The Great Han Chauvism once again

Wang Junzheng, new TAR party Secretary

In 2004, I had mentioned one of the cancers of Communist China: The Great Han Chauvinism (see post below).

 

The situation seems to be getting worst, particularly in Tibet or Xinjiang.
The Chinese media just announced  that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) had decided to nominate Wang Junzheng of Han nationality as Secretary of the Party Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR); he become de facto a member of the TAR Standing Committee.

 

A Chinese website explained: "On October 19, the Tibet Autonomous Region held a meeting of leading cadres, at which Comrade Zeng Yichun, vice minister of the Central Organization Department, announced the decision of the Central Government; Zeng said that the adjustment was made by the Central Government [Beijing] in the light of the overall situation, according to the work needs and the actual construction of the leadership team of the Tibet Autonomous Region, after thorough consideration and careful study."
 

So far, not a single Tibetan or non-Han has made it to Party Secretary's seat, can you believe it?
The situation is similar in Xinjiang with the Uyghur minority being second-class citizens.

 

Seventy years after having 'liberated' the Tibetans, the latter are still slaves of the Han majority.

 

It is ironical that during the forthcoming Sixth Plenum of the Communist Party (November 8 to 11), President Xi Jinping will boast about the achievements during the 100-year rule of the Communists in China (and 70 years in Tibet).
But, he will certainly not mention the fate of the Tibetans or Uyghurs and why they are not given the top responsibility.

The Communist Party of China is in fact a racist Party, not giving any place to the minorities.

 

Can you imagine such situation in India: if West Bengal or Tamil Nadu never had a Bengali or Tamil Chief Minister since Independence?
This is the situation in Tibet, Xinjiang or Inner Mongolia.

Simply shameful.

Wang widely Sanctioned
According to The South China Morning Post, Wang is China’s highest ranking official "to be widely sanctioned over accusations of human rights violations in March, during his tenure as Xinjiang’s deputy party secretary and security chief. His boss, Xinjiang party chief Chen Quanguo, appeared only on the Donald Trump administration’s sanctions list announced last year."

The Hong Kong newspaper added: "Wang’s promotion underlines Beijing’s snub of the West’s response to its policies in Xinjiang, as well as its growing interest in the pool of officials who have been held up as examples of competence in areas with large ethnic minority populations. He served as Xinjiang’s security chief from 2019 before starting his most recent role last year as political commissar of the paramilitary Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, while retaining his post as deputy party chief."

The years to come are going to be tough for the Tibetans.

No question, of course, to negotiate anything with Dharamsala.

Wu's farewell speech
While leaving Wu Yingjie said: "I have lived on the Tibetan plateau for more than 60 years, worked for 47 years, traveled through the mountains and waters of Tibet, personally witnessed the human miracle of Tibet under the leadership of the Party in just a few decades, spanning thousands of years. Tibet is my home and the Tibetan people will always be my relatives. I feel extremely happy to be able to live here, work here and grow here, feel proud to be able to dedicate the most precious youthful years of my life here, and feel extremely honored to be able to plow, struggle and harvest together with my comrades here. Looking back on the work and life in Tibet, looking back on the unforgettable years with all of us together, remembering the instructions, thanksgiving and progress, many scenes are real, many past events are vividly remembered, all of them make me deeply moved, infinite fondness."

 

Interestingly, Wang has never been posted in Tibet. It is definitively a change of policy from the rulers in Beijing.

About Wang Junzheng

He is born in May 1963, in Linyi, Shandong Province; he has a postgraduate degree and a doctorate in management. He is currently an alternate member of the 19th Central Committee.

Chinese name: Wang Junzheng
Nationality: China
Ethnicity: Han Chinese
Place of origin: Linyi, Shandong
Birth date: May 1963
Graduated from Shandong University

Biography

• 1981.09-1985.07 Shandong University, Department of Scientific Socialism, majoring in Scientific Socialism
• 1985.07-1988.08 Master's degree in Scientific Socialism, Marxist-Leninist Institute, Renmin University of China
• 1988.08-1993.10 Section officer and deputy chief section officer of the General Office of the Ministry of Labour, chief section officer and deputy divisional secretary of the Minister's Office
• 1993.10-1994.09 Deputy Divisional Secretary and Full Divisional Secretary, General Office of Yunnan Provincial Party Committee
• 1994.09-1995.06 Deputy Secretary, Guandu District, Kunming City, Yunnan Province (at divisional level)
• 1995.06-1998.12 Secretary of Guandu District Committee of Kunming City, Yunnan Province
• 1998.12-2000.11 Standing Committee Member and Secretary of the Political and Legal Committee of Kunming City, Yunnan Province
• 2000.11-2003.10 Standing Committee Member and Director of the Organization Department of Kunming Municipal Committee, Yunnan Province
• 2003.10-2003.11 Deputy Secretary of the Kunming Municipal Committee and Director of the Organization Department, Kunming City, Yunnan Province
• 2003.11-2005.01 Deputy Secretary of Kunming Municipal Party Committee and Minister of Propaganda Department, Kunming City, Yunnan Province
• 2005.01-2007.05 Vice-President of Yunnan Provincial High People's Court
• (1998.09-2006.07 Postgraduate studies in Business Administration, School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, PhD in Management)
• 2007.05-2007.06 Deputy Secretary of Lijiang Municipal Party Committee, Yunnan Province
• 2007.06-2007.11 Deputy Secretary and Acting Mayor of Lijiang City, Yunnan Province
• 2007.11-2009.12 Deputy Secretary and Mayor of Lijiang City, Yunnan Province
• 2009.12-2012.09 Secretary of Lijiang Municipal Party Committee, Yunnan Province
• 2012.09-2013.05 Vice Governor of Hubei Province
• 2013.05-2013.06 Vice-Governor of Hubei Province, Secretary of Xiangyang Municipal Party Committee
• 2013.06-2013.09 Standing Committee Member of Hubei Provincial Party Committee, Secretary of Xiangyang Municipal Party Committee
•  2013.09-2016.01 Member of the Standing Committee of Hubei Provincial Committee, Secretary of Xiangyang Municipal Committee and Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Municipal People's Congress
•  2016.01-2019.01 Member of the Standing Committee of the Jilin Provincial Committee and Secretary of the Changchun Municipal Committee
• 2019.01-2019.02 Standing Committee of the Party Committee of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
• 2019.02-2020.04 Standing Committee of the Party Committee and Secretary of the Political and Legal Committee of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region
• 2020.04-2020.05 Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee and Secretary of the Political and Legal Committee of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, and Secretary of the Party Committee of Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, at full ministerial level 
• 2020.05-2020.09- Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee and Secretary of the Political and Legal Committee of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, Secretary of the Party Committee and Political Commissar of Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, Chairman of the Board of Directors of China New Construction Group Corporation, at full ministerial level
• 2020.09- Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, Secretary of the Party Committee and Political Commissar of Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, Chairman of the Board of Directors of China Xinjiang Group Corporation, full ministerial level 
• 2021.10- Secretary of the Party Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region. 

The Great Han Chauvinism still in full bloom in the Middle Kingdom.

 

Here is my 2004 article

A A few years back, I wrote an article, Flag and nationalities on the issue.

The recent unrest in Tibet has generated a healthy debate in India. Some sections of the Indian society like the Kashmiri Pandits now view their plight through the Tibetan prism (the bad luck of the Pandits is that they never had a charismatic leader like the Dalai Lama, though India’s ruling family belong to their community and they have remained a divided lot).
Some others say that we should give time to China to change and progressively evolve into a decent democratic system. They are probably not aware that the ‘time’ is also clocking against India’s interests. Last year alone 3.8 millions of Chinese ‘visited’ Tibet using the railway line to Lhasa; a few lakhs of them settled on the Roof of the World. Like in the Nepal case, when we will realize that the situation is irreversible, it will be too late. And it is India which will have to suffer.
More than twenty years ago, I had asked the Dalai Lama how will Tibet regain its independence (or autonomy). He had answer: “It does not depend on us Tibetans, changes will come from within China”.
It seems also clear that he was not expecting the United States or India to offer him on a platter the most cherished dream of his people. This statement may be disappointing to those who believe that he is only banking on the Great White Chief in Washington.
He repeatedly said that the people of China will bring about changes in their own country which will give a chance to the people of Tibet to fulfill their aspirations. 

