The Red Cross and the 1962 Sino-Indian Conflict

A letter sent by an Indian POW

(Courtesy: Col Nirmaljit Pannu)

My article The Red Cross and the 1962 Sino-Indian Conflict appeared in the USI Journal

Here is the link...


Abstract
For the Indian nation, the 1962 conflict with China has been one of the most traumatic post-independence events. For more than 3,000 prisoners of war (PoWs), the experience was particularly harrowing.
This article looks at difficult relations between the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Geneva, the Indian Red Cross (IRC) and the Chinese Red Cross (CRC) Society. The ICRC’s archives in Geneva helped to understand the role of the international organization as well as of the two national Red Crosses and their respective governments during the conflict.
China not only refused to officially acknowledge the Geneva Convention of 1949 on PoWs, but also committed several violations in respect of the treatment meted out to captured Indian military personnel.
27 Military officers taken PoWs during operations were taken on a tour of china and repatriated on 04 May 1963.
The rosy picture painted by the Chinese propaganda had actually been a traumatic experience for the Indian PoWs.

Introduction
For the Indian nation, the 1962 conflict with China has been one of the most traumatic post-independence event. For more than 3,000 PoWs, the experience was particularly harrowing.
Still today some veterans who spent several months in the PoW’s camps in Tibet, refuse to speak to their families and friends about these dark days. But according to Chinese records, never in the history of warfare have prisoners been treated so well.
Preferential treatment or propaganda?
An account recently published by China1 tells us: “During the Sino-Indian border war, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) captured more than 3,900 Indian officers and soldiers2 (including one brigadier general and 26 officers). In the long-term goal of striving for friendship between the Chinese and Indian people and in accordance with the principle of lenient treatment of prisoners, which had always been upheld by the PLA, the treatment of prisoners of war by the Chinese side had far exceeded the provisions of the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War, and many touching deeds had taken place”.
I shall cover the Geneva Convention and the role the Red Cross played in getting the PoWs released in several batches in 1962/63 a little later. This article looks at difficult relations between the Indian Red Cross (IRC) and the International Committee of the Red Cross ((ICRC) in Geneva with the Chinese authorities represented by their Red Cross Society (CRC). It is often said the winner writes the history, but it is then with a deep distortion: “China released all Indian prisoners of war in a short period of time, playing an important role in winning over rivals, turning enemies into friends and promoting the restoration of friendly relations between the Chinese and Indian peoples,” mentioned the Chinese report.
Interestingly, China terms the Sino-Indian border conflict, a ‘counter-attack’, as if it was India who attacked China in NEFA or Ladakh. “In late October 1962, the General Political Department of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army issued several provisions on the question of prisoners of the invading Indian Army,” further explaining that the PLA “emphasised that captive officers and soldiers should not be killed, mistreated or insulted, or tied up and their private property should not be confiscated. The injured should be treated. At the same time, it was also required to take care of the living habits of all prisoners, and to find out the names and army numbers of dead bodies on the battlefield as far as possible, to bury them properly and to set up signs. Prisoners had to fill in medical records and death certificates signed by military doctors.” These principles were hardly followed.

No Declaration of War
An important legal element needs to be noted; there was no formal declaration of war between China and India. The Chinese said that they called the captured Indian Army personnel ‘captives’ and not ‘PoWs’; the camps were ‘captive shelters’, an euphemism. This was indeed part of the Chinese propaganda.3 The Chinese account does not mention the constant indoctrination sessions to which the Indian jawans and officers were subjected; China just says that meetings were organised to discuss “according to the wishes of the Indian prisoners …on the right and wrong issues in the Sino-Indian border dispute.” One can guess who was said to be right and who was wrong.
The Chinese described thus the departure of the PoWs from Tibet: “The captured Indian officers and soldiers, carrying clothes and souvenirs from the Chinese side, reluctantly bid farewell to the Chinese personnel. …the Indian captives in farewell with the Chinese Red Cross staff cheered their arms: ‘Long live the friendship between the Chinese and Indian people!’” The facts were, however, different.

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You can also watch this video made by the Chinese...

The man who brought Tawang under India: 70 years ago

Maj Khathing discusses with Tibetan officials and village elders in Tawang (April 1951)

Here is a note recorded by the Prime Minister of India on February 9, 1951, when he heard that Maj Bob Khathing (and the Assam Rifles) had taken over the administration of Tawang earlier in the day.
The note is addressed to the Foreign Secretary (FS).
The Committee referred to by Nehru is the Himmatsinghji Committee, known as the North and North East Border Defence Committee.
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Ref: from Nehru Paper (JN Collection Vol  72 - Part II)


SECRET
PRIME MINISTER’S SECRETARIAT

The Committee appointed recently to tour the North East Frontier etc., has taken some action which I consider of doubtful value. For instance they decided to send some troops to Bhutan. I considered this most undesirable and the matter has been dropped.
Tawang has now been occupied. Probably the step taken was justified. But it was an important step and I should have been consulted about it. The instructions issued to the Officer Commanding should also have been placed before me before issue. This is a frontier matter involving possibly some complications and no step should be taken without full consultation.
I have just learnt that there is a proposal that this Committee should go to Nepal. This is not desirable in the present state of affairs.
If the Committee has any other step in view, I should be informed of it before-hand

(J. Nehru)
F.S.
9-2-1951

I repost below an old article dated 2015 on the subject.

My article The man who brought Tawang under India appeared today in the Edit Page of The Pioneer

Here is the link...

Major Ralengnao (Bob) Khathing, a Naga tribal from Manipur, used his distinguished military background and exemplary diplomatic skills to win over the locals and establish Delhi’s control over the region

