When China takes Tibet for a ride!

Jigmey Passang, Bhuchung K Tsering, Tenzin P. Atisha, Kelsang Gyaltsen, Lodi Gyari (left to right)

then Du Qinglin, Zhu Weiqun, Sithar, Nyima Tsering, Chang Rongjun and An Qi Yi (2010)

Zhu Weiqun is a well-known hawk, at least as far as Tibet and ‘religion’ are concerned.
A few years ago, he retired as Executive Deputy Director of the United Front Work Department (UFWD) of the Communist Party of China (CPC).
Born in Jianhu County, Jiangsu Province, Zhu graduated from the department of journalism of the school of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; he joined the CPC as early as July 1970.
In February 1999, he became the UFWD’s Executive Deputy Head and as such he was responsible for the negotiations with Dharamsala (2002-2010).
In January 2006, he was promoted to minister rank.
Zhu was supposed to have retired from active politics in 2013; but he took an ornamental job as Chairman of the Ethnic and Religious Affairs Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).
As such Zhu is close to Wang Yang, the CPPCC’s boss, who looks over the Tibetan issue as well as religious and minorities’ affairs and Hong Kong and Taiwan …and the United Front Work.
In May 2013, when asked whether if religious members should be openly admitted in the Party, Zhu is said to have answered: "No Chinese Communist Party members should be allowed to be religious."

Zhu’s nasty writings
From time to time, Zhu still writes a nasty article in The Global Times.
On June 9, in one these articles, he commented on the visit of Terry Branstad, the US Ambassador to China, to Tibet.
Speaking about the ambassador, he remarked: “It is hard to figure out his true feelings about Tibet. On the one hand, he spoke positively of Tibet's economic and social development, (which disproved the Dalai Lama group's lie about the destruction of Tibet's environment by the Qinghai-Tibet Railway). On the other, he repeated the hackneyed remarks of the US government.”
Zhu strongly criticized Branstad, who dared, according to him, to encourage Beijing “to engage in substantive dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives, without preconditions, to seek a settlement that resolves differences."
This was not appreciated by Zhu. Why?
Zhu said it is blatant interference in China's internal affairs.

China wants preconditions
He also questioned the meaning of ‘seeking a settlement without preconditions’ as well as the definition of a ‘substantive dialogue’.
Though time and again the Dalai Lama has said that he wanted an association with China; Zhu considers the Dalai Lama as a splittist. The ‘retired’ Communist leader also said (does he really believes it?) that the Dalai Lama’s clique has only one objective, to split China.
At the same time, Zhu gave the assurance that the CPC's Central Committee had not closed the “door to contacts and negotiation with the Dalai Lama.”
Showing his hard-line stance, he added that “the proposed negotiation cannot come without preconditions.”

The Old Preconditions
One remembers the preconditions given by Hu Yaobang, the CCP General Secretary to Gyalo Thondup in 1981; it was called the “Five-Point Policy towards the Dalai Lama”.
Please note, these five points are not related to Tibet, but only to the Dalai Lama’s status.
Zhu Weiqun and his clique have often asserted that there was nothing to discuss about Tibet, the ‘negotiations’ could only be about the condition of the Dalai Lama's returns to the Motherland and his status ...in Beijing.
The five Points were:

1. The Dalai Lama should be confident that China has entered a new stage of long-term political stability, steady economic growth and mutual help among all nationalities.
2. The Dalai Lama and his representatives should be frank and sincere with the Central Government, not beat around the bush. There should be no more quibbling over the events in 1959.
3. The central authorities sincerely welcome the Dalai Lama and his followers to come back to live. This is based on the hope that they will contribute to upholding China's unity and promoting solidarity between the Han and Tibetan nationalities, and among all nationalities, and the modernization programme.
4. The Dalai Lama will enjoy the same political status and living conditions as he had before 1959. It is suggested that he not go to live in Tibet or hold local posts there. Of course, he may go back to Tibet from time to time. His followers need not worry about their jobs and living conditions. These will only be better than before.
5. When the Dalai Lama wishes to come back, he can issue a brief statement to the press. It is up to him to decide what he would like to say in the statement.

In his recent article in The Global Times, Zhu explained: “First, it must be made clear that in nature, contact and consultation are not talks between China's central government and the Tibetan government-in-exile or ‘Central Tibetan Administration’, nor are ‘Tibetan-Han Talks’ or ‘Tibetan-China Talks’. The Dalai separatist political group is illegitimate and ineligible to have a ‘dialogue’ with representatives of the CPC Central Committee.”
Beijing wants only to talk to the Dalai Lama’s personal envoys.
In my book The Negotiations that Never Were, I argued that with such conditions the ‘talks’ could go anywhere and they indeed went nowhere during the Lodi Gyari’s days (nine rounds between 2002 and 2010).
The second point mentioned by Zhu was: “the Dalai Lama must accept Tibet as an integral part of China, abandon all attempts about so-called Tibet independence, stop all separatist and destructive activities, and recognize Taiwan as an integral part of China.”
It has never been clear why Beijing wants to link Taiwan to Tibet.
Regarding the other point, China has been insisting that the Dalai Lama agreed that historically Tibet has always been a part of China.

Tibet is part of China only since 1951
When a senior Tibetan exiled Lama went to China a couple of years ago, the Chinese said that they wanted the Dalai Lama to sign a statement acknowledging that Tibet has been part of China since ancient times. This is obviously not acceptable to the Dalai Lama and the People of Tibet, as it was a falsification of history.
Taking a hard stand, Zhu affirmed that in these two preconditions “there is no so-called Tibet issue, but just the problem of the Dalai Lama. The Dalai group, whose existence is against the Chinese Constitution, is not at all eligible to discuss Tibetan affairs with the CPC Central Committee.”
It means that today, the Chinese stand has not changed; Beijing is ready to discuss the Dalai Lama’s status, not the status of Tibet.

No substantive dialogue
Zhu also objected to Ambassador Branstad speaking about ‘substantive dialogue’.
The former UFWD official does not like the word ‘substantive’.
He listed the ‘substantive’ issues presented by Lodi Gyari and his team during the ‘negotiations that never were’, it included “denying that Tibet has been a part of China since ancient times; defining Tibet as a ‘State’ occupied by China; demanding the Dalai Lama’s rule to be extended to the whole of ethnic Tibet, (i.e.) Qinghai, as well as two autonomous prefectures in Sichuan, one in Yunnan and one in Gansu (an area equal to one fourth of China's territory); requiring the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to withdraw from Tibetan areas and make it a so-called international zone of peace under the control of Western countries; requiring all the Han people who settled down in Tibet return to where they came from - in other words, to implement ethnic cleansing in all Tibetan areas.”
It is travesty of the demands of Lodi Gyari; how could the Special Envoy ask for a Zone of Peace under Western control?

