When China takes Tibet for a ride!

Jigmey Passang, Bhuchung K Tsering, Tenzin P. Atisha, Kelsang Gyaltsen, Lodi Gyari (left to right)

then Du Qinglin, Zhu Weiqun, Sithar, Nyima Tsering, Chang Rongjun and An Qi Yi (2010)

Zhu Weiqun is a well-known hawk, at least as far as Tibet and ‘religion’ are concerned.
A few years ago, he retired as Executive Deputy Director of the United Front Work Department (UFWD) of the Communist Party of China (CPC).
Born in Jianhu County, Jiangsu Province, Zhu graduated from the department of journalism of the school of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; he joined the CPC as early as July 1970.
In February 1999, he became the UFWD’s Executive Deputy Head and as such he was responsible for the negotiations with Dharamsala (2002-2010).
In January 2006, he was promoted to minister rank.
Zhu was supposed to have retired from active politics in 2013; but he took an ornamental job as Chairman of the Ethnic and Religious Affairs Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).
As such Zhu is close to Wang Yang, the CPPCC’s boss, who looks over the Tibetan issue as well as religious and minorities’ affairs and Hong Kong and Taiwan …and the United Front Work.
In May 2013, when asked whether if religious members should be openly admitted in the Party, Zhu is said to have answered: "No Chinese Communist Party members should be allowed to be religious."

Zhu’s nasty writings
From time to time, Zhu still writes a nasty article in The Global Times.
On June 9, in one these articles, he commented on the visit of Terry Branstad, the US Ambassador to China, to Tibet.
Speaking about the ambassador, he remarked: “It is hard to figure out his true feelings about Tibet. On the one hand, he spoke positively of Tibet's economic and social development, (which disproved the Dalai Lama group's lie about the destruction of Tibet's environment by the Qinghai-Tibet Railway). On the other, he repeated the hackneyed remarks of the US government.”
Zhu strongly criticized Branstad, who dared, according to him, to encourage Beijing “to engage in substantive dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives, without preconditions, to seek a settlement that resolves differences."
This was not appreciated by Zhu. Why?
Zhu said it is blatant interference in China's internal affairs.

China wants preconditions
He also questioned the meaning of ‘seeking a settlement without preconditions’ as well as the definition of a ‘substantive dialogue’.
Though time and again the Dalai Lama has said that he wanted an association with China; Zhu considers the Dalai Lama as a splittist. The ‘retired’ Communist leader also said (does he really believes it?) that the Dalai Lama’s clique has only one objective, to split China.
At the same time, Zhu gave the assurance that the CPC's Central Committee had not closed the “door to contacts and negotiation with the Dalai Lama.”
Showing his hard-line stance, he added that “the proposed negotiation cannot come without preconditions.”

The Old Preconditions
One remembers the preconditions given by Hu Yaobang, the CCP General Secretary to Gyalo Thondup in 1981; it was called the “Five-Point Policy towards the Dalai Lama”.
Please note, these five points are not related to Tibet, but only to the Dalai Lama’s status.
Zhu Weiqun and his clique have often asserted that there was nothing to discuss about Tibet, the ‘negotiations’ could only be about the condition of the Dalai Lama's returns to the Motherland and his status ...in Beijing.
The five Points were:

1. The Dalai Lama should be confident that China has entered a new stage of long-term political stability, steady economic growth and mutual help among all nationalities.
2. The Dalai Lama and his representatives should be frank and sincere with the Central Government, not beat around the bush. There should be no more quibbling over the events in 1959.
3. The central authorities sincerely welcome the Dalai Lama and his followers to come back to live. This is based on the hope that they will contribute to upholding China's unity and promoting solidarity between the Han and Tibetan nationalities, and among all nationalities, and the modernization programme.
4. The Dalai Lama will enjoy the same political status and living conditions as he had before 1959. It is suggested that he not go to live in Tibet or hold local posts there. Of course, he may go back to Tibet from time to time. His followers need not worry about their jobs and living conditions. These will only be better than before.
5. When the Dalai Lama wishes to come back, he can issue a brief statement to the press. It is up to him to decide what he would like to say in the statement.

