The Big One

Recent developments not far from the Indian border in Arunachal Pradesh are worrying.
A notice from the Metok Border Management Brigade announced that from March 1, the Chinese authorities began “to check border pass, ID cards and other documents of people entering and exiting Metok.”
Metok is the last small, but strategic town located near the Great Bend of the Yarlung Tsangpo, north of the McMahon Line. Let us remember that the river becomes the Siang on entering Arunachal and later the Brahmaputra in Assam (and the Meghna in Bangladesh).
The notice says that the entire Metok region now comes under ‘border management’ and the area will thereafter be restricted: “People entering and leaving must comply with the relevant regulations of the border management area and need to show relevant documents at border checkpoints to be allowed to pass.”
Even the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is not exempted from these new restrictions: “officers and soldiers of the PLA and the People’s Armed Police (PAP) who are not stationed in the area must present a certificate issued by the competent department at or above the regimental level to enter and leave the border area.” The notice adds that if an entire military unit wants to enter or exit the border area, the border inspection department should be notified in advance for inspection.
Why suddenly these new restrictions?
An answer maybe be found in an article in The Hindu; Ananth Krishnan says that a draft of China’s new Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) would have given “the green light for the first dams to be built on the lower reaches of Yarlung Tsangpo river.” According to the Chinese version of the new Plan covering the period 2020-2025 as well as “long range objectives through the year 2035” which was submitted to National People’s Congress (NPC) for approval, “the building of hydropower bases on the lower reaches of the river as among the priority energy projects to be undertaken in the next five years.”
The draft later adopted by the Chinese legislature calls for “a hydropower base on the lower reaches of the river, along with clean energy bases in the upper and lower reaches of Jinsha river,” known as the Upper Yangtze in Sichuan Province.
On the occasion of the New Year, President Xi Jinping called the Communist Party “a gigantic vessel that navigates China's stable and long-term development;” he stated: “Upholding the principle of putting people first and remaining true to our founding mission, we can break the waves to reach the destination of realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”
As a result, Xi Jinping is thinking big.
The Seventh Tibet Work Forum (TWF), a mega meeting which decides the fate of Tibet for the years to come (to which Tibetans are rarely invited), was held in Beijing on August 28 and 29, 2020. It was a crucial event not only as far it concerns the fate of the Roof of the World, but for the Indian border too.
Soon after, some massive projects were announced; first, the Pai-Metok (Pai-Mo) Highway linking Nyingchi to Metok, north of Upper Siang district of Arunachal Pradesh which should open in July 2021.
After the completion of the highway, the length of the road from Nyingchi City to Metok County will be shortened from 346 kilometers to 180 kilometers and the driving time will be shortened from 11 hours to 4.5 hours. Though only 67 kilometers long, in strategic terms the highway will be a game changer and greatly accelerate the developments of new model villages, and therefore relocation of populations on the border. But more importantly, it will pave the way for a mega hydropower plant (HPP).
In December 2020, The Global Times announced Beijing’s plan to build a cascade of mega hydropower plants (HPP) on the Yarlung Tsangpo.
The Metok County government confirmed that the project would be built north of the Indian border, while The Global Time added: “The head of Power Construction Corp of China (POWERCHINA) suggested the planned hydropower station - which is expected to have three times as much generating capacity as the world-leading Three Gorges power station - aims to maintain water resources and domestic security.”
A series of nine hydropower plants in cascade, producing thrice the amount of electricity generated by the Three Gorges Dam, will threaten the life in the entire North-East region.
But it is not all; already in 2016, The China Daily had reported the construction of a 1,629-kilometer Sichuan-Tibet railway. It has now entered a crucial phase. The railway will be connecting Chengdu in Sichuan to Lhasa; it will be divided into three sections from west to east: Lhasa-Nyingchi, Nyingchi-Kangding, and Kangding-Chengdu. It takes today 42 hours by train and three days by road to travel from Chengdu to Lhasa; the new rail line will shorten the travel time to less than 15 hours.
The Lhasa-Nyingchi section is scheduled to be opened in July.
All this will have incalculable strategic implications for India as the train will pass near the Indian border and the hydropower plant is located just north of the McMahon Line.
Last, but not the least, Xi is planning to start a mega lead-zinc mining project in Huoshaoyun area, in the China-occupied Aksai Chin in Ladakh; according to the Shanghai Nonferrous Metals Network: “In September 2016, Xinjiang geological prospecting made a new major breakthrough. Among them, the Huoshaoyun super large lead-zinc mine has a proven resource of 17.08 million tons, ranking seventh in the world, second in Asia, and first in China.”
Though the two first projects (the HPP on the Yarlung Tsangpo and the Sichuan Railway) are directly affecting India, the last one (the mining in the Aksai Chin) is located on Indian territory.
Further, nobody seems to have thought about the pollution generated by the mines; indeed, t is a great tragedy in the making; moreover for India, the development of the ‘dual-use’ (civil and military) infrastructure by China in the Ladakh sector will take place on a much larger scale than today.
How will the Mandarins of South Block react? They will probably try to keep the information under the carpet as long as possible. But if they wait too long, it may be too late. Remember the Aksai Chin road.

Is China building a new front in the Himalayas?

My article Is China building a new front in the Himalayas? appeared a few days ago in The Daily Guardian

Here is the link...

China is apparently planning to build a hydropower project over the Tsangpo river in Tibet —a project which it had previously assured was unlikely to happen. Not only is it another example of the nation being untrustworthy, it is also worrying, given that the river flows into Indian territory as the mighty Brahmaputra and the planned site is a highly seismic zone.
 

The unthinkable has happened. The Global Times has announced: “China to build historic Yarlung Zangbo (Tsangpo) River hydropower project in Tibet.” The dam or hydropower plant (HPP) around the Great Bend of the river, known as the Siang, which in India is called the Brahmaputra, has been the object of thousands of articles. Most serious analysts concluded that it was not doable, not feasible and would never happen. It has often been associated with the diversion of the river towards the Qinghai province and mainland China as well as the revival of the Yellow river.
Now, it appears that the new emperor has decided to go for it. “China will build a hydropower project on the Yarlung Zangbo river, one of the major waters in Asia that also passes through India and Bangladesh, and the head of the involved company said that the project could serve to maintain water resources and domestic security,” wrote the mouthpiece of the Communist Party of China.
The project would be part of China’s 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-25) and China’s long-term objectives for 2035. Quoting Yan Zhiyong, chairman of the Power Construction Corp of China, or POWERCHINA, the Global Times noted: “There is no parallel in history… it will be a historic opportunity for the Chinese hydropower industry.”
The announcement has to be seen in the context of the confrontation in Ladakh. Even if the HPP does not come up immediately, it is good Information Warfare (IW) for Beijing “to scare the Indian monkey”.
It is a fact that China had always denied that they would do it. If Beijing does go for it, it would be another example showing that the present regime cannot be trusted.
In November 2006, as President Hu Jintao was leaving India after a state visit, the Chinese Minister for Water Resources, Wang Shucheng, had categorically stated that the proposal of the dam and diversion was “unnecessary, unfeasible and unscientific”. He had added that it had no government backing: “There is no need for such dramatic and unscientific projects.” However, he had admitted, “There may be some retired officials that support the plan, but they’re not the experts advising the government.” Thus, it had not been a point blank denial as the minister had admitted that the project existed on paper. Have the ‘experts’ changed their mind now?
It is necessary to look at the project in more detail.
Yan Zhiyong explained that the hydropower exploitation on the trans-boundary river could provide 300 billion kWh of clean, renewable and zero-carbon electricity annually. The project would play a significant role in realising China’s goal of reaching a carbon emissions peak before 2030 and carbon neutrality in 2060, and it could annually generate an income of 20 billion yuan ($3 billion).
Yang added that POWERCHINA already signed a strategic cooperation agreement with the Tibetan Autonomous Region government after meeting Party Secretary Wu Yingjie.
The Global Times mentioned that the hydropower plant would have thrice the capacity of the Three Gorges dam (which has an installed capacity of 22,500 Mw), which would mean around 60,000 Mw or 60 Gw.
There is no doubt that China’s dam lobby is pushing hard for the mega plant, forgetting that the area is one of the most highly seismic regions of the planet.
The Times in London reported the August 15, 1950 earthquake—which had its epicentre not far away, in Rima in Tibet, just north of the McMahon Line in the Lohit Valley—saying, “Seismographs the world over one day last fortnight registered an earthquake so violent that the record of its convulsions ran off the paper… Shipping on the lower Brahmaputra River (whose source is in the Himalayas) was dislocated by a tide of tens of thousands of uprooted trees and the bodies of tigers, elephants and other wild life borne down the river from the earthquake area. The waters of the Brahmaputra, blackened with sulphur that the quake had churned up from the earth’s innards, cast up millions of dead and dying fish.”

