PLA: An Army without Generals?

China is a strange country; it has the most sophisticated war gadgets, the largest number of ships and the latest technology for rockets and space warfare, but it has less and less generals. Who is going to lead the troops in case of a conflict? It is a valid question.
In meantime, all sorts of rumours are floating around, mostly fake news, though indicating the present climate in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
Wanjun Xie, the New York based chairman of China Democracy Party, an active student during the Tiananmen Square events in 1989, recently wrote: “It is reported that the announcement stating that Xi Jinping is no longer the Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), has been issued to all military units at the brigade level and above throughout the entire army.”
A few days later, on September 17, Chairman Xi was seen in Beijing, when he met with representatives from various groups involved in organizing the commemorations marking the 80th anniversary of the victory against the ‘Japanese Aggression’.
But let’s go back a few weeks earlier. 
On August 20, Xi Jinping, the Secretary of the Communist Party of China and CMC Chairman landed at Lhasa Gongkar airport to celebrate sixty years of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). China watchers examined the composition of the large delegation accompanying Xi from Beijing to decipher the visit.
Xi was accompanied by Wang Huning, No 4 in the Party, Cai Qi, No 5 and director of the General Office of the Central Committee, Li Ganjie, head of the United Front Work Department …and Gen Zhang Shengmin, one of three remaining uniformed CMC members.
Gen Zhang Youxia, the CMC vice-chairman did not turn up probably because he and Xi have lately not seen eye to eye. One can assume that it is the difference of perceptions between the two leaders which has fuelled most of the recent wild rumours.
But there was more to be decoded. Lt Gen Wang Haijiang who since August 2021 has been commanding the Western Theatre Command opposite India, was missing in action. Earlier Wang had a long career in Tibet. Has he been purged? Also missing was Lt Gen Wang Kai, the commander of the Tibet Military District (TMD); only the TMD’s Political Commissar Lt Gen Yuan Honggang was seen with Xi. 
These absences are intriguing.
Another surprise for the watchers, during the Gala reception in the evening, Gen Zhao Zongqi, the artisan of the Doklam confrontation (2017) and the Eastern Ladakh Chinese intrusions in 2020, was posturing, seated in full uniform in the row behind the top leader. Gen Zhao retired from the PLA in December 2020; he was then serving as Commander of the Western Theatre Command. In the past Gen Zhao created havoc in Sino-Indian relations. So, why was he invited? Probably to show India that the border issue is far from being settled, despite the recent high-level meetings.
A friend, closing following the developments in China, told me: “Don’t worry, we will get more information on the absentee generals on September 3 during the grand parade.
It was not to be the case.
The South China Morning Post (SCMP) published a piece entitled: “Why were China’s generals missing in action during the Victory Day parade?”
The Hong Kong publication explained: “When China held its first Victory Day military parade in 2015, more than 50 generals joined troops to march down Changan Avenue in central Beijing. The generals of all stripes led dozens of formations past the Tiananmen rostrum, saluting President Xi Jinping as the official announcer read out each commander’s name.”
Four years later, the same practice was followed: “The generals were also out in force for the National Day parade in 2019, giving observers a rare opportunity to see the PLA’s new generation of rising stars,” the SCMP added: “[such] events were also a valuable chance to learn who was in charge of each unit.” 
Though 89 generals (including four full generals, two lieutenant generals, and 83 major generals) leading 59 formations were announced for the September parade, none appeared on September 3. 
Only senior colonels (brigadier equivalent) and colonels walked or rode a vehicle on the Tiananmen Square without their names being announced.
The SCMP quotes a Chinese political scientist: “It could be that too many major generals are suspected of having ties to senior generals under investigation, and Beijing may be hesitant to let major generals lead the parade.”
Two weeks after the impressive parade (though without generals), the Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun spoke of China’s efforts to safeguard world peace at the 12th Beijing Xiangshan Forum. From September 17 to 19, under the theme "Upholding International Order and Promoting Peaceful Development," the forum brought together some 1,800 official representatives.
Dong pleaded for peace; he asserted: “The Chinese military stands ready to work with all parties to defend sovereign equality, uphold the post-war international order, bolster multilateralism, protect common interests, and jointly advance reforms to improve the global governance system.”
At the end Dong issued a veiled threat: “The Chinese People's Liberation Army stands ready to defeat any secessionist plot of Taiwan separatist forces, and will foil any military interference from external forces.”
But this does not explain where the generals are, and more importantly, if China can fight battles, in Taiwan or elsewhere, with revolving generals, who have a constant sword hanging over their heads.
Earlier this year, Joel Wuthnow, a senior research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the US National Defense University wrote an essay Can Xi Jinping Control the PLA? for the publication China Leadership Monitor.
While presuming that Xi Jinping is in control of the PLA, he noted: “Recent purges of senior Chinese military officers have renewed the question of how firmly in charge of the People’s Liberation Army is Xi Jinping.” Wuthnow’ conclusions were: “[Xi] has largely preserved a tradition of PLA autonomy relative to the party leadership, both to consolidate his own power …and to focus on its warfighting missions. …the scope of the dismissals has remained narrow.” 
They may be relatively narrow, but they are significant; indeed, can an Army fight with a constant sword above the heads of its senior officers? Will the energy and time of the generals be spent to preserve their future (and their heads) or can they seriously do war preparation planning. The answer seems obvious that they can’t.

Lhasa invaded again ...by Han Chinese

 

According to China Tibet News Network, the permanent population of Lhasa is 867,891, an increase of 55.14% compared to the Sixth National Census.

It is an enormous increase, particularly because it only takes into account the ‘permanent’ settlers in the Tibetan capital.
The number of ‘migrants’ or ‘temporary settlers’ which can easily be manipulated, should ba added to these figures. It is a real invasion of the Tibetan capital.

On June 8, 2021, a communiqué released by the Office of the Leading Group for the Seventh National Census of Lhasa, announced the new figures were “in accordance with the Regulations on the National Census and the decision of the State Council.”
It was the seventh census and it was carried out on November 1, 2020.
China Tibet News says that “the national census is in accordance with the unified deployment of the State Council and the Tibet Autonomous Region’s Seventh National Census Leading Group.”
According to the same source, the staff who conducted the census was supported by “Lhasa City’s governments at all levels, census agencies and all census personnel.”
The communiqué adds: “With the hard work and selfless dedication, the majority of census subjects participated and actively cooperated, and successfully completed the tasks of the Seventh National Census in Lhasa.”

Let us remember that the data for the 'permanent' and 'temporary' populations are compulsorily contained in each individual's phone.
Even if it has probably been ‘polished’, the outcome is shocking.

1. Permanent Population
Today, the ‘permanent’ resident population of Lhasa is 867,891.
Compared with the 559,423 in the Sixth National Census in 2010, it is an increase of 308,468 or 55.14%; it means an average annual growth rate of 4.49% says the communique (arithmetically, 55% divided by ten (years) does not make 4,5%).
It must be a first time that an urban area witnesses a 55% population increase in 10 years. It is only possible, if formerly ‘migrants’ workers have been incorporated in these figures.
This raises many questions, in particular for the environment.
How much  increment of population can the Land of Snows take without choking? The natural resources are limited and the fragile ecology of the plateau has certainly limits.
Beijing has probably never taken this into account. 

The Chinese Government objective seems only to flood the local population with Han Chinese.

2. Family population
There were 292,976 households in the Seventh Census, for a population of 683,405 people. The average population of each household was 2.33 people, which was a decrease of 0.86 people from the 3.19 people in the Sixth National Census in 2010.
Only an expert in statistics could analyse this, but too me, it seems to indicate that many more single persons have settled in Lhasa during the last 10 years; It shows that tens of thousands more migrants have come to the Tibetan capital.

3. Gender composition
Among the city’s permanent population, the male population is 470,353, accounting for 54.19%; the female population is 397,538, accounting for 45.81%. 

The sex ratio of the total population (100 women, the ratio of men to women) rose from 105.68 in the Sixth National Census in 2010 to 118.32.
The gender composition also seems to indicate the massive arrival of migrant male workers.
Many of them have now be given the status of ‘permanent’ resident of the Tibetan capital and others married Tibetan girls.

