Why does the state keep secrets?

My article Why does the state keep secrets? appeared in The Asian Age/Deccan Chronicle.

Here is the link...

Now that defence minister Manohar Parrikar has complained that a murder story is getting more coverage than the 50th anniversary of the 1965 “victory” against Pakistan, in the coming weeks, the Indian press may carry more analyses about what happened during the war over Kashmir.
One issue is bound to come out again. What happened in Tashkent to Lal Bahadur Shastri, the Indian Prime Minister? Was he poisoned as many suspected? Why does the Prime Minister’s Office stubbornly refuse to declassify the files in its possession?
But like it often happens in India, the “celebrations” will pass and Shastri will be buried once again. This has happened many times to Subhash Chandra Bose despite politicians’ promises.
It, however, raises a larger issue: the principle of declassification of historical documents, and I am not just speaking of “famous” cases. Lakhs of “classified” files are lying in the record rooms of the ministry of external affairs or home affairs and no scholar, researcher or history lover can access them. This is a tragedy for India.
The Modi sarkar had come with great hopes; many thought that the old policy of blind “classification” would change and India would not remain a “banana republic” as far as historical research is concerned.
Disillusionment was not long in coming. Soon after taking over as the new defence minister, Arun Jaitley informed the Rajya Sabha: “The Henderson Brooks Report on 1962 Indo-China war is a ‘top-secret document’ and disclosure of any information about it would not be in the national interest.” The same Mr Jaitley had been vociferous, when in the Opposition, in favour of the “declassification” of this very document.
Incidentally, very few politicians and babus noticed that the famous report written by the Anglo-Indian general had in fact already been “released” by the old Australian journalist Neville Maxwell and was online since March 2014.
When he was in the Opposition, Mr Jaitley had blogged that it was not in the larger public interest to keep documents “top-secret” indefinitely: “Any society is entitled to learn from the past mistakes and take remedial action. With the wisdom of hindsight, I am of the opinion that the report’s content could have been made public some decades ago.”
It is important for a nation to know its past. Simply because, as Mr Jaitley said, a society is entitled to learn from its past mistakes. For this however, history has to be based on the nation’s own archival sources. The Henderson-Brooks report, the death of Shastri or Bose’s disappearance, are unfortunately only the tip of a huge iceberg.
To give an example in which I have been personally involved: the history of modern Tibet. You can find plenty of books based on American documents released under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), which ensures public access to all US government records. The FOIA legally carries a presumption of disclosure; the burden is on the government — not the public — to substantiate why information should not be released.
After receiving a written demand, any US agency is required to disclose the requested records, unless they can be lawfully withheld from disclosure under one of nine specific exemptions in the FOIA. If not satisfied, an appellant is entitled to appeal to a federal court.
One can also visit the India Office Records near London. The British have meticulously kept the records of the Raj, which are open to the general public for consultation and research. The Chinese version of this period is also available through the memoirs of several of the main actors who served in Lhasa and some selected foreigners have been given access to the Communist Party’s archives.
The tragedy is that we don’t have an Indian version of the same historical facts because relevant files remain sealed in the almirahs of the ministries of external and home affairs. As a result, one gets a version of history of Indo-Tibet relations only from the Western and the Chinese points of view, and not India’s. Isn’t that shocking?
It is not that there is no rule, but the babus and politicians often show no interest in implementing the law of the land.
The Public Records Rules, 1997, state that records that are 25 years or more must be preserved in the National Archives of India and that no records can be destroyed without being recorded or reviewed. Legally, it’s mandatory for each department to prepare a half-yearly report on reviewing and weeding of records and submit it to the NAI. The rules also stipulate that no public records, which are more than 25-years-old, can be destroyed by any agency unless it is appraised.
While the personnel declassifying historical documents (fully or partially) should make sure that it does not jeopardise the security of the country, at the same time this should not be a pretext to block the due process of declassification.
The Prime Minister can speak of good governance, transparency and accountability, but the fact remains, and it is quite appalling, there is no proper professional declassification policy in India. One genuine problem is the lack of “professionals” to do the job.
But there may be hope. India has an intelligent foreign secretary who recently introduced the concept of “lateral entry” into the ministry; under this scheme or a similar one, it should not be difficult to find and train young talent.
But is there the will to come out of the prevalent lethargy?

Myth that must be busted at earliest

My article Myth that must be busted at earliest appeared in the Edit Page of The Pioneer today.

Here is the link...

Neville Maxwell, who recently ‘released’ the Henderson-Brooks-Bhagat Report on the 1962 conflict, claims that Nehru forced the war on Mao. This is a dangerously inaccurate interpretation of history and must be debunked

It is necessary to come back to the Henderson-Brooks-Bhagat Report (HBBR) and the role played by Neville Maxwell. The Australian journalist, who recently ‘released’ the famous report by posting it on his website, has been propagating a wrong interpretation of history, namely that India attacked China in 1962.
Even presuming that Indian troops may have crossed what the Chinese perceived as the international border, many other factors have to be taken into consideration.
At age 87, why Maxwell remains a great advocate of China’s theory that India was the aggressor, is a mystery to me.
It is not that I have any doubt that Nehru committed blunder after blunder, but Maxwell’s version is truly a biased over-simplification of the facts.
In an interview in The South China Morning Post, when asked by the Hong Kong newspaper: "What do you hope to achieve with this disclosure?" Maxwell answered: "What I have been trying to do for nearly 50 years! To rid Indian opinion of the induced delusion that in 1962 India was the victim of an unprovoked surprise Chinese aggression, to make people in India see that the truth was that it was mistakes by the Indian government, specifically Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, that forced the war on China."
Reading the HBBR does not show that India forced a war on China, it just proves that India was not prepared to successfully defend some new forward positions ordered by Krishna Menon (and Nehru) in NEFA and Ladakh.
It is undoubtedly a Himalayan Blunder in itself; it demonstrates the foolishness of the Prime Minister (and his arrogant Defence Minister), but it was certainly not the root-cause of the War.
The ‘forward policy’ was however the ideal pretext for Mao to show that India could not go unpunished for insulting China (by giving refuge to the Dalai Lama and his followers).
An interesting conversation which took place in February 1972 in Beijing, (during the historic Nixon visit) demonstrates the high esteem the Chinese have for Maxwell.
The Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai told Nixon, Nehru never implemented the famous the Panchsheel (five principles). In an earlier encounter, Zhou had already mentioned “a book by Neville Maxwell (India’s China War) about the Indian war against us, which proves this.”
Zhou repeatedly quoted Maxwell: “Neville Maxwell mentioned in the book that in 1962 the Indian Government believed what the Russians told them that we, China, would not retaliate against them. Of course we won’t send our troops outside our borders to fight against other people. We didn’t even try to expel Indian troops from the area south of the McMahon line, which China doesn’t recognize, by force. But if [Indian] troops come up north of the McMahon line, and come even further into Chinese territory, how is it possible for us to refrain from retaliating?”
He concluded: “You know all the other events in the book, so I won’t describe them, but India was encouraged by the Soviet Union to attack.”
The question of how India could attack without arms, ammunitions, clothing, food or basic supplies, etc. is not explained (The HBBR even says that some Indian troops starved for days).
One should grant China ideological consistency in its interpretation of the conflict. I remembered interviewing Indian PoWs who were taken shivering to Tibet in their light parkhas, they were repeatedly told by their jailors, “why did you attack us, we are a peaceful nation.” China has been propagating this theory ever since and Maxwell’s over-simplistic interpretation has been extremely useful to them.
However, many other factors came into play, but first and foremost the flight of the Dalai Lama in March/April 1959 and his subsequent asylum in India, changed the rapport between India and China. It is an aspect that Maxwell has totally ignored: China has been aggressive from the day it entered Tibet in October 1950. Let us not forget that China had NO BORDER with India till that time.
When Nehru acquiesced to the annexation of Tibet, it was a far more serious blunder than the so-called Forward Policy.
Another blunder of Nehru was to have ‘discovered’ the Aksai Chin road, linking Tibet to Xinjiang, only in 1958, (while it was officially opened to traffic in 1957 and the construction had started several years earlier). That was Blunder No 2.
Further, Maxwell conveniently forgets is that at the end of the 1950s and the early 1960s, Tibet was on the boil (particularly Eastern Tibet, north of the McMahon Line).
The 70,000 character petition from the Panchen Lama to Zhou Enlai on the internal situation in Tibet demonstrates the atrocious suffering of the Tibetan people during the period.
A few weeks back, while working in the National Archives of India, I came across interesting reports from the Indian Trade Agent in Yatung (Tibet). The Chinese authorities kept harassing the local Tibetans. For example, they were told: “[They] should offer scarves to the photograph of Mao Tse-tung which will be displayed in the bazaar. It is no use to worship images in the monasteries which are of no use. Some images from the local monastery were thrown in the latrine or trampled down under their feet in the presence of the gathering.” They were also ordered: “From now onwards, nobody should utter any Hindi word and they should not speak of [to] India Office [Trade Agency] in any matter. They should address Indian merchants here as ‘dogs’.”
The ITA says: “The effect of the above announcement in the meeting is having adverse effect on the general local population and they are making every effort to escape into India.”
By attacking India, China could effectively and ruthlessly seal the Tibet border and stop the Tibetans taking refuge in India.
Another factor forgotten in Maxwell's simplistic approach is the internal power struggle in China; the War was a plank for Chairman Mao to return to power. In Volume III of his Origins of the Cultural Revolution, the US scholar Roderick MacFarquhar said “It is not difficult to understand why Mao launched this sudden [internal] counter-attack [during the 10th Plenum in September 1962]. He was faced with what he saw as fundamental and unacceptable changes in key areas of policy: a rolling back of collectivization in the countryside which would have undermined his whole vision for a socially transformed China; and a détente with the Soviet Union.”
But here too, Maxwell only sees the Chinese side of the coin; it explains why he was so lavishly praised by Zhou Enlai.
Retrospectively, the babus who confiscated the HBBR made a huge disservice to India, they allowed Maxell’s one-sided interpretation to flourish.
Let us hope more hidden aspects of India’s modern history will soon be made public; it can only help India to become a mature nation.

