”
‘Natural oxygen bar’ is just a gimmick to attract tourism, as the altitude is not so high (Zemithang, the last big village on the Indian side is at 2,100 meter asl) and the area is afforested, with plenty of oxygen.
The Chinese site says: “To create the tourism brand of ‘natural oxygen bar’, by centering [sic] on the Legbo [Le] Valley scenic spot, Cona [Tsona] County strengthens the construction of tourism infrastructures, improves tourism services, explores unique folk customs, develops characteristic local products, and builds tourism leisure resort destination.”
All this on the Chinese side of the LAC!
China Tibet News gives figures: up the beginning of 2016 up to November “the number of tourist reception in Legbo Valley is 46,242 passengers and tourism revenue is 15.929 million yuan, increasing 20.4% and 18.5 respectively.”
It is not clear what a ‘passenger’ is, but it seems a lot of visitors for such a small border village.
Beijing is said to be ready to invest some 89 million yuan (14.5 million US dollars) to have “an ecological civilization site”.
Ecological site or military base?
Probably both!
Like most of the places in Southern Tibet (particularly in the Nyingchi prefecture) local farmers (and even herdsmen) are encouraged to open up ‘Inns’ (family hotels). The Chinese site speaks of promoting “a combination of characteristic culture and tourism.”
The nearby town of Tsona is ‘the site of commodity’ [sic] and is where the Tsangyang Gyatso Festival [takes place].
Let us remember that Tsangyang Gyatso, the Sixth Dalai Lama was born in Urgyeling, a hamlet south of Tawang. Tsona is not the birthplace of the ‘Indian’ Dalai Lama, though he stayed there for a short time while on his way to Lhasa; strangely the town is today promoted as Tsangyang Gyatso's place.
China Tibet News reports that during a first phase of investment (77 million yuan or 6 million dollars poured into the area), a ‘characteristic’ small town project is being launched in Le village: “The overall planning project of Kyipa and Gomri Monpa nationality township has been completed. At present, the Legbo Valley tourism leisure resort has been basically formed, attracting tourists with unique charm.”
All this would be fine, it was not happening a few kilometers away from the LAC.
Beijing has used a similar tactic in Metok County, located near the Indian border (Upper Siang). This small country, with a population of hardly 11,000 inhabitants received over 70,000 visitors in 2015.
China Tibet Online, an affiliate of Xinhua reported last year that since a highway reached the village of Metok in 2013, “tourism industry has seen rapid development”. In 2015, Metok officially welcomed some 70,800 tourists. For the first time in 2014, the authorities of the county started selling tickets for entrance to its scenic areas; in 2015, total ticket sales have exceeded 5 million yuan.
The propaganda invites the Chinese tourists to see the Galongla Waterfall, the wonder of Swallow Pond, the Metok Waterfalls, the Menba suspended tower and other scenic sites, “as well as ‘plant fossil’ spinulosa trees and other such thousands of kinds of plants and animals.”
The potential tourists in China are told that Metok “is famous for its natural ecology and highland tropical climate. The drop in elevation here is huge, with both brilliant snow mountains and tropical and subtropical plants existing side-by-side, and it is knows as a hiker’s paradise.”
I wonder how many Indian tourists are allowed to Zemithang or Tuting/Geling (Metok is located just north of these villages on the Yarlung Tsangpo river — the river becomes the Siang in Arunachal and later the Brahmaputra in Assam).
Incidentally, was the visit of the Party boss of the Tibet Autonomous Region, near the LAC north of the Upper Subansiri district, linked with a similar scheme to 'occupy the frontiers with tourists' north of the Upper Subansiri district?
Probably!

India to emulate China
Delhi should perhaps emulate China and open the Indian borders to tourism.
Would it not be the best way for the Government of India to demonstrate that Arunachal is part of India?
For Beijing, the trend is bound to continue; the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been told that all new infrastructures built in China should be able to be used for civilian and military requirements.
According to Xinhua, on November 10, President Xi Jinping called for the building of strong and modern logistics forces that will guarantee the realization of the Chinese dream as well as the dream of a strong army.
Xi said: “As the international military competition situation experiences profound changes, and national interests and military missions develop, logistical construction is becoming an increasingly crucial factor that affects wins or losses in battle... and occupies a key place in the development of the Party, the country and the military."
Xi added that “more efforts should be made to use state-level resources and enlist the help of local governments as well as social groups and individuals to develop a series of innovation projects that cater to both military and civilian uses.”
As the result in 2016, 50,000 ‘passengers’ will come a few kilometers from the Indian border.
India should start thinking about the implications of this development.
Incidentally, Lt Gen Devraj Anbu, the GOC of 4 Corps called yesterday on Arunachal Chief Minister Pema Khandu. According to press reports, the discussion centered on construction of roads in the border areas and land acquisition for army use; Gen Anbu also suggested having an Advanced Landing Ground (ALG) in the Tawang-Kameng area.
How many years it will take, nobody knows; India is not China.

For information, I am reproducing an extract of the Diary of Capt Frederick Bailey during his journey in the area in 1913. Based on this report, McMahon drew the famous Line.

20th October, Shakti, 11 ½ miles, 7,250 feet. We had a good view down the valley of the Tawang Chu this morning and were shown the frontiers of Bhutan. Our road left the Tawang valley and went up the Nyamjang valley. We had to change our coolies at several villages and were delayed each time. We passed some terraced rice cultivation at Gyipu. The hills were covered in forest. We stopped in a house in the village of Shakti. No rain.