In his recent article in The Global Times, Zhu explained: “First, it must be made clear that in nature, contact and consultation are not talks between China's central government and the Tibetan government-in-exile or ‘Central Tibetan Administration’, nor are ‘Tibetan-Han Talks’ or ‘Tibetan-China Talks’. The Dalai separatist political group is illegitimate and ineligible to have a ‘dialogue’ with representatives of the CPC Central Committee.”
Beijing wants only to talk to the Dalai Lama’s personal envoys.
In my book The Negotiations that Never Were, I argued that with such conditions the ‘talks’ could go anywhere and they indeed went nowhere during the Lodi Gyari’s days (nine rounds between 2002 and 2010).
The second point mentioned by Zhu was: “the Dalai Lama must accept Tibet as an integral part of China, abandon all attempts about so-called Tibet independence, stop all separatist and destructive activities, and recognize Taiwan as an integral part of China.”
It has never been clear why Beijing wants to link Taiwan to Tibet.
Regarding the other point, China has been insisting that the Dalai Lama agreed that historically Tibet has always been a part of China.

Tibet is part of China only since 1951
When a senior Tibetan exiled Lama went to China a couple of years ago, the Chinese said that they wanted the Dalai Lama to sign a statement acknowledging that Tibet has been part of China since ancient times. This is obviously not acceptable to the Dalai Lama and the People of Tibet, as it was a falsification of history.
Taking a hard stand, Zhu affirmed that in these two preconditions “there is no so-called Tibet issue, but just the problem of the Dalai Lama. The Dalai group, whose existence is against the Chinese Constitution, is not at all eligible to discuss Tibetan affairs with the CPC Central Committee.”
It means that today, the Chinese stand has not changed; Beijing is ready to discuss the Dalai Lama’s status, not the status of Tibet.

No substantive dialogue
Zhu also objected to Ambassador Branstad speaking about ‘substantive dialogue’.
The former UFWD official does not like the word ‘substantive’.
He listed the ‘substantive’ issues presented by Lodi Gyari and his team during the ‘negotiations that never were’, it included “denying that Tibet has been a part of China since ancient times; defining Tibet as a ‘State’ occupied by China; demanding the Dalai Lama’s rule to be extended to the whole of ethnic Tibet, (i.e.) Qinghai, as well as two autonomous prefectures in Sichuan, one in Yunnan and one in Gansu (an area equal to one fourth of China's territory); requiring the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to withdraw from Tibetan areas and make it a so-called international zone of peace under the control of Western countries; requiring all the Han people who settled down in Tibet return to where they came from - in other words, to implement ethnic cleansing in all Tibetan areas.”
It is travesty of the demands of Lodi Gyari; how could the Special Envoy ask for a Zone of Peace under Western control?

The Seventeen Point Agreement
Incidentally, the Seventeen Point Agreement signed ‘under duress’ by Tibetan delegates in May 1951 admitted the invasion of Tibet; Article I said: “The Tibetan people shall unite and drive out imperialist aggressive forces from Tibet; the Tibetan people shall return to the family of the Motherland the People's Republic of China (PRC).”
The fact that the Tibetans had to return to the Motherland, meant that they were not ‘in the Motherland’ earlier.
In any case, the PRC was only created in 1949.
Article III stated: “In accordance with the policy towards nationalities laid down in the Common Programme of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the Tibetan people have the right of exercising national regional autonomy under the unified leadership of the Central People's Government (CPG) of the PRC.”
Zhu may have not read the Agreement. This nevertheless raises the question, how and when was the right to autonomy dropped?

Branstad visit to Tibet
To come back to Zhu’s article, he affirmed: “If the US government insists that ‘substantive’ dialogue means meeting all the aforementioned requests of the Dalai Lama, then its hopes would be dashed.”
My question is: what the point to discuss, if what China promised in 1951 cannot even be brought today on the negotiating table.
Zhu Weiqun observed that during his visit to Tibet, Branstad had met with the Communist leaders, that he visited “local communities, educational and cultural institutions and religious sites, which at least improved his understanding of Tibet.”
Zhu’s conclusion was that “the knowledge he gained from the trip will help him in his career.”
The Ambassador’s career should not be the concern of the Chinese …or the Tibetans.
Zhu added that “Since the peaceful liberation [the Chinese term for occupation], especially since the reform and opening-up [the massacre of thousands of Tibetans in 1959], Tibet has witnessed rapid economic and social development, with people's livelihood improving and the environment getting better and better. From my point of view, China could and should create conditions for more foreigners to visit Tibet and encourage them to draw their own conclusions based on what they see.”
It is not the case today, though the Chairman of the CPPCC’s Ethnic and Religious Affairs Committee affirmed that “Tibet's door has always been open to foreigners.”
At the end, he again puts the blame on the 'Dalai clique' who creates disturbance in Tibet, forcing Beijing to take 'administrative measures' to regularly close down Tibet to visitors.