 The purported HPP would be located in an area known as Pemaokoe, one of the last virgin areas of the world. For the Tibetans, it is as sacred as Mt Kailash and Lake Mansarowar, and Goddess Dorjee Phagmo, Tibet’s protector, is said to dwell there.
More on the project could be gathered from Chinese sources: the dam would be located at Deyang, a few kilometres upstream of Pai in Nyingchi Prefecture, and the terminal (power station) would be at Shirang, a few kilometres from the Indian border (Bishing). If completed, it will be the largest hydropower station in the world.
The retinue would not be more than 50 or 60 metres high. If higher, the reservoir could flood the military installations in Bayi, the main PLA cantonment in Southern Tibet and the urban area of Nyingchi town.
The diversion towards Shirang would use several diversion pipes and tunnels and then high-pressure pipes to divert water back in the Tsangpo, close to the McMahon Line which is the LAC.
It would be a run of the river project (which means the water just goes through the turbines after having been diverted through mega pipes or tunnels). The diversion or short-cut between the beginning and the end of the gorges (known as the Great Bend) would be between 30 and 40 km, cutting short the 260 km course of the Tsangpo.
Electricity would be produced by the huge difference of altitude between Pai Town, located at 2,930 metres above sea level (ASL) and Shirang near the Indian border at 600 metres ASL only. The drop would be between 2,200 and 2,400 metres, depending on the location of the last power station. It is said that water could flow at the rate of 3,000 cubic metres per second. As the turbines may not be able to withstand the pressure if there is only one station downstream, the Chinese engineers have apparently decided to have 6 or 9 substations (if 6, each would have 400 m altitude difference between them). Some also speak of a ‘ladder’ project. Apart from the incredibly difficult terrain, another problem lies in evacuating the power generated.
The project may be over in 2035 (the new dream date for the megalomaniac leaders in Beijing).
Many Chinese experts have suggested that the HPP project will be linked with the diversion of the Tsangpo towards the mainland. The project, called Hongqi or Red Flag, is spearheaded by Prof Wang Hua of Tsinghua University, who is also Chairman of the Expert Group on Dialogue for the ‘Red Flag River Issue’. When the university had reopened after the Cultural Revolution, on the same benches was Chen Xi, today a member of the Politburo. Wang and Chen know each other from the 1970s. Also studying in Tsinghua University at the same time was one Xi Jinping. There is no doubt that the diversion protagonists are well-connected—and that it is extremely worrying for India.

Declaration of War? A New Front in the Himalaya

The unthinkable has happened, yesterday, The Global Times announced "China to build historic Yarlung Zangbo River hydropower project in Tibet".
The dam in the Great Bend has been the object of thousands of articles, I myself wrote more than 70 on the Big Dam and the Diversion of the Brahmaputra, but I always thought (and all the serious analysts too), that it was not feasible.
Now Emperor Xi as decided to go for it: "China will build a hydropower project on the Yarlung Zangbo River, one of the major waters in Asia that also passes through India and Bangladesh, and the head of the involved company said that the project could serve to maintain water resources and domestic security," wrote the mouthpiece of the Communist Party of China.
The Global Times continued: "China will implement hydropower exploitation in the downstream of the Yarlung Zangbo River, and this was clearly put forward in the proposals for formulating the country's 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-25) and its long-term goals through 2035 made by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Yan Zhiyong, chairman of the Power Construction Corp of China, or POWERCHINA, said at a conference on Thursday, according to an article on the WeChat account of the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League of China."

The dam company explained: "There is no parallel in history… it will be a historic opportunity for the Chinese hydropower industry," Yan told a conference to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the founding of the China Society for Hydropower Engineering."

China has always denied that they would do it. One more example showing that the present regime cannot be trusted.

In November 2006, as President Hu Jintao was leaving India after a State visit, the Chinese Minister for Water Resources, Wang Shucheng, categorically stated that the proposal was "unnecessary, unfeasible and unscientific." He added that it had no government backing: "There is no need for such dramatic and unscientific projects.” He however admitted: "There may be some retired officials that support the plan, but they're not the experts advising the government.” In 2006, I wrote: "It was not a point blank denial as he admitted that the project existed. As we know, governments change, so do their advisors."

I reproduced here an article that I wrote 10 years ago, quoting a piece of 2013.

Dams on the Brahmaputra
In October 20, 2003, I wrote an article Diverting the Brahmaputra: a Declaration of War for Rediff.com. At the time, I was told that it was a cheap journalistic gimmick; there was no ‘scientific’ proof!
My question then was: “What is the rationale for the project?”
I had explained: “Two of the most acute problems China faces today are food and water. These two issues are closely linked and, if not solved, are bound to have grave social and political consequences for the country” and added: “The new emperors are not sure where the solution lies or even if there is a solution.”
Seven years later, these problems are more acute than ever. Since then, another issue has cropped up: fast-track development of the Tibetan plateau (also known as The Third Pole by environmentalists). The new activities, mainly large-scale tourism, are energy-hungry. More power is required to maintain the increasing flow of mainland visitors (over millions tourists  visited the Tibetan capital in 2009).
The problem faced by China today is far more serious than 7 years ago.
The basic quandary however remains the same, with water becoming a rare commodity in China and agriculture needing more water to sustain its growth.
This led Chinese experts to look around for water. The answer was not far: four of the world’s ten major rivers, the Brahmaputra (or Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet), the Yangtze, the Mekong and the Huang Ho (or Yellow River) have their headwaters on the Tibetan plateau. The other major rivers which originate in Tibet are the Salween, the Irrawaddy, the Arun, the Karnali, the Sutlej and the Indus. About 90% of their runoff flows downstream to China, India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, Thailand, Burma, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam.
Thus the idea to use Tibet’s waters for Northern China was born.

One of the possibilities was to divert waters from the Great Bend of the Yarlung Tsangpo, north of the McMahon Line by building a mega structure. There are different versions of the project, but the Shuotian Canal is the most elaborated. It is the brainchild of an engineer, Guo Kai whose life mission is to save China with Tibet’s waters. He has calculated that if waters from the Salween, the Mekong, the Yangtse, the Yalong and the Dadu (last two are Yangtse’s tributaries) were diverted and directed to the Ngawa Prefecture of Qinghai (Amdo) Province, the problem for the recurrent water shortage in north and northwest China could be solved (today, the Yellow River is dry more than 250 days in a year).

Guo not only worked closely with experts from the Chinese Ministry of Water Resources and the Academy of Sciences (CAS), but also made several on-the-spot investigations and surveys, before coming up with the details of his pharaonic scheme.
According to him, the ‘Great Western Route’ diversion could solve the water shortage in north China, bring drinkable water to Tanjing and even counter the desertification facing the northern and northwestern provinces. It is why it is considered so vital to the Middle Kingdom’s strategic security.
The name Shuotian comes from the contraction of ‘Shuomatan’ the origin of the canal (near the Great Bend of the Brahmaputra) and the city of Tanjing at the fag end.

From the start the Chinese military have shown a lot of interest in Guo's Great Western Route scheme. In November 2005, the Great Western Route project got a boost with the publication of a book entitled Save China Through Water From Tibet, written by a Li Ling; the writer used Guo’s theme and arguments. It appears that more than 10,000 copies were ordered by various central government ministries and commissions, including the Ministry of Water Resources. Some observers will say that it is a figment of the imagination of a few old retired generals (with the backing of journalists looking for scoops), but it may or may not be the case.
In November 2006, as President Hu Jintao was leaving India after a State visit, the Chinese Minister for Water Resources, Wang Shucheng, categorically stated that the proposal was "unnecessary, unfeasible and unscientific." He added that it had no government backing: "There is no need for such dramatic and unscientific projects.” He however admitted: "There may be some retired officials that support the plan, but they're not the experts advising the government.” It was not a point blank denial as he admitted that the project existed. As we know, governments change, so do their advisors.