The Seventeen Point Agreement
Incidentally, the Seventeen Point Agreement signed ‘under duress’ by Tibetan delegates in May 1951 admitted the invasion of Tibet; Article I said: “The Tibetan people shall unite and drive out imperialist aggressive forces from Tibet; the Tibetan people shall return to the family of the Motherland the People's Republic of China (PRC).”
The fact that the Tibetans had to return to the Motherland, meant that they were not ‘in the Motherland’ earlier.
In any case, the PRC was only created in 1949.
Article III stated: “In accordance with the policy towards nationalities laid down in the Common Programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the Tibetan people have the right of exercising national regional autonomy under the unified leadership of the Central People's Government (CPG) of the PRC.”
Zhu may have not read the Agreement. This nevertheless raises the question, how and when was the right to autonomy dropped?

Branstad visit to Tibet
To come back to Zhu’s article, he affirmed: “If the US government insists that ‘substantive’ dialogue means meeting all the aforementioned requests of the Dalai Lama, then its hopes would be dashed.”
My question is: what the point to discuss, if what China promised in 1951 cannot even be brought today on the negotiating table.
Zhu Weiqun observed that during his visit to Tibet, Branstad had met with the Communist leaders, that he visited “local communities, educational and cultural institutions and religious sites, which at least improved his understanding of Tibet.”
Zhu’s conclusion was that “the knowledge he gained from the trip will help him in his career.”
The Ambassador’s career should not be the concern of the Chinese …or the Tibetans.
Zhu added that “Since the peaceful liberation [the Chinese term for occupation], especially since the reform and opening-up [the massacre of thousands of Tibetans in 1959], Tibet has witnessed rapid economic and social development, with people's livelihood improving and the environment getting better and better. From my point of view, China could and should create conditions for more foreigners to visit Tibet and encourage them to draw their own conclusions based on what they see.”
It is not the case today, though the Chairman of the CPPCC’s Ethnic and Religious Affairs Committee affirmed that “Tibet's door has always been open to foreigners.”
At the end, he again puts the blame on the 'Dalai clique' who creates disturbance in Tibet, forcing Beijing to take 'administrative measures' to regularly close down Tibet to visitors.

Some conclusions
All this will not help to bring a rapprochement between Dharamsala and Beijing (probably China is not interested).
The time has perhaps come for the Tibetan Administration to set aside the idea to find a negotiated agreement with Beijing and wait for a new leadership to emerge in the Middle Kingdom.
Remember when the Chinese forces invaded Tibet in 1910, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama took refuge in India, and returned to Tibet in 1912 to proclaim the Independence of Tibet.
He wrote in his Testament:

"As a result of our meritorious Karma, and the numerous prayers and services that were conducted in Tibet, internal strife took place in China. It was no problem therefore to completely drive out the Chinese from Tibet."

This shows the importance given by the Tibetans to the power of prayers and rituals.

Zhu Weiqun final conclusion is: “We must start from the needs of stability and development in Tibet.”
We should not forget that 'stability’ has serious implications for the Indian borders and schemes such the Xiaogang villages, often mentioned on this blog, and the fast building of infrastructure on the plateau is truly worrisome.

Why China will change: The Tibet factor (An Interview with Lodi Gyari)

Lodi Gyari Rinpoche is no more. He passed away yesterday morning in a San Francisco hospital, where he was being treated for liver cancer. 
Rinpoche was 69. His family members were reported to be with him.
Gyari Rinpoche was born in 1949 in Nyarong in eastern Tibet, where he received a traditional monastic education as the tulku of Khenchen Jampal Dewe Nyima from Lumorap Monastery. 
In 1959, he fled with his family to India.  
In 1970, Rinpoche had been one of the founding members of the Tibetan Youth Congress.
In 1982 and 1984, he was a junior member of the delegation which went to China to 'negotiate'. 
See my book, Dharamsala and Beijing: the Negotiations that never were. 
From 2002 to 2009, he conducted the talks with China as the Dalai Lama's Special Enjoy. 

I am posting today a twelve-year old interview with Lodi Gyari Rinpoche.
It appeared on April 20, 2006 in Rediff.com under the title Why China will change: The Tibet factor

Here is the link...

A few days before his departure for Beijing for the fifth round of talks with the People's Republic of China, the Dalai Lama's chief negotiator and Special Envoy in Washington, DC Lodi Gyari Rinpoche spoke to Claude Arpi.
Examining the dynamics of the 'dialogue process' with China, he shared his frustrations and hopes for the future. He also explained how difficult it has been for the Dalai Lama to abandon his claim for independence and to accept that Tibet becomes a 'genuinely autonomous' part of the People's Republic.
He also examined an interesting factor which may play a role in finding a solution to the Tibetan tangle: The revival of Buddhism in China.

What can you tell us about the negotiations that you are conducting with China?

The Tibetan movement is a very unique movement. This can be seen from the way we are conducting the negotiations with the People's Republic of China. We are doing it in a different way. If one day, His Holiness the Dalai Lama's' efforts succeed, it will not only have an impact on the six million Tibetans, but it will also be a breakthrough for humanity, because of the nature of our negotiations.
Even for someone like me, engaged in the negotiations, I see it more as a spiritual practice than an exercise in diplomacy. Let me explain this. I remember very vividly that in 1987, when His Holiness first presented the 'Middle Way approach' in a formal document, he consulted a few people outside of the Tibetan leadership.
One of them was former (US) President (Jimmy) Carter. His Holiness has a lot of respect for President Carter, not because he had been the US president, but because His Holiness believes he is very wise and religious minded (in fact he became closer to us after he left the White House). So I flew directly from New Delhi to New York to Minneapolis, where President Carter was staying at that time, to show him an 8-page document, which later became the 'Strasbourg Proposal'.
He really took time to read it through (he is famous for that) and took nearly one hour to study it very carefully. Then he turned to me and asked: "What is His Holiness' bottom line?" I told him: "This is the bottom line." He was surprised: "If this is the bottom line, you have to start from somewhere else."
I responded to President Carter saying this issue was raised, but His Holiness' position is that he is not a politician and that he was a simple monk who wants to be really sincere and transparent and place on the table what he really wants.
It is because of such a nature of our negotiations position that I feel our success, when it happens, will be a major breakthrough in the art of negotiation.

Was it difficult for the Dalai Lama?