Some conclusions
All this will not help to bring a rapprochement between Dharamsala and Beijing (probably China is not interested).
The time has perhaps come for the Tibetan Administration to set aside the idea to find a negotiated agreement with Beijing and wait for a new leadership to emerge in the Middle Kingdom.
Remember when the Chinese forces invaded Tibet in 1910, the Thirteenth Dalai Lama took refuge in India, and returned to Tibet in 1912 to proclaim the Independence of Tibet.
He wrote in his Testament:

"As a result of our meritorious Karma, and the numerous prayers and services that were conducted in Tibet, internal strife took place in China. It was no problem therefore to completely drive out the Chinese from Tibet."

This shows the importance given by the Tibetans to the power of prayers and rituals.

Zhu Weiqun final conclusion is: “We must start from the needs of stability and development in Tibet.”
We should not forget that 'stability’ has serious implications for the Indian borders and schemes such the Xiaogang villages, often mentioned on this blog, and the fast building of infrastructure on the plateau is truly worrisome.

Why China will change: The Tibet factor (An Interview with Lodi Gyari)

Lodi Gyari Rinpoche is no more. He passed away yesterday morning in a San Francisco hospital, where he was being treated for liver cancer. 
Rinpoche was 69. His family members were reported to be with him.
Gyari Rinpoche was born in 1949 in Nyarong in eastern Tibet, where he received a traditional monastic education as the tulku of Khenchen Jampal Dewe Nyima from Lumorap Monastery. 
In 1959, he fled with his family to India.  
In 1970, Rinpoche had been one of the founding members of the Tibetan Youth Congress.
In 1982 and 1984, he was a junior member of the delegation which went to China to 'negotiate'. 
See my book, Dharamsala and Beijing: the Negotiations that never were. 
From 2002 to 2009, he conducted the talks with China as the Dalai Lama's Special Enjoy. 

I am posting today a twelve-year old interview with Lodi Gyari Rinpoche.
It appeared on April 20, 2006 in Rediff.com under the title Why China will change: The Tibet factor

Here is the link...

A few days before his departure for Beijing for the fifth round of talks with the People's Republic of China, the Dalai Lama's chief negotiator and Special Envoy in Washington, DC Lodi Gyari Rinpoche spoke to Claude Arpi.
Examining the dynamics of the 'dialogue process' with China, he shared his frustrations and hopes for the future. He also explained how difficult it has been for the Dalai Lama to abandon his claim for independence and to accept that Tibet becomes a 'genuinely autonomous' part of the People's Republic.
He also examined an interesting factor which may play a role in finding a solution to the Tibetan tangle: The revival of Buddhism in China.

What can you tell us about the negotiations that you are conducting with China?

The Tibetan movement is a very unique movement. This can be seen from the way we are conducting the negotiations with the People's Republic of China. We are doing it in a different way. If one day, His Holiness the Dalai Lama's' efforts succeed, it will not only have an impact on the six million Tibetans, but it will also be a breakthrough for humanity, because of the nature of our negotiations.
Even for someone like me, engaged in the negotiations, I see it more as a spiritual practice than an exercise in diplomacy. Let me explain this. I remember very vividly that in 1987, when His Holiness first presented the 'Middle Way approach' in a formal document, he consulted a few people outside of the Tibetan leadership.
One of them was former (US) President (Jimmy) Carter. His Holiness has a lot of respect for President Carter, not because he had been the US president, but because His Holiness believes he is very wise and religious minded (in fact he became closer to us after he left the White House). So I flew directly from New Delhi to New York to Minneapolis, where President Carter was staying at that time, to show him an 8-page document, which later became the 'Strasbourg Proposal'.
He really took time to read it through (he is famous for that) and took nearly one hour to study it very carefully. Then he turned to me and asked: "What is His Holiness' bottom line?" I told him: "This is the bottom line." He was surprised: "If this is the bottom line, you have to start from somewhere else."
I responded to President Carter saying this issue was raised, but His Holiness' position is that he is not a politician and that he was a simple monk who wants to be really sincere and transparent and place on the table what he really wants.
It is because of such a nature of our negotiations position that I feel our success, when it happens, will be a major breakthrough in the art of negotiation.