Recent developments
The proposed diversion/damming has come back in the news with the construction of a series of dams on the Yarlung Tsangpo upstream to the Great Bend. According to available information, the Chinese plan to build a series of five dams in the Shannan Prefecture (Lhoka) of Tibet at Zangmu, Gyatsa, Zhongda, Jiexu and Langzhen.
The Zangmu dam will be the first to be built. At an altitude of 3,260 meters, it is expected to generate 540 MW of electricity; its height will be 116 m and length 390 m, it will have a width of 19 m wide at the top and 76 m at the bottom. The 26 turbines-dam would cost 1.138 billion yen.
The contract has been awarded to a consortium of five companies under the leadership of Gezhouba, one of China's biggest dam-building companies (also involved in the massive $1.5 billion river diversion and hydro-electricity project on Neelum-Jhelum in POK).
For more than a year, satellite imagery as well photos of the project were available on the Net, even though the construction was denied by the Chinese government. The Government of India knew of the project but was unwilling to forcefully tackle Beijing and ask for factual explanations.
However recently during the question hour in Rajya Sabha, External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna informed the Members that during his visit to China, Beijing had finally admitted to the existence of the dam: “It is a fact that when we met in Beijing, the question of the power station did come up. The Chinese foreign minister assured me that there would be no water storage at the dam and it would not in any way impact on downstream areas.”
New Delhi sighed and Krishna and his team came back to India reassured.
Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao was so happy; there would be no diversion: “This would not be a project that would divert water… It is not a storage dam for irrigation purposes”, she said.

The latest developments and the Indian Government’s declaration raise several points:

1- At this stage it is difficult to link the string of five dams to the larger project of diverting the waters of the Yarlung Tsangpo/Brahmaputra to Northern China. The five dams, including the Zangmu dam located upstream of the proposed diversion project — Shuomatan or Great Bend — is said to be a run-of-river project only.

2- The rationale to divert the waters of the Yarlung Tsangpo is more compelling as ever. Many believe that it is only a question of time and one day China will have to go for it in order to survive. It is as serious as this.

3- For many months, the fact that China was building a dam in Zangmu was known and photos were circulating on the Net. Why did Delhi take up the matter with Beijing so late? It remains a mystery. Probably to not hurt the Chinese ‘sensitivities’.

 4- The Yarlung Tsangpo's gorge is a highly seismic zone. Most geologists agree that the area is prone to earthquakes. The South China Morning Post quoted Yang Yong, a Chinese geologist saying: “Huge mountains suddenly surged from a piece of flat land, forming two almost vertical walls to the horizon,” adding the canyon “is fresh evidence of violent geological movement. I cannot imagine a more dangerous spot to build dams.”

August 1950 earthquake in Tibet (8.6 on Richter scale)

5- India and China have no water-sharing agreements. A meeting of experts from India and China took place between April 26 and 29 in Delhi to discuss the issue of sharing information on the Brahmaputra and the Sutlej. Hopefully the outcome will be made public. Indian and Chinese water experts were to ink an ‘implementation plan’ to share hydrological data on the Sutlej and Brahmaputra rivers. Though the mechanism was mentioned in the Sino-Indian Joint Statements issued after the visits of Premier Wen Jiabao (2005) and President Hu Jinatao (2006) to India, the Chinese authorities had refused to share data because there was no ‘implementation plan’ to support decisions taken at the highest level.

6- Regarding the data of the Himalayan rivers, there is a major problem. The Indian babus are even more jealous of ’their’ data than their Chinese counterparts. Those who have tried to get scientific information on the flow of the Brahmaputra and other rivers have had a nightmarish experience. ‘National security’ is the babus’ mantra (this includes the Army babus).
One wonders sometimes is these babus are really interested in ‘national security’. Many believe that they are unconsciously playing into the hands of forces adverse to India. Because where are the ‘national interests’ in this case? How does it help to hide hard facts about the happenings on the Yarlung Tsangpo?

7- China has never consulted lower riparian states before undertaking dam constructions upstream, though it is considered as a trans-border water issue. As IDSA scholar, P. Stobdan puts it: “No downstream country has any legal arrangements or provisions of international law to deal with China’s river manipulation. China has refused to join the Mekong River Commission, and has also not ratified the UN convention on Non-Navigable Use of International Watercourses (1997)”. This is an issue on which Delhi could insist when Indian officials meet their Chinese counterparts. Data should be shared and transparent information on the projects undertaken on the Tibetan plateau should be given to the lower riparian States (though Bangladesh is so obsessed with India ‘stealing’ its waters that it does not realize that the Brahmaputra is flowing from China).
Pressure should also put on China to respect international regulations.

8- In China, there is a strong lobby advocating large dams (in India as well). An excellent paper Mountains of Concrete: Dams Building in the Himalayas published by an NGO International Rivers — People, Water, Life explains: “One of the biggest changes to occur in big dams in the past 20 years is the rise of Chinese dam builders and financiers. China’s dam industry has gone global, building hundreds of dams throughout Africa and Southeast Asia, but also Central Asia, South America, and the Himalayas. …Chinese dam builders have taken their business to nearby countries such as Burma, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Second, China’s domestic dam industry is now arguably the most prolific in the world, with technical skills on par with those of industrialized nations. While the playing field is becoming crowded within China, there is huge external demand for the technology, capacity, and financial backing that Chinese dam building companies can bring, particularly in countries like Pakistan and Nepal, where there are few domestic resources and leaders are eager to exploit rich hydropower resources or boost irrigation capacity.”
This lobby is very influential and advocates the diversion project (as the Chinese Minister for Water Resources stated, many PLA generals are also involved in the dam business). One should also not forget that several major Chinese banks have an interest in the mega-projects. Since the completion of the Three Gorges dam, this lobby has not been able to undertake ‘big’ projects.

9- One of the main problems is that some Indian intellectuals (this word is not appropriate, because according to me, they lack intellect), believe that the Chinese ‘are our friends’ (if not brothers) and India cannot afford a conflict with the Middle Kingdom. Their conclusion is that India should keep quiet. They trust that the Chinese leadership will never ‘dare’ to harm their brothers in India and that they will stand by their words.
When Beijing says that the Zangmu damming on the Brahmaputra will have no consequences for India, Indian 'experts' therefore readily agree. There was recently a talk at a reputed Indian think-tank in Delhi with the main Indian 'expert' arguing that even if the Brahmaputra is diverted, it will only be a mere 30% of its waters which will be lost to India and Bangladesh, with no consequence for these countries. This is frightening and unscientific. Is it not the duty of ‘experts’, scientists, strategists to study and analyze all possibilities, even if some are more remote?

10- One can understand what is going to happen to India and Bangladesh (whether it is a diversion or simply a string of dams) when one looks at the fate of the Mekong. The 4,350 km river has its source on the Tibetan Plateau. It flows downstream to the Yunnan province of China, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam. Chinese experts assert that Tibet contributes only 20 % to the Mekong's waters, and the remaining 80 % is fed from water sources in downstream countries. During recent months, a severe draught has been experienced in Yunnan province of China and the Indochinese peninsula.
The problem seems compounded by the fact that China has built several dams on the upper reaches of Mekong without consulting its neighbours. This year, the drought has been so severe that the cargo traffic on the river has stopped, affecting the lives of 65 million people in the peninsula.
Though some environment scientists claim that the lack of rainfall alone is responsible for the low level of the river, a group of affected countries — Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam— met in Thailand to discuss this hot issue.
When Panitan Wattanayagorn, a Thai government spokesman asked Beijing for 'more information, more cooperation and more coordination', China immediately denied any wrong doing.
Environmental NGOs in the peninsula however blame China for 'drying' the Mekong and provoking the crisis. China, a dialogue partner of the Commission took the 'attack' seriously and sent a delegation led by Vice-Foreign Minister Song Tao to the two-day conference in Thailand. Liu Ning, the Chinese Vice Minister of Water Resources argued that the dams and irrigation projects upstream have actually helped stave off some of the effects of drought. Facts speak otherwise.
The earlier mentioned report of International Rivers says: “Large dams alter the natural hydrology of rivers in unpredictable ways, and hold back soil-renewing silt, while the ‘hungry water’ below them scours river banks and stream beds, destroying fish habitat and wiping away fields and villages. The cascade of dams under construction in China’s Yunnan Province and the half-dozen proposed dams in northern Laos are particularly threatening because of their large storage capacity and impact on the river’s natural hydrology and seasonal inflows, the key to its natural bounty. Along with proposed dams in Cambodia, they also threaten to advance the expected date of sea-level rise in the Mekong Delta.”
It is a fact that large dams have an influence on the ecology of the bioregion, whether it is admitted by the dam builders or not.

