India’s big blunders and China changing the posts

My article India’s big blunders and China changing the posts appeared in The Daily Guardian

Here is the link...

The border dispute with China since May 2020 seems to be a repeat of the episode which took place in the 1950s. The then Indian leadership made a mistake by keeping it away from the public and the media. What remains to be seen now is whether Delhi has learnt its lesson and will do better this time.

One of the greatest tragedies of post-Independence India is having let China occupy the Aksai Chin plateau and with barely any protest. The nation still suffers the consequences of this blunder today in Ladakh.

The fact that China occupied this part of north Ladakh and built a road on Indian territory was known to the Indian leadership as early as 1952, when the first surveys were conducted by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The Chinese started to build the road sometime in 1954, but the issue only came up for discussion between Jawaharlal Nehru and Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier, in September 1959, more than two years after the road was inaugurated.

A year earlier, on 18 October 1958, Foreign Secretary Subimal Dutt had sent a feeble protest to Beijing: “It had come to the Government of India’s [GoI] notice that a road had been constructed by the PRC [People’s Republic of China] across the eastern part of the Ladakh region of the J&K State, which is part of India.” The note continued: “It is a matter of surprise and regret that the Chinese Govt should have constructed a road through indisputably Indian territory without first obtaining the permission of the GoI and without even informing the Government of India.” The note sounded more as an encouragement to go ahead than anything else.

In September 1959, the Prime Minister, who knew that the Chinese had built the road, explained India’s rationale to his Chinese counterpart: “We did not release to the public the information which we had about the various border intrusions into our territory by Chinese personnel since 1954, the construction of a road across Indian territory in Ladakh, and the arrest of our personnel in the Aksai Chin area in 1958 and their detention. We did not give publicity to this in the hope that peaceful solutions of the disputes could be found by agreement by the two countries without public excitement on both sides.”

 Delhi did not want ‘to make things worse’, probably fearing a violent reaction from Beijing, but what can be worse than the 1,00,000 troops facing each other now, in the harsh winter of Ladakh. One can’t rewrite history but we can learn from it: Had the Indian public and media known about the road in 1953-54, India might not have been facing China in Ladakh today!

However, is the mindset of today’s babus different from what it was in the 1950s and 1960s? Undoubtedly, it is more difficult to keep such secrets today, but the babus’ modus operandi and motto remain the same: Keep everything secret. They probably feel that they derive their power from the fact that they control the information, forgetting that silence and secrecy have often, as in the case of the Aksai Chin, endangered the interests of the nation.

I am particularly thinking of the fact that since the beginning of the India-China Special Representatives’ process in 2003, the public has never been informed that the Line of Actual Control (LAC) was a myth and that there were actually two Lines of Perception, and that anything could happen in between. Why was the Indian public not informed that the Chinese had refused to provide maps of their ‘perceptions’?

Beijing has no scruples in changing the posts, whenever it is convenient. The correspondence between Nehru and Zhou Enlai for the period between September and December 1959 brings some light on the treacherous intentions of the Chinese in Ladakh today. On 8 September 1959, Zhou Enlai wrote to his Indian counterpart: “I find from your letter that there is a fundamental difference between the positions of our two Governments on the Sino-Indian boundary question.” Two weeks later, Nehru replied that he was ‘greatly surprised and distressed’ to be told that there was a dispute on the border: “[in January 1959], I had no idea that the People›s Republic of China would lay claim to about 40,000 square miles of what in our view has been indisputably Indian territory.”

It is true that no Chinese had ever set foot in the area in the early 1950s. It is unfortunate that today, Beijing continues to change, despite speeches of the New Helmsman, Xi Jinping, about a community of “shared future for mankind”.

In September 1959, Zhou explained: “The Punjab Western Himalaya and Adjoining Parts of Tibet compiled by British John Walker by order of the Court of Directors of East India Company (published in 1854) corresponded fairly close to the Chinese maps.” This line, though not acceptable by India, was mid-way between the present Chinese claims and India’s traditional boundary, coinciding with the Kunlun watershed.

On 21 October 1959 a serious incident took place within Indian territory, south of the Kongka Pass and 10 CRPF personnel were killed—that was a turning point.

With the situation fast deteriorating on the border, on 7 November, Zhou offered that each party should withdraw 20 km from where they were: “to ensure the tranquillity of the border regions and to create a favourable atmosphere for a friendly settlement of the boundary question.” Less than two weeks later, Nehru replied: “Unfortunately, we do not yet know with any precision where the frontier line lies according to the claims of the Chinese Government. This is a matter for surmise based on small scale maps published in China. These maps themselves have not always been consistent, and different lines are sometimes indicated in them.” China would refuse to exchange maps and kept publishing maps with different alignments, though the lines kept moving more and more inside India’s territory.

On 16 November, the Prime Minister suggested the Indian troops withdraw “all personnel to the west of the line which the Chinese Government has shown as the international boundary in their 1956 maps which, so far as we are aware are their latest maps.” At the same time the Chinese troops should return north of the Aksai Chin. This was obviously not acceptable for Beijing who wanted to continue using the newly-built road. Zhou replied the next day: “The line up to which each side exercises actual control in this sector is very clear… As a matter of fact, the Chinese map published in 1956, to which Your Excellency referred, correctly shows the traditional boundary between the two countries in this sector;” clearly confirming that China stood by the 1956 Line, faraway from Beijing’s claims in the area today. A few weeks later, China advanced further its line, engulfing large parts of India’s territory.

The situation since May 2020 seems to be a repeat of the Chinese advances in 1959. The question which remains here is: Has India learnt its lesson? Let us hope that it has.

Constantly Changing Posts

This map appeared in a booklet entitled "Chinese Aggression in Maps", published in 1963 by the Publication Division of the Government of India. 

It shows China's moving claims in the Western Sector of the Sino-India boundary (formerly, the Eastern Turkestan-India frontier).
A quick look at the correspondence between Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Premier Zhou Enlai of China, as reprinted in the “Notes, Memoranda and letters Exchanged and Agreements signed between The Governments of India and China” (also known as 'White Papers') for the period between September to December 1959 is shockingly telling about today’s Chinese intentions in Ladakh.
The White Papers, published by Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, show that the Chinese were already masters at changing the posts ...and they continue despite the 'humanitarian' speeches of the New Helmsman, Xi Jinping.

September 8, 1959
The Chinese Premier wrote to the Prime Minister of India and referred to a letter from Nehru dated March 22, 1959.

Zhou said: “I find from your letter that there is a fundamental difference between the positions of our two Governments on the Sino-Indian boundary question. This has made me somewhat surprised and also made it necessary for me to take a longer period of time to consider how to reply to your letter. The Sino-Indian boundary question is a complicated question left over by history.”
It was the first time that ‘differences’ were admitted. 

Let us remember that between March and September 1959, tens of thousands of Tibetans had followed the Dalai Lama in exile in India. This partly explains China's new belligerence.

Zhou said: “I would like now to further explain the position of the Chinese Government in connection with the questions raised in Your Excellency's letter and in conjunction with the recent situation along the Sino-Indian border."
He started by the boundary separating China's Sinkiang [Xinjiang] and Tibet regions from Ladakh:

"Regarding the 1842 Peace Treaty between Ladakh and Tibet, Zhou argued that the Chinese Central Government did not send anybody to participate in the negotiations nor did it later ratify the treaty,  ...Moreover, this treaty only mentioned in general terms that Ladakh and Tibet would each abide by its borders, and did not make any specific provisions or explanations regarding the location of this section of the boundary.”

The Premier admitted: 

Map mentioned by Zhou Enlai (1854), though it did not represent the post-independence
Indian position, was 'fairly close' to the Chinese map, according to Zhou

 

“The marking of this section of the boundary on the map of "Punjab Western Himalaya and Adjoining Parts of Tibet" compiled by British John Walker by order of the Court of Directors of East India Company (which was attached to the British Major Alexander Cunningham's book ‘Ladakh’ published in 1854) corresponded fairly close to the Chinese maps,” but Zhou complained that later British and Indian maps “included large tracts of Chinese territory into Ladakh [Aksai Chin]. This was without any legal grounds, nor in conformity with the actual situation of administration by each side all the time.”

Details of the map above (around Pangong tso)

The remarks of the Chinese Premier refers to the Aksai Chin; but according to him, the dispute had begun with “the outbreak of the rebellion in Tibet, the border situation has become increasingly tense owing to reasons for which the Chinese side cannot be held responsible. Immediately after the fleeting of a large number of Tibetan rebels into India, Indian troops started pressing forward steadily across the eastern section of the Sino-Indian boundary.”
It was easy to put it on the Tibetans.
In conclusion, Zhou wrote: “I hope that Your Excellency and the Indian Government will, in accordance with the Chinese Government's request, immediately adopt measures to withdraw the trespassing Indian troops and administrative personnel and restore the long existing state of the boundary between the two countries.”
India had to stop trespassing into Indian territory.