21st October, Le, 19 miles, 8,350 feet. We made a very late start as were again had trouble with our local coolies. Two miles from Shakti we crossed to the right bank of the river and six miles further we came to a large [Gorsam] chorten of a peculiar design having a base of over 50 yards. A mile beyond this was Pangchen on the left bank above which the river has been dammed up by a landship and there are marshy flats [near Zemithang]; at other places the river flows in a very valley with steep sides covered with forest. At Shoktsen where we changed transport we again had trouble with the coolies who threw our loads down and bolted into the jungle. The road is in places over galleries and causeways built up in from the river. We crossed the river 3 tames by good wooden bridges. We arrived after dark, the villagers of Le coming out to meet us with torches of dried bamboo. We stopped in a house. No rain.

[And then Bailey and his colleague Henry Morshead continued towards Tsona]

22nd October, Trimo, 10miles, 10,700 feet.-We went up the valley all day crossing the river 3 times. After going 5 ½ miles we suddenly came on Lepo Tsukang or custom house astride the road where we found an agent of the Tsona Dzongpons who took us in and gave us tea. He collects a tax in kind of 10 per cent on all merchandise which goes up into Tibet from the lower lying Monba country. He also collects 1 tanka on each animal and ½ tanka on each man who passes his post. At Trimo we found the people, though still Monbas, to be very Tibetan in their appearance; they grow crops of barley and turnips but maize and other Himalayan crops have been left behind. Their cattle are dzos. No rain.

Tourism Development on the Plateau ... and in Arunachal

Chinese trekkers near Metok

As mentioned in one of my last posts, when he joined a panel discussion with the delegates from Qinghai province, President Xi pledged to protect the fragile ecology of Tibet. This is great news …if implemented!
Xi said: “The ecological environment has irreplaceable value. We should treat it as our lifeline and protect it like the apple of our eye."
He exhorted the delegates to treat environment 'as our lifeline'.
Let us see if the President's words will be followed by acts.
A day later, Xinhua reported that Beijing had ‘poured’ some 3.44 billion U.S. dollars into water conservancy infrastructure in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) during the past five years.
According to ‘local authorities’ of the Water Resources Department, this has benefited about 1.8 million farmers and nomads; it has stabilized grain output, and also ensured safe drinking water and power supply in remote areas.
The ‘local’ statistics are often difficult to check in China.
It was also announced that from 2011 to 2015, the TAR saw its capacity of water supply increase by 700 million cubic meters and some 100,000 hectares of irrigation land had been ‘created or improved’.
Further, 773,000 ‘rural’ residents, students, teachers and monks were provided with clean drinking water while hydropower helped 270,000 people in accessing electricity.
Is it true or just propaganda? It is difficult to say.
Also during the proceedings of the National People’s Congress, officials from Yunnan announced that no new small-scale hydropower plants will be built on the Nu (Salween) River in order to restore the environment.
This is a clear admission that environment has been damaged in the past.
Li Jiheng, Yunnan’s party boss, even spoke of turning the river into ‘China’s Grand Canyon’.
Is it a change of policy? From dams to tourism?
Li told China National Radio: “The Nu River will become a world-level tourism destination in five to 10 years. It will succeed and even surpass the Grand Canyon in the United States.”
The South China Morning Post (SCMP) was more cautious in its approach, “the fate of the country’s last free-flowing river is still unclear as the officials remained tight-lipped on whether they would go ahead with plans to build a series of dams on the upper reaches of the Nu”.
It however confirmed that the Yunnan government will stop exploiting ‘small mines’ and building ‘small hydropower projects’ to help restore vegetation on river banks.
What about larger dams?
For years, environmentalists had pleaded for scrapping plans to construct large dams the river.
Wang Yongchen, an environmentalist, who believes in keeping the natural state of the Nu river, told the SCMP:  “Their comments are rather vague and tricky. No one would confirm plans for large dams. They say it’s up to the central leaders if large dams will be built.”
The plans to dam the upper reaches of the Nu had been shelved in 2005 by Wen Jiabao, the Chinese Premier who had expressed concerns for the environment …and the safety of the dams.
Plans were however revived in 2013.
In 2013, the State Council surprised the environmentalists and scientists by mentioning new plans to construct 13 dams on Nu River.
The SCMP says: “Since then, local officials have admitted preparatory work – such as building roads around the planned sites – has started. But no real progress had been made on dam construction so far.”
Scientists have discovered that some 40 per cent of aquatic species have already disappeared from the Nu River, mainly due to human activities such as overfishing, mining and dam construction.