It has been extremely difficult for His Holiness. When he chose 'the Middle Way' path, there were tremendous protests from his own people. This strong opposition came from people who were ready to give their lives for the cause. And as someone who served His Holiness very closely and has been intimately involved in the process, I can tell you, it was very painful. It was certainly a difficult thing for those of us who had the honour to be associated with him. But it was even more difficult for His Holiness to take such a decision.
He showed that he was a real leader, because a real leader has sometimes to take unpopular decisions. He showed that he had the courage to take difficult decisions. I always share this with my Chinese colleagues to give them an idea of the extent His Holiness has gone to work for a mutually satisfactory solution.
I would like to mention a personal experience. My mother was one of the first women to take on the fight against the Chinese. She was quite well known. Though she was a very gentle woman, she never hesitated to fight the Chinese.
When I accompanied His Holiness to Strasbourg to present the Proposal, she was deeply upset with me. Until His Holiness' presentation of his proposal to the European Parliament, I would keep this document under my pillow because it was extremely confidential.
When I returned from Strasbourg, the first thing my mother told me: "If I had known that the documents that you were so preciously guarding were this Proposal, I would have ripped it apart."
This is just to give you an idea about the mindset of the Tibetan people when they first heard of the Proposal. This shows how difficult the process has been.

Tell us more about your involvement in this dialogue.

My first trip to China was in 1982, when I was chairman of the Tibetan parliament. I was part of the high level exploratory delegation sent by His Holiness the Dalai Lama. When we first landed in China, the Chinese officials came forward to greet us. For a moment, I did not know what to do: if I shake hand with them, it would a betrayal of the thousands Tibetans as well as my family members.
At that moment, I had a flashback of my grandmother and my brothers who died under indescribable circumstances. I thought that if I shake hands, I would betray all those Tibetan who died. Many Tibetans had a similar experience.
Despite all this, we are today engaging the Chinese because we believe that it is the best solution. From this angle also you can see how important the dialogue process is. This is certainly not just diplomacy. It is the background of our dialogue with China.

How would you describe the negotiations?
Usually some kind of glamour is associated with negotiations of this nature, but in our case, it is not like this. There is a real human approach. That is why I believe that the impact of this type of dialogue goes far beyond the Tibetan people and the Tibetan plateau.
Further, if these efforts of His Holiness bear some fruits, it can bring about some fundamental shift in China. You may think it is too ambitious, but if it sincerely done, it is possible though it is difficult. From this point of view also it is very important that our process succeed.

Does anybody else in the world show interest in the Sino-Tibetan dialogue?

Lately, there is a renewed concern about China, especially in Washington, DC. There was a time when there was so much enthusiasm about China: it was considered as the most important country to be courted. It was the biggest market that ever existed. China could get away with everything. But things have changed.
If the Middle East developments had not happened, it would have come even earlier, but there is today a great concern about China; some people even see China as a threat.
I tell my American friends: "Well your concern is real, but You can not solve anything through confrontation or by using force. You should make China more friendly and less isolated."
That is why I think that with the positive attitude of His Holiness, the Tibetan issue can be a tremendously positive factor for the future of China. I do not say this in an idealist way, but am being very practical.

Can you give us some examples?

Zhao Ziyang, the former Chinese premier, died recently after spending many years under house arrest. When he was critically ill, we received a message from one of his sons: 'My father is very ill, can you ask His Holiness to pray for him?' We assumed that this request came because the son was interested in Buddhism. I passed the request to His Holiness who prayed for him. Then after the death of Zhao Ziyang came a communication from all his children thanking His Holiness for praying for their father.
But what surprised me most is when we were informed that virtually the last word of Zhao Ziyang was the name of His Holiness. We are talking about a person who reached the highest level of the Chinese hierarchy (general secretary of the Communist party and premier).
This illustrates the extent of reverence for His Holiness even in China today. There are many other instances.
I do not believe that it is too far-fetched to think that the Tibetan issue can have a profound impact on tomorrow's China. This sentiment is shared by many Chinese. I see this through my contacts not only with the Chinese government, but with Chinese of all shades.
I am surprised and encouraged to come across Chinese in the government, in the Communist party, but also this new class of rich Chinese entrepreneurs who believe that what China really needs is the presence of His Holiness.

Are you trying to negotiate the future of the Tibetan people?
If you look at the Tibetan plateau, you see that Tibet is the giver of life: all the major (Asian) rivers have their sources in Tibet. Perhaps in a few years time, definitely in 50 years time, people will be fighting wars over water.
Recently, I dined with some senior Indian officials. I was telling them that it was very smart of them to invite the Saudi king as chief guest for the Indian Republic Day. They said their prime minister made a special exception and went to receive the king at the airport. I said: "Yes, after all, he is the custodian of the most holy shrine for the Muslims." They said: "Yes, he is also the custodian of oil."
Unfortunately, the time will come when there will be a scarcity of what we today take for granted, particularly resources like water. You do not need to be a prophet to know that there will be shortage of water in 50 years time. Just with that consideration alone, imagine how important the plateau of Tibet is.
You know that former Chinese premier Zhu Rongji took the wise decision to stop the deforestation in Tibet. He took the decision not because he cared for the environment, certainly not for the sake of the Tibetans, but he realized that the floods in China were due to the deforestation in Tibet, which was not natural ones, but man-made.
For many decades, the Chinese authorities had not cared for the Tibetan plateau, thinking that whatever they can take from Tibet will only benefit them. But at the end the people of China began to suffer much more than the Tibetans.
So you can see that the whole issue of Tibet is larger than the interest of Tibet and the Tibetan people, and has wider ramifications.

What about India?

In terms of geopolitics, it is very encouraging that there is today much more trade relations between India and China. It is not the Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai relation, which was very unfortunate, but a much more rational relation. But then, it would be an illusion if anyone in South Block (the Delhi area where India's ministry of external affairs is located) feels that there could be a real progress in the relations with China without solving the problem of Tibet. It would be very naïve.
For centuries, Tibet acted as a buffer between these two great Asian civilisations. Now we can become a bridge. A buffer was important during the 19th and the 20th century to bring a certain amount of stability: It was like a wall separating empires during what is known as 'the Great Game.'
Today we do not need a buffer, but a bridge. Tibet could play that unique role, to be the bridge. This could help find a lasting and genuine solution. A solution in which the Tibetan issue would not be considered would not be lasting.
A genuine and lasting solution will be in the interests of these two great Asian nations. No one else than Tibet can help to bridge the difference between India and China. Though we are very much part of the Indian civilization, many people feel the Tibetan language must be similar to Chinese language, just because of the fact that Tibet is under China. Similarly, they believe that the Tibetan culture or civilisation is similar to the Chinese.
I have to explain that our link is much deeper with the Indian civilisation. His Holiness describes the link between the Tibetan and Indian civilisations as a filial link. Many aspects of the Indian civilisation have been kept intact in Tibet.
His Holiness jokes and says that the Indian civilisation has been put in a deep freezer on the Tibetan plateau. One of the good things out of our misfortune is that many texts, the ancient wisdom of India, has been preserved in Tibet.
Today scholars in Sarnath are retranslating these texts into Sanskrit or Pali. But by circumstances, we are politically and otherwise very much part of the Chinese political orbit. This fact is also a positive factor.

What is the status of your negotiations today?

