The Chinese Village in India and the Pure Crystal Mountain Pilgrimage

New Village inside India's Territory

It has been reported by NDTV that China has constructed a new village consisting of about 101 homes, inside Arunachal Pradesh.
The TV channel acquired satellite imagery dated November 1, 2020 and the images “were analyzed by several experts approached by NDTV, who confirmed that the construction, approximately 4.5 kms within Indian territory of the de facto border.”
It is of huge concern to India, added the channel: “Though this area is Indian territory, according to official government maps, it has been in effective Chinese control since 1959. However, earlier only a Chinese military post existed, but this time a full-fledged village that can house thousands has been built. The village, located on the banks of the River Tsari Chu, lies in the Upper Subansiri district, an area which has been long disputed by India and China and has been marked by armed conflict.”

NDTV quoted me; here is the link to the article.

New Village near Longju

Interestingly, the village is located near Longju, a highly symbolic place, where the first clash between India and China took place on August 25, 1959 (5 months after the arrival of the Dalai Lama in India).
Here is India's complaint:

Note given to the Foreign Office of China by the Indian Ambassador, 28 August 1959

The Government of India have recently brought to the notice of the Chinese Government a number of instances in which Chinese troops have violated the international frontier and trespassed into Indian territory.
On the 11th August the Chinese Government were informed of a violation of the border at Khinzemane [Tawang sector] and on 13th August detailed information was provided about Chinese intrusion in the Spanggur region [Ladakh sector]. No replies have been received so far to these notes.
Another serious instance of violation of the Indian border and unlawful trespass into Indian territory by Chinese forces has just been brought to the notice of the Government of India. On the 25th August a strong Chinese detachment crossed into Indian territory south of Migyitun on the NEFA border and fired without notice on an Indian forward picket. They arrested the entire picket which was twelve strong but eight Indian personnel somehow managed to escape. Thereafter the Chinese detachment outflanked the Indian outpost at Longju and opened fire on it from a distance of about 800 yards.Their object clearly was to overpower our outpost which was well within our territory about two miles south of the international border. There could be no doubt about the international frontier in this area and this is a case of deliberate aggression on Indian territory. The Government of India take very serious notice of this latest incident which as we have said above, is one of a number [during] recent weeks.

My old 2016 post

The Tibetan calendar is based on a sixty-year cycle using a combination of the twelve animal signs (Mouse, Ox, Tiger, Rabbit, Dragon, Snake, Horse, Sheep, Monkey, Bird, Dog and Pig) with the five elements (Wood, Fire, Earth, Metal, Water).
We have just entered into the Monkey-Fire Year.
Monkey and Fire have often produced special years.
Take the last Monkey-Fire Year was 1956.
The Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama honoured India with their visit on the occasion of the 2500th anniversary of the birthday of the Buddha in that year.
But Year 1956 witnessed another significant event: the last Tsari Pilgrimage.
In the Tibetan psyche, Tsari has always been synonymous of ‘sacred place’. With the Mount Kailash and the Amye Machen in eastern Tibet, the pilgrimage around the Dakpa Sheri, the ‘Pure Crystal Mountain’ has, since centuries, been one of the holiest of the Roof of the World. 

The ‘Pure Crystal Mountain’ lies at 5,735 meters above the sea in the Tsari district of southern Tibet.
Toni Huber, one of the foremost scholars on the subject, wrote a great deal about the site of the pilgrimage, located between Tsari and the Upper Subansiri district of Arunachal Pradesh: “The large-scale, 12-yearly circumambulation of Tibetan Buddhist pilgrims around the mountain known as the Rongkor Chenmo, had the character of a state ritual for the Ganden Phodrang [Tibetan Government]. Pilgrims in this huge procession crossed the McMahon Line below the frontier village of Migyitün in Tsari district,” wrote Huber.
After crossing the McMahon line, the procession would proceed southwards along the Tsari Chu (‘river’) and then suddenly turned westwards to follow the Subansiri, to finally cross back into Tibet to reach the first frontier village in Chame county.
The southern leg of the Rongkor procession crosses the tribal areas of Upper Subansiri. This was the territory of the Mara clan of the Tagin tribe who lives downstream the Tsari Chu valley and around its confluence with the Subansiri at Gelensiniak.