4. Age composition
Among the city’s permanent population,

• the population aged 0-14 is 143,069, accounting for 16.48%;
• the population aged 15-59 is 651,141, accounting for 75.03%;
• the population aged 60 and above is 73,681, accounting for 8.49%;
• the population aged 65 and above is 48,170 people, accounting for 5.55%.

Compared with the Sixth National Census in 2010,

• the proportion of people aged 0-14 dropped by 1.05 percentage points,
• the proportion of people aged 15-59 dropped by 0.24%,
• the proportion of people aged 60 and over rose by 1.29%.
• The proportion of the population of and above increased by 0.85 percentage points.

Age-wise, if the statistics are correct, it seems a rather stable population.
These statistics should be read with Xi Jinping mega project for poverty alleviation.
On October 17, 2020, according to Xinhua: “Tibet Autonomous Region has accomplished the historical feat of eradicating absolute poverty. …By the end of 2019, Tibet had lifted 628,000 people out of poverty and delisted 74 county-level areas from the poverty list.”
Wu Yingjie, the boss of the Communist Party of China in Tibet called this achievement a "major victory." 

He said that the average annual net income of poor people in Tibet had risen from 1,499 yuan (about 220.44 U.S. dollars) in 2015 to 9,328 yuan in 2019.
Wu also mentioned that since 2016, a total of 39.89 billion yuan has been invested in over 2,900 poverty alleviation projects, which helped lift more than 238,000 impoverished people out of poverty and benefited more than 840,000 people.
For this, 965 ‘relocation’ villages (known as Xiaogang villages) were built and 266,000 people were moved to new houses. "The relocation programs were carried out entirely on a voluntary basis," Wu said.
This means that if these villages have to be inhabited, from where the populations have come, especially when the population of the Tibetan capital has already increased so drastically during the same period.
The answer is probably from China.
Though we do not have the figures for the other Cities/Prefectures and the Xiaogang villages, the same pattern in population increase than in Lhasa, must have taken place, if not worse. 

It means more Hans are daily arriving in Tibet to settle.

5. Ethnic composition
Among Lhasa City’s permanent population, the Tibetan population is 608,856, the population of other ethnic minorities is 25,953, and the Han population is 233,082.
Compared with the Sixth National Census in 2010, the Tibetan population increased by 179,752, the population of other ethnic minorities increased by 16,699, and the Han population increased by 112,017.
In their own admission, the ‘permanent’ migrant population has increased nearly as much as the Tibetans.

• Tibetan increase = 179,75
• Other minorities increase =  16,699
• Han increase =  112,017

What about the ethnic composition in the border villages?

6. Population with education level
Among the City’s permanent population,

• 147,800 people have a university education (referring to a junior college or above);
• 107,840 people have a high school (including technical secondary school) education;
• 174,689 people have a junior high school education; and those with elementary school education.

The population is 256,544 (the above-mentioned population with various educational levels includes graduates, undergraduates and students from various schools).
Compared with the Sixth National Census in 2010, the number of persons with college education per 100,000 people rose from 12,319 to 17,030; those with high school education rose from 8,817 to 12,426; those with junior high school education rose from 19,654
The number of people rose to 20,128; the number of people with primary school education dropped from 34,105 to 29,559.
There is no doubt that the level of education has improved.

7. Urban and rural population
Among the city’s permanent population,

• the population living in urban areas is 605,511, accounting for 69.77%;
• the population living in rural areas is 262,380, accounting for 30.23%.

Compared with the sixth national census in 2010, the urban population increased by 364,553, the rural population decreased by 56,085, and the proportion of the urban population increased by 26.70 percentage points.
These figures are for Lhasa City (ex-Prefecture) only.
Let us hope that we can soon access the figures for the other Cities/Prefectures.

8. Regional population
The last part of the report mentions the ‘region distribution’ of Lhasa’s ‘permanent’ population.
The fact that the report speaks of ‘permanent’ population shows that a large percentage of the migrant population is not accounted. This is even more worrisome.

The following figures show that the permanent population of Lhasa is 867,891, of which:

• the permanent population of Chenggoin (Chengguan) District is 473,586, accounting for 54.57%;
• the permanent population of Tolung Dechen (Duilung Deqing) District is 91065, accounting for 10.49%;
• the permanent population of Tagtse (Dazi) District is 32,318, accounting for 3.72%. The permanent population of Lhundrup (Linzhou) County is 50,596, accounting for 5.83%;
• the permanent population of Damshung County is 47,900, accounting for 5.52%;
• the permanent population of Nimo County is 29,989, accounting for 3.46%;
• the permanent population of Chushul County is 41,851, accounting for 4.82%;
• the permanent population of Medro Gonkar (Mozhugongka) County is 49,511, accounting for 5.70%;
• the permanent population of Lhasa National Economic and Technological Development Zone is 11,804, accounting for 1.36%;
• the permanent population of Lhasa Liuwu High-tech Zone is 34,582, accounting for 3.98%;
• the permanent population of Tibet Cultural Tourism Creative Park is 4,689, accounting for 0.54%.

The Tibetan Autonomous Region's Figures
Last month The China Daily had announced that the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) continued “to enjoy a demographic dividend as young adults make up a relatively high proportion of its population, providing abundant labor resources.”

It is probably due to migrant workers.
The article said that despite a steadily growing aging trend nationwide, less than 9 percent of Tibet's population is aged above 60: “The number of Tibet residents aged 60 or older on November 1, 2021 was 311,000, accounting for just 8.52 percent of the region's population and up by 0.85 percentage points from a decade previously. …Across the country, the average proportion of the population aged 60 or older was 18.7 percent.”
 
According to census, the TAR's ‘permanent’ resident population on November 2020, was 3.64 million, an increase of 645,900 or 21.52 percent over a decade previously. 

Between 2000 and 2010, the region's population increased by 385,800, or by an average of 1.39 percent a year.

Therefore, there is an acceleration of the migration in Tibet in general.

Vast Sea of Chinese Migrants
Remember in 1985, the Dalai Lama wrote in The New York Times that A Vast Sea Of Chinese Threatens Tibet.
The Tibetan leader then observed: "It is now more than 30 years since China forcefully occupied Tibet. In this period, our religion and culture has been destroyed. The people of Tibet have suffered tremendous physical and economic deprivation, and at least 1.2 million have died as a direct result of the occupation. But never, even in the worst of times, did the Tibetans lose their distinct national identity. That is the threat we face today: The complete assimilation and absorption of our people by a vast sea of Chinese settlers streaming across our borders."

The Tibetan leader continued: "Early this century, the Manchus were a distinct race with their own culture and traditions. Today, only two to three million Manchurians are left in Manchuria, where 75 million Chinese have settled. In Eastern Turkestan, which the Chinese now call Sinkiang [Xinjiang], the Chinese population has grown from 200,000 in 1949 to seven million, more than half of the total population of 13 million. In the wake of the Chinese colonization of Inner Mongolia, Chinese now outnumber the Mongols by 8.5 million to 2.5 million."

On June 8, Xi Jinping visited a Tibetan village in Amdo

In 1985, the Dalai Lama mentioned his native place, Amdo, an area visited yesterday by Xi Jinping: "The area where I was born, the Kokonor region of northeastern Tibet, now already has a population of 2.5 million Chinese and only 700,000 Tibetans, according to a recent Chinese newspaper report. The Chinese claim to be giving special care and attention to the so-called Tibet Autonomous Region, which comprises only the western and central parts of Tibet, but they are sending large numbers of young Chinese colonists into the eastern and northeastern parts of our country."

The situation is far more dramatic today, but nobody seems to bother.

 

1963: Indian PoWs in Beijing

Some Indian PoWs in Tibet in 1962-63 with their Chinese guards
(first row left, Lt Col Gurdial Singh, 3 J&K)

I recently came across an interesting book, My Peking Memoirs of the Chinese Invasion of India by Dr Purnendu Kumar Banerjee, the Indian Chargé d’Affaires in Beijing during the Sino-Indian War.
In the chapter reproduced below, he mentioned the reception given to the senior Indian officers who had spent more than six months as prisoner of war in Tibet, in extremely dramatic conditions.
Against their will, the officers were taken on a propaganda tour of 'New China'.
The Communuist leadership had planned to 'parade' these officers on the Tiananment Sqaure on May 1 on the occasion of the Labour Day.
Brig John Dalvi strongly opposed this final humiliation for his men.
The Chinese had not choice, but to drop their plans.
It is in these circumstances that they were 'allowed' to visit the Indian Embassy in Beijing (it was certainly part of Beijing's propaganda efforts, to show how 'liberal' was China).
Before going into PK Banerjee's memoirs, here is the account of Maj Gen (then Lt Col) KK Tewari, one of the Commanding Officers who spent seven months in captivity.