September 26, 1959
Nehru replied on September 26, he noted: “I was greatly surprised and distressed to read it. You and I discussed the India-China border, and particularly the eastern sector, in 1954 in Peking and in 1956-57 in India.”
After referring to the McMahon Line, the Indian Prime Minister said: “when I received your letter of January 23, 1959, I had no idea that the People's Republic of China would lay claim to about 40,000 square miles of what in our view has been indisputably Indian territory for decades and in some sectors for over a century.”
It is rather surprising as Nehru knew that the Chinese had built a road across the Aksai Chin.

However, the Prime Minister gave his own rationale, Delhi had just been nice with China: 

“We did not release to the public the information which we had about the various border intrusions into our territory by Chinese personnel since 1954, the construction of a road across Indian territory in Ladakh, and the arrest of our personnel in the Aksai Chin area in 1958 and their detention. We did not give publicity to this in the hope that peaceful solutions of the disputes could be found by agreement by the two countries without public excitement on both sides.”

It is not necessary here to go into the other sectors of the boundaries touched upon by Nehru.
A Note on The Border Disputes was attached to the Prime Minister’s letter in which he complained about an Indian patrol being arrested: “Aksai Chin is a part of Ladakh. The Chinese Government have now admitted that in 1956 they built a highway from Tibet to Sinkiang, running for about a hundred miles through this territory. In September 1957, it was announced that this road had been completed. The next year Indian personnel [an army party under Lt Iyengar from the Madras Sappers] carrying out routine patrol duties were arrested near Haji Langar in north-east Aksai Chin, taken to Suget Karol and detained for five weeks. The leader of the Indian patrol was placed in solitary confinement, and all documents were seized.”

November 7, 1959
Zhou replied to Nehru’s letter of September 26, 1959; though in a meantime (on October 21)  a serious incident had taken place  within Indian territory, south of the Kongka Pass and 10 CRPF personnel had been killed.
In this communication, Zhou offered that each party should withdraw 20 kms from where they were: “to maintain effectively the status quo of the border between the two countries, to ensure the tranquility of the border regions and to create a favourable atmosphere for a friendly settlement of the boundary question.”
It was suggested that the armed forces of China and India “undertake to refrain from again sending their armed personnel to be stationed in and patrol the zones from which they have evacuated their armed forces.”
The innocuous proposal came back recently in the news, when Beijing planted a story in an Indian newspaper, mentioning that China had offered the fixation of a LAC in this very letter. There is of course no map attached to this proposal.

November 16, 1959
Nine days later, Nehru replied, mentioning that Delhi had given a note to the Chinese Ambassador in Delhi on November 4, with full details of the international boundary in Ladakh and the Konka-la incident.
Nehru agreed “that the two Governments should come to an agreement without delay, which would eliminate risks of border clashes.”
The Prime Minister went on: “you have suggested that the armed forces of China and India should withdraw twenty kilometers from the lines which they occupy at present. This, in your view, would effectively prevent any border clashes.”
Nehru, after mentioning the Central and the Eastern Sectors, pointed out: “Unfortunately, we do not yet know with any precision where the frontier line lies according to the claims of the Chinese Government. This is a matter for surmise based on small scale maps published in China. These maps themselves have not always been consistent, and different lines are sometimes indicated in them. I regret I cannot accept the contention that you have been in occupation of the area up to the frontier line shown in your maps. On the contrary, the Government of India have exercised jurisdiction up to the frontier line specified by them.”
Therefore, in the Ladakh area, both Governments should agree to the following interim measure: 

Map of 1956 showing the Chinese claims in Ladakh
The Line was reported on the GOI  map above

“The Government of India should withdraw all personnel to the west of the line which the Chinese Government have shown as the international boundary in their 1956 maps which, so far as we are aware are their latest maps.” At the same time the Chinese troops should withdraw their personnel to the east of the international boundary which has been described by the Government of India.”

Practically, it meant that the Indian troops could patrolled up to the Kunlun range, north of the Aksai Chin; Nehru added: “The area is almost entirely uninhabited. It is thus not necessary to maintain administrative personnel in this area bounded by the two lines on the east and the west.”
This was obviously not acceptable for Beijing who wanted to continue using the Aksai Chin road.

December 17, 1959
The next day Zhou replied. One could ask, why such a hurry?
China was probably nervous about India patrolling till the Johnston Line.
Zhou said that he was anxious to know if the proposal to stop patrolling in some areas only was: “to apply to the entire Sino-Indian border." he affirmed that "no different measure should be adopted in the sector of the border between China and India's Ladakh.”
Now comes the interesting part. After saying that was no reason to treat this sector of the border as a special case: “The line up to which each side exercises actual control in this sector is very clear, just as it is in the other sectors of the Sino-Indian border. As a matter of fact, the Chinese map published in 1956, to which Your Excellency referred, correctly shows the traditional boundary between the two countries in this sector, except for the Parigas area [Chinese name for Demchok] by the Shangatsangpu [Indus] River, India has not occupied any Chinese territory east of this section of the traditional boundary.” See map above by the brown arrows.

The letter continued to argue about the different sectors of the border.

December 21, 1959
Four days later, Nehru replied to say that he “deeply regret that you have not accepted the very reasonable proposals contained in my letter of 16th November.”
The Prime Minister affirmed: “I am always ready to meet and discuss with your Excellency the outstanding differences between our countries and explore the avenues of settlement. How can we, Mr. Prime Minister, reach an agreement on principles when there is such complete disagreement about the facts?”

December 26, 1959
A Note was given by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Indian Embassy. 

For the first time, Beijing’s position was clarified in some details, though without maps.
Beijing reiterated that “China and India are two peace-loving, big countries with a long history of mutual friendship and with many great common tasks both at present and' in the future. Friendship between China and India is in the interests not only of the two peoples, but also of world peace, particularly of peace in Asia.”
It answered into some details a set of questions, again without provided any map.

•    Has The Sino-Indian Boundary Been Formally Delimited?
•    Where Is The Traditional Customary Sino-Indian Boundary Line?
•    What is the Proper Way To Settle The Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute?

The Chinese note pointed out: “The Indian Government has also referred to the talks between the two Prime Ministers in Peking in October 1954, expressing the view that Premier Chou En-lai's remarks about Chinese maps implied that the Chinese Government would revise its maps in accordance with Indian maps, that is to say, the Chinese Government had accepted the Indian Government's claim regarding the boundary.”
The Note argued that Zhou had never said that, ditto for the McMahon Line.
To conclude, the note answered the question: 

“Whether China wants to engage in aggression and expansion?” 

The Noted said: “Centering around the Sino-Indian boundary question, there has recently appeared in India a great deal of anti-Chinese pronouncements, which in cold war language slander China as ‘imperialism’, ‘expanding into India’ and ‘committing aggression’.' The Chinese people cannot but feel deep regret at such malicious attacks against China, which simply fly in the face of facts. …But at no time in future will China become a threat to its neighbouring countries, just as China does not believe that India, after it has grown strong as China fervently hopes, would become a threat to China; to say that the growth of China's population and industry would constitute a threat to its neighbours is utterly incomprehensible to the Chinese people.”
It strongly asserted: “So far as the question of boundary is concerned, China absolutely does not want one inch of another country's territory. There are undelimited boundaries between China and many of its neighbouring countries, but China has never taken, and will never take, advantage of this situation to make any changes in the actually existing state of affairs on the borders by unilateral action.”
A few weeks later, a map of Chinese claims will finally be published by Beijing. It would engulf large parts of India’s territory.
The question which remains: has China changed?

Outrageously changing the post once again (1960)

 

A Truce that was not to be

My article A Truce that was not to be appeared in the Mail Today

One of the strangest characters who appeared on the political scene after India’s Independence was VK Krishna Menon.
PK Banerjee, the Indian chargé d’affaire in Beijing in 1962, who often encountered the arrogant politician, wrote in his memoirs: “Krishna Menon's appearance in the Indian political arena was as sudden as it was unexpected. …he had his education and was enrolled as a Barrister. He hardly had any legal practice …[but] became a protégé of Palme Dutt, a lawyer and founder member of the British Communist Party.”