11- Interestingly, the Pakistanis are laughing at South Block wishy-washiness. In October 2009, a discussion took place on the dams on http://forum.pakistanidefence.com.
Here is an extract:
Commenting on what External Affairs Ministry spokesperson Vishnu Prakash said in response to a media report stating that India will be checking “to ascertain whether there are recent developments that suggest any change in the position conveyed to us by the government of China”, a commentator said: “Checking, still checking… You can't help but laugh!”

12- It is not that the Chinese are unable to bend and listen. In May 2009 Premier Wen Jiabao, himself an engineer by training, suspended the construction of a planned cascade of 13 dams on the Nu River (Salween in Burma). Already in 2004 Wen had blocked an earlier version of the cascade and asked for a serious review of the environmental impact to be carried out. Wen’s decision has been seen as the response to international and local pressure over the environmental effects of such a structure in an eco-sensitive region. And let us not forget that Tibet’s environment is even more sensitive.

13- Last but not the least, there is a strong lobby in India which wants to build dams in Arunachal Pradesh. Ask any Arunachali minister, he will tell you: “We are the richest Indian State, we will soon ‘sell’ 50,000 MW of electricity to India”. The Assam Tribune recently reported: “Speaking to the media in North Lakhimpur after participating in a public function on 10th April, [Arunachal Home Minister] Tako Dabi said international circles that did not want India to become energy efficient by tapping its natural resources had been behind such popular movements that were voicing opposition to the construction of mega dams like the one in Gerukamukh and Dibang valley.” This shows another aspect of the issue, more difficult to handle by a weak Center.

One can only conclude that India is facing a complex and extremely serious problem; only by firm diplomacy and proper information of the public, does India have a chance to force Beijing to change its plans, avoiding thus a regrettable fait accompli.

'Red Flag River’ diversion project

Can the Hu Huanyong Line be changed?

A few weeks ago, I mentioned a new scheme for diverting part of the waters of the Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra) towards the north and northwest of China.
The project was spearheaded by Prof Wang Hua of Tsinghua University.
It appears that many have started raising issues on the feasibility of such mega project.
A scientific paper has come out in The Journal of Natural Resources in China.
It makes interesting points.
It is titled The Query: The Feasibility of the Water Diversion Function of 'Hongqi River' and written by Yang Qin-ye and Jing Ke1 of the Institute of Geographic Sciences and Natural Resources Research, Chinese Academy of Science and, Xu Jian-hui of the China Science Daily in Beijing.

A new element
A relatively new element in the debate on the subject is the recent declaration of the Bangladesh High Commissioner to India Syed Muazzem Ali.
Responding to a question on China building dams on the Yarlung Tsangpo, Ali said: "On the Brahmaputra basin, we are very concerned about diversion of water and Bangladesh is prepared to join a joint basin management concept where we will discuss the points of water as it flows from the point of origin to the point of exit in the sea."
He added: "And naturally, we will be very happy to fully cooperate with all regional joint agencies."
He said that Bangladesh believes in joint river basin management both in the Ganges and the Brahmaputra.
It would be good if India and Bangladesh could align their position on the subjet.

The original Hongqi Project 
The Red Flag Canal (‘Hongqi’) is an irrigation canal located 80 km northwest of Anyang in the northern extremity of Henan province.
In China, it is a mythic project because the canal was initiated during the Great Leap Forward and dug entirely by hand labour in the 1960s. The main canal is 71 kilometers long.  It begins close to the border of Henan and Shanxi province, diverting water from the Zhang River which flows from Shanxi. A dam is located near the junction of the three provinces. The canal winds around the side of a cliff, through 42 tunnels and along the side of the Taihang Mountains.
The Red Flag Canal was the subject of several movies. It has been used by Chinese propaganda as an example of what workers can achieve under local mass initiative.

The new Hongqi project 
According to those who conceived it, the basic objective of the present ‘Hongqi River’ Project (also known as ‘Red Flag River’ Project) is to improve the ecological and environmental conditions of dry areas in the Northwest China.
It could be done, they believe, by transferring water from the following rivers to Xinjiang and other arid areas in Northwest China:

• the Yarlung Zangbo (later Brahmaputra)
• the Salween
• the Mekong
• the Yangtze
• the Yalong 
• and the Dadu River

All these rivers flow from the Tibetan plateau.
The objective is to develop some 200 million mu (around 13.33×104 km2) of farmland and an oasis (green corridor) in these desert areas.
The above mentioned paper notes that the ‘Hongqi River’ Project is a grand 'idea' of water diversion across river basins, which has attracted wide attention at home and abroad.

Many difficulties/impossibilities
This ‘grand idea’ faces multiple severe challenges in the fields of geology, technology, economy, society and ecology, and there is a great uncertainty, admits the scientists.
First issues: can 60 billion m3 of 'diverted' water cannot meet the needs of the development of 200 million mu of farmland?
Then, can it meet the needs of the ecological green belt of 15×104 km2?
Some Chinese scientists would like to realize both at the same time.
The authors of the paper do not agree: “From the perspective of physical geography, natural resources and environment and regional development”, the answer is ‘No’, they assert.

How much water will reach Xinjiang?
Another question is how much water can reach the areas to be developed in Xinjiang “when there is strong leakage and evaporation along the river?”
According to those who planned the project, it should be built in 10 years, with investment of 4 trillion yuan (US $ 650 billion). Knowing that the normal investment for farmland irrigation per mu is about 2,00,00 yuan, the cost of 'diverted' water per cubic meter will be around 66 yuan.
The paper rightly asked: “Who will pay for the expensive water bill when the project is completed and running?”

The Environmental Impact
Yet another issue is the environmental impact and ecological consequences triggered by the water diversion. There is a great uncertainty; the authors admit that they are highly concerned.
The paper further explains that the water diversion project is not only a complex water conservancy project, but also a very complex ecosystem engineering, and a very complicated social and economic project.
Have the engineers who conceived it studied this in detail?
Apparently not.

Other issues
The list of issues to be tackled is long: “Environmental effects, ecological consequences and socioeconomic effects involve complex geophysical, chemical and biological processes, as well as the complex process of harmonious balance between human and earth relations.”
Interestingly, the paper also notes that that is an international angle to ‘diversion’: “The ‘Hongqi River’ Project involves international rivers. The potential geopolitical risks need to be drawn attention.”
India and Bangladesh and the countries of the Indo-Chinese peninsula have certainly not been informed.

Conclusions
The conclusions of the authors are: “At the existing level of understanding, it is necessary to make a thorough and systematic study of these problems.”
The noted that there are also misunderstandings in the public about the ‘Hongqi River’ project: “there are still several views that are contrary to scientific cognition, such as ‘changing the climate pattern of China’ [by diverting the water], ‘forest causing precipitation’, and breaking the ‘Hu Huanyong Line’.
The paper goes in detail and clarifies some of these misunderstandings.
This paper shows that there is no unanimity among Chinese scientists for the mega project.
Let us hope that sanity will prevail at the end, but a lot of money is involved. It makes many lobbies greedy.

The Brahmaputra Diversion and the Tsinghai Clique

The Diversion Scheme
Some fifteen years ago, a Chinese engineer Li Ling and a retired PLA General Gao Kai, seriously worked on a scheme for the diversion of the Yarlung Tsangpo/Brahmaputra. Li Ling published a book called Tibet's Waters will Save China in which he detailed the diversion project, also known as Shuomatan Canal (from Suma Tan in Central Tibet to Tanjing in China).
At that time, 'experts' denounced the plans of Li Ling and Gao Kai.
Beijing also decided to cool down India’s legitimate worries.
In 2006, the Chinese Water Resources Minister Wang Shucheng, a hydraulic engineer, affirmed that the proposal was "unnecessary, unfeasible and unscientific. There is no need for such dramatic and unscientific projects."
He however admitted that there a plan in the drawers, but "the project involves major financial and technical difficulties".
Wang further explained: “For example, we must keep an eye on possible floods when the Yellow River has 58 billion cubic metres of water. If another 50 billion cubic metres, not to mention 200 billion, is poured in, I am sure all the dams and protection embankments will be destroyed immediately.”
He added: “the cost of diverting water from the Yarlung Zangbo would be much more expensive than any of the current water projects.”
The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao also confirmed: “The Chinese government has no plans to build a dam on the Yarlung Zangbo River (the China part of the Brahmaputra) to divert water to the Yellow River.”
Qin Hui, a professor in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences of Tsinghua University declared: “We have to take the international response into consideration. It is undoubted that the lower reaches of Yarlung Tsangpo River are within India's Assam Province, where it is a lifeline for local agriculture and backbone of the economy, just as it is further downstream in Bangladesh.”
The Chinese media also criticized Li Ling's book Tibet's water will Save China.
Nobody took the project too seriously.