 This is a far more plausible alternative than any other, including a dead-locked dialogue between Dharamsala and Beijing. In this context, three letters addressed to President Hu Jintao by the veteran Tibetan Communist leader Phuntsok Wangyal, who had led the Chinese troops into Lhasa in September 1951, could trigger a larger debate in China once the Olympics are behind us.
Wangyal (known as Phunwang by the Tibetans) told Hu several interesting things: the Dalai Lama’s demise would only radicalize young Tibetan hardliners frustrated with his ‘middle way’ approach; he reminded the Chinese President about his own objective to establish a harmonious society; and if Hu would strive for the return of hundreds of thousands of exiled Tibetans, he could turn ‘confrontation into harmony’.
The present debate veers around the place and status of the nationalities within the People’s Republic of China.
A historical incident about the Tibetan flag gives an indication of the direction in which the question could go.
In the 80’s, I had interviewed Phuntso Tashi Takla, the Dalai Lama’s brother-in-law who was in charge of the Tibetan leader’s security when the latter visited China in 1954-55. Takla recalled: “At that time [in 1954] because the Chinese occupation of Tibet was not complete, the Chinese extended full courtesy and cooperation to the Dalai Lama. On some occasions Mao Zedong came himself to the Dalai Lama’s residence [in Beijing]. During one of the several discussions that the Dalai Lama and Mao Zedong had, they were talking on some subject, when Mao [suddenly] said: “Don’t you have a flag of your own, if you have one, you can hoist it here [on the Guest House]”.
Takla was surprised to hear Mao Zedong speaking thus.
Personally I did not immediately realize the importance of Mao’s point, but when I later read Phunwang’s biography, I understood better the incalculable implications of the Chairman’s statement.
It is worth quoting Phunwang: “One day, Mao unexpectedly came to visit the Dalai Lama at his residence… During their conversation, Mao suddenly said, "I heard that you have a national flag, do you? They do not want you to carry it, isn't that right?"
Phunwang further recalled: “Since Mao asked this with no warning that the topic was to be discussed, the Dalai Lama just replied, "We have an army flag." I thought that was a shrewd answer because it didn't say whether Tibet had a national flag. Mao perceived that the Dalai Lama was concerned by his question and immediately told him, "That is no problem. You may keep your national flag." Mao definitely said ‘national’ flag [tib. rgyal dar].
The Chairman added that in the future the Communist Party could also let Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia have their own flag. He then asked the Dalai Lama if it would it be fine for him to host the national flag of the People's Republic of China in addition to the Tibetan flag. Phunwang says that the young Lama nodded his head and said ‘yes’: “This was the most important thing that Mao told the Dalai Lama, and I was amazed to hear it” later wrote Phunwang.
His mind immediately started racing. He was not sure if Mao had discussed this with other leaders in the Politburo or if it was his own idea: “As I had always paid great attention to the Soviet Union's nationality model, I was excited because I took Mao's comment that Tibet could use its own flag to mean that China was contemplating adopting the Soviet Union's ‘Republic’ model, at least for these three large minority nationalities.”
Phunwang realized that the innocuous remark of the Great Helmsman had far reaching consequences for the future of China and particularly for the Tibetans.
Unfortunately Phuwang was arrested in April 1958; he ‘needed to cleanse his thinking'. He spent the following 18 years in solitary confinement. This gave him time to ponder about Mao’s remarks on the flag and the ‘nationalities’ issue and their place in the People’s Republic of China. His studies of Marxism led him to believe that the relationship between nationalities in a multiethnic state should be one of complete equality.
He wrote: “In socialist states, the majority nationality does not (or should not) oppress the minority nationalities. All should be equal, and there should be complete unity and cooperation among nationalities.”
The Great Han Chauvinism
Most of the problems facing China today are due to the Great Han Chauvinism. The State (or Central Government) had to guarantee the equality amongst nationalities (by not imposing Chinese language over a ‘nationality language’ such as Tibetan for example).
Phunwang was finally rehabilitated at the end of the seventies.
In the early 80’s, Phunwang managed to send a 25,000 character memo to senior Party leaders such as Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang. He stressed that the outcome of a debate on the question of nationality would have a huge impact on future work in ‘minority nationality areas’ such Tibet.
After Hu Yaobang and Deng Xiaoping instructed the officials not to remove him as a member of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, his stand seems vindicated.
In May 1980, a delegation headed by Hu Yaobang, then General Secretary of the Communist Party of China visited Lhasa. Hu Yaobang was shocked to see the level of poverty in Tibet. During a meeting with the Party cadres, he asked “whether all the money Beijing had poured into Tibet over the previous years had been thrown into the Yarlung Tsangpo [Brahmaputra] river”. He said the situation reminded him of colonialism. Soon hundreds of Chinese Han cadres were transferred back to China and Tibetan language rehabilitated. Tibet witnessed a few years of glasnost.
The debate started by Mao’s remark more than fifty years ago and reignited by Phunwang twenty years later, is still on. Will Hu Jintao and his colleagues listen to Phunwang’s point on the issue of nationalities or will the Great Han Chauvinism prevail once again?
The fate of Tibet depends on which side the wind will blow in Beijing not on CIA operations?
In the meantime, it is not advisable to go around Lhasa with a national Tibetan flag: Mao’s Thought has not percolated that much in China.

The Return of Hu Yaobang ...and Xi Jinping

Yesterday, Xi Jinping visited Nyingchi near the Indian border of Arunachal Pradesh and Lhasa.
I will come back later on the visit, but this reminded me the visit of CPP's General Secretary Hu Yaobang in May 1980.
It was truly important visit to Tibet, not for the show, like yesterday.

 

 

This article in the Epoch Times (affiliated with the Falun Gong group) says that a number of Chinese publications have commemorated the death anniversary of Hu Yaobang, the former CCP's General Secretary. 
Hu has been a great reformer and it is his death which triggered the Tiananmen events in 1989.
For Tibet also, the tenure of Hu Yaobang brought positive changes on the ground, especially after his visit to Lhasa in May 1980.
I am posting here the report of his visit written by one of his close collaborator, Wang Yao.
This shows that with a more open leadership, many things could change on the Roof of the World (and in China). 

File photo dated April 14, 199

Report of the visit of Comrade Hu to Tibet

During the week from May 22 to May 31, 1980, Hu Yaobang led a Working Group of the Party Central Committee (PCC) to visit and inspect Tibet. This event was watched with great interest by those, both at home and abroad, who were concerned with Tibetan society, and it can be said that this event marked the beginning of a new era for the PCC's Tibet policy. In the ten years that followed that visit history marched on with its strong steps, leaving behind impressive footprints: amongst them, indisputably, the open door, a revitalised economy, changes in the social structure and an improvement in people's lives. As for Hu Yaobang himself, he experienced his ups and downs with officialdom and left the world with his ambitions unfulfilled on April 15, 1989. The great honours that were paid to him at his funeral could not make up for the regrets during his life. But the past has passed. According to Chinese custom, final judgment can only be passed on Hu when the lid is placed on his coffin, and this note is a reflection on the historical significance of Hu's visit to Tibet, as a mark of respect to him and as a way of cherishing the memory of a great man. 
The Composition and Timing of the Working Group The importance of the Central Committee's Working Group can be judged from Wan Li's description of it: “This is the first working group to be formed since Comrade Hu Yaobang became the General Secretary after the new secretariat was formed at the Fifth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee.” The Working Group was composed principally of five people:
Hu Yaobang, the General Secretary of the Central Committee and a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Central Committee; Wan Li, member of the Central Committee and Vice-Premier of the State Council; Ngapo Ngawang Jigme, the Vice-Chairman of the National People's Congress; Yang Jingren, member of the Central Committee and the Head of the State Commission of Nationalities Affairs, and Zhao Zhengqing, Vice-Minister of the Organisation Department of the PCC. There were several other staff members, amongst whom I was the only one who was not a government official. Edgar Snow, as an old friend of the Party leadership who knew their working style quite well, once said, 'Nothing carried out in public by the leaders of the Central Committee is ever casual or without significance.' This was true of the date chosen for the visit, and there were at least three reasons which led the Working Group to select May 22 as the date when it should arrive in Lhasa. First, the date indicated that the Central Government's policy on Tibet was based on the 'Seventeen-Point Agreement'. This was the agreement (entitled in full, 'Seventeen Points for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet') signed in the Qinzheng Hall in Zhongnanhai, Beijing, on May 23, 1951, after a long period of discussion and consultation, by the delegation of the Central People's Government, headed by its plenipotentiary Li Weihan, and the delegation of the Tibetan Regional Government, headed by plenipotentiary Ngapo. That agreement marked the first time since its victory in the domestic revolution that the Chinese Communist Party had found a point of convergence with the Tibetan regional government; it was also the first agreement, based on compromise and harmony, which was acceptable to all the political forces in Tibet. It thus became the governing principle in Tibetan work and policy for a long period. Secondly, the choice of date pointed out that the Central Government was willing to settle matters through consultation with the local people. Thirdly, it aimed to show the
Central Government's wish to restore the harmonious atmosphere of cooperation which had prevailed in the early 1950s. The Working Group arrived at Gongkar airport near Lhasa at 10 a.m. on May 22, and two hours later had reached Lhasa and begun its meetings with the Tibetan leaders. Hu Yaobang came straight to the point by asking Paba-la [Phagpa-la Gelek Namgyal] a question:”Comrade Paba-la, what is tomorrow?” This summed up the feelings and intentions of the Group. At the cocktail party held on May 23 to celebrate the 39th anniversary of the Seventeen-Point Agreement, Wan Li held the hands of Sampho Tenzin Dundhup and said: 'You have rendered an outstanding service to history! Thank you!' Apart from Ngapo, Sampho was the only surviving member of the delegation sent by the Tibetan government who had signed the Agreement. He had just been released after nearly twenty years in labour camps. 