Closer to India
In an earlier post, I mentioned the development on the Yarlung Tsangpo/Siang/Brahmaputra river.
The development in Nyingchi/Nyingtri prefecture, north of the Indian border in Arunachal has critical implications for India.
Nyingchi plans to have an international ecotourism zone during the ‘13th Five-Year Plan’ (2016-2020) in order to receive six million tourists by 2020 …and get a hefty 1.2 $ billion revenue from the Chinese tourists.
According China Tibet Online, Nyingchi will build 10 national-level rural tourism demo villages in the next five years, with more than 20,000 people involved in the tourism industry, adding 70,000 jobs with an average of per capita income increase of 10,000 yuan.
The Chinese figures demonstrate that tourism has become the major force in developing the economy and infrastructure of the area; it is also ‘crucial’ to improve the Tibetan income, says the Plan.
The Chinese website, affiliated to Xinhua, says that in 2015 for the first time, Nyingchi GDP has crossed 10 billion yuan to reach 10.4 billion yuan (1.67 US $ billion), with a growth rate of 11.2%; it is the highest among cities on the plateau.
Some 25% of the prefecture’s revenue comes from tourism: “there were 3.2 million tourists in Nyingchi in 2015, a 20% increase from 2014. Over 5,000 local residents work in tourism, running 219 family inns. Per capita income in the pasturing area surpassed 10,000 yuan for the first time to reach 10,800 yuan, which is 1,600 yuan (258 $) more than the Tibet average,” says the local officials.

Is India sleeping?
On the southern side of the plateau, India seems to be sleeping, busy with mega-cultural events or ‘tolerance’ in the Indian Universities.
While north of the McMahon Line, the number of tourists grows every year by 15% to 20% , the infrastructure south of the McMahon Line is going at snail pace.
Let us not forget that the infrastructure in Tibet can be used by the People’s Liberation Army at any point in time.
China Tibet Online asserts that “the local government began to focus on improving their ability to accommodate the tourists and make the environment sustainable, various measures were introduced, including ecological protection and improvement of the tourism industry to ensure honest practices.”
About improving the environment, this is to be seen.
Though India has just been able to ‘reopen’ two Advanced Landing Grounds in Ziro and Along in Arunachal Pradesh, thereby slightly improving the Indian Air Force's operational capability, still the two ALGs are located far-away from the border.
Air Marshal C. Hari Kumar, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Eastern Air Command announced that "The ALGs will further enhance our existing operational capabilities in Eastern Air Command," adding that the new capacity build-up will enable operations by some of the force's new inductions including the C-130J Super Hercules.
This is good news.
The Air Marshal also asserted that “Besides enhancing air maintenance capability of the IAF in the region, the new airfield will also facilitate civil air connectivity soon.”

North of the McMahon Line

With a cumbersome and antiquated Inner Line Permit system, the area can probably forget the ‘civilian’ connectivity for a long time to come.
On the other side of the Line, during the 13th Five Year Plan, “Nyingchi will strengthen the transportation networks via air, rail, highways, and waterways, as well as the building of starred hotels, economy hotels, motels, theme hotels, family inns, and RV parks to diversify the type of accommodations.”
The China Tibet Online further reports: “Last year, fixed investment in Nyingchi reached 16.3 billion yuan. The Lhasa-Nyingchi highway was put in use by the end of 2015, while the Lhasa-Nyingchi railway is also under construction. Renovations of the Lhasa's airport are in full swing. There are now seven direct flights reaching Nyingchi, with possible new routes added from Xi’an, Shanghai, and Xiamen this year. In addition, Mainling Airport could become an international airport with more flights and routes in the future.”
Once again, India is left behind in terms of infrastructure development, though the Army has recently showed its capacity of build ‘environment-friendly’ pontoons on the Yamuna, construction is much slower on the banks of the Subansiri, Dibang or other rivers of Arunachal.
It is truly a national tragedy.

McMahon Line, more than just a border issue

The Indian flag flying over Dekilinka, the Indian Mission Lhasa

My article McMahon Line, more than just a border issue appeared today in the Edit Page of The Pioneer.

Here is the link...


India must seek to preserve the sanctity of the McMahon line because it not only demarcates its legal border with China but also marks its historical ties with Tibet, which was once an independent nation