The new scheme
Today the situation is different, Prof Wang Hao mentioned in my article is the main proponent the new diversion scheme; he is Chairman of the Expert Group on Dialogue for the ‘Red Flag River Issue’.
Wang is a respected academician of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, and honorary director of the Water Resources Institute of the China Institute of Water Resources and Hydropower Research. He is also Vice President for China of the Global Water Partnership; Deputy-Director, Academic Commission of China Institute of Water Resources and Hydropower Research (IWHR) and a member of the Science & Technology Committee of the Ministry of Water Resources.
He is an alumnus of the famous Tsinghua University.
He did his B.Sc. on Irrigation and Drainage Engineering, from the Department of Hydraulic Engineering, Tsinghua University (April 1978－July 1982) and his M.Sc. on Hydrology and Water Resources from the Department of Hydraulic Engineering, (August 1982－March 1985).
Later he earned his PhD in System Engineering from the Institute of Economics and Management of the same Tsinghua University.

Tsinghua University
For more on Tsinghua University, let us have a look at Wikipedia:

When the Cultural Revolution began in 1966, many university students walked out of the classrooms, and some went on to be part of the Red Guards, resulting in the complete shutdown of the university. It was not until 1978, after the Cultural Revolution had ended, that the university began to take in students again. Even so, Tsinghua University remained in the top tier of schools in China.

Wikipedia further explains:

Since the 1980s, the university has incorporated a multidisciplinary system. As a result, several schools were re-incorporated. These included the School of Sciences, the School of Economics and Management, the School of Life Sciences, the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, the Tsinghua Law School, the School of Public Policy and Management, and the Academy of Arts and Design.

Chen Xi
Who was seating on the same benches than Wang Hao when the University reopened after the Cultural Revolution?
One Chen Xi was there.
Chen is today member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China. Chen is also Secretary of the Secretariat of the Communist Party of China, and President of the Central Party School.
From 2002 to 2008, Chen served as the party chief of the University. Later he was vice-minister of education and Vice Chairman of the China Association for Science and Technology.
Wang and Chen know each other from the 1970s.
Wikipedia says:

“Chen was recommended to attend the prestigious Tsinghua University as a ‘Worker-Peasant-Soldier student’, where he earned a bachelor's degree. At Tsinghua he was friends with Xi Jinping, who was also attending Tsinghua at the time.

Chen had joined the Communist Party in November 1978. After graduating from Tsinghua he returned to Fuzhou University to become a lecturer. In September 1979 he headed back to Tsinghua where he completed a Masters of Science degree. He stayed at Tsinghua to work for the Communist Party and its affiliated Youth League as a political organizer.”

Incidentally, Chen was born in September 1953, Prof Wang is a month younger.

Another well-known Tsinghua Graduate
Another famous alumnus from Tsinghai University is born in 1953 (June).
His name is Xi Jinping.
His closeness with Chen from their student’s days explains the latter's quick promotion to the politburo.  Let us quote Wikipedia again:

Xi Jinping
From 1975 to 1979, Xi studied chemical engineering at Beijing's prestigious Tsinghua University as a ‘Worker-Peasant-Soldier student’, where engineering majors spent about one-fifth of their time studying Marxism–Leninism–Mao Zedong thought, doing farm work and "learning from the People's Liberation Army".

The present diversion scheme
That is why the present diversion scheme is far more serious than the previous one(s); he may have the backing of many in the academic world and the Party.
The scheme, presented by Wang Hao and his group of scientists, should not be dismissed like the previous one prepared by two old nationalist fools (Li Ling-Gao Kai Plan).
Further, as mentioned in yesterday’s article. China has tremendously progressed in the technological field, making it easier to realize on the project ground.
The problem is the project economically feasible?
Certainly not, but if big shots are behind...

China’s craving for mad old dreams

New scheme to divert the Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra)

My article China’s craving for mad old dreams appeared in the Edit Page of The Pioneer.

Here is the link...

Chinese scientists continue to work on grandiose dam projects which are bound to do more harm than good. But these megaprojects may not quench the locals' thirst for freedom

China is thirsty. What can the Middle Kingdom do to quench its thirst? Simple, have said the Chinese experts for decades, divert the rivers from Tibet to the Mainland and to Xinjiang.
On March 29, the Chinese magazine The Southern Weekend carried an interview of Wang Hao, the Chairman of the Expert Group on Dialogue for the ‘Red Flag River Issue’, a group of ‘scientists’ discussing regularly these issues, in particular the diversion of the Yarlung Tsangpo River.
Wang is also an academician of the Chinese Academy of Engineering, and honorary director of the Water Resources Institute of the China Institute of Water Resources and Hydropower Research.
Though plans to divert Yarlung Tsangpo (which becomes the Siang as it enters in India and then the Brahmaputra) are known for decades, the Expert Group is working on a new scheme known as the ‘Red Flag River’, which apparently has already been turned down by the Government.
The Southern Weekend admitted that despite the participation of a number of academicians and experts, the project raises a lot of questions. How is this scheme different from the previous plans? The Brahmaputra Valley is known for its rich ecosystem; it is also an area witnessing frequent geological disasters. What would be the environmental consequences of such a project?
Wang admitted that though a large number of ecological and environmental impact studies have been carried out, “the environmental impact assessment has not yet been completed”.
However, for the Chinese scientist, the ecological issue not the basic one, the real difficulty is political; each Province on the route is bound to create problems for handing over the required lands, prices will rise and competition between local interests will create more hurdles.
Wang Hao however argued: “These people (the scientists planning the diversion) are not crazy…they have a sense of responsibility.” He pointed out what he called the main issue: “There is no water in the southwest and in the northwest. (If the project is realised), the entire country will change, and future generations will be better off.”
It is true that there is a difference with previous plans; in the past, China did not possess “hard rock tunneling machine and only drill and blast method was used”. Wang observed that China is today the world leader in drilling technology: “Our longest tunnel is 55 kilometers. Considering that the hard rock boring machine also needs a proper access, we have selected a (new) alignment, where it is relatively easier.”

Another project
Already in August 2017, The Global Times had reported that some 20 scholars had met in Urumqi in Xinjiang to discuss the “feasibility of diverting water from the heights of the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau to Xinjiang’s lowland plains”. The tabloid wrote: “Experts want the Government to reconsider diverting water from Tibet to parched northern regions. They claim the project will help stimulate the world economy and create a ‘second China’ in the region’s arid plains. Disagreements remain strong due to the huge cost and possible environmental damage.”
For the downstream neighbours, the small mercy lies in these disagreements. Ren Qun Luo, professor at the Xinjiang University of Finance and Economics, told the party’s mouthpiece: “Water from (Tibetan) rivers can help turn the vast deserts and arid lands into oasis and farmlands, alleviate population pressure in the east, as well as reduce flood risks.”
It is not clear if these ‘scientists’ are a part of the group headed by Wang; however Ren was quoted as saying: “Xinjiang has 1.1 million square kilometers of plains, equal in size to all the plains in the country’s east. But less than 70,000 square kilometers are arable due to a shortage of water...If all these plains are greened, another China will have been created.”
The Global Times admitted the dream of massive water diversions, from soaking-wet Southwest China to the thirsty north, has been on the minds of engineers and scholars for decades: “Some say this dream could be a nightmare of environmental damage, and these concerns mean the plateau-to-plain project has never been approved.”
One wonders if the Indian mandarins in South Block will dare to question their Chinese counterparts about these crazy schemes. If they do, it will probably immediately be denied by Beijing.
When Chinese President Hu Jintao visited India in November 2006, Wang Shucheng, his Minister for Water Resources, stated that the scheme of diverting the Yarlung Tsangpo was “unnecessary, unfeasible and unscientific” and it had no government backing. The China Daily quoted him as saying: “There is no need for such dramatic and unscientific projects.”
But nothing can stop Chinese ‘scientists’ who love these so-called impossible projects. It probably evokes for them the Great Wall or the Grand Canal.