The country recently saw some promising developments in the North-East. The Union Government signed a historic peace accord with Nagaland’s insurgent group — the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah). And though the details have not been made public, it is certainly a first step towards the restoration of peace in the region.
Then the Government decided to celebrate the birth centenary of Rani Gaidinliu, the legendary freedom fighter from Nagaland. Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a commemorative coin of hundred rupees on Rani-maa to mark the beginning of the celebrations. However, there is a true hero of independent India who has not been sufficiently honoured by the nation: It is Major Ralengnao (Bob) Khathing.
Born on February 8, 1912, at Ukhrul in Manipur, Bob belonged to the Tangkhul Naga tribe. Till Class V, he went to Pettigrew Mission School in Ukhrul; being extremely intelligent, the boy received a handsome State scholarship of three rupees per month. Later, he joined the Government High School in Shillong, then the capital of unified Assam State and eventually studied in the Bishop Cotton College in Guwahati. He was the first tribal from Manipur to graduate.
During the World War II, as he decided to join the British Army under an Emergency Commission, he faced a serious problem. The British rules were strict: Recruits had to be five feet four inches, with the exception of the Gurkhas who could be recruited at five feet two inches. Bob, like many in the North-East, was too short, five feet three inches only. But with a clever hairstyle and the help of an understanding officer of the Royal Army Medical Corps, he made it. He was the first Manipuri to get a King’s Commission.
After his basic training in Agra, under Major KS Thimayya (later Army Chief), Bob opted to serve in a special intelligence-cum-sabotage unit, called the ‘V Force’ formed by the British in May 1942, to operate from Manipur.
For his devotion to duty and his brilliant organising skills, he was soon awarded Member of the British Empire in December 1943. Later, Bob fought the Japanese so well that in August 1944, he received the military cross. What a start in the life of the young Manipuri Naga!
After World War II, acceding to a request from the Maharaja of Manipur, he took leave from the Army to join the Government of Manipur as the Minister for Hills Administration. Here too,he excelled.
When the Manipur Assembly was dissolved in 1949, he was asked by Akbar Hydari, the first Governor of Assam, to join the Assam Rifles where he served for some time as Assistant Commandant. His next assignment will forever remain in the history of India. As Assistant Political Officer in the Kameng Frontier Division of the North-East Frontier Agency, he brought Tawang under Indian administration.
In January 1951, in consultation with the Himatsinghji Border Defence Committee, then Assam Governor Jairamdas Daulatram ordered the young Naga officer to march to Tawang and take over the administration. On January 17, 1951, Bob, accompanied by Captain Hem Bahadur Limbu, 200 troops of 5 Assam Rifles and 600 porters, left the foothills for his historic mission. During the following weeks, the young Manipuri showed his toughness, but also diplomatic skills.
A few days after his arrival, he selected a high-ground near the Tawang Monastery for meeting the Dzongpens, the Commissioners from Tsona in Tibet and the village elders (gaon burahs). Bob walked to the place, while 100 riflemen encircled the ground. The APO instructed his second in-command to ‘fix bayonet’: “One hundred click sounds of bayonets coming in unison seemed to say, we are even ready for blood,” wrote his biographer. Then Bob spoke to the people about the Indian nation.
It is not often mentioned, but the local Monpas were delighted by the arrival of the Khathing expedition. The Tibetan ‘administration’ only forcefully collected (in particular corvee) taxes, which the local people often could not afford to pay. Only a person with an Army background with his knowledge of the local tribes, his ‘human’ skills, could succeed in this tricky operation — and this, without a drop of blood.
Neeru Nanda, an IAS officer who was posted in Tawang in the 1980s, recalled what old villagers still remembered: After watching Khathing and his men for about a month, the village leaders came in a deputation with folded hands and grave faces. “Well sahib”, they said, “we have been watching your work and we like it but there is something that makes us very suspicious.” Khathing was quite startled: “What is it?” he asked. Had he done something wrong? “Sahib”, they said, “you do not take anything from us by way of tax, neither do you seem to be proposing to take any. This is causing grave concern to all of us.” The young officer then relaxed. “Is that all?” he asked them cheerfully. He then gave them a long lecture about India and its Government which would never exploit its people. It is the way Khathing conquered the hearts.
On March 18, six weeks after Bob had reached in Tawang, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote a note to the Foreign Secretary: “I hear constantly about the activities of the North and North-East Border Defence Committee. These activities have resulted in action being taken on the Tibetan border and in Nepal. At no stage have these matters been brought up before me for consultation, although apparently consultations have taken place with the Governor of Assam and other people far away. …I am greatly concerned about this matter because, as I have already mentioned to you, the manner of our going to Tawang and taking possession of it and thus creating some international complications has not been a happy one. I am yet not quite clear how all this was done without any reference to me.”
Well, it was probably better for India. It was a dying Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel who had got the ball rolling and decided upon the operation sometime in December 1950; he had ordered Jairamdas Daulatram to go ahead with his faithful APO. The experience of Kashmir was not to be repeated.
In 1953, Bob officially joined the newly constituted Indian Frontier Administrative Service; he was first posted Political Officer of the North-East Frontier Agency’s Tuensang Frontier Division; he then occupied several important posts in the North-East and Sikkim. During the 1962 war, he served as NEFA’s Security Commissioner.
Eventually, he was the first person from a tribal background to become Ambassador of India; he was posted in Burma in the early 1970s. Though Bob was awarded the Padma Shri in 1957, he is a fit case for the Padma Vibhushan, but having retired in his native State, Delhi has forgotten the ‘tribal’ who got back Indian territory. A rare case in India! Is it too late to posthumously offer him a well-merited recognition?

Maj Khathing arrives in Bomdila

Tawang (April 1951)

Let the staff go along with the flag; the typewriters can follow later

KC Johorey with Prime Minister in Yatung (September 1958)

This morning, one of the pioneers of the Indian Frontier Administrative Service (IFAS) passed away.
It perhaps marks the end of an era.
KC Johorey, who later joined the IAS and became Chief Secretary in Goa, was one of the first to join the IFAS in 1954.
He started his career in the Indian Army (Corps of Engineers), but one day, he decided to jump into the newly-created IFAS. It was quite an adventure.
In an interview, he remembered that Prime Minister Nehru personally briefed the officers who had been selected to administer India’s frontiers: “The staff must go along with the flag and the typewriters can follow later on. That is it, physically and literally,” recalled Johorey, who provided some details about the first days of the Service: “We had all met in Delhi [the first batch of 14 officers] and received some training there.” 

Then, the batch proceeded to Shillong where they were briefed by the Governor, the Chief Minister of Assam and various Heads of the Department: “We learnt the law and the local trait of each tribe; not that we learnt their languages in 14 days.” And that was it. 

They were then ordered to join duty in their respective posts. Johorey and his colleagues, Captain U. Chakma and Lt Col Rashid Yusuf Ali (the senior-most of the three) had no alternative, but to take their assignment by air: “We landed at Rowria airfield in Jorhat [Assam] and we waited. We could not walk to Along [today Aalo], there were no roads. The Brahmaputra River had eroded the banks and damaged all the approaches. There was no bridge on the Brahmaputra at that time and you could not even go by ferry boat to Pasighat,” he recalled. 

He elaborated: “Along had a very small hastily levelled air-strip. So, we waited in Jorhat for 14 days. Every day we used to go to the airfield, wait for the dense clouds to disappear and come back [due to bad weather]. This happened for 14 days. One fine morning, the dashing pilot of the Indian Air Force told us: ‘Let us board and take off quickly for Along’. "

Yusuf Ali, U. Chakma and Johorey had been given the charge to ‘administrate’ the Siang Frontier Division with Along as a base. Later, a doctor was appointed and joined the 3 officers. Johorey liked to evoke his first days in Siang: there were two houses, one for the burra sahib, and behind another smaller hut: “The houses were really huts made of bamboos, palm leaves and canes. Even the tables and the beds were of bamboos. There were no mattresses, no electricity and no furniture. The houses were very clean and airy. That was all,” says Johorey. 

As for the food, they depended on the airdrop; the small airfield was used as a Dropping Zone. It is how the IFAS started. All the IFAS officers interviewed by me, like Johorey or Brigadier (Justice) DM Sen, the first Judge Advocate General of India, who lived till 100 years, had fond memories of their days in NEFA; they all had similar stories to tell. Earlier, officers had been headquartered in Dibrugarh or Pasighat and they only occasionally visited Along (not to speak of the more remote parts of the Siang Frontier Division today under Upper Siang, and West Siang districts of Arunachal).  

Pasighat was then a five-day journey by mule track: “Usually we arrived on the fifth or sixth day”, said Johorey, who added: “we kept on meeting the people to know their problems, aspirations and expectations.” After a couple of weeks, having ‘comfortably’ settled at the ‘headquarters’, they started travelling to remote villages: “Some of the villages were very new and no administration had ever gone there. They had never seen a coin. They had no medicines.”  

Indian Trade Agency in Yatung

The new administrators had a small protective escort of the Assam Rifles; in each NEFA district headquarters, the paramilitary force, then under the Ministry of External Affairs, had the responsibility to guard the government treasuries.  Johorey went on with his fascinating narration: “We continued travelling and meeting people. They used to come with their personal problems and legal cases including land disputes. [For example] somebody had violated the tribal code which had the sanctity of law or violated the rules; and there were simple cases. Then, there was the distribution of salt.” Earlier the tribal population had to walk for weeks to reach Tibet to get salt; sometimes, tribals visited plains of Assam to barter goods. Such were the early days of the IFAS. 

 At the end of the 1950s, KC Johorey was posted as Indian Trade Agent in Yatung. It had the privilege to receive the Prime Minister when the latter crossed over the Chumbi Valley on his way to Bhutan. Nehru spent two nights in the Indian Residence in Yatung.
I have earlier mentioned Nehru's visit to Tibet on this blog.

Short Biodata
Maj KC Johorey, Indian Army, IFAS and IAS, was born on 14th May, 1927.
He completed his education from Allahabad University during the year 1944-47.  On completion of  his academic education he joined Indian Army on September 12, 1948 and he served till January, 1954. During his service in Indian Army, Maj Johorey went through various Training and Courses at different institutes:
-   Indian Military Academy, Dehradun - 1947-48
-   College of Military Engineering,  Pune - 1949-52,
-   Infantry School Mhow
-   Intelligence Training School Mhow,
KC Johorey later had served Government of India in the IFAS and IAS :
He was with the Indian Frontier Administrative from Jan 1954 to 1962 as Assistant Political Officer, Sub- Divisional Magistrate, Political Officer/District Magistrate /Deputy Commissioner in Along, Pasighat, Khonsa and Bomdila.
He was later posted as India Trade Agent (ITA) in Yatung and acting ITA in Gyantse, Tibet; First Secretary, Embassy of India in Afghanistan; Counsellor (Political) & Financial Adviser, Political Officer in Sikkim & Bhutan in Gangtok.
Later, he joined the Indian Administrative Service in the AGMUT Cadre. 