If you are interested, you can read this old post, POW in Tibet (Gen Krishna Tewari's book, A SOLDIER’S VOYAGE OF SELF DISCOVERY is also downloaded from here).

Extracts:
One day a couple of us even had a walk from the hotel to the Tiananmen Square, which was in the news recently due to the student unrest in China. On 30th April, we were taken to the Great Wall of China which is supposedly the only man-made structure in the world visible from space. Built in 300 B.C. by the Chou Dynasty, it is 3,000 miles long (1,700 miles of it in the plains and the rest in the mountainous area), it took 300,000 men ten years to complete it, used enough material to build a wall 8 feet high and 3 feet thick around the world, has an average height of 28 feet 8 inches with a base width of 24 feet and a top width of 18 feet. We were also shown the famous Ming tombs.
On 1st May, we saw the fire-works from the roof of the hotel to celebrate May Day.
On 2nd May evening we were entertained to tea at the Indian Embassy and a warm reception by Dr. PK Banerjee, who embraced each one of us at the entrance. The Chinese guards, of course, were left outside and it was a lovely feeling to step into the ‘little India’ in Peking. However, all the time our thoughts were on our return to our homeland.
It was on 3 May that we left Peking for our journey home.
On our last night in Peking, we were taken to a musical show put on by an oriental troupe who performed Indian, Pakistani and Ceylonese dances and songs. It was an enjoyable treat. We had to
be up early for the 45 mile drive to the airport and after a lot of photographs, we took off at 5:20 a.m. from Peking in two IL 14 aircraft. We landed at Sian for refuelling at 8:45 a.m., were given, surprisingly enough, a very poor breakfast after all the excellent service we had been given till then and took off again at 10:20 a.m. We had another brief landing at Chengdu at 12:45 to pick up Rattan who had been left behind earlier due to his illness, took off at 13:25 and landed at Kunming at 15:45.

Extracts:
My Peking Memoirs of the Chinese Invasion of India (Clairon Books, New Delhi) by Purnendu Kumar Banerjee (Indian Chargé d’Affaires in Beijing)
Chapter 30

INDIAN PRISONERS OF WAR
I mentioned earlier our attempts to have the International Red Cross in Switzerland assist in the disposal of dead bodies and. the release of Indian troops and officers. As the Chinese refused to deal with the International Red Cross, the matter remained confused and a solution to the problem was delayed. At the same-time the Chinese exploited the situation to their benefit in various ways. Since the invasion and even long after the ceasefire, they played up their propaganda. For example, they maintained that Nehru, as an agent of the imperialists, had forced the Indian troops to attack a friendly neighbour, China; that the Indian troops had never been properly looked after and cared for; that the Indian Government showed no interest in the disposal of the dead bodies and the release of prisoners; that 'due to the goodwill and- friendship of the Chinese troops', the Indian troops were being taken good care of and were being sent home to be reunited with their families despite the Indian government's reluctance to help or assist in the matter; and that the departing troops had been expressing their thanks and gratitude to .China for her "magnanimous" attitude and treatment. Such propaganda was evident in the daily broadcasts on Peking radio, not only in Chinese - but also in Indian languages.
Another matter was concerned with the repatriation of about two thousand Chinese from India which was agreed to by India. Consequently, efforts were made for their transport mainly by boat, but the Chinese turned on their propaganda and compared the situation to Nazi concentration camps. Meanwhile, other attacks on India's news media continued and so did the protest notes.
By early spring in 1963, it was clear the three thousand nine hundred persons belonging to the Indian armed forces were prisoners in Chinese hands. Though a large number of our troops were eventually released after considerable effort by the Chinese to brainwash them with propaganda, an equally large number remained unaccounted for. In the last category were twenty-seven officers and I requested the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs for information about them. This request was turned down and I was told that the Indian Red Cross should approach the Chinese Red Cross in the matter. While this was still pending, I was having dinner one evening at an East European embassy, when a newspaper reporter from another East European country, whom I knew well, asked me in private if I had heard about the captive Indian officers? I told him that I had no news and that my legitimate request for such information had been rejected by the Chinese Foreign Ministry. He then told me, in confidence, that according to the latest information, one of his colleagues had seen the Indian officers in Nanking and that they were being taken by bus and train to many large cities and, possibly, would soon be brought to Peking.
I thanked him sincerely.
The same evening I requested to see the Foreign Minister, Chen Yi.
The next day, I was given an appointment to see the Vice-Foreign Minister as Chen Yi was out of town, which in other words meant that the latter was not prepared to see me. When I met the Vice-Foreign Minister, I opened fire. I told him that the Chinese were continuing to violate international law and conventions such as the Geneva Convention, and this was unacceptable and regrettable. First the Chinese had refused to deal with the International Red Cross in matters of the dead and the release of Indian troops resulting in delay, harassment, humiliation and more suffering. At the•same time, the Chinese were engaged in constant and cheap propaganda about Indian troops being happy to be in Chinese prisons where they were loved. The Vice-Foreign Minister tried to interrupt me because the language and the tone I was using were not often applied in "diplomatic dialogue". He could•not stop me. I continued. I said I had information that the Indian officers in captivity had been separated from their troops. and were being paraded in public, in blatant violation of international law, international practice and international conventions, in particular the Geneva Convention, even though China was a signatory to these conventions. I demanded that this cruel circus must stop, that this kind of thing was unknown in the civilized world; and that the prisoners must be released.
The Vice-Foreign Minister was perspiring profusely and was visibly shaken. His•aide and interpreter fumbled while translating. Though my words were somewhat harsh, I kept my expression calm. I knew with conviction that the Chinese had made a serious blunder. He wanted to know my source of information. I told him that I was not prepared to disclose this but I was prepared to accept his assurance that the Indian officers were not being taken from city to city, in public places and in public view. He tried to avoid the tight corner I had placed him in by saying that they were not prisoners and were not being treated as such. They were visitors to a friendly country and had expressed their wish to see China before going home, which would hopefully be soon. Then I opened my second round of fire. I told him that I would enjoy Chinese fairy tales in other circumstances but not in such a serious matter.
Were they captives of the Chinese or not? If they had been captured, were they not prisoners? Then shouldn't they be governed by the Geneva Convention? If they were not prisoners, why had they been kept under guard for more than six months away from their homes, families and friends? I repeated my two demands, but I added that in case the Chinese failed to respond positively in the matter, India would be compelled to inform the world, in particular the Asian and African countries and the other one hundred signatories of the Geneva Convention, about China's flagrant violations. I thanked him for receiving me and got up to go. He was still shaken when I left.
I informed my Ministry about the latest developments and what action I had taken. When I told my colleagues in the embassy about my talk, they were rather pessimistic about the Chinese response. A few days later, our number two in the embassy, Damodaran, informed me that he had received a message from the Chinese Foreign Ministry that the Indian army officers were in Peking and that facilities would be given to me if I wanted to visit them. I called a meeting immediately of all our officers and placed the facts before them for their views. After some discussion, it was evident that they wanted me to visit them. I disagreed, I told them the officers were prisoners of the Chinese and were obviously kept under strict security.
Therefore they were in a Chinese prison, in law and-in fact. How could the Indian envoy visit a Chinese prison to see the Indian officers? My visit, at the Chinese behest, would legitimise the whole illegal and uncivilised Chinese policy in this regard. My colleagues pointed out that, in principle, I was right. But if the information leaked out that I had refused to visit the Chinese prisons or detention camps to see the Indian officers, there would be severe criticism in the Indian press and in Parliament. They were right. I decided on a compromise solution. Damodaran [No 2 in the embassy] would call back the Chinese official dealing with this matter and say that it would be inappropriate for the Indian envoy to visit the Indian officers. But if they were free and willing, they were invited to visit their own embassy and call on the envoy. If this proposal was not acceptable, we would fly out a representative of the Indian Red Cross to visit the Indian officers. This was communicated in due course. After a three days' wait, we received a message that the Indian officers - would visit the embassy.
The date and time were worked out on the clear understanding that no armed or unarmed guards would be permitted inside the embassy compound during the visit of the Indian officers. We were more than delighted that our gamble had won.

