The Sino-Indian Boundary - A Historical Background with emphasis on the Ladakh sector

 

The Fault Lines is a series by FNVA that discuss developments occurring on our Indian frontiers. Engaging extensively with the Universities on these regions and bringing them to the fore.

The Second Episode of The Fault Lines sees Claude Arpi, Author, Tibet Expert, Advisor at FNVA and Director of the Pavilion of Tibetan Culture at Auroville addressing on the topic "The Sino-Indian Boundary - A Historical Background with emphasis on the Ladakh sector".

This Episode is moderated by Professor Sonam Joldan from the University of Ladakh and was addressed to the University of Ladakh. Claude Arpi in part 1, here shares with us the historical background and significance of Ladakh when it comes the current India - China Boundary which was previously the India - Tibet Border.

LAC vs IB: Why India's assessment of the length of border along China is misleading

My article LAC vs IB: Why India's assessment of the length of border along China is misleading appeared in FirstPost.

 Here is the link...

The length given by India's Ministry of Home Affairs (3,488 km) is unfortunately wrong

What is the length of India’s border with China?
You may think that it is easy to answer this question, but unfortunately, it is not.
The Ministry of Home Affairs states: “India has 15,106.7 Km of land border and a coastline of 7,516.6 Km including island territories.” It then gives the length of India’s land borders with neighbouring countries; Bangladesh has the longest border (4,096 km), then China (3,488 km) and Pakistan (3,323 km).

India’s International Border (IB) with China is 4,056 km.
Let me explain why.
The length given by the MHA (3,488 km) is the length of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), not the IB.
The concept of LAC was introduced by the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, during a press conference in Delhi in April 1960 (he had earlier vaguely mentioned it at the end of 1959 in a letter to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru).
Zhou proposed six points to solve the border issue; the first two points were:

•     There exist disputes with regard to the boundary between the two sides.
•     There exists between the two countries a line of actual control (LAC) up to which each side exercises administrative jurisdiction.

The fact that the Indian government then rejected the Premier’s proposal is irrelevant to the present argument.
Zhou had come to Delhi to set up talks with India on the boundary dispute. Subsequently, the officials of India and China met for several months during which Delhi made its position clear: “The India-China boundary starts from the tri-junction of the boundaries of India, China and Afghanistan and runs eastward through the Kilik Pass, Mintaka Pass, Kharchanai Pass, Parpik Pass, and the Khunjerab Pass. These passes lie on the watershed between the Hunza river flowing into the Indus system in India and the Qara Chukar river flowing into the Yarkand system in Sinkiang. From the Khunjerab Pass the boundary lies along a spur down to the north-western bend of the Shaksgam or Muztagh river which it crosses at that point and ascends the crest line of the Aghil mountains. It then runs along the crest of the Aghil watershed through the Aghil Pass the Marpo Pass and the Shaksgam Pass to the Karakoram Pass.” The coordinates for each of these places were given.
Historically, there is no doubt that Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) was part of the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir’s territory and that the IB presently starts at the trijunction with Afghanistan while the LAC begins at the Karakoram Pass.

Rajnath Singh’s declaration
On 28 October, 2022, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, while addressing a function in Srinagar to mark 75th year of induction of the Indian Army in Kashmir, reiterated that GB was part of India, though presently under occupation. “India’s development march towards the North will be complete after reaching GB,” he stated.
The minister also referred to the 1994 Resolution passed in the Indian Parliament to recover the territories under illegal occupation of the ‘neighbouring country’. “We have only started our northward journey. Our journey will be complete when we fully implement the unanimous resolution passed by the Parliament on February 22, 1994, and we reach our remaining areas like GB,” said Singh.

A little bit of history
In 1935, the viceroy prevailed upon Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir, ‘in the interests of the security of the British empire’ to lease the Gilgit Agency as well as the hill-states Hunza, Nagar, Yasin and Ishkoman for 60 years to the British. Thereafter, Gilgit was administered by the Political Department, with a Political Officer reporting to the viceroy.
The British Paramountcy lapsed on 1 August, 1947, and Gilgit reverted to the Maharaja’s control. Lt Col Roger Bacon, the British Political Agent, handed his charge to Brig Ghansara Singh, the new governor appointed by the Maharaja. A British officer, Maj Brown remained in-charge of the Gilgit Scouts.
On 26 October 1947, after the brutal tribal invasion of Jammu and Kashmir organised by Pakistan, Maharaja Hari Singh signed an Instrument of Accession and joined the Union of India. However, Maj Brown refused to acknowledge the orders of the Maharaja, under the pretext that some leaders of the Frontier Districts Province (in GB) wanted to join Pakistan. He took it upon himself to hand over the entire area to Pakistan on 1 November, 1947.
An interesting announcement was published in the 1948 London Gazette which mentioned that the King “has been graciously pleased… to give orders for… appointments to the Most Exalted Order of the British Empire…” The list included “Brown, Major (acting) William Alexander, Special List (ex-Indian Army).”
Why awarding Brown? Simply because Brown had just ‘offered’ to Pakistan this strategically important area for London.

A British Article
In 2017, an IANS article, When the British poured scorn over Gilgit, explained the background of the 1947 rebellion in Gilgit: “A carefully chosen force capable of rapid movement in the mountainous territory controlled by British officers, the Gilgit Scouts, provided the muscle to the administration.”
The article continued: “The bloodless coup d’etat was planned by Brown to the last detail under the code name ‘Datta Khel’, which was also joined by a rebellious section of the J&K 6th Infantry under Mirza Hassan Khan.”
In his memoirs, Gilgit Rebellion: The Major who Mutinied over the Partition of India, Brown described his encounter with Pakistan prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan in November 1947: “Colonel Bacon, Colonel Iskander Mirza, and I were called into the ante-room. The Pakistan Premier was seated at a desk, poring over a large-scale map of Kashmir and Central Asia. …Mr Liaquat Ali Khan started by congratulating me and thanking me for all I had done in preserving peace in the Gilgit Agency.”
Liaquat then said: “Brown, give me your ideas [for Gilgit] from a military point of view.” The major explained in detail his plans to defend the area by reorganising the Scouts. “Right” said the Premier: “That disposes of the military angle.”
Though there is no doubt about the illegality of the mutiny, one paramount question remains: was the British Headquarters informed?
At the time, the entire Pakistani Army hierarchy was British. So, the answer can only be that Maj Brown’s British bosses were aware of his ‘gift’ to Pakistan. The fact that he was nominated to the OBE is further proof. The King usually does not appoint ‘deserters’ or ‘rebels’ to the august Order.