He served as Director (Backward Classes  Welfare), Central Zone, Min of Planning & Social Welfare , Commissioner (Food & Civil Supplies); Secretary, Administrative Reforms, Department of Health & Family Planning. & Administration; Financial Commissioner in Delhi administration.
He retired as Chief Secretary, Goa.
His bio says: “KC Johorey served in some of the most sensitive areas in delicate and difficult assignments  at critical periods like the opening of administration in erstwhile NEFA since 1954, Chinese aggression (while he was posted at Bomdila) and Indo-Pak conflict of 1965 (during my tenure in Afghanistan). His service record during the period of emergency in India has been remarkable. During his brief tenure as Financial Commissioner of Delhi Administration he had delivered over a thousand judgments in cases arising out of appeals from various Courts of Collector.”
KC Johorey was a recipient of Padma Shri.
He has written his memoirs "India Pre and Post-Independence,: Indo-China War and Beyond" published by Pentagon Press.  

Johorey was also a great mountaineer, in 1953, he participated in the climb of the  Nun Kun. 

A book Abode of Snow - A History 0f Himalayan Exploration and Mountaineering by Kenneth Mason, 1955, says:

Nun was eventually climbed  in 1953 by a  French party led by Bernard Pierre. They travelled by Jammu and Kishtwar and pitched their base in the upper Fariabad valley. The party comprised Bernard Pierre,  Michel  Desorbay, J. Gudernin, Madame  Claude  Kogan, Pierre Vittos (a Swiss missionary working in Ladakh), and two Indian officers, Flight Lieutenant Nalni D. Jayal and Captain KC Johorey. They had with them six Sherpas, led by Ang Tharkay. Three camps at 18,000, 19,800, and 21,400 feet were placed on the west ridge of Nun. The assault party, comprising Madame Kogan and Vittos on one rope, and Bemard Pierre with the Sherpa Pemba Nurbu (No. I 50) on another left Camp 111 at 21,400 feet at 7.30 a.m. on 28 August. During the ascent Bemard Pierre had to give up, but Madame Kogan and  Pierre Vittos reached  the summit at three o'clock. The three highest summits of the massif have now all been climbed : Pinnacle Peak (22,810) by the Workmans in 1906, Kun (23,250) by Calciati in 1914, and Nun (23,410) by this party in 1953.

In homage to KC Johorey, I reproduced an article several years ago on the Indian Frontier Administrative Service.

My article Romance of Hostile Borders appeared in the Opinion Page of the The Statesman.

Here is the link...

Philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau said once: “Nothing is so gentle as man in his primitive state, when placed by nature at an equal distance from the stupidity of brutes and the fatal enlightenment of civil man.”
Jawaharlal Nehru too was a romantic; he wrote thus about the inhabitants of the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA): “I am not at all sure which is the better way of living, the tribal or our own. In some respects I am quite certain theirs is better. Therefore, it is grossly presumptuous on our part to approach them with an air of superiority, to tell them how to behave or what to do and what not to do. There is no point in trying to make of them a second-rate copy of ourselves.”
Though constitutionally a part of Assam, in the 1950s, the NEFA was administered by the Ministry of External Affairs, with the Governor of Assam, acting as agent to the President of India, seconded by a senior officer (often from the ICS), designated as Advisor to the Governor.
In 1955, Dr. Verrier Elwin, the famous British anthropologist who had just taken Indian citizenship, joined as Adviser for Tribal Affairs; Verrier’s concept of the development of these areas was expounded in his celebrated book, The Philosophy of NEFA.
In his Foreword to the book, which became the Bible of the officers serving in the NEFA, Nehru asserted that he “began to doubt how far the normal idea of progress was beneficial for these people and, indeed, whether this was progress at all in any real sense of the word.”
Sixty years later, one realizes that this romantic view of the border population amounted to the segregation of a large chunk of the Indian population.
It has been the tragedy of the North-East, particularly Arunachal Pradesh.
With the invasion of Tibet at the end of 1950, followed 9 years later by the Tibetan uprising in Lhasa and the consequent flight of the Dalai Lama to India, the relations between the border populations and Tibet were discontinued, while Delhi’s romantic policies led to their neglect.
Verrier Elwin and Nehru could only see the anthropological side of the problem, forgetting the strategic as well the economic aspects of the border development; it resulted in a huge development gap between the frontier areas and the rest of India.
The first Prime Minister took however an excellent initiative: he created a separate cadre for India’s frontiers, namely NEFA, Tibet, Sikkim and Bhutan.
On April 4, 1952, Nehru wrote to Jairamdas Doulatram, the Governor of Assam, mentioning the need a ‘special’ cadre for the border areas.
A few weeks later, the Prime Minister Nehru told the Foreign Secretary: “These primitive people especially have to be dealt with care and friendliness and require expert knowledge which our average administrator does not possess. Hence the necessity for a specially trained cadre.”
The idea of a separate cadre was not appreciated by all. First the Assamese realized that the move to have a special cadre would further separate the NEFA from Assam.
Finally in 1954, the first batch of officers was posted on the frontiers and two years later, the ‘special cadre’ was officialized.
These officers were at first drawn from All-India services such as the ICS or IPS; others had served in the Army earlier.
The initial recruitment to the Indian Frontier Administrative Service (IFAS) was made by the Central Government through a Special Selection Board with representatives from the MEA, the MHA and the MoD, along with an expert in tribal affairs (often Verrier Elwin).
K.C. Johorey who later became Chief Secretary in Goa was one of the first pioneers who joined the IFAS. He still remembers what Nehru told his batch: “The staff must go along with the flag and the typewriters can follow later on.”
Johorey recalls his first posting in Along in the Siang Frontier Division: “There were two houses, one for the burra sahib [for Yusuf Ali, his boss], and behind another smaller hut. The houses were really huts made of bamboos, palm leaves and canes. Even the tables and the beds were of bamboos. There were no mattresses, no electricity and no furniture. The houses were very clean and airy. That was all,” says Johorey.
One of the most famous members of the IFAS is Maj. Ranenglao ‘Bob’ Khathing who single-handedly brought Tawang under Indian administration in February 1951.
Another officer Maj. S.M. Krishnatri has left an extraordinary account of his ‘tour’ report in what is today the Upper Subansiri district of Arunachal. Krishnatry and his wife Geeta provide a detailed description of their adventures. Krishnatry who had earlier been posted in Tibet for 7 years, explains how his expedition was different from the British’s: “Most exploratory expeditions in the tribal frontiers have been armed or armoured with heavy escorts much to the cost and suppression of human rights, occupation of their lands, burning of villages, molestation of women, looting of livestock, crops and banning of trade.”
Geeta Krishnatry religiously took notes of her encounter with the villagers on the way to the border, entering in her diary every detail of their perilous tour. It is a most remarkable anthropological and strategic document.
The former officer of the Maratha Light Infantry officer explains: “I felt that a woman was a more secure safeguard against tribal onslaught, while Geeta was firm she would rather trust peace with tribals than with armed escort in our company.”
Another remarkable IFAS officer is Col. Rashid Yusuf Ali who is today 92 year-old and lives in Shillong (Meghalaya); he has lived an extraordinary life. His father, Abdullah Yusuf Ali was a reputed Islamic scholar of Indian origin who translated the Qur'an into English. Abdullah married an English woman. Their young son studied in England, Greek and Latin amongst other subjects.
In 1941, Rashid was commissioned in the Indian Army, and fought for the British in Burma. Like several other frontier officers, he resigned from the Army to join the newly-created ‘frontier’ service. He believes that what characterized IFAS officers, was their long tours; they used to walk over long distances (sometimes for weeks) to visit remote villages near the Indo-Tibet border. Ali, a Christian, also remembers walking with his wife from the plains of Assam to Sepla (today’s Seppa, in East Kameng district).
Ali is modest when he says the IFAS officers had not much work to do; he thus explains why on their return from the annual tours, they used to write long and delightful reports, very much enjoyed by the Prime Minister.
These officers, like Brigadier (Justice) D.M. Sen, the first Judge Advocate General of India, who is now 100 years old, have still fond memories of their days in NEFA.
But when one looks at the events before the 1962 war, one realizes that ‘the philosophy of NEFA’, though based on genuine human concerns, did not take into consideration the military and strategic aspects the region.
After all, Dr. Verrier Elwin, the guru of the NEFA, was an anthropologist, and it was certainly not his task to consider other aspects of the border areas. After 1962, Nehru probably greatly regretted to have neglected the preparation of the border defence for a romantic preservation of the ‘tribal life’.
It is sad that the IFAS, an adhoc creation by the Prime Minister, was dissolved in the mid-1960s and the intrepid IFAS officers were ‘merged’ into the more boring IFS, IAS or IPS. The fact remains that these officers who decided to sacrifice their careers to join the IFAS were all remarkable personalities, and even though the cadre does not exist anymore, these individuals should be role models for young IAS/IPS officers.