Maxwell on the Henderson-Brooks Report: an ideological over-simplification

The arrival of the Dalai Lama in India was the turning point

To continue on the Henderson-Brooks-Bhagat Report (HBBR) and the role of Neville Maxwell, I strongly disagree with the Australian journalist that India was the aggressor and Nehru was to blame for everything. 
It is clearly an over-simplification, though, there is no doubt that Nehru committed blunders after blunders.
Recently, an interview of Neville Maxwell appeared in The South China Morning Post (another appeared in The Times of India). Maxwell was asked by the Hong Kong newspaper: "What do you hope to achieve with this disclosure?"
Maxwell explained: "I hope to achieve what I have been trying to do for nearly 50 years! To rid Indian opinion of the induced delusion that in 1962 India was the victim of an unprovoked surprise Chinese aggression, to make people in India see that the truth was that it was mistakes by the Indian government, specifically Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, that forced the war on China."
Reading the HBBR, does not show that India forced a war on China, it just shows that India was not prepared to successfully sustain some new forward positions ordered by Krishna Menon (and Nehru) in NEFA and Ladakh.
It is undoubtedly a Himalayan Blunder in itself; it shows the foolishness of the Prime Minister (and his arrogant Defence Minister), but it is not the root-cause of the War.
The forward policy was nevertheless the ideal pretext for Mao to show India that nobody goes unpunished after insulting China (by giving refuge to the Dalai Lama and his followers) .
As I mentioned in previous postings, many other factors came into play, first and foremost the flight of the Dalai Lama in March/April 1959 and his subsequent asylum in India.
Where I agree with Maxwell is when he said: "My putting the report online now deprives the government of India the excuse they’ve used to keep it secret, the false claim that it was to preserve national security. It’s clear to anyone who reads the report that it has no current military or strategic significance. So there is no good reason for the government to persist in refusing to declassify the whole report, including Volume Two, which I never saw."
Apart from this, it is apparent that Maxwell sees only the Chinese side of the coin. That is why he is so lavishly praised by Zhou Enlai.
When asked why he hates Nehru so much, he admits: "I knew Nehru well and liked him immensely, he was a man of great charm. I was twice the head of the foreign correspondents association, and that brought me into personal contact with him, and as The Times man, I could sometimes get in to talk to him," but he adds: "That access and friendliness shows, to my shame, in my reporting of the dispute with China as that developed – throughout I took the Indian side, never seeing what should have been obvious, that China was not aggressive but was consistently trying for a settlement on mutually beneficial terms."
I will try in the next few days to show that this assessment is entirely wrong.
China has been aggressive from the day it entered Tibet in October 1950. 
Let us not forget that China had NO BORDER with India till that time.
For Nehru, to have agreed to the annexation of Tibet is a far more serious blunder than a so-called Forward Policy.
Another factor that Maxwell conveniently forgets is that Tibet was on the boil (particularly Eastern Tibet, north of the McMahon Line) at the end of the 1950s and the early 1960s.
The 70,000 character petition from the Panchen Lama to Zhou Enlai on the internal situation in Tibet demonstrates the suffering of the Tibetans during the period before the Sino-India war.
Another factor mentioned in Maxwell's simplistic approach is the internal power struggle in China; the War was a plank for Chairman Mao to return to power.
I would like today to post an interesting letter from Nehru to Subimal Dutt, his Foreign Secretary. It is dated September 13, 1959.
At that time, there was no question of 'forward policy'.
Nehru particularly says: "Our armed forces and others should keep clearly within our side of our frontier, that is, the MacMahon [McMahon] Line or elsewhere. If they happen to be on the other side in any particular place, they should withdraw to our side. They should not withdraw beyond that. In the event of any Chinese armed detachment coming over to our side, they should be told to go back. Only if they fire should our people fire at them."
One of the factors which cause the 'Himalayan Blunder' was the sycophancy around the Prime Minister; nobody would give him a clear picture of the situation on the border and where the border was (whether it is B.N. Mullick, the Director of Intelligence Bureau, the historical Department under Dr. S. Gopal or the Army with Lt. Gen. B.M. Kaul, Nehru's blue-eyed boy in the control room).
This letter posted below shows that at the end of 1959, Nehru still had an extremely careful approach.
It is part of Volume 52 of the Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru published by the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund (page 211).

From Prime Minster to Ministry of External Affairs: India-China Border Controversy 
September 13, 1959 

There has been a good deal of talk in Parliament and elsewhere about our controversies with China. In fact, so much has been said that there might well be some confusion in people's minds. That confusion was apparent in the course of the debate yesterday in the Lok Sabha, and many members were greatly excited about the situation.  I have no doubt that they represented the general excitement in the public. This morning a number of little children came to see me from the schools, and they appeared to be excited over this affair. I am, therefore, putting down some points which might help us to clear our own minds and guide us in the near future. In a changing situation one cannot lay down any fixed instructions. But the broad lines of our approach should be more or less clear.

(2) It should be clearly understood by our civil and military officers and others that we must avoid actual conflict unless it is practically forced down upon us. That is to say, we must avoid armed conflict not only in a big way, but even in a small way. On no account should our forces fire unless they are actually fired at.

(3) Our armed forces and others should keep clearly within our side of our frontier, that is, the MacMahon [McMahon] Line or elsewhere. If they happen to be on the other side in any particular place, they should withdraw to our side. They should not withdraw beyond that. In the event of any Chinese anned detachment coming over to our side, they should be told to go back. Only if they fire should our people fire at them.

(4) Our frontier with Tibet-China can be divided up broadly into three parts:
    (i) the MacMahon Line from Burma to Bhutan,
    (ii) the frontier between Tibet and Uttar Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh and the Punjab, and
    (iii) the Ladakh frontier.
These three involve a slightly different approach. So far as the MacMahon Line frontier is concerned, I have referred to it above.

(5) In regard to (ii), that is, UP, Himachal Pradesh and the Punjab, our check-posts should be vigilant and, where necessary, might be reinforced. About Hoti area, we have some understandings which are not always kept. We should adhere to these understandings. This particular frontier is largely conditioned by the reference to various clauses in the 1954 Agreement. We should adhere to that frontier.

(6) So far as the Ladakh frontier is concerned, this may be divided up into two parts: (a) Chushul and round about area and (b) the Aksai Chin area. In the Chushul area we should have strong detachments at our check-posts and more especially guard the Chushul airfield. We should avoid actual conflict as far as possible. The Chinese have put up some kind of a check-post within our boundary and not far from Chushul. We should not take any aggressive armed action against this check-post, but we should prevent any advance towards the Chusul airfield or indeed any other part nearby.

(7) The Aksai Chin area has to be left more or less as it is. We have no
check-post there and practically little means of access. Any questions relating to it can only be considered, when the time arises, in the context of the larger question of the entire border. For the present, we have to put up with the Chinese occupation of this North-East sector and their road across it.

(8) Broadly speaking, we should be prepared for talks in regard to any minor deviation from the border as accepted by us throughout the three areas mentioned above. That is, we can discuss these matters if the time arises. But any question relating to major changes such as are envisaged in the Chinese maps cannot be considered by us in this way.

(9) Thus, on the whole, the status quo that has existed for some time should be maintained throughout the frontier. It has been disturbed at Longju and Tamadem and perhaps one or two other minor places. We have already made a proposal about Longju that both sides should retire from this place and discuss the exact border there, through proper representatives. That proposal stands.
At Tamadem we have issued instructions already for withdrawal of our detachment because, in our opinion, this area is on the other side of the MacMahon Line frontier. This instruction should hold.

(10) Our general instructions to our people on the border should be that they should avoid any provocative action, but should remain firmly on our side of the line and not allow themselves to be pushed away easily. I think it is unlikely that the Chinese forces will take up any aggressive line on this frontier, that is, try to enter into our territory any further. If they should do so, they will have to be stopped and the matter reported to us immediately for instructions.

(11) A carefully drafted reply to Premier Chou En-lai's last letter should be prepared. On my return from Tehran, we shall consider this and then send it.

(12) As for the other points in controversy, chiefly about the behavior of the Chinese authorities towards our missions inside Tibet, wherever any answers are necessary, they can be sent without waiting for any return.