Changing the weather
Take another example. A few weeks ago, The South China Morning Post reported: “Vast system of chambers on Tibetan plateau could send enough particles into the atmosphere to allow extensive clouds to form.” The Hong Kong newspaper added: “China is testing cutting-edge defence technology to develop a powerful yet relatively low-cost weather modification system to bring substantially more rain to the Tibetan plateau, Asia’s biggest freshwater reserve.”
There is an obsession with Tibet’s waters and environment among some of the members the scientific community in China; the The South China Morning Post explained: “The system, which involves an enormous network of fuel-burning chambers installed high up on the Tibetan mountains, could increase rainfall in the region by up to 10 billion cubic metres a year — about seven per cent of China’s total water consumption. Tens of thousands of chambers will be built at selected locations across the Tibetan plateau to produce rainfall over a total area of about 1.6 million square.”
Ma Weiqiang from the Institute of Tibetan Plateau Research observed that a cloud-seeding experiment on such a scale could help answer many intriguing scientific questions; he was however quick to add that it could affect the weather in the region: “(It) might not work as perfectly in real life, as intercepting the moisture in the skies over Tibet could have a knock-on effect and reduce rainfall in other Chinese regions.”

What about India?
The point is that Chinese scientists continue to work on these grandiose schemes which are bound to bring more harm than good to China …and also to the neighbours who are never consulted anyway. The question remains: Why are Chinese ‘experts’ putting so much time and energy to materialise old mad dreams?
In the meantime, Beijing has decided to spend $300 million to improve the irrigation systems “in the heavily ethnic Uygur part of the violence-prone region of Xinjiang,” announced Xinhua which added: “The Government has increasingly turned its focus to development in southern Xinjiang in recent years, in an implicit recognition of the economic causes of some of the unrest there.”
Will more water help in solving the restive Province’s issue? Can these megaprojects quench the locals’ thirst for freedom? Certainly not.

Tibet’s Waters for Xinjiang: Another Diversion of the Brahmaputra?

Picture accompanying the Chinese article

I often mentioned on this blog, the different 'diversion' schemes, whether of the Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra) or the Indus River.
Now, a new one has come to light.
According to an official Chinese website, during the 'Two Sessions', the China Railway Tunnel Group Co Ltd (CRTG), the largest specialized company in the field of underground works in China, which integrates design, construction, scientific research and manufacture, proposed to divert the Yarlung Tsanpo (Brahmaputra) from Tibet to Xinjiang.
CRTG is itself a subsidiary of the China Railway Group Ltd, with has 14 wholly-owned subsidiaries, 3 holding subsidiaries, 2 share holding subsidiaries and 8 branch companies.
The company likes to think big (money).
Whether it could trigger a conflict with India is not its concern.

The New Scheme
During the Second Session of the Twelfth National People's Congress (NPC), CRTG’s Deputy Chief Engineer Wang Mengshu submitted a project for the first phase of mega ‘a water diversion’ scheme.
Wang Mengshu stated that the water transfer project could not only help the ecological environment in the project area, but also greatly improve the social and economic development of the region, i.e. Xinjiang.
It would also improve the transportation, energy, communications and other infrastructure conditions in Southern Xinjiang, on a desert area covering 80 million square kilometers which could be transformed into an oasis.
It would later help ‘transferring’ of a large number of people to this strategic area of Western China.
In a long-term, it would have a great significance for the development of the region.
The ‘proposal’ has been worked out with the Hydraulics and Mountain River Development Department of the Sichuan University. Key national research laboratories are ready to provide further support.
Wang Mengshu introduced the first phase of the project to divert some 10 billion to 15 billion m3 from the Yarlung Zangbo River (Brahmaputra) to Southern Xinjiang.
The main feature of the project would be that the transfer of flood waters would not require a hydropower station power generation required as the waters would flow downstream and the ecological environment of the basin would not be significantly affected.

The first hub: four features
The first hub would not used 'water diversion technology’ with a dam.
Gravity through a tunnel would be complemented by smart water management for the distribution system.
In his introduction, Wang Mengshu said that in the first phase of the project, there will four major technical features.
One, the first part will not use a dam for the diversion.
It will conform to natural and sustainable laws.
Second, the traditional Dujiangyan watershed, sand and diversion control technology and water flow control technology will be utilised.
What is a Dujiangyan irrigation system?
According to Wikipedia, it was originally constructed around 256 BC by the State of Qin as a water conservation and flood control scheme. The system's infrastructure is on the Min River (Minjiang) in Sichuan.
The area is situated in the western portion of the Chengdu flat lands at the confluence between the Sichuan basin and the Qinghai-Tibet plateau. Originally the Minjiang rushed down from the Min Mountains, but slowed abruptly after reaching the Chengdu Plains, causing the watercourse to fill up with silt, making the surrounding area extremely prone to flooding. Li Bing, then governor of Shu for the state of Qin, took care of the construction of the Dujiangyan, which harnessed the river using a new method of channeling and dividing the water rather than simply following the old way of dam building. It is still in use today to irrigate over 5,300 square kilometers of land in the same area.
In the 'diversion' scheme, the principles will be to utilize ‘curved circulation’ to achieve secondary water flow and sedimentation, the use of ‘settling sedimentation’, and finally use of a shaft to control the water, according to the principle of using floods waters.
It could work even during the dry season, as well as meet the downstream ecological requirements while helping reduce the downstream floods.
The third feature the water supply will be the use of gravity through flow tunnel technology, it will avoid evaporation along the way.
All other technical issues will make the project safe and reliable.
Fourth and finally, the pressure-flow will be self-regulated by the shaft technology which can be used to divide the whole water delivery system into several relatively independent subunits.
It can reduce the ‘water hammer pressure’ of the whole water supply system and avoid the full range of diffusion and propagation of hydraulic oscillation.
And also it will reduce the 'vibration' of the water flow system and tackle other issues; it will be easy to control and will fully transfer the flood waters.
The structure is also relatively simple, according to Meng, though not easy to understand for the lay man.
Wang Mengshu said that this water transfer technology is feasible, the ecological impact is minimal; it has a low operating and maintenance costs.
With the use of tunnels for the water supply, water evaporation loss is minimal and water security is fully protected. The principle of taking away flood waters, will avoid the outflow of surplus water downstream and even will reduce the pressure on the river flood control.
Wang Mengshu suggested carrying a demonstration of the water diversion project. On this basis, the implementation of the first phase of the project is feasible, he said.
The translation of the article might not be perfect but it gives an idea of the concept of the project.

What about India?
No doubt that the ‘tunnel lobby’ is as powerful as the ‘dam lobby’ in the Middle Kingdom.
Like the other projects reported in this blog earlier, it is a dream of megalomaniac engineers, who forget that the Yarlung Tsangpo (the Siang in Arunachal Pradesh and later the Brahmaputra and the Jamuna in Bangladesh) is not the sole property of the the People's Republic of China.
India and Bangladesh have a say as far as the utilisation of its waters is concerned.
It is probably one of these projects to remind India that China, by controlling Tibet, also control the Tibetan rivers and can create a lot of trouble for the lower riparian States.
Can it go further than the drawing board?
It is doubtful.

Some previous posts

• Water War in South Asia? (2003)

• Again diverting the Brahmaputra (2013)

• The 'feasibility' of diverting the Brahmaputra (2014)

• Diverting the Indus to Xinjiang (2015)

Rijiju on Modi sarkar: Discipline can't be termed as dictatorship

Tsona Rinpoche who recently passed away

Part Two of my Rediff interview (with Sheela Bhatt) of Kiren Rijiju, Minister of State for Home Affairs

‘Our weather conditions are determined by the lofty Himalayan ranges, 90 percent of the fresh water to India comes from the Himalayan region. If the Himalayan region is protected, then India’s future is bright. But if the Himalayan region is in danger, it will be a disaster for our country.’

‘Every politician has his own trait. Modiji is unique in many senses. His idea about anything is precise and sharp. His working style is focused. Any decision is fast and quick.’
 
‘People were looking for leadership for the country. For a long time it was perceptible to everybody that India lacked a leader. Without strong leadership you cannot get a direction for the country.’

Minister of State for Home Kiren Rijiju speaks of his plans in the second and final part of an exclusive interview to Claude Arpi and Sheela Bhatt.