Was it difficult for the Dalai Lama?

It has been extremely difficult for His Holiness. When he chose 'the Middle Way' path, there were tremendous protests from his own people. This strong opposition came from people who were ready to give their lives for the cause. And as someone who served His Holiness very closely and has been intimately involved in the process, I can tell you, it was very painful. It was certainly a difficult thing for those of us who had the honour to be associated with him. But it was even more difficult for His Holiness to take such a decision.
He showed that he was a real leader, because a real leader has sometimes to take unpopular decisions. He showed that he had the courage to take difficult decisions. I always share this with my Chinese colleagues to give them an idea of the extent His Holiness has gone to work for a mutually satisfactory solution.
I would like to mention a personal experience. My mother was one of the first women to take on the fight against the Chinese. She was quite well known. Though she was a very gentle woman, she never hesitated to fight the Chinese.
When I accompanied His Holiness to Strasbourg to present the Proposal, she was deeply upset with me. Until His Holiness' presentation of his proposal to the European Parliament, I would keep this document under my pillow because it was extremely confidential.
When I returned from Strasbourg, the first thing my mother told me: "If I had known that the documents that you were so preciously guarding were this Proposal, I would have ripped it apart."
This is just to give you an idea about the mindset of the Tibetan people when they first heard of the Proposal. This shows how difficult the process has been.

Tell us more about your involvement in this dialogue.

My first trip to China was in 1982, when I was chairman of the Tibetan parliament. I was part of the high level exploratory delegation sent by His Holiness the Dalai Lama. When we first landed in China, the Chinese officials came forward to greet us. For a moment, I did not know what to do: if I shake hand with them, it would a betrayal of the thousands Tibetans as well as my family members.
At that moment, I had a flashback of my grandmother and my brothers who died under indescribable circumstances. I thought that if I shake hands, I would betray all those Tibetan who died. Many Tibetans had a similar experience.
Despite all this, we are today engaging the Chinese because we believe that it is the best solution. From this angle also you can see how important the dialogue process is. This is certainly not just diplomacy. It is the background of our dialogue with China.

How would you describe the negotiations?
Usually some kind of glamour is associated with negotiations of this nature, but in our case, it is not like this. There is a real human approach. That is why I believe that the impact of this type of dialogue goes far beyond the Tibetan people and the Tibetan plateau.
Further, if these efforts of His Holiness bear some fruits, it can bring about some fundamental shift in China. You may think it is too ambitious, but if it sincerely done, it is possible though it is difficult. From this point of view also it is very important that our process succeed.

Does anybody else in the world show interest in the Sino-Tibetan dialogue?

Lately, there is a renewed concern about China, especially in Washington, DC. There was a time when there was so much enthusiasm about China: it was considered as the most important country to be courted. It was the biggest market that ever existed. China could get away with everything. But things have changed.
If the Middle East developments had not happened, it would have come even earlier, but there is today a great concern about China; some people even see China as a threat.
I tell my American friends: "Well your concern is real, but You can not solve anything through confrontation or by using force. You should make China more friendly and less isolated."
That is why I think that with the positive attitude of His Holiness, the Tibetan issue can be a tremendously positive factor for the future of China. I do not say this in an idealist way, but am being very practical.

Can you give us some examples?