(13) Papers relating to our relations with China, subsequent to those published in the White Paper, should be got ready. We should aim at publishing this collection early in October.

(14) When General Thimayya comes back from Shillong, FS might have a talk with him and find out what the position is and what arrangements have been made. I had a talk with him two days ago on the lines of this note. Nevertheless, a copy of this note might be given to him.

(15) So far as possible, general indications of our attitude in these matters might be informally and privately given by Foreign Secretary to some of our important newspapers. While the situation is undoubtedly serious in the long run, there is no need to exaggerate it or to speak or write in an alarmist manner. Criticisms of general policy are always permissible, but attacks on China should be avoided.

(16) Our Ambassador in Moscow as well as our Heads of Missions in the East European countries might be kept informed of our general policy and developments. Also some of our other important Missions abroad. They are likely to be constantly approached by the Governments to which they are accredited as well as by the press, and they should, therefore, know what to say in reply.

Neville Maxwell and the Chinese leadership

Neville Maxwell is going around saying that the Henderson-Brooks-Bhagat Report proves that Nehru 'attacked' China.
It is, of course a non-sense, even if one accepts that the fact that Indian troops may have crossed what the Chinese perceived as the international border, many other factors have to be taken into consideration. 
It includes the flight the Dalai Lama in March 1959 and the refuge offered by the Government of India to the Tibetan leader and his followers and more importantly the internal situation in China after the Great Leap Forward.
In previous articles, I have dealt with this issue, particularly in an article for the Indian Defence Review,Why Mao attacked India in 1962.
The fact remains that Neville Maxwell has for years been very close to the Chinese leadership as the documents from the US archives posted below show.
I reproduce here an old posting on the subject which was published 4 years ago.
 
There are many ironies in the Henderson-Brooks Report saga. One of them is that it was given to a foreign journalist, Neville Maxwell the author of India’s China War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970).

He was (and probably still is) kept in high esteem by the Chinese leadership as these two memoranda of conversation demonstrates. The remarks of Premier Zhou Enlai are both from 1972.
The first one occurred during the Nixon's visit to Beijing in February and the second one when NSA Henry Kissinger visited again China in June.
It makes interesting reading. No doubt that the Chinese have a copy of the Report. The question remains, who has given a copy of the Henderson-Brooks report to Maxwell and why.


Memorandum of Conversation
Beijing, February 23, 1972, 2–6 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
The President [Nixon]
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
John H. Holdridge, NSC Staff
Winston Lord, NSC Staff
Prime Minister Chou En-lai
Ch’iao Kuan-hua, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
Chang Wen-chin, Director of Western Europe, North American, and Australasian
Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Wang Hai-jung, Deputy Director of Protocol
Chao Chi-hua, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Chi Chao-chu, Interpreter
T’ang Wen-sheng, Interpreter
Two Notetakers

…Prime Minister Chou: Actually the five principles were put forward by us, and Nehru agreed.
But later on he didn’t implement them. In my previous discussions with Dr. Kissinger, I mentioned a book by Neville Maxwell about the Indian war against us, which proves this.

President Nixon: I read the book.

Dr. Kissinger: I gave it to the President.

President Nixon: I committed a faux pas—Dr. Kissinger said it was—but I knew what I was doing. When Mrs. Gandhi was in my office before going back, just before the outbreak of the war [1971 Bangladesh Liberation War], I referred to that book and said it was a very interesting account of the beginning of the war between India and China. She didn’t react very favorably when I said that (Chou laughs).

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, but you spoke the truth. It wasn’t a faux pas. Actually that event was instigated by Khrushchev.

President Nixon: You think it was? Khrushchev?

Prime Minister Chou: He encouraged them. Mr. Holdridge probably knows this. He has studied it.

Mr. Holdridge: I can remember the editorial that came out in the press.

Prime Minister Chou: In looking at 1962, the events actually began in 1959. Why did he go to Camp David? In June of that year, before he went to Camp David, he unilaterally tore up the nuclear agreements between China and the Soviet Union. And after that there were clashes between Chinese and Indian troops in the western part of Sinkiang, the Ak-sai Chin area. In that part of Sinkiang province there is a high plateau. The Indian-occupied territory was at the foot of the Karakorums, and the disputed territory was on the slope between.

Dr. Kissinger: It’s what they call Ladakh.

President Nixon: They attacked up the mountain.

Prime Minister Chou: We fought them and beat them back, with many wounded. But the TASS Agency said that China had committed aggression against India. After saying that, Khrushchev went to Camp David. And after he came back from Camp David he went to Peking, where he had a banquet in the Great Hall of the People. The day after the banquet he went to see Chairman Mao. Our two sides met in a meeting.
At that time our Foreign Minister was Marshal Chen Yi, who has now passed away. Marshal Chen Yi asked him: “Why didn’t you ask us before releasing your news account? Why did you rely on the Indian press over the Chinese press? Wasn’t that a case of believing in India more than us, a fraternal country?”
And what did Khrushchev say? “You are a Marshal and I am only a Lieutenant General, so I will not debate with you.” He was also soured, and did not shake hands when he left. But he had no answer to that. He was slightly more polite to me.

President Nixon: To the Prime Minister?

Prime Minister Chou: Yes. He said: “The casualties on the Indian side were greater than yours, so that’s why I believe they were victims of aggression.” If the side with the most casualties is to be considered the victim of aggression, what logic would that be? For example, at the end of the Second World War, Hitler’s troops were all casualties or taken prisoner, and that means that Hitler was the victim of aggression. They just don’t listen to reason.
So they had no way of passing this away, and anyway, the TASS Agency account had the effect of encouraging India. And also Neville Maxwell mentioned in the book that in 1962 the Indian Government believed what the Russians told them that we, China, would not retaliate against them. Of course we won’t send our troops outside our borders to fight against other people. We didn’t even try to expel Indian troops from the area south of the McMahon line, which China doesn’t recognize, by force. But if your (e.g. Indian) troops come up north of the McMahon line, and come even further into Chinese territory, how is it possible for us to refrain from retaliating? We sent three open telegrams to Nehru asking him to make a public reply, but he refused.
He was so discourteous; he wouldn’t even do us the courtesy of replying, so we had no choice but to drive him out.
You know all the other events in the book, so I won’t describe them, but India was encouraged by the Soviet Union to attack.
Of course, Mr. President also comes from Camp David, but we have no interest in asking you not to have good relations with the Soviet Union. And we also hope that you will reach agreements with the Soviet Union on disarmament and other matters. We have even expressed the wish that you visit the Soviet Union first.

The Five Fundamental Errors

Bunker at Sela pass

Some excerpts of the Henderson-Brooks/Bhagat Report on the 1962 Sino-Indian War.
The Report speaks of Five Fundamental Errors.
These sections deal only with the NEFA operations.

SUMMARY
149 The unbalanced posture of our forces in the KAMENG Sector [of NEFA, today Tawang and West Kameng’s district] on the eve of the Chinese offensive needs NO elaboration. TOWANG [Tawang], which should have been the main centre of strength, lacked troops; the bulk having been inveigled to a flank in the NAMKA CHU Valley, without adequate logistic support and in tactically unsound positions. That we continued to oblige the Chinese in this unbalanced posture till they struck was as grave an error as the initial sending of 7 Infantry Brigade into the Valley. These two can be combined and categorized as ‘FUNDAMENTAL ERROR NO 1’. The responsibility for this lies with the Corps Commander [Lt. Gen. B.M. Kaul], though both Army Commander [Lt. Gen. L.P. Sen] and the General Staff Army Headquarters could easily also have changed it, had they been more decisive.

150 The rout of 7 Infantry Brigade was a foregone conclusion, but, in its wake, it started the snow-ball of defeat, which was to stop a month later and that also at the instance of the Chinese.

151 It is clear that much of this would have been averted had a clean break been made at TOWANG and the withdrawal to BOMDILA had been carried out as planned. The holding of SELA [pass] was accepted by the Army Commander [Sen], presumably, at the dictates of the General Staff at Army Headquarters [in Delhi]. That SELA was a strong natural tactical position there is NO doubt, but it required both extra troops and logistic support to hold it. Neither of these were planned or provided for by the General Staff or Eastern Command [in Lucknow]. Instead the lull between the two Chinese offensives brought about a sense of complacency and IV Corps were given troops haphazardly and in fits and starts. Little provision was made for adequate logistic support.

152 It is agreed that the NEFA battles were the concern of the [IV] Corps. It must, however, be made clear that this applied to only the tactical sphere. The overall defensive planning and the provision of logistic support must and always should be the concern of the Command [in Lucknow, General Sen] and the General Staff at Army Headquarters [in Delhi]. Unfortunately, the reverse happened. There was interference in the tactical level and the overall planning and provision of logistic support was conspicuous by its absence. The decision for holding SELA [pass] and the lack of overall planning and providing of logistic support can be grouped together as “FUNDAMENTAL ERROR No 2”. The responsibility for this lies jointly with General Staff Army Headquarters and Eastern Command.