In this final part of his interview, he speaks of the policies of the Modi government for the Himalayan belt and what Modi’s election as the prime minister means.

A few questions related to Arunachal Pradesh: 

Tsona (TG) Rinpoche recently passed away in very tragic circumstances and his funeral witnessed some law and order problems. Would you like to comment? Do you see nefarious forces behind this tragic incident?

It is difficult to pinpoint the reason for the tragic death of T.G. Rinpoche. But it’s a tragedy for all of us. He was young, a highly revered lama and he took this extreme step. I could not really come to terms with what might be the reason for that.
It’s not really comprehensible in my mind. It is a great loss, not just for Arunachal, but the entire Himalayan region because he is the president of the Himalayan Buddhist Association and so many organisations. Rinpoche was running so many institutes. He was the most influential Buddhist leader of the country. This is really unfortunate.

Do you think the Chinese could use his demise and his reincarnation? Tsona is located in Tibet, isn’t it?

Yes, Tsona is around 70 km off Tawang. About the Chinese, I cannot really comment. I hope a controversy like the Karmapa or the Panchen Lama doesn’t happen. Especially because Rinpoche was from my own region, I hope his reincarnation takes place in Mon Tawang region (Tawang and West Kameng districts) or in any of the Himalayan Buddhist regions within Indian territory.
That’s my wish, but these have serious religious connotations. I cannot really apprehend what could have happened. It’s difficult to say. But it was a tragedy, an unbearable loss.

In Arunachal, you have people who are either anti-dams or pro-dams. It is an issue that has divided the people in Arunachal and in Uttarakhand. Any comments?

In Arunachal, the whole hydro power issue has been mishandled. We need power, but the way the projects were given away raised suspicion in the minds of the people. They have become suspicious because you can award two or three projects but you cannot have the entire basin in one go. It was so haphazardly done that people started objecting.
Personally, I’m not in favour of big dams; but I’m in favour of small or medium dams that are environmentally sustainable, can generate revenue for the state and produce power for the country.
India is a power deficient country and I hope that we generate a good amount of hydro electricity power from Arunachal, but certainly not by tapping those ultra mega power projects in our state which are not good for the local people, as well as the state.
What about the diversion of the Brahmaputra which the Chinese have constantly denied since 2006? Though they are still denying that any such type of project is on the cards, it appears that some engineers in China are still thinking about it.
The original plan was to be carried out in the 1950s. Today, their western route involves the Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra) river. This is known as the western diversion. Now, whether it is going to materialise or not is still not very clear.
It has been reported that their project was going on, however the dams that they are constructing today on the Tsangpo river are only run-of-the river dams.

I’m speaking of the big one in Metok area, north of Upper Siang district…

We have to understand this from two points. If they’re going to generate 30,000 megawatts at Metok, then they cannot divert the river. The water has to fall down (to produce electricity); if they divert the river they cannot generate that kind of electricity.
This is a technical issue: once the river is diverted from the Great Bend (of the Brahmaputra), to then generate that kind of electricity seems difficult.
Recently, there was a plan to use the 30,000 megawatts generated in Metok to pump the water up towards Gansu and Qinghai provinces.
If that technology exists and if they’re planning to use it, then it is dangerous for us. We hope that the Chinese government will only take such steps after consultation with India. Both countries are planning to move together, to have a better understanding.
When both these huge countries have an understanding and a plan to move together, I hope that the Chinese side will not take such extreme steps.

Any comment on Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi's statement that China was giving stapled visas to people of Arunachal ‘out of goodwill’?

That was quite a complicated statement. I could not really understand the intention or the meaning of what the foreign minister said. He wanted to sound positive towards us, but (China’s) action is not exactly that. But I will not be able to comment on what he had intended till our external affairs ministry comes out with a statement.

The question of having a ministry for the Himalayas has come up. In the Lok Sabha, your party has 11 out of 13 seats from the region. What are your views on a Himalayan ministry or how it could help tackling environmental and security issues in the region?

The entire Himalayan region is not just sacred to us, but it is environmentally very crucial for the subcontinent. Our weather conditions are determined by the lofty Himalayan ranges, 90 percent of the fresh water to India comes from the Himalayan region. If the Himalayan region is protected, then India’s future is bright. But if the Himalayan region is in danger, it will be a disaster for our country.
When we talk about having an authority or a ministry for the Himalayan region, it will deal with every aspect of the region. This whole Himalayan region has a unique identity of its own.
Never before has the Himalayan region been given the importance that our government has given: by cleaning the Ganga or taking care of the pristine, yet very fragile environmental condition of the whole of Himalayan region. So as an MP from the Himalayan region I’m very hopeful that a road map will be laid out and action will start very soon.

Could you envisage having a group of MPs in the Lok Sabha dealing with the Himalayas?
 
Yes, during the 14th Lok Sabha, I was the convener of the Himalayan parliamentary forum. I have already dealt with this subject long back. Now I’m the minister myself, I will bring some synergy with the members of Parliament for the entire Himalayan belt, Ladakh, Mandi belt in Himachal, Uttarakhand, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh.
We are definitely going to have a sitting because our problems are similar; if we sit together and come up with a strategy, then it will help the government in formulating policies.

The PM said recently that all the ministries should clarify the division of work between the Cabinet minister and the minister of state. During the last 10 years, all the MoS of the United Progressive Alliance government were not given enough work by their ministers. What is your position?

I don’t think that we will face this kind of situation. In my case, my senior minister, Rajnath Singh, is party president and I have been his colleague, as one of the office-bearers of the party. We have a long working relationship; now we are both in the home ministry and I’m very comfortable with him.
We are working together, for every presentation, with security agencies, for developmental schemes taken up by our ministry. My senior minister has made me very comfortable in the ministry. In fact, I should complement the synergy in the ministry under the leadership of this dynamic leader.

When did you meet Narendra Modi for the first time, what was your first impression and how did your relationship grow?

When I was general secretary of the Arunachal Pradesh BJP; it was in 1999. Modiji was national general secretary. We had met on many occasions. I remember a north-eastern workers’ training programme, which brought us, north-eastern BJP leaders, to Thane near Mumbai. Modiji came and took a class.

What was it about?

It was about the efficiency required for the organisation and how the party leaders should devote their time to expand the party work and its pace. The classes taken by Modiji were very effective and everybody appreciated that he was really hardworking and intelligent.

Did the thought that he’ll become the prime minister one day cross your mind?

I always thought that Modiji will forever be in the party organisation, but when he was made the chief minister of Gujarat in 2002 I thought that was the best decision the party has ever taken.

What makes him different or special? He is also a politician.

Every politician has his own trait. Modiji is unique in many senses. His idea about anything is precise and sharp. His working style is focused. Any decision is fast and quick. He is tireless and we get a lot of inspiration looking at him. Even if I’m tired, I look at him. He’s forever fresh.

Does he understand the intricacies of the north-east's issues?

When he was general secretary, he visited the north-eastern region many times. He understands the north-eastern people. We’re so lucky to have him as our PM and I’m lucky to serve under him.

Why were you selected?

We don’t lobby for ministries in BJP, like people in other parties do. It doesn’t look nice to put yourself forward; it is unbecoming. So we left everything to Modiji.

Please tell us your broader view of what has happened in India, on the change that India has witnessed.

People were looking for leadership in the country. For a long time it was perceptible to everybody that India lacked a leader. Without strong leadership you cannot get a direction for the country. Direction must be driven by strong leadership. That leadership was provided by Modi. When he came into the scene, people felt he is the man we’re looking for.
The Congress lacks leadership. They have a dynastic system where quality doesn’t come into the picture. The vision doesn’t come into the picture; it is the family name that is driving the party. There was a clear cut choice in front of the people, especially the younger generation. We have a fantastic future for the country and a fantastic leader (Modi).

How should normal Indians understand the north-east? Because, some attacks and killings in Delhi in recent times are so shocking.

First of all, we should not see the problems of north-eastern people as a problem of the north-eastern region. Suppose a person of the north-eastern region is being harassed or discriminated against, it is the problem of the country.
India has faced huge problems in the past 200 years under the British rule. It is we, Indians, who complained that we were being racially abused (by the British). If we ourselves are practising the same thing within the country, is it tolerable? No.
Secondly, India is multi-racial, multi-ethnic country. If the identity of India is not put into practice, then the idea of India is demolished.
Thirdly, the challenge before us is that India is a huge country. I cannot tell a person living in a remote corner of Karnataka to know about Mizoram. How will he know about Mizoram? The only way to let them know is through connectivity, education, publicity.
Suppose I’m here as a minister in home ministry, if I’m visible, I’m letting people know who’s the MoS of the home ministry, then people know where Kiren Rijiju comes from; the MoS is from Arunachal Pradesh, that way we come to know each other.