Captured Indian army officers visit the embassy
All the members of the embassy joined together and with great enthusiasm produced enormous quantities of excellent and varied food, delicacies from almost all parts of India. Rosha, one of our first secretaries, a dear friend and a fine officer, looked after the arrangements. The drinks included lassi (buttermilk), different fruit juices, tea, coffee and of course champagne, wines, scotch and cognac. The reception rooms were decorated with flowers and Indian flags. I called a meeting with all members of our embassy, both diplomatic and non-diplomatic. I explained to them that our officers had a very hard time as prisoners for almost six months, completely cut off from their families, friends and home, and even news from India. The Chinese had attempted to brainwash them. They inevitably had feelings of loss, defeat and humiliation, all for no fault of theirs. We then agreed on the following programme and arrangements:

1. On their arrival, we would garland each officer;
2. The national anthem would be played;
3. I would say a few words of welcome, telling them how India was proud of them, of their courage and dedication, and that a great and warm welcome would await them in India;
4. We would then take them inside and show them their places in six separate groups;
5. Each group would have at least two members of the embassy as hosts, looking after them with warmth and affection, and helping them with food and drinks;
6. It was expected that these groups would break up and regroup according to the inclinations of our guests;
7. The military attaché Lt.-Colonel Khera and I would move freely from one group to another;
8. While the embassy staff were playing host, they were not to show any curiosity and ask questions, but would reply if the officers asked them a question;
9. Whatever was heard or whatever impressions were formed by the hosts would carefully be remembered, and reported to me later, after the officers’ departure.

The army officers duly arrived in buses, at the time fixed earlier. There were no Chinese guards either with them or outside in the street where the buses were parked. The officers cried and so did we, as we embraced them; the atmosphere was charged with emotion and affection. Some of the officers were in their military uniforms; they explained that this was because they were officially visiting their embassy. We took them inside to their seats, but very soon they started to regroup.
Food and drinks were offered. They were delighted to have such a variety of Indian delicacies after such a long time. They showed their appreciation by consuming large quantities of the food. It was wonderful to have them with us. The conversation in the different groups continued. We soon learned that because of the unrelenting Chinese propaganda which was based on distortion of statements, mainly made by the opposition parties in India, the officers were deeply worried about the future after their return to India. I kept assuring that they would be given the warmest welcome, a hero's welcome. Brigadier Dalvi however, was most worried; he was depressed, dejected and disappointed. He had a distinguished career behind him and he impressed me as an intelligent person. He had legitimate and serious complaints against the planning and implementation of India's defence policy. In his book Himalayan Blunder, he did not refer to his time in China or the visit to the Indian embassy in Peking. It is understandable, considering the unavoidable tensions and dissensions endured by these officers during the previous six months.
One of the most joyous moments of that reception was when Lt Colonel Khera called me to a corner and quietly pointed out an officer who had been declared dead in combat and whose wife had received from the President• of India a high decoration awarded posthumously, We had another round of champagne to celebrate.
The time came for them to leave. We did not know then where and when they would be released, nor did they.
After the army officers left, we sat down together to draft reports on our conversations and impressions. In the meantime, I also sent a top secret and most urgent telegram in code addressed to the Secretary-General of our Ministry, in which I described briefly the visit of the officers, their main worries and my assurances, and indicated that a detailed report on the information obtained and our impressions during three 'hours of conversation was being sent by special courier to New Deihi. 
I also suggested. that pending a serious study of my report, the government and if possible the opposition should desist from discussing matters relating to these twenty-seven officers;• that all of them should be given a hero's welcome but if later on, after careful and discreet observation, "bad eggs" were discovered, they should be removed without publicity because otherwise we would be strengthening China's pernicious propaganda about the Indian armed forces; and that we had as yet no information about when •or where the officers would be released. I also gave information about the officer who was presumed dead but was alive. By the time all the reports were coordinated, written or dictated and finally typed, it was well past midnight. Everyone was happy and we were teasing each other. My colleagues teased me too, saying that I was at my best after midnight because of my association with Chou En-lai. I will always remember with gratitude the warmth and affection of these colleagues during my time in China.

Return of Indian prisoners
In diplomatic circles in Peking, everyone soon came to know about the visit of our officers to our embassy. After a few days, Terence Garvey (later Sir Terence Garvey), my opposite number from the British Embassy came to see and tell me in confidence that, according to information he received from Hong Kong, the Chinese were planning to release our officers from the-border of China and Hong Kong. I told him that this could be to draw the attention of the international press; TV and radio representatives who would witness the release and handing over of the officers as a gesture of peace and magnanimity by the Chinese. I thanked him for this information and for being such a good friend. I reported to New Delhi immediately and requested them not to inform the press. I sought an interview with Marshal Chen Yi urgently. This time Chen Yi received me himself.' He asked me whether I was satisfied and happy to have seen and spent some time with our officers in our embassy. I had a feeling that both Chen Yi and Chou had received a report from their Vice-Minister about our "warm" discussions previously in this regard, Chen Yi said that the officers had, as they desired, seen a good part of China and her achievements, and that soon they would be going home. I referred• to my earlier discussions with his Vice-Minister and strongly affirmed our-view-that China had violated and continued to violate the Geneva Convention by parading them publicly.
Our officers were no more and no less than prisoners in Chinese hands. If China had any respect for international law and respect for humanitarian considerations, the officers should have been released months ago and reunited with their families.
Chen Yi got angry. He said he forthwith rejected my false and fabricated allegations against China. I should have been grateful and pleased that I had been I given the opportunity to see the officers. I said I was sorry to upset him but I had to tell him: the truth as warranted by the facts. I added that I had come to see him about another very serious aspect of the matter. I told him that according to my information, China was planning to release the officers on the border of China and Hong Kong. Chen Yi cut me short and asked me my source of information. I said I was- not prepared to disclose my source since it was not relevant. What was relevant was that if my information was wrong, I would withdraw it and offer my profound regrets, but if it were true, I would lodge a most serious protest in the strongest terms. Chen Yi was boiling in anger and I was enjoying it in calm satisfaction. He said that China was not answerable to anyone as to where and when the officers would be returned. I told him they were our officers, prisoners of war' who had to be returned to us, and therefore we would need advance information about the date, time and place of their release. If the Chinese authorities had decided to release them on the border of China and Hong Kong, a colonial territory, we would not need advance intimation of time and date as there would be no representative from India to take them over from the Chinese representative. Of course the Chinese representative could hand them over to the colonial representative of Hong Kong and might get an extra mileage of propaganda. Chen Yi was so upset he had to make an effort to calm himself before he could speak; but before he could do that I got up and thanked him for receiving me and said that I would leave him with my earnest request because the decision- was his in the matter. I returned to our embassy, informed New Delhi and briefed my colleagues. We were not very optimistic about the outcome from this last gambit.
At a National Day reception the next day, I saw Chou En-lai when he came to our table to clink glasses in a toast. I asked his permission to mention a matter of utmost urgency, He signalled me to continue. I told him very briefly that I had information that China was considering releasing our officers on the border of China and British colonial Hong-Kong. When China and India had two thousand miles of common frontier and a history of hundreds of years of friendship and cultural ties, why not release them anywhere on our common border or inside China? Why on colonial soil?
Despite the recent unfortunate relations between our two countries, both India and China had fought against colonial rule. So why now involve Hong Kong? Before I could continue, Chou looked at me and said in English, "I don't know anything about it and have nothing to do with it." He turned round and left for the next table. I felt at that moment that it was not much of a diplomatic success for me.
I reported my talk with Chou En-lai to New Delhi. Three days later, in the morning, Lt-Colonel Khera rushed into my room bubbling with excitement and radiant like a child, holding a piece of paper in his hand. He said, “We got it, we made it, it worked." I asked him if it was my transfer orders! He became serious. He said he had an urgent message from the Chinese Defence Ministry giving the date, time and place where the Indian officers would be handed over, and requesting the time, date and identification of the Indian aircraft which would fly the officers back to India. We were so relieved and happy. I informed New Delhi accordingly.
A few days later, I received a letter from General Chaudhuri, Chief of Staff of the armed forces of India. It said, "I join the armed forces in saluting you." His generous comment, obviously, was related to my recent telegrams and special report on our officers' visit to our embassy. I knew General Chaudhuri because for three generations our families had had connections: our grandfathers were friends, our fathers were colleagues and, much later, I had more occasions to see him.
The tensions continued on the border: The Colombo proposals had buried by the Chinese. The atmosphere was one of stalemate and uneasy calm. The protest notes continued to be fired by each side with regularity and rapidity. Having completed two years of my two-year assignment, I wrote MJ a personal letter, requesting a change to a calm, pleasant and easy capital. He wrote back that a change was not possible because the normal rules did not apply to me, and that he had obtained the approval of the Prime Minister in the matter. In fact, it was the Prime Minister's wish that I should continue for longer.