According to Huber, there was an elaborate system of ‘compensations’ or ‘taxes’ depending from which side one experienced the holy pilgrimage.
Payments in kind were regularly made to both the Mara and Na tribes by the Tibetan Government to allow the passage of tens of thousands of pilgrims via the tribal areas. The ‘assistance’ to the local population was compulsory for the sacred journey to proceed smoothly, south of the McMahon Line.
During the 1914 Simla Conference between Tibet and British India, Capt Frederick Bailey, an intelligence officer who had mapped the area with his colleague Capt Henry Morshead, informed Sir Henry McMahon about the sensitivity of the issue and it is probably on their recommendation that a condition was inserted in the border agreement to reassure the Tibetans and persuade them to agree to the Red Line.
The condition for the Tibetan acceptance was that the Government of India would allow the smooth continuation of the Tsari pilgrimage on the Indian side of the Tibet-India border.
Bailey and Morshead had visited the place in 1913 during their journey ‘beyond the snowline’. The young captain later recalled: “The great pilgrimage took place every twelve years, in the Monkey Year. 100,000 [perhaps less] pilgrims usually made the pilgrimage, many of them coming from Pome [in Kongpo province]. The Pobas [Tibetans] sent a hundred soldiers; fifty were sent from Trasum in Kongpo and thirty from the frontier village of Tron on the Chayul river. These were to protect the pilgrims from attack by the tribals, through whose territory the pilgrims had to travel when making the Great Pilgrimage.”
The pilgrims used to embark on their circumambulation from Migyitün which was the acknowledged border-post; the McMahon Line, drawn a few months later only reiterated this fact. Then, there was a several-day journey into Indian territory before returning to Tibet.
There is a clear racial distinction between the Tibetans and the Indian tribes, known as Lopas by the Tibetans; as Bailey put it: “The Lopas were not allowed to travel up the Tsari valley beyond the frontier village of Migyitün because the Tibetans feared they would damage their shrines. They were induced to give the pilgrims unmolested [sic] passage through their own country with the Tibetan government lavishing on them presents of woolen cloth, tsampa (barley flour) and swords.”
A few months later, the findings of Bailey and Morshead would be used by Sir Henry during the Simla Conference to draw the famous line.
When they scouted this most inaccessible area in 1913, the two Britishers probably heard about the clash which occurred during the previous Rongkor, in 1906, between some border tribes and the Tibetans. Indian tribals were enticed to abandon their traditional trade with the village of Tron located not far from the Cristal Mountain, in Chayul Dzong. Highly disturbed by this loss of trading revenues, the villagers of Tron killed more than a hundred tribals in a cold-blooded revenge. The Tibetan government had to send five hundred troops to punish the tribal attackers, thereafter the Tibet-tribal relations would never be the same.
To come back to the pilgrimage, Alex McKay, in a review of Huber’s work explained: “In terms of logistics, the event resembled a military exercise. Around 20,000 pilgrims from all parts of the Tibetan cultural world took part in this circuit with direct support from the central Government, whose agents negotiated safe passage from the various tribal groups through whose territory the pilgrims passed.”
In some ways, it was a clash of civilization. The tribes of the NEFA did not belong to the Tibetan world, but it was for them an occasion to interact and eventually extract their dues for the passage of the pilgrims on their territory.
With the recurrence of these clashes, the Tibetan government in Lhasa decided to take control the entire religious exercise. In 1920, Tibet’s strong man, Tsarong was sent to Tsari to overlook the preparations for that year’s Rongkor. The religious pilgrimage thus became a State affair, with all the implications for the future relations between India and Tibet …and today China.
The last Rongkor was performed in 1956; the Chinese had then begun occupying most of the strategic axis in Tibet and had reached north of the Indian border, i.e. the McMahon Line.
By that time, the Tibetans were also aware that the Government of India meant business, especially after Major Bob Khathing took over the Tawang area in February 1951. Elsewhere in NEFA, the Indian State was also fast pushing its administration towards the Red Line.
The 1956 Rongkor passed off peacefully with only a few noticeable incidents; according to Huber: “the Lhasa government had given a satisfactory tribute payment, made them all swear the oath successfully, and performed the appropriate rituals,” he adds: “However, it is almost certainly the fact that a vigorous decade of Indian administrative contacts had already either broken the spirit of the upper Subansiri tribes or made conditions too inconclusive for them to attempt any aggravation of their northern neighbors and risk a political incident during this increasingly critical period of Tibetan, Indian, and Chinese relations.”
For the first time during the 1956 Rongkor procession, a foreign presence was seen; the Chinese PLA camped in the Mandala Plain of Tsari from where the Pilgrimage assembles; the Chinese however kept their participation rather discreet, merely providing medicines for the pilgrims.
Huber however saw their presence differently: “These apparently innocent medical teams are now seen by Tibetans as an important reconnaissance leading up to the Chinese occupation and border claims of 1959, a view not without substance.”
Only three years after the last Pilgrimage, hostilities started on what was now the Sino-Indian border. New actors had occupied the border areas: it was no longer the Tibetans vs. the local tribals of the Upper Subansiri, but the Indian State vs the Chinese State.
The fact remains that till August 1959, the border was not really disputed in this area; it corresponded to the customary border. This however did not prevent the first serious clash between India and China.
It occurred in a small village called Longju, a few hundred meters south of Migyitün, the first Tibetan village north of the McMahon Line. This clash took place a few months after the escape of the Dalai Lama to India following the aborted Tibetan uprising in Lhasa. After India granted asylum to the Tibetan leader, the relations between Beijing and Delhi became tenser by the day. The Longju incident led to an uproar in the Indian parliament and for the first time, Nehru was questioned about his frontier policy. Ever since, the Longju area has become a bone of contention between India and China.
One should remember that traditionally the Himalayan range was never an ‘impenetrable’ barrier; on the contrary, it was a realm of exchange between people who were socially, ethnically and culturally different. Due to the geography, the contacts between the Tibetans and the tribals had not always been smooth, but the Rongkor pilgrimage institutionalized regular and business-like contacts.
With the invasion of Tibet by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, the situation changed dramatically. Though previously, every 12 years the Upper Subansiri area was a point of contact between the Tibetan world and the subcontinent, it is no longer the case.
Sixty years after the last Rongkor, the area remains one of the most impenetrable and inaccessible parts of the entire Himalaya.
Will we have to wait another Fire-Monkey Year, i.e. 60 years, to see this stunningly luxuriant area become again a bridge between two words?
Today, no solution is in view to solve the border dispute between China and India. The reopening of the Rongkor pilgrimage could be a great Confidence Building Measure between India, China …and the Tibetans.
Unfortunately, Arunachal is today busy with politics, with crores of rupees flying above the Himalayan ranges, spoiling the democratic process.
Who thinks of reviving the Great Pilgrimage?
In the meantime, China still claims the entire Arunachal as hers!

(Here are some of the rare pictures of Tsari and its surroundings found on the Internet)

Tsari today

India’s big blunders and China changing the posts

My article India’s big blunders and China changing the posts appeared in The Daily Guardian

Here is the link...

The border dispute with China since May 2020 seems to be a repeat of the episode which took place in the 1950s. The then Indian leadership made a mistake by keeping it away from the public and the media. What remains to be seen now is whether Delhi has learnt its lesson and will do better this time.

One of the greatest tragedies of post-Independence India is having let China occupy the Aksai Chin plateau and with barely any protest. The nation still suffers the consequences of this blunder today in Ladakh.

The fact that China occupied this part of north Ladakh and built a road on Indian territory was known to the Indian leadership as early as 1952, when the first surveys were conducted by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The Chinese started to build the road sometime in 1954, but the issue only came up for discussion between Jawaharlal Nehru and Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier, in September 1959, more than two years after the road was inaugurated.

A year earlier, on 18 October 1958, Foreign Secretary Subimal Dutt had sent a feeble protest to Beijing: “It had come to the Government of India’s [GoI] notice that a road had been constructed by the PRC [People’s Republic of China] across the eastern part of the Ladakh region of the J&K State, which is part of India.” The note continued: “It is a matter of surprise and regret that the Chinese Govt should have constructed a road through indisputably Indian territory without first obtaining the permission of the GoI and without even informing the Government of India.” The note sounded more as an encouragement to go ahead than anything else.

In September 1959, the Prime Minister, who knew that the Chinese had built the road, explained India’s rationale to his Chinese counterpart: “We did not release to the public the information which we had about the various border intrusions into our territory by Chinese personnel since 1954, the construction of a road across Indian territory in Ladakh, and the arrest of our personnel in the Aksai Chin area in 1958 and their detention. We did not give publicity to this in the hope that peaceful solutions of the disputes could be found by agreement by the two countries without public excitement on both sides.”

 Delhi did not want ‘to make things worse’, probably fearing a violent reaction from Beijing, but what can be worse than the 1,00,000 troops facing each other now, in the harsh winter of Ladakh. One can’t rewrite history but we can learn from it: Had the Indian public and media known about the road in 1953-54, India might not have been facing China in Ladakh today!