The length of the IB
Even today, this has serious implications for India, though it does not change the length of the IB (4,056 km), beginning at the trijunction with Afghanistan in the West and ending at the trijunction with Burma (Myanmar) in the east. The report of the officials cited above gives the Indian position in the East: “The boundary crosses the Yonggyap Pass and the Kangri Karpo Pass in this sector. It then crosses the Lohit river a few miles south of Rima and joins the tri-junction of the India, Burma and China boundaries near the Diphu Pass.”

The UN Resolutions
The UN resolutions of 17 January, 1948, and 13 August, 1948, and 5 January, 1949, (UNCIP Resolutions) made it clear that “Pakistan cannot claim to exercise sovereignty in respect of J&K.” In 1963, a secret note from the MEA clarified further that according to the term of the UN Resolutions, “Pakistan cannot purport to exercise even ‘actual control’ over the defence of these areas.”
Practically, it also means that the agreement signed on 2 March, 1963, between Pakistan and China about the Shaksgam Valley of the Gilgit Agency being transferred to China is legally invalid.
Another logical conclusion is that inhabitants of the area if they want to move to India, should be entitled to Indian citizenship.

A British Resolution
Amazingly, in 2017, the British Parliament passed a resolution confirming GB was part of Jammu and Kashmir.
The motion was tabled on 23 March, 2017, by Bob Blackman of the Conservative Party. It reads: “GB is a legal and constitutional part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, India, which is illegally occupied by Pakistan since 1947, and where people are denied their fundamental rights including the right of freedom of expression.”
Two years later, the new maps released by the Government of India showing the Leh district of Ladakh including the districts of Gilgit, Gilgit Wazarat, Chilhas and Tribal Territory of 1947, made this clear.
Interestingly, the Indian media reported last month: “Amidst news of flour and food crisis across Pakistan, the Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK), GB is again making headlines as residents are furious over the discriminative policies of the Pakistan government that has exploited the region for several decades and are now demanding a reunion with India in Ladakh”, noted India Today, adding: “Several videos on the internet show the extent of the discontent among residents.”
Let us hope that the correct length of India’s border with China will soon be obvious to all.

About the Land Dispute with Nepal

Survey of India map (1943)

On May 8, 2020, an argument erupted between India and Nepal; the immediate reason which triggered the debate was an 80 km road between Darchula to Lipulekh, the border pass near the trijunction with Tibet and Nepal, inaugurated by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh.
The road is to be used by the Indian pilgrims visiting Kailash-Mansarovar, located some 90km from the pass, as well as the local traders; Lipulekh being one of the three landports between India and China. Strategically, this road is also crucial for India.
PTI then explained: “The Lipulekh pass is a far western point near Kalapani, a disputed border area between Nepal and India. Both India and Nepal claim Kalapani as an integral part of their territory.”
Kathmandu handed over a diplomatic note protesting against the construction of the road to Vinaya Mohan Kwatra, the Indian Ambassador to Nepal; Kwatra was subsequently called by Pradeep Kumar Gyawali, Nepal’s Foreign Minister, who lodged a protest.
It is only very late that the Nepali realize that there was a dispute. 

In 1998, the CPN-ML faction led by Bam Dev Gautam started claiming some Indian territory in the vicinity of Kalapani as Nepalese; one of the main actors was Buddhi Narayan Shrestha, the former Director General of the Land Survey Department. According to him, the ‘Kali River’ is in fact the Kuthi Yankti river that arises below the Limpiyadhura range and not the one earlier accepted by India, China and Nepal.
It is how Nepal began claiming an entire area of Kumaon up to the Kuthi Valley, some 400 km2 in total.
But up to 2000, the Nepalese government kept quiet and did not push for these demands.
In a statement to the Indian Parliament in 2000, the Indian foreign minister Jaswant Singh suggested that Nepal had questioned the source of the Kalapani river, while denying that it was a dispute.
Unfortunately, on May 20, 2020, Nepal for the first time released a map incorporating the Maoist claims; it showed the entire area to the east of Kuthi Yankti river as part of their territory. To make it worse, on June 13, a bill seeking to give legal status to the new map was unanimously approved by the lower house in the Nepal Parliament.

The Road to Kailash
In May 2020, India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) denied that the road was crossing Nepal’s territory: “The recently inaugurated road section in Pithoragarh district in the state of Uttarakhand lies completely within the territory of India. The road follows the pre-existing route used by the pilgrims of the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra,” said South Block.
Already in November last year, Kathmandu had protested, “unilateral decisions on border issues won’t be accepted,” it was in reference to the new Political Map of India published by Delhi after two new Union Territories - Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh - came into existence on October 31.
Kathmandu formally protested over the inclusion of the Kalapani area in the new map.
What is strange is that the new Indian map is exactly the same than the one published in 1954 in the Atlas of the Northern Frontiers of India, which is the official reference till today for India’s boundaries. Kathmandu did not protest against the old map and apart from the new UTs, there was nothing new in the 2019 maps.
The case is complicated by different factors; amongst them the political struggle within the ruling party in Nepal and also the fact that there has been no historical consistency in Kathmandu’s position.
Let us look at the history.

Tracing the History
After a War between British India and Nepal in 1814, the Nepalis were sent back across the Kali River in May 1815 and subsequently the Segowli Treaty was signed on March 4, 1816. Article 5 of the Treaty stated: “The Rajah of Nepaul renounces for himself, his heirs and successors, all claim to or connexion with the countries lying to the West of the River Kali, and engages never to have any concern with those countries or the inhabitants thereof.”
Unfortunately, there was no map attached which could have authoritatively shown the exact alignment and the source of the Kali River.
In any case, at that time, no scientific survey worth the name could be carried out; it was only by mid-19th century that the Himalayan border was first surveyed by the Great Trigonometrical Survey of India (a precursor of the Survey of India), in a more scientific manner.

General Conwan’s Take
General Sam Cowan, a retired British general, studied Nepal through his British Gurkha connections and his extensive trekking in the country, wrote in 2015 a well-researched article. There is no doubt that due to his long service with the Gurkhas, Conwan’s sympathies lies with Nepal; his arguments are interesting nevertheless.
Long before the issue of Kalapani erupted, he observes: “A further major complication for Nepal is that India rejects the claim that the river from Lipu Lekh is the renamed Kali River. It asserts, and claims that it has maps and diagrams to prove it, presumably based on the 1879 map, that the river Kali begins from the junction of the river that flows from Lipu Lekh and a stream that flows from springs in Kalapani. Hence, the earlier quote from the Indian pilgrim that “Kalapani …is supposed to be the origin of River Kali.”
According to Conwan: “The date on which this Kalapani stream first appeared on maps is disputed, but, whatever the maps show or do not show, the ground reality is that Indian security forces occupy the area of Kalapani to the east of the river, which traditionally has been regarded as the Nepali side.
We shall come back to this.