While the Indian archives are still jealously kept in the vaults of the Ministry of External Affairs, the Chinese are slowly (and selectively) declassifying their documents. Is declassification on the agenda of Modi Sarkaar? If it is, it will be good for the country because slowly Chinese perceptions are starting to prevail among Indian ‘experts’.
Let us take an example. During the annual KF Rustamji lecture, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval (who is also the Special Representative for border talks with China), said that he was surprised that, while China agreed to the McMahon line being the Sino-Burmese border in 1960, it does not accept the same principle for India. Some Indian ‘experts’ have argued that Mr Doval was wrong to compare the Sino-Burmese and Sino-Indian border issues. The Agreement on the Question of the Boundary between China and Burma signed on January 28, 1960, slightly departed from the McMahon alignment.
Also, Burma did not call its border with China, the ‘McMahon Line’. Why so? Today, like in 1960, Beijing wants to wipe out all proof that Tibet was once an independent nation and signed bilateral treaties with other countries; therefore, China insists we forget about Sir Henry McMahon, the Indian Foreign Secretary, who signed one such agreement with Tibet in 1914. The treaty between China and Burma was based on a principle that the northern boundary would follow the traditional McMahon line, but the imperialist name would be removed. For Burma, it did not matter much if the independent status of Tibet was erased.
For India, it is different; Tibet’s status matters hugely. Not only does the Dalai Lama and many of his countrymen live in India, but for India, its deep cultural, economic and religious contacts with the Roof of the World far pre-dated the arrival of the British in the subcontinent. The border issue is not just a question of ‘demarcating’ a line between China and India; it is also about acknowledging this ancient relation between India and Tibet. For this reason, Mr Doval is absolutely right to call the Sino-Indian border the McMahon Line.
Mr Doval also reminded his audience of the existence of Arunachal Pradesh: “We are particularly concerned about the Eastern sector where [Chinese] claims have been made on Tawang which is totally in contravention of accepted principles.” He was referring to the Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles signed on April 11, 2005, between India and China. Article VII says: “In reaching a boundary settlement, the two sides shall safeguard due interests of their settled populations in the border areas.” Beijing seems to today have forgotten about the 2005 Guidelines!
Soon after, the Chinese Foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying affirmed: “The Chinese side holds a consistent and clear position on the eastern section of the China-India boundary: Arunachal Pradesh is a part of Southern Tibet.” Ms Hua explained: “The Chinese Government does not recognise the McMahon Line, which is illegal.”
What does history say? The Wilson Center in Washington, DC, recently released the translation of important documents from the Chinese Foreign Policy Database, an online resource on China’s international relations. According to one of these documents, in early 1952, the Indian Ambassador in China, KM Panikkar, speaking to a Chinese official, gave a report about “the existing conditions [in Tibet], without implying that those conditions should be preserved.” The “existing conditions” meant the existence of a full-fledged Indian mission in Lhasa.
Soon after entering the Tibetan capital in September 1951, Beijing realised that the Indian mission was proof of Tibet’s independence. Zhou Enlai met Panikkar in June 1952 and agreed that “to proceed in this manner was very proper”, ie the “existing conditions” need not to be preserved. Zhou felt that the situation was a scar left by Britain: “For all of this, the new Government of India was not at all responsible.” He went on to say that “to settle the question of Sino-Indian relationship in Tibet, time and proper steps were required. Therefore, the Chinese Government proposed that the Indian mission, previously stationed in Lhasa, be changed into an Indian Consulate General.” Zhou insisted that this “specific problem” should be solved first.
The Government of India readily (and foolishly) agreed and offered a Consulate in Mumbai to the Chinese as ‘bonus’ (though the Indian Head of the Mission in Lhasa, S Sinha,  was deeply upset about it, as he understood the far-reaching consequences for the future Indo-Tibet relations). Wanting to please Zhou Enlai, Panikkar added: “The Government of India was very anxious to remove those conditions through negotiations; for example, the 200 Indian troops stationed at Yatung [in fact in Gyantse], and the postal and telegraphic establishments of India in Lhasa.” According to the Chinese declassified documents, the Indian Ambassador continued: “The Government of India would be willing to transfer these to the Chinese Government as soon as the latter was ready to take them over.”
It was Sales Season! India was ready to offer all its Tibetan ‘privileges’ for free to China. During the following months, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was under the impression that the situation was settling down in Tibet and slowly the Tibetans were accepting the invasion of their country by the Peoples Liberation Army as fait accompli. He was wrong; the Chinese had begun interfering actively in the life of the Tibetans whose resentment was boiling.
On October 21, 1953, Beijing’s representative in Tibet, General Zhang Jingwu, sent a cable to Beijing to explain the “existing conditions” which had to be disbanded: “The Indian troops and officials should be withdrawn; postal facilities shall be taken back; Indian radio facilities shall also be withdrawn or transferred to us, all [dak bungalows] relating to posts and telecommunications shall be withdrawn; as a consulate general already exists in Lhasa, the Indian commercial representatives in Yatung and Gyantse shall be cancelled; radio stations should be given to China [in India to ‘balance’] the one of the Consulate General of India in Lhasa.”
He further suggested that trade should continue for some time and “when [the Chinese presence] becomes mature, one or two years later, relevant rules on entry and exit visas may be established.” It is what happened after the signature of the Panchsheel Agreement in April 1954. Import duties were levied on Indian goods and progressively, by the end of the 1950s, the flourishing Indo-Tibet trade and while it became impossible for Indian pilgrims to visit the holy sites in Tibet.
The McMahon Line is more than a line; it symbolises centuries of close contact between India and Tibet, which unfortunately does not exist anymore. Why should India rewrite history, and wipe out a glorious past just for the sake of Beijing’s good conscience? And what about the Indian archives?

Ajit Doval reminds China of History on border issue

My article Ajit Doval reminds China of History on border issue appeared in NitiCentral.


Here is the link...