An Unlikely Minister
Why after Independence, he was suddenly nominated Indian High Commissioner in UK, is not clear.
A few years later, he came back to India and was made Minister of Defence: “In addition, for all practical purposes, he functioned as Foreign Minister de facto,” noted Banerjee.
The Nehru Memorial and Museum Library (MNNL) recently opened the VK Krishna Menon Papers to the public. The first surprising thing to note is that a politician can walk away with so many government documents; of course it has been done by many bureaucrats too (scholars nevertheless rejoice to be able to access these ‘stolen’ files, as the ‘official’ ones remained classified in the different ministries).
In the case of Krishna Menon, he was certainly a smart politician; it can be seen from the fact that he did not leave many ‘traces’ behind.
I was hoping to find the records of his meeting with Marshal Chen Yi, the tough Foreign Affairs Minister of China.
A few years ago, The Hindu quoting declassified Chinese documents asserted that on July 23, 1962, Chen Yi met Krishna Menon in Geneva over breakfast. The Chinese Foreign Ministry reported that Menon suggested that both sides make clear their perception of the western boundary: “both sides could establish posts, but they would not attack each other. There should be a distance between posts of each side …Mr. Chen instantly opposed the suggestion.” The Aksai Chin was Chinese, he argued.
Sixty seven years later, it is a tragic fact that we still have to depend on Chinese archives to know what happened in 1962; I had hoped that a report of the breakfast with Chen would be in the Krishna Menon Papers; unfortunately, it was not. Another problem is that the brash Indian Defence Minister often believed that he did not need to keep proper minutes of his meetings.
However, I found the undated and unsigned transcript of his 1960 encounter with Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier; it is an important document as it is the only record not available in the Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru which consecrate some 300 pages to Zhou’s meetings with Indian leaders (the Prime Minister alone had 17 hours of talk with his Chinese counterpart to try to unlock the disputed border issue).

Tryst with Zhou
The visit of Zhou Enlai in Delhi in April 1960 was clearly a turning point and the last opportunity to settle the Sino-Indian boundary issue peacefully.
As they met, Zhou Enlai told Menon that he had been told by Nehru that he wanted to see him; this was not a fact, noted Menon. Zhou then insisted that Menon spoke first.
The Defence Minister told the Premier that India’s foreign policy was “we were by far the best of friends and the world also thought so.” The minutes were obviously not taken in a professional manner and the English is often poor; for example when Zhou explained that despite “the Tibetan affair [the flight of the Dalai Lama], both in the world and even here although a great many of our people understand, they were very shocked” (sic).
The clever Zhou said that friendship with India was the basis of China’s foreign policy, and whatever happened does “not make any difference to this.”
Zhang Hanfu, the Chinese Vice-minister remained ‘inscrutable’ during the monologue, watching every move of Zhou, noted Menon.
Interestingly, for the Eastern Sector of the boundary, though China did not recognize the McMahon Line, “[Zhou] suggested that we leave it alone.” This meant that Beijing was ready to accept the Line minus the ‘imperialist’ name (McMahon); the Premier however objected to the Indian advance in Khinzemane (north of Tawang) and in Longju (in Subansiri Frontier Division).
Zhou then mentioned the Western Sector.

The Hint of a Swap
He said there had never been any delimitation and only an old treaty (of 1842), which did not mention any area; the Aksai Chin was part of Sinkiang (today’s Xinjiang) and the road built by China was on Chinese territory.
Zhou also spoke of Chinese total sovereignty over Tibet and the autonomy granted to the Tibetans. Though he had no problem with the Dalai Lama, he was shocked by the reception given to him in India. Menon noted: “I think he referred at this stage, though I am not quite sure, about a considerable amount of talk against China in India.”
The entire transcript is in this vein. It is rather surprising, not to say shocking, that such vital talks were handled in such an amateurish manner.
There was a second round of talks: “I think he [Zhou] said much and I think there is no purpose in repeating what he said about the past, but about the frontiers. …I cannot remember the whole of the conversation.”
The conversation had lasted two hours (apparently Zhou had spoken Nehru to say that he wanted another half hour with Menon). Zhou was testing the ground for a ‘swap’: India acknowledges that the Aksai Chin as Chinese and Beijing recognizes NEFA as India. The duo met a third time during the dinner; Zhou again alluded to a deal.
It is evident that these crucial talks for the nation were conducted in an extremely unprofessional manner, without briefing, debriefing or proper note-taking. A chance was probably missed, leading two years later, to the worst possible debacle for India.

Diplomat TN Kaul's 'serious affair' with a Chinese girl and what all went behind 1954 Indo-China agreement on Tibet

Thuksey Rinpoche, Kushok Bakula, Indira Gandhi and TN Kaul in Ladakh

My article Diplomat TN Kaul's 'serious affair' with a Chinese girl and what all went behind 1954 Indo-China agreement on Tibet appeared in Mail Today/Daily O

Though Kaul was asked to return to India immediately, he took four weeks to come back to Delhi.


History is often politically distorted and it is sometimes only decades later that one discovers it. The image that successive governments left of the Panchsheel Agreement is that it was “the best thing” that Nehru did. Unfortunately, the facts do not tally with the myth.

Fate Sealed
The ‘five principles’ were just a small preamble of the “Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India" signed on April 29, 1954 in Beijing by the Indian Ambassador N. Raghavan and Zhang Hanfu, the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister of China; it was about mutual trading and pilgrimage rights.
On May 15, Nehru admitted to the Parliament that the agreement had settled the fate of Tibet, a peaceful independent nation, which was suddenly deprived of its autonomy: “So far as Tibet is concerned, it is a recognition of the existing situation there,” Nehru stated.
For the Prime Minister, the most important feature of the Agreement was not the fate of the Tibetans, but the ‘wider implications for world peace’.
That day, Nehru was in his revolutionary mood: “Now we must realise that this revolution that came to China is the biggest thing that has taken place in the world at present, whether you like it or not.”
During the debate which followed, most of the members from the Congress and the Communist Party were enthusiastic in their endorsement of the agreement. Acharya Kripalani however strongly attacked the Government policy: “We feel that China, after it had gone Communist, committed an act of aggression against Tibet.” A few years later, Kripalani, would call the Agreement, “Born in Sin”.
Historical documents, recently opened to the public, bring some light on how the accord was arrived at; retrospectively, it is clear that it has been the worst-negotiated treaty post-independence.
Whatever position and advantages India had in Tibet, were lost week after week during the four-month hard talks in Beijing, while the border issue was left hanging …it is still pending 64 years later.
One incident which has never been related outside South Block needs to be related.

'Honey Tray'
On March 13, 1954, NT Pillai, the Secretary General of the Ministry wrote to the Prime Minister about the private life of the glamorous Indian Chargé d’affaires in Beijing who had written to Nehru about his private life. After quoting the second marriage of V. Shankar, a staff member of the embassy, Pillai wrote “Kaul's letter has left me somewhat dazed. …Here are two able young men - serious minded, practical, shrewd, even ambitious - cutting themselves away from their moorings, with apparently little thought of where they are going to drift.”
TN Kaul, the Chargé d’affaires was having a ‘serious affair’ with a Chinese girl and wanted to marry her: “One feels sad and subdued at the sight of this volcanic eruption of deep-seated emotions. For all the actors in this human drama, both willing and unwilling, …[it is] as a member of a profession with a code of behaviour, that I must consider the situation before us.”
The Secretary General was deeply upset: “Every Foreign Service officer is expected to obtain the Government's permission before he marries a foreigner. Had Kaul been an unmarried man, a widower, or divorcee, his request for permission to marry a Chinese girl would have caused us enough worry, if only because we know nothing of the antecedents of the girl.”
Not only did Kaul have a lawfully-wedded wife and two children, but more critically for India, he was conducting tricky the negotiations with China.
Even in normal times, this is called a ‘honey trap’; in this case, India’s relations with Tibet and the fate of the common border depended on the outcome of the talks.
Pillai rightly pointed out: “If the new partner is to be a foreigner, even the legality of the alliance is open to doubt, and the Government cannot by according their administrative approval, legalise what is not permissible under the law.”
Pillai said that in the case of Shankar, he was sent back to his Province, “we cannot treat Kaul very differently. At the same time I do not suggest we should threaten him with expulsion from the ICS.”

Missed Opportunity
Pillai considered Kaul’s request for two months’ leave ex-India on the conclusion of his duty in Peking unreasonable: “It is his duty to return to India and report to us on the negotiations in which he has participated. With his past record, he will not, we hope, shirk his obvious duty.”
This entire episode is flabbergasting to say the least.
Was the intransigence of the Chinese negotiators connected to the fact that they had a hold on Kaul? It is difficult to say for certain.
In any case, it was unheard of that a senior diplomat, holding crucial talks for his nation, could have at the same time an affair with an ‘unknown’ lady from the opposite side.
The Prime Minister immediately replied to Pillai’s note: “I would like Kaul to return to India as soon as possible without waiting for end of Tibetan talks which I presume are nearing completion.” The next day, Ambassador Raghavan took over the negotiations.
Though he was asked to return to India immediately, Kaul took four weeks to come back to Delhi. The Prime Minister ‘spoke’ to him; he was however transferred as Joint Secretary in charge …of China, where he officiated several years. Later, he became Ambassador to Soviet Union, America and Foreign Secretary.
India not only lost her advantages in Tibet, but it missed an incredible opportunity to settle her border with China; a gentle neighbour was lost while the guilty officer was forgiven …and promoted.
Is there another country in the world where this could happen?

Nehru’s advisor and Tibet’s tragic fate

K.M. Panikkar: working for India's or China's interests?