The Tibet Factor in India-China Relations

Seventy Years Ago: Tibet Invaded
October 7, 2020 marks the 70th anniversary of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) crossing the Upper Yangtze and entering into the territory controlled by Lhasa.
While invading Eastern Tibet, Beijing asserted that it was ‘liberating’ the Land of Snows. Today, seven decades later, the Tibetans, particularly the first ‘liberated’ populations of Eastern Tibet, still disagree with this interpretation. Tragically, in the process, India lost a peaceful border shared with a Buddhist nation.
The Battle of Chamdo, the first and only encounter between the Tibetan and Chinese forces, is interesting to look at for several reasons.
Tibet, a Buddhist nation was not military and tactically ready to oppose the seasoned troops of Mao (and some of China’s brilliant commanders). From the start, The Land of Snows stood no chance, especially without outside support from India or the West.
Further, many in Tibet still believed that increasing the number of japa (recitation) or parikramas (circumambulations) around the monasteries and stupas of Kham, would be sufficient to make the Truth Prevail. As Robert Ford, the British radio operator posted in Chamdo, remarked ‘The gods are on our side’ was the mantra most oft-repeated in the town, “but it seemed to me that something more Churchilian was needed.”
For the Chinese, it was a well-prepared operation (a ‘police operation’ would have said Marshal Peng Dehuai) in 2 stages: the fall of Chamdo, the capital of Kham province during the Fall of 1950 and then the advance to Lhasa during the next season.
India was fooled into believing that Communist China wanted a ‘negotiated’ settlement with the Tibetans: it was never the case. Marshal Liu Bosheng in a message in August 1950 made it clear that he was going to ‘liberate’ Tibet.
Opposite the Chinese strategists was Ngabo Shape , the Tibetan Commissioner for the Kham province, a weak leader, ready to surrender; he was obviously not the military chef de guerre that Tibet needed at that point in time to coordinate the defence of the different border posts.
It has to be noticed that Mao Zedong entered the Korean campaign on the same day  as the PLA crossed the Yangtze and started its operations in Tibet. It shows the confidence the Communist leadership had in the local PLA commanders.
The PLA summary of the battle and the recommendations distributed by the PLA after the Battle of Chamdo tend to show that it was an excellent preparation for the Chinese troops for another battle 12 years later on the Himalayan slopes. Against India this time!

Emergence of a ‘Liberated’ World
Looking back into the fifteen-year period before the India-China War (1947-1962), one can see that the world witnessed earth-shaking changes: India became independent; China did its own revolution, resulting in the arrival of a new regime, more brutal in its approach, especially towards the periphery of the Middle Kingdom; most of the African and Asian nations were decolonized. However, at the same time, a de facto independent nation came under the yoke of Communist China; hardly two months after the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Xinjiang was annexed, opening the door to Western Tibet which would be occupied a few months later, thereby changing the status of India’s Northern frontiers.
An unprepared and peaceful Land of Snows became part of the Chinese ‘Motherland’ in a two-pronged strategic move, i.e. the military fall of Chamdo and Eastern Tibet in October 1950 and then in May 1951, a ‘diplomatic’ coup, forcing a 17-Point Agreement on a weak and disunited Tibetan nation. Mao was indeed a master strategist.
Tibet lost its independence and India’s serene northern frontier vanished. Even though at that time, India had some excellent strategic thinkers, the Government in Delhi decided not to use their competence; their conclusions and recommendations were not accepted by the then Prime Minister.
The tumultuous last six months of 1950 saw the emergence of two factions in India: one led by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and KM Panikkar, his ambassador in Beijing, both obsessed with an imaginary friendship with New China and fixated on the ‘larger implications for World Peace’ for any decision concerning Tibet; the other, which immediately saw the strategic implications for India, if Delhi let Tibet down, was led by Sardar Patel, the Deputy Prime Minster with Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, the Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations as his main adviser, but also comprised President Rajendra Prasad, C. Rajagopalachari, KM Munshi and others. They were fed with reports ‘from the ground’ by Harishwar Dayal, the Political Officer in Sikkim and Sumul Sinha, the Head of the Indian Mission in Lhasa, two sincere and far-sighted civil servants. At that time, India had a full-fledged Mission in Tibet as well as three Trade Agencies in Gyantse, Yatung and Gartok.
This tragic dichotomy between the officers on the ground with first hand information and the ‘visionaries’ in Delhi continued throughout these fifteen years.
Today China speaks of ‘poverty alleviation’ for the Roof of the World, but what has the Communist regime been doing since they entered Lhasa in September 1951, if the Tibetans have remained poor 70 years later?
The truth is that Mao was only interested in the strategic assets of Tibet; China gained not only a huge landmass, but the access to the ‘water tower of Asia’, large mineral resources and a strategic position dominating the subcontinent. The Tibetan masses were nowhere in China’s periscope.
At that time, the Indian government decided to ignore the Tibetan issue, probably due to a lack of vision and courage, despite the warnings of Sardar Patel and his colleagues. This move would have tremendous consequences; some that continue to be felt even 70 years later, for example, on the Northern borders of India, particularly in Eastern Ladakh.

The Tibetan appeal at the UN
On the same day that the Deputy Prime Minister Patel, wrote his prophetic letter to Nehru , a well-drafted appeal sent from Kalimpong  pointed to the fact that “the Tibetans were racially, culturally and geographically far apart from the Chinese.” It also made a parallel with the situation in the Korean peninsula: “The attention of the world was then riveted on Korea where aggression was being resisted by an international force.
Similar happenings in Tibet were taking place with the world covering its eyes: … [The problem is] largely the outcome of unthwarted Chinese ambitions to bring weaker nations on her periphery within her active domination,” said the Appeal, which continued: “As a people devoted to the tenets of Buddhism, Tibetans had long eschewed the art of warfare, practised peace and tolerance and for the defence of their country, relied on its geographical configuration and on non-involvement in the affairs of other nations.”
It added that the Chinese, in their natural urge for expansion, “have wholly misconstrued the significance of the ties of friendship and interdependence that existed between China and Tibet.”
Some twenty years ago, Claudia Johnston, an independent researcher in International Law at the University of Victoria, Canada, wrote a fascinating paper, Tibet: The International Mistake of the Century.
The outcome of her research was that the Tibetan Appeal was still a pending matter in the UN …waiting to be reopened: “The UN and individual Member States, have been conducting their decisions based on the false assumption that Tibet is not a ‘State’, but ‘an internal affair’ of China. UN official records show this to be a mistake.” Tibet was then a legal State.
As a result, “the issue of Tibetan Statehood remains unconsidered by the United Nations. United Nations mechanisms for ‘States’ to employ peaceful solutions to ‘Disputes’ have not been utilised.”
All this was done …at the request of India.
From the start, Nehru was pessimistic about the outcome of the UN appeal: “We doubt whether a discussion of Tibetan problem in General Assembly or in Security Council will yield any useful result,” wrote the Prime Minister. The friendship with China was already too important to be sacrificed for the fate a weak neighbour like Tibet.
The Prime Minister frankly admitted that though Beijing had repeatedly expressed itself in favour of Tibetan autonomy “but of course we do NOT know what their idea of autonomy is.”
He thought: “We do NOT think that legal argument will be helpful or that [General] Assembly should attempt more than appeal to two parties to come to a peaceful settlement. Condemnation of China will NOT help Tibet; and neither Security Council nor Assembly is in any position to render physical aid to Tibet.”
As a result China was not condemned and could complete its task of entering Lhasa without hindrance; in Sun Tzu’s jargon, ‘liberating Tibet without waging war’.
In the course of the discussions at the UN in New York, most of the representatives indicated that India was the nation most concerned and that they would follow India’s lead. In a note, Nehru sadly asserted: “I think it may be taken for granted that China will take possession, in a political sense at least, of the whole of Tibet.”  
He further admitted that for the Tibetan people the “autonomy can obviously not be anything like the autonomy, verging on independence, which Tibet has enjoyed during the last forty years or so.”
His final words were: “We cannot save Tibet, as we should have liked to do so, and our very attempts to save it might bring greater trouble to it. It would be unfair to Tibet for us to bring this trouble upon her without having the capacity to help her effectively.”
The strange argument was: if we do anything to help Tibet, it will upset the Chinese and the fate of Tibet would be worse.
The case was eventually ‘put in abeyance’ at India’s demand.
Let us remember that Sardar Patel was by then a dying man and nobody else could stand up to Nehru.
But today China stubbornly continues to occupy Indian territory in Ladakh; however if the Western Theatre Command generals manage to convince President Xi Jinping that India should be taught more lessons, there are plenty of old issues for India to reopen; the UN appeal is one of them.