The 1879 Survey of India Map

The general says: “What is the value of doing so? There is evidence that the Indians first used Kalapani simply because it was the only piece of flat land in the area to establish a rudimentary camp to cover the approach to Lipu Lekh. At a later stage they must have come to realize that under the complexities of riparian water rights their claim to control the headwaters of the Mahakali River would be strengthened by their occupation of Kalapani. At the military and security level, answers can only be speculative, but presumably the thinking is that an Indian security presence there helps to balance the Chinese security force presence in Taklakot just a short distance away over Lipu Lekh. There may also be an intelligence advantage.”
The British ‘Gurkha’ general brings another issue; the realignment of the border with the watershed; he points out: “There is one other significant consequence of India’s occupation of Kalapani. As the map shows, India has used its argument on the origin of the Kali river, and its occupation of the site, to claim a frontier line which corresponds to the 1879 map, in following a ridge line (‘Kali river watershed’ on map) that runs from just south of Kalapani to a point slightly to the west of Tinker Pass, which is about 5 kilometers east, southeast of Lipu Lekh. Tinker Pass is the location of Pillar Number 1 of 79 marking the Sino-Nepal Border. Nepal maintains that the tri-junction should be at Lipu Lekh, where Pillar Number 0 should be placed. However, for the present, the reality is that the India-Nepal-China tri-junction is de facto just to the west of Border Pillar Number 1.”

The Watershed at Kalapani

He comments on a Google map: “the top red line, which follows the river up from Kalapani to Nabhidhang toward Lipu Lekh, shows the border that appeared in maps after the 1860s and in the Panchayat era. The lower red line, which follows a watershed from Kalapani to a tri-junction on the main ridge to the north, indicates India’s view of where the border runs. An 1879 map shows this border, as does a map produced by the Government of Nepal in 1960. This shows in more detail where India considers the India-Nepal-China tri-junction should be, just to the west of the Tinker Pass. Lipu Lekh is 5 kilometers further west along the ridge.”
However Conwan can only admit: “Nepal’s case for Kalapani has been badly undermined by long years of silence on the issue by the country’s leaders. Some key related questions make that clear. When did India first occupy Kalapani? Who in Kathmandu knew what, and when? What did they do about it?”
The British general also mentioned the historic trading pass of Urai Lekh “with Nepal and the Seti gorge on the right and the trail into Tibet on the left. It is the site of Border Pillar Number 2.” He said that Sydney Wignall (see my article on Sydney Wignall) used this pass when illegally entering Tibet in the late autumn of 1955. They were forced to return by the same route in winter.”

The Border in the 1950s
Interestingly, in the early 1950s, the Indian police already manned a check-post at Kalapani. In his diary, Lakshman Singh Jangpangi, the Indian Trade Agent in Gartok wrote: “July 10, 1955. I could not start on 9th, as my clerk suddenly ran a very high temperature and was unable to leave his bed. I called local Ayurvedic doctor who gave him some medicine. The Compounder was sent with the advance party on 6th. This clerk was today better and fit to travel, I started and camped at Kalapani near Police Post. A section of P.A.C. [Provincial Armed Constabulary] under Subedar Sher Singh has been stationed here since 28th June 1955. This post is about 8 miles below the pass and a patrol party occasionally goes up to the pass. There is plentiful supply of firewood and water here. They are living in two single-fly tents and Subdear has constructed a small mud but for himself which leaks very badly in rainy weather. The Garbyang villagers have cultivated land close to the post. Besides passing caravans they have no other company or activities. I saw them keeping busy in collecting firewood and making Subedar’s hut livable.”
Due to heavy rainfall “which continued more than 14 hours starting from 2 am to 5 pm,” Jangpangi stayed one more day at the check-post.
The police post had probably been set in 1952 by the Uttar Pradesh’s government.
There was then no question of dispute, especially after the "Agreement on trade and intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India", was signed on April 28, 1954 in Beijing: “Pilgrims customarily visiting Lhasa may continue to do so in accordance with custom. Article IV Traders and Pilgrims of both countries may travel by the following passes and route : (1) Shipki La pass, (2) Mana pass, (3) Niti pass, (4) Kungri Bingri pass, (5) Darma pass and (6) Lipu Lekh pass.”
There was no doubt about it.

Pillar No 1 corresponds to the India stand

The 1961 Sino-Nepal Treaty
Interestingly, the “Boundary Treaty between the People's Republic of China and the Kingdom of Nepal” signed by President Liu Shaoqi of China and King Mahendra of Nepal on October 5, 1961 shows the Kali river as per the Indian stand: “The Chairman of the People's Republic of China and His Majesty the King of Nepal, being of the agreed opinion that a formal settlement of the question of the boundary between China and Nepal is of fundamental interest to the peoples of the two countries,” said the preamble.
Article I (1) defined the China-Nepal boundary line which “starts from the point where the watershed between the Kali River and the Tinkar River meets the watershed between the tributaries of the Mapchu (Karnali) River on the one hand and the Tinkar River on the other hand…”
Even more telling are the precise maps attached to the Treaty and signed by both parties; Kathmandu seems to have forgotten that the location of river on the maps of the Sino-Nepali treaty matches with the Indian one, which implies that the road is on Indian territory.
What is however disputed and needs to be negotiated is the area south of the river, where the British (and later Indian) cartographers have taken into account, like everywhere else on the frontiers, the watershed principle as well as the land revenues of Gunji village on the Indian side.
More of such examples of Kathmandu’s inconstancy could be cited.
What presently compounds the issue is the rift within the ruling party’s leadership in Nepal and the role played by China through Hou Yanqi, Beijing’s Ambassador to Kathmandu, the new ‘Queen’ of Nepal, who is credited to have arranged a rapprochement at the top level of the ruling Nepal Communist Party.

The Sino-Nepal Treaty reinforcing India's Stand

Mao’s Blessings
A Nepali author, Birat Anupam cites historical documents in an article entitled “Nepal-China Boundary Treaty: An example of peaceful Himalayan frontiers;” he quotes a discussion between Mao Zedong and King Mahendra of Nepal. Here is the exchange:
The author notes that it was “a snippet of the candid conversation between founding father of People’s Republic of China and Nepal’s the then king Mahendra on the historic Nepal-China Border Treaty day of 5 October 1961.”
The conversation on the Treaty goes like this:

Mao and King Mahendra in 1961

Chairman Mao: How is everything with Your Excellency? Have all the problems been solved?
King Mahendra: Everything is settled.
Chairman Mao: Fair and reasonable?
King Mahendra: Yes. We all agree.
Chairman Mao: It is good that we agree. There is goodwill on both sides. We hope that will get along well, and you hope we shall get along well too. We do not want to harm you, nor do you want to harm us.
King Mahendra: We fully understand.
Chairman Mao: We are equals; we cannot say one country is superior or inferior to the other.
King Mahendra: We very much appreciate the way of speaking.