The first round of negotiations dates from 1982, when the first Tibetan high level exploratory delegates went to China. More recently, I went thrice to China after 2002 and we had a fourth round of talks in Geneva in January 2005. Soon, I will go back to China to conduct the 5th round of talks.
It is a very slow process; it is going to take a long time, before we can make substantial progress. I always tell my Tibetan friends: "Don't be in a hurry and don't ask me to hurry." We should not allow ourselves to be forced into an agreement too quickly. After all, we have already waited very long.
His Holiness is in good health; we have time. We are committed and optimistic and we will continue very slowly.

Are you optimistic about the outcome of the talks?

Yes, I am hopeful, because if I had lost hope, I would have no business to conduct these talks. If I did not believe in this process, it would be immoral for me to continue to lead this team. I do it as my spiritual practice.
His Holiness is not only my political leader, but also my guru. If I had any doubt in my heart, my job would be to go to His Holiness and tell him: "Your Holiness, please take me out of this business because I do not believe in it."

Dharamsala and Beijing: the negotiations that never were

Phayul.com reported that the Tibetan edition of my book Dharamsala and Beijing: the negotiations that never were was launched yesterday in Dharamsala by the Library of Tibetan Works & Archives (LTWA), which edited the translation.
The Dharamsala-based webiste said: "The Tibetan translation of the book Dharamsala and Beijing: The Negotiations That Never Were by noted scholar Claude Arpi was launched today by the Minister of Education (Kalon) Ngodup Tsering at the LTWA in Gangchen Kyishong."
Geshe Lhakdor, the LTWA's Director noted: "It may sound simple and insignificant if we just see it as a work of translation. However, we know that even translating a thin book take a lot of effort. Therefore we need to appreciate such hard work and efforts.”
While thanking those who helped make the book a reality, Yeshi Dhundup, editor at Tibet.net, took around two years to translate the book, using his after office hours and holidays; he explained: "I translated the book with a hope that it would be of some help to those who want to read about the Tibet-China bilateral dialogues in Tibetan and I hope that it would be useful to all the Tibetans.”
Kalon Ngodup Tsering remarked: "It is imperative that we know in detail about the Tibet-China Negotiations, which we often speak on. However, there are not many who have full in-depth knowledge about it. So this book may help especially those doing research works or for anyone willing to know.”

Here are a few comments about the English version:

The book is enriched by the author’s deep access to all the Tibetan principals involved in the dialogue process and the actual negotiations. It is also enriched by the author`s own extensive research on a subject much commented but little researched on. The Negotiations that Never Were will form the basis of future Sino-Tibetan negotiations literature because the book's enduring contribution to this literature is the blow-by-blow accounts it gives of all the contacts and discussions between Dharamsala and Beijing.
www.sify.com

The Negotiations that Never Were will form the basis of future Sino-Tibetan negotiations literature because the book's enduring contribution to this literature is the blow-by-blow accounts it gives of all the contacts and discussions between Dharamsala and Beijing.
In reviewing this book one marvels at the fact that these negotiations took place at all. In international politics, diplomacy is always backed by military force. In conducting such relations among sovereign nations, the unstated message always is, negotiate, or else. The option of war is used as a compelling argument for concerned parties to choose negotiations as a less expensive way to settle outstanding disputes. Tibetans, committed to non-violence, do not have the military option. Despite this, why did the negotiations take place at all? That these negotiations took place is a reflection of His Holiness the Dalai Lama's hold on his people and the quality of leadership he has provided.
A welcome addition in the book is the author's examination of the attitude of individual Chinese to the Tibet question. Although official China says there is no problem in Tibet, un-official China, that vast interlocking network of human rights and environmental activists, writers and scholars who form the country's nascent but growing civil society, sees that there is a big problem in Tibet and the government is mishandling it.
www.tibet.net

The annexation of an independent Tibet is irrefutably outlined in Claude Arpi’s book, Tibet: The Lost Frontier, which was published last year. Arpi, a Frenchman based in South India, is arguably India’s most effective communicator of the Tibetan cause. He displays the research of a scholar and the insight of a strategist. This year he has written a follow-up book, Dharamsala and Beijing : The Negotiations that Never Were, published by Lancer Publishers. The book is an eye opener. It meticulously describes the entire farcical engagement since inception between Beijing and the Dalai Lama’s aides.
www.boloji.com

In 1947 there was no India-China border. There was only the India-Tibet border. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai hoodwinked Pandit Nehru. From then up till now the Chinese brazenly lied, indulged in doubletalk and blandly denied self-evident truths. From then up till now India and America lamely accepted such contemptuous treatment. In 1954 India and China signed a treaty for eight years by which among other things India recognised Tibet to be part of China. Beijing violated the assurances given in that treaty by transgressing the border. A confused Nehru decided to keep Parliament in the dark. He persisted with secrecy about Chinese encroachments during the following years.
That was when this reviewer through an article in 1960 demanded Nehru’s resignation. As a junior he made this reasonable demand when media doyens critical of Nehru’s China policies such as S Mulgaokar and Frank Moraes could not bring themselves to state this. No wonder it took a child to blurt that the Emperor wore no clothes! Zhou told Nehru that he was ignorant about the McMahon Line until he studied the border problem. And today China claims Arunachal Pradesh to be part of China! Beijing and Tibet broke ice. Beijing allowed fact-finding missions from Dharamsala to visit Tibet and view its progress. The Chinese genuinely thought that better roads and infrastructure had made Tibetans happy. The frenzied reception given to the Dalai Lama’s representatives by the Tibetans stunned them. Four succeeding missions were doomed to fail. I think the Chinese fail to empathize with Tibet because Tibetans believe in God. Most Chinese don’t.
In 2005 former Defence Minister, Army Chief and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Chi Haotian, said in a speech: ‘Maybe you have now come to understand why we promulgate atheism, if we let all Chinese people listen to God and follow God, who will obediently listen to us and follow us?’
Claude Arpi’s book exposes the painful repetitiveness of all contacts between China and Tibet, between China and the rest of the world. Tibet was like a woodpecker trying to penetrate a block of steel. The Chinese refused to countenance the slightest change in Tibet. In 1988 Dalai Lama made the Strasbourg Proposal and adopted the Middle Way, demanding autonomy instead of independence. Beijing kept calling him a ‘splitter’. China continued to lie and deceive the world to keep talks going. Only once in 60 years did a senior Chinese official speak the truth. In 1980 CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang admitted: ‘Our party has let the Tibetan people down. We feel very bad!’ Very soon he had to eat his words and fall in line. The world kept hoping for China to change. It was a futile hope.
The Statesman

The book
In October 1950, Communist China invaded Tibet. After nine years of difficult co-habitation with the occupiers, the Dalai Lama, the young temporal and spiritual leader of the Tibetans, had no choice but to flee his country to take refuge in India.
It took 20 years for the Tibetans to renew a dialogue with the leaders in Beijing. Soon after Deng Xiaoping’s return to power in 1978, the first contacts were made. Using rare documents, this is the story of thirty years of encounters between the Tibetan Administration in Dharamsala and Beijing.
Today the stalemate continues; Beijing refuses to offer any sort of concession to the Dalai Lama’s demand for a genuine autonomy for Tibet. Just like the border ‘talks’ between India and China, the negotiations with Dharamsala have never really started.
Reading through this book one understands how the relations between India and China are inextricably linked to the status of Tibet. Further, the present unrest in Tibet renders China unstable and increasingly belligerent towards India which gave refuge to the Tibetans.