The Panchsheel Agreement: a Turning Point
One of the most immoral actions of the Indian Government was to ignore the existence of the Tibetan Government during its dealing with the new masters of the Roof of the World, particularly during the talks for the 1954 Tibet Agreement. It was wrong of the government to be vociferous about the decolonization of Africa or Asia, while at the same time ignoring the occupation by force of Tibet, a gentle neighbor at its gates, which enjoyed what the Indian Prime Minister himself described as ‘verging on Independence’.
The “Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India”, remembered as the Panchsheel Agreement, was signed on April 29, 1954 in Beijing. At the end of 1953, negotiations started for an accord on Tibet, taking into account the new situation, i.e. China’s occupation of the plateau. The talks were to be settled in a couple of weeks; it would take four months to arrive at a settlement …but forgetting the border.
The Panchsheel Agreement resulted in the unhindered advance of the Communist ideology and Mao’s army on the Tibetan plateau. Having received the green light from Nehru, the Communists imposed a new way of life, less compassionate, less enlightened over the Roof of the World.
The Chinese officials in Tibet did not look favorably upon the Dalai Lama’s aspiration to radically change the Tibetan society while still maintaining its 2,000-year old tradition. This would have cast a shadow on the Communist Party.
It is however true that many senior Indian politicians and diplomats, educated in ‘modern’ ideas, thought the ‘old Lama hierarchy’ should go and Tibet become a ‘modern’ country; they believed that the Chinese invasion was a chance to make a clean sweep of the old superstitions, beliefs or rituals.

The Slow Take-over of the Plateau
Soon after the Tibet Agreement was signed, the Chinese leadership took a radical approach towards Tibet, though, for a couple of years, the main emphasis was the building of the infrastructure needed to ‘stabilize the revolution’ on the plateau.
This period was marked by a general deterioration of the situation in Central Tibet and the slow take-over of the institutions by the PLA and the representatives of the Communist Party’s Central Committee.
The Tibetans were at a loss, should they collaborate with the Communists or revolt against the Chinese occupation? Interestingly, it was the poorer sections of the society who started to rebel, while the high clergy and the aristocracy were not unhappy with the Chinese ‘largesse’ (which often included collaboration).
Over the years, the situation slowly changed with the Chinese getting bolder and establishing themselves by force, imposing their law on the local Tibetan officials as well as the Indian representatives. The pilgrims to Mt Kailash and the traders from the Himalayan region and Ladakh started to face harassment. It was only a beginning.
As the situation in Lhasa and elsewhere in Tibet continued to deteriorate, strengthening the Indian borders was imperative. For the purpose, an Indian Frontier Administrative Service was created and several ex-Army officers were recruited. This was one of the positive outcomes of the exacerbated tensions on the borders. These remarkable officers performed miracles on the frontiers. One wishes that the government would today recreate such a service.
By 1955, the construction of the Tibet-Sinkiang Highway cutting across Ladakh, had started and the roads heading towards the NEFA (now Arunachal Pradesh) and Sikkim had already been completed. The significance of these moves was ignored by Delhi; we are seeing the consequences today in Ladakh.

The Nehru-Zhou Talks in 1956
The visit of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama to India in 1956-57 should be seen in this perspective. The former was hesitant to return to Lhasa. He finally decided to return and give a chance to the Communists to ‘reform’ Tibet in a peaceful manner. It was not to be.
In 1956, during bilateral talks with his Indian counterpart , Zhou Enlai gave his rationale for invading Tibet ‘only’ in 1950: “The Ching [Manchu] Emperor appointed Governors to Tibet and troops were also stationed in Lhasa. The British wanted to go into Tibet under the pretext that Russia wanted to get into Sikang . Russia also made the same pretext, namely, that Britain was trying to get into Tibet, to get into Sikang. Exactly because of this rivalry and balance of power, Sikang and Tibet were never taken actually [by China].”
This is a strange argument; the truth was that the Tibetan nation was an independent country with all the attributes of a sovereign State (a government, a language, a script, a flag, a (weak) army, coins, stamps, etc); further, for centuries, the Land of Snow had close relations with India, first and foremost in the cultural and spiritual domains (Tibetan Buddhism originates from Nalanda, let us not forget), but also politically and economically with countless ‘silk’ roads across the Himalaya; in other words, there was a deep kinship.
Zhou continued to explain: “But there are many still who are not acquainted with these facts. Even the Pakistan Prime Minister recently  told me that he always thought Tibet to be independent. Even the Simla Conference admitted Chinese suzerainty over Tibet.”

Zhou did not know about the McMahon Line
The Chinese Premier then tried to justify China’s new claims in the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA), i.e. the McMahon Line: “People like me never knew about it [the Line] till recently. The then Chinese Government, namely, the warlords in Peking and the KMT naturally knew about it. Perhaps U Nu might have told Your Excellency [Nehru] that we studied this question and although this Line was never recognised by us, still apparently there was a secret pact between Britain and Tibet and it was announced at the time of the Simla Conference. And now that it is an accomplished fact, we should accept it. But we have not consulted Tibet so far.”
The clever Chinese statesman then mentioned the Panchsheel Agreement: “In the last agreement which we signed about Tibet , the Tibetans wanted us to reject this Line; but we told them that the question should be temporarily put aside. I believe immediately after India's independence, the Tibetan Government had also written to the Government of India about this matter. But now we think that we should try to persuade and convince Tibetans to accept it. This question also is connected with Sino-Burmese border and the question will be decided after Dalai Lama's return to Lhasa. So, although the question is still undecided and it is unfair to us, still we feel that there is no better way than to recognise this Line.”
The Indian Prime minister gave a nehruvian answer, with the consequences that India experiences on the border today: “The border is a high mountain border and sparsely populated. Apart from the major question, there are also small questions about two miles here and two miles there. But if we agree on some principle, namely, the principle of previous normal practice or the principle of watershed, we can also settle these other small points. Of course, this has nothing to do with the McMahon Line.”
His Chinese counterpart answered: “Yes, the question can be solved and we think it should be settled early.” That was in 1956.
Nehru then ‘excused’ some Indian mayors who wanted ‘to make out Tibet as an independent country’, he said: “Reference by a Mayor has no significance. He does not know much politically and probably very little about China and Tibet. They would generally only know about the great religious significance of Tibet to Indians and that is all that they must be stressing.” The Prime Minister concluded: “Our policy has been to deal with the Chinese Government about Tibet …We are naturally interested in what happens in Tibetans one of our near neighbours but we don't want to interfere. Our main interest is from the point of view of the pilgrims not only Buddhist pilgrims but Hindu pilgrims too for whom Kailash and Manasarovar are sacred places and abodes of God.”
The Indian Prime Minister’s last words were: “Your Excellency [Zhou Enlai] has said that Tibet is backward and cut off. But it cannot remain long that way. They are a deeply religious people and they are naturally afraid that their religion and customs would be upset. I myself personally think that changes are inevitable in Tibet, but I would like Tibetans to feel that they themselves have brought about the changes. As Your Excellency has said, Tibet is a part of China but with full autonomous powers. Then I don't understand why there should be any trouble in Tibet at all.”
Severe troubles had already started in Eastern Tibet.