This conversation was published in a book titled ‘Mao Zedung On Diplomacy’.
It was a propaganda work compiled by The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China and published by Foreign Languages Press in Beijing in 1998; it however shows that the 1961 Treaty had the blessings of the Great Helmsman.
The Nepali author, forgetting that the 1961 Treaty coincides with India’s stand on the dispute, writes: “This conversation, from the verbatim records, speaks volumes about the level of trust and the height of friendship between two neighbors Nepal and China.”

King Birendra’s visit to China in 1978
King Birendra, Mahendra’s son visited China in 1978.
On May 14, 1978, at the State banquet, the King asserted: “I recall with particular satisfaction, Your Excellency, the wide and cordial exchange of views with you at Chengtu in 1976 and the recent discussions and exchanges with His Excellency Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-ping [Deng Xiaoping] when he paid a visit to Nepal, earlier this year: I believe these exchanges have gone a long way to deepen friendship between our two countries, a friendship which has its roots in history as well as-in the great efforts that the late Chairman Mao, the late Premier Chou En-lai and, my august father, the late King Mahendra made with far-sighted statesmanship…”
At that time, both countries were working to demarcate the border with 76 pillars.
On September 27, 1978, Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping gave a speech in honour of the vaster Nepalese Prime Minister KN Bista. His words were probably directed at the US: “Anybody who attempts to disrupt the peace and stability of this region will only end up by crushing his own toes with the rock he picks up to throw at others. So long as the people of all countries heighten their vigilance, strengthen their unity and persevere in struggle, they will certainly frustrate the aggressive and expansionist schemes of the superpowers.”
Nepal was then trying to promote the Zone of Peace, dear to the Nepalese King; Bista answered Deng: “His Majesty King Birendra who is firmly committed to development has realised the vital connection between development and peace for a small country like Nepal. For this reason, we have supported the idea of peace zones in critical areas and have ourselves suggested that Nepal be declared a zone of peace. We appreciate your understanding and support of this basic policy of ours.”
There was no question about the border.
In August 1979, King Birendra visited again China. A People's Daily editorial said: “China and Nepal have long been good friends and neighbours. The friendly and good neighbourly relations between China and Nepal set an example for what may be achieved in the relations between countries. His Majesty King Birendra himself has visited China on many occasions…”
The editorial praised the government and people of Nepal for their adherence to the principle of maintaining independence and state sovereignty and for the successes they have achieved under the leadership of King Birendra in developing agriculture and small and medium scale industry.
During the same visit, the border agreed and demarcated in 1961 was ratified and therefore the Indian stand was confirmed.
At the banquet given in honour of King Birendra on August 27, the Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng praised Nepal “for the positive contribution she had made to the non-aligned movement as a founding member of the movement. He said: "We are happy to note that persisting in opposing imperialism, colonialism, racism and all forms of foreign domination and hegemony and supporting the efforts of the small and weak nations to take their destiny into their own hands, the non-aligned movement has played an important role in international affairs and its ranks have kept expanding.”
Hua added: “Sino-Nepalese friendly relations and cooperation have become a model of good-neighbourly relations based on the five .principles of peaceful coexistence.
He then mentioned the border: "We are most appreciative to His Majesty King Birendra for the important contributions he has made to promote Sino-Nepalese friendship. Over the past year or so, our two countries have completed the joint inspection and have thus further consolidated our common boundary of peace and friendship. The border inhabitants on both sides of the boundary line have lived in amity for generations with frequent contacts between them. We are sure that through the joint efforts of our two sides, Sino-Nepalese friendship will grow stronger and develop steadily…”

The 1961 Line agreed by China and Nepal

The border as shown in 1961 map was officially confirmed.
On November 21, 1979, the China-Nepal border protocol was signed.
In reply to a question whether the Nepal-China boundary had been settled finally, Huang Hua said that "in fact the boundary question was settled long ago. But now the joint boundary inspection committee had perfected the understanding of the line so that it is the more accurate basis."
The signing of the boundary protocol further proves that there existed peace on the boundary and friendship and cooperation between the two countries.
Hua described the border protocol as "adding something new to the annals of Sino-Nepalese friendship and setting once again a good example of how bilateral ties could be developed through friendly consultations on the basis of equality and cooperation. Protocol is a significant document achieving accurate demarcation of the boundary line between Nepal and China."
He said China would support just causes of the people of all countries in safeguarding their national independence and sovereignty, in opposing foreign interference, domination and hegemonism and in defending world peace. China appreciated and supported all efforts of the government of Nepal in up-holding the cause of peace."
Does China deny today that these exchanges took place?
The border has been the traditional frontier for decades and it has never been objected by China or Nepal.

Other proofs in favour of India’s Stand
Shyam Saran, who was the Indian Ambassador to Nepal from 2000 to 2004, cited the case of the then Prime Minister of Nepal Kirti Nidhi Bisht, who in 1969, demanded that India military personnel manning 17 villages along the Nepal-Tibet border since the early 1950s should be withdrawn. According to the National Panchayat record, Bisht said: “The Minister informed that the check posts manned by the Indian nationals exist in seventeen villages — Gumsha, Mustang, Namche Bazar, Lamabagar, Kodari, Thula, Thumshe, Thulo, Olanchung Dola, Mugu,Simikot, Tin Kar, Chepuwa, Jhumshung, Pushu, Basuwa and Selubash.” Saran rightly pointed out: “If Lipu Lekh and Kalapani were on Nepali territory then why were they omitted from the list?”
The former Foreign Secretary added: “I have pointed out earlier that the argument that the omission was due to Nepali ‘magnanimity’ taking into account India’s security concerns vis-à-vis China is laughable. The withdrawal of Indian military personnel from the Nepal-Tibet border was precisely to win brownie points with China.”
The Memorandum between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Resumption of Border Trade signed on 13 December 1991, and Protocol on Entry and Exit Procedures for Border Trade, signed on July 1, 1992 are other example; it confirms that China agreed to the border in this area.
The Trade Protocol between the two countries provided for expansion and diversification of trade between the two countries. “...Both sides have agreed to encourage direct trade between the two countries. They have also agreed to promote the exchange of delegations in specific areas and to encourage their respective trade organisations and traders to explore possibilities of promoting bilateral trade through various forms of trade and cooperation.” It was the first time that a pass reopened after the 1962 Indo-China war and the subsequent shutting down of the Himalayan borders.
For China, the border pass was (and still is today) Lipulekh.