153 The dispersal of forces in penny-packets, the complacency shown in the allotting of defence sectors to brigades, and the lack of urgency in developing defenses during the lull period was “FUNDAMENTAL ERROR No 3”. For this the major responsibility was that of the Division [4 Infantry Division]. It also partly reflects on the poor leadership of the [IV] Corps [Kaul] who could have stopped the dispersal and energized the preparation of defences.

Map of Kameng Frontier Division

154 The pendulum swung the other way, once the second Chinese offensive started. There was frenzied reaction to the Chinese approach to BOMDILA [between Sela pass and the foothills] from the NORTH. A battalion was hurriedly ordered up from the main defenses of BOMDILA with inadequate ammunition and fire support, and rushed to THEMBANG to meet the enemy half-way. In the first instance, the sending of this battalion to fight it out by itself in hurriedly prepared defences against a regiment or more was a mistake. Besides, even if the battalion had to be sent, this should have been planned and organized earlier. Inspite of these handicaps the Battalion fought well till its ammunition was spent. That it had to withdraw and then get disintegrated is neither the fault of the Battalion nor of the Brigade. The loss of this Battalion, 5 GUARDS, lies squarely on the [4] Division.

155 On the fall of THEMBANG and the possibility of the Road BOMDILA – DIRANG DZONG being cut and DIRANG DZONG itself being infested brought about a complete frenzy in Divisional Headquarters. Troops from Brigades were rushed for the protection of Divisional Headquarters. Withdrawals were planned and stories concocted to make the withdrawal case stronger. Indeed it reached the pitch when 62 Infantry Brigade was led to believe it was in danger. A withdrawal on it was forced so that Divisional Headquarters could withdraw.

156 NOT content with that the Division committed the Brigade to withdraw within a matter of hours on night 17/18 November the battalion holding KAILA Pass. This was the turning point in the Fall of SELA. The withdrawal of this battalion led to the panic in 1 SIKH and the abandonment of SELA and eventual disintegration of 62 Infantry Brigade.

157 The last role of the Divisional Headquarters was its flight. A strong force of all arms of over 2500 vanished within a matter of minutes. This was NOT the fault of the troops nor of the units but of the lack of centralized leadership and control in the face of the enemy. A coordinated force of that size had more than even chance of getting to BOMDILA. Efforts of a few officers, particularly those of Capt N.N. RAWAT, could NOT, however, replace disintegration of command.

158 All the above Divisional reactions can be grouped under “FUNDAMENTAL ERROR No 4”, and was fairly and squarely due to the acts and omissions of Headquarters 4 Infantry Division.

159 The Division dissolved and the last of its brigades was next to be broken up by Corps or more accurately, by a ‘Triumvirate’ comprised of the Army Commander [Sen], the Corps Commander [Kaul], and the Director of Military Operations [Maj. Gen. D.K. Palit]. Ignorant of the tactical layout, out of touch with the situation in BOMDILA, they planned an ordered the moving out of a sizeable force from the already bare BOMDILA defences. NOT that they were NOT warned, and ‘irrespective of what happed to BOMDILA’ they ordered a force to open the Road BOMDILA – DIRANG DZONG. For what purpose and for whom on the morning of 18 November is NOT clear.

160 The ordering out of the force was directly responsible for the fall of BOMDILA. There were four companies left in the BOMDILA defences. Indeed, on the flank where the Chinese attacked, there was one platoon, where there should have been a battalion. This then was “FUNDAMENTAL ERROR No5” and it sealed the fate of BOMDILA. The planners and orderers must take the blame for this.

161 BOMDILA fall. It was now the Corps Commander’s turned to give orders and counter-orders as to where the Chinese should be held. It was first BOMDILA, then right back to FOOT HILLS, then forward to RUPA, and, finally midway to CHAKU. To blame the hapless Brigade Commander of NOT being able to restore the situation is to find a scapegoat. Under the circumstances, the resistance that was offered and that the Brigade remained a fighting force, despite these orders and counter-orders- some direct to units – was due to the Brigade Commander keeping his head and striving till the last to organize what little force he had.

162 Thus ends the story of the famous ‘Fighting Fourth’ [Brigade]. In the end all that could be mustered for the last fight were six weak infantry companies out of a total force of sixteen battalions and countless other troops of the supporting arms and services.

Know yourself, know your enemy

Senior Officer Inspecting the Signals Office in Tezpur

It was probably in late 1963. A senior Indian Army officer, just released from a PoW camp in Tibet where he had spent 7 months in dreadful conditions, went to Grindlays Bank on Connaught Place in the Indian capital.
As he entered the bank, he saw a familiar figure at one of the counters. He had served under this person before being taking prisoner to Tibet by the People’s Liberation Army. The officer was one of the hundreds of ill-fated jawans and officers caught by the Chinese at the front, near the Namkha Chu (river) in Tawang sector of West Kameng Frontier Division (today Tawang district of Arunachal Pradesh). Hundreds of others were even less lucky; they never returned from West Kameng.
The officer went to the ‘familiar figure’ and saluted him: “Good morning, Sir”. The person stood still, staring at him, silent. After what seemed to be a very long time, the officer asked: “Anything wrong, Sir? Are you not keeping well?” He added: “Do you recognize me, Sir”
The person started crying and said: “Of course I do. How could I not, but you are the first officer who has deemed fit to salute me after such a long time.”
The ‘person’ was Lt. Gen. B.M. Kaul, Nehru’s blue-eyed boy, the Commander of the 4 Corps. For many, he was the chief villain of the 1962 debacle against Mao’s troops.
The officer who greeted him had served under Kaul in the 4 Infantry Division (of 4 Corps).
This story came back to my mind when I read the now ‘declassified’ report of the 1962 war prepared by Lt. Gen. Henderson-Brooks and Brig. Prem Bhagat.
General Kaul, who was Chief of General Staff (CGS) in the Army Headquarters, before taking the command of the 4 Corps, is one of the main persons indicted by the Henderson-Brooks Inquiry Commission, as we shall see on the excerpts published below.
But Nehru, who had promoted Kaul to positions that the general was unable to assume, was the real guilty man. His name is not mentioned in the Henderson-Brooks report, as the terms of reference of the Commission were limited to military operations.
I am posting here the ‘conclusions’ of the operations in the Western Sector (Ladakh) and the lack of preparedness of the Indian Army. The ‘Headquarters’ [meaning, Nehru, Krishna Menon (Defence Minister), Gen Thapar (Army Chief) and Kaul, amongst others] had tried to bite more than they could swallow.
Time and again, the myth that ‘the Chinese will not attack’ was reiterated.
The intelligence agencies (under B.M Mullick) are definitively to blame.
The 'Chinese will not attack' mantra was still being recited on the morning of October 20, 1962, when thousands of Chinese descended the slopes of Thagla ridge and surrounded the Indian troops.
On the title page of the Top Secret Report, Henderson-Brooks quote the Chinese tactician Sun Tzu: “Know yourself, know your enemy: a hundred battles, a hundred victories”.
Does India know China today? Probably not.
My comments are in []; the underlining is mine.
Reading this, one understands why Lt General Kaul was crying in the Bank in Delhi.

CONCLUSION
GENERAL
1. This Review of Western Command was undertaken as the ‘Forward Policy’ was primarily introduced to baulk the Chinese claims in LADAKH. Had the developments stemming out of it been correctly apprised by the General Staff [Lt. Gen/ B.M. Kaul] at Army Headquarters and correlated to NEFA [North East Frontier Agency]; it is possible that we would NOT have precipitated matters till we were better prepared in both theatres.

2. As it was, we acted on a militarily unsound basis of not relying on our own strength but rather on believed lack of reaction from the Chinese. We forgot the age old dictum of the ‘Art of War’ summed up so aptly by Field Marshal. Lord ROBERTS. “The art of war teaches us to rely not on the Likelihood of the enemy NOT coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable”.

3. Militarily, it is unthinkable that the General Staff did not advise the Government on our weakness and inability to implement the ‘Forward Policy’. General Kaul in his report (Appendix paras 65-69) has brought out that, on a number of occasions in 1961-62, the Government were advised of our deficiencies in equipment, manpower, and logistic support, which would seriously prejudice our position in the event of a Chinese attack on us. The fact, however, remains that orders were given by the General Staff in December 1961 for the implementation of the ‘Forward Policy’ without the prerequisite of ‘Major Bases’ for restoring a military situation, as laid down by Government. Indeed General KAUL as CGS and the DMO [Directorate of Military Operations], time and again, ordered in furtherance of the ‘Forward Policy’ the establishment of individual posts, overruling protests made by Western Command.

4. There have been pressure put on by the Defence Ministry [V.K. Krishna Menon and probably Nehru], but it was the duty of the General Staff to have pointed out the unsoundness of the ‘Forward Policy’ without the means to implement it. ‘This was brought out very forcibly by GOC-in-C [Army Commander] Western Command in his letter of 17 August 1962 (Annexure 21). Apparently, however, the General Staff at No stage submitted to the Government an appraisal on the consequences of the ‘Forward Policy’ or the basic requirement of troops and resources required before it should have been implemented.