I recently came across a telling note written on October 31, 1950 by Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai, who served as Secretary General of Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations in the early days of Independent India.
This note is interesting for several reasons. One, it was based on this note, that Sardar Patel, the Deputy Prime Minister sent his famous prescient letter on Tibet to Jawaharlal Nehru (tragically, Patel’s letter was never answered and 5 weeks later, he passed away).
The note starts by pointing out that as early as July 15, 1950, “the Governor of Assam reported that …Chinese Communist troops, in unknown strength, had been moving towards Tibet from three directions, namely the north, north-east and south-east.”
The Indian Embassy in Beijing was aware of the fact, rumours had been widely “prevalent during the last two days that military action against Tibet has already begun,” Delhi was informed.
Bajpai then instructed the Ambassador, “a friendly enquiry should be made from the Foreign Office in Peking [Beijing] regarding these reports and the desirability of settling Sino-Tibetan relations by friendly negotiations should be emphasized.”
Things soon started going on the wrong track. K.M. Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador in China wrote that “in spite of what he himself had reported in his telegram, he did not consider the time suitable” for inquiring from the Chinese government.
His arguments were that “the Chinese had been anxious to settle the question by peaceful negotiations and had offered Tibetans autonomy, …[and] Tibet had been stalling negotiations on one excuse or another.”
Both arguments were absolutely false and during the weeks to come, South Block would remind Panikkar about it time and again.
But worse, Panikkar said: “since military action was reported to have already started, any such suggestion now will only meet with rebuff.”
The Ambassador’s conclusions were: “time for direct approach will come if Tibetan opposition is serious and there is possibility of a prolonged conflict.”
Panikkar was told that he was wrong, in fact, it was the Chinese Government which was ‘stalling negotiations; South Block added “if China had embarked on military action, such representation would be desirable,” whatever the Chinese reactions.
Unfortunately for Tibet (and for India), the Ambassador was not ready to listen to his direct bosses in the ministry, simply because he had Nehru’s ears and he could directly ‘advise’ the Prime Minister passing over the ministry’s hierarchy (this should remind us of the 1962 fiasco when a Corps Commander went above the military hierarchy to ‘advice’ Nehru?).
On August 3, Delhi was informed that General Liu Bocheng had issued a notification, he had been “assigned to liberate Tibet …The People’s Liberation Army will soon march towards Tibet with the object of driving out the British and American aggressive forces so as to make Tibetans return to the Great Family of the Peoples Republic of China.”
The fact that there was no ‘foreign’ presence in Tibet, except for the Indian Mission, did not strike Panikkar.
While Delhi was surprised about Liu’s words about the “control of the Imperialists over the Tibetan authorities”, Panikkar was not.
Delhi however told its Ambassador: “We consider it a friendly duty to draw the attention of the Chinese Government to this aspect of their proposed action and to urge [that] the proposal military march be stayed.”
The Ambassador was specifically instructed to make a representation to Zhou EnLai the Chinese Premier, on these lines.
On August 13, Panikkar met Zhang Hanfu, the Vice Foreign Minister but ‘forgot’ to mention “the inappropriateness of military operations.”
On August 15, Lhasa informed the Ambassador that the number of Chinese troops near the frontier ‘is now increasing’, but this did not change Panikkar’s view and after meeting Zhou Enlai a few days later, he reported to Delhi: “I am satisfied that the representations we have made have had two important results; they (the Chinese) will NOT now proceed to attack Tibet unless all efforts at peaceful settlement have been exhausted. …Short of giving Tibet its privileged position, China, I am convinced, would do everything to satisfy Tibetans.”
A week later, the Ambassador was instructed to hand over an aide-memoire to the Chinese Foreign Minister. In this, the Government of India repeated that “they have no political or territorial ambitions in Tibet and no desire to seek any novel privileged position for themselves or their nationals in Tibet.”
On October 7, 1950, Tibet was invaded. India lost a Buddhist neighbor and a peaceful border.
Panikkar was told to “draw the attention of the Chinese Government to our grave concern about this development.”
He was asked to inform Beijing that Tibet and India had ancient relations “owing to geographical contiguity and cultural and economic links, to point out that all that we had suggested for Tibet was autonomy within the framework of Chinese sovereignty to be attained by peaceful negotiations.”
It is here that Panikkar changed ‘sovereignty’ but ‘suzerainty’ which had a completely different legal meaning. Though it has pointed to him several times, the Ambassador refused to correct his ‘mistake’.
Moreover, Panikkar continued to deny the invasion of Tibet: “As far as can be seen from here (Peking), NO military action against Tibet has so far taken place”. He had been “unable to discover any information about new developments in regard to Tibet”.
Panikkar further argued: “Further I should like to emphasise that the Chinese firmly hold that Tibet is purely an internal problem …Chinese Government will not for a moment accept that they would be committing aggression if they were forced to take military action against Tibet, as they have all along claimed the right …NO one had claimed that it was international action.”
Even Nehru was worried. On October 25, he wrote: “It is difficult for us to understand how any intelligent person can consider Chinese security to be threatened along the Tibetan frontier, whatever might happen, including a world conflict. …If the Chinese Government distrust and disbelieve us, in spite of all that we have said and done, then there is nothing further that we can say.”
Bajpai’s conclusion was: “Peking’s objective has been to settle the problem of its relations by force. Much ingenuity has been exercised to invent unconvincing excuses for armed action.”
He then wrote: “I feel it my duty to observe that, in handling the Tibetan issue with the Chinese Government, our Ambassador has allowed himself to be influenced more by the Chinese point of view, by Chinese claims, by Chinese maps and by regard for Chinese susceptibilities than by his instructions or by India’s interests.”
Based on this Patel took the issue to the Prime Minister, but the latter never answered. Nehru had faith in his advisor in Beijing.
What a tragedy for Tibet and India!

Panchesheel: it is right for our country, for Asia and for the world or Born in Sin?

The ‘Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India’ was signed April 29, 1954 in Beijing.
It has remained (in)famous for its preamble, containing the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence; the Agreement became known as the Panchsheel Treaty (from Pali, panch: five, sheel: virtues)
Soon after the signature one could hear the refrain: “The Government of India found its old advantages in Tibet (military escorts, trade agencies, trade mats, dak bungalows, telegraph lines, etc..) of little use and in any case the Chinese exercised full control in Tibet.”
For P.N. Kaul, who was one of the Indian negotiators, India was just getting rid of her colonial past: “But, more important was the fact that they were vestiges of imperialist domination and violated the principle of equality, Nehru's policy was not a replica of British policy and he did not want any irritants of no practical value.”
Tibet had been an independent nation for nearly 2000 years; in one stroke India was given away the Land of Snows’ independence under the pretext that India’s presence in Tibet was an imperialist remnant.
However for Nehru, it represented for “an attempt, the first in post-World War II history, to put bilateral relations between the two big countries of Asia on a principled basis. Its success would depend on the intentions and motives, the national aspirations and interests, the leadership and implementing machinery on each side.”
When the Prime Minister presented the ‘Agreement’ in the Parliament he was in his revolutionary mood; he proclaimed: “Now we must realise that this revolution that came to China is the biggest thing that has taken place in the world at present, whether you like it or not.”
In the same speech Nehru spoke described the content of the Agreement Panchsheel: “Live and let live, no one should invade the other, no one should fight the other... this is the basic principle which we have put in our treaty.”
He had forgotten that China had invaded Tibet three years earlier.
He later summed up the Parliamentary debate by saying: “in my opinion, we have done no better thing than this since we became independent. I have no doubt about this... I think it is right for our country, for Asia and for the world.”
A few years later, he felt ‘betrayed’ by Zhou Enlai and Communist China.
But was he really betrayed?
I recently came across an interesting document which shows that Nehru had been warned about China, even before signing the Agreement.
On March 18, 1954, five weeks before the signature, N. Raghavan, the Indian Ambassador to China, wrote a personal note to the Prime Minister: “It was drawn up on the basis of my own observations and experience as also of my study of Chinese relations with us since the advent of New China. I have tried to take as objective a view as possible.”
The Ambassador tells the Prime Minister: “The Chinese unlike our warm-hearted people, are not emotional by nature, and while the Indian people often display an emotional approach towards China, the Chinese themselves have none such towards India. …Any friendship [in China] is evaluated from the standpoint of its usefulness to China.”
Raghavan explains: “For security reasons, I have not dealt with this aspect in my Annual Report for 1953.”
I am posting here the Ambassador’s ‘Top Secret’ Note to the Prime Minister.
It is worth reading this note as it shows that Nehru had been warned several years before the situation on the border became tense, which eventually ended up in a short War in October 1962.
The Panchsheel Agreement had lapsed 6 months earlier.