Zhao Ziyang, the former Chinese premier, died recently after spending many years under house arrest. When he was critically ill, we received a message from one of his sons: 'My father is very ill, can you ask His Holiness to pray for him?' We assumed that this request came because the son was interested in Buddhism. I passed the request to His Holiness who prayed for him. Then after the death of Zhao Ziyang came a communication from all his children thanking His Holiness for praying for their father.
But what surprised me most is when we were informed that virtually the last word of Zhao Ziyang was the name of His Holiness. We are talking about a person who reached the highest level of the Chinese hierarchy (general secretary of the Communist party and premier).
This illustrates the extent of reverence for His Holiness even in China today. There are many other instances.
I do not believe that it is too far-fetched to think that the Tibetan issue can have a profound impact on tomorrow's China. This sentiment is shared by many Chinese. I see this through my contacts not only with the Chinese government, but with Chinese of all shades.
I am surprised and encouraged to come across Chinese in the government, in the Communist party, but also this new class of rich Chinese entrepreneurs who believe that what China really needs is the presence of His Holiness.

Are you trying to negotiate the future of the Tibetan people?
If you look at the Tibetan plateau, you see that Tibet is the giver of life: all the major (Asian) rivers have their sources in Tibet. Perhaps in a few years time, definitely in 50 years time, people will be fighting wars over water.
Recently, I dined with some senior Indian officials. I was telling them that it was very smart of them to invite the Saudi king as chief guest for the Indian Republic Day. They said their prime minister made a special exception and went to receive the king at the airport. I said: "Yes, after all, he is the custodian of the most holy shrine for the Muslims." They said: "Yes, he is also the custodian of oil."
Unfortunately, the time will come when there will be a scarcity of what we today take for granted, particularly resources like water. You do not need to be a prophet to know that there will be shortage of water in 50 years time. Just with that consideration alone, imagine how important the plateau of Tibet is.
You know that former Chinese premier Zhu Rongji took the wise decision to stop the deforestation in Tibet. He took the decision not because he cared for the environment, certainly not for the sake of the Tibetans, but he realized that the floods in China were due to the deforestation in Tibet, which was not natural ones, but man-made.
For many decades, the Chinese authorities had not cared for the Tibetan plateau, thinking that whatever they can take from Tibet will only benefit them. But at the end the people of China began to suffer much more than the Tibetans.
So you can see that the whole issue of Tibet is larger than the interest of Tibet and the Tibetan people, and has wider ramifications.

What about India?

In terms of geopolitics, it is very encouraging that there is today much more trade relations between India and China. It is not the Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai relation, which was very unfortunate, but a much more rational relation. But then, it would be an illusion if anyone in South Block (the Delhi area where India's ministry of external affairs is located) feels that there could be a real progress in the relations with China without solving the problem of Tibet. It would be very naïve.
For centuries, Tibet acted as a buffer between these two great Asian civilisations. Now we can become a bridge. A buffer was important during the 19th and the 20th century to bring a certain amount of stability: It was like a wall separating empires during what is known as 'the Great Game.'
Today we do not need a buffer, but a bridge. Tibet could play that unique role, to be the bridge. This could help find a lasting and genuine solution. A solution in which the Tibetan issue would not be considered would not be lasting.
A genuine and lasting solution will be in the interests of these two great Asian nations. No one else than Tibet can help to bridge the difference between India and China. Though we are very much part of the Indian civilization, many people feel the Tibetan language must be similar to Chinese language, just because of the fact that Tibet is under China. Similarly, they believe that the Tibetan culture or civilisation is similar to the Chinese.
I have to explain that our link is much deeper with the Indian civilisation. His Holiness describes the link between the Tibetan and Indian civilisations as a filial link. Many aspects of the Indian civilisation have been kept intact in Tibet.
His Holiness jokes and says that the Indian civilisation has been put in a deep freezer on the Tibetan plateau. One of the good things out of our misfortune is that many texts, the ancient wisdom of India, has been preserved in Tibet.
Today scholars in Sarnath are retranslating these texts into Sanskrit or Pali. But by circumstances, we are politically and otherwise very much part of the Chinese political orbit. This fact is also a positive factor.

What is the status of your negotiations today?

The first round of negotiations dates from 1982, when the first Tibetan high level exploratory delegates went to China. More recently, I went thrice to China after 2002 and we had a fourth round of talks in Geneva in January 2005. Soon, I will go back to China to conduct the 5th round of talks.
It is a very slow process; it is going to take a long time, before we can make substantial progress. I always tell my Tibetan friends: "Don't be in a hurry and don't ask me to hurry." We should not allow ourselves to be forced into an agreement too quickly. After all, we have already waited very long.
His Holiness is in good health; we have time. We are committed and optimistic and we will continue very slowly.