5. General KAUL in his report goes on to state that in a number of meetings held by the Defence Minister and attended by COAS [Chief of Army Staff. General P.N. Thapar], himself as CGS, DIB [Director Intelligence Burreau, B.N. Mullick] and representatives of Defence, External affairs, and Home Ministries, the general view was that the Chinese would not provoke a show-down. (Appendix para 70). This is strange, because military action emerges from both political and military appreciations. It was clear from 1960 onwards that CHINA had greatly increased her forces in TIBET. A strength far greater than that required for defence of quelling of Tibetan uprising. This was brought out in October 1960 in the Military intelligence Review 1959-1960.

6. To base military actions and place in jeopardy the security of troops on suppositions and beliefs put across at conference tables indicates either acceptance of the belief or a militarily immature mind. The General Staff, particularly the CGS, Deputy CGS, and the DMO went a step further and permeated this belief into the Army, with the disastrous result that even field formations were infected with a sense of complacency. This stemmed from the fact that after 1960 planning and detailed staff work be essential for ‘Higher Direction of War’ was never seriously undertaken [that is the tragedy].

STAFF DUTIES
7. Where there are so many intangibles, as in war, it is essential that all facets of a problem are thoroughly examined before a course of action is determined. The higher the level the greater the necessity for a thorough examination. This process of higher levels must be carried out in writing as the wide range of examination cannot obviously be covered mentally or verbally. Thus, in modern times, staff has increased as the complexities of war increased, and a system of staff duties have evolved which ensures a thorough appraisal and systematic planning before a course of action is adopted.

8. The detailed staff work that was carried out before the NORMANDY Operations is common knowledge. Our staff at Army Headquarters is patterned on the War Office in the UNITED KINGDOM. Our General Staff with its Operations, Intelligence, and Staff Duties Directorates is designed for such detailed staff work.

9. In fact, till 1960 one can see systematic planning being carried out at all levels. Intelligence and operational appreciations were made and plans evolved, in which the tasks laid down were compatible with the resources available. The plans were then tried out through war games and it was hoped that the flaws discovered would be put right. This as has been seen was not done. In 1961-62, major developments took place that required fresh appraisal at each state. These were as under:

(a)    The Chinese build up in TIBET by end of 1960 had substantially increased and was brought out in the Military Intelligence Review 1959-60. This required a fresh reappraisal of our forces and tasks.
(b)    The introduction of the ‘Forward Policy’ end of 1961. Before its introduction it was essential that an appreciation should have been prepared bringing out the requirements of troops and resources and also possible Chinese reactions.
(c)    The incidents in August/September 1962 including the surrounding of the Galwan Post in Ladakh and the Dhola in NEFA showed clearly the mounting tension and a possibility of an armed clash. Western Command had brought out in August 1962 in no uncertain manner the dangerous situation that had developed. This again required a fresh appraisal for the steps to e taken to meet the overall situation.
(d)    At the outbreak of hostilities if a coordinated plan had been made to meet the Chinese offensive our troops would perhaps have been more balanced and there would NOT have been any question of plugging holes at the last moment.

10- It is apparent that none of this planning took place and NO operation orders or instructions were issued by the General Staff. It was therefore NOT possible for Command or lower formations to issue any comprehensive order without a directive from the General Staff. All that could be done by Western Command to meet the situation, when the hostilities broke out, was done. Troops and equipment were depleted from formations facing Pakistan to reinforce Ladakh.

11- This lapse in Staff Duties on the part of the Chief of General Staff [Lt. Gen. B.M. Kaul], his Deputy, the DMO, DMI, and other Staff Directors is inexcusable. From this stemmed the unpreparedness and the unbalance of forces. These appointments in General Staff are key appointments and officers were hand-picked by General Kaul to fill them. There was therefore no question of any clash of personalities. General Staff appointments are stepping stones to high command and correspondingly carry heavy responsibility. When, however, these appointments are looked upon as adjuncts to a successful career and [if] the responsibility is not taken seriously, the results, as is only too clear, are disastrous. This should never be allowed to be repeated and the staff as of old must be made to bear the consequences for their lapses and mistakes. Comparatively the mistakes and lapses of the staff sitting in Delhi without the stress and strain of the battle are more heinous than the errors made by commanders in the field of the battle.

COURSE OF OPERATIONS
12- The unmilitary poise of our forces in Ladakh has already been too clearly brought out and needs no further elaboration.

Where is the Himmatsinghji Committee’s Report?

I am republishing here an article posted 2 years ago on this blog.
After the 'release' of the Henderson-Brooks-Bhagat Report, one should not forget that there are many more hidden reports in the almirahs of the South Block (both MEA and MoD).


As the 50th anniversary of the debacle of 1962 approaches, it is necessary to have a fresh look into some of the events which led to the Himalayan Blunder.
The Sino-Indian conflict is usually associated with the Henderson-Brooks Report (HBR) prepared in 1963 by Lt. Gen. Henderson-Brooks and Brig. Prem Bhagat. Today, this file is the most secret of the Indian Republic.
In 2008, the Indian Defense Minister told the Parliament that the Henderson-Brooks could not be declassified after a MoD internal audit “had established that its contents are not only extremely sensitive but are of current operational value.”
But R.D. Pradhan, the Private Secretary of Y.B. Chavan, who replaced Krishna Menon as Defence Minister after the 1962 War, wrote in his memoirs: “In 1965, it was considered too sensitive to be made public and although outdated today, the report unfortunately remains secret.”
Whom to believe?
Pradhan says that he is the only person alive who had examined the report (Neville Maxell, the author of India’s China War probably saw portions of it).
There is another report, 12 years older than the HBR which is also missing in action. It is the Himmatsinghji report, prepared after China’s invasion of Tibet in October 1950. It seems to have been misplaced in some North Block almirah.
In November 2011, under the Right to Information Act, a petitioner applied to have a look at the Himmasinghji Report (as well as 5 other historic reports prepared by the MoD).
In its order, the Central Information Commission (CIC) noted that on October 12, 2011, the Director (Vigilance) in the Ministry of Defence had informed the CIC that only one report could be found: “none of the remaining five, (i) PMS Blackett Report 1948; (ii) Himmatsinghji Committee Report, 1951; (iii) HM Patel Committee report on functioning of the Ministry of Defence(MOD), 1952; (V) Sharda Mukherjee Committee report on restructuring of MoD, 1967 and (v) Committee on Defence expenditure report, 1990 are available in the MoD.”
The officer had been authorized to make this statement by the Defence Secretary: “It is, thus, clear that the reports …of the RTI application are not available with the MoD and the question of supplying them to the appellant does not arise.”
Can you believe it?
Does it mean that the Himmatsinghji Committee Report is lost forever?
The CIC’s conclusion was: “The MoD has not denied existence of these Reports; it has simply indicated their non-availability. …In the premises, it is ordered that a copy of this order be sent to the Defence Secretary for information and appropriate action at his end.”
The ministry’s babus will probably sit on this order till their retirement and the CIC will forget about it; the Himmatsinghji Report will never be available to the Indian Public. In any case most babus believe that military and strategic affairs are not the business of ‘common men’.
Why is the Himmatsinghji Committee’s report important?
Intelligence Chief, B.N. Mullik wrote in his memoirs that the decision to form a Committee followed a note ‘New Problems of Internal Security’ sent by the Intelligence Bureau (IB) in November 1950 …as well as the letter of Sardar Patel to Nehru on Tibet.
Mullik takes too much credit for the IB, as it is undoubtedly Patel’s letter to Nehru (and an earlier one to Sir GS Bajpai) which started the ball rolling. Patel wrote to Bajpai: “The Chinese advance into Tibet upsets all our security calculations. Hitherto, the danger to India on its land frontiers has always come from the North-West. ...For the first time, a serious danger is now developing on the North and North-East side.”
On December 1, a Committee was formed with Major-General Himmatsinghji, Deputy Minister of Defence as a Chairman.
Two main decisions were taken: “(1) A small committee of military experts with a representative of the IB in Shillong would visit the NEFA agencies and propose the places near the frontier at which the Assam Rifles units should be posted. (2) A high-powered committee presided over by the Deputy Minister of Defence, Major-General Himmatsinghji, with representatives of Defence, Communication, Home, External Affairs and the IB would be formed to study the problems created by the Chinese aggression in Tibet and to make recommendations about the measures that should be taken to improve administration, defence, communication, etc. of all the frontier areas.”
Mullik informs us further: “The Himmatsinghji Committee also had before it the recommendations which had been made by a smaller Committee formed in Assam to assess the dangers in NEFA.”
This Committee would have suggested that in the sectors where the boundary was undefined, India should decide its claims. Having decided on its claim line, effective steps should be taken to prevent unilateral occupation of these areas by Chinese or Tibetans.
It is probably this ‘smaller’ Committee which decided to immediately march towards Tawang.
The Committee also recommended the reorganization of the administrative divisions of NEFA, the opening of new districts, and increase in the staff manning new posts, the extension of these administrative centres further towards the McMahon Line and the formation of a Frontier Service cadre for service in the frontier areas. An important increase of the Assam Rifles and the Civil Armed Police at strategic points was also sanctioned.
The Committee suggested the construction of new roads and the improvement of existing ones to link the Assam Rifles posts with headquarters (it was in 1951!).
At that time, the entire area down to Dirang (south of the Sela Pass in Tawang district) was still under some vague Tibetan administration, with a Tibetan Dzongpon (district commissioner) still collecting 'monastic' taxes from time to time in and around Tawang.
It is then that Major Bob Khathing, a Manipuri officer who served in the Assam Rifles, entered the stage. In January 1951, just as he had been posted as an Assistant Political Officer (APO) in Bomdila, Khathing was summoned by the Assam Governor, Jairamdas Daulatram who asked him to go and administer Tawang.
On 17 January 1951, Khathing, accompanied by 200 troops, left for Tawang, south of the McMahon Line. The party was later joined by a 600-strong team of porters.
The Assam Rifles of Bob Khathing reached Tawang on February 7.
Was it Bajpai's last homage to Sardar Patel who had passed away on December 15 and who had understood the importance of integrating all territories belonging to the Union of India?
As he arrived in Tawang, Khathing was warmly welcomed by representatives of the Tawang monastery, the local headmen and leaders.
Nari Rustomji, the Advisor to the Governor of Assam, till then responsible for the border areas, was soon after transferred to Sikkim; he recalled: “The Chinese entry into Tibet in 1950 …dictated henceforward a more elaborate and complex administrative structure in the tribal areas than I had favoured, ...Mine had been governance with a light touch, on a personal, paternalistic basis.”
The Himmatsinghji Committee probably realized the light touch had to be balanced by military presence.
Some rumours have recently circulated that Nehru did not know about the Tawang operation; this would truly mean a serious lapse as the Assam Rifles worked directly under the Ministry of External Affairs and Nehru was then the Minister. A 'military' operation of this scale certainly could not be decided locally and needed the approval and funding from the Central Government.
Did Patel and Bajpai decide the operation on their own and order Jairamdas Daulatram accordingly?
It is impossible to answer this question unless the related files are found.