Contents

• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• Prelude
• The Last Bridges are Cut
• The First Contacts in the Seventies
•  Seeking the Truth from Facts
•  Return to Tibet?
•  Internalization of the Tibetan Issue
• Second Uprising and Border Build-up
• The Nineties, the Difficult Years
• Dharamsala and Beijing: Renewed Contacts
• Eight Round and A Special Meeting
• A Different Interpretation : The Case of Bapa Phunsok Wangyal
• China's Voices of Dissent
• Where Do We Go From Here?
• Postscript
• Annexure I
• Annexure II
• Index

Will Beijing allow the Dalai Lama's return

[standing] Phuntsok Tashi, Panchen Lama, Ngabo, Phunwang, Juchen Thubten Namgyal

The 92-year-old Bapa Phunsok Wangye (alias Phunwang) is again in the news. His new book, published by New Century Press in Hong Kong has just been released.
Earlier, the CCP’s General Secretary Zhao Ziyang’s memoirs had also been distributed by the same firm.
In his autobiography titled A Long Way to Equality and Unity, Phunwang apparently pleads with Beijing to compromise with Dharamsala and to allow the Dalai Lama’s return to Tibet.
According to The South China Morning Post, the book says: “Phunwang appealed to former President Hu Jintao and several members of the Communist Party Politburo Standing Committee to allow the hundreds of thousands of exiled Tibetan compatriots headed by the Dalai Lama to return home, live and work in peace”.
Similar appeals were ignored by Beijing in the past.
In a chapter titled, ‘We cannot walk the road towards a Chinese Empire’, Phunwang warns the Chinese government that it should not rely on violence and economic development to rule over Tibet.
The Publisher in Hong Kong explained that Phunwang’s health has been deteriorating quickly. “He couldn’t proofread the book anymore, this is why we have to publish the full version of the book as it is.”
A return of the Dalai Lama to Tibet is a Dream, but not a Chinese Dream.

On July 28, 1981, while in Beijing, Gyalo Thondup, the Dalai Lama brother, met the CCP General Secretary Hu Yaobang who gave him the parameters of future negotiations.
The Chinese issued a policy statement: only the status of the Dalai Lama and his future role in case he returned to the ‘motherland’ can be discussed. Here is the text of the 1981 Five-Point Communiqué from Beijing:

1. The Dalai Lama should be confident that China has entered a new stage of long-term political stability, steady economic growth and mutual help among all nationalities.
2. The Dalai Lama and his representatives should be frank and sincere with the Central Government, not beat around the bush. There should be no more quibbling over the events in 1959.
3. The central authorities sincerely welcome the Dalai Lama and his followers to come back to live. This is based on the hope that they will contribute to upholding China's unity and promoting solidarity between the Han and Tibetan nationalities, and among all nationalities, and the modernization programme.
4. The Dalai Lama will enjoy the same political status and living conditions as he had before 1959. It is suggested that he not go to live in Tibet or hold local posts there. Of course, he may go back to Tibet from time to time. His followers need not worry about their jobs and living conditions. These will only be better than before.
5. When the Dalai Lama wishes to come back, he can issue a brief statement to the press. It is up to him to decide what he would like to say in the statement.

Nothing was said about the Tibetan people and the legal status of Tibet.
A couple of years later, when the Dalai Lama expressed the wish to visit Tibet, this was rejected by Beijing.
Here are excerpts of my book: The Negotiations that never were.
It shows that Phunwang’s wishes may not materialize soon, though the Dalai Lama has since then dropped the idea of ‘independence’.
You can also read my article on Phunwang and the Tibetan Flag.

The First Political Contacts
In April 1982, a delegation comprising Juchen Thubten Namgyal, the senior most ministers of the Kashag, Phuntsok Tashi and Lodi Gyari left for Beijing for preliminary talks with the Chinese authorities. Their first demand was the reunification of the three traditional provinces of Tibet (Kham, Amdo and U-Tsang) under a common administration.
…Juchen Thubten Namgyal [later] explained: “We discussed with three Chinese officials of the United Front Work Department. One of the objectives was to enquire about the letter sent by the Dalai Lama to Deng.”
The three fact-finding delegations went to Tibet on the basis of 1978 Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 statement (“It is better to see once than to hear a hundred times”), while the purpose of the visit of Juchen Thubten and his colleagues to Beijing was to hold discussions on the future of Tibet.
The Envoys first discussed the nine-point offer from the Communists to the Kuomintang regime in Taiwan. Beijing had proposed that 3 important issues politics, finance and defense could remain with the Formosans. All other subjects could be shared. When the Tibetan representatives raised the ‘one-country, two-system’ formula that Beijing was ready to grant to Taiwan and Hong Kong, the Chinese bluntly refused and said that it was not applicable to Tibet which had already been ‘liberated’ by the 17 Point Agreement.
Namgyal recalls that many believed at that time that the ‘Taiwan’ formula, providing local autonomy, could be the basis for a solution to the Tibet issue.
This formula was a proof that Beijing did not want to impose a communist regime on the rebel island. Namgyal recalled: “At a time the Taiwanese people (themselves Chinese by race) were granted this by the Communist regime; we, as [non-Chinese] asked logically for more liberties for the people of Tibet.”
The Tibetan delegates insisted on the reunification of the 3 provinces: “I made this point very clear to the Chinese officials, the way of thinking and the way of acting of the Communist government of China is not correct. The Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) has a population of 1,700,000 and Karze (located outside the TAR in Kham province), has a population of 800,000 people. They have been [administratively] forced to join with [mainland] China who are 1 billion people. This is not correct. The Tibetan people are poles apart from the Chinese, they are totally different and they are forced to stay together under the Sichuan [administration]. Why should they stay together?”
The Chinese answered: “Taiwan has to be liberated, you cannot argue by using the case of Taiwan. Tibet has already been liberated 33 years ago and decisions have already been made. It is because Taiwan has not been liberated, that we made this nine-point offer. It is not the case for Tibet.”
The ‘negotiations’ lasted more than a month. At the end the Chinese asked: “Are you taking these positions because you are representatives of the Dalai Lama or as representatives of the Tibetan Government in exile? If you are saying all this as representatives of the Tibetan Government in exile, we have nothing to say to you?”
Clearly, the Chinese authorities wanted to stick to the 5-point plan for the Dalai Lama and did not want to discuss the fate or rights of the Tibetan people. The Chinese have kept the same position since then, even today more than 27 years after the first dialogue [my book was published in 2009]. Beijing does not recognize the existence of the Tibetan government in exile or the Tibetan Assembly.
…Around that same time, General Secretary Hu Yaobang came more and more under the conservatives’ pressure. This appeared in the agenda of China's Second Work Forum on Tibet, held in Beijing in March-April 1984. Hu Yaobang had to announce that Beijing had decided to encourage Hans to settle in Tibet. Hu further confirmed that there would no change in the "Five-point Policy toward the Dalai Lama". It was obvious that the leadership in Beijing was no longer interested to see the Dalai Lama back in China.
A month later, the Tibetan Autonomous Region's Party boss Yin Fatang accused the Dalai Lama of treason. If he wanted to return, he would have to admit his ‘mistakes' first.
In October 1984, the same Tibetan delegation returned to Beijing. In the meantime the Dalai Lama had expressed his wish to visit Tibet in 1985. Though the 1984 talks were the follow-up of the 1982 visit, the main subject of the discussions was the proposed visit of the Dalai Lama to his native land.
During the talks, Juchen Thubten Namgyal and his colleagues asked that the Tibetan people should be given the right of self determination. Their argument was the Tibetan people enjoy all the qualifications for the purpose. The Tibetans told their Chinese interlocutors that the Communist Party had passed a resolution in 1931 stating that all minorities, especially the Mongolians and the Tibetans had the right, either to stay with China or to get self determination or even to secede and get independence. They pointed out that in 1946 Mao Zedong had repeated the same proposal.
Regarding the Dalai Lama’s visit to Tibet, the Chinese told the Tibetans that he was most welcome, though no foreign press people should accompany him. Moreover, they could not invite him in 1985. There was “a lot of construction inside Tibet at that time, there were 42 sites of construction in 6 districts”. Further, the preparations for the 20th anniversary of the Tibetan Autonomous Region were going on in full swing. The Chinese authorities in Tibet were too busy to receive the Dalai Lama!
About self-determination, they pointed out that though it was true that a resolution was passed in 1931, at that time the Communist Party was a small child. Now the Party had grown and the circumstances had changed. Further in 1931, the resolution was passed under some external pressure. A final decision had been taken during a Congress meeting held in Nanjing in 1957. The problems of the minorities were discussed; the Chinese officials added that some Tibetan representatives were even present.
…The final conclusion from the Tibetan envoy was: “We can see today that the Tibetans are not happy in Tibet, though you have done a lot to improve their condition, you have not taken care of their [deeper] aspiration. In this, you have failed.”