‘The views of the two Governments remain as far apart as before’, wrote Subimal Dutt, the Indian Foreign Secretary in April 1960.
He was addressing ‘all the Indian Missions abroad’ to inform them about the visit of the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, who had come to Delhi to discuss the Sino-Indian border issue.
Tens of hours of talks between Nehru and his Chinese counterpart led nowhere. The transcript of the discussions has recently been declassified in The Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, (Series II, Volume 60). These documents make fascinating reading, particularly in the context of Prime Minister Modi’s recent visit to China and the seemingly stuck border negotiations.
Let us return to the present. During the annual K.F. Rustamji lecture, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval (who also officiates as Special Representative for the border talks with China), affirmed that while India's relations with China ‘were looking up’, India needs to remain on a ‘very very high alert’.
Speaking on 'Challenges of Securing India’s Borders: Strategising the Response’, Doval noted: “We have got a very long border, a very difficult and mountainous terrain snow-clad... for the bilateral relations with China, border is the critical and vital issue.”
Considering that Ajit Doval admitted that ‘advancement made in the relationship with China are centred around the settlement of the border’, it makes the ‘partnership’ all the more unstable.
Doval touched upon Arunachal Pradesh: “We are particularly concerned about the Eastern sector where [Chinese] claims have been made on Tawang (in Arunachal Pradesh) which is totally in contravention of accepted principles.”
Obviously, the NSA refers to ‘Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question’ signed on April 11, 2005 between India and China.
Article VII speaks of the ‘settled population’: “In reaching a boundary settlement, the two sides shall safeguard due interests of their settled populations in the border areas.”
Ten years after the signature of the agreement, Doval reminds the Chinese that: “there is [a] settled population in these areas particularly in Tawang and other areas which have been participating in the national mainstream all through.”
But Beijing has forgotten about the 2005 Guidelines!
It is not even mentioned in the Joint Statement signed during Mr. Modi’s visit to China! It is a serious issue: if an agreement is reached after a lot of effort and time and soon after Beijing become affected by Alzheimer disease, it creates a huge problem for the co-signatory.
Doval mentioned another point: he was surprised that while China has agreed to the McMahon line being the Sino-Burmese border in 1960, the same principle was not accepted in the case of India. He added: “So, these are the ticklish issues. But these ticklish issues have to be talked about, deliberated and worked out.”
Doval also readily admitted that the Special Representative talks between India and China on the boundary issue had not made any headway so far: “Special Representative level talks …haven't reached anywhere. But it is also true that for last 30 years we have not exchanged a single bullet. But, it is also true that the number of intrusions have gone up and down. Fortunately, in the last one year the intrusions have become much less."
Beijing was quick to react to the NSA’s statements.
Foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying declared: “The Chinese side holds a consistent and clear position on the eastern section of the China-India boundary: Arunachal Pradesh is a part of Southern Tibet.”
Madam Hua explained: “The Chinese government does not recognise the McMahon Line, which is illegal,” adding: “The Chinese side is ready to work with the Indian side to resolve the boundary question through friendly consultation at an early date."
Hua did not say anything on the McMahon Line and Burma, she just noted: “it is not easy to resolve the China-India boundary question, as it is an issue left over from history."
Minus the 2005 Guidelines!!!
Incidentally, about the ‘left over from history’ theory, Morarji Desai, the then Finance Minister told Zhou Enlai during the 1960 talks, that it was wrong. China has created ‘history’ by invading Tibet: “Our attitude to Tibet has been condemned not only by our people but also by our friends abroad. They say that instead of being neutral in this dispute between Tibet and China, we should not have allowed you [Chinese] to dominate the Tibetans.”
The future Prime Minister added that India “surrendered all the privileges that we had inherited from the British. This was not entirely to the liking of our people but the Government of India and its leaders are convinced that what we did was the right thing.”
As mentioned earlier, Subimal Dutt told the Indian Missions that the Chinese and Indian views ‘remain as far apart as before’.
That was in April 1960. Unfortunately, nothing has changed since then.
After Zhou left Delhi on April 26, 1960, Dutt wrote to the Indian Ambassadors: “The Premier had seven long talks with the Prime Minister.”
Can you imagine today Modi and Xi together for a week and having 7 rounds of talks (of several hours each) on the disputed border?
What was Beijing’s position vis-à-vis China’s border with India in 1960?
It is summarized by Dutt: “The Sino-Indian boundary is not delimited and has to be settled by discussion between the two Governments.”
Delhi has always said the Eastern sector (then NEFA, today Arunachal) was settled in 1914 during the Simla Convention (i.e. the McMahon Line).
Dutt continues to quote Beijing’s views: “The Chinese will never accept the McMahon Line as a valid boundary. The NEFA area was traditionally part of Tibet and in many parts the Tibetans had been exercising jurisdiction. Indian control has extended there during the last 20 or 30 years.” Madam Hua says the same thing now!
China was (and still is) unwilling to acknowledge that in 1914, Tibet, an independent nation, was entitled to sign treaties or agreements with other countries.
According to Dutt, the next Chinese argument was: “The Ladakh area has been historically and traditionally part of Sinkiang [Xinjiang] in China and western Tibet, and has never been disputed until India tried to extend her control during the last one or two years.”
Here again, Beijing rewrites the history, and the Chinese position is as inflexible 55 years later.
Finally, Beijing equates the situation on the East (where the Chinese claim Tawang) to the West (India’s claims over the Aksai Chin) and says: “The position in Ladakh and NEFA is exactly similar in that there is a line upto which Indian control extends in NEFA and there is a line upto which Chinese control extends in Ladakh. The Indian claim to Ladakh must be treated in exactly the same basis as the Chinese claim to the NEFA.”
Dutt’s conclusion was: “We have disagreed with the Chinese stand on every single point,” however he told the Ambassadors, that it was “quite obvious that the Chinese aim is to make us accept their claim in Ladakh as a price for their recognition of our position in NEFA.”
In another words, a swap.
Today, Beijing is not even ready for a swap as it has added Tawang and the ‘populated’ area around, to its claims, in total contradiction of the 2005 Guidelines.
An Alzheimerish China is dangerous for India and Delhi ‘needs to remain on a very high alert’.