NOTE ON SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS
by N. Raghavan

What is the attitude of the Government of New China towards India? This is a vital question, the answer to which it is the duty of India's accredited representative at Peking to find out if possible. After a careful examination and objective analysis of the various trends, express and implied, observed for about 18 months, one cannot but help coming to certain conclusions. That there is a definite policy towards India is certain. Whether it is a settled one or subject to changes, it is yet difficult to say. The period, November 1952 to December 1953, the period of India's active participation in the settlement of the Korean question, was not only an extremely trying time in Sino-Indian relations, but was, to some extent, a period of revelations. China's attitude towards India was occasionally discernible without the usual trimmings or diplomatic window-dressings. However, in the examination of Chinese policy as such towards India and her Government, one has to discount statements and expressions of opinion made by Chinese Government spokesman and official journals in the heat of controversy due to dissatisfaction.
As far as observations go, the answer to the question as to what really is the attitude of the Chinese Government towards India is briefly as follows:

1. To remain correct and friendly, without being warm and cordial, in their relations with the Government of India.
2. To prepare the way for the cultivation of warm and cordial relations with the 'People of India', as distinct from the Government of India. (The publicity line is such as to lead one to think that the Chinese Government enjoy the confidence and admiration of the Indian people to a greater extent than even the Indian Government!)
3. To wait for the emergence (in which the Chinese are Led to believe) of a "People's Government" of India and to do what they can to advance and accelerate such emergence.
4. Until then, to 'play down' India and belittle the achievements of her present Government (including their contribution to world peace and progress) or at least to keep the Chinese nation in ignorance of them.
5. To the extent possible, without offending India or her Embassy at Peking, to project India as a capitalist country, suffering from all the economic and political ills of capitalism, colonialism and feudalism; and as such, still not free, but awaiting ultimate liberation by her people (meaning the Communist Party).
6. To make use of India and her independent role in international affairs, but to see as far as possible that by doing so, India does not increase her stature in the international fields so that China's ultimate role as the leading Asian Power will in no manner be affected or threatened.

New India is considered an anachronism, a half-way house at best, in the transition from capitalism and semi-colonialism to Communism and "Popular Democracy".
As a corollary to the Chinese attitude it was observed that China gave publicly no credit to the Indian Government for its impartial assistance in the solution of the Korean problem because, to the Chinese mind, no credit was due. It was thought that the Indian Government could not have pursued any policy other than one of utmost assistance to China as the Indian people would not have allowed anything else to be done. While the Chinese let no occasion pass without singing peans of praise of the Soviets and their contribution to Peace, and while no opportunity was missed to acknowledge the deep gratitude of the Chinese people and Government to the fraternal Soviet people and Government, not a line was publicly uttered or published in praise of India and no word of acknowledgement or thanks has so far appeared in the Chinese Press for the great and universally acclaimed contributions of India and her Government t o a Korean Armistice. India had more than her fair share of blame, criticism and condemnation in the Press and at Party meetings whenever she did not adopt the Chinese line, but little or no approbation or appreciation even when India did something palatable to the Chinese.
The only public reference to India's great role in the Korean Armistice negotiations was a reference by Prime Minister Chou En-lai at a reception to a team of visiting Indian Artists in July, 1953, when he acknowledged with thanks the assistance given by the Indian Ambassador at Peking; but even this was blacked out from the Press Reports of the speech. Since the friendly policy of the Indian Government is not placed to its credit but is ascribed to public pressure which it cannot possibly withstand, it is not surprising that the Chinese Government did not - as even President Eisenhower did - send any formal letter of appreciation on the work of the Indian Custodian Force or of the Indian Chairman of the NNRC, to the Government of India.

Even during the days of 'the illegal Indian Resolution' as well as the 'illegal handing over of the Prisoners to the detaining sides' the Chinese line was to show that the objectionable steps taken by India were against Indian opinion.
The view of the Chinese Government that while the Government of India endeavours to remain neutral, it is not a free Government but is subjected to direct influences of Britain, and indirectly of U.S., is also occasionally visible. It was significant that according to a report that reached the Embassy of a speech delivered by one of the leading Chinese statesmen at a Secret Session of the Government Council in February 1953, the Chinese view was, more or less, as follows:-
Indian Government, as it is today, is a capitalist Government and to that extent, not reliable; India, as she is today, cannot be considered a friend, but is useful, as she is more or less certain to remain neutral in any conflict. As such, friendly relations are to be carefully maintained.
If China has a policy or programme of immediate or long-term friendship with India, one would naturally expect to see some signs of it. At least the people of the country would have been prepared. The tendrils of the gigantic Publicity Octopus of the Government of China would have tried to reach all parts of the country in a programme of kindling friendly interest in India and her people.
It is true that for centuries China remained self-centered. No other country seemed to exist for China. The same tradition might, to some extent, be persisting even today. But people are taught about Soviet Russia and Sino-Soviet relations with meticulous finesse, day in and day out.
For all the protestations of Asian patriotism by Chinese leaders in private conversations, there is absolutely nothing done to stimulate the interest of the Chinese people in other countries of Asia or to educate them on China's affinity, or at least friendliness towards them. India is no exception. At best, she might be occupying a special position in Chinese policy - neither friend, nor foe.
At times, one is led to wonder whether there exists a lurking feeling in some Chinese circles or rivalry - even of jealousy - a fear that India may be a threat to Chinese leadership of Asia, a role which China aspires one day to play. It is curious to observe that even references to ancient connections between India and China or to India's past contributions to Chinese culture are studiously avoided (except in unreported speeches at banquets to visiting Indian delegations).
Not only nothing is done to popularise India, but anything that might enhance her prestige is not very happily received. The anniversary of India's Republic Day usually passes unnoticed. No news paper or other journal ever mentions names like Gandhi or Tagore.
No Indian happening appears to be of the slightest interest, unless it be a C.P.I. Congress or election victory, a Lucknow students strike or a 'Peace' Committee Resolution. India, apart from pro-Chinese extracts from Indian newspapers and especially from the Communist journals, remains practically blacked out in the Press of this country.
None of the thousands of bookshops in China sells any book on India - whether cultural, political or economic. While delegations of a particular colour are invited from India, invitations by the Government of India or public bodies for Conferences held in India are not welcomed or accepted. Uninvited Indian tourists do not appear to be welcome. Exchanges of students and scholars between the two countries are discouraged. Indian film publicity (Indian Information Service documentaries) has never been in demand as in other friendly countries.
Though there was little or no adverse publicity against India for the last year or so, except in so far as India had failed to toe the Chinese line concerning Korea, no information was vouchsafed to the public concerning the great strides that the Indian people under the leadership and guidance of their Government had been making in various fields. Perhaps it is felt that any publicity concerning Indian achievements would not be helpful to the new regime in China in its propaganda to establish Chinese superiority in all fields.
The Chinese people should be made to feel superior. The only country that can do better than China is the Soviet Union. The studied silence on major happenings in India and visible indifference to India's domestic and international achievements were, therefore, understandable.

Don’t give India a chance to amuse themselves by our failure

Panchen Lama, Dalai Lama, Chen Yi, Zhou Enlai, Nehru, Indira Gandhi in 1956

The Tibetan factor impeded longer military operations against India in the fall of 1962. With discontent brewing on the Roof of the World, the supply lines to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), had been greatly weakened.
This is an important to understand the ‘short’ Sino-Indian border war.
Tibet's instabilty appears clearly in the 70,000-character petition sent by the Panchen Lama to Zhou Enlai in May 1962.The Tibetan Lama who had been made Chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region when the Dalai Lama left for India in 1959, dared (‘with anger’) to criticize the policies of the Party in Tibet.
The Chinese Premier requested Xi Zhongxun, Vice-Premier and father of Xi Jinping, Li Weihan, the minister of the United Front Work Department dealing with ‘Minorities’, General Zhang Jingwu, the Representative of the Central Committee in Tibet and General Zhang Guohua, the Secretary of the CPC Tibet Committee and main commander during the 1962 war, to read and study the Panchen Lama's petition.
Interestingly, when the Panchen Lama died in 1989, Xi Zhongxun wrote in The People’s Daily that the Tibet experts found “most of the comments and suggestions [of the Panchen Lama were] good; they could be implemented, but some had gone too far.”
Indeed, he had gone 'too far' for the Communist leadership; Mao called it a 'Poisonous Arrow". 
The Panchen Lama listed several problems such the ‘suppression of the Rebellion’ in 1959.
Each time, after agreeing with the official line, he criticized it:

The rebellion in Tibet was counter-revolutionary in nature, being against the Party, the motherland, the people, democracy and socialism. Its crimes were very grave. Thus, it was entirely correct, essential, necessary and appropriate for the Party to adopt the policy of suppressing the rebellion. However, when these points were implemented…

And then he mentioned the grievances of the Tibetan population.
Then he took on the ‘Democratic Reform’, the ‘Production in Agriculture and Animal Herding’, ‘Livelihood of the People’, the United Front policy for the ‘nationalities’, ‘Democratic Centralism’, the Dictatorship of the Party and finally the most important for him, the freedom of religion. Each time, he used the same pattern.
The Panchen Lama paid a heavy price for having dared to write what everyone knew. He eventually spent the years from 1964 to 1978 in solitary confinement and rehabilitation camps.
Very few analysts have pointed out that a longer war would have been very difficult to sustain in the atmosphere of 'rebellion' prevalent on the Roof of the World at that time. Though openly siding with the 'reformists' camp led by Lui Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, the Panchen Lama was also warning the Communist leadership of the resentment of the so-called nationalities.
During his speech at Beidaihe in August 1962, Mao, who for months had been in the wilderness, staged a comeback using the case of the Panchen Lama.
Dr Li Zhisui, Mao’s physician, recounts:

Then [Mao] turned his opprobrium against the Panchen Lama of Tibet, denouncing him as ‘an enemy of our class’. [After the 1959] crackdown, the Panchen Lama, ordinarily subservient to Beijing, was now arguing that Beijing's so-called ‘democratic reforms’ had moved too far to the left. He hoped that the ultra-leftist trend in Tibet could be corrected.