Thirty years later, nothing much has changed.

The Dalai Lama is an insignificant character, Deng

Gyalo Thondup and Deng Xiaoping in 1979

In my book The Negotiations that never were, I mentioned the encounter between Deng Xiaoping, China's new Paramount Leader and Gyalo Thondup, the Dalai Lama's elder brother in March 1979.
Excerpts of the book are posted below. 
We have now another side of the coin.
The US Department of State has recently released Volume XIII of the Foreign Relations of the United States (Carter Administration - 1977-80).
What is surprising is that there are very few mentions about Tibet (was not President Carter a great 'friend' of the Dalai Lama?)
One discussion is however worth citing. It took place during Walter Mondale, the US Vice-President's visit to China in August 1979. 
On August 27, 1979, Mondale met  Deng Xiaoping (then China's Vice-Premier of the State Council). 
Mondale was accompanied by Leonard Woodcock, U.S. Ambassador to China; David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Richard Holbrooke, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and Denis Clift, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs while Deng Xiaoping had Huang Hua, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Zhang Wenchin, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chai Zemin, China's Ambassador to the US, on his side.
During the course of the conversation Deng broached the topic of Dalai Lama.
He stated:

As for the matter of the Dalai Lama, that is a small matter. We made clear our position. It is not a very important question because the Dalai Lama is an insignificant character.

Vice President Mondale: You have awfully good housing waiting for him. Could Woodcock [the US Ambasssdor] live there? (Laughter)

Vice Premier Deng: If he wants to come back, he could still live in that house. Of course, it is an illusion on his part. The idea of wanting to have a state of Tibet. Not long ago he visited the Soviet Union, and we have confirmed information that he went there on orders of the Indian Government. Some of his important officials [the first fact-finding delegation] have recently come back and have gone to Tibet to see officials and conditions there.

Though the discussion shifted on Cambodia and Vietnam, Vice President Mondale later brought back the question of the Dalai Lama:

Concerning the Dalai Lama’s visit to the United States, he was received only as a religious leader and not as a political leader. He will not be treated as a political leader. And our position, whenever asked, is that Tibet is part of China. 

Deng's remark raises a serious question, was the Chinese leader sincere when, a few month earlier, he told Gyalo Thondup: “The door is opened for negotiations as long as we don’t speak about independence. Everything else is negotiable”.
Difficult to say!

Excerpts of The Negotiations that never were:
The first encounters
In November 1978, Gyalo Thondup met with Li Ju-sheng who was designated as ‘Xinhua Director No. 2’ in Hong Kong. They had several encounters which lasted 5 or 6 weeks. Li certainly relayed his conversations to the leadership in Beijing. It seems that the objective from the Chinese side was to build confidence to prepare an eventual visit of Thondup to China where he would meet officials.
At the beginning, Gyalo Thondup did not know that Li Ju-sheng was close to Deng Xiaoping (who was acquainted with his intelligence work in Indonesia in the 1960s). Deng had personally sent Li to Hong Kong and given him this designation (Director No 2) . After a few meetings, Li recommended to Deng that Thondup be invited to discuss the situation in Tibet.
The Dalai Lama recalled in his memoirs that around the same time:

Thirty-four prisoners, mostly elderly members of my own administration, were publicly released with great ceremony in Lhasa. These men were purportedly the last of the 'rebel leaders'. Chinese newspapers stated that, after being taken on a month-long tour of the 'New Tibet', they were to be assisted in finding jobs and even in going abroad if that was what they desired.”
The Dalai Lama was informed of the meetings between Gyalo Thondup and the Chinese emissary. He commented:
The arrival of the [Tibetan] New Year brought no let-up in this spate of extraordinary developments. On 1 February 1979, coincidentally the day that the People's Republic of China was formally recognised by the US, the Panchen Lama, in his first public appearance for fourteen years, added his voice to those calling for the Dalai Lama and his fellow exiles to return. 'If the Dalai Lama is genuinely interested in the happiness and welfare of the Tibetan masses, he need have no doubts about it, he said. I can guarantee that the present standard of living of the Tibetan people in Tibet is many times better than that of the old society’ .