The Events of March 1959: the Background
On June 1, 1959, Maj SL Chibber sent his report for the months of March, April and May 1959  to the Political Officer in Gangtok and the Ministry of External Affairs in Delhi; he reported about the crucial months in the life of the Tibetan nation which witnessed the uprising of the Tibetan population in Lhasa and the departure of Tibet’s temporal and spiritual leader in exile. This is a unique and remarkable document as it is the only eye-account by a ‘foreigner’.
Before going into the details of those historic months, Maj Chibber gave the background of the events of March 1959 in the Tibetan capital: “The nationalist movement in Tibet, the climax of which was reached on 10th March, 1959, had started sometime in 1955 in Kham, Eastern Tibet and then spread to west in Amdo region and north-east in Golok areas. In 1955 and 1957, it took shape of an open revolt against the Chinese regime in these areas. These people though did not succeed but they were a constant headache to the Chinese who had to resort to aerial bombing and deploy large number of forces to subjugate the local inhabitants.”
Chibber described the happenings in Kham: “During [the] operations, number of monasteries was destroyed and the local people suffered heavy losses. Due to absence of proper means of communication and security measured adopted by Chinese to suppress the information the correct news of happenings in these areas-seldom reached out-side world. However, whatever little news trickled through traders and travelers contained horrible accounts of atrocities committed by the Chinese against the people of these areas, especially against the lamaseries. This naturally had an effect on the minds of Tibetans elsewhere and a stage had reached that some among these Tibetans who had thrown their lot with the Chinese previously, many became apprehensive and doubted Chinese promises of respect for religion and internal autonomy.”
The Consul said that the Khampas finding, it difficult to face frontal attacks from the Chinese troops resorted to guerilla tactics and “moved towards the south where the Chinese garrisons were few and far between and the difficult terrain suited to hit and run type of war.”
He remarked that at the beginning the Chinese did not take any action against these Khampa, “except on one or two occasions but pressed the Tibetan Government to suppress them.”
Under pressure from the Chinese authorities, the Tibetan Government tried to reach a compromise by sending some Peace Missions of monks and lay officials to Kham and Lhoka areas, but this did not help, according to the Consul “most Tibetan Government officials did not like the presence of Chinese in Tibet.”
The rejection of the Chinese occupation by the Tibetan populations was the turning point in the history of Modern Tibet.

The Events of March 1959
The first-hand account of Maj Chibber is important, because the Chinese propaganda would like us to believe that during these dramatic weeks of March 1959, they ‘emancipated’ the serfs. But in fact, the opposite happened; recounting the events that he witnessed in Lhasa, Chibber observed: “In the history of movement for free Tibet the month of March, 1959, will be most historic as during this month Tibetans high and low, in Lhasa, capital of Tibet, openly challenged the Chinese rule in Tibet. They set up an organisation called ‘Pho Mimang Ranchen Chi Chog’, meaning, ‘Tibetan Peoples Independent Organisation’; renounced the Sino-Tibetan Agreement of 1951; staged demonstrations to give vent to their anti-Chinese feelings and demanded withdrawal of the Chinese from Tibet.”
The Indian Consul General first reported about the Might of Chinese People’s Liberation Army, “who on 20th March, 1959, started an all out offensive against the ill-organised, ill-equipped, untrained-Tibetans with artillery, mortars, machine guns and all types of automatic weapons.”
The revolt was short lived: “His Holiness the Dalai Lama, smelling danger, left Lhasa secretly on the night of the 17th March, 1959, with important members of his personal staff, three Cabinet Ministers and members of his family for Lhoka area (south of Lhasa), where at that time Khampas had full sway and from where it was easier for him to escape to India if need arose. Many other important and un-important-Tibetans followed him when the actual trouble started on the night of 19th March, 1959,” noted Chibber.
On March 28, 1959, the State Council dissolved the ‘local’ Tibet Government; the Kashag was no more and its functions and powers were transferred to the Preparatory Committee for the Tibetan Autonomous Region.
A Chinese communiqué announced that the Panchen Lama would be Acting Chairman, “for the period the Dalai Lama was held in duress .”
A Military Control Commission was established in Lhasa on March 23, 1959. Chibber also remarked that the Chinese Transport Department’s passenger service between Yatung, Shigatse, Gyantse and Lhasa had been stopped several months earlier. A dusk to dawn curfew was promulgated, while meetings to criticize the former Tibetan Government, the ‘imperialists’ and the Indian ‘expansionists’ were organized to denounce their interference in the internal affairs of Tibet.
Military Control Commissions were also installed in other areas in Tibet. Soon after the events of March, the Preparatory Committee held two meetings, one under the Chairmanship of the Panchen Lama and the other under General Zhang Guohua as the Panchen Lama had gone to Beijing to attend the Second National People’s Congress Session.
The Consul General commented: “the booms of Chinese guns and fire from their weapons, which destroyed number of buildings including religious places, large scale killing of Tibetans followed by mass arrests, departure of Dalai Lama and high-ranking Tibetan officials from Lhasa completely shattered the morale of Tibetans in general and they were left with no other alternative but to bow before the Chinese.”
Today, the Tibetans in exile still celebrate March 10 as their Uprising Day. Will the Day be commemorated one day in Lhasa by the Tibetans?
It is impossible to answer.
In March 1959, India could only witness the events, without taking an active part.
A couple of weeks later, the Dalai Lama took refuge in India, creating a new narrative in the India-China relations.

What can be done to untie the past knots?
Delhi should officially start a dialogue with the Tibetans in exile. One possibility is to immediately set-up a mechanism with the Dalai Lama’s representative in Delhi , to discuss the issues of mutual interests. It should not be done in a hushed-up way.
Some general principles should dictate the new policy.
First, India should look after her own interests and the security of the people living on the borders; it seems obvious, but it has not always been the case.
Another principle is that India’s policies or actions should not be dictated by what others will think or say, particularly how China will react to a particular decision. This tendency has lasted too long with no tangible gain for the country; for example, the 2018 notice circulated to all ministries/departments ordering that no Indian officials should meet the Dalai Lama, had serious counter-productive effects.
It is unfortunate but it is a fact that India faces a country which still believes that power comes from the barrel of a gun; without emulating China, India needs to quietly and forcefully look after her own interests and be straightforward about it; a closer kinship between Delhi and Dharamsala is in the country’s interests.
Whatever over-all policy is adopted by the Government at a later stage, one element is critical: coordination. In view of the individualistic tendencies of the Indian bureaucracy, this is crucial in order to achieve the targeted aim of the policy between the different shakeholders (Ministries of External Affairs, Defence, Home Affairs, Education, Culture, intelligence agencies, etc).
Without proper coordination, it will be just one more futile new policy.
The creation of a Department, coordinating the different aspects of the Tibet policy would be the first step to strengthen the relations with Tibet; India should use the goodwill of the Tibetans towards India; the rest will follow. But undoing the knots of the past will take time.
It is however necessary if India wants to play a role of leader in the world affairs and have peace and prosperity on her frontiers.

India’s big blunders and China changing the posts

My article India’s big blunders and China changing the posts appeared in The Daily Guardian

Here is the link...

The border dispute with China since May 2020 seems to be a repeat of the episode which took place in the 1950s. The then Indian leadership made a mistake by keeping it away from the public and the media. What remains to be seen now is whether Delhi has learnt its lesson and will do better this time.