Hu Yaobang's Speech 
On May 29 Hu Yaobang made a very sincere and passionate political speech at a gathering of 5,000 cadres in Lhasa. The slogan put forward in the speech was 'Strive to build a united, prosperous and civilised new Tibet' ('Wei jianshe tuanjie fuyu wenmingde, xin Xizang xiang nuli douzheng'). In the speech Hu listed six tasks facing Tibet:

1. To exercise nationality autonomy in the region fully - that is to say, to let Tibetans really be the masters of their own lives. 
2. A commitment by the Central Government to relieve and reduce burdens of the people, exempting the from agricultural and animal husbandry tax over the next three to five years in order to allow the Tibetan people a chance to recover.
3. To adopt a special policy to revive the Tibetan economy, including the adoption or a system of private economy in line with Tibetan circumstances. Nationwide this initiative was developed into the economic (household) responsibility system. 
4. To make great efforts to develop agriculture and animal husbandry as well as the manufacture of consumer goods, in order to promote economic prosperity and enrich people's lives. 
5. To make efforts to develop Tibetan science, culture and education, and to prepare for the establishing of the University of Tibet. 
6. To implement the policy on minority nationality cadres correctly, to strengthen the unity between the Han and Tibetan cadres, and to transfer a large quantity of Chinese cadres who had worked in Tibet for many years back to the interior. 

Naturally, these six tasks were endorsed and supported by the Tibetan people. The atmosphere was very lively both inside and outside the meeting. Hu Yaobang was an excellent orator and his address was received with waves of warm applause, especially when he admitted very frankly:  'Our present situation is less than wonderful because the Tibetan people's lives have not been much improved. There are some improvements in some parts, but in general, Tibetans still live in relative poverty. In some areas the living standards have even gone down. We comrades in the Central Committee, Chairman Hua as well as several vice-chairmen, were very upset when we heard about this situation. We feel that our party has let the Tibetan people down. We feel very bad! The sole purpose of our Communist Party is to work for the happiness of people, to do good things for them. We have worked nearly thirty years, but the life of the Tibetan people has not been notably improved. Are we not to blame? If we don't make this
clear, people won't let us oft the hook; party members won't let us get away with it!' What he said touched people's hearts. They admired him for his statesmanship and his broad-mindedness as a true Communist. It was open and honest, dared to act, dared to face reality and dared to bear responsibility. Ten years later Hu Yaobang's words still ring out forcefully. To this day, the Tibetan people still keep his likeness in their hearts, referring to him affectionately as 'sku-zhabs Hu' [Gentleman Hu].  The Two Cordial Conversations  In the first of the Two Cordial Conversations, Hu Yaobang invited three leading Tibetan cadres, Dorje Tseten, Lobsang Tsultrim, and Phuntsog Tashi, to the hotel in which he was staying in Lhasa. Hu, in his sitting room, opened his hearts to them and said: 'You are all exemplary Tibetans. You are leaders as well as communists; the Tibetan cause relies on you. I hope that you will make further contributions towards the construction of a united, prosperous and civilised new Tibet. I did not know you before, but now we have become friends. Tibetan affairs will rely on you. You can directly come to see me if there are any problems.' These three men were later appointed to important Positions. Dorje Tseten became Director of the TAR Department of Education, First Secretary of the Lhasa Party Committee, and Chairman of the TAR People's Government. Now he is the Director of the China Tibetology Center in Beijing. Lobsang Tsultrim was appointed as the Director of the TAR Party Committee's Department of Organisation, and as the vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Tibetan People's Congress. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack shortly afterwards. Phuntsog Tashi became at various times in his career the Director of Publications for the Tibetan
Administration, the vice-Chairman of the Tibetan People's Congress and the vice-Chairman of the Social Science Academy. Now he is the vice-Director of the China Tibetology Center. In the second of the Two Cordial Conversations, Hu invited two leading figures of the Old Tibet to talk with him. Sholkhang Thubten Nyima and Chapei Kelsang Wangdu were old acquaintances of Hu, who as members of the Chinese Youth Delegation had been to visit Moscow and Bucharest with him in the 1950s. Hu did not forget his old friends although thirty years had passed. Hu held their hands and chatted delightedly. He looked back over their past friendship and hoped that they would guide the patriotic leading figures of the old Tibet to strive together to construct a new Tibet. Before long, Sholkhang Thubten Nyima was appointed as the vice-Director of the Tibetan Cultural Department and the vice-Chairman of the People's Political Consultative Conference of the TAR, and Chapei Kelsang Wangdu later became the Director of the People's Bank of the TAR.

Beijing Leadership Dares to Reawaken June 4 Memories
Hu Yaobang, leader memorialized in 1989 by the Tiananmen students, is commemorated
Epoch Times
Matthew Robertson
April 5, 2012

In a sign that Chinese Communist Party head Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao are willing to inflame the Chinese people’s long-suppressed hopes for political reform, dozens of Chinese newspapers have recently run articles commemorating former Chinese leader Hu Yaobang, Wen’s mentor and the epitome of a reformist cadre.
Hu Yaobang’s death on April 15, 1989, and the commemoration of it, was the main fuse for the massive outpouring of protests that were violently suppressed in Beijing on June 4 that year. His name has always been associated with the Tiananmen Square massacre, and thus has been mostly ignored or suppressed in official media.
The occasion for the recent news is China’s Qingming festival, usually falling on April 4 or 5, a time when Chinese pay tribute to their deceased family members, including visiting and cleaning their graves.
An article in China News Service, the Communist Party’s Chinese-language mouthpiece outside China, celebrated the man.
Titled “Hu Yaobang Tomb’s During Qingming Festival: He is long dead but masses remember him,” the article appeared in other official Chinese media outlets and was forwarded widely on major news portals.
Hu was responsible for politically rehabilitating hundreds of thousands of people who had been persecuted or given class labels by Mao, and he energetically sought political and economic reforms before being ousted for “laxness” in fighting against “bourgeois” elements in 1987.
Qingming, also known as the grave sweeping festival, has serious political connotations in China. The April 5 movement of 1976, where hundreds of thousands gathered in Tiananmen Square mourning Zhou Enlai and attacking the Gang of Four, and the June 4 democracy protests, were both connected with the traditional Chinese celebration.
The article says that near to the 23rd anniversary of Hu’s death, over 80 CCP leaders and 200 provincial and ministerial-level cadres have paid respects at his tomb.
“This large-scale commemoration activity is a way for Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao to strike out at Bo Xilai’s Cultural Revolution-style politics,” said Zhang Tianliang, a commentator on Chinese politics, in an interview. Zhang said that Zhou Yongkang, the security czar and supporter of ousted Chongqing Party chief Bo Xilai, will also take notice.
Seen through the prism of the current political struggle, Hu Yaobang is a paragon of the reformist camp. He is also Wen Jiabao mentor, who seeks to emulate the late leader. The high-profile coverage brings to greater prominence these reformist themes—but whether it will manifest in concrete actions, like freedom of the press, the ceasing of religious persecutions, and the dismantling of labor camps, has yet to be seen, Zhang said.
“Hu and Wen’s priorities are to gain the confidence of the international community, and put pressure on the hard-line elements in the Chinese Communist Party,” says Wen Zhao, a current affairs commentator for the New York-based NTD Television. “They want to make sure that hard-liners such as Bo and Zhou Yongkang don’t act rashly,” he said.
One widely forwarded microblog post referred to the news and remarked on how widely it had been posted on the Chinese Internet. “What wind is this now blowing?”
With reporting by Xue Fei and research by Ariel Tian.

