China is a strange country; it has the most sophisticated war gadgets, the largest number of ships and the latest technology for rockets and space warfare, but it has less and less generals. Who is going to lead the troops in case of a conflict? It is a valid question.
In meantime, all sorts of rumours are floating around, mostly fake news, though indicating the present climate in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
Wanjun Xie, the New York based chairman of China Democracy Party, an active student during the Tiananmen Square events in 1989, recently wrote: “It is reported that the announcement stating that Xi Jinping is no longer the Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), has been issued to all military units at the brigade level and above throughout the entire army.”
A few days later, on September 17, Chairman Xi was seen in Beijing, when he met with representatives from various groups involved in organizing the commemorations marking the 80th anniversary of the victory against the ‘Japanese Aggression’.
But let’s go back a few weeks earlier.
On August 20, Xi Jinping, the Secretary of the Communist Party of China and CMC Chairman landed at Lhasa Gongkar airport to celebrate sixty years of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). China watchers examined the composition of the large delegation accompanying Xi from Beijing to decipher the visit.
Xi was accompanied by Wang Huning, No 4 in the Party, Cai Qi, No 5 and director of the General Office of the Central Committee, Li Ganjie, head of the United Front Work Department …and Gen Zhang Shengmin, one of three remaining uniformed CMC members.
Gen Zhang Youxia, the CMC vice-chairman did not turn up probably because he and Xi have lately not seen eye to eye. One can assume that it is the difference of perceptions between the two leaders which has fuelled most of the recent wild rumours.
But there was more to be decoded. Lt Gen Wang Haijiang who since August 2021 has been commanding the Western Theatre Command opposite India, was missing in action. Earlier Wang had a long career in Tibet. Has he been purged? Also missing was Lt Gen Wang Kai, the commander of the Tibet Military District (TMD); only the TMD’s Political Commissar Lt Gen Yuan Honggang was seen with Xi.
These absences are intriguing.
Another surprise for the watchers, during the Gala reception in the evening, Gen Zhao Zongqi, the artisan of the Doklam confrontation (2017) and the Eastern Ladakh Chinese intrusions in 2020, was posturing, seated in full uniform in the row behind the top leader. Gen Zhao retired from the PLA in December 2020; he was then serving as Commander of the Western Theatre Command. In the past Gen Zhao created havoc in Sino-Indian relations. So, why was he invited? Probably to show India that the border issue is far from being settled, despite the recent high-level meetings.
A friend, closing following the developments in China, told me: “Don’t worry, we will get more information on the absentee generals on September 3 during the grand parade.
It was not to be the case.
The South China Morning Post (SCMP) published a piece entitled: “Why were China’s generals missing in action during the Victory Day parade?”
The Hong Kong publication explained: “When China held its first Victory Day military parade in 2015, more than 50 generals joined troops to march down Changan Avenue in central Beijing. The generals of all stripes led dozens of formations past the Tiananmen rostrum, saluting President Xi Jinping as the official announcer read out each commander’s name.”
Four years later, the same practice was followed: “The generals were also out in force for the National Day parade in 2019, giving observers a rare opportunity to see the PLA’s new generation of rising stars,” the SCMP added: “[such] events were also a valuable chance to learn who was in charge of each unit.”
Though 89 generals (including four full generals, two lieutenant generals, and 83 major generals) leading 59 formations were announced for the September parade, none appeared on September 3.
Only senior colonels (brigadier equivalent) and colonels walked or rode a vehicle on the Tiananmen Square without their names being announced.
The SCMP quotes a Chinese political scientist: “It could be that too many major generals are suspected of having ties to senior generals under investigation, and Beijing may be hesitant to let major generals lead the parade.”
Two weeks after the impressive parade (though without generals), the Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun spoke of China’s efforts to safeguard world peace at the 12th Beijing Xiangshan Forum. From September 17 to 19, under the theme "Upholding International Order and Promoting Peaceful Development," the forum brought together some 1,800 official representatives.
Dong pleaded for peace; he asserted: “The Chinese military stands ready to work with all parties to defend sovereign equality, uphold the post-war international order, bolster multilateralism, protect common interests, and jointly advance reforms to improve the global governance system.”
At the end Dong issued a veiled threat: “The Chinese People's Liberation Army stands ready to defeat any secessionist plot of Taiwan separatist forces, and will foil any military interference from external forces.”
But this does not explain where the generals are, and more importantly, if China can fight battles, in Taiwan or elsewhere, with revolving generals, who have a constant sword hanging over their heads.
Earlier this year, Joel Wuthnow, a senior research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the US National Defense University wrote an essay Can Xi Jinping Control the PLA? for the publication China Leadership Monitor.
While presuming that Xi Jinping is in control of the PLA, he noted: “Recent purges of senior Chinese military officers have renewed the question of how firmly in charge of the People’s Liberation Army is Xi Jinping.” Wuthnow’ conclusions were: “[Xi] has largely preserved a tradition of PLA autonomy relative to the party leadership, both to consolidate his own power …and to focus on its warfighting missions. …the scope of the dismissals has remained narrow.”
They may be relatively narrow, but they are significant; indeed, can an Army fight with a constant sword above the heads of its senior officers? Will the energy and time of the generals be spent to preserve their future (and their heads) or can they seriously do war preparation planning. The answer seems obvious that they can’t.
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