Some new historical documents regarding the 70,000 characters letter have now been translated in English, by two independent researchers, Jianglin Li and Matthew Akester.
The transcripts make fascinating reading.
In the Summary of a Meeting between Comrade Xi Zhongxun, Comrade Li Weihan and Panchen held on June 21, 1962 in The Great Hall of the People in Beijing, Nehru and India are several times cited.

I am posting here some extracts of the longish discussions.
The entire transcript is available on the bog of Jianglin Li and Matthew Akester.

Xi [Zhongxun, Xi Jinping’s father] intervenes: “I had a meeting with the Master [the Panchen Lama] once, and the Master expressed his support for the [Tibet] Work Committee’s leadership [the so-called Communist reforms]. This is very good. This can be seen in the report too. It is possible that you have a few opinions about each other, this is quite natural. We held several meetings here just for you to vent your anger and figure out ways to solve problems. This is a beginning. You should do the same after returning [to Tibet]. If you are angry, let it out. If you have disagreement, speak out. Problems should be solved through consultation and discussion.”
In 1964, the Panchen Lama’s ‘anger’ will take him for 14 years to jail.
Later, the issue of the Dalai Lama’s flight and India came again in the discussion. Xi explains:

Comrades in Tibet should be clear of the fact that through a big struggle, the reactionary Dalai clique had split off. Through suppressing rebellion and implementing reform, we have laid an initial foundation for our work in Tibet, which is the foundation for development and prosperity within the big family of motherland.

It has to be noted that according to Chinese figures 87,000 died in the first week of the ‘suppression’. For Communist China, it was the ‘base’ of the ‘Liberation’.
Xi admits:

There might be tens and thousands of shortcomings and mistakes, however, as long as we have this foundation, all shortcomings and mistakes can be corrected. Our work during the past few years should be cherished. Achievements cannot be denied, our power should be truly strengthened. Dalai is watching us in India right now. He is dreaming that all we have implemented in Tibet will fall apart, and Banchan [Panchen] will meet his downfall. If we don't want his dreams to come true, we must do our work diligently and prudently. First of all, we must strengthen our unity, and unite every person that can be united. If this work is not done well, Dalai will laugh at us, and Nehru will laugh at us too. Don’t give them a chance to amuse themselves by our failure.

This shows that Xi Jinping’s father was not really a ‘moderate’ and those who believe the Xi Jinping will follow his footsteps and ‘open up’ China were wrong.
Xi again cites Nehru:

This requires that we do our work better under the leadership of the [Tibet] Work Committee [implementing the ‘reforms’], and construct our motherland better. Nehru is laughing now, but don’t let him have the last laugh. Nehru launched an anti-communist satellite, we will launch a revolutionary satellite. We will compete with him on this point.

It is interesting to see that even so-called moderate leaders like Xi, put squarely the blame on Nehru and his government for the Dalai Lama’s flight to India. It will result in the ‘punishment’ three years later, on the slopes of the Thagla ridge and in Ladakh.

At another point came up during the three-day discussions, Xi Zhongxun mentions other implications of the Panchen Lama’s letter:

…Specific problems still need to be solved through consultation and discussion. In Tibet, the workload is very heavy, internal matters are quite difficult, foreign affairs are arduous too. Tibet is the front line of national defence, and there is struggle against enemies as well. Rebels are meddling in Nepal, they took over a county government there and sent spies and rebels to make trouble in Nepal,” and Xi adds: “This is the joint work of Nehru and Dalai. If they messed up Nepal, how can they not want to mess up Tibet? What’s their purpose? They just want to overthrow the current leadership in Tibet and restore the old order. This is not only a current struggle, it is also a long term and arduous one. We must unite ourselves closely; otherwise we won’t be able to handle this situation. Things are difficult in Tibet, but solutions and hope do exist, and our future is bright.

After the three days meeting in June, the same officials had an ‘audience’ with the Premier, Zhou Enlai, who gave a long, tortuous ideological speech. Zhou mentions the historical background:

First was Director Banchan’s [Panchen] report, which was submitted on May 18 [1962]. After that, the Tibetan and Chinese texts were double checked, and submitted again in June.  Now by July 19, four documents had been formulated, two months in between. This is a big job, and is well done. All of you at present have been kept in the mainland for ten months, the past two months being most important. Your task has been well accomplished. Based on the written report, four documents, Director Banchan’s two speeches and opinions from other comrades, [the four documents have been prepared].

Let us not forget that the Party was on the boil, with Mao preparing his come-back a few weeks later.
The Premier says:

We now have these four documents, primarily because Director Banchan submitted his report, and raised questions. The attitude of raising questions is in line with the frank, sincere and outspoken attitude shared by our nation’s senior cadres. Regardless of the content, [the report] recorded all or most of what he saw and what was in his mind. It is a good thing, and applaudable as [General Zhang] Jingwu said just now. In the past we didn’t have such a relationship with Dalai. He didn’t speak out when he had objections, playing a double game, saying one thing to us and another to Nehru; one thing in front of us and another thing to the conspirators behind our back, so we couldn’t be sure what he was up to. We communists were frank with him, but he thought the way.

Zhou Enlai refers to the visit of the Dalai Lama to India in 1956-57 and the long talks with the Indian Prime Minister (Incidentally, Nehru strongly advocated that the Dalai Lama should go back to Tibet and ‘work’ with the Chinese).
Zhou says that in March 1959, China had no clue that the Tibetans would revolt:

we had no clue when he [the Dalai Lama] started the rebellion. Even Apei [Ngabo Ngawang Jigme] was in the dark. We dispatched troops there only after the rebellion broke out. Why did Dalai play a double game? He took us as enemies instead of comrades and friends, and took Nehru as his own circle, the conspirators who plotted rebellion as his own circle, thus it was inevitable for him to play a double game. We were sincere and honest when we told him the Party’s attitude; for example, I talked with him twice in New Delhi and told him the Party’s attitude, but he wouldn’t listen, he listened to Nehru instead. So this made it hard for us to get along. This means that rebellion in Tibet was bound to happen, since he took Nehru as friend and took us as enemy. Now, the attitude adopted by Master Banchan is basically different from that of Dalai.

Zhow Enlai then explains:

When problems arise, the Party will make sure to solve them; you must know this particular characteristic of the Party by now. Do not evade problems and solve problems when they arise, this is the Party’s tradition over the past forty years. When problems are raised, they must be solved; however, this does not mean that all the problems raised are correct. Some are correct, some are not. As both situations exist, careful investigation is required. Correct ones should be accepted, as for the incorrect ones, either raise one’s opinions in a positive way, or criticize from an opposing angle.

The Panchen Lama assessment must have been very incorrect as he will have to spend from 1964 to 1978 in jail.
The next few weeks saw the ‘return’ of Mao on the stage, the purge of Xi Zhongxun and a war against India to make ‘Nehru’ pay for giving asylum to the Dalai Lama.
I have dealt with this in a separate paper.

China’s border tactics unchanged

Indian patrol in the Barahoti Plain in the 1950s

My article China’s border tactics unchanged appeared in The Asian Age/Deccan Chronicle
 
Here is the link...

Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi’s visit to New Delhi on Saturday will not change anything in the mindset of the leadership in Beijing, and the intrusions (transgressions?) will continue. It is important, therefore, that the Indian public is aware about the history of our borders.