However, is the mindset of today’s babus different from what it was in the 1950s and 1960s? Undoubtedly, it is more difficult to keep such secrets today, but the babus’ modus operandi and motto remain the same: Keep everything secret. They probably feel that they derive their power from the fact that they control the information, forgetting that silence and secrecy have often, as in the case of the Aksai Chin, endangered the interests of the nation.

I am particularly thinking of the fact that since the beginning of the India-China Special Representatives’ process in 2003, the public has never been informed that the Line of Actual Control (LAC) was a myth and that there were actually two Lines of Perception, and that anything could happen in between. Why was the Indian public not informed that the Chinese had refused to provide maps of their ‘perceptions’?

Beijing has no scruples in changing the posts, whenever it is convenient. The correspondence between Nehru and Zhou Enlai for the period between September and December 1959 brings some light on the treacherous intentions of the Chinese in Ladakh today. On 8 September 1959, Zhou Enlai wrote to his Indian counterpart: “I find from your letter that there is a fundamental difference between the positions of our two Governments on the Sino-Indian boundary question.” Two weeks later, Nehru replied that he was ‘greatly surprised and distressed’ to be told that there was a dispute on the border: “[in January 1959], I had no idea that the People›s Republic of China would lay claim to about 40,000 square miles of what in our view has been indisputably Indian territory.”

It is true that no Chinese had ever set foot in the area in the early 1950s. It is unfortunate that today, Beijing continues to change, despite speeches of the New Helmsman, Xi Jinping, about a community of “shared future for mankind”.

In September 1959, Zhou explained: “The Punjab Western Himalaya and Adjoining Parts of Tibet compiled by British John Walker by order of the Court of Directors of East India Company (published in 1854) corresponded fairly close to the Chinese maps.” This line, though not acceptable by India, was mid-way between the present Chinese claims and India’s traditional boundary, coinciding with the Kunlun watershed.

On 21 October 1959 a serious incident took place within Indian territory, south of the Kongka Pass and 10 CRPF personnel were killed—that was a turning point.

With the situation fast deteriorating on the border, on 7 November, Zhou offered that each party should withdraw 20 km from where they were: “to ensure the tranquillity of the border regions and to create a favourable atmosphere for a friendly settlement of the boundary question.” Less than two weeks later, Nehru replied: “Unfortunately, we do not yet know with any precision where the frontier line lies according to the claims of the Chinese Government. This is a matter for surmise based on small scale maps published in China. These maps themselves have not always been consistent, and different lines are sometimes indicated in them.” China would refuse to exchange maps and kept publishing maps with different alignments, though the lines kept moving more and more inside India’s territory.

On 16 November, the Prime Minister suggested the Indian troops withdraw “all personnel to the west of the line which the Chinese Government has shown as the international boundary in their 1956 maps which, so far as we are aware are their latest maps.” At the same time the Chinese troops should return north of the Aksai Chin. This was obviously not acceptable for Beijing who wanted to continue using the newly-built road. Zhou replied the next day: “The line up to which each side exercises actual control in this sector is very clear… As a matter of fact, the Chinese map published in 1956, to which Your Excellency referred, correctly shows the traditional boundary between the two countries in this sector;” clearly confirming that China stood by the 1956 Line, faraway from Beijing’s claims in the area today. A few weeks later, China advanced further its line, engulfing large parts of India’s territory.

The situation since May 2020 seems to be a repeat of the Chinese advances in 1959. The question which remains here is: Has India learnt its lesson? Let us hope that it has.

The Case of Shipki la

After looking at the ‘dispute’ in Chuva-Chuje area, I shall continue eastward and study the case of Shipki la (pass), also in Himachal Pradesh.

This is another tenuous claim from China, with no historical, cartographical or geographical backup. Presently it is a dormant claim, but with Beijing in the mood to claim Tajikistan’s Pamir Region and Vladivostok (and Ladakh), it is worth looking into the facts.

The First Incursion

The first Chinese incursions inside India’s northern border, in Barahoti in June 1954; took place hardly two months after the signature of the Agreement on Tibet. I shall come back to it in a later post.
In a way, Barahoti could be explained by the fact that Indian negotiators omitted to insist on Tunjun-la as a pass notified in the 1954 Tibet Agreement. This gave an opportunity to the Chinese to claim an area south of the border pass.

But what happened two years later, cannot be justified under the same principle. It was plain violation of the Indian territory, without any justifications.

The Chinese claim the territory between the blue and red lines

1956: Chinese Intrusion South of Shipki-la
On September 8, 1956, India had to deliver a note verbale to the Chinese Charge d’Affaires in India; one week earlier, some Chinese troops had trespassed in an area south of a pass notified in Article IV of the 1954 Agreement.
The note verbale read thus: “The Government of India have received a report that on the 1st September 1956, a party of about 10 Chinese Army personnel entered and took up position about 2 furlongs  from Hupsang Khad   on the Indian side of Shipki-la pass. The Party withdrew after the Officer-in–Charge of the Indian Border Police pointed out to the captain-in-command of the Chinese military personnel that the Indian territory extends up to the Shipki-la pass.”
This is one of the first notes published by the Ministry of External Affairs in the Volume 1 of the Notes, Memoranda and letters Exchanged and Agreements signed between The Governments of India and China 1954 –1959 (known as the White Papers), the first ones being about Barahoti.
It was observed: “The crossing of the Shipki-la pass by the Chinese Army personnel without visas and passports violates the Sino-Indian Agreement of April 29, 1954, in which the Shipki-la pass has been recognised as the border between India and Tibet region of China at that place.”
There was of course no question of ‘visas’ as the Chinese had deliberately crossed into Indian territory, though Delhi still hoped for a mistake: “[we] presume that the Chinese Army personnel crossed into Indian territory by mistake and not deliberately.”
The note concluded by requesting Beijing “to issue strict instructions to the authorities concerned that no unauthorised persons should cross into Indian territory in this manner in future, as otherwise there is danger of breach of peace.”

Delhi was still living in a dream world; it wanted action be taken against the offenders and to be ‘informed of the action taken’.