Turning points in the Tibetan Movement

The Red Army marches into Tibet: the first turn

Reposting an 8-year old article.

Here are some remarks I made during a one-day  conference on “Current State of Affairs in Tibet: Reasons?” organized by the Bureau of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, New Delhi, the India International Centre (IIC) and the Foundation for Non-Violent Alternatives on April 21, 2012 at the IIC.

In 1986, I had asked the Dalai Lama about the future of Tibet.
He said that the solution will not come from any action of the exiled community, but from changes from within China. In a way the Tibetans have nothing to do (whether it is fighting for “freedom or Rangzen” or “autonomy”), but to keep their culture and religion alive.
Today, I understand better this statement. It appears even truer than 25 years ago.
When will changes occurring in China trigger a solution for the Tibet issue?
It is necessary to look at some important dates in modern Tibetan history, to grasp the changes of wind on the Roof of the World.
It is what I call here ‘shifts’ or turning points.
There have been many turning points earlier:

Deng Xiaoping-Thondup

• In 1950, when Tibet was invaded
• In 1959, when the Dalai Lama took refuge in India
• In 1973, when the Dalai Lama started travelling abroad
• In 1979 when Gyalo Thondup, the Dalai Lama’s brother met Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese Paramount Leader, who told him that everything except independence could be discussed.
• In 1987/88 when the Dalai Lama internationalized the Tibet issue through his Five Point Peace Plan and his Strasbourg proposals

However for the sake of this presentation, I will restrict myself to the period starting in 2000.

Unrest in Lhasa in 1987

Some Important Dates:
(In bold = important turning points)

• 2001    June    Fourth Tibet Work Forum (Under President Jiang Zemin)
• 2001    November    White Paper on Modernisation
• 2002    September    Visit of Lodi Gyari and Team to China Round 1
• 2003    May    Visit of Lodi Gyari and Team to China Round 2
• 2004    May    White Paper on Tibetan Issue
• 2004    September    Visit of Lodi Gyari and Team to China Round 3
• 2005    February    White Paper on Nationalities
• 2005    June    Visit of Lodi Gyari and Team in Bern Round 4
• 2006    January    Kalachakra in Amravati

Let us start with the Fourth Tibet Work Forum in June 2001 under the Chairmanship of President Jiang Zemin.
These “Tibet Work Fora” are very large meetings called for deciding China’s Tibet Policy. They are attended by 200/300 senior Party leaders, including members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, Party Secretaries involved in Tibet areas, PLA Commanders, etc...
The decisions taken at the highest level during these meetings are usually implemented during the following decade.
President Jiang Zemin’s two priorities were development and stability, for China as well as for Tibet. The motto was therefore to develop Tibet by building infrastructure, keeping a tab on the ‘stability’ of these ‘minority’ areas.
It is probably in this perspective (to bring ‘stability’ to Tibet) that soon after the Fourth Tibet Work Forum, Lodi Gyari, the Dalai Lama’s Special Envoy and his team, were invited to visit China for ‘talks’.
After the difficult times at the end of the 1980’s and during the first years of the 1990’s, Beijing thought that the situation in Tibet was rather stable. It was therefore decided to emphasize on development programmes in order to win the support of Tibetan people.

The first attempt to reach out to the Tibetans
The first negotiations between China and the Dalai Lama’s representatives had taken place in 1979, twenty-nine years after the so-called peaceful liberation in 1950/51.
In 1980, during his March 10 Statement, the Dalai Lama elaborated on his perception of the then situation in China and Tibet:  “In the past few years, the fluid international political scene has witnessed rapid new developments; the internal situation in China under the present leadership who are ‘seeking the truth from facts’ is also undergoing changes. We hear of the repeated calls by the Chinese government requesting us to return to our homeland. We also hear that the so-called wave of moderation has begun to creep into China and, to some extent, into Tibet. However, it is still too early to predict the outcome of what may happen in the future. In response to these changes, as well as to the request by the Chinese government, I have despatched a fact-finding delegation to visit Tibet through China. It is for the first time in nearly twenty-one years that we have established contact with the Chinese government, as well as our beloved countrymen”.

The Chinese Communist government in Beijing was under the impression that the ‘backward Tibetan people’ had finally been ‘liberated’. Hence, the local Communist authorities briefed the Tibetan population in Lhasa about the forthcoming visit of the Dalai Lama’s delegates: “You should not resent this visit. You should not insult the delegates; you should not spit on them, just receive them as your own countrymen,” were the strict Party instructions.
They had however misread completely the Tibetan people’s feelings, their deep resentment, as well as their will to resist colonization. The three first delegations visited Tibet between 1979 and 1980; wherever the Dalai Lama’s envoys went, they were mobbed by crowds of Tibetans. One delegate remembered: “The Tibetans tried even to tear our chubas (Tibetan dress) to have them as relics”. The entire Lhasa population was in the streets; everybody wanted a darshan of the Dalai Lama’s envoys.
During these fact-finding trips, Tibetans inside Tibet told the Dalai Lama’s representatives of their descent to hell. During the past 20 years, since their precious Protector had left for India, they felt orphaned. Despite the constant indoctrination by the Communist Party, that they had been ‘liberated’, nobody had forgotten the Precious One. Each and every Tibetan still dreamt of seeing him back in the sacred Land of Snows with his full power and regalia.
The leader of the first delegation told us:

The Chinese definitively did not expect that the Representatives of the Dalai Lama would be received with so much enthusiasm. They were bewildered. During the 20 years of absence of His Holiness and the twenty years of Chinese administration, they had tried their best to denounce and put down the Dalai Lama, they wanted people to lose their faith in the Dalai Lama. Whenever the Chinese would make derogatory statements against the Dalai Lama, peopled used to say, “Yes, Yes”.
At that time, the Chinese might have thought that the people might spit at the representatives and throw stones at them. The Chinese had in fact forbidden the people to spit at the Representatives, to throw stones at them or do anything bad to them. When they saw what was happening, they were completely bewildered.
The local populations had been told by the Chinese that a delegation was coming to facilitate a better relation between China and Tibet.

Surprisingly, the Chinese cadres sincerely believed that the Chinese presence on the Roof of the World was appreciated by the locals and that none would ever think with nostalgia of the ‘old regime’.
But the unbelievable happened. The same Envoy said:

The day after the delegation reached Lhasa, the delegation went to Jokhang. We went to the terrace and from there we saw that thousands of people had gathered around the Jokhang. They were very enthusiastic, so we went down and tried to meet the people, but we were not allowed by the police who had barricaded us off inside the Jokhang to cut us off from the people. There was a building in front of the Jokhang from where the Chinese were peering and watching what was happening on Jokhang. When they saw that the Tibetan people were prostrating, folding their hands in prayers in front of the delegates and were trying to get whatever their hands could grab [from the delegates], the Chinese people in Jokhang became so angry that they remarked “Here is the result of all our efforts for these people for 20 years.
They became so nervous and disappointed by their failure, that some stamped their feet and even cried. From these anecdotes, you can see that the Chinese were not expecting what happened.

It was after all Avalokistehwara’s envoys driving away in those vehicles. The Chinese perhaps began to understand that their ‘liberation’ had not brought all the changes that they had expected.
The following delegations had the same experience.