One of the greatest tragedies of post-Independence India is having let China occupy the Aksai Chin plateau and with barely any protest. The nation still suffers the consequences of this blunder today in Ladakh.

The fact that China occupied this part of north Ladakh and built a road on Indian territory was known to the Indian leadership as early as 1952, when the first surveys were conducted by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The Chinese started to build the road sometime in 1954, but the issue only came up for discussion between Jawaharlal Nehru and Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier, in September 1959, more than two years after the road was inaugurated.

A year earlier, on 18 October 1958, Foreign Secretary Subimal Dutt had sent a feeble protest to Beijing: “It had come to the Government of India’s [GoI] notice that a road had been constructed by the PRC [People’s Republic of China] across the eastern part of the Ladakh region of the J&K State, which is part of India.” The note continued: “It is a matter of surprise and regret that the Chinese Govt should have constructed a road through indisputably Indian territory without first obtaining the permission of the GoI and without even informing the Government of India.” The note sounded more as an encouragement to go ahead than anything else.

In September 1959, the Prime Minister, who knew that the Chinese had built the road, explained India’s rationale to his Chinese counterpart: “We did not release to the public the information which we had about the various border intrusions into our territory by Chinese personnel since 1954, the construction of a road across Indian territory in Ladakh, and the arrest of our personnel in the Aksai Chin area in 1958 and their detention. We did not give publicity to this in the hope that peaceful solutions of the disputes could be found by agreement by the two countries without public excitement on both sides.”

 Delhi did not want ‘to make things worse’, probably fearing a violent reaction from Beijing, but what can be worse than the 1,00,000 troops facing each other now, in the harsh winter of Ladakh. One can’t rewrite history but we can learn from it: Had the Indian public and media known about the road in 1953-54, India might not have been facing China in Ladakh today!

However, is the mindset of today’s babus different from what it was in the 1950s and 1960s? Undoubtedly, it is more difficult to keep such secrets today, but the babus’ modus operandi and motto remain the same: Keep everything secret. They probably feel that they derive their power from the fact that they control the information, forgetting that silence and secrecy have often, as in the case of the Aksai Chin, endangered the interests of the nation.

I am particularly thinking of the fact that since the beginning of the India-China Special Representatives’ process in 2003, the public has never been informed that the Line of Actual Control (LAC) was a myth and that there were actually two Lines of Perception, and that anything could happen in between. Why was the Indian public not informed that the Chinese had refused to provide maps of their ‘perceptions’?

Beijing has no scruples in changing the posts, whenever it is convenient. The correspondence between Nehru and Zhou Enlai for the period between September and December 1959 brings some light on the treacherous intentions of the Chinese in Ladakh today. On 8 September 1959, Zhou Enlai wrote to his Indian counterpart: “I find from your letter that there is a fundamental difference between the positions of our two Governments on the Sino-Indian boundary question.” Two weeks later, Nehru replied that he was ‘greatly surprised and distressed’ to be told that there was a dispute on the border: “[in January 1959], I had no idea that the People›s Republic of China would lay claim to about 40,000 square miles of what in our view has been indisputably Indian territory.”

It is true that no Chinese had ever set foot in the area in the early 1950s. It is unfortunate that today, Beijing continues to change, despite speeches of the New Helmsman, Xi Jinping, about a community of “shared future for mankind”.

In September 1959, Zhou explained: “The Punjab Western Himalaya and Adjoining Parts of Tibet compiled by British John Walker by order of the Court of Directors of East India Company (published in 1854) corresponded fairly close to the Chinese maps.” This line, though not acceptable by India, was mid-way between the present Chinese claims and India’s traditional boundary, coinciding with the Kunlun watershed.

On 21 October 1959 a serious incident took place within Indian territory, south of the Kongka Pass and 10 CRPF personnel were killed—that was a turning point.

With the situation fast deteriorating on the border, on 7 November, Zhou offered that each party should withdraw 20 km from where they were: “to ensure the tranquillity of the border regions and to create a favourable atmosphere for a friendly settlement of the boundary question.” Less than two weeks later, Nehru replied: “Unfortunately, we do not yet know with any precision where the frontier line lies according to the claims of the Chinese Government. This is a matter for surmise based on small scale maps published in China. These maps themselves have not always been consistent, and different lines are sometimes indicated in them.” China would refuse to exchange maps and kept publishing maps with different alignments, though the lines kept moving more and more inside India’s territory.

On 16 November, the Prime Minister suggested the Indian troops withdraw “all personnel to the west of the line which the Chinese Government has shown as the international boundary in their 1956 maps which, so far as we are aware are their latest maps.” At the same time the Chinese troops should return north of the Aksai Chin. This was obviously not acceptable for Beijing who wanted to continue using the newly-built road. Zhou replied the next day: “The line up to which each side exercises actual control in this sector is very clear… As a matter of fact, the Chinese map published in 1956, to which Your Excellency referred, correctly shows the traditional boundary between the two countries in this sector;” clearly confirming that China stood by the 1956 Line, faraway from Beijing’s claims in the area today. A few weeks later, China advanced further its line, engulfing large parts of India’s territory.

The situation since May 2020 seems to be a repeat of the Chinese advances in 1959. The question which remains here is: Has India learnt its lesson? Let us hope that it has.

Constantly Changing Posts

This map appeared in a booklet entitled "Chinese Aggression in Maps", published in 1963 by the Publication Division of the Government of India. 

It shows China's moving claims in the Western Sector of the Sino-India boundary (formerly, the Eastern Turkestan-India frontier).
A quick look at the correspondence between Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Premier Zhou Enlai of China, as reprinted in the “Notes, Memoranda and letters Exchanged and Agreements signed between The Governments of India and China” (also known as 'White Papers') for the period between September to December 1959 is shockingly telling about today’s Chinese intentions in Ladakh.
The White Papers, published by Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, show that the Chinese were already masters at changing the posts ...and they continue despite the 'humanitarian' speeches of the New Helmsman, Xi Jinping.

September 8, 1959
The Chinese Premier wrote to the Prime Minister of India and referred to a letter from Nehru dated March 22, 1959.

Zhou said: “I find from your letter that there is a fundamental difference between the positions of our two Governments on the Sino-Indian boundary question. This has made me somewhat surprised and also made it necessary for me to take a longer period of time to consider how to reply to your letter. The Sino-Indian boundary question is a complicated question left over by history.”
It was the first time that ‘differences’ were admitted. 

Let us remember that between March and September 1959, tens of thousands of Tibetans had followed the Dalai Lama in exile in India. This partly explains China's new belligerence.

Zhou said: “I would like now to further explain the position of the Chinese Government in connection with the questions raised in Your Excellency's letter and in conjunction with the recent situation along the Sino-Indian border."
He started by the boundary separating China's Sinkiang [Xinjiang] and Tibet regions from Ladakh:

"Regarding the 1842 Peace Treaty between Ladakh and Tibet, Zhou argued that the Chinese Central Government did not send anybody to participate in the negotiations nor did it later ratify the treaty,  ...Moreover, this treaty only mentioned in general terms that Ladakh and Tibet would each abide by its borders, and did not make any specific provisions or explanations regarding the location of this section of the boundary.”

The Premier admitted: 

Map mentioned by Zhou Enlai (1854), though it did not represent the post-independence
Indian position, was 'fairly close' to the Chinese map, according to Zhou

 

“The marking of this section of the boundary on the map of "Punjab Western Himalaya and Adjoining Parts of Tibet" compiled by British John Walker by order of the Court of Directors of East India Company (which was attached to the British Major Alexander Cunningham's book ‘Ladakh’ published in 1854) corresponded fairly close to the Chinese maps,” but Zhou complained that later British and Indian maps “included large tracts of Chinese territory into Ladakh [Aksai Chin]. This was without any legal grounds, nor in conformity with the actual situation of administration by each side all the time.”