A week later, this invitation was repeated by Radio Lhasa. The nomination of a special welcoming committee to receive Tibetans from abroad was announced.
The Dalai Lama continued:

This was followed just a week later by the unexpected arrival of Gyalo Thondup in Kanpur (Uttar Pradesh) where I was attending a religious conference. To my surprise, he announced that he had heard through some old and trusted friends of his in Hong Kong (where he now lives) that Xinhua, the New China News Agency, which constitutes China's official legation to the British colony, wanted to make contact with him. Following this, he had met a personal emissary of Deng Xiaoping, who explained that the Chinese leader wanted to open communications with the Dalai Lama. As a mark of his goodwill, Deng wanted to invite Gyalo Thondup to Peking for talks. My brother had refused as he wanted to seek my opinion first.
This was totally unexpected, and I did not reply immediately. The developments of the past two years all looked very promising However, as the ancient Indian saying goes, 'When you have once been bitten by a snake, you become cautious even of a rope.' And unfortunately, all my experience of the Chinese leadership suggested that it was untrustworthy. Not only did the authorities in question lie, but worse, when these lies were exposed they were not the least bit ashamed. The Cultural Revolution had been a 'tremendous success' whilst it was going on; now it was a failure — but there was no sense of humility in this admission. Nor was there anything to suggest that these people ever kept their promises. Despite the concrete undertaking of clause thirteen of the Seventeen-Point Agreement that the Chinese would 'not arbitrarily take a needle or thread' from the Tibetans, they had ransacked the whole country. On top of this, through countless atrocities, they had shown a total disrespect for human rights. It seemed that to the Chinese mind, perhaps because of the huge size of their own population, human life is considered to be a cheap commodity — and Tibetan lives to be of still less value. I therefore felt it necessary to exercise extreme caution.
On the other hand, my basic belief is that human problems can only be solved through human contact. So there could be no harm in hearing what the Chinese had to say. Hopefully we could simultaneously explain our own views. We certainly had nothing to hide. Also, if the authorities in Peking were in earnest, we might even be able to send some fact-finding missions to discover for ourselves the real situation.
With these considerations in mind, and knowing that our cause was 100 per cent just and in accordance with the wishes of the entire population of Tibet, I told my brother he was free to go. After he had seen the Chinese leaders, we would consider the next step .

The road was cleared for the first direct contacts between the Dalai Lama’s brother and the new leadership in Beijing.

The Deng-Thondup meeting
The meeting between the supreme leader of the People’s Republic of China and the Dalai Lama’s brother took place in Beijing on March 12, 1979. Immediately, Deng blamed the Gang of Four for the difficult situation in Tibet. It was then the standard excuse for all that had gone wrong in China (and in Tibet) since the mid-sixties. But Deng said that he was keen to improve the lot of the Tibetan population. He told Thondup that he would like to invite the refugees in India and abroad to return to Tibet, “It is better to see once than to hear a hundred times”.
It was during this encounter with Gyalo Thondup that Deng Xiaoping said: “The door is opened for negotiations as long as we don’t speak about independence. Everything else is negotiable”. 
Around that time, the Dalai Lama proposed to Beijing (via the Chinese Embassy in India) that a fact-finding mission from Dharamsala should be permitted to visit Tibet with a view to discovering the real situation there and reporting. Gyalo Thondup had been requested to work out the details.
It is in these circumstances that three delegations were sent by the Dalai Lama in 1979 and 1980 to visit their native land after a gap of 20 years and much suffering.

If you have money, you can buy independence for Tibet

Photo: Lobsang Wangyal

Yesterday former Kalon Tripa (president of the Council of Ministers of the Tibetan Government-in-exile) Sonam Topgyal passed away at his residence in Dharamshala after a prolonged illness. He was 77.
Sikyong Lobsang Sangay and his cabinet colleagues visited Sonam Tobgyal's home to pay their last respects.
Phayul.com reported:

Topgyal, 77, breathed his last at 4.30 am at his residence near Norbulingka Institute in Dharamshala. He was suffering from stomach cancer, family sources said.
Sonam Topgyal held the post of Prime Minister of the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) from April 1997 September 2001. The post was then called Kalon Tripa.
He had worked in different capacities in various departments of CTA. He was one of the members along with Tenzin Geyche and Tenzin Namgyal Tethong who started Sheja, a Tibetan publication, in 1968. The same became a part of the CTA publication from 1971.
He was one of the four convenors of the first Tibetan youth conference in Dharamshala, along with Tenzin Geyche, Lodi Gyari and Tenzin Tethong. This conference resulted in the formation of the Tibetan Youth Congress. The organisation advocates for an independent Tibet from China.

Sonam Topgyal was born in 1935 in Chamdo, Tibet.
In 1959, he left Tibet to come into exile in India.
In 1971, he joined the Central Tibetan Administration. Rising through the ranks and working mostly with the erstwhile Information Office, now the Department of Information and International Relations, Sonam Topgyal served twice in the exile Tibetan cabinet.
In the 10th Kashag from 1993−1996, Sonam Topgyal served as the minister of the departments of home and health and later as the Chairman of the Cabinet. In the 11th Kashag from June 1996 to August 2001, Sonam Topgyal served as the Kalon Tripa, the de facto Tibetan Prime Minister from April 1997-2001.
In July 1993, Sonam Topgyal, who was then the secretary of DIIR, visited China along with Kalon Gyalo Thondup to deliver a letter and memorandum on behalf of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. The Tibetan delegation met Wang Caogo, Director of the CPC’s United Front Work Department.
Here is the rough transcript of my interview with Sonam Topgyal on March 17, 1997 (translator: Ngodup Dorjee).
The interview was conducted in the Kashag Office, Gangchen Kyishong, Dharamsala. Very kindly, the Kalon Tripa came out of a Kashag's meeting to answer my questions.

Interview with Kalon Tripa Sonam Tobgyal 
[About his visit to Beijing]
Claude: After the visits of Gyalo Thondup, Juchen Thupten Namgyal and Phuntsok Tashi Takla in 1984, the Tibetan Administration had no contact with the Chinese Government, am I correct? Yours was the first visit after 9 years?

Kalon Sonam Tobgyal: Officially, of course, the 1984 visit was the last contact [before our visit], but unofficially, Gyalo Thondup visited Beijing 13 times; sometimes just to give a message; sometimes to discuss [the Tibet issue] or for personal reasons.
Apart from the two earlier visits, in 1982 and 1984; there was also Mr Kundeling’s fact finding mission in 1985.

Claude: What was the purpose of your visit?