1960: The views of the two Governments remain as far apart as before

Nehru, Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi, Swaran Singh (April 1960)

During the annual K.F. Rustamji lecture, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, (who is also Special Representative for the border talks with China), affirmed that while India's relations with China ‘were looking up’, but there was a need to remain at a ‘very very high alert’.
Speaking on 'Challenges of Securing India’s Borders: Strategising the Response’, Doval admitted: "We might have to see China border in a different way once the boundary is settled.”
According to PTI, he explained: “We have got a very long border, we have got 3,488-km [?] long border, a very difficult and mountainous terrain snow-clad... now for the bilateral relations with China, border is the critical and vital issue.”
After he affirmed that ‘advancement made in the relationship with China are centred around the settlement of the border’, he touched upon Arunachal Pradesh: “We are particularly concerned about the Eastern sector where the claims have been made on Tawang (in Arunachal Pradesh) which is totally in contravention of accepted principles."
Doval refers here to ‘Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question’ signed on April 11, 2005.
Article VI says: “The boundary should be along well-defined and easily identifiable natural geographical features to be mutually agreed upon between the two sides.”
And even more importantly, Article VII speaks of the ‘settled population’: “In reaching a boundary settlement, the two sides shall safeguard due interests of their settled populations in the border areas.”
Doval rightly said: “The fact is there is settled population in these areas particularly in Tawang and other areas which have been participating in the national mainstream all through.”
Apparently, Beijing has forgotten about the 2005 Guidelines!
It is a serious issue, because if an agreement is reached after a lot of efforts and time and soon after, Beijing become affected by Alzheimer disease, it is a problem.
Doval mentioned another point: he was surprised that while McMahon line was agreed till Burma by China (in 1960), the same principle was not accepted in the case of India.
He concluded: “So, these are the ticklish issues. But these ticklish issues have to be talked about, deliberated and worked out …there was a need for working out a larger plan for tackling China.”
He also admitted that the Special Representative talks between India and China on the boundary issue had not made any headway so far: “There have been a series of Special Representative level talks, about 17 rounds and they haven't reached anywhere. But it is also true that for last 30 years we have not exchanged a single bullet. But, it is also true that the number of intrusions have gone up and down. Fortunately, in the last one year the intrusions have become much less and some of the intrusions which have been made were controlled."
Beijing was quick to react.
Foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying declared:  “The Chinese side holds a consistent and clear position on the eastern section of the China-India boundary: Aunachal Pradesh is a part of Southern Tibet.”
She explained: “The Chinese government does not recognise the McMahon Line, which is illegal,” adding: “The Chinese side is ready to work with the Indian side to resolve the boundary question through friendly consultation at an early date and create more favourable conditions for the development of the bilateral relations."
Hua did not mentioned directly the McMahon Line and Burma, she just said: “it is not easy to resolve the China-India boundary question, as it is an issue left over from history. …During Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's recent visit to China, the two sides reaffirmed their commitment to a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution to the boundary question by pressing ahead with the process of the special representatives' meeting."
Minus the 2005 Guidelines!!!
It is interesting to look at China’s position 55 years ago, when Premier Zhou Enlai came to India with a large delegation to try to resolve the dispute.
As Subimal Dutt, the then Foreign Secretary wrote to the Indian Missions abroad: “The views of the two Governments remain as far apart as before.”
That was in April 1960.
The Foreign Secretary’s note makes interesting reading.
Nothing has changed 55 years later.
Will it change one day?

Subimal Dutt to Heads of Missions

Premier Chou En-lai and his party left Delhi 26th morning. The Premier had seven long talks with the Prime Minister. He and Foreign Minister Chen Yi had also separate talks with Vice-President and several senior Ministers. The views of the two Governments remain as far apart as before.

The Chinese took the following stand.

(1) The Sino-Indian boundary is not delimited and has to be settled by discussion between the two Governments.

(2) The Chinese will never accept the McMahon Line as a valid boundary. The NEFA area was traditionally part of Tibet and in many parts the Tibetans had been exercising jurisdiction. Indian control has extended there during the last 20 or 30 years. The Chinese however recognise that the area is now under full Indian control. This area has always been disputed between China and India.

(3) The Ladakh area has been historically and traditionally part of Sinkiang in China and western Tibet, and has never been disputed until India tried to extend her control during the last one or two years. The dispute in this area has therefore arisen because of attempted penetration by India. Chinese have always been in control of this area which has been shown as part of China in Chinese maps.

(4) Neither side should make a territorial claim as a precondition. China is not making any such claim to the NEFA and undertakes not to cross the line upto which Indian control has extended. Similarly, India should recognise that Chinese control extends upto the line shown in the Chinese maps and should not try to cross that line. The position in Ladakh and NEFA is exactly similar in that there is a line upto which Indian control extends in NEFA and there is a line upto which Chinese control extends in Ladakh. The Indian claim to Ladakh must be treated in exactly the same basis as the Chinese claim to the NEFA.

(5) A joint committee of officials should meet, examine the material in the possession of both sides and make recommendations for border adjustments.

2. We have disagreed with the Chinese stand on every single point. In regard to point (2) we have reiterated that the NEFA area south of the McMahon Line has always been part of India by custom, tradition and exercise of jurisdiction and there is no similarity between the Indian stand in respect of NEFA and the supposed Chinese stand in respect of Ladakh. We have also made it quite clear that officials cannot be entrusted with the task of making proposals involving the sovereignty of a country.

Top Secret

3. It is quite obvious that the Chinese aim is to make us accept their claim in Ladakh as a price for their recognition of our position in NEFA. Throughout the discussions they have invariably connected Ladakh with NEFA and stressed that the same principles of settling the boundary must govern both these areas. It was also obvious that if we accepted the line claimed by China in Ladakh they would accept the McMahon Line. There might be need for minor frontier rectifications, but that would not create much practical difficulty.