Are you optimistic about the outcome of the talks?

Yes, I am hopeful, because if I had lost hope, I would have no business to conduct these talks. If I did not believe in this process, it would be immoral for me to continue to lead this team. I do it as my spiritual practice.
His Holiness is not only my political leader, but also my guru. If I had any doubt in my heart, my job would be to go to His Holiness and tell him: "Your Holiness, please take me out of this business because I do not believe in it."

The negotiations that unfortunately never were

When in 2009, I published a book: Dharamsala and Beijing: The negotiations that never were I still believed that the Chinese leadership would be wise enough to start genuine negotiations with Dharamsala.
It was not to be.
Later that year, I wrote on this blog:

This statement of  Zhu Weiqun, Vice Minister of the United Front Work Department is  depressing at first sight (Zhu said the the Dalai Lama lied) ; it however probably signals a return to the negotiating table.
The Chinese are also adepts of the Middle Path approach, but they prefer to change the posts before the beginning of the talks: the further the posts, closer to their position is the 'middle'.

One of the most shocking fact about the 'negotiations' is that the Chinese side does not even allow the Tibetans to have a Chinese-speaking member in their team.
The Chinese officials speak of 'lies', but their own is the biggest: they pretend that there never was an 'invasion' of Tibet and Tibet was just 'liberated'. According to the latest news from Eastern Tibet (Nyagchuka County, Kardze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Sichuan Province), it is clear that Tibet is still not liberated.

The recent immolations on the Tibetan plateau is another indication that Tibet has never been 'liberated'
The back cover of my book explains the background of the 'negotiations':

In October 1950, Communist China invaded Tibet. After nine years of difficult co-habitation with the occupiers, the Dalai Lama, the young temporal and spiritual leader of the Tibetans, had no choice but to flee his country to take refuge in India.
It took 20 years for the Tibetans to renew a dialogue with the leaders in Beijing. Soon after Deng Xiaoping’s return to power in 1978, the first contacts were made. Using rare documents, this is the story of thirty years of encounters between the Tibetan Administration in Dharamsala and Beijing.
Today the stalemate continues; Beijing refuses to offer any sort of concession to the Dalai Lama’s demand for a genuine autonomy for Tibet.
Just like the border ‘talks’ between India and China, the negotiations with Dharamsala have never really started.
Reading through this book one understands how the relations between India and China are inextricably linked to the status of Tibet. Further, the present unrest in Tibet renders China unstable and increasingly belligerent towards India which gave refuge to the Tibetans.

Now, the Dalai Lama's Special Envoy, Lodi Gyari Rinpoche and his colleague,  Envoy Kelsang Gyaltsen have resigned. It is sad, but it is the logical outcome of lack of interest of the Communist regime in Beijing in finding a 'negotaited' solution to the Tibetan issue.
Kalon Tripa Lobsang Sangye did not need to accept the resignation of the Envoys, because Gyari and Gayaltsen were not 'his' Envoys or the Kashag's Envoys, but the Dalai Lama's. 
When the Charter (Constitution) was reviewed in May 2011, the Dalai Lama, though retiring from 'political activities', was entitled to nominate 'Envoys' to have discussions with Beijing.
For the last 30 years, Beijing had made clear that they would never speak to Envoys from the Kashag.
By the way, the photo above was taken in Bern, Switzerland (in June 2005) on the occasion of the 4th round of talks between the Tibetan Envoys and the officials of the United Front Work Depaartment. It is the only time that the 'negotiations' were held outside China, though one could argue that technically that it was on Chinese territory (in the Chinese embassy in Switzerland). 
Another small detail, it is doubtful if the 'transition' in Beijing will be over in December. The latest rumors emanating from Zhongnanhai are that the outcome of the 18th Congress of the CCP may be postponed from 2 or 3 months, in order to reach a consensus on the number of members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo and who these members will be.

PRESS RELEASE
The Kashag
June 3, 2012

Kalon Tripa Accepts Resignations of Special Envoy Lodi G. Gyari and Envoy Kelsang Gyaltsen.
The Tibetan Leadership Reiterates its Commitment to the Middle-Way Policy

Kalon Tripa Dr. Lobsang Sangay, Head of the Central TibetanAdministration, regretfully accepted the resignations of SpecialEnvoy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama Lodi G. Gyari and EnvoyKelsang Gyaltsen. The resignations became effective June 1, 2012.