Lord Bertrand Russell's representatives in Peking
A few days later, in early July, a peculiar if not ominous event happened. -I was told by a friend in a foreign news agency that two men from Britain, representing Lord Bertrand Russell, were in Peking. They had brought a new offer from Mr. Nehru for Chou En-lai, Their names were Schoenman and Pottle. I was surprised that I had not even been informed by New Delhi about this. I consulted my British colleague, Terence Garvey, and he, knew nothing except that the two men were in Peking.
I sent a telegram to New Delhi asking for information and guidance. In the meantime, I was told in Peking that Mr. Nehru had made an offer to Chou En-lai that if China accepted twenty kilometers along the Western Sector of withdrawal as "no man's land", he would start negotiations with Chou En-lai without any other preconditions. I reported this to New Delhi and received a reply stating that

1. Mr. Nehru had never made any such offer or proposals, and 
2. The two men had come initially to discuss, on behalf of the Russell Peace Foundation, some matters with the Gandhi Peace Foundation. 

They were given an opportunity to meet Mr. Nehru when they discussed the possibility of starting a dialogue between China and India.
After a couple of days, the Chinese came out with a statement in the press concerning the discussions with the two representatives of Lord Russell, which made it clear that Mr. Nehru never made the proposals; the two Britishers had mentioned to Mr. Nehru that when in Peking they would make the proposals to the Chinese leaders, and Mr. Nehru raised no objection. What a fiasco, what a farce!
Later, when I inquired privately as to why Mr. Nehru had decided to see the two men and discuss matters of such vital national importance,-which ended in futile, unproductive and immature manoeuvring, I was told that Krishna Menon who was sometimes a visitor with Mr. Nehru, had recommended that Mr. Nehru should see them. No wonder, the whole episode reminded me of my earlier experiences during Krishna Menon's reign. He had been vanquished but had not yet vanished!

The Communist High-Mass

The High-Mass of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has started.
Every five years, it follows the same precise ritual. The outgoing CCP’s General Secretary (in the present case, Xi Jinping), gives a 3 hour long speech, describing the internal and external changes facing the country, which the party needs to address.
Everything is scripted.
First, the election of 2287 delegates to the 19th Congress which took place months ago, among 40 ‘electoral blocs’ – representing each of China’s 31 provinces as well as the central party organs, national State institutions, the People’s Liberation Army, etc.
There are two types of delegates, the ‘big shots’ who will make it to the 200-odd member Central Committee (CC) and the ‘grass-root’ delegates which count for nearly half of the delegates; and five or seven ‘big ones’ who will eventually reach the Communist Paradise, the Politburo’s Standing Committee.
The Party Congress has three main purposes.
First, it establishes a new party line to be followed for five years; the Congress is the authoritative body to do so. The ‘draft’ read by the General Secretary has been seen and commented by thousands and hundreds of amendments have already been incorporated.
Alice Miller, one of the best experts in CCP’s affairs wrote: “Over the course of its session, a party congress sets down a consensus evaluation of the party’s work over the five-year period since the preceding congress and an assessment of the party’s present situation, and it sets forth general guidelines—the party’s line—for the party’s priorities, emphases, and tasks for the coming five-year period until the next congress.”
At the end, a resolution will endorse Xi Jinping’s speech establishing the party’s consensus on all policies that the party leadership will face.
Then, according to the Constitution, a CC Plenum must convene at least once a year to follow up on the directions given by the Congress.
The second purpose of the Meet is to revise the Party’s Constitution and introduce changes such as a new theory, a brain-child of the current Secretary General.
Finally, the Congress nominates a new leadership for the five years to come. It includes the CC whose plenums give directions to the Party between two Congresses, but also some 170 alternate members whose role is replace the CC’s full-members when required (when full members are sent to jail for corruption for example), as well as a new Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CDIC), whose job is to tackle corruption.
Finally, before the Congress closes its doors, the CC’s first Plenum will appoint the top party leadership. It also nominates the all-powerful Central Military Commission, a new Secretariat (the body that facilitates the implementation of Politburo decisions) as well as the State Council or Cabinet, headed by the Premier, usually the No 2 in the Party’s hierarchy.
During his speech on October 18, President Xi Jinping outlined his vision for the next five years of China’s development. According to The South China Morning Post, “he vowed to step up ideological guidance within the party, strengthen its anti-corruption campaign, retain the government’s grip on Hong Kong and Macau, and oppose any moves towards independence in Taiwan.”
One of the most expected parts of the speech was the inclusion of Xi’s so-called political philosophy; it will thereafter be known as ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era’.
The new motto will be repeated thousand times all-over the Middle Kingdom. It is said that there are 14 elements behind the elaborated concept; the first is that Party should lead in every aspect of life in China. Xi declared that “the dream of national rejuvenation would only be a fantasy without the leadership of China’s Communist Party. The party should lead in all areas and the authority of the party central leadership should be respected.”
Other highlights are ambitious targets to be achieved during the next 30 years and more, “From 2035 to 2050, China should become a nation with pioneering global influence.” The momentum of the anti-corruption campaign is ‘irreversible’ and rule by law would be maintained.
Of course, national security would be boosted and the Party would resolutely protect its sovereignty and interests. Xi spoke of ‘historical breakthrough’ in national defence and military reform: “The navy has protected the nation’s maritime interest and its army rapidly upgraded its weaponry. …The People’s Liberation Army should be a ‘world class’ force by 2050.”
Some in India may think, it is not necessary to worry; 2050 is far-away. However it is crucial to watch the CMC’s new composition. It may bring radical changes and surprises which could determine if new ‘Doklam’ incidents would take place in the years to come.
Sharp observers have predicted that the number of Vice-Chairmen of the Commission may go from two to four. Some of Xi Jinping’s close allies are expected to be promoted.
One is General Zhang Youxia, director of the Equipment Development Department, who is tipped to become one of two vice chairmen, while present vice chairman, Xu Qiliang, is expected to stay on. Zhang, like Xi is native from the northwestern province of Shaanxi and both he and Xi are children of former senior PLA officials.
The other two candidates are Li Zuocheng, director of the Joint Staff Department and Miao Hua, the new head of the Political Department; they may also make it.
Whether China will follow a ‘peaceful rise’ or a more tumultuous one, will depends on the capacity of Xi to impose a ‘rule of law’.
If the generals remain ‘wild’ as in the past, India may have to face a serious situation.
The battle is not yet played out.

The Tibetans in full costume 
Apart from the Secretary General's speech,  is it interesting to look at the attire of the delegates.
On the second day of the 19th Congress, the delegates of the 31 provinces met separately.
While most of the delegates wore suit and tie, the Tibetans had to show off their regional attire.
Just have a look at these photos.

Hubei Province delegation

Anhui Province delegation

Yunnan Province delegation

Fujian Province delegation

Delegation of the central financial organs

Qinghai Province delegation

Guangdong Province delegation

Gansu Province delegation

Zhejiang Province delegation

And now the Tibetan delegation.
Out of 29 delegates, 11 Tibetans are from the 'grass root'.
While the 'big shots', from the regional Standing Committee of the Tibetan Autonomous Region like Wu Yingjie, Lobsang Gyaltsen or Che Dralha wore suits and ties, the 'grass root' delegates have no choice but to show their regional costumes.
It is always a great attraction for the journalists and photographers.
Can it be considered as a display of Tibetan culture?
Are the delegates just for the show in Beijing ?
Difficult to say.