New Map of Nepal rejected by India

Some other evidences
Why was the 'dispute' not solved earlier with India and Nepal having a joint commission to sort out the issue?
Many feel that Nepal is not confident enough about the veracity of its claim. Shyam Saran noted: “While I was in Nepal as ambassador, a request was made to put the issue on the agenda of the foreign secretary level talks held in 2003 but without any expectation of actual discussion. When we conveyed our readiness to have a substantive discussion on the treaty revision, the agenda item was dropped by the Nepali side. The purpose was to merely show that the Nepali side was taking up the issue seriously with India.”
Maj Gen Vinaya Chandran, who is doing a PhD on Nepal and earlier served in Military Operation Directorate, further commented for stratnewsglobal: “Historical and geographical facts are inconclusive, as is the case in many international boundaries, that are colonial legacies. Only way out appears to be an adjudication by the ICJ [International Court of Justice] and that can happen only if both India and Nepal agree to take the matter to the ICJ and also accept the verdict even if it doesn’t conform to their respective claims. An analysis of legal standing of the issue, puts the Indian claim on a stronger ground.”
Some of India’s strong arguments have been listed.

What is the Issue?
The river Kali does not seem the real issue, but the area south of the river. General Chandran wrote: “Even if both sides accepts Lipulekh as the origin of Kali River, they need to resolve the issue of the start point of the boundary, which now is on the highest point of the Eastern shoulder of Lipulekh Pass. This is also the point from where the China – Nepal boundary starts. The India – Nepal boundary marked on Indian maps, run South from this point along the watershed and Joins the Kali River, South of Kalapani. The boundary in effect is running along the watershed and not along Kali River. This is an issue that need to be resolved bilaterally by India and Nepal.”
There is no doubt about the location of the river and the fact that the new road is inside Indian territory; it is however in Delhi’s interests to find an amicable solution with Nepal for the areas for which there is no agreement; it could avoid China poking its nose into the bilateral affairs between Delhi and Kathmandu in the future.

CIA Map of 1965

Chuva and Chuje: Obscure Chinese Claims in the Central Sector

Chinese claims in the Central Sector
(click to enlarge)

It was recently reported that the populations of the Lahaul and Spiti, and Kinnaur districts of the Himachal Pradesh were becoming increasingly nervous; they expressed serious concerns as China has been building roads leading to the Indian villages near the border.
The Hindustan Times wrote: “Road construction along the Indo-China border, on no man’s land, came to fore after villagers of Kunnu-Charang in Kinnaur raised an alarm and informed the local administration and border patrol party.”
The article further noted: “China has accelerated work of road construction along the Indian border in Tango and Yamrang regions, which are close to Chitkul and Charang villages on the Indian side. Both Yamrang and Tango in China are controlled [by the] Tibetan Autonomous Region.”
Though there is no known villages with these names in Tsamda (Zanda) county of Ngari Prefecture, it is possible that these are new villages or the names have been changed.
According to The Hindustan Times, the Indian villagers have asked security agencies to increase their vigil along the border after the incidents in Ladakh and in view of China's renewed activities (road construction and two air incursions which are said to have taken place in the Kaurik sector in April).
When a team of the armed Forces, accompanied by local villagers conducted a recce near the border, they are said to have spotted some road construction on the Chinese side.

A villager told the media that China was building a road to the Yamrang village. “There is no mobile network in the region and road connectivity is poor on the Indian side. There is fear among villagers that the Chinese troops could invade the Indian territory,” said the article.

The Indian Army and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police manning the border, are now on high alert.

A Disputed Area?
While most of the Indian media reported that the area was not ‘disputed’ by China, it is not the case. Areas called by China, Chuva and Chuje have been on their long ‘shopping’ list to extend their territory since the end of the 1950s.

A Note from Historical Division

On July 30, 1980, the Historical Division of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) sent a Secret Note to the East Asia (EA) Division, dealing with China. This was with reference to the claims/occupation of some Indian areas in the Central Sector by China.

The Note described the Sino-Indian Boundary in the Middle Sector.

It said that during the 1960 talks between the officials of the Government of India and China on the Sino-Indian Boundary question, the Indian officials gave their description of the boundary in the Middle Sector:

Map showing the Indian territory 'disputed' by China
One can see the coordinates given by China and India in 1960

“This sector of the boundary also has the natural features of watersheds, mountain passes and river valleys. Its location is as follows: Starting from the terminal point of the western sector, it runs southward along the watershed west of the Pare River and the Chuva River, passes by the coverging point of the Pare River and the Spiti River, crosses the Siangchuan (Sutlej) River west of Shipki Pass, continues southward along the watershed and crosses the Jadhganga River west of Tsungsha. It then turns east, passes through Mana Pass, Mount Kamet, skirts along the south side of Wuje, Sangcha and Lapthal, again runs along the watershed, passing through Darma Pass, and reaches the tri-junction of China, India and Nepal.”

The Historical Division said that the Indian officials brought forward clear and conclusive evidence:

“to show that the alignment as shown by them in the Middle Sector had, throughout its length a traditional and customary basis reaching back through many centuries, and that, in addition, this boundary had been recognized by Chinese Governments and been confirmed through diplomatic exchanges, treaties and agreements."

Consequently, these areas were occupied in the early 1950s.

The officials further presented to representative evidences:

“relating to different aspects of administration, to show that Indian Governments had exercised full, continuous and uninterrupted control over all the areas right up to the traditional alignment.”

Where are these papers now? Nobody knows.

They are probably kept in some almirahs of South Block.

Who has the keys? It is a real issue as there is no more Historical Division in the MEA.

The Chinese Views
As always the Chinese argued that the Indo-China boundary had never been formally delimited and that only a traditional customary boundary line between two countries existed.
China provided its description of the boundary alignment in the Middle Sector.
Incidentally, the boundary was 'not defined' simply because there was no Indo-China boundary, but only a frontier between India and Tibet, two friendly countries.
The Note continued,quoting the Chinese views:

“The middle sector of the traditional customary line, starts from the terminal point of the western sector, runs southwards along the watershed between the Pare and the Chuva Rivers on the one hand and the other tributaries of the Spiti River on the other, and passes through peak 6,526 (approximately 78° 30' E, 32° 21' N) on this watershed. Several kilometers west of the junction of the Chuva and the Spiti Rivers, the boundary meets the Spiti River and, running along it, reaches its junction with the Pare River (approximately 78° 36' E, 32° 02' N). South of the junction of Pare and the Spiti Rivers, the boundary passes through peak 6,791 (approximately 78° 45' E, 31° 54' N) and runs southwards along the mountain ridge until it crosses the junction of the Siangchuang and the Hupsang Rivers approximately 7 kilometres west of Shipki Pass.”