Many people have a fear that the Modi government is going to be a closed one and very dictatorial. What are your views?

Discipline and closed coordination within a system cannot be termed as dictatorial in any manner. We have come to power with a popular mandate, we are discharging our duty and fulfilling the wishes of the people.
We are trying to bring some discipline in our working system, everything is being streamlined; it has to be seen from this perspective. Some people might be saying that Modiji is trying to centralise power, it’s totally wrong.

Fifty Years ago: China already planned to dam the Brahmaputra

The Great Bend of the Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra)

As I am quoted, I am posting below an article published by the  Geopoliticalmonitor.com, a Canadian intelligence publication.
Though the project of a mega dam on the Brahmaputra (or worse, the diversion of the river) is today 'officially' denied by Beijing, there is no doubt that some scientists are working on it.
It is not a new project.
I recently came across a letter from the Deputy Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs, addressed to the Political Officer in Sikkim (Apa Pant).
The Note is dated October 1960. It appears that in the 1950s, the Chinese were already planning to use the hydroelectric potential of the Brahmaputra.
I reproduce here this letter which is available in the National Archives of India.

Secret 

From: B.C. Mishra
Deputy Secretary
Ministry of External Affairs
New Delhi
October 7, 1960
No. 12/281/NGO

Dear Shri Pant,
The following extract from a tour report of the Secretary General, Relief Committee for Tibetans, New Delhi, will be of interest to you:
"During the course of the talk, the Dalai Lama also informed that he had reports that Chinese are planning to build high dams across Brahmaputra and Indus group of rivers in the Tibetan region. He told that, as a matter of fact, the Chinese had those schemes in view ever since they came to Tibet in 1951. He wondered how far such projects undertaken unilaterally would be in the interest of India and when the projects took shape how the Government of India would view the situation”
2- We have received no information so far about any proposal of the Chinese Government to construct dams across the Indus and the Brahmaputra before the rivers leave Tibet. The correct international practice in such matters is that building of dams, reservoirs, etc. by the upper riparian must not cause material injury to the interests of the lower riparian. Since, however, the information contained in the above extract is rather vague, we cannot make representations to the Chinese. However, the necessity of being alert in this matter can hardly be over-emphasized.

3- As I said above, we have no correct information about any Chinese plan to construct dams or reservoirs on the rivers. However, we do know that there is a great fall in the Brahmaputra just before it enters Indian territory – I believe 6 miles from our border. This fall has a great potential for power and irrigation (?). It will, of course, require huge resources to make anything out of it and it will certainly take a long time. Nevertheless, I thought you would be interested to be apprised of this. You may perhaps like to pass the above information on our Missions in Tibet too.

Yours sincerely
sd/ (B.C. Mishra)

To Shri Apa B. Pant
Political Officer
Government of India
Sikkim
Gangtok

Fifty-four years later, Mishra's conclusion: "However, the necessity of being alert in this matter can hardly be over-emphasized," is still valid.

Water Wars: The Next Clash between India and China
Amitava Mukherjee
April 17, 2014

A China watcher named Claude Arpi has drawn attention to a recently posted article on the website of the Yellow River Conservancy Commission under China’s Ministry of Water Resources. The article speaks of the necessity and feasibility of diverting the waters of some rivers, including the Brahmaputra (called Yarlung Tsangpo in China), to meet water supply needs in China’s arid north and northwest. This further confirms the fact that, in spite of several denials, China is still progressing with the controversial project that could spell doom in not just large parts of India but Bangladesh as well.
If the article is to be believed, engineers in China’s Ministry of Water Resources have already completed a feasibility study. In 1999, Jiang Zemin, a former president of China, announced the grandiose “Great Western Extraction” plan which would transfer huge volume of water from Tibet to the Yellow River. In 2008, Prime Minister Singh raised the issue with the Chinese leadership, but Wen Jiabao, the then Chinese prime minister, replied that the water diversion plan was imperative due to China’s water insecurity.
There was a grain of truth in Wen Jiabao’s statement, and herein lies a grave source of tension in the Indian subcontinent. Fast-paced development has raised water imbalance in China to such an extent that the Chinese government has no other option but to look at unconventional replenishment options. Already 300 million people in China have no access to safe drinking water and 400 of the country’s 600 major towns are suffering from water shortages. While southern China has 80 inches of average annual rainfall, northern China - with massive population centers like Beijing with over 20 million people and Tianjin with 12 million - receives only 8-16 inches of annual rainfall on average. Groundwater levels under Beijing have fallen by 2.5 meters since 1999 and a staggering 59 meters since 1959.
The situation is very alarming, as water conflicts may soon become the main source of discord between India and China, replacing the two countries’ ongoing boundary dispute. China has 2.8 trillion cubic meters of water and stands fourth in the world in this regard. But due to the gigantic size of its population, China’s per-capita water reserves stand at only 2,300 cubic meters. The northern portion of the country has 44.3 percent of overall population and 59.6 percent of its arable land - but it has only 4.5 percent of the country’s water resources. The region has an average per-capita water reserve of 747 cubic meters, which is one third the national average.
The burning question then becomes: how much of the Brahmaputra’s water does China plan to divert?  To all intents and purposes Beijing seems to have a two pronged strategy. The first one is called the South-North Water Diversion Project, which seeks to transfer 45 billion cubic meters of water from the Yangtze River to the north and northwest of the country. The first phase of this project has already gone operational. But the most ambitious strategy aims to shift 50 billion cubic meters of water from the Brahmaputra to the Yellow River. Experts believe that the energy generated from these proposed hydro-electric projects on the Brahmaputra might turn out to be useful in pushing up river waters through difficult mountainous terrains.
No one knows whether there are any Chinese plans for the river Indus, which also originates in Tibet. If Beijing were to divert the Indus, then several other Indian rivers, like the Sutlej, Kosi, Gandak, and Mahakali which get their replenishment from it would run dry.
The Brahmaputra is a trans-national river. It enters India from China at Arunachal Pradesh, where it is known as the Siang. While in Assam it takes the name Brahmaputra and enters Bangladesh at a place named Bahadurabad. On March 1, 2012 residents of Pasighat, a town on the bank of the Siang in Arunachal Pradesh, witnessed a very strange sight. On that date, the Siang - which used to be nearly several kilometers wide - ran completely dry. Since then the river has continued to shrink.
There is no doubt that China is in need of water. However, the Mumbai-based Strategic Foresight Group has calculated that the Himalayan river basins in Bangladesh, China, India, and Nepal shelter 1.3 billion people. In the next two decades, annual per-capita water availability in these basins will decline by 13-35 percent. Moreover, 10-20 percent of the Himalayan rivers are largely dependent on glaciers and lakes for their supplies and 70 percent of these glaciers may melt in the next 100 years.
Within China there are two opposing schools in regard to the Brahmaputra water diversion proposal. In 2006, Wang Schucheng, the then Minister for Water Resources, described the proposal as unnecessary, unfeasible, and unscientific. But Wang Guangqian, an expert on the subject who enjoys great influence over the present Chinese power set-up, threw his weight behind the idea of Brahmaputra water diversion. In such a milieu, India has also stepped up its efforts to make use of the river’s flow. Already New Delhi has sanctioned an 800-megawatt hydro-electric project on the Brahmaputra. A technical  expert  group (TEG) constituted by the Indian government has suggested the construction of hydro power projects on the rivers Lohit and Subansiri, both tributaries of the Brahmaputra, at sites close to India’s border with China. India has also decided to speed up studies on the basins of the rivers Subansiri, Lohit, and Siang for their strategic utilization.
Bangladesh will face serious problems if China and India start actively competing over the Brahmaputra. Bangladesh receives around 1,106 cubic kilometers of water per year from external sources, out of which around 600 cubic kilometers of water come from the Brahmaputra. Bangladesh’s own internal generation is only 105 cubic kilometers, which means the country’s dependence on external water supplies is around 91 percent.
Thus, the need of the hour is a multilateral approach for solving this growing controversy over the Brahmaputra – before it starts to do real harm to Sino-Indian relations.
Amitava Mukherjee is a contributor to Geopoliticalmonitor.com