More Reports of the Border Incident
Two weeks later, this time it was an aide-mémoire which was given to the Chinese embassy in Delhi. It stated that since the handing over of the note to Fu Hao, the Chinese Chargé d’ Affaires, Delhi had received two more reports about the serious situation that had developed “between the Chinese and Indian border patrols in the region of Shipki-la Pass on the Indo-Tibetan border.”
The first incident occurred on September 10, “a party of Indian border Police on its way to the Shipki-la pass sighted a party of Chinese military personnel on the Indian side of the frontier,” the report stated before continuing: “The Chinese Party was commanded by a captain and consisted of at least ten persons. The Indian Patrol signalled the Chinese Party to withdraw, but the latter did not do so. Thereupon, on the Indian patrol trying to advance, the Chinese personnel threw stones at it and threatened to use their grenades.”
In the evening, the Indian Party approached the Chinese and discussed with them. According to the aide-mémoire, during the encounter, the Chinese commander said that he had “received instructions from the Tibetan Government that the border extended up to Hupsang Khad and that Indian personnel should accordingly not advance beyond Hupsang Khad.”
The Indian Commander argued that the border was at the Shipki-la pass; he further suggested that the Chinese should accordingly withdraw.
However, the Chinese troops refused to listen, “as the following morning, they were again soon on the ridge above the roadway on the Indian side of the pass.” The standoff continued the next day.
The Ministry’s aide-mémoire told the Chinese Government “[you] will no doubt agree that in throwing stones and threatening to use hand grenades, the Chinese patrol offered such provocation as could easily have resulted in serious and regrettable incidents.”
An even more serious development “likely to cause an ugly situation” soon followed, said the mémoire.
It described the facts thus: “on September 20 at 4:45 am, a party of 27 Indians Border Security Force came face to face with a party of 20 Chinese soldiers and officers two miles on the Indian side of the Shipki-la pass. The Indian Commanding Officer asked the Chinese Officer to withdraw his troops.”
The Chinese captain said that he had received no communication from his Government, but he added that his instructions were clear, “namely to patrol right up to Hupsang Khad, and in carrying these out he was prepared to face the consequences. He concluded that if the Indian Party went beyond Hupsang Khad he would oppose it with arms.”
The Indian Ministry stated that it was pained and surprised at the conduct of the Chinese Commanding Officer, adding: “It is not difficult to visualise that the natural and direct result of such attitudes, if continued in, may be one of clash of arms.”

The Border Agreed in 1954
Delhi reiterated that the pass was clearly the border, as acknowledged in the Sino-Indian Agreement of April 1954: “the Government of India consider any crossing of this border pass by armed personnel as aggression which they will resist.”
Beijing was told that India had ordered the Border Security Police Force “not to take any action for the present in repulsing this aggression and to await instructions which they hope the Central People’s Government will issue immediately.”
The State Force was however instructed that on no account they should withdraw from their position or permit Chinese personnel to go “beyond where they are even if this involves a clash”.
Delhi requested immediate action from China: “Otherwise there might be an unfortunate clash on our border which will have undesirable results.”
The situation had become hot.

The Prime Minister on the Chinese Incursions
Once Nehru realized that the Chinese had entered Indian territory, his attitude changed. On September 21, 1956, the Prime Minister wrote to the Foreign Secretary: “This is a serious matter and we cannot accept this position.”
The Prime Minister instructed his officials: “We should, of course, protest in emphatic language both to the Chinese Embassy here and to the Chinese Government through our Ambassador in Peking.”
Moreover, he thought that was not quite enough: “The question arises as to what directions we should give to the Himachal Pradesh Government which they can pass on to their police force at the border. From the telephone account it appears that our party consists of 27 persons of the Border Security Police and the Chinese party consists of 20 officers and men. Thus, the numbers on both sides are small and there is a slight advantage on our side.”
He ordered the Indian troops that: “on no account [they should] withdraw from their present position, which appears to be between the Shipki-la pass and Hupsang Khad.”
The Prime Minister’s stand was rather firm: “They must remain there even at the cost of conflict. For the present, they should not force their way beyond this place, as this would presumably mean a conflict with the Chinese. But it must be made clear that they must remain where they are and if the Chinese advance further, they should be checked.”
India considered the crossing of the Shipki-la without permission as improper and an aggression. He asserted that the Chinese should go back: “We would not permit them to go any further and if they did not go back, we would have to take further steps in the matter. We are not doing so immediately because the matter has been referred to Delhi and Peking and because of our friendly relations we should like to avoid a clash. But if there is any further aggression, a clash is inevitable.”
The Prime Minister suggested that Himachal Pradesh Government should immediately send more troops or the Border Security Police to the pass.
He also mentioned that in the Indian protest to the Chinese Embassy, it should be stated that “in view of the fact that Shipki-la is clearly the border and is acknowledged as such even in our agreement with China, we consider any crossing of armed forces without our permission as aggression and we have to resist it.”
He added: “…we attach great importance to this matter and request immediate action by the Chinese Government. Otherwise there might be an unfortunate clash on our border which will have undesirable results.”
The orders were “on no account to retire from their position or to permit the Chinese forces to go beyond where they are, even if this involves a clash”.
Delhi had started realizing that the good days of eternal friendship with China were over; darker clouds were gathering.

A Meeting at the Ministry of External Affairs
On October 3, 1956, a meeting of representatives of Ministries of External Affairs, Defence and Home, and the Himachal Pradesh Government, was held in Delhi to consider the Chinese activities on the Indo-Tibetan border (mainly in Himachal Pradesh).
TN Kaul, who chaired, gave an account of the recent events in the Shipki-la area; he pointed out that during previous weeks the Chinese had transgressed into Indian territory on three occasions. He informed the participants about the notes handed over to the Chinese Embassy in Delhi on September 8 and 22, while the matter had also been taken up by the Indian embassy with the Chinese Foreign Office in Beijing.
Kaul reiterated the Prime Minister’s concerns; it was a serious issue and it was not enough to lodge a protest with the Chinese: “He had instructed that specific directions should be given to the Government of Himachal Pradesh to be passed on to the border checkposts and that these checkpost personnel should on no account withdraw from their present position.”
The meeting was told that Nehru had decided to let the Chinese know that “any further aggression into Indian territory would lead to unhappy results.”
Kaul noted that this meeting was called “to make specific recommendations to meet the present situation and future eventualities.”
However, according to the representatives from the Himachal Pradesh government, the Chinese had already withdrawn from the posts and they were not likely to return to this area during the present season.
The information was confirmed by SK Roy, the SOFA; Roy had been touring in Western Tibet and he had just crossed back into India via Shipki-la. For the State government, the issue was not immediate, but it was necessary to formulate “a definite line of action to meet eventualities in the spring.”

The Recommendations
The meeting made four recommendations:

1. Since the Chinese troops had withdrawn it was not necessary at present to send our troops to this area, but a few Army officers may be sent to make a reconnaissance right up to Shipki-la and suggest ways and means of meeting a possible threat from Chinese troops next spring and draw up plans accordingly.
2. A permanent police outpost should be established at Namgia village with an increased strength.
3. India’s border personnel should be in physical possession of Shipki-la pass before the April 1 next and earlier, if possible. For this purpose, a permanent party, even though of a very small size, should be posted at the pass itself, or, if not possible, as close to the pass as possible. Construction of cave shelters and aluminum huts should be taken up immediately and these should be ready before March 1957.
4. Constant patrolling from Namgia up to the pass should be done from now on as often as possible, weather permitting.