How Nehru's proteges messed it up

The War Memorial in Tawang (Arunachal Pradesh)

This article is dedicated to all those who died during the 1962 Sino-Indian war; to those who suffered for months in the PoW camps in Tibet; to those who were humiliated for no fault of theirs; to their families.
Let us hope that what happened in 1962 will never happened again.

Two years ago, I wrote an article on the Henderson Brooks Report for The Indian Defence Review (Issue Vol. 27.2 Apr-Jun 2012). The title was “Why the Henderson-Brooks report has never been released!”
My conclusion was that one of the reasons for the famous report, written by the Anglo-Indian General Henderson Brooks, not to be released by the Government of India, was that in the early months of 1962, the Army Headquarters had some doubts about where the frontier with Tibet was.
Under political pressure, they nevertheless foolishly went ahead and established a post at Dhola near the disputed Thagla ridge. It was the perfect excuse for the People’s Liberation Army to go to war against an unprepared India.
I then quoted from The Fall of Towang [Tawang], by Major General Niranjan Prasad, the Commander of 4 Infantry Division, who thus described the setting of the operations:
“The McMahon Line from just north of Khinzemane, as drawn by Sir Henry McMahon in 1914 with a thick blue pencil on an unsurveyed map, was not an accurate projection of the Himalayan watershed line. Much of the territory in those days had not been explored and McMahon was only guessing at geography when he drew a thick blue [red] line from Khinzemane to the Bhutan-Tibet-India tri-junction to its east. In this process the position of Thagla Ridge was, to say the least, left ambiguous.
The story goes that the officer surveying the area had completed an admirable task of delineating the watershed up to this point when a pretty Monpa girl claimed his attention and the work was left uncompleted. Whatever the reason, the survey authorities, ignoring physical features on the ground, joined Point MM 7914 to the India-Bhutan-Tibet tri-junction by a straight line. Stranger still, the Government of India had not corrected this obvious mistake even in 1962. Clearly someone in External Affairs had not done his home work. This lapse cannot be easily excused or explained away. It was largely responsible for the critical dispute which later developed and eventually led to war.”
Though the Thagla Ridge was the logical border if one followed the watershed principle as well as the ownership of customary pastures’ rights, the fact remains that the old map which was the reference for India’s position on the ‘genuine’ location of the border, showed the Thagla Ridge and the Namkha Chu, North of the 1914 McMahon Line.
As Major General Prasad said, this lapse had unfortunately not been corrected after India’s independence. The Chinese must have known the doubts of the local Indian Army commanders. In his memoirs, Prasad recalls: “From our own Signals channels I had received reports of a pirate radio operating somewhere in our area, but when we referred this to higher authorities the matter was dismissed.”
It could explain how Mao was aware of Operation Leghorn to evict the Chinese from the Thagla Ridge (north of the Dhola post) in October 1962.
This explains that the Government of India was not keen to show that the 4 Corps Commander (earlier Chief of General Staff in the army Headquarters), Lt. General BM Kaul, a special appointee (and protégé) of Prime Minister Nehru, was not only unsure where the frontier with Tibet was, but took the risk to set up a post in a place which could be north of the border. The Prime Minister was too busy solving the problems of the world to look into these ‘small’ details.
But it was enough for China to have a pretext to attack India a few months later (October 20, 1962). The rest is (sad) history.
Today, we know the guilty men of 1962. It is a step forward for the nation.

Excerpts from the Henderson-Brooks-Bhagat Report released by Neville Maxwell, author of India’s China War.

Brig John Dalvi's map of the Operations in Thagla ridge sector

Background of the Establishment of Dhola Post in NEFA
22- As the Dhola Post was the focus of the start of the Sino-Indian hostilities in NEFA, it is important that the background to the establishment of the Dhola Post is given in some detail.

23- Till the introduction of the ‘Forward Policy’’ in December 1961, the policy in NEFA in regard to activities in the vicinity of the McMahon Line was as under:

“No patrolling except defensive patrolling is to be permitted within two to three miles of the McMahon Line. In case a post has been established within two miles of the McMahon Line, in accordance with paragraph 2 above, then defensive patrolling is permissible in the vicinity of this post”. Para 2 if the letter laid down that, under certain conditions, post could be established NOT more than 2 miles as the crow flies from the McMahon Line. (Headquarters Eastern Command letter No. 120901/20/A/GS(O) of 9 June 1960 – Annexure 40).

24- The Chinese in June 1961 had, it appeared, patrolled across the McMahon Line some 3 – 4 miles West of Khinzamane [also written Khenzimane] and had shown interest in the area. Thus, in March 1962, with the approaching of the patrolling seasons, Eastern Command, on the subject from XXXIII Corps, asked Army Headquarters for permission to patrol the area of the McMahon Line West of Khinzamane.

25- On 27 April 1962, Army Headquarters gave their permission for patrolling as well as establishing news posts upto the McMahon Line, without prior sanction (Army Headquarters letter NO. 67045/GS/MO1 of 27 April 19562 – Annexure 41).

26- Originally, the intention of the establishing a post West of Khinzamane was to establish one at the Bhutan-India-Tibet Tri Junction, as given in the maps existing in May 1962. (Refer Para 15 above). These maps showed the Tri Junction at MM 7914.

27- The border in the map did not run along the watershed but was an arbitrary one running due West from Khinzamane. The watershed line and the old line are given in sketch. The watershed Tri junction is some four miles north of the one given in the maps then existing.

28- The post for various reasons was not established at the old Tri Junction, but Dhola MM 8316. Capt Mahabir Prasad of 1 Sikh selected and established the Dhola Post with a strength of one platoon of Assam Rifles on 4 June 1962.

Details of the Dhola Post

29- In August 1962, XXXIII Corps brought to the notice of the Eastern Command the discrepancy between the arbitrary line drawn on the map and the line as it should be according to the watershed principle. (Annexure 42). This letter is important, as it gave the details of the two boundary lines. The main points are given below: (For the location of various features see Sketch H).

a-   The boundary line printed on the maps had considerable inaccuracies, if the watershed principles and usage were to be applied.

b-   According to local inhabitants (grazers) and the political representatives who accompanied the Assam Rifles to the Dhola Post, the accepted/recognized boundary was the one based in the watershed principle. (The letter did not specify as to who accepted/recognized the boundary line). It was however, common knowledge that the McMahon Line was based on the watershed principle. The Tri-junction, according to the watershed principle, should be MM 7522 and not as shown on the map MM 7914.

c-   There were three important approaches on the watershed boundary that lead into our area between Khinzamane and the recommended Tri-Juntion MM 7533. The approaches were as under:

(i) Thagla MM 8717

(ii) Karpola II MM 8321

(iii) Mamdangla MM 7822

(iv) XXXIII Corps recommended that one post should be established at Thagla and another at the Tsangle MM 7719 to cover the other two passes. Tsangle, as can be seen, according to the old boundary, was in Bhutan. (Bhutan, incidentally did raise this question in October, when a representative of their approached Corps Headquarters).

(e) The letter went on to give recommendations for establishing these posts and also asked for a survey to be carried out. Pending approval o the recommendations, it was intended to carry out patrolling between Khinzamane and the Watershed Tri-junction.

(f) The last paragraph of the letter is of some importance and is reproduced below:

“It will be seen from Sketch P attached (Sketch H of this review) that Dhola Post grid reference (MM 8513), as reported earlier, is not correct and should be MM 8316. However, to avoid alarm and queries from all concerned, it is proposed to continue using the present grid reference in the location statement situation report until such a time the case is finally decided by you. We hope its meets with your approval.”