Hu Yaobang’s visit

Hu Sr., Hu Jr. and Wen

It was the first big shock of the Chinese because for the first time they noticed that there is something wrong in their policies. As a result, the General Secretary of People’s Republic of China (PRC), Hu Yaobang went to Tibet in May 1980 to see the real situation in Tibet. Hu Yaobang was the first Chinese leader to have the courage to announce publicly that there was something wrong with the Chinese policy in Tibet. In my view, the Chinese will bring change in Tibet only when the leaders in the politburo have the courage to tell the truth of the situation. Otherwise, it will be very difficult.
Unfortunately, Hu Yaobang was soon after removed as Party Secretary. Today, China is still waiting for another Hu Yaobang, or a Chinese Gorbachev to reform the country.
We have gone into details in the happenings of this period to show the surprise of the Chinese leaders when they realized that the Tibetans were unchanged by their ‘liberation’.
With the political struggle going on full swing in China today, will  we see  the emergence a new Hu Yaobang? And more importantly, can a reformist leader last in the present system?

Another turning point: Amravati Kalachakra: January 2006
Let us come to more recent times.
The Dalai Lama gave the Kalachakra initiation in Amravati (Andhra Pradesh) in January 2006. More than one thousand Tibetans from Tibet had come to attend the teachings. The Dalai Lama started the function with a powerful statement urging Tibetans from inside Tibet to tell their countrymen living on the Roof of the World when they returned about the importance of the 'Middle Path' approach towards a genuine autonomy for Tibet. The Tibetan leader said that it was natural to consider the newcomers from Tibet as the main audience for the Kalachakra: "Tibetans living in Tibet are less fortunate than their counterparts living in India. They have to suffer a lot in their own motherland from repressive forces. Tibetans from Tibet are the key for the Tibetan cause”.
During an audience with the Tibetans from Tibet, the Dalai Lama urged the Tibetans not to wear robes and furs of endangered animals which Tibetans used to traditionally wear, especially those who came from Amdo and Kham regions of Eastern Tibet.
As a result of his speech, there was an immediate reaction in Tibet, thousands started to burn their chupas made with animal fur. Once again it was a big shock for the Chinese leadership, who had come to believe that they had got Tibetans on their side by building roads, bringing a railway line to Lhasa or developing the Tibetan plateau.
Despite the changes in the Tibet policy introduced during the Fourth Tibet Work Forum in 2001, Beijing seemed to face a tremendous reaction from the Tibetans.
I personally believe that the negotiations between Beijing and Dharamsala were already finished in 2006 after this incident. The United Front work Department suddenly realized the power of the Dalai Lama on the simple folks in the remotest parts of Tibet: he just had to say a few words and the entire population followed his advice.
During the following months, Beijing got busy in the preparations of the Olympic Games and their main preoccupation was the ‘peaceful’ passage of this world event .The dialogue with the Dalai Lama’s representatives was not a priority. Their only interest in Tibet was that the issue should not disturb the peaceful conduct of the Games. As a matter of fact, no progress has been made in the dialogue after 2006.
Though in the Fourth Tibet Forum Meeting, the Chinese had strongly emphasized on the economic development of Tibet, the resentment of the Tibetan population was still present. The huge infrastructural development in Tibet both in terms of railways and roadways especially in the border region, had not helped removing the misgivings against the Chinese Hans.

Another Turning Point: The 2008 riots

On March 10, 2008, soon after 500 monks of Drepung monastery began a peaceful protest in Lhasa, they were tear-gassed and beaten by the People’s Armed Police (PAP). Some ten monks were arrested and the monastery surrounded by the PAP; the water supply was cut off.
The same day, 14 monks from Sera monastery held a protest in the Jokhang Central Cathedral in Lhasa; they waved Tibetan flags. They were immediately taken away by the local police. Minor protests were also reported from Amdo region (today in Qinghai province).
The next day, 600 monks from Sera monastery marched peacefully to the Tibetan capital. They were also tear-gassed by the police and many were arrested. The same method was used by the PAP: the water supply of the monastery was cut off and restaurants in the area closed.
On March 12, when two monks from Drepung cut their wrists, other monks from Sera monastery began a demonstration.
During the first three days, the main events occurred around Lhasa. Local authorities however considered the happenings as "a direct challenge to the long term stability of Tibet".
On March 13, when a few hundreds of monks from Ganden monastery, together with a few nuns, came to Lhasa to stage a peaceful protest, they were stopped by the police. Later that day, the three Great Monasteries of Drepung, Ganden and Sera were closed.

The next day, March 14, 2008 will remain etched in the history of protests in Tibet. It was subsequently termed ‘the 3/11 incident’ by Beijing, probably to make it sound like a terrorist attack against the People’s Republic of China.
In the morning, about one hundred monks from Ramoche monastery began to demonstrate against the arrest of the monks on the previous days. Once again they were stopped and beaten by the police. This infuriated the Tibetan by-passers. From then on, the situation went out of control.
Soon after, a large scale demonstration involving tens of thousands of people lead to a confrontation between Tibetans and the PAP.
It was reported that on March 14, the ban on firing weapons was lifted. Police and the PAP were free to shoot at will.
Robert Barnett, a scholar from Columbia University later wrote the details of the events for the New York Review of Books :

Unlike the great monasteries, Ramoche is in the heart of Lhasa, and opens onto a busy market street in one of the few areas of the city that remains a largely Tibetan quarter. Members of the public, apparently aroused by rumors that monks detained that Monday had been beaten in custody, began to attack the police and a small squad of PAP sent in to support them. The police and soldiers were pelted with stones, their cars were burned and, pursued by a group of stone-throwing youths, they fled. No reinforcements were sent into the area for at least three hours (one Western journalist who witnessed the events saw no police for twenty-four hours), though they were waiting on the outskirts. It was the traditional response of the Chinese security forces to serious unrest—to wait for orders from Party leaders on whether to shoot or not—but the hours of inaction left the citizenry unprotected and allowed the violence to escalate. (The government announced on April 9 that wily monks had ‘misled’ them into sending the security forces to the city suburbs).

In this vacuum, a number of Tibetans turned from attacking police to attacking the next available symbol of Chinese governance, the Chinese migrant population. The rapid increase of migrants in Tibetan towns (they already were 34 percent of the Lhasa population when official figures were last made available in 2000, and this figure probably excludes temporary residents and the military) had created uneasy resentment — until then silent — among the indigenous population. About a thousand Chinese-owned shops were set on fire by rioters who were seen by foreign tourists igniting cooking gas cylinders or dousing shops in gasoline.

According to The Economist's correspondent James Miles, the only accredited foreign journalist in Lhasa at the time, almost every [Chinese or Chinese Muslim] business was either burned, looted, destroyed, smashed into, the property therein hauled out into the streets, piled up, burned. It was an extraordinary outpouring of ethnic violence of a most unpleasant nature to watch: “Miles saw Chinese passersby, including a child of about ten years old, pelted with stones, and several Western tourists described hard-core rioters beating random Chinese civilians with enough force to have killed them. Eleven Chinese civilians and a Tibetan were burned to death after hiding in shops set on fire by the rioters, and a policeman and six other civilians died from beatings or unknown causes, according to the Chinese government. Later, the PAP moved in, shooting from time to time, leading to an unknown number of casualties. 

The exiled Tibetan government declared that eighty Tibetans were shot dead in Lhasa, while the Chinese government says that its forces never opened fire; just what happened when the security forces moved in remains unclear because no tourists saw Tibetans being shot and most foreign reporters were allowed to visit Tibet only for three days in March and then only in a group under supervision. By the official count, one thousand Tibetans were detained in Lhasa alone, and the punishment of those deemed guilty of offenses is expected to be ferocious—to be handled according to the principles of ‘quick approval, quick arrest, quick trial, quick execution’ according to Zhang Qingli, the current Party secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region.

From Beijing, the Tibetan Autonomous authorities immediately blamed the Dalai Lama. Even Premier Wen Jiabao accused the Tibetan Leader to have masterminded the violence for sabotaging the forthcoming Olympic Games. This was denied by the Dalai Lama.
An interesting collateral was a redefinition of Tibet, the map of Tibet was redrawn.

Till 2008, it was very clear that for China, ‘Tibet’ was only the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), while the Dalai Lama spoke for Cholka Sum, the three traditional provinces of U-Tsang, Kham and Amdo. For Beijing, there was absolutely no question of negotiating anything special status for ‘traditional’ Tibet; the discussion between the Dalai Lama’s representative and the Chinese were restricted to the TAR.
After March/April 2008, a tremendous change occurred: the map of Tibet was changed. Suddenly all the Tibetan inhabited areas were included in Tibet, not only by Dharamsala but by Beijing too.