Details of the map above (around Pangong tso)

The remarks of the Chinese Premier refers to the Aksai Chin; but according to him, the dispute had begun with “the outbreak of the rebellion in Tibet, the border situation has become increasingly tense owing to reasons for which the Chinese side cannot be held responsible. Immediately after the fleeting of a large number of Tibetan rebels into India, Indian troops started pressing forward steadily across the eastern section of the Sino-Indian boundary.”
It was easy to put it on the Tibetans.
In conclusion, Zhou wrote: “I hope that Your Excellency and the Indian Government will, in accordance with the Chinese Government's request, immediately adopt measures to withdraw the trespassing Indian troops and administrative personnel and restore the long existing state of the boundary between the two countries.”
India had to stop trespassing into Indian territory.

September 26, 1959
Nehru replied on September 26, he noted: “I was greatly surprised and distressed to read it. You and I discussed the India-China border, and particularly the eastern sector, in 1954 in Peking and in 1956-57 in India.”
After referring to the McMahon Line, the Indian Prime Minister said: “when I received your letter of January 23, 1959, I had no idea that the People's Republic of China would lay claim to about 40,000 square miles of what in our view has been indisputably Indian territory for decades and in some sectors for over a century.”
It is rather surprising as Nehru knew that the Chinese had built a road across the Aksai Chin.

However, the Prime Minister gave his own rationale, Delhi had just been nice with China: 

“We did not release to the public the information which we had about the various border intrusions into our territory by Chinese personnel since 1954, the construction of a road across Indian territory in Ladakh, and the arrest of our personnel in the Aksai Chin area in 1958 and their detention. We did not give publicity to this in the hope that peaceful solutions of the disputes could be found by agreement by the two countries without public excitement on both sides.”

It is not necessary here to go into the other sectors of the boundaries touched upon by Nehru.
A Note on The Border Disputes was attached to the Prime Minister’s letter in which he complained about an Indian patrol being arrested: “Aksai Chin is a part of Ladakh. The Chinese Government have now admitted that in 1956 they built a highway from Tibet to Sinkiang, running for about a hundred miles through this territory. In September 1957, it was announced that this road had been completed. The next year Indian personnel [an army party under Lt Iyengar from the Madras Sappers] carrying out routine patrol duties were arrested near Haji Langar in north-east Aksai Chin, taken to Suget Karol and detained for five weeks. The leader of the Indian patrol was placed in solitary confinement, and all documents were seized.”

November 7, 1959
Zhou replied to Nehru’s letter of September 26, 1959; though in a meantime (on October 21)  a serious incident had taken place  within Indian territory, south of the Kongka Pass and 10 CRPF personnel had been killed.
In this communication, Zhou offered that each party should withdraw 20 kms from where they were: “to maintain effectively the status quo of the border between the two countries, to ensure the tranquility of the border regions and to create a favourable atmosphere for a friendly settlement of the boundary question.”
It was suggested that the armed forces of China and India “undertake to refrain from again sending their armed personnel to be stationed in and patrol the zones from which they have evacuated their armed forces.”
The innocuous proposal came back recently in the news, when Beijing planted a story in an Indian newspaper, mentioning that China had offered the fixation of a LAC in this very letter. There is of course no map attached to this proposal.

November 16, 1959
Nine days later, Nehru replied, mentioning that Delhi had given a note to the Chinese Ambassador in Delhi on November 4, with full details of the international boundary in Ladakh and the Konka-la incident.
Nehru agreed “that the two Governments should come to an agreement without delay, which would eliminate risks of border clashes.”
The Prime Minister went on: “you have suggested that the armed forces of China and India should withdraw twenty kilometers from the lines which they occupy at present. This, in your view, would effectively prevent any border clashes.”
Nehru, after mentioning the Central and the Eastern Sectors, pointed out: “Unfortunately, we do not yet know with any precision where the frontier line lies according to the claims of the Chinese Government. This is a matter for surmise based on small scale maps published in China. These maps themselves have not always been consistent, and different lines are sometimes indicated in them. I regret I cannot accept the contention that you have been in occupation of the area up to the frontier line shown in your maps. On the contrary, the Government of India have exercised jurisdiction up to the frontier line specified by them.”
Therefore, in the Ladakh area, both Governments should agree to the following interim measure: 

Map of 1956 showing the Chinese claims in Ladakh
The Line was reported on the GOI  map above

“The Government of India should withdraw all personnel to the west of the line which the Chinese Government have shown as the international boundary in their 1956 maps which, so far as we are aware are their latest maps.” At the same time the Chinese troops should withdraw their personnel to the east of the international boundary which has been described by the Government of India.”

Practically, it meant that the Indian troops could patrolled up to the Kunlun range, north of the Aksai Chin; Nehru added: “The area is almost entirely uninhabited. It is thus not necessary to maintain administrative personnel in this area bounded by the two lines on the east and the west.”
This was obviously not acceptable for Beijing who wanted to continue using the Aksai Chin road.

December 17, 1959
The next day Zhou replied. One could ask, why such a hurry?
China was probably nervous about India patrolling till the Johnston Line.
Zhou said that he was anxious to know if the proposal to stop patrolling in some areas only was: “to apply to the entire Sino-Indian border." he affirmed that "no different measure should be adopted in the sector of the border between China and India's Ladakh.”
Now comes the interesting part. After saying that was no reason to treat this sector of the border as a special case: “The line up to which each side exercises actual control in this sector is very clear, just as it is in the other sectors of the Sino-Indian border. As a matter of fact, the Chinese map published in 1956, to which Your Excellency referred, correctly shows the traditional boundary between the two countries in this sector, except for the Parigas area [Chinese name for Demchok] by the Shangatsangpu [Indus] River, India has not occupied any Chinese territory east of this section of the traditional boundary.” See map above by the brown arrows.

The letter continued to argue about the different sectors of the border.

December 21, 1959
Four days later, Nehru replied to say that he “deeply regret that you have not accepted the very reasonable proposals contained in my letter of 16th November.”
The Prime Minister affirmed: “I am always ready to meet and discuss with your Excellency the outstanding differences between our countries and explore the avenues of settlement. How can we, Mr. Prime Minister, reach an agreement on principles when there is such complete disagreement about the facts?”

December 26, 1959
A Note was given by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Indian Embassy. 

For the first time, Beijing’s position was clarified in some details, though without maps.
Beijing reiterated that “China and India are two peace-loving, big countries with a long history of mutual friendship and with many great common tasks both at present and' in the future. Friendship between China and India is in the interests not only of the two peoples, but also of world peace, particularly of peace in Asia.”
It answered into some details a set of questions, again without provided any map.

•    Has The Sino-Indian Boundary Been Formally Delimited?
•    Where Is The Traditional Customary Sino-Indian Boundary Line?
•    What is the Proper Way To Settle The Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute?

The Chinese note pointed out: “The Indian Government has also referred to the talks between the two Prime Ministers in Peking in October 1954, expressing the view that Premier Chou En-lai's remarks about Chinese maps implied that the Chinese Government would revise its maps in accordance with Indian maps, that is to say, the Chinese Government had accepted the Indian Government's claim regarding the boundary.”
The Note argued that Zhou had never said that, ditto for the McMahon Line.
To conclude, the note answered the question: 

“Whether China wants to engage in aggression and expansion?” 

The Noted said: “Centering around the Sino-Indian boundary question, there has recently appeared in India a great deal of anti-Chinese pronouncements, which in cold war language slander China as ‘imperialism’, ‘expanding into India’ and ‘committing aggression’.' The Chinese people cannot but feel deep regret at such malicious attacks against China, which simply fly in the face of facts. …But at no time in future will China become a threat to its neighbouring countries, just as China does not believe that India, after it has grown strong as China fervently hopes, would become a threat to China; to say that the growth of China's population and industry would constitute a threat to its neighbours is utterly incomprehensible to the Chinese people.”
It strongly asserted: “So far as the question of boundary is concerned, China absolutely does not want one inch of another country's territory. There are undelimited boundaries between China and many of its neighbouring countries, but China has never taken, and will never take, advantage of this situation to make any changes in the actually existing state of affairs on the borders by unilateral action.”
A few weeks later, a map of Chinese claims will finally be published by Beijing. It would engulf large parts of India’s territory.
The question which remains: has China changed?

Outrageously changing the post once again (1960)