‘New normal’ in form of old for Beijing?

My article ‘New normal’ in form of old for Beijing? appeared last week in the Edit Page of The Pioneer.


Here is the link...

China has been asserting itself globally. The US's possible withdrawal from the TPP will help Beijing.  Can China be a champion of ‘globalisation' and yet remain an authoritarian regime internally

The new Literature Nobel Prize laureate once sang, “The Times They Are a-Changin”. Lately, they have been changing even faster. Realignments are swiftly taking place, creating a sense of planetary incertitude. Take the example of US President-elect Donald Trump’s announcement that the US would pull out of the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); it could undoubtedly create a void that Beijing is dreaming to fill. New York University professor Ian Bremmer noted that “officials in China are excited about Trump’s plan to withdraw from the US’s participation in the planned TPP”.
The New York Times report headlined, ‘China’s Influence Grows in Ashes of Trans-Pacific Trade Pact’, remarked that an apparent defeat was “an unalloyed triumph for China”. There is no doubt that we may soon witness a considerable realignment in Asia, with China taking the lead.
During his keynote speech at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in Lima in Peru, Chinese President Xi Jinping renewed his call for ‘globalisation’; he pushed for the construction of a Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP). While the new US dispensation preaches protectionism and is crusading against economic globalisation, Xi plays the ‘global’ card: “We should firmly pursue the FTAAP as an institutional mechanism for ensuring an open economy in the Asia-Pacific”, he said. Were Mao Zedong to come out of his mausoleum, he would not believe his ears.
But nothing is simple in today’s world. The TPP was to promote fairer and freer trade with far-reaching provisions for labour and environmental protection. The US withdrawal may trigger a halt of domestic reforms in the Middle Kingdom. The fact that China will face no restriction anymore, will not help Beijing become a ‘normal’ state. The South China Morning Post (SCMP) pointed out: “The scale of the pact was expected to put external pressure on Beijing to lift its own standards.”
Zhao Minghao, a researcher with the China Centre for Contemporary World Studies, told the SCMP that “the TPP’s demise would be a ‘double-edged sword’ for China”. It pointed out that other deals such as the FTAAP “did not require the Central Government to make painful domestic changes”.
Can China simultaneously promote free-market and remain an authoritarian regime, controlling its own people in a repressive manner? In this context, it is interesting to look at the new counter-terrorism law which came into effect on January 1, 2016. The new law consists of 97 Articles in 10 chapters, covering issues such as terrorism designation, prevention, intelligence gathering, investigation, emergency response, international co-operation or legal liabilities.
While one can rejoice that China has decided to become a ‘normal’ state ruled by law, one is forced to notice that general repression of individual freedom of speech and thought, has dramatically increased since the 18th Congress in November 2012. Though Rule of Law is one of The Four Comprehensives, President Xi’s new mantra (namely build a moderately prosperous society; deepen the reform; govern according to law; govern strictly under the direction of the Party), it is feared that the last ‘comprehensive’ will not be in accord with the third one. Can a state be governed without checks and balances and at the same time follow the Rule of Law?
Moreover, the new federal Anti-Terrorism Law will be part of a ‘package’ which will include a National Security Law, a Non-Governmental Organisations Management Law and a Cyber-Security Law, amongst others. How far can the new law become a tool to further contain the resentment of the people? Will the Internet and social media networks be an instrument of information or repression?
A few months ago, David Shambaugh, a respected Chinese watcher, who is director of the China Policy Program at George Washington University, wrote a Saturday Essay entitled, ‘Coming Chinese Crackup’. It was published in The Wall Street Journal, but circulated widely on social media. Later Shambaugh, elaborated his theory in a 203-page new book, China’s Future, where he argues that “China is in a state of ‘atrophy’ and ‘decline’, which will continue if no major political reform takes place in the near future”.
It is certain that the new law will engender more fear among the so-called minorities and though, like everywhere on the planet, religious extremism may exist in China, ‘regionalism’ in Xinjiang or Tibet is always assimilated to separatism and terrorism. The question remains: Can China become a normal state?
Xinhua had reported: “The regional Government of Xinjiang unveiled China’s first local counterterrorism law. Based on China’s Counterterrorism Law, passed in December 2015, the regional law details and supplements the national law in defining terror activities and terrorists, security precautions, intelligence, investigations, countermeasures and punishment.”
The fact that a ‘counter-terrorist law’ was immediately enacted in Xinjiang (it will probably happen in Tibet soon) makes the future of human rights in China quite disquieting. Once again, it is too easy to associate regional resentment with terrorism. Authoritarianism has other implications.
The Diplomat recently published an article titled, ‘China and Germany: The Honeymoon is over’. It said, “The prolonged honeymoon between China and Germany has come to an abrupt halt. In Berlin, awareness has grown that Beijing has moved from being an economic partner to a serious global competitor.” It cited the recent visit to China of Sigmar Gabriel, the German Economy Minister, which “came in the middle of an atmosphere of crisis in German-Chinese economic relations” It added,  “Instead of attempting to improve matters, however, Gabriel set out to teach the Chinese a lesson.”
Gabriel is also Vice-Chancellor and Chairman of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and is a possible candidate for the next chancellorship.
The Diplomat explained that Gabriel burst out by quoting the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “China is by far the most restrictive industrial country in the world. Unlike the freedom of maneuver Chinese companies enjoy in the West, foreign firms in China are not allowed, for instance, to invest in the banking, telecommunication, or media industries. Public tenders usually are awarded to Chinese companies rather than to foreign ones.”
All this together creates a rather confusing situation; it shows that China is far from stepping into the US’s shoes as the world leader.
Indeed the question is: Can China be a champion of ‘globalisation’ and yet remain an authoritarian regime internally? The answers are not easy to get.

The Fate of Planet Earth

As torrential rains forces the authorities to close Chennai Airport, as Beijing chokes under a thick, brown smog and air pollution reaches 20 times what the World Health Organization considers to be safe and as Delhi become the ‘Most Polluted City in the World’, leaders from 147 nations addressed the opening session of the 2015 UN Climate Change Conference held in Paris between November 30 to December 11.
One of the objectives of the COP21 (it is the 21st yearly session of the Conference of Parties), is to review the implementation of the 1992 Rio Convention. In Brazil, world leaders had agreed on a UN Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC), aimed at stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases and avoiding ‘dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’.
The UNFCCC has now 195 parties/members.
During the COP3 in Japan, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted; then the COP11 in Canada agreed to the Montreal Action Plan, while the COP15 in Copenhagen could only acknowledge that the Kyoto Protocol targets had not been achieved; this perhaps triggered the creation of a Green Climate Fund during the COP17 in Durban.
This time, the aim is to find an effective and equitable agreement to limit global temperature rise to 2 degrees Celsius.
Will it succeed?
Probably not: simply because the interests of the different players are too divergent. However one should look at the COP21 in another perspective.
Never in the history of mankind, have so many heads of State and Governments congregated in a single place. For months, the world’s chancelleries put tremendous efforts to enable a consensus during the Meet.
France, as the host of the COP21, says that “it is committed to the role of an impartial facilitator for forging an ambitious agreement.”
Laurent Fabius, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs and COP21 Chairperson has been criss-crossing the world for months. After his visit to Delhi on November 20, he rushed to South Africa, Brazil and Canada to look for possible solutions and this, despite the disparate interests.
Each and every capital has done some homework. Take Beijing, it recently released its latest scientific assessment, a 900-page document called ‘Third National Climate Change Assessment Report’; some 550 scientists have participated to sum up the present knowledge and environmental consequences of rising greenhouse gas levels for China.
They found that average temperatures across the Middle Kingdom have been rising faster than the global average, and that te trend is likely to continue.
If you multiply these efforts by more than 100 nations who have taken the issue seriously, the COP21 is already a success.
The human race has realized that its fate is in the balance.
Of course, the West and Asia do not see eye to eye.
Steffen Böhm, a professor in Management and Sustainability at the University of Essex is one of the few Westerners who understand the less-developed nations’ point of view; he wrote: “Stop blaming India and China for the West’s 300 years of destroying the environment”
Böhm believes that the COP21 will be failure: “The basic reason is that the unequal distribution of carbon emissions is not even on its agenda. The historical responsibility of the West is not on the table, nor is a method of national carbon accounting that looks at how the emissions a country consumes rather than produces.”
The Indian Prime Minister, while addressing the opening session, expressed similar views: “Over the next few days, we will decide the fate of this planet. …the consequences of the industrial age powered by fossil fuel are evident, especially on the lives of the poor. The prosperous still have a strong carbon footprint. And, the world's billions at the bottom of the development ladder are seeking space to grow. So, the choices are not easy. But, we have awareness and technology.”
A western journalist wrote in La Libre Belgique: “India claims the right to pollute”. She represents the view of many in the West, but this type of attitude can lead nowhere.
President Obama was more diplomatic; he urged negotiators to deliver a meaningful deal, because the ‘next generation is watching’; he added: “Climate change could define the contours of this century more than any other challenge.”
The urgency of the situation is the only consensus right now.
There are however several positive initiatives.
Narendra Modi along with French President Francois Hollande launched the International Solar Alliance. It will be hosted in the premises of the National Institute of Solar Energy in Gurgaon and India will provide land and contribute about US$ 30 million to build the Secretariat: "This day is the sunrise of new hope –- not just for clean energy, but for villages and homes still in darkness; and for our mornings and evenings filled with a clear view of the glory of the sun," said Modi. Let us hope.
The world event in France will see the participation of the ‘civil society’, the green NGOs, ‘stakeholders’ of every hue and of course the climatosceptics, who do not believe in climate change, but only see it as a conspiracy of the rich nations.
Probably a crucial concept will be forgotten, that is Sustainable Consumption which means that humanity has to start consuming less, if it wants to survive. Humans need to realize that the resources of the planet are limited and need to be shared by all. But who should start acting first, the rich or the poor?