The changes were even incorporated in the Chinese official website (chinatibetonline.com)

Similarly after the Drugchu mudslide, while the Chinese (and even the Western) medias first mentioned the tragedy as having happened in ‘Western China’, later, it was shown as “Tibetan-inhabited areas”.

Change of Definition of Tibet
It was a tremendous change for the definition of the Tibet issue. The same thing occurred in the case of the huge earthquake in Jyekudo; the media first reported that it touched ‘Western China’ and later it was designated as part of “Tibetan inhabited areas”.
External events (2008 unrest, mudslide, earthquake, etc.) forced Beijing to reconsider the Tibet geographical definition: a feat that several rounds of negotiations have never succeeded to achieve.
This is quite remarkable and the words of the Dalai Lama of 1986, that the change will not come through the efforts of the exiled-community, but through changes in China, resounded in my mind.
Interestingly, though after the TAR was formed in 1965, the Tibetan leadership often raised the question of ‘reunifying’ Tibet, it was never accepted by Beijing. In 2008, it became a fact, accepted by even the Chinese media; the development plans were also altered.
And the Fifth Tibet Work Forum in January 2011 for the first time included all the Tibetan-inhabited areas of the plateau in its projections and programs.

Self-Immolation
Another important shift in the annals of the Tibetan issue is the Dalai Lama’s ‘retirement’ from his political activities in March 2011. This was subsequently enshrined in the Charter (Tibetan Constitution in Exile) after a General Meeting of the Tibetans in exile in May 2011.

Practically in parallel, another shift started: the Tibetan movement moved from Dharamsala, the seat of the Dalai Lama in India to Tibet.
It manifested through a series of immolations which began around March/April 2011 in Kirti Monastery in Eastern Tibet. The world media coverage of the Tibetan issue also shifted from Dharamsala to Eastern Tibet.
Let us look at the phenomena: most of the people who committed the ultimate self-sacrifice were very young; they were not even born during the 1959 Uprising, the Martial Law in Tibet (1988-89), or the 1989 Tiananmen Incident. For the Tibetan movement, it is a very new phenomenon led by very young people. It will probably continue during the next months or years. It will put a tremendous pressure on Beijing and badly dent China’s image. New repressive measures imposed by the Communist leadership may give rise to more self-immolations in Tibet rather than stopping the process, thereby entering in a vicious circle.
Let us examine some statistics

• 35 Tibetans have been confirmed to have self-immolated since February 27, 2009
• 30 men, 5 women
• 25 of the 35 are known to have died following their protest
• 25 of the 35 are from Ngaba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture in Sichuan province
• One is from Chamdo prefecture in the Tibet Autonomous Region
• Five are from Tibetan Autonomous areas in Qinghai province
• Seven of the 35 were monks at Kirti monastery in Ngaba
• Eight of the 35 are former monks at Kirti monastery in Ngaba
• Two of the 35 were nuns from Mame Dechen Chokorling nunnery in Ngaba
• 34 of the self-immolations have occurred since March 16, 2011

The immolations have occurred mainly in former Amdo and Kham provinces.

The Fifth Tibet Work Forum
What has made the situation worse is the series of decisions/actions, reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution, put in place by the United Front Work Department after the 5th Tibet Work Forum held in January 2010.
It was decided to send 21,000 Han and Tibetan Party officials in teams of four to each of the TAR’s 5,453 administrative villages; they had to remain for a period of 4 years. Each team member could rotate to a new location after 12 months, but the team was assigned to the same village for at least 25 days per month.
In addition teams were sent from Lhasa to each of the seven prefectures “to oversee the prefecture’s work teams, receive the work reports and monitor the success or failure [of the program]”. The scale of the scheme was the largest since the Cultural Revolution.
It created further rancor and resentment.
The objectives of the Fifth Tibet Work Forum were five‐fold:

1. To strengthen the Party organization at the local level,
2. To promote stability by persuading villagers to join the struggle against the Dalai Lama’s splittist activities and independence plans,
3. To improve the economy of each village and create new jobs for the village youth,
4. To educate the locals to appreciate and be grateful to the motherland and the Party, and
5. To get each village to begin to more effectively carry out the plans and policies of the Party.

The Party started implementing these decisions in October 2011.
Further the United Front Department decided to promote new schemes such as the “Nine Haves Monasteries”

1. Have a poster of the four national leaders
2. Have a national PRC flag
3. Have a motorable road to the monastery
4. Have a good source of water
5. Have electricity
6. Have a broadcast TV set
7. Have (the capacity) to show films
8. Have a reading room for books
9. Have The People’s Daily and the Tibet Daily newspapers (both have Tibetan language editions)

The Party added that all expenses will be met by the TAR Government.
Another scheme: ‘The Six Ones’ was also implemented.

1. Make one friend. Each temple management official should try to be soulmates with one or several monks/nuns to understand their difficulties in life and what's going on in their mind.
2. Visit one family. Each temple management official to visit the families of one or more monks/nuns to understand what's going on in their homes.
3. Solve one problem.  To solve the most urgent, real problem facing the family of any monk/nun so as to make them feel the warmth of the party and government.
4. Build one file. Establish a file for every monk/nun to document in a detailed fashion their personal and family situation. This will aid in preparedness, understanding and management.
5. Keep clear one communication channel. Steady communications should be maintained between temple management officials and the families of monks/nuns through telephone, letters and house visits, so as to educate them to love the nation and love the religion, as well as to obey the law.
6. Develop one mechanism. To build temple management committees (with full-time officials) that temple management officials, monks/nuns and families are jointly responsible for. This is to develop a mechanism for building harmonious model temples.
7. Policies such as monks having to build a file on their dharma brothers or sisters which could “aid in preparedness, understanding and management” explain the state of despair of the monks and nuns of Eastern Tibet.

Torture Permitted
Another example can be given: a police poster threatening to punish 'criminals' appeared in different counties of Gannan Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (Gansu province). Those not following the ‘directives’ were promised violent beating and torture.
Here is the content of the poster written in Tibetan:

The following directives have been authorized by the Security Department (PSB). All the following actions will be met with violent beating/torture by the PSB:

1. The disturbance of relations between ethnic groups, public agitation between ethnic groups, the destruction of national unity.
2. The corruption of the public with ideas of the splitting of the nation, through speech and the distribution of written information, cartoons, home-made materials, videos, etc —.all acts destructive to social discipline and stability.
3. The membership, promotion of, or the making of donations to illegal organizations — all of which harm national security and destabilize society.
4. The incitement of the public to illegal activities through websites, e-mails and audio files, all acts destructive to ethnic unity through websites and sms texts, and other major criminal actions against the security of society
5. The engagement in criminal activities such as grievous bodily harm, destruction of property, arson and looting, etc, and the coercion of others into criminal acts that damage the security of society.

Further informers/denunciators were promised a hefty reward: “Any member of the public who informs the police about the above criminal acts or gives the police information about the perpetrators will be guaranteed personal protection by PSB officers, personal confidentiality, and a reward of 5,000 Chinese Yuan.”
It should be noted that like in the 1950’s, it is in Eastern Tibet that the most repressive measures are first implemented.


Abolishing ‘Special Privileges’ for Minorities
To make things worse, an article written by Zhu Weiqun, the Deputy Director of CCP's United Front Work Department in The Study Times (Xuexi Shibao) raises the possibility of abolishing special privileges and preferential policies offered to minority nationalities, taking the nationality name off all IDs cards and passports and removing nationality names from provinces.
Zhu, who is the interlocutor of the Dalai Lama's Envoys in the Beijing-Dharamsala negotiations, argues that China must change some aspects of its present political and educational system in order to achieve 'national cohesion'. Fortunately, this issue was not taken up during the last National People’s Congress, too busy with L’Affaire Bo.

A New Shift?