It was also felt that since Chinese were likely to trespass into the Indian territory in other areas, therefore reconnaissance “should be made of all the disputed areas by Army personnel who should make specific recommendation about the places, as close to the frontier as possible, where border police posts could be established.”
These resolutions had little chance to be implemented in view of the apathy of the Indian bureaucracy.

Another Note from the Prime Minister
On October 8, 1956, the Prime Minister sent another note to the Foreign Secretary: “There is no question of sending any troops to the Shipki-la now,” Nehru wrote “even in the spring next year, I do not envisage the necessity of sending troops. The fate of Shipki-la is not going to be decided by fighting or by a large show of force.”
He however agreed that it was desirable, “for some Army officers to reconnoitre and see the place at a suitable time now or early next year.”
He concluded: “The main thing to do is to have a Police outpost there and that our personnel should be in physical possession of the Shipki-la when the snows melt. Also, it is desirable for us to investigate the other passes.”

One problem faced by India from the first years of Independence was, who should be responsible for the border areas. It was eventually delegated to the Ministry of Home Affairs, which unfortunately had neither the capacity nor the training to defend the borders …and lacked the strategic vision to do so.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Traditional and Customary Basis of the Indian Alignment in the Middle Sector
The Report of the Officials of India and China of 1961 is the best source to understand the different contentions.
In the Report, the Indian stand is described thus: “…The boundary throughout lies along the main watershed in the region between the Spiti River and the Pare chu (river), between the tributaries of the Sutlej and between the Ganges and the Sutlej basins. In this sector the Chinese alignment are conformed for the most part to the traditional Indian alignment. Only in four areas did it diverge from the watershed to include certain pockets of Indian territory in China-the Spiti are (Chuva and Chuje), Shipki pass, the Nilang-Jadhang area (Sang an Tsungsha) and Barahoti (Wu-je), Sangchamalla and Lapthal. In this sector, therefore, it would be sufficient to prove the traditional and customary basis of the Indian alignment in these four areas.”
Regarding Shipki La (pass), it was noted that it part of the Zanskar range, a well-defined watershed frontier, forms the boundary between Tibet and India on which the Shipki la is located: “The Shipki pass had been the traditional and customary boundary between the States of Bashahr (now part of the Himachal Pradesh State of India) and Guge which was incorporated in Tibet in 1720. This fact that Shipki Pass was always a part of Bashahr has been attested by travellers.
In 1821, Alexander Gerard visited the area. He stated in this Account of Koonawar in the Himalaya, London 1841:
"October 12, Marched to Shipki, nine miles. The road ascended a little, and then there was a steep descent into the bed of the Oopsung. Here the rocks were more rugged than any we had yet seen: they were rent in every direction, piled upon one another in wild disorder, in a most extraordinary manner not to be described, overhanging the path and threatening destruction to the traveller. From the Oopsung the road was a tiresome and rocky ascent, to the pass which separates Koonawur from the Chinese dominions, 13,518 feet above the level of the sea."
Oopsung is Hupsang Khud, and Gerard stated that the boundary lay at Shipki Pass, at the top of Hupsang Khud.
He later confirmed: “This is the line of separation between Busahir and Chinese Tartary, and there could scarcely be a better-defined natural boundary. …From hence to Shipki was two and a quarter miles, by an excellent road upon the hill slope at an angle of 15°, on gravel and frangible red granite, like a good turnpike-road."
Twenty years later Dr Ch Gutzlaff, a corresponding member of the Royal Geographical Society, visited Shipki area, and gave a report of his journey to the Royal Geographical Society, in February 1849, he confirmed the location of the border. Other travelers who visited later said the same thing; the pass is the border.
The Report observed: “The Indian side then brought forward, and supplied photostats of, some unofficial maps published in various countries to show that the traditional boundary in this sector lay along Shipki pass.”
All this evidence showed that the traditional and customary alignment in this area lay where Indian maps were now showing it.
As mentioned earlier, the main principle for delineating a border is the terrain, and first and foremost the watershed; in which case, the top of a pass is the best way to have an agreed border.

China did not agree to this basic principle.

The Namgia Village on the way to the pass

Treaty Basis of the Indian Boundary Alignment
The Report of the Officials explains further: “The traditional boundary from Shipki pass to the tri-junction of India, Nepal and Tibet was also confirmed in the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between India and the Tibet Region of China signed in April 1954 (also known as Panchsheel Agreement); Article IV stated: "Traders and pilgrims of both countries may travel by the following passes. (1) Shipki La Pass, (2) Mana Pass, (3 Niti Pass, (4) Kungribingri Pass, (5) Darma Pass and (6) Lipu Lekh Pass."
Geographically the Zanskar Range formed the watershed between the eastern and western tributaries of the Sutlej; and the other five passes in the Central Sector lie on the watershed dividing the Sutlej and Ganges basins.
In the original Chinese draft presented on 1 March 1954, Article IV read: “The Chinese Government agrees to open the following mountain passes in the Ari (Ngari) District of the Tibet Region of China for entry by traders and pilgrims of both parties.”
Tibetan traders crossing Shipki la entered India and vice-versa, Indian traders or pilgrims walked into Tibet, on the other side of the pass.
It was also the route used by decades by the Indian Trade Agen in Gartok. It had never been objected by the Tibetans who agreed on the principle.

In 1960, the Indian conclusion was: “The Indian side brought forward clear and conclusive evidence to show that the alignment as shown by them in the Middle Sector had, throughout its length, a traditional and customary basis reaching back through many centuries, and that, in addition, this boundary had been recognised by Chinese Government and been confirmed through diplomatic exchanges, treaties and agreements. The Chinese side had now claimed certain areas south of the watershed boundary - the Spiti "area, Shipki Pass, the Nilang-Jadhang area and Barahoti, Sangchamalla and Lapthal. They were, however, unable either to bring forward any real documentary evidence to substantiate these claims, or to refute the evidence brought forward by the Indian side.”