4. The only substantive agreement in the joint communique is that officers of both sides should examine the maps, documents etc. in each other's possession and send a joint report to the two Governments listing the points on which they agree and the points on which they either disagree or which, in their view, need further clarification. It is not known whether the Chinese will implement this agreement sincerely. Whatever be it, it leaves the way open for further consideration of the border problem by the two Prime Ministers. It would however be entirely incorrect to give the impression, that each side appreciates the other's point of view better or that prospect of reasonable settlement is even remotely in sight. The Chinese might try to give that impression to the world.

5. You should use the information contained in this telegram discreetly for rebutting any misleading Chinese propaganda and to give a correct appraisal of the Delhi talks. 

The McMahon Line is legal

My article The McMahon Line is legal appeared in NitiCentral.
Here is the link...

Soon before India started suffering from an acute Obama fever, a small incident took place which, though largely unnoticed, it made China extremely unhappy.
During his recent visit to Delhi, the Japanese foreign minister Fumio Kishida dared to speak about what Beijing calls “a Chinese territorial area adjacent to India as Indian Territory.” According to The China Daily, the Japanese diplomat was referring to Arunachal Pradesh
Beijing immediately lodged a strong protest: “We hope Japan fully understands the sensitivity of the China-India boundary question,” said Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei, who added that in his speech in New Delhi, “Kishida attracted media attention after referring to a southern area of China’s Tibet Autonomous Region as Indian Territory. …Beijing has taken notice of the report, expressed serious concerns, demanded Japan make a clarification and immediately manage damage control.”
Hong affirmed that Tokyo had earlier stated its position of “no taking sides in regard to the areas disputed by China and India” and promised Beijing that it will not get involved in the issue.
Later, Kishida’s clarification did not satisfy China.
Unfortunately for Beijing, the bullying tactics do not work with Japan.
Apart from the China’s official position expressed by Hong Lei, Beijing used one of its ‘scholars’ to add to the barrage of artillery against Kishida.
Geng Xin, who teaches at Renmin University in Beijing and is involved in Japan-based China Studies Think Tank, spoke to The Global Times, the Communist party mouthpiece. He affirmed that Kishida’s words had
“unveiled Japan’s intent of ‘uniting’ the countries that have territorial disputes with China, in an attempt to create a strong impression that Japan, along with China’s other neighboring countries, is bullied by a rising China.”
At the time of the incident, the website China Tibet Online explained Beijing’s position vis-à-vis the border:
“Arunachal Pradesh, which includes three areas in Tibet Autonomous Region -Monyul, Loyul and Lower Tsayul, is currently under Indian illegal occupation. The Chinese government’s stance on these areas, located between the illegal ‘McMahon Line’ and the traditional customary boundary between China and India, is that they have always been Chinese territory.”
Historical facts speak very differently.
Contrary to what China says today, the McMahon Line is very much legal: it was signed by the Prime Minister of Tibet (Lochen Shatra) and India’s Foreign Secretary (Sir Henry McMahon) in March 1914.
As importantly, during the last two millennia, the Chinese have never set a foot in Arunachal Pradesh (formerly NEFA), except for one short visit in one particular location in 1910.
Soon after their occupation of Lhasa in 1910, the troops of Zhao Erfeng, a Chinese warlord troops undertook the subjugation of Poyul, the region located north of the territory inhabited by the Abors in the Yarlung Tsangpo/Brahmaputra Valley. Zhao Erfeng also invited Chinese settlers to come and settle in Zayul, near Rima on the Tibetan side in the Lohit valley. During the summer of 1910, some Chinese officials posted near Rima, went as far south as Walong in Indian Territory where they planted boundary flags, in a place called Menilkrai.
This incident rang the bells in Delhi and London. Something had to be done.
This brief intrusion in the Lohit valley more than 100 years ago, does not means that the entire NEFA has always belonged to China.
In November 1913, the Secretary of State sanctioned what the British called a ‘promenade’. T.P.M. O’Callaghan, the Assistant Political Officer (APO), accompanied by an escort of the 1/8th Gurkha Rifles visited Rima at the invitation of the Tibetan authorities, and clarified the location of the border.
On May 6, 1914, Sir Archdale Earle, the Chief Commissioner of Assam wrote:
“Mr. O’Callaghan’s report confirms the information …that there are at present no Chinese troops anywhere in the neighbourhood of Rima.”
The APO had found Chinese markers at Menilkrai, near Walong (one set dated from 1910 and new markers had been placed in 1912 by the Chinese troops). O’Callaghan removed the markers, repositioned them upstream, near Kahao, just south of the McMahon Line.
O’Callaghan however suggested that a military post needed to be established at Walong:
“I am more than ever convinced of the necessity of the finishing of the road to our frontier and the opening of a post as near our frontier as soon as possible.”
Even before the McMahon Line was formerly delineated, there was no Chinese presence in NEFA.
It is however true that there were areas where the Tibetans had some influence (it represented some 10% of the NEFA’s/Arunachal’s territory); it was mainly in Tawang area; in today’s West Siang [Pachaksiri], Upper Siang [Tuting, Geling], and Lohit/Anjaw, where tribes affiliated with the Tibetans (Monpas, Mempas, etc…) lived.
This again does not make Arunachal ‘Chinese'; the Chinese never even visited these areas.
China knew this and admitted it. Take a letter from Jawaharlal Nehru to U Nu, his Burmese counterpart; on April 22, 1957, Nehru wrote: “I am writing to you immediately so as to inform you of one particular development which took place here when Chou En-lai (Zhou Enlai) came to India. In your letter you say that while premier Chou En-lai was prepared to accept the McMahon Line in the north (of Burma), he objected to the use of the name ‘McMahon Line’, as this may produce ‘complications vis-à-vis India’, and therefore, he preferred to use the term ‘traditional line’.”
Nehru continued: “[Zhou] made it clear that he accepted the McMahon Line between India and China, chiefly because of his desire to settle outstanding matters with a friendly country like India and also because of usage, etc. I think, he added he did not like the name ‘McMahon Line’.”
Whether he liked or not the ‘colonial’ connotation, the line remained the border and till September 1959, there was no dispute about the border!
NEFA/Arunachal as part of China is definitively a claim which followed the border tensions at the end of the 1950s and culminated in the 1962 War.
It is however true that the shyness of the Government of India, which still insists on an Inner Line Permit (or Protected Area Permit for foreigners) encourages the Chinese government to continue with its wild claims.
Delhi should assert once and for all that the entire Arunachal is Indian and therefore treat at par with the other Indian States and every Indian national should be allowed to freely visit the State, while, of course, keeping in mind the security issues.