Special Envoy Lodi Gyari, assisted by Envoy Kelsang Gyaltsen, led the Tibetan team in nine rounds of talks with representatives of the Chinese government starting in 2002. The last meeting with the Chinese side took place more than two years ago in January 2010. Despite Mr. Gyari’s desire to step down in April 2011, the twoenvoys were asked to continue their efforts to reach out to their Chinese counterparts by Kalon Tripa-elect Dr. Lobsang Sangay. The envoys met and briefed the Kalon Tripa on twelve separate occasions since May 2011.

At the Task Force meeting on May 30-31, 2012 in Dharamsala, the envoys expressed their utter frustration over the lack of positive response from the Chinese side and submitted their resignations to the Kalon Tripa. “Given the deteriorating situation inside Tibet since 2008 leading to the increasing cases of self-immolations by Tibetans, we are compelled to submit our resignations. Furthermore, the United Front did not respond positively to the Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People presented in 2008 and its Note in 2010. One of the key Chinese interlocutors in the dialogue process even advocated abrogation of minority status as stipulated in the Chinese constitution thereby seeming to remove the basis of autonomy. At this particular time, it is difficult to have substantive dialogue,” stated the two envoys in their resignation letter.

“I have known both Special Envoy Lodi G. Gyari and Envoy Kelsang Gyaltsen for many years. They have worked extremely hard in challenging circumstances and made earnest efforts to move the dialogue process forward and resolve the issue of Tibet peacefully. Their contributions during their decade-long leadership of the Tibetan negotiating team have been invaluable. The Kashag will continue to rely on them for their wise counsel. They will remain as senior members of the Task Force team,” said Kalon Tripa Dr. Lobsang Sangay.

The Kashag urges Beijing to accept the Middle-Way Approach, which seeks genuine autonomy for Tibetans within the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and within the framework of the Chinese constitution. This is a win-win proposition, which contributes to PRC’s unity, stability, harmony and its peaceful rise in the world.

The Tibetan Task Force on Negotiations will be expanded and will meet again in December 2012 to discuss the Chinese leadership transition with the hope of continuing to dialogue with the new Chinese leaders to resolve the issue of Tibet peacefully.

The Tibetan leadership remains firmly committed to non-violence and the Middle-Way Approach, and strongly believes that the only way to resolve the issue of Tibet is through dialogue. The Tibetan leadership considers substance to be primary and process as secondary, and is ready to engage in meaningful dialogue anywhere and at anytime.

A Greater Cohesion with Chinese Characteristics

Zhu Weiqun

An article written by Zhu Weiqun, the Deputy Director of CCP's United Front Work Department in The Study Times (Xuexi Shibao) has hardly been noticed by the Indian press, though it has serious implications for India.
Zhu, who is the interlocutor of the Dalai Lama's Envoys in the so-called Beijing-Dharamsala negotiations, argues that China must change some aspects of its present political and educational system in order to achieve 'national cohesion'.
He wants a discussion on this issue to take place at the upcoming National People's Congress and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference annual meetings in March.
Zhu raises the possibility of abolishing special privileges and preferential policies offered to minority nationalities, taking the nationality name off all IDs cards and passports and removing nationality names from provinces.
Does it mean that autonomy will be deleted from the Constitution in the name of  promoting a 'greater cohesion'?
Let us not forget that China's State Council published in 2005 a White Paper on Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities in China
The White Pater states: "The People's Republic of China is a united multi-ethnic state founded jointly by the people of all its ethnic groups. So far, there are 56 ethnic groups identified and confirmed by the Central Government." 
Zhu was probably directed by Party's higher-up to write this essay.
This should cause serious worries to the Tibetans. 
In 2008, the Dalai Lama's Envoys had given a Memorandum to Mr Zhu; and a year later, they presented a Note on the Memorandum.
On his return to India, the Dalai Lama's Special Envoy, Lodi Gyari declared:

We first arrived in Changsha, capital of Hunan Province, on January 26, 2010. Before beginning our programmes there, we formally presented to the Central United Front Work Department, a Note relating to the Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for All Tibetans that we had given during the previous eighth round of dialogue in November 2008. The Note contained seven points that addressed the fundamental issues raised by the Chinese leadership during the eighth round and some constructive suggestions for a way forward in the dialogue process. The seven points include respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity of the PRC, respecting the Constitution of the PRC, respecting the “Three Adherences,” respecting the hierarchy and authority of the Chinese Central Government, Concerns raised by the Central Government on specific competencies referred to the Memorandum, recognising the core issue, and offering His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s cooperation for a mutually beneficial solution.