The Shipki Pass
The Chinese claim to the Shipki Pass area was sustained by only one evidence and even “this solitary item of evidence was found to be irrelevant,” said the Indian Report.
The Chinese claimed that the people of Shipki village had constantly used the pastures west of the Shipki Pass and that these areas belonged to them: “But no proof of such ownership had been brought forward. Even proof of use of these pastures had not been provided, although mere use of pastures, even if the assertion be true, could prove nothing. For the route from India through Shipki La to Tibet was one of the main routes in this area, and as sheep were used in this part as pack animals, people of both countries used the pastures besides the route. ln fact, Indian citizens used the pastures lying between Shipki La and Shipki village, and even beyond.”
It has to be pointed out that sending yaks to graze, cannot be the proof of ownership, as often in the Himalaya lease or other agreements existed between villagers/herders from both side of the border.

Evidence of Indian Administration and Jurisdiction of the Areas claimed by China
In the next section, the Officials studied the ‘administrative’ evidence for Shipki la; the Shipki Pass was part of the village of Namgia, a small village in the Chini Tehsil of Bashahr State (now Himachal Pradesh). The village is, situated above Nako in the upper Kunawar valley; Namgia village has regularly been assessed for land revenue which included forest and grazing dues to the Bashahr authorities. Assessments for land revenue in the area were made at the Settlements of 1853, 1854, 1856, 1859, 1876 and 1894 (shown in the Bashahr State Gazetteer in 1910): “Old records of the erstwhile Rampur (Bashahr State) show that the Tibetans recognised that the frontier lays at Shipki-la. In fact, Shipki villagers migrated from Namgia and were at that time subjects of Bashahr State. That it was well-known that Indian administration extended upto the Shipki Pass is shown by the saying common in Tibet, Pimala Yanchhod Bod-Gialbo, Pimala Ranchhod Khuno Gialbo:  "The territory above Pimala belongs to the Raja of Tibet and below to the Raja of Bashahr."
‘Pima-la’ in Tibetan means "common pass".
The area was surveyed during 1882, 1897, and 1904-1905. Very detailed surveys were carried out in 1917 and 1920-1921.
Another evidence was that the famous Hindustan-Tibet Road had been constructed and maintained by the Public Works Department of the Government of India, till the top of the pass; Tibet never objected.
Regarding the Middle Sector, the Indian Officials affirmed that they “brought forward a large amount of representative evidence, relating to different aspects of administration, to show that Indian governments had exercised full, continuous and uninterrupted control over all the areas right upto the traditional alignment. The Chinese side were unable to disprove the conclusive nature of this evidence. As for the material submitted by them with regard to the areas south of the watershed now claimed by them, the Indian side established that they constituted no proof of administration having ever extended to these areas.”
The final word was that the Indian officials “had shown conclusively that Indian administration had throughout extended right upto the Shipki Pass, across which lay the traditional and customary boundary between India and Tibet.”

The Chinese Refused to Agree
As usual, the Chinese officials denied every piece of Indian evidence: “The boundary in the middle sector has also not been formally delimited by any treaty. As to the treaty basis of this sector of the boundary, the Indian side has submitted few new evidences, and its arguments had for the most part been put forward in the past and refuted by the Chinese side. No matter how the Indian side has defended its own stand, it can in no way change this basic fact, that is, as in the case of the western sector, the Indian side cannot advance any treaty basis whatever which could prove that the middle sector of the boundary has been formally delimited.”
But denying an evidence does not create an evidence.
 
The LAC Claim
In the 1980s, like for Chuva and Chuje, the LAC depicted by the Chinese maps has conceded “the entire territory claimed by India except in the Barahoti area as lying within India’s actual control. In the Barahoti area administrative and army personnel of the two sides are not being permitted,” wrote SN Gopalkrishnan, Senior Research Officer of the Historical Division in August 1980.

It does not mean that Beijing has dropped the territorial claim over the area south of Shipki la.

The Namgia village

To conclude, I am posting some questions raised by India and China in 1960 during the Meetings of the Officials

Chinese Questions for the Shipki la area (with Indian Answers)
It has to be noted that while the Indian Officials were forthcoming by details and coordinates, it was not the case with their Chinese counterpart who often did not answer the questions.

Q 4: The Indian side stated that their alignment crossed the Siang-chuan (Sutlej) river at its bend. What were the co-ordinates of the crossing? What were the geographical features followed by the Indian alignment from Peak Leo Pargial to Shipki Pass?

A: The Indian alignment crossed the Sutlej at approximately Long 78° 44' E and 32° 52' N. From Peak Leo Pargial, the alignment descended along a spur, crossed the Sutlej and again mounted the spur on the opposite bank of the river to the Shipki Pass.

Q 5: Were there other passes along the Indian alignment from Shipki Pass to Thaga Pass besides Raniso and Shimdang Passes mentioned by the Indian side?

A: Between Shipki Pass and Thaga Pass, apart from the Ramso and the Shimdang Passes mentioned earlier, the Khimokul (Gumrang) Pass (Long. 78° 49' E and Lat. 31° 26'N) also lay on the boundary.

Indian Questions for the Shipki la area (with the Chinese Answers)

Q 17: Would the Chinese side give the co-ordinates of the point at which the alignment crossed the Sutlej river? It was said to be west of Shipki Pass. How for west of Shipki Pass?

A: At a place (there was a small river called the Hupsand Khud there) about 6 to 7 kilometres west of Shipki Pass, the boundary crossed the Siangchuan River. North-east of this point the boundary passed through Peak 6791 (approximately) 78° 45'E. Long, 31° 54'N. Lat.)

Q 18: The Chinese side stated that the alignment crossed the Sutlej at a place 6 to 7 kilometers west of Shipki Pass. The Indian side would like to have the co-ordinates of this point.

A: No Answer

Q 19: The Chinese side stated that west of Shipki there was a small river called the Hupsand Khud. Did the alignment cross the Sutlej west or east of the junction of the Sutlej with the Hupsang Khud?

A: No Answer

Q 20:
The Chinese side stated that north-east of the crossing of the Sutlej the alignment passed through Peak 6791. The Indian side would like to have the heights of other peaks and a description of the natural features followed by the alignment in this segment.

A: No Answer

Q 21: The description given by the Chinese side stated that after the crossing of the Sutlej river the alignment continued southward along the watershed. The Indian side would like to have details of heights of peaks and names of passes on this watershed, as well as the co-ordinates of these points.

A: South of this point, the boundary passed through Peak 5642 (approximately .78°50'E. Long. 31°37 N. Lat.).

Q 22: The Chinese side stated that south of the Sutlej, crossing the alignment passed through peak 5642. The Indian side would like to have the heights of other peaks and a description of the natural features in this segment.

A: From Height 6791, the alignment ran along a spur in a southerly direction, and crossed the junction of the Siangchuan river and the Hupsang Khud river. It then ran along the ridge passing through Height 5642 and Gumrang Pass (approximately 78° 49'E. Long., 31°25' N. Lat).