Kalon Sonam Tobgyal: The purpose of our visit was to negotiate [with China]. His Holiness always believes that the problem between China and Tibet can only be resolved through negotiations. That was the main focus of the visit. [The background was] that Deng Xiaoping had said that except independence, all other matters can be discussed and sorted out.
On the basis of these two points, we visited China.
In 1987, His Holiness the Dalai Lama presented his Five Point Peace Plan and then the Strasbourg proposal [in 1988] and he also made a speech at Yale University in the States [in 1991], all these proposals were made on the basis of the promise made by Deng Xiaoping in 1979.
Our team went with the purpose to check on the Chinese reaction to His Holiness’ proposals; from our side, we had given so much, we wanted to know the position of the Chinese Government. We wanted to ask Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin ‘what are your reactions?’
We also carried two letters from His Holiness, one to Deng Xiaoping and the other one to Jiang Zemin.
Secondly, we wanted to know why the Chinese are always calling His Holiness a ‘splitist’; whatever he had done, whatever proposals he had made, it always was on the basis of Deng Xiaoping’s guidelines, so we wanted to know from the Chinese themselves, “explain to us when His Holiness had splitist activities; in which place, on which date, why are you always saying that His Holiness is a splitist?”
That was the main purpose of our visit.

Claude: How long did you stay in China?

Kalon Sonam Tobgyal: One week. All together seven days, but for a few days we went out of Beijing.

Claude: Who did you meet, which senior official?

Kalon Sonam Tobgyal: An official of the United Front Department [Wang Caogo, Director of the CPC’s United Front Work Department]; we also met the Deputy Minister [of the United Front] and some other more junior officials. At that time, Raidi [Deputy Party Secretary of the Tibetan Autonomous Region] was also there.

Claude: Were Gyatsen Norbu or Dorjee Tsering [other Tibetan Party officials] there?

Kalon Sonam Tobgyal: Raidi was the only Tibetan present.

Claude: What was the Chinese position? Did they stick to their Five Point made in 1981 about His Holiness status and welfare and his return to Tibet?

Kalon Sonam Tobgyal: If one analyses what they were saying, there was no clear argument. They were only saying that their position vis-a-vis the Dalai Lama was very clear; they were very happy to keep in contact with the Dalai Lama’s representatives; they were keen that these contacts should go on; they were glad that the Tibetans spoke in very frank and clear manner.
The Chinese reiterated that they felt that the Dalai Lama was having splitist activities.
[On our side] we proposed that the three provinces of Tibet should be reunited: Central Tibet, Kham and Amdo. There should ‘One Tibet’.
To this the Chinese replied that this was not realist. Tibet was already divided; administrative arrangements have already been made [to divide Tibet]. This had been decided in the National People’s Congress. It was now part of the Chinese Constitution.
They kept using these types of arguments.
I feel that whatever we were saying, it was always the same thing [we got the same answer]. They were repeating that they were very happy that the team had come to China; they kept repeating the same thing.
But one thing that was clear, was that the officials with whom they were talking, had not the authority to decide anything on their own.
If something had to be decided; if some policy decisions had to be made, it was clear that these officials had no power.
I did not feel that very substantive discussions were taking place; I had more an empty feeling.

Claude: Did the Chinese promise to meet you again?

Kalon Sonam Tobgyal: They were saying, ‘please come again, you are always welcome’, especially His Holiness’ elder brother, Gyalo Thondup. They said that he had always been kind to them and ‘next time you come, bring your family and we will take you to all parts of China’.

[Regarding the reincarnation of the Panchen Lama]
They said that the process had started; we said that His Holiness should be involved; he should be able to consult lamas, geshes, oracles, [if they had] visions at the Lhamoi Lhatso [sacred lake where one can get visions] and [he should be in contact with] the authorities of the Tashilhunpo monastery.
The Chinese replied that it was the Tashilhunpo’s business and the Tashilhunpo Search Committee was responsible [to find the true reincarnation].
The Chinese officials said one day that Chatrel Rinpoche [head of the Tashilhunpo Search Committee] would come after two days and we could have a meeting with him, but Chatrel Rimpoche had actually come to Beijing eight days earlier.
This type of deceptive attitude from the Chinese side occurred all the times.

Claude: Did you eventually meet Chatrel Rimpoche?

Kalon Sonam Tobgyal: We met him and he left a letter for His Holiness where he mentioned that whatever they had done so far [to discover the Panchen Lama] and what he had found [during the search]. It actually wanted to give this letter to His Holiness.
When we met Chatrel Rimpoche, he said that at the time of death of the Panchen Lama, he was [?]
We met Hu Jintao and told him that for the search of the Panchen Lama His Holiness should be consulted. Hu Jintao was also in Beijing at that time.

Claude: Was he still the Party Secretary in Tibet or in the Politburo?

Kalon Sonam Tobgyal: No, no. He was not yet in the Politburo. He was in Beijing and we met him.

Claude: Was the overall visit positive?

Kalon Sonam Tobgyal: My feeling is that the visit was helpful in the sense that the contact was renewed after so many years. Otherwise we did not achieve anything.
After our meeting, the Chinese position even hardened.

Claude: Why has it become so hard? Last week, the Beijing Review mentioned that Tibet has never been independent, while earlier that they had been saying that Tibet is a part of China since the 13th Century, do you consider this as a hardening? It seems to me that the Chinese position has never been so hard since 1980.

Kalon Sonam Tobgyal: This is my personal view. The issue of Tibet has been internationalized and there is a great deal of sympathy for the Tibetan cause; for the Chinese, it is a big problem.
Secondly, the Tibetans inside Tibet dislike the Chinese.
There is a lot of hatred. There is great animosity from the Tibetans side towards the Chinese. Wherever the Chinese and the Tibetans live together, particularly in cities, there is a great animosity. The Chinese feel that it is a long term problem, so now their policy is: as long Tibet is under their control, they want to control it and suppress it.

Claude: Another reason is perhaps that there is a power struggle within the Chinese Communist Party?

Kalon Sonam Tobgyal: Most Chinese know that in the long run, there will be internal problems in China. At that time, the Tibet issue will be a big problem which can split China. For this reason, the Chinese want to suppress the Tibetans feelings.
The Chinese documents say that the US and other western powers are the enemies of China; they want to split China. Their point is that “the Dalai Lama’s clique is used by these forces”, the Dalai Lama is a tool of these imperialists against China.

Claude: Last question, who will be, according to you, the next leader of China?

Kalon Sonam Tobgyal: This is again my personal view, I do not know, but deeply inside, I think that there will be upheaval in China. It will come very soon.
It will come in a very short time.
If you look at the Chinese economic situation, the difference between the rich and the poor and the deception of the intellectuals who are very dissatisfied with the political system and then, the power struggle. All these together make me feel that there will be upheaval very soon.
I feel that the Chinese leader Jiang Zemin will not be able to lead China through this difficult and critical period. He will not be able. But some people think that Jiang Zemin can manage, but I think otherwise.
Just looking at the events taking place, one can predict something; otherwise it is quite difficult.

Claude: One problem that you have not listed is corruption, corruption by Party members?

Kalon Sonam Tobgyal: Yes, yes, corruption. There is a saying in Lhasa, that if you have money, you can buy independence for Tibet. It means that if you have money, you can buy anything.
Most of the officials are corrupt; the corruption is the worst amongst officials.