Zhu Weiqun had already rejected the Memorandum during a Press Conference:

During the contact in 2008, the private representatives of the Dalai Lama handed in a 'Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy of the Tibetan People', which was rejected by us immediately. But now the Dalai clique still shams that they are still "waiting for the central government's response". I would suggest they'd better stop such a self-delusional act.

The latest essay of Zhu will have serious implications for the Tibetans, Uyghurs and Mongols and other minority nationalities. They may loose their identity guaranteed by the Constitution of China.
Zhu and his bosses in the Standing Committee of the Politburo probably believe that it is a way to solve the Tibetan issue once and for all. 
But it could also create more resentment amongst the people of non-Han origin and increase the circle of violence.

For India, it will also have serious implications as Delhi has always acknowledged Tibetan autonomy (within the People's Republic of China, after 1954).
This should be followed closely during the next National People's Congress and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference in March.

Call to strike ethnic status from I.D. cards
South China Morning Post
Minnie Chan
Feb 15, 2012
A senior official has urged the central government to make a host of changes to its ethnic affairs policies, including scrapping the "ethnicity" category from people's identity cards and expanding mixed-ethnic schools.
An article by Zhu Weiqun , deputy head of the Communist Party's United Front Work Department, said in the party's Study Times on Monday that the increasingly mobile population had led to the most intense cultural and economic exchange in Chinese history. He called on the central government to seize that opportunity and set up political and educational systems to better promote "national cohesion".
Zhu, who in is charge of Tibetan affairs, said listing ethnic minority or Han Chinese status on identity cards, using ethnic labels in the titles of schools and autonomous regions, and reserving privileges for members of ethnic minorities were obstacles to promoting such cohesion.
"Some of our current educational and administrative policies have unintentionally weakened [the minority people's] sense of nationhood and Chinese nationalism," he said. "For example, the ethnic consciousness of students studying in [minority] schools was easily stimulated after some ethnic incidents occurred."
He suggested that the central government should expand mixed schooling, with both Han Chinese and ethnic minority children studying Han Chinese culture.
Zhu said his suggestions were aimed at preventing overseas powers from using China's internal ethnic problems to divide the country and urged the authorities to take strict action to punish those pursuing such an agenda on the mainland.
Zhu said the central government's preferential policies "should not put too much emphasis" on targeting people from ethnic minorities but all people from remote and impoverished areas to ease tensions between minorities and Han Chinese.
Dr Barry Sautman, an associate professor of social science at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, argued such a move would widen the wealth gap between Han Chinese and ethnic minorities.
"What Zhu says is complete lies," Sautman said. "If those [preferential] policies are abolished, that is a major departure in terms of the policy stance of the Chinese Communist Party government.
"The answer to narrowing the gap between the Han and the minorities is to increase the levels of privilege polices rather than decrease them. And the answer to satisfying minority people in terms of their desire for increased participation in the affairs of their state is to increase rather than decrease the level of autonomy."
Jiang Zhaoyong , a Beijing-based specialist in Xinjiang issues, said Zhu had adopted suggestions from mainland ethnic affairs experts following riots in Tibet in 2008 and in Urumqi , Xinjiang , in 2009.
"Zhu's article indicates that the central government will make a big change to its ethnic policies in the future," he said, adding that many mainland experts would welcome the elimination of ethnic status on identity cards.
But Sautman argued the move would make it more difficult for minorities to benefit from preferential policies, saying only their identity card can prove their minority status.
"The complaint by many minority people, not just in China, but all over the world, is that their status ... was not decided by themselves, but people far way in their national capitals," Sautman said.
minnie.chan@scmp.com Copyright (c) 2012. South China Morning Post Publishers Ltd. All rights reserved.