Q 24: The Indian side would like to have the co-ordinates of Shipki and Puling Sumdo which were marked on the map

A: Shipki was a village in China Puling Sumdo was located at approximately 79° 08' E. Long. 31° 18' N. Lat.)

When Tibetans fought for Rangzen

The Panchen Lama with Chinese Fan Ming and another Communist official

I am posting today a personal letter from Apa B. Pant, the Political Officer in Sikkim addressed to Subimal Dutt, India’s Foreign Secretary.
The letter is dated February 17, 1956.
It is interesting in the context of the present campaign to elect the next Political Leader of the Tibetans.
The S.I.B. report mentioned by Pant is unfortunately not available.
It is interesting to note that in the history of modern Tibet, the dissent or even the revolt, has often come from the masses, not from the aristocracy or the clergy.
The same thing will happen 3 years later in Lhasa with the uprising of the 'masses'.
The 'masses' had however supporters among the latter classes as Pant's letter shows. Alo Chonze was then the main leader of the Mimang.
"The absorption of Tibet by China would be a difficult process", says Pant in 1956. It was quite prophetic.
Pant also affirms: "The more they try to put up the Panchen Lama, as an equal of the Dalai Lama, the more the general mass of Tibetans would resist them", the present leadership in China should read this at a time the Party tries to impose their own Panchen Lama on the masses.

Here is Apa Pant's letter

I had asked the S.I.B. [Subsidiary Intelligence Bureau] to prepare a note about the Mimang Tsongdu [Peoples’ Association] from the information they have collected over the past four years. I send you herewith a copy of the report sent to me by Shri Bose, Asst. Director S.I.B. Kalimpong.

2. It is interesting to note that most of the Tibetan officials in the govt. of Tibet have been either inactive or too afraid of the Chinese to take any positives [steps] and amongst them there have been some like Ngapo [Ngabo Ngawang Jigme] Shape who sincerely in the beginning felt that the Chinese would be in a position to help the Tibetans in their progress. His collaboration with the Chinese however has not at all satisfied the general mass of Tibetans. Other Tibetan officials including such people as Tsarong, Surkhang, have sided with the Chinese in order to make their own position secure in the govt.

3. The Mimang movement has thus grown from the bottom. It is an expression of the discontent that now pervades many classes of people inside Tibet. I have been reliably told that the committee of seven have taken oaths in front of some of the sacred chapels in Lhasa to carry through the resistance movement. The committee of fifteen of which the majority of members are not very important has also sworn an oath of secrecy and allegiance to the Mimang.

4. The most important people who are perhaps directing the actions of the Mimang are Lukhangwa the ex-prime minister, Lobsang Tashi and Trijang rimpoche. Trijang rimpoche is very close to the D.L. and I personally have no doubt that he himself is well aware of both these parties the Mimang and the Thamang.

5. What this S.I.B. report says about the actions of some of the nobility from Tibet regarding their attempts to contact foreign powers is very true. Most of them however not understood that outside help for the furtherance of their cause would not be available. There are however, some people like PHU RAGPA PANDATSANG, who still persists in contacting foreign powers. I have given my views about him in a letter which I have written to [T.N.] Kaul [Joint Secretary in the MEA].

6. The absorption of Tibet by China would be a difficult process. Tibetans certainly feel that the Chinese are imposing a form of colonialism on them. They therefore look towards those nations who are professedly anti colonial and take up the cause of the down trodden.

7. The Chinese on their side I am quite sure would try to bring about their dynamic reformist and revolutionary zeal in order to change the pattern of life in Tibet. I think the Chinese will stand or fail not only by their good intentions but by their actions untarnished either by persecution, violence or totalitarian methods. If the Chinese in order to reform Tibet establish a kind of a dictatorship I fear the Tibetans would certainly resist them.

8. Though I am myself not yet convinced that the organization of the Thamang or Mimang is perfect it will certainly come about and the Chinese would find it very difficult to carry on in that country. Nearly six years have elapsed since the arrival of Chinese in Tibet and yet it has not been possible for them to have any substantial majority of the mass of the population on their side on the other hand many who hoped China would help have been disillusioned and some have even joined the Mimang.

9. The action of the Chinese to bolster up the PANCHEN LAMA has also affected of the general mass of Tibetans towards them. The more they try to put up the PANCHEN LAMA, as an equal of the Dalai Lama, the more the general mass of Tibetans would resist them.

I feel that we should keep good watch on these events that are taking place across our border. The Indo-Mongoloid living in Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal and our other border areas are very deeply affected emotionally and otherwise by all that is happening in Tibet.
They watch the events in Tibet very carefully and also watch the reactions of India and other countries to all that is happening there. To these people the METO [METO or Middle East Treaty Organization?], SEATO (?) [The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization], the Hydrogen bomb or the Atom bomb are far away things. What is vital to them is the position of the D.L. [Dalai Lama] and the fate of their brothers and cousin across the border.

Chinese Incursions: 60 years ago

The way to Shipki La

Following the recent Chinese incursion in Burtse in Ladakh and the quick ‘answer’ from the Indian forces who dismantled the structure built by the Chinese, it is interesting to look at what happened nearly 60 years ago at Shipki La, the pass between Himachal Pradesh and Tibet.
At that time too, it started with some Chinese incursions.
Soon after the PLA entered for the first time on Indian territory, a Note Verbale was given to the Chinese Charge d’Affaires in India on September 8, 1956. The Note said:

The Government of India have received a report that on the 1st September 1956, a party of about 10 Chinese Army personnel entered and took up position about 2 furlongs [1/2 kilometre] from Hupsong Khad on the Indian side of Shipki La Pass. The Party withdrew after the Officer-in–Charge of the Indian Border Police pointed out to the Captain in command of the Chinese Military Personnel that the Indian territory extends up to the Shipki La Pass.
The crossing of the Shipki La Pass by the Chinese Army Personnel without visaed Passports violates the Sino-Indian Agreement of April 29, 1954, in which the Shipki La Pass has been recognised as the border between India and Tibet region of China at that place. The Government of India presume that the Chinese Army Personnel crossed into Indian territory by mistake and not deliberately.

In fact, the Chinese troops had deliberately crossed the pass and soon after they started claiming areas located a few kilometres, south of Shipki La as Chinese territories.
Let us remember that according the Article IV of the Panchsheel Agreement of 1954 ('Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India'):

Traders and pilgrims of both countries may travel by the following passes and route:
(1) Shipki La pass, (2) Mana pass, (3) Niti pass, (4) Kungri Bingri pass, (5) Darma pass, and (6) Lipu Lekh pass.
The agreement also mentioned the Ladakh route: “the customary route leading to Tashigong along the valley of the Shangatsangpu (Indus) River may continue to be traversed in accordance with custom.