The confluence of the Spiti and Pare rivers is definitively India’s territory, but the Chinese claims remain as shows this recent map of the TAR.
In 1960, the Chinese officials however contented that the evidences provided by the Indian officials “had nothing the do with the disputed areas”. It was a blatant lie, but as a result Beijing claimed:

1. Chuva-Chuje (till Sumdo village)
2. The area West of Shipki La Pass;
3. The area that they call Sang and Tsungsha and Puling Sumdo (known in India as Nilang, Jadhang and Pulam SUmdo) and
4. Wuje, Sangcha and Lapthal (Wuje is a Chinese name for Barahoti, Lapthal and Sangchamalla are two adjacent valleys).

The Note of the Historical Division concluded that the Chinese claimed a total area of 2,000 sq. kms as ‘disputed area’ in the Middle Sector.
The Note further quoted Premier Zhou Enlai’s letter dated November 15, 1962 addressed to the leaders of Asian and African countries on Sino-Indian Boundary question, confirming the same:

“In the Middle Sector, the places disputed by the Indian Government east of the traditional customary line have always belonged to China. They covered a total area of 2,000 sq. kms. The inhabitants are nearly all Tibetans. The Tibet local Government had all along exercised the jurisdiction over these places and its archives to this day contain document pertaining to this exercise of jurisdiction.”

The Kinnauris certainly do not consider themselves as Tibetans.

Recent Chinese map showing parts of Kinnaur as Chinese

Did the Chinese dropped their claims?
It appears that later, the Chinese LAC in the Middle Sector conceded “the entire territory claimed by India except in the Barahoti area as lying within India’s actual control. In the Barahoti area administrative and army personnels of the two sides are not being permitted.”

Army personnel may not been permitted, but every years Chinese PLA are intruding in the area.

In any case, the fact that Chuva and Chuje is not in Beijing's LAC claim, does not mean that these areas in Kinnaur district of Himachal Pradesh, are no more claimed to be within the Chinese territory; it just mean that India has ‘temporarily' control over these places. See the Chinese map above.

Historically, the customary border was east of Kaurik, and this China can't change it, but this will not make Beijing drop its claim.
The building of roads in these areas is therefore a serious issue to be looked into by the Government, including the MEA.

Another reason for dropping the LAC claim

In 1960, the India Officials quizzed their Chinese counterparts: where were Chuva and Chuje?
China seemed to be unaware. They could not give the proper coordinates.

Here are the questions of the Indian Officials and the Chinese vague answers.

Q. 12.-Chuva and Chuje were alleged to be places "under Indian occupation". These places were not marked on the map. The Indian side would like to have details of their location and area.

A.- Chuva and Chuje were to the east of the boundary and west of place called Chulupu. Chuje was to the east of Chuva.

Q. 13.-The Chinese side mentioned that Chuva and Chuje were to the east of the Chinese alignment and west of Chulupu. The Indian side would like to have the coordinates of Chuva and Chuje. Were these villages or camping-grounds?

A.-Chuva and Chuje were two villages. Chuva river was a small river west of Sumdo. The Chinese line met the Spiti river a few kilometres west of the converging-point of the Chuva and the Spiti rivers. Then it ran along the Spiti river upto the junction where it met the Pare river (approximately 78' 36' E. Long. 32° 02' N. Lat.)

[the point given is not the confluence of the Pare and Spiti rivers, my cmment]

Q. 14.-Chuva and Chuje were stated to be two villages. The Indian side would like to know how far and in what direction from Sumdo they were located.

A.-Chuva was to the north of Sumdo. Chuje was to the east of Sumdo.

[There was no such villages near Sumdo].

In 1960,  during the meetings between the Officials of India and China, the Chinese asked some questions to their Indian counterpart. I am reproducing here the Chinese questions as well as the Indian responses. It refers to the area discussed above.

Middle Sector

Chinese Question (Q) 1

Was the watershed between the Spiti and the Pare rivers referred to by the Indian side a continuous mountain ridge or did it again move on to spurs? Before the India alignment crossed the Pare river what ridge did it follow?

Indian Answer (A)

The watershed between Spiti and Pare rivers lay along high and continuous mountains and not along spurs. Before crossing the Pare river the Indian alignment lay along the ridge lying to the north-west Kauirik.

Q. 2.

What was the location of Kauirik village? From inset 'A' on the map handed over by the Indian side, it appeared that it was situated north-west of the junction of the Pare and the Spiti rivers. Did the Indian alignment also pass in the vicinity the junction of the Pare and the Spiti rivers as indicated on the Indian map?

A- Kauirik was situated at approximately Long. 78° 39' E. and Lat. 32° 06' N, which was about five miles north-east of the junction of the Pare and Spiti rivers. The Indian alignment lay immediately to the north and east of Kauirik and cut the Pare river about a mile south of Kauirik.

Q. 3

The Indian side stated that south of the Pare river their alignment ascended a spur. To what their mountain range did this spur belong?

A- The spur south of the Pare river, along which the Indian alignment belonged to the Zaskar Wange.

Q. 4
The Indian side stated that their alignment crossed the Siang-chuan (Sutlej) river at its bend. What were the co-ordinates of the crossing? What were the geographical features followed by the Indian alignment from Peak Leo Pargial to Shipki Pass?

A- The Indian alignment crossed the Sutlej at approximately Long 8° 44' E and 32° 52' N.
From Peak Leo Pargial the alignment descended along a spur, crossed the Sutlej and again mounted the spur on the opposite bank of the river to the Shipki Pass.

The other questions were about Shipki-la.

In this context, a letter from Zhou Enlai, the Prime Minister of China addressed to his Indian counterpart is interesting.