In July 1952, the Intelligence Bureau sent New Delhi a worrying report about the Garhwal-Tibet border; after explaining that the border in this area could “only be crossed through Mana and Niti Valleys, where there are open places and habitation, the rest of the border area consists of snow-covered mountains studded with glaciers,” it mentioned one area, Hoti, used by Indian traders going to Tibet during the warm season.
The report warned that at the end of the 19th century, the Tibetans had once established a customs post in Hoti Plain: “To stop this practice, the British government had to send out a detachment of Gurkhas along with Dharmanand Joshi, deputy collector, in 1890. This had a salutary effect and the Tibetans removed their post,” the IB report noted.
But once the Chinese appeared on the scene and occupied the plateau in 1950-51, the Tibetans became bolder: “It appears the Tibetans have again established a police-cum-customs post at Hoti during the trading season,” the 1952 IB report said. It added: “It’s quite possible that if the Tibetans aren’t stopped from establishing their post at Hoti Plain, they might eventually claim it to be their own territory. Since there is no habitation or cultivation in this area, the Garhwal authorities hardly ever visit the area or take action to denote that it lies within their jurisdiction.”
For centuries, the dzongpon (commissioner) of Daba in Tibet had sent serjis (messengers) to Hoti Plain in Indian territory to announce that the trading season had begun. As Indian traders went to Tibet, there were charged some “hospitality” taxes corresponding to the facilities they got from the Tibetan authorities (fodder for animals, etc).
In 1952, the Tibetans again shifted their “customs” camp to Barahoti. The IB then suggested sending a detachment of the Garhwal Rifles and local armed police to hoist the Indian tricolour in Barahoti “to stop the Tibetans from establishing their customs post”.
That is how the Barahoti “dispute” started. It took a nastier turn two years later, when China had established its presence in western Tibet.
It’s important to remember that the Indian and Chinese governments had signed the “historic” Panchsheel Agreement on trade and pilgrimage in Tibet in April 1954. India gave away all its rights in the Land of Snows (telegraph lines, post offices, dak bungalows, military escorts in Gyantse and Yatung), but got no assurances on the border demarcation from Beijing.

In the negotiations, Indian diplomats clearly showed that the traditional and customary boundary followed the watershed range; the passes of Mana, Niti, Tun Jun La, Balcha Dhura, Kungri Bingri, Darma and Lipulekh marked the border in the area. China agreed to name five of them in the agreement, but flatly refused to mention Tsang Chok La, Tun Jun La and Balcha Dhura.
Why? Simply because Tun Jun La is north of Barahoti in Garhwal and Balcha Dhura north of Sangchamalla and Lapthal in Almora district. Not naming these passes allowed China to later claim that these areas were located south of the watershed. The Indian negotiators were fooled... but then China, at that time, was a great friend!
The ink barely dried on the Panchsheel that China started making claims on the Indian territories. On August 13, 1954, a note from the Chinese embassy in New Delhi complained: “Over 30 Indian troops armed with rifles crossed the Niti Pass on June 29, 1954, and intruded into Wu-Je (Chinese name for Barahoti).” Beijing pretended to be shocked, saying “this not in conformity with the principles of non-aggression and friendly co-existence between China and India.” So while China had entered Indian territory, it was now blaming India!
Beijing later protested that on July 17, a 33-person unit had entered its territory... in Barahoti: “The unit was under the command of an officer called Nathauja (Chinese pronunciation), a deputy commander, the district magistrate of Walzanjapur district as well as a doctor, a radio operator and soldiers, all living in 17 tents.”
After investigations, India replied on August 27 that it was found “the allegation is entirely incorrect. A party of our Border Security Force is encamped in Hoti Plain, which is southeast of Niti Pass and in Indian territory. None of our troops or personnel have crossed north of Niti Pass.”
It is how the saga of incursions in the central sector of the Indo-Tibet (now Sino-Indian) border began.
A new terminology has been found by bureaucrats in New Delhi. It is called a “transgression”, but it doesn’t change the historical fact: Barahoti is south of the Himalayan watershed marking the border.
In 1958, New Delhi decided to try to negotiate a settlement with Beijing. Fu Hao, Chinese counsellor in New Delhi, met a MEA joint secretary several times. The Chinese suggested a joint local inquiry. Foreign secretary Subimal Dutt sent a note to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru: “Our case is that Barahoti is an area of about one and a half square miles. We have given the exact position with reference to its latitude and longitude. The Chinese have not defined which area they mean by Wu-Je... an area south of Tun Jun La.” Dutt then added: “If the Chinese claims are conceded, the international boundary would lie south in what is undoubtedly Indian territory.”
The foreign secretary said: “The Chinese are apparently keen on a local inquiry because they will thereby be in a position to define the exact borders of the area which they are claiming.” But Beijing didn’t know where Wu-Je or Barahoti was located.
Subimal Dutt then concluded: “We should emphatically refuse to take any oral evidence locally. Barahoti is more easily approachable from the Tibet side than from our side. The Chinese would be able to produce any number of Tibetans to say what they (want) these people to say.”
He went on: “The Chinese government is not prepared to accept our northern border as shown on our maps, as these maps are supposed to have been prepared by British colonialists surreptitiously. They are also not prepared to accept passes mentioned in the 1954 agreement as border passes... thereby indirectly repudiating the principle of watershed as marking the international boundary.”
All this shows that the Chinese still use the same tactics (whether in the South China Sea today or earlier in Aksai Chin or Barahoti); they occupy a territory that they deem important for their own interests and later emphatically declare it has always been “Chinese territory”, which is sacred and will be defended by force if necessary.
Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi’s visit to New Delhi on Saturday will not change anything in the mindset of the leadership in Beijing, and the intrusions (transgressions?) will continue. It is important, therefore, that the Indian public is aware about the history of our borders.

The Closure of the Indian Consulate in Kashgar and the Aksai Chin Road

Last week, I quoted an article published by Xinhua about the Aksai Chin Road (Xinjiang-Tibet Highway or NH 219 for China); it concluded: “The highway today looks to me like an airport runway -- wide, flat and smooth - a heavenly road, indeed.”
It is certainly a great boon for the People's Libration Army (PLA) and China’s border management in general.
Xinhua asserted: “With a safe, modern highway, transportation costs from Yecheng to Ngari have fallen by 55 percent, leading to cuts of about 40 percent in the price of commodities in the Tibetan town. Better yet, the number of tourists in Ngari has surged five-fold.”
It is probably just a beginning.
Ngari area (Western Tibet) is going to become a very fashionable tourist destination in the years to come.
It will have critical implications for India's borders.
To understand how this point was reached, I reproduce below an extract of my book, Born in Sin - the Panchsheel Agreement.
To close down the Indian Consulate in Kashgar, without getting anything in return, was probably one of Nehru's greatest blunders.
But, like other blunders, it has been forgotten long ago.


The Closure of the Kashgar Consulate
A series of incidents occurred in the early fifties should have awakened the Government of India from its soporific Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai dream-like world. It was not to be so.
Instead of alarming Nehru, these disturbing reports reinforced his determination to bolster the friendship with China.
On September 1, 1953, Nehru began a letter to the Chinese Premier thus:

It has been a matter of deep satisfaction to me to note the growing cooperation between our great countries in international affairs. I am convinced that this cooperation and friendship will not only be to our mutual advantage, but will also be a strong pillar for peace in Asia and the world.

The first of these incidents was the harassment of the Indian Trade Agent posted in Gartok in Western Tibet. Though Nehru wrote to Zhou Enlai about it, no following action was taken and no proper analysis of Chinese motivations was made.  And the complain was weakly drafted!
Nehru barely brought the matter to Zhou’s notice:

Recently, some incidents have taken place when the local authorities in Tibet stopped our Trade Agent in Western Tibet from proceeding on his official tour to Rudok and his staff to Taklakot, both important trade marts for Indian traders and pilgrims. There has been a forcible seizure of his wireless set which is essential for the performance of his duties. We learnt of this incident with surprise and regret, because it did not seem to us in consonance with the friendly relations between our two countries.

The harassment of the Indian Trade Agent in Western Tibet was without doubt linked with the work which had started on the Tibet-Xinjiang highway.
Rudok, located midway between Lhasa and Kashgar is the last small town before entering the Aksai Chin.
The presence of an Indian official there was embarrassing for the Chinese as they had started building a road on Indian soil. Did Nehru see the implications of the incident or did he still believe in Chinese goodwill?
His letter concludes thus:

I would invite Your Excellency’s Government to confer with our Government at the earliest suitable opportunity, either in Delhi or in Peking, on all such matters affecting relations between our two countries.

An official Indian report mentions that S.S. Khera, a Cabinet Secretary in 1962, later wrote that “information about activities of the Chinese on the Indo-Tibetan border particularly in the Aksai Chin area had begun to come in by 1952 or earlier.”

India's interests gone with the wind 
If the Indian government had been ready to read beyond the Chinese rhetoric and Zhou’s assurance of friendship, it would have seen many more ominous signs. One of them was the closure of the Indian Consulate in Kashgar.
Here again, as in several other cases, Nehru justified the Chinese actions without taking any retaliatory measures or even protesting. India’s interests were lost to the ‘revolutionary changes’ happening in China. He declared in the Parliament:

Some major changes have taken place there [Kashgar]. As a result of those changes, which have nothing to do with India at the moment… our Consul went there – I speak from memory – probably in 1948, maybe even later, in 1949. But when these changes, revolutionary changes took place there, it is perfectly true that the Chinese Government, when they came to Tibet, told us that they intended that they wanted to treat Sinkiang as a closed area. They told other State Government, too. Well, nothing happened. Our Consul remained there. But because of those changes, because of many factors – among them being what happened in Kashmir – the trade ceased... Kashgar is important to us as a trade route. The trade went over the Karakoram, passed though Ladakh and Leh on to Kashmir. Various factors, including developments in Kashmir led to the stoppage of that trade... The result was, our Consul remained there for some time, till recently… but there is now no work to be done. So we advised him to come away and he did come away.