This, in effect, meant that the post was actually NORTH of the McMahon Line as the marked on the map. The location as given out MM 8513 was just SOUTH and MM 8816 just NORTH of the Line. (Though the sketch showed this, the letter was not clear, and it was never really expressly brought out till 12 September 1962).

30- Eastern Command conveyed the contents of this letter to Army Headquarters on 31 August, 1962.

31- An incident of some interest to the above recommendations had occurred in the meantime and requires note. A Subsidiary Intelligence Bureau representative, on a reconnaissance of the area of Thagla Ridge had found a wooden plank on 23 May 1962 with Chinese characters. These were later translated at Tezpur and read “This is our river and mountain”. This was conveyed to 4 Infantry Division by XXXIII Corps, Eastern Command and Army Headquarters on 12 July 1962. (Annexure 43).

This then was another pointer that Namka Chu and the Thagla Ridge were sensitive areas.

32- On September 1962, as is well known, Dhola Post was surrounded by the Chinese, who, by the evening, were reported to be some 600 strong in the area.

The Henderson-Brooks Report is out!

The Henderson-Brooks/Bhagat Report of the 1962 is out!
Neville Maxwell, the author of  India's China War has posted the famous Report on his website.
Here are his explanations.

My Henderson Brooks Albatross
Published 7th February, 2014
Those who gave me access to the Henderson Brooks Report when I was researching my study of the Sino-Indian border dispute laid down no conditions as to how I should use it.  That they would remain anonymous went without saying, an implicit condition I will always observe, otherwise how the material was used was left to my judgement.  I decided that while I would quote freelyfrom the Report, thus revealing that I had had access to it (and indeed had a copy), I would neither proclaim nor deny that fact; and my assumption was that the gist of the report having been published in 1970 in the detailed account of the Army’s debacle given in my India’s China War, the Indian government would release it after a decent interval.
The passing of years showed that assumption to have been mistaken and left me in a quandary.  I did not have to rely on memory to tell the falsity of the government’s assertion that keeping the Report secret was necessary for reasons of national security, I had taken a copy and the text nowhere touches on issues that could have current strategic or tactical relevance.  The reasons for the long-term withholding of the report must be political, indeed probably partisan, perhaps even familial.  While I kept the Report to myself I was therefore complicit in a continuing cover-up.
I marked the new century by publishing as an “Introduction to the Henderson Brooks Report” a detailed description, and account of the circumstances in which it was written, explaining its political and military context and summarising its findings (EPW,April 14, 2001): there was no public reaction in the Indian press or even among the chauvinist ranks of the academic security establishment.  My first attempt to put the Report itself on the public record was indirect and low-key: after I retired from the University I donated my copy to Oxford’s Bodleian Library, where, I thought, it could be studied in a setting of scholarly calm.  The Library initially welcomed it as a valuable contribution in that “grey area” between actions and printed books, in which I had given them material previously.  But after some months the librarian to whom I had entrusted it warned me that, under a new regulation, before the Report was put on to the shelves and opened to the public it would have to be cleared by the British government with the government which might be adversely interested!  Shocked by that admission of a secret process of censorship to which the Bodleian had supinely acceded I protested to the head Librarian, then an American, but received no response.  Fortunately I was able to retrieve my donation before the Indian High Commission in London was alerted in the Bodleian’s procedures and was perhaps given the Report.
In 192, noting that all attempts in India to make the government release the Report had failed, I decided on a more direct approach and made the text available to the editors of three of India’s leading publications, asking that they observe the usual journalistic practice of keeping their source to themselves. (I thought that would be clear enough to those who had long studied the border dispute and saw no need to depart from my long-standing “no comment” position)  To my surprise the editors concerned decided, unanimously, not to publish.  They explained that, while “there is no question that the report should be made public”, if it were leaked rather than released officially the result would be a hubbub over national security, with most attention focused on the leak itself, and little or no productive analysis of the text.  The opposition parties would savage the government for laxity in allowing the Report to get out, the government would turn in rage upon those who had published it.
Although surprised by this reaction, unusual in the age of Wikileaks, I could not argue with their reasoning.  Later I gave the text to a fourth editor and offered it to a fifth, with the same nil result. So my dilemma continued – although with the albatross hung, so to speak, on Indian necks as well as my own.
As I see it now I have no option but, rather than leave the dilemma to my heirs, to put the Report on the internet myself.  So here is the text (there are two lacunae, accidental in the copying process).

The downloadable report is available on the website of The Indian Defence Review.

The Henderson Brooks Report again

Lt. Gen. Henderson-Brooks

The Indian Defence Review publishes an article entitled Why Henderson Brooks Report Cannot be De-classified written by Lt. Gen. Prakash Katoch. 
As it quotes me, I am posting it here.
It probably answers my article, 1962 War: Why keep Henderson Brooks report secret?
Unfortunately (or fortunately for me), I am not Assange or Snowden, though I only hope that one day, one Indian General will play the Assange role.
I always wondered why Neville Maxwell, if had a copy of the Report, had not 'declassified' it, posting him on the Net? 

Why Henderson Brooks Report Cannot be De-classified 
Lt. Gen. (Retd) Prakash Katoch

Claude Arpi’s demand to release the Henderson Brooks report is akin to Julian Assange and Edward Snowden seeking asylum in India. Understandably, Wikileaks disclosures of black money stashed abroad by Indians had sent many personalities scurrying for cover. There was flurry of movement to foreign lands, personal jets, and chartered planes, jets lent by birds of same flock, unexplained mysterious absences and what have you. Now that there is some measure of relief, Julian Assange wants asylum here. Where is the guarantee that he will not release another list disclosing how the black money has been siphoned out, to which new destinations, how much has been surreptitiously routed back to India, by whom, and into which developmental, private construction or other projects. Edward Snowden is even bigger threat. That he is already in league with Julian is an established fact, implying Julian can always leak information through Edward. But the bigger threat is what information Edward has swiped from the US NSA’s Prism. Although our Foreign Minister has certified “no data has been stolen” from the Indian Embassy in Washington DC, his own subordinates are not convinced of his credentials as cyber expert. So getting back to Edward Snowden, God knows what secrets this guy may leak out given that even Obama appears so shaken up.

Claude has quoted Neville Maxwell in questioning that even if Jawaharlal Nehru emerges in in bad light in the Henderson Brooks Report, why should it be kept in wraps in a modern democracy like India. He also writes that in 2008, Defense Minister, Mr AK Antony told the Indian Parliament that the Henderson Brooks could not be declassified. Mr Antony claimed that the report could not be made public because an internal study by the Indian Army had established that its contents “are not only extremely sensitive but are of current operational value.” When did the Government of India start seeking military advice on strategic security issues? As to Claude pointing out that the report only generally points out to lack of political direction, which report in India ever has indicted individuals in power?

Claude Arpi has quoted the Henderson Brooks Report in saying, “No major security threat other than from Pakistan was perceived. And the armed forces were regarded adequate to meet Pakistan’s threat. Hence very little effort and resources were put in for immediate strengthening of the security of the borders.” What stands obfuscated was this was ‘whose appreciation’; political appreciation, military appreciation, individual appreciation? Perhaps there could have been no one better to warn Nehru of China’s intentions and in no better form than Sardar Patel’s strategic advice through his letter dated 7th November 1950, excerpts of which are as follows:

“…We have to consider what new situation now faces us as a result of the disappearance of Tibet, as we knew it, and the expansion of China almost up to our gates. Throughout history we have seldom been worried about our north-east frontier. The Himalayas have been regarded as an impenetrable barrier against any threat from the north. We had a friendly Tibet which gave us no trouble. …..Chinese irredentism and communist imperialism are different from the expansionism or imperialism of the western powers. The former has a cloak of ideology which makes it ten times more dangerous. In the guise of ideological expansion lie concealed racial, national or historical claims. The danger from the north and north-east, therefore, becomes both communist and imperialist…….for the first time, after centuries, India’s defence has to concentrate itself on two fronts simultaneously….. we shall now have to reckon with communist China in the north and in the north-east, a communist China which has definite ambitions and aims and which does not, in any way, seem friendly disposed towards us…….”

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Declassified History

My article Declassified history: Documents on The War With China appeared in The Statesman in Sunday.