Beijing, December 17, 1959.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,
Thank you for your letter of November 16, 1959. Although the Indian Government's opinions regarding the prevention of border clashes are still a certain distance away from the Chinese Government's proposal of November 7 and part of them obviously lack fairness, it is heartening that in your letter you have indicated the, desire of trying to avoid all border clashes and to settle the boundary disputes between the two countries by peaceful methods.
The Chinese Government's proposal of November 7 for the withdrawal of the armed forces of the two countries 20 kilometers respectively along the entire border is aimed at thoroughly eliminating the risk of border clashes not wholly foreseeable, completely changing the present tense situation on the border where the two countries are facing each other in arms, and creating a favourable atmosphere of mutual confidence between the two countries. These aims are unattainable by other provisional measures. Furthermore, the adoption of this measure pending the delimitation of the boundary will in no way prejudice the advancing by each side of its claims when negotiations for the settlement of the boundary question take place. Therefore, the Chinese Government still earnestly hopes that we can reach agreement on such a measure for the sake of friendship between our two countries in the past and for hundreds of years to come. As to how far the armed forces of each country should withdraw, the Chinese Government is entirely willing to decide on a distance which will be deemed appropriate by both sides through consultation with the Indian Government.
Pending the above-mentioned agreement, the Chinese Government, in a conciliatory spirit and out of the desire to move toward the withdrawal of armed forces along the entire border, is prepared to agree first to reach a partial solution by applying the proposal you have made in your letter for the non-stationing of the armed forces of both sides at Longju to the other disputed places on the border as well. In the eastern sector of the Sino-Indian border, armed Indian personnel once occupied Longju and are now still in occupation of Khinzemane. In the western sector of the Sino-Indian border, armed Indian personnel are up to now in occupation of Shipki Pass, Parigas Sang, Tsungsha, Puling-sumdo, Chuva, Chuje, Sangcha and Lapthal. Most of these places which definitely belong to China were occupied successively by armed Indian personnel after the signing of the 1954 Agreement on Trade and Intercourse Between the Tibet Region of China and India in which China and India for the first time put forward the Five Principles of peaceful coexistence. Among them Puling-sumdo is one of the ten places which the Chinese Government agreed to open as markets for trade in the Ari area of the Tibet region of China as specified in Article II Section 2 of the 1954 Agreement. Now since the Indian Government holds a different opinion on the ownership of these places, the Chinese Government proposes that no armed personnel of either side be stationed at any of them...

A Truce that was not to be

My article A Truce that was not to be appeared in the Mail Today

One of the strangest characters who appeared on the political scene after India’s Independence was VK Krishna Menon.
PK Banerjee, the Indian chargé d’affaire in Beijing in 1962, who often encountered the arrogant politician, wrote in his memoirs: “Krishna Menon's appearance in the Indian political arena was as sudden as it was unexpected. …he had his education and was enrolled as a Barrister. He hardly had any legal practice …[but] became a protégé of Palme Dutt, a lawyer and founder member of the British Communist Party.”


An Unlikely Minister
Why after Independence, he was suddenly nominated Indian High Commissioner in UK, is not clear.
A few years later, he came back to India and was made Minister of Defence: “In addition, for all practical purposes, he functioned as Foreign Minister de facto,” noted Banerjee.
The Nehru Memorial and Museum Library (MNNL) recently opened the VK Krishna Menon Papers to the public. The first surprising thing to note is that a politician can walk away with so many government documents; of course it has been done by many bureaucrats too (scholars nevertheless rejoice to be able to access these ‘stolen’ files, as the ‘official’ ones remained classified in the different ministries).
In the case of Krishna Menon, he was certainly a smart politician; it can be seen from the fact that he did not leave many ‘traces’ behind.
I was hoping to find the records of his meeting with Marshal Chen Yi, the tough Foreign Affairs Minister of China.
A few years ago, The Hindu quoting declassified Chinese documents asserted that on July 23, 1962, Chen Yi met Krishna Menon in Geneva over breakfast. The Chinese Foreign Ministry reported that Menon suggested that both sides make clear their perception of the western boundary: “both sides could establish posts, but they would not attack each other. There should be a distance between posts of each side …Mr. Chen instantly opposed the suggestion.” The Aksai Chin was Chinese, he argued.
Sixty seven years later, it is a tragic fact that we still have to depend on Chinese archives to know what happened in 1962; I had hoped that a report of the breakfast with Chen would be in the Krishna Menon Papers; unfortunately, it was not. Another problem is that the brash Indian Defence Minister often believed that he did not need to keep proper minutes of his meetings.
However, I found the undated and unsigned transcript of his 1960 encounter with Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier; it is an important document as it is the only record not available in the Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru which consecrate some 300 pages to Zhou’s meetings with Indian leaders (the Prime Minister alone had 17 hours of talk with his Chinese counterpart to try to unlock the disputed border issue).

Tryst with Zhou
The visit of Zhou Enlai in Delhi in April 1960 was clearly a turning point and the last opportunity to settle the Sino-Indian boundary issue peacefully.
As they met, Zhou Enlai told Menon that he had been told by Nehru that he wanted to see him; this was not a fact, noted Menon. Zhou then insisted that Menon spoke first.
The Defence Minister told the Premier that India’s foreign policy was “we were by far the best of friends and the world also thought so.” The minutes were obviously not taken in a professional manner and the English is often poor; for example when Zhou explained that despite “the Tibetan affair [the flight of the Dalai Lama], both in the world and even here although a great many of our people understand, they were very shocked” (sic).
The clever Zhou said that friendship with India was the basis of China’s foreign policy, and whatever happened does “not make any difference to this.”
Zhang Hanfu, the Chinese Vice-minister remained ‘inscrutable’ during the monologue, watching every move of Zhou, noted Menon.
Interestingly, for the Eastern Sector of the boundary, though China did not recognize the McMahon Line, “[Zhou] suggested that we leave it alone.” This meant that Beijing was ready to accept the Line minus the ‘imperialist’ name (McMahon); the Premier however objected to the Indian advance in Khinzemane (north of Tawang) and in Longju (in Subansiri Frontier Division).
Zhou then mentioned the Western Sector.

The Hint of a Swap
He said there had never been any delimitation and only an old treaty (of 1842), which did not mention any area; the Aksai Chin was part of Sinkiang (today’s Xinjiang) and the road built by China was on Chinese territory.
Zhou also spoke of Chinese total sovereignty over Tibet and the autonomy granted to the Tibetans. Though he had no problem with the Dalai Lama, he was shocked by the reception given to him in India. Menon noted: “I think he referred at this stage, though I am not quite sure, about a considerable amount of talk against China in India.”
The entire transcript is in this vein. It is rather surprising, not to say shocking, that such vital talks were handled in such an amateurish manner.
There was a second round of talks: “I think he [Zhou] said much and I think there is no purpose in repeating what he said about the past, but about the frontiers. …I cannot remember the whole of the conversation.”
The conversation had lasted two hours (apparently Zhou had spoken Nehru to say that he wanted another half hour with Menon). Zhou was testing the ground for a ‘swap’: India acknowledges that the Aksai Chin as Chinese and Beijing recognizes NEFA as India. The duo met a third time during the dinner; Zhou again alluded to a deal.
It is evident that these crucial talks for the nation were conducted in an extremely unprofessional manner, without briefing, debriefing or proper note-taking. A chance was probably missed, leading two years later, to the worst possible debacle for India.

The Truth from the Dragon's Mouth

Recently a book Spying Against India (Chinese Military Intelligence from 1962 to 2012) Volume 1, written by one Ben Keiler (probably a nom de plume) was published by Amazon Kindle.
It is difficult to verify the veracity of the content.
However it complements the above map that I posted a few weeks ago on this blog (China ties to alter the status quo in Bhutan).