Where is the LAC?

LAC in Demchok, Ladakh

Once again, the LAC or Line of Actual Control has recently come in the news.
The latest mention came from Beijing, where China turned down an Indian proposal to exchange maps of the LAC; a move which seemed most reasonable and for-too-long delayed.
Huang Xilian, the deputy director general of the Asian Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told some Indian journalists: “We tried to clarify some years ago but it encountered some difficulties, which led to even complex situation. …That is why whatever we do, we should make it more conducive to peace and tranquility for making things easier and not to make them complicated.'' Huang added: "We have to do many things. We have to seek comprehensive approach to this.''
This sentence means nothing, though it shows that Beijing is not interested to sort out the border issue with India.
Narendra Modi had specifically asked for a clarification on the LAC during his recent visit to China. While addressing Chinese students at Tsinghua University in Beijing (the Chinese foreign minister, Wang Yi was in attendance), he had reiterated his demand.
Huang now proposed that the two sides should have a code of conduct on the border issue: “Our position is that we have to seek some kind of comprehensive measures, not only one measure to control and manage the border to ensure peace and tranquility along the border.''
It does not make sense because these ‘measures’ already exist.
It is not the first time the LAC makes the news. Remember the visit of the Chinese President Xi Jinping to India in 2014. All started well when President Xi landed at the Sardar Vallabhbhai International Airport at Ahmedabad on September 17.
Xi and Peng Liyuan, his wife had a great taste of Modiland.
Then the planned programme went awry with the situation deteriorating fast on LAC, in Chumur in South Ladakh. Differences in ‘perception’ about where the LAC lay were known to exist, but this time, more than one thousand five hundred Chinese troops belonging to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the People’s Armed Police Force (PAPF) crossed the LAC and stood a few metres away from the Indian jawans. The situation has never been so tense for years. Why this show of force at a time Xi Jinping, who is also Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), was trying to instill trust in the bilateral relations? Was there a better way to sabotage the Presidential visit? It was all the more surprising as Xi had come to sell his ‘Chinese Dream’.
A day later, President Xi and Modi met at Hyderabad house. At the end of the encounter, the Indian Prime Minister announced: “I suggested that clarification of Line of Actual Control would greatly contribute to our efforts to maintain peace and tranquility and requested President Xi to resume the stalled process of clarifying the LAC. We should also seek an early settlement of the boundary question.”
When he answered Modi, Xi spoke of border agreement, not about the LAC. It was telling. Later, ‘exchange of maps’ was not mentioned in the Joint Statement either.
Then nine months later, Narendra Modi went to China. Many observers expected to some progress on the border issue. But again nothing on the Joint Statement on the LAC and the famous maps; and now Mr Huang says that it would ‘complicate the issue’.
How could a clarification of the Chinese and Indian ‘perceptions’ complicate the border dispute?
The most ironic is that the concept of a LAC was a brainchild of the Chinese.
On December 17, 1959, in a letter addressed to Jawaharlal Nehru, Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai used for the first time a new terminology. He wrote that the Line of Actual Control (LAC) consisted of “the so-called McMahon Line in the East and the line up to which each side exercises actual control in the West.” The term ‘LAC’ became a legal concept in the Sino-Indian agreements signed in 1993 and 1996, 2012 and 2013. The 1996 agreement states, “No activities of either side shall overstep the line of actual control.”
Now, Beijing does not want to tell us where its ‘perception’ of the LAC is.
Perhaps Beijing has decided to continue intruding from time to time into Indian ‘perceived’ territory; with no defined LAC, it is more convenient!
But there are other reasons why China does not want to tell India of its ‘perceptions’ of the LAC.
In the Eastern sector, the LAC corresponds more or less with the McMahon line. Though some minor adjustments on both sides might be required at the time of a final agreement; today, Beijing is probably under the impression that ‘fixing’ the LAC would ‘fix’ the McMahon Line. It is out of question for Beijing.
During the annual KF Rustamji lecture, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval (who is also the Special Representative for border talks with China), said that he was surprised that, while China agreed to the McMahon line being the Sino-Burmese border in 1960, it was not ready to accept the same principle for India today.
China and Burma agreed that the northern boundary would follow the ‘traditional line’, but the imperialist name [McMahon] was removed of the final agreement.
For India, it is different, the border issue is not just a question of ‘demarcating’ a line between China and India; it is also about acknowledging this ancient bonds between India and Tibet. For this reason, Mr Doval is absolutely right to call the Sino-Indian border the McMahon Line. Soon after, the Chinese Foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying reacted sharply: “The Chinese side holds a consistent and clear position on the eastern section of the China-India boundary: Arunachal Pradesh is a part of Southern Tibet.” Ms Hua explained: “The Chinese Government does not recognise the McMahon Line, which is illegal.”
By ‘fixing’ the McMahon Line, Beijing believes that Delhi would use it to give credence to the existence of the 1914 Simla Treaty between India and Tibet. China will not accept this.
For the Western sector, it is more complicated. As mentioned earlier, in December 1959, Zhou Enlai was clear where the LAC in Ladakh was; Zhou had even sent a map to his Indian counterpart in 1956,: “The line up to which each side exercises actual control in this sector is very clear, just as it is in the other sectors of the Sino-Indian border. As a matter of fact, the Chinese map published in 1956, to which Your Excellency referred, correctly shows the traditional boundary between the two countries in this sector,” the Chinese Premier wrote in December 1959.
But after the 1962 conflict, during which China occupied large portions of Ladakh, the PLA did not withdraw fully behind the 199 LAC, thereby changing the location of the LAC.
By exchanging maps, it would be clear that China has not withdrawn from several places it occupied in 1962. Today, Beijing is not ready to come back to its 1959’s claims; which is why it says that it would ‘complicate’ the border issue.
Another issue, while the civilian leadership may agree to fix the LAC, the PLA generals are probably against the idea and the civilians do not always prevail in the Middle Kingdom.
The Chinese like to say that the border imbroglio has been ‘inherited from history’. But, while Beijing cites British imperialism, the facts are different: there was no ‘border issue’ between India and Tibet before 1950-51, simply because the Roof of the World was a peaceful independent state. This changed when Tibet was invaded by the PLA.
In the early 1950s, having swiftly taken control of Tibet, the People’s Liberation Army progressively stopped the age-old trade and exchanges between India and the Dalai Lama’s land. China even built a road on Indian territory (without Nehru’s government noticing it); the stakes brutally changed and the border gradually became ‘disputed’.
Today, the 4,000 km-long LAC is divided in three sectors: the western, central and eastern sectors, all with large or small ‘disputed’ areas. A solution probably favoured by Beijing would be to ‘exchange’ the Aksai Chin area in Ladakh, vital for China, as it links Tibet and Xinjiang, against Arunachal Pradesh that is claimed by Beijing and keep the status quo in the central sector.
But before, Beijing needs to tell India where its perception of the border lies.
One may have to wait.