WHILE China chose to remain quiet, the 1962 Sino-Indian war which has left such a deep scar on Indian psyche, received extensive coverage in India. The international press more or  less ignored the issue; it is a fact that outside India, very few cared for what happened fifty years ago on the Himalayan slopes. For example, I have not seen a single article in the French press about the 1962 war.
however, the Cuban missile crisis between the United States and the Soviet Union which occurred at the same time, has been widely discussed in the world media and amongst historians.
Further difference between the two conflicts is the number of new documents which have been declassified by the US, the Russians and other protagonists of the Cuban crisis while in India and China, the archives have remained as hermetically closed as ever. This is not a sign of maturity for the two ‘emerging’ nations.
It has not been the case in the US and Russia; take the example of the National Security Archives of the George Washington University which has posted a large number of newly declassified documents about the role of submarines in the Cuban conflict. On 27 October 1962, the most dangerous day of the crisis, the confrontation between the US Navy sub-chasing units and the B-59 Soviet submarines was described in great detail on TV shows.
Declassified documents include the original Soviet Navy map of the Caribbean showing the locations of the four ‘Foxtrot’ diesel submarines which on 1 October 1962, had left their Murmansk base, north of the Arctic Circle, to sail towards Cuba. One realises now that the US Navy did not know that the Soviet subs were loaded with a nuclear-tipped torpedo and oral instructions were given to the Soviet captains to use them if attacked by the Americans.
The documents include a till now unknown after-action report prepared by Soviet Northern Fleet Headquarters when the subs’ commanders returned to Murmansk in November 1962; it describes the dreadful conditions aboard the submarines, extreme temperatures, equipment breakdowns, and the reckless deployment of nuclear torpedoes aboard Soviet submarines. The subs were just not designed for tropical waters.
The Cuban missile crisis continued long after the  ‘13 days’ publicised by both sides; the Soviet tactical nuclear weapons remained for some time in Cuba. The personal archives of Sergo Mikoyan, the son of Anastas Mikoyan, show that the Soviet statesman was sent to Cuba by Khrushchev: “to convince the Cuban leadership that Cuba’s security had been assured and that there was no danger of invasion, even though the missiles were being removed.” As the National Security Archives put it: “Khrushchev knew he had a real problem in Cuba ~ with 42,000 Soviet military personnel armed with tactical nuclear weapons ~ and an emotional revolutionary leader, who felt betrayed and abandoned by the Kremlin.”
Many more such examples could be given. One of them is the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC  which released its CWIHP Bulletin (Issue 17/18) on ‘The Global Cuban Missile Crisis at 50’ which contains “over 500 newly declassified and translated documents from international sources; this issue is the most extensive collection ever presented of original, never-before published, non-US primary sources on the Crisis.”
One can continue to dream that one day India will open its archives. But it is just a dream. The Sino-Indian conflict is usually associated with the Henderson-Brooks report prepared in 1963 by Lt. Gen. Henderson-Brooks and Brig. Prem Bhagat. Today, this file is the most secret of the Indian Republic. In 2008, the Indian Defence minister told Parliament that the Henderson-Brooks report could not be declassified after a MoD internal audit “had established that its contents are not only extremely sensitive but are of current operational value.”
RD Pradhan, the Private Secretary of YB Chavan, who replaced Krishna Menon as Defence Minister after the 1962 war, wrote in his memoirs: “In 1965, it was considered too sensitive to be made public and although outdated today, the report unfortunately remains secret.”
Whom to believe?
There is another report, 12 years older than the HBR which is also missing in action. It is the Himmatsinghji report, prepared after China’s invasion of Tibet in October 1950. It seems to have been misplaced by the Ministry of Defence.
In November 2011, under the Right to Information Act, a petitioner applied to access the Himmasinghji Report (as well as five other historic reports prepared by the MoD). In its order, the Central Information Commission (CIC) noted that on 12 October 2011, the Director (Vigilance) in the Ministry of Defence had informed the CIC that only one report could be found: “none of the remaining five: (i) PMS Blackett Report 1948; (ii) Himmatsinghji Committee Report, 1951; (iii) HM Patel Committee report on the functioning of the Ministry of Defence (MOD), 1952; (iv) Sharda Mukherjee Committee report on restructuring of MoD, 1967; and (v) Committee on Defence expenditure report, 1990 are available in the MoD.”
The officer had been authorized to make this statement by the Defence Secretary: “It is, thus, clear that the reports …of the RTI application are not available with the MoD and the question of supplying them to the appellant does not arise.”
Can you believe it? All missing in action! While other countries declassify, India loses its reports! Does it mean that the Himmatsinghji Committee Report is lost forever?
The CIC’s conclusion was: “The MoD has not denied existence of these Reports; it has simply indicated their non-availability. …In the premises, it is ordered that a copy of this order be sent to the Defence Secretary for information and appropriate action at his end.”
To come back to the Henderson-Brooks Report, why is it still classified today? India Today in its cover story on the 1962 war mentioned: “The three main findings of the report are the failure of the army’s higher command, the organization of the army and finally the events leading to the appointment of the glib but militarily unsound corps commander Lt General Brijmohan Kaul.”
Does the Report really exonerate the political bosses? Probably not.
In the meantime, China still pretends that it was attacked by India. Though there was no question of the Indian Army ‘attacking China’ with no food, no warm clothes, no armament or ammunition supply, the Chinese seemed to have perceived the situation differently.
A detail gives a hint to one of the real political blunders of 1962. In his memoirs, Maj. Gen. Niranjan Prasad, the 4 Division’s Commander describes the setting: “The McMahon Line as drawn by Sir Henry McMahon in 1914 on an unsurveyed map, was not an accurate projection of the Himalayan watershed line. …In this process the position of Thagla ridge was, to say the least, left ambiguous.” The survey had been completed in 1913 by Captain Bailey, but it was rather sketchy (1 inch to 8 miles).
If one follows the watershed principle, the Thagla ridge was the logical border, but the fact remains that the old map which was the reference for India’s position on the location of the McMahon Line, showed the Thagla ridge and the Namkha Chu, north of the Red Line. Further surveys were unfortunately not conducted after India’s independence.
Did this incertitude on the exact location of the border lead to the war? It is what the Chinese say, though the fact that the Chinese attacked simultaneously in all sectors (Tawang, Walong in NEFA and Ladakh) is proof that the operations had been prepared well in advance by the Communist regime in Beijing; it did not really even need a pretext.
But is it a valid reason to hold back declassification of 50-year-old historical documents related to the conflict?

The Classified Report

Excerpts of my book, 1962: the McMahon Line Saga  are published in the Sunday Magazine of The Pioneer.

Details of the Sino-Indian war, closely examined in the 1963 Henderson-Brooks Report, remain obsessively guarded by the Government of India. Claude Arpi’s latest book tells us why. Excerpts:

Fifty years have passed since China entered NEFA and Ladakh. This event has so deeply traumatised India that the Sino-Indian conflict has remained a scar in the nation’s psyche, partly because we do not know what exactly happened.
While it is today possible to get some hints of what took place from Indian official sources (the Official History of the 1962 War prepared by the Ministry of Defence and a number of White Papers published by the Ministry of External Affairs), but also from memoirs written by the main actors like Brig John Dalvi, Maj Gen Niranjan Prasad, Maj Gen DK Palit or Lt Gen BM Kaul as well as CIA, Russian and Chinese sources, but the main Indian report prepared by Lt Gen Henderson-Brooks and Brig Prem Bhagat is unfortunately still the most secret document of the Indian Republic.
Having lost hope that the famous document will one day be declassified, I have tried to guess: “What on earth has stopped the Government to declassify the report?”
Though portions of it were read out in Parliament by then Defence Minister YB Chavan in 1963, the gist seems to be missing.
A book helps us to understand the background of the Henderson-Brooks Report. Between 1962 and 1965, RD Pradhan was the Private Secretary of YB Chavan, who took over as Defence Minister from the disgraced VK Krishna Menon after the debacle of October 1962. Pradhan’s memoirs give great insights on the reasoning of the then Defence Minister who ordered the report: “For Chavan the main challenge in the first years was to establish relationship of trust between himself and the Prime Minister. He succeeded in doing so by his deft-handling of the Henderson-Brooks Report of Inquiry into the NEFA reverses.”
The Private Secretary elaborated on the Defence Minister’s sentiments during the following months: “During the conduct of the enquiry, Chavan was apprehensive that the committee may cast aspersions on the role of the Prime Minister or the Defence Minister.” Pradhan adds: “His (Chavan’s) main worry was to find ways to defend the Government and at the same time to ensure that the morale of the armed forces was not further adversely affected. For that he repeatedly emphasised in Parliament that the enquiry was a fact-finding one and to ‘learn lessons’ for the future and it was not a ‘witch-hunt’ to identify and to punish the officers responsible for the debacle.”
It is clear that the main objective of Chavan was to defend the Government, in other words, ‘defend Nehru’ and the political coterie around him who were responsible for the death of nearly 2,000 Indian officers and jawans.
Chavan’s Secretary concludes: “It was a tribute to his sagacity and political maturity that he performed his role to the full satisfaction of Parliament and also earned the gratitude of the Prime Minister.” He obviously earned Nehru’s gratitude because he managed to absolve him of any wrong even though the Prime Minister was the main culprit.
In 2008, answering a question on the report, Defence Minister AK Antony told Parliament that the Henderson-Brooks Report could not be made public because an internal study by the Indian Army had established that its contents “are not only extremely sensitive but also of current operational value”.
At first sight it seems strange that this 49-year-old report is still of ‘operational value’. Does the Minister mean reverse operational value? It is probably a manual of what should not be done in case of a conflict with China or any other country. All the more reason to study it!
Were the officials who drafted the Minister’s reply aware of another report, Official History of the Conflict with China (1962), prepared by the same Defence Ministry, detailing the famous ‘operations’ in 474 foolscap pages?

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