The death of 26-year-old Jampel Yeshi may be the latest shift in the Tibetan issue. Yeshi, the 26-year-old Tibetan youngster who immolated himself on March 26 in New Delhi during a demonstration against Chinese President Hu Jintao's presence at the BRICS Summit has become 'Pawo' Jampel Yeshi, a hero.
He was given a 'national' funeral in Dharamsala, the seat of the Central Tibetan Administration.
The picture of the young native of Tawu from the Kham province of eastern Tibet splashed on the front pages of hundreds of publications around the world.
The function was held on the Tiananmen of Dharamsala, in front of the Central Cathedral in Dharamsala where all important ceremonies, such the Dalai Lama’s addresses to the Tibetan people or the oath taking of a new Kalon Tripa (Chairman of the Council of Ministers) are held.
As khatas (Tibetan ceremonial scarves) were placed on Yeshi's coffin, with the Tibetan national anthem resounding in the hill town over the Kangra Valley, Dhondup Lhadar, vice president of the Tibetan Youth Congress which spearheaded the demonstration against President Hu in Delhi, spoke emotionally of the young martyr's last days.
This was a first: the Tibetan Youth Congress presiding over a function in the central place of power of the Tibetan capital-in-exile.
Has the Tibetan Youth Congress taken the lead in the Tibetan movement? Since he retired last year, the Dalai Lama does not actively participate in the political life of the exiles, for example, he has hardly commented on the self-immolations. And though Yeshi's funeral was less than a furlong away from his residence, he did not participate. This could be a real shift.

Some conclusions

The resentment of the Tibetan populations which was witnessed by the first fact-finding delegations in 1979-80 in Tibet is still present, even stronger today. It is mainly due to the senseless repressive policies of the Chinese government or at least a clique in the Government which believes that repression will solve all the problems.
The novelty is that it is a new generation of Tibetans, the third one, today revolts against the Chinese occupation. This has serious implications for the regime in Beijing which has always thought that it could ‘liberate’ Tibet by giving a few freebies.
It has not been the case, and it will not be so in the coming years.

Wake Up India

My article Wake Up India appeared in Mail Today

It is rather unusual to wish your countrymen (and your neighbours) with a War Cry. It is what Xi Jinping, the Chairman of China’s Central Military Commission (CMC) and Chinese President, did.
On January 4, during a CMC meeting, Xi ordered the Chinese armed forces to enhance their combat readiness and be prepared for war.
Xi urged the armed forces to resolutely safeguard China’s national sovereignty and withstand complex situations and severe struggles: “The world is facing a period of major changes never seen in a century," he asserted while speaking of the various risks and challenges facing China.
The Chinese Armed Forces are expected to speed up their preparation in view of a series of landmark anniversaries in 2019, particularly the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic; the 1989 massacre of Tiananmen Square will, of course, be omitted from the ‘celebrations’.
Four days later, the Chinese State-owned Global Times reported that some units of the People's Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF) stationed in Tibet have been equipped with a new vehicle-mounted howitzer to boost China's combat capability and improve border security.

China's arm race
The mouthpiece of the Communist Party referred to the new system as ‘PLC-181’, claiming that it had already been deployed by an artillery brigade in Tibet during the 73-day-long stand-off in Doklam in 2017.
At the same time, Xinhua reported that some 2 million personnel had been involved in more than 18,000 mostly small-scale exercises in 2018. The report did not offer a comparison for 2017, but state media reported earlier that the PLA conducted roughly 100 larger-scale exercises in 2016.
Apart from that, China has been active for months in boosting its border defence with India; one can cite a few examples: construction of Xiaogang (‘moderately well-off’) model villages in Tibet on the Indian border; rapid development of infrastructure on the plateau (in particular three new airports in Lhuntse, Purang and Tingri); new drones to boost border control; the new-generation Type 15 lightweight battle tanks, which are much swifter and have better mobility than other armoured vehicles that can easily be deployed in Tibet in the event of a conflict with India.
At the Airshow China 2018 in Zhuhai, a new laser weapon system was displayed. According to The Global Times quoting military analysts, it could “effectively contain tactical reconnaissance and prevent terror attacks and can be easily deployed on level ground like in Tibet and islands of the South China Sea.”
The LW-30 laser defense weapon system could use a directional-emission high-energy laser to quickly intercept many kinds of aerial targets, such as photoelectric guidance equipment, drones, guided bombs or mortars.
Another article spoke of troops equipped with futuristic individual combat weapons like grenade-launching assault rifles, corner shot pistols and knife guns; it is said that the PLA special forces were building ‘Super Soldiers’ able to meet the requirements of a ‘digital’ modern warfare.
Already in August 2018, photos of China-developed Z-20 utility helicopters trended on Chinese online military forums; it is to replace the imported UH-60 Blackhawk and will be deployed in Tibet.
Many more such examples could be cited.
All this shows that China is working hard to be ready to face any contingency.

The 'BRO' Code
India needs to take necessary counter-measures to boost the preparedness of its forces along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
The tragedy is that in the present set-up, politicians are more interested by petty electoral gains than national interests.
The pace of development on the Indian side of the border is painfully slow.
The Minister of State for Home Affairs, Kiren Rijiju stated in the Lok Sabha that 73 roads had been identified as strategic Indo-China Border roads (ICBRs) with a total length 3812 km, out of which 61 ICBRs with a length of 3417 km have been entrusted to Border Roads Organisation (BRO). Out of the 61 ICBRs, only 28 roads (981 km) have been completed.
In Arunachal Pradesh alone, 11 roads (1110 km) have been identified as priority; though the government says that connectivity has been achieved for several roads, in practical terms many are not motorable as yet.
The quasi monopoly of the BRO is a serious problem. Can the government be bold enough to bring in private players on a big scale in ‘national interests’, before the elections. It is doubtful.
The main reasons given by the Minister for the slow pace are: “delay in obtaining Forest/Wildlife clearances, hard rock stretches, limited working season, difficulties in availability of construction materials, delay in land acquisition, natural calamities and strategic security consideration.”

Soft Weapons
Being ruled in a totalitarian manner, the Middle Kingdom, does not have the ‘political’ and bureaucratic compulsions facing a democracy.
Developing the border infrastructure (roads, advanced landing grounds, communications) more vigorously than presently, should be India’s first priority for 2019; it is the only chance to ‘dissuade’ China.
Another ‘weapon’, a soft one, needs to be mentioned; for the first time in 2018, the number of Chinese tourists in Tibet exceeded 30 million, up 31.5 percent from the previous year. The TAR government hopes to receive 40 million visitors in 2019. What does it mean for India? It will translate into a change of the demography of the plateau and trigger an exponential growth of dual-use (civil and military) infrastructure; not only in the big urban centers such as Lhasa, but in the smallest hamlets on the India border too.
This is a dreadful time bomb ticking louder and louder.
Apart from the infrastructure development, the acquisition of the Rafale aircrafts (and their arrival at Hasimara Air Force Station in Bengal) could be a game changer …if the Opposition lets it happened. In the meantime, Beijing greatly enjoys watching the debates in the Indian Parliament.

Dalai Lama, China and the homecoming urge

My article Dalai Lama, China and the homecoming urge appeared in the Edit Page of The Pioneer

Here is the link...

It has been a lifetime wish for the Lama to visit Wutaishan. But he must follow his own saying: Look at situations from all angles. It is unwise for him to go on pilgrimage in China right now