The intrusions meant that for China, passes such as Shipki La were not border passes, but located within China’s territory. Beijing’s interpretation of Article IV was: ‘the passes are only an indication of the route through which traders could enter India”.
Amazing logic!
Let us continue with the story.
On September 24, Delhi had go a step further and send an Aide-Mémoire to China:

Since the handing over of the last informal note to Charge d’ Affaires Fu Hao on the 8th September, the Government of India have received two reports of serious situations that recently developed between the Chinese and Indian border patrols in the region of Shipki La Pass on the Indo-Tibetan border.

It then gives some details about the incidents:

On 10th September, when a party of Indian border Police on its way to the Shipki La Pass sighted a party of Chinese military personnel on the Indian side of the frontier. The Chinese Party was commanded by a Captain and consisted of at least ten persons. The Indian Patrol signalled the Chinese Party to withdraw, but the latter did not do so. Thereupon, on the Indian Patrol trying to advance, the Chinese personnel threw stones at it and threatened to use their grenades.
Towards the evening, the Indian Party approached and held conversations with the Chinese. During this conversation, the Chinese commander intimated that he had ‘received instructions from the Tibetan Government that the border extended up to Hupsang Khad and that Indian Personnel should accordingly not advance beyond Hupsang Khad’.”

Note that, like many other parts of the Indo-Tibetan frontier, the Chinese hid behind so-called earlier Tibetan claims
The note continues:

The Indian Patrol Commander pointed out that the border was in fact situated at the Shipki La Pass and suggested that the Chinese should accordingly withdraw. However, it does not appear that the Chinese troops withdrew, as the following morning (11th September) they were again soon on the ridge above the roadway on the Indian side of the Pass. The Position remained the same on the 12th September.

Delhi reacted, what the Chinese had done was not nice:

The Chinese Government will no doubt agree that in throwing stones and threatening to use hand grenades, the Chinese patrol offered such provocation as could easily have resulted in serious and regrettable incidents. However, a development even more likely to cause an ugly situation was soon to follow.

A worse incident occurred on September 20 (see White Paper No 1)
Delhi was ‘pained and surprised’: "It is not difficult to visualise that the natural and direct result of such attitudes, if continued in, may be one of clash of arms.”
The Indian Government reminded the Chinese of the Panchsheel Agreement: “Shipki La is clearly the border and is acknowledged as such in the Sino-Indian Agreement of 29th April 1954, the Government of India consider any crossing of this border pass by armed personnel as aggression which they will resist."

Nehru was in a dilemma: how to react?
He wrote to the Foreign Secretary: "I agree with [your] suggestion …it would not be desirable for this question to be raised in the Lok Sabha at the present stage."
Nehru decided to keep the matter secret but discretely mention it to the Chinese officials: "I think that if this question is raised in our Parliament at this stage, this might prove embarrassing from the point of view of the negotiations between Burma and China."
The Indians MPs being unpredictable, they may raise a hue and cry, better to keep it secret and eventually ‘speak’ to Beijing.


A Meeting to discuss the issue
A meeting was however held on October 3, 1956 to consider how to handle the Chinese incursion.
It was chaired T.N. Kaul, then Joint Secretary in the MEA. His colleagues Col. P.N. Luthra, Special Officer Frontier Areas and Dr. Gopalachari, the Deputy Director of the Historical Division were in attendance.
So were H.C. Sarin, the Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Defence; he was accompanied by Maj Gen M.S. Wadalia, Chief of General Staff and Brig. K.H. Katoch, Director of Military Operations. The Home Ministry was represented by a Joint Secretary (N. Sahgal) and a Deputy Secretary (Rajkumar).
The Chief Secretary to the Government of Himachal Pradesh and the Inspector General of Police had also come.
Kaul gave a brief account of the events. He said:

The Prime Minister had directed that this was a serious matter and that it was not enough to lodge a protest with the Chinese. He had instructed that specific directions should be given to the Government of Himachal Pradesh to be passed on to the border checkposts and that these checkpost personnel should on no account withdraw from their present position.

The representatives from Himachal Pradesh informed the meeting that the Chinese had withdrawn due to the coming winter season, but they were likely to return in 1957: “it was necessary to formulate a definite line of action to meet eventualities in the spring.”The meeting discussed:

1. the desirability of sending some troops in adequate strength to Namgia and if possible to Shipki La Pass before the pass closes;
2. the question of making arrangements for the next spring so that our border security force are in position in Shipki La Pass before the Chinese come, and
3. the building of certain aluminum huts, cave shelters and other allied matters were then discussed in detail.

The Himachal Pradesh government was in favour of “a permanent police outpost at Namgia [below the pass] and some cave shelters and aluminium huts were constructed as near Shipki La as possible before the next spring.”
The meeting therefore recommended:

• Since the Chinese troops had withdrawn it was not necessary at present to send our troops to this area, but a few Army Officers may be sent to make a reconnaissance right up to Shipki La and suggest ways and means of meeting a possible threat from Chinese troops next spring and draw up plans accordingly.
• A permanent police outpost should be established at Namgia with increased strength.
• Our personnel should be in physical possession of Shipki La pass before the 1st of April next and earlier, if possible. For this purpose, a permanent party, even though of a very small size, should be posted at the pass itself, or, if that is not possible, as close to the pass as possible. Construction of cave shelters and aluminium huts should be taken in hand immediately and these should be ready before March 1957.
• Constant patrolling from Namgia up to the pass should be done from now on as often as possible, weather permitting.
• The Himachal Pradesh representatives raised the question of increase in the strength of the border police and also the issue of rations to them. It was agreed.

And what happened then?
Four days later, on October 10, the Prime Minister sent a note to the Foreign Secretary. It reads:

There is no question of sending any troops to the Shipki La now. In fact, even in the spring next year, I do not envisage the necessity of sending troops. The fate of Shipki La is not going to be decided by fighting or by a large show of force.

Nehru however agreed: “It might be desirable, however, for some Army officers to reconnoiter and see the place at a suitable time now or early next year.”
Just compare with what happened in Burtse in Ladakh, where the Indian forces dismantle the Chinese structure and send them back on their side of the LAC and only then, discussed the issue during 2 flag-meetings (after the Chinese said that nothing had happened) and what happened in Shipkila in 1956.
The moral of the story is that a 'show of force' always helps to prepare 'talks' with Chinese. It may be unfortunate, but it is a fact.
The Indian Army (and their political bosses) seem to have understood the lesson during the past decades.