India had been trading with Central Asia and more particularly Kashgar and Yarkand for millennia.
Just because ‘revolutionary changes’ had occurred, the Government of India accepted the closure of its trade with Sinkiang as a fait accompli.
The reference to Kashmir is not relevant. Since the winter of 1948, India controlled the Zoji-la pass as well as Ladakh. At that time, the Karakoram Pass was still open to the caravans.
The unnecessary closure of the Indian Consulate in Kashgar was the green light that Mao needed to start building the Aksai Chin Road on the Indian territory.

Photos of the road today:

 

 

 

India is soft on Chinese intrusions (cont.)

As the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has done it again in Ladakh, I republished an old post of 2013.
According to PTI, earlier this week, the Chinese troops entered almost 6 kilometer deep inside the Indian territory in the Panggong lake area.
This led to a stand-off between the Indo-Tibetan Border Force (ITBP) and the PLA: “The incident occurred on March 8 when a platoon of at least 11 PLA men led by a colonel-rank officer crossed over the Line of Actual Control at ‘Finger VIII’ Sirjap-I area close to the Pangong lake,” says PTI.
The Chinese soldiers came with four vehicles - two light, one medium and one heavy - from across border post and reached 5.5 km deep inside the Indian territory.
The Indian sources said the Chinese soldiers were soon ‘countered and engaged’ by a patrol of the ITBP.
The confrontation lasted for a few hours “after which the situation got defused and the other side retreated.”
The Chinese intruders were led by a colonel-rank officer and two majors.
Apparently, China has managed to construct a road up to Finger-IV area which also falls under Sirijap area and is five-km deep into the LAC.
When will it stop?
Not soon, considering that Beijing does not even want to exchange maps of the LAC.
 

My September 2013 post
Making a statement in the Parliament on the reported Chinese intrusions in Ladakh, Defence Minister AK Antony asserted that there is "no question of India ceding any part of its territory to China".
The Opposition parties had rightly demanded that the government should clarify some media reports on an official note from the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) which had been submitted to the Prime Minister's Office. 
The NSAB is said to have alleged (though it was denied later) that Indian troops are not being allowed to patrol the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and that 640 sq km of Indian territory has been occupied by China.
Mr. Antony is right in the sense that the LAC, in fact the LACs (there are today one the 'perceived' Indian and one 'perceived'  Chinese LAC) have never been defined or demarcated.
So, where is the Indian territory and where is the Chinese territory?
The Minister has however forgotten to mention that the NSAB Report pointed out that an LAC was agreed by Zhou Enlai in his letter to Nehru on November 8, 1959. 
Have the Chinese changed their views since?
The fact that China refuses to exchange maps of 'their' today's perceptions tends to show that the Chinese perceptions have greatly move since 1959 (and continue to move south-westernwards).
Five years ago, I had interview for Rediff.com, Thupstan Chhewang, then the Member of Parliament for Ladakh, intrusions were already happening. It continues the same way, except for the fact that yesterday's grazers have been replaced by regular Chinese soldiers.

India is soft on Chinese intrusions
Rediff.com
March 27, 2008
In 1995, after years of protests, the people of Ladakh were finally granted a special status with the formation of the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council. This resulted in some degree of autonomy.
From 1995 to 2004, Thupstan Chhewang, 60, was chairman of the council, trying to lead the erstwhile Buddhist kingdom into modernity, without losing its traditional roots. Since 2004, Chhewang represents Ladakh in the Lok Sabha as an independent member.
Claude Arpi met him to find out the progress of education and development in the Himalayan region, and also about the Chinese incursions in the border areas, the state of the environment and the effects of global warming in Ladakh and the relations between the Muslim and Buddhist populations of this most strategic part of Jammu and Kashmir.

There has been a lot of reports of Chinese intrusions in Arunachal Pradesh, are you facing the same problem in Ladakh?

Yes, off and on. Of course, it is much worse in Arunachal. But in Ladakh also we consistently have Chinese incursions; some of them very serious. For example, the Chinese started building a road on the other side of the Pangong Lake on Indian territory. It was only after the construction had started that it came to the notice of the government of India. It has now been stopped and we have constructed a road right up to the border.

There are reports of incidents with speed boats on the Pangong Lake. Where is the LAC (Line of Actual Control) across the lake? How do you determine the line?

Both sides have speed boats to man the border. The lake is about 120 km long, some 40-45 km are with us, the rest with China. It means some 30 percent of the lake is Indian. The lake is very narrow, I am not very sure how the LAC is determined on the lake, but it is close to the shore.

Are the Chinese entering Indian territorial waters?

Once a Chinese patrol chased an Indian party four or five kilometers inside the Indian side of the lake. They captured the crew of the Indian boat, and took them prisoner.

When was it?

It happened some three to four years ago.

I was told that in Arunachal the Chinese send grazers and if the Indian side does not react, they occupy the place. Is the same thing happening in Ladakh?
We have the same problem in Ladakh in places like Chumur and Skagjung which are very rich in pasture and preserved as a winter pasture for the Changpa tribals. There is also a place called Dungti where a motorable bridge was constructed to take cattle and animals for grazing on the other side of Indus which is well within our borders. It was removed because China objected to it. Skagjung is the main pasture where the entire nomad population of the Changthang area comes. The nomads depend on this pasture for their survival. The Chinese used to intrude in winter. In Chumur sector, the Chinese object to grazing our cattle claiming the area is theirs, which is not true.

Why is the government of India not saying anything?

They are very soft. Like in Chumur, the Chinese send their cattle for grazing, though it is very much Indian territory. When they are asked to go away, the Chinese say it is their territory. Our government agencies do nothing. Instead of encouraging nomads from Changthang to go there (it is legitimately our territory), they advise them to stay away. This is the type of situation that we are facing.

Do you mean to say that while the Indian Army is asking Ladakhi nomads not to go, the Chinese are encouraging theirs to go there?

Yes, exactly.

It is the same pattern as in Arunachal.

Yes, it is the same.

Five years ago, you mentioned that you were lobbying to get the border post in Demchok opened which will allow Indian pilgrims to go to Kailash/Mansarovar by road.

A delegation from Ladakh recently met the prime minister, the home minister and the leader of the Opposition to request them to take up the matter with China. During these meetings, we also objected to plans to cede to China any territory under Chinese occupation, places like Aksai Chin or Lingzinthang. We requested the prime minister to allow the Demchok road to be opened for the Kailash Yatra as well as trade and commerce. Some trade is already illegally taking place, but we want it to be legalised. China has already set up a market near Demchok.

When Premier Wen Jiabao came in April 2005, some guidelines to solve the border issue were agreed upon. It stated that uninhabited places could be exchanged. Does it mean that the government is ready to exchange Aksai Chin?

Exactly, but it is not acceptable to us. We cannot accept that just because some parts of Ladakh are uninhabited, they can be given away. There are many places elsewhere which are uninhabited, if the Chinese claim them, are we going to give them away? Ladakh is a large area; just because there is so much vacant land, do you think that we should cede these areas? We don't agree to these guidelines.

In the Ngari region of western Tibet, a lot of Chinese have settled recently. Is it one of the reasons why the Chinese refuse to open the Demchok road?

I don't know, but in any case, why should the Chinese not allow tourists? We are ready to accept whatever control (they would like to put in place). There is the existing LAC, we always abide by this line as the international border. Today, China is opening to trade and international commerce in a big way. Why not Demchok road? If it is opened for tourism, lakhs of people, especially Hindus, will use the road to go on pilgrimage to Kailash. The road can go right to the base of Kailash. The present road (through Uttarkhand) is very tedious. Old people can't go. It will not be the case with Demchok road. Hindus will benefit, but China will also benefit. They will get a lot of revenue from the pilgrims and also earn goodwill.

Why do they refuse?

Earlier there were some reservations from the Indian side, but now India has agreed, the only reservation is from the Chinese side. But I am told that during the last meeting (between the Indian National Security Advisor and his Chinese counterpart) before the visit of Dr Manmohan Singh to Beijing, it was discussed by the two sides in Delhi and the Chinese might be more inclined to accept.

What is the progress on Union territory status for Ladakh?

It will take a long time. It might come only with a solution of the Kashmir issue. We can only try to persuade the government. The present Congress government is not inclined at all to grant UT status to Ladakh.

Can't the people of Ladakh build more pressure?

As you know, the Indian system is based on electoral politics. We have a small population. Only the large states with large populations are heard today. Although Ladakh is a very strategically located area, nobody listens to us because our population is small. But we will not give up, we will continue our efforts.

The rest of the interview is  available on Rediff.com