One Chapter of the book is entitled: The Western Territories of Bhutan

It explains that the above map is a copy of Top Secret Chinese Intelligence map.
(it copy was probably published to hide the embarrassing information about the Indian and Bhutanese camps inside the area today claimed by China)
The book publishes the originals along the translation of the accompanying texts and provides its own comments.

For example, this Chinese Intelligence map provides an overview of the disputed areas in Western Bhutan with detailed textual explanations.
The map is said to have been compiled by Chinese intelligence some 30 years ago.
The original maps with the positions of the Bhutanese and Indian Armies were obviously not published in China, as they contradict China's version of the historical background of the present standoff with India near the trijunction.

Here are details of the above map.
The present standoff between the Chinese and Indian Army is taking place in the Southern part of the map.

The legend for the map is interesting. It says:

The top text shows what the Chinese consider the international border.
The second text is what India and Bhutan consider as the location of the border.
The third is the “illegal” McMahon Line (in Eastern Bhutan - not shown on this particular map)

The fact that this area is shown in a separate colour (green), as well as the captions clearly demonstrates that the area was already disputed 30 years ago.
Today, China pretends that the area has always been Chinese territory!

This map marked Document 67 shows that the Royal Army of Bhutan and the Indian Army were in control of the area in the 1980s.
Not a single post occupied by the Chinese Army is marked.
The PLA was nowhere to be seen.



















Here is the legend for the above map :

Blue circle: Permanent base of the Royal Bhutan Army

Blue triangle outlined: Observation post of the Royal Bhutan Army

Blue triangle: Checkpoint of the Royal Bhutan Army

Light brown circle: Indian army base.

Here is the translation of text on the Chinese text accompanying the Intelligence map (as well as it 'edited' reproduction; see map on the top of this post - top most text).

Luling (also called Ru-ling) area is located on southeast of the Rinchengang town, in the lower part of the Dro-mo [Lower Chumbi Valley].
The area includes some of the small rivers in the east of Dromo Machu, Charthang river and Luling river.
The size of the area is around 340 sq. km and there are more than 40 grasslands (pastures). The source [of income] comes from the products of the forest; it is pretty marvelous.
According to some historical documents, before 1843 China put border stone pillars on the hill of Ha-la, which is the source of the Luling River. [Nobody has ever heard of these 'pillars'; my comment].
The western part of the Ha-la Mountain’s range was in the past the pastoral area of the nomads of the Dro-mo [Chumbi].
In the year of 1954, the Bhutanese army permanently settled at Charthang for whole year. There were around 100 troops occupying the area.
In 1960, the Bhutanese soldiers came again and set up an Observation Post at Ha-rar with more than 20 soldiers. There were sent from the pasture ground of Charthang.
In 1973, the people of the Dro-mo [Chumbi] restored their control over the border area and managed to send their animals grazing like before in the upland region of Lang-ma.
Moreover, in 1975, we [China] established a forest park in the Langma’s upland.
In 1983, we [China] a set up a civil administration.
Now the soldiers and nomads of Bhutan do not enter the lower part of Lang-ma’s upland grassland by crossing the Phu-tren pass as before.

These facts contradict the Chinese propaganda: Beijing never maintained any army base, customs office or other government function in that area until 1983.
Further, according to the book Spying Against India:"If we go to the map [marked] as Doc 67 [above], we see the 1987 reality as reported by Chinese military intelligence: there are four bases by the Bhutanese army and one by the Indian army in that area alone. Those bases are located along the border and there is not one single Chinese base."
The author of the book further comments:

First no Tibetan from Yatung [in Chumbi Valley] or any other Chinese lived there or even went there. After some 20 years after the arrival of the Chinese army in Yatung, they start to send local Tibetans as ‘nomads’ with their cattle into that area to stake a claim. If those Tibetans are not expelled for some ten years, they open a small civil administration post which could be only an unmarked tent operated during summer. Again if that civil administration station is not demolished they start to make propaganda to claim this area has been Chinese territory since ancient times.

Perhaps more interesting is the Chinese description of the place where the conflict is presently going on. Here is the translation of the text:

Tunglang (Doklang) area is located in the south, moreover the valley of Tunglang river is an area of more than 100 sq. km.
Northern parts of that area are plain with lots of lakes and there are more than 30 small and big grassland.
Southeast are mostly forest with steep mountains and deep valley.
According to the historical documents, Tunglang grassland is the summer pastoral area of the people of Lower Dro-mo [Lower Chumbi] region and the army of India and Bhutan both are not entering into the Tung lang area. They just observed to the nomads and people from a big stone.
From the year of 1975, China’s armies went around very carefully, almost once a every year.
Generally after we (Chinese) reached near to the Lhamasi through Shismo, we [China] returned back.
In 1983, the boundary line of our observation was expanded towards the south and later it was getting nearer to the Observation Post of the Bhutanese army in Dung-Tsona in South of Trae grassland.

The author of the book rightly notes: "The names and areas of those disputed territories are not identical in China and Bhutan. Therefore if the Chinese talk about Tonglang it’s not identical in size and geographical location to what the Bhutanese and Indians called Doklam."
He points out at the contradiction in the Chinese Intelligence documents: "a second and different Chinese story appears is in Doc 67 where Chinese intelligence marks one base of the Bhutanese army clearly inside that very area and two more at the border."
See the legend above.

The book Spying Against India says:

In Doc 70, we can see the deployment of Bhutanese and Indian army units in western Bhutan in 1987. The first Battalion of the Bhutanese army defends the area close to the border with Sikkim.
In that location they make sure the Chinese army cannot take any shortcut through Bhutanese territory and cut-off and encircle the Indian border defense in the northern areas of Sikkim.
The 2nd, 3rd and 5th battalions were positioned to defend the area between Yatung and the capital Thimphu.
The 6th battalion serves as reserve force and can be deployed in any direction. The Indian troops are intermixed with the Royal Army of Bhutan to strengthen the defense but also to make sure the Chinese army cannot enter any area of Bhutan without fighting the Indian Army. This mix makes sure the Chinese cannot only target the Bhutanese army and grab more land without killing Indian soldiers.

This was in 1987.
All this shows that the situation is far more complicated than the one showed in the recent Chinese statement.
In other words, the PLA has blundered in entering Indian territory, a place that a few decades ago, China did claim as its own. Today,  at best for Beijing, it is today 'disputed'.

It also shows the Chinese way of claiming new territories.
They first send grazers. If not objected, the grazers would visit every year.
Then a small patrol is sent.
The following year a tent (representing the Civil Administration) is planted.
After a few years, it becomes "Chinese territory administrated by China since immemorial times".