The Dalai Lama is an insignificant character, Deng

Gyalo Thondup and Deng Xiaoping in 1979

In my book The Negotiations that never were, I mentioned the encounter between Deng Xiaoping, China's new Paramount Leader and Gyalo Thondup, the Dalai Lama's elder brother in March 1979.
Excerpts of the book are posted below. 
We have now another side of the coin.
The US Department of State has recently released Volume XIII of the Foreign Relations of the United States (Carter Administration - 1977-80).
What is surprising is that there are very few mentions about Tibet (was not President Carter a great 'friend' of the Dalai Lama?)
One discussion is however worth citing. It took place during Walter Mondale, the US Vice-President's visit to China in August 1979. 
On August 27, 1979, Mondale met  Deng Xiaoping (then China's Vice-Premier of the State Council). 
Mondale was accompanied by Leonard Woodcock, U.S. Ambassador to China; David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and Denis Clift, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs while Deng Xiaoping had Huang Hua, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zhang Wenchin, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chai Zemin, China's Ambassador to the US, on his side.
During the course of the conversation Deng broached the topic of Dalai Lama.
He stated:

As for the matter of the Dalai Lama, that is a small matter. We made clear our position. It is not a very important question because the Dalai Lama is an insignificant character.

Vice President Mondale: You have awfully good housing waiting for him. Could Woodcock [the US Ambasssdor] live there? (Laughter)

Vice Premier Deng: If he wants to come back, he could still live in that house. Of course, it is an illusion on his part. The idea of wanting to have a state of Tibet. Not long ago he visited the Soviet Union, and we have confirmed information that he went there on orders of the Indian Government. Some of his important officials [the first fact-finding delegation] have recently come back and have gone to Tibet to see officials and conditions there.

Though the discussion shifted on Cambodia and Vietnam, Vice President Mondale later brought back the question of the Dalai Lama:

Concerning the Dalai Lama’s visit to the United States, he was received only as a religious leader and not as a political leader. He will not be treated as a political leader. And our position, whenever asked, is that Tibet is part of China. 

Deng's remark raises a serious question, was the Chinese leader sincere when, a few month earlier, he told Gyalo Thondup: “The door is opened for negotiations as long as we don’t speak about independence. Everything else is negotiable”.
Difficult to say!

Excerpts of The Negotiations that never were:
The first encounters
In November 1978, Gyalo Thondup met with Li Ju-sheng who was designated as ‘Xinhua Director No. 2’ in Hong Kong. They had several encounters which lasted 5 or 6 weeks. Li certainly relayed his conversations to the leadership in Beijing. It seems that the objective from the Chinese side was to build confidence to prepare an eventual visit of Thondup to China where he would meet officials.
At the beginning, Gyalo Thondup did not know that Li Ju-sheng was close to Deng Xiaoping (who was acquainted with his intelligence work in Indonesia in the 1960s). Deng had personally sent Li to Hong Kong and given him this designation (Director No 2) . After a few meetings, Li recommended to Deng that Thondup be invited to discuss the situation in Tibet.
The Dalai Lama recalled in his memoirs that around the same time:

Thirty-four prisoners, mostly elderly members of my own administration, were publicly released with great ceremony in Lhasa. These men were purportedly the last of the 'rebel leaders'. Chinese newspapers stated that, after being taken on a month-long tour of the 'New Tibet', they were to be assisted in finding jobs and even in going abroad if that was what they desired.”
The Dalai Lama was informed of the meetings between Gyalo Thondup and the Chinese emissary. He commented:
The arrival of the [Tibetan] New Year brought no let-up in this spate of extraordinary developments. On 1 February 1979, coincidentally the day that the People's Republic of China was formally recognised by the US, the Panchen Lama, in his first public appearance for fourteen years, added his voice to those calling for the Dalai Lama and his fellow exiles to return. 'If the Dalai Lama is genuinely interested in the happiness and welfare of the Tibetan masses, he need have no doubts about it, he said. I can guarantee that the present standard of living of the Tibetan people in Tibet is many times better than that of the old society’ .

A week later, this invitation was repeated by Radio Lhasa. The nomination of a special welcoming committee to receive Tibetans from abroad was announced.
The Dalai Lama continued:

This was followed just a week later by the unexpected arrival of Gyalo Thondup in Kanpur (Uttar Pradesh) where I was attending a religious conference. To my surprise, he announced that he had heard through some old and trusted friends of his in Hong Kong (where he now lives) that Xinhua, the New China News Agency, which constitutes China's official legation to the British colony, wanted to make contact with him. Following this, he had met a personal emissary of Deng Xiaoping, who explained that the Chinese leader wanted to open communications with the Dalai Lama. As a mark of his goodwill, Deng wanted to invite Gyalo Thondup to Peking for talks. My brother had refused as he wanted to seek my opinion first.
This was totally unexpected, and I did not reply immediately. The developments of the past two years all looked very promising However, as the ancient Indian saying goes, 'When you have once been bitten by a snake, you become cautious even of a rope.' And unfortunately, all my experience of the Chinese leadership suggested that it was untrustworthy. Not only did the authorities in question lie, but worse, when these lies were exposed they were not the least bit ashamed. The Cultural Revolution had been a 'tremendous success' whilst it was going on; now it was a failure — but there was no sense of humility in this admission. Nor was there anything to suggest that these people ever kept their promises. Despite the concrete undertaking of clause thirteen of the Seventeen-Point Agreement that the Chinese would 'not arbitrarily take a needle or thread' from the Tibetans, they had ransacked the whole country. On top of this, through countless atrocities, they had shown a total disrespect for human rights. It seemed that to the Chinese mind, perhaps because of the huge size of their own population, human life is considered to be a cheap commodity — and Tibetan lives to be of still less value. I therefore felt it necessary to exercise extreme caution.
On the other hand, my basic belief is that human problems can only be solved through human contact. So there could be no harm in hearing what the Chinese had to say. Hopefully we could simultaneously explain our own views. We certainly had nothing to hide. Also, if the authorities in Peking were in earnest, we might even be able to send some fact-finding missions to discover for ourselves the real situation.
With these considerations in mind, and knowing that our cause was 100 per cent just and in accordance with the wishes of the entire population of Tibet, I told my brother he was free to go. After he had seen the Chinese leaders, we would consider the next step .

The road was cleared for the first direct contacts between the Dalai Lama’s brother and the new leadership in Beijing.

The Deng-Thondup meeting
The meeting between the supreme leader of the People’s Republic of China and the Dalai Lama’s brother took place in Beijing on March 12, 1979. Immediately, Deng blamed the Gang of Four for the difficult situation in Tibet. It was then the standard excuse for all that had gone wrong in China (and in Tibet) since the mid-sixties. But Deng said that he was keen to improve the lot of the Tibetan population. He told Thondup that he would like to invite the refugees in India and abroad to return to Tibet, “It is better to see once than to hear a hundred times”.
It was during this encounter with Gyalo Thondup that Deng Xiaoping said: “The door is opened for negotiations as long as we don’t speak about independence. Everything else is negotiable”. 
Around that time, the Dalai Lama proposed to Beijing (via the Chinese Embassy in India) that a fact-finding mission from Dharamsala should be permitted to visit Tibet with a view to discovering the real situation there and reporting. Gyalo Thondup had been requested to work out the details.
It is in these circumstances that three delegations were sent by the Dalai Lama in 1979 and 1980 to visit their native land after a gap of 20 years and much suffering.