Who is complicating what?

Amazing Chinese!
They are unhappy about India’s plans to build a road on the southern side of the McMahon Line in Arunachal Pradesh.
Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei stated that India should not “take any actions that may further complicate the situation.”
"The boundary issue between China and India is left by the colonial past. We need to deal with this issue properly. Before a final settlement is reached, we hope that India will not take any actions that may further complicate the situation”, Hong said.
He added: “We should jointly safeguard peace and tranquility of the border area and create favourable conditions for the final settlement of the border issue.”
The proposed billion-dollar project on the Indian side of the India-Tibet border was announced by Kiren Rijiju, the Minister of State for Home Affairs during a visit to his home State.
Rijiju hoped that the construction of the 1,800km long road could begin soon. The Minister also said that the road would be the “biggest single infrastructure project in the history of India.”
One could ask Mr. Hong: when China decided to build a road through the Aksai China plateau in the early 1950s, was not Beijing ‘complicating’ the issue with India.
Yesterday on this blog, I mentioned two roads (today highways) which in the 1950s changed the military and strategic stakes on the plateau (the Qinghai-Tibet and the Sichuan Tibet highways).
At a time when China criticizes New Delhi for planning a road on India’s own territory, The China Daily assets that “The nation [China] has the capability to build an expressway linking up Tibet Autonomous Region and Qinghai Province in west China if major technical barriers are overcome.”
The newspaper quotes Wang Shuangjie, Party's chief of the CCCC First Highway Consultants Co., Ltd., a technical consultant for the planned project, who affirms: “Technically, we have the confidence to build the Qinghai-Tibet Expressway."
Wang and his team believe that the main technical barrier lies in the 500-km frozen earth belt along the planned 1,900-km expressway that links Lhasa with Qinghai’s provincial capital Xining. The Chinese engineers are aware of the extreme conditions on the Plateau, i.e. high altitude, low oxygen content, strong solar radiation and freezing temperature, which are serious technical challenges for the expressway's construction.
Wang said that the expressway will span over areas where the average altitude is above 4,500 meters and annual average temperature below zero.
The China Daily believes that Wang and his team need also to address problems concerning the possible environmental consequences of the construction (melting of permafrost?) and come up with proper technology to take care of the fragile ecological environment.
China has already completed the construction of the roadbed of the expressway's 300-km section between Xining and Caka in Qinghai, while construction of the 400-km section linking Xining with Golmud is also under way. The Chinese newspaper adding: “The rest of the 1,100-km section remains a hard nut to crack for engineers.”
China already ‘complicated’ the situation for India by bringing the train to Lhasa in July 2006 (and now to Shigatse); the express-highway from Xining to Lhasa will further tilt the strategic balance.
But that it not all, to complicate the situation further, Beijing plans to invest 278 million yuan (US $ 45 million) for expanding the Mainling (Nyingtri) airport. The Central Government has already allocated 139.5 million yuan (US $ 23 million) and the balance will be provided by the civil aviation development fund.
China Tibet Online says: “The abundant tourism resources and many famous scenic spots in the region attract more and more tourists to Nyingtri [Chinese Nyingchi] as their first stop for Tibet. In the first half year of 2014, Nyingchi totally received 836,200 tourists from home and aboard.
This airport is located north of the McMahon Line.

The Nyingtri Development and Reform Commission announced that, from January to September 2014, the Nyingtri/Mainling airport transported 246,611 passengers, up 17.5% from the same period in 2013.
Meanwhile, the airport handled a total of 2,734 takeoff and landing flights and 961.8 tons of cargo, up 17.7% and 74.6% from 2013 respectively.
Nyingtri/Mainling is the second largest (and lowest airport with an altitude of 2,900 meters) in Tibet.
It is built on the banks of the Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra), north of the McMahon Line.
For India, it is extremely worrying and it definitively complicates the situation on the north-eastern frontiers.
The train to Nyingtri in 2020 will further exacerbate the border row.
And then, the train to Chumbi Valley!
And of course, the train to Kyirong (see yesterday's post)
Mr. Hong Lei should check his facts before making statements.