At the end of 2017, Prof Samdhong Rinpoche, former Chairman of the Central Tibetan Administration in Dharamsala and now, the Dalai Lama’s Special Envoy, went to China to ‘negotiate’ an eventual visit of the Tibetan leader to Wutaishan in Shanxi Province of northern China.
Mount Wutai is said to be one of the four sacred mountains in Buddhism. Each of the mountains is viewed as the abode of one of the four great bodhisattvas. Wutai is the home of Manjusri, the Bodhisattva of wisdom.
Since decades, the Dalai Lama has expressed the wish to visit Wutaishan in his lifetime. While in China, Samdhong Rinpoche is said to have met senior officials of the United Front Work Department in Kunming and Wutaishan to discuss the proposed visit, which would exclude Tibet, as Beijing does not want to see the Dalai Lama returning to his native land, where he is immensely popular.
Beijing believes that China could benefit from the visit by extracting a ‘statement’ from the Dalai Lama. But can the Tibetan leader ‘admit’ to Tibet always ‘belonging’ to China?
In his Five-Point Peace Plan speech in Washington DC in 1987, which heralded his Middle Way approach, the Dalai Lama stated: “The real issue …is China’s illegal occupation of Tibet, which has given it direct access to the Indian sub-continent. The Chinese authorities have attempted to confuse the issue by claiming that Tibet has always been a part of China. This is untrue. Tibet was a fully independent State when the People’s Liberation Army invaded the country in 1949/50.”
The Dalai Lama knows history can’t (and shouldn’t) be changed. In 1987, the Lama stated: “China’s aggression, condemned by virtually all nations of the free world, was a flagrant violation of international law. …China’s military occupation of Tibet continues.”
The recent secret, though formal, contacts between Beijing and Dharamsala, could make the public believe that there was a relaxation of the Chinese position. It is not the case.
On February 11, The Global Times reported: “The public security bureau (PSB) in Southwest China’s Tibet Autonomous Region has released details on how the public can provide tips on activities of criminal gangs connected to the separatist forces of the Dalai Lama.”
Practically, it means that the Tibetans, who worship, or even simply respect, the Dalai Lama could now be termed criminals?
The mouthpiece of the Party continued: “[the circular] warns local people to be on the lookout for the ‘evil forces’ of the Dalai Lama that might use local temples and religious control to confuse and incite people against the Party and Government.”
The circular asked people to report on the activities of ‘foreign hostile forces’. Interestingly, a few weeks ago, Beijing announced the nomination of three Han cadres in the 20-member Tibet delegation to the National People’s Congress (NPC).
One of the delegates is Zhao Kezhi, the Minister of Public Security, responsible for the dreaded PSBs; he will ‘represent’ Tibet at the NPC. Probably wanting to show the leadership his efficiency, Zhao acted fast; the PSB’s circular said: “Criminal gangs are cancers on the healthy economic and social development, and gangsters are a chronic disease that severely disgusts the public”.
It listed 22 illegal activities to be reported to the PSB; three of them mention the ‘Dalai’s clique’: “The Dalai Lama has been in exile for decades but still holds the ambition to split China’s Tibet from the Chinese territory.”

Mt Wutai in China

Dai, a professor at Public Security University of China told The Global Times: “Collusion with criminal gangs is a tactic the Dalai group uses to spreading its message of separatism. These kinds of gangsters were involved in the Lhasa rebellion in the 1950s and the violent incident in 2008 in Tibet.”
Dai added “the spread of separatist gangs in Tibet is rampant. Only a campaign against the ‘gangsters’ would deter secessionist activities by the Dalai.”
Wang Xiaobin, a Chinese scholar at the Beijing-based China Tibetology Research Center, explained that the primary task for Tibet is “to maintain national and ethnic unity”. He cited a few groups in China “closely connected with the Dalai group…The Dalai group always interferes in national affairs by controlling temples, including lamas and living Buddhas, and by spreading a kind of ‘middle way’ to the world.”
Xinhua had earlier reported that the campaign would involve targeting “protective umbrellas of gang crime — the officials who shelter the criminals.”
This explains another Han nomination in the NPC’s Tibet delegation, Jing Hanchao, who is currently Vice-President of the Supreme People’s Court. Jing will make sure that the ‘criminals’ caught in the nets of Zhao Kezhi are heavily sentenced.
All this comes at a time when Beijing has just introduced sophisticated facial recognition softwares on the plateau. The circular promised that the PSB informers’ identity and safety will be protected: “The targets are gangsters who threaten political stability and infiltrate politics, or encourage the public to go against the Party.”
Beijing has also taken the campaign against the Dalai Lama internationally; there too it has been ferocious.
On February 8, The People’s Daily Online titled: ‘Mercedes-Benz: Don’t dare challenge China’s core interest’ while announcing that the German car company had apologised for quoting the Dalai Lama ‘in an extremely wrong message’. What did Mercedes-Benz do so wrong?
Next to one of its luxury cars, the German firm had quoted the Dalai Lama: “Look at situations from all angles, and you will become more open.”
You may think that it is a nice quote, but Beijing is not amused: “The post not only hurt the feelings of the Chinese people, but also challenged their bottom line on national sovereignty.”
The challenge is clear: If the firm, which sold 600,000 new cars in China in 2017, wants to continue to do business in the Middle Kingdom, it has to follow the paranoid regime’s diktats. The same misadventure had recently happened to the US hotel chain Marriott, who had to profusely apologise for wrongly marking Tibet and Taiwan as independent countries.
President Xi Jinping would have said in 2015 that foreign interference in China’s domestic affairs is intolerable: “Country, enterprise, or individual should not challenge the core interests of China, and [have] any activity to split China.”
Even after due apology by Mercedes-Benz, the Chinese newspaper said that “the apology lacks sincerity and reflects the German carmaker’s lack of understanding of Chinese culture and values. China’s core interests cannot be challenged.”
The paper even compared the Dalai Lama to Hitler: “How will the German people react if a foreign enterprise speaks highly of Adolf Hitler.”
It seems definitely unwise for the Dalai Lama, considered by Beijing as the ‘head of the gangsters’, to go on pilgrimage in China right now. Let us hope that the spiritual leader will not accept the diktats of the bully regime in Beijing.

New infrastructure developments in Tibet

Lhasa-Lhoka Express Highway
Yesterday the Lhasa-Nyingchi (or Nyingtri in Tibetan) High Grade Highway was opened for trial operations.
Quoting from the TAR’s transportation department, Kangba TV reported: “except Songduo Tunnel and Milashan Tunnel, Lhasa-Nyingchi High Grade Highway has been well prepared and begins trial operation from October 1.”
The four-lane Lhasa-Nyingchi High Grade Highway is 398 km long; it is designed for a 80 km/h speeed.
According to the Chinese media: “The operation of Lhasa-Nyingchi High Grade Highway shortens the travel time between Lhasa and Nyingchi from 10 hours to four hours, which can greatly improve the traffic condition of the golden tour line as well as boost local economy development.”
The train on the same route should follow in a couple of years.

The Rongme Ngatra tunnel
Another project, termed as the world's highest highway tunnel, was also recently opened to traffic.
The China Daily wrote: “The Que'ershan Tunnel, stretching 12.997 kilometers on National Highway No.317, in Ganzi, Sichuan province, opens to traffic on September 26, 2017. It is said to be the world's highest tunnel on a highway. The tunnel, whose highest point is 4,378 meters above sea level, was completed 15 years after the launch of the project.”
Que'ershan  is the Chinese name for the Rongme Ngatra is the highest peak of the Chola Mountains in the Kham region (today’s Sichuan).
According to the press release: “With the opening of the tunnel, it takes only 10 minutes to pass through the perilous and steep Que'ershan Mountain that stands 6,168 meters above the sea level. The project is projected to become a new impetus to help drive the economic and social development of the remote Tibetan region.”
The project is part of a highway (NH 317) between Nagchu and Chengdu.
Chengdu, Sichuan via Garzi (756 km), Dege (960), Jomda (1070), Chamdo (1298), Riwoche (1403) Dengchen (1546) Bachen (1782), Sog (1812) and Nagchu (2043).

The Tibet-Nepal Road
On August 29, 2017, the Kyirong-Nepal border post was reopened for foreign travelers.
The Middle East North Africa Financial Network reports: “It not only saves the expensive flight cost but also offers a superb overland landscape along the driving trip.”
Located in the Kyirong County, Shigatse, Kyirong border post is a vital landport between Tibet and Nepal.
Kyirong border is located 85 km away from Nepal's capital Kathmandu; from China-Nepal highway section, Kyirong docking distance is only about 30 km.
Interesting, the article mention that it is the terminus of the National Highway 216 (Xinjiang-Tibet Highway second line). I mentioned earlier about this extremely important development ('A new road between Tibet and Xinjiang').

The website gives the historic background of Kyirong border post:

1. In 789 AD, according to legend, when Nepal's Princess Bhrukuti married the Tibetan King Songtsan, she followed the trekking route to Tibet via Kyirong Border. Kyirong border was the main channel of the political and cultural communication between China and Nepal, but also the traditional border trade market. Tibetan people main export sheep to Nepal.
2. In 1972, China's State Council has approved Kyirong Border become a national second-class land port and set up the departments such as customs and commodity inspection department. But trade market and the departments in Kyirong Border were closed later because of the prosperity of Zhangmu port.
3. In 1987, China's State Council has approved Kyirong Border for the national first-class land port. Except for barter transactions, Nepalese currency, and RMB is also as a means of payment.
4. In 2014, China government decided to expand the opening in Kyirong Border.
5. However, in 2015, the road to the Kyirong border has been severely damaged by the heavy earthquake in Nepal. Therefore, the Kyirong border was closed for foreign travelers. Besides, in June 2016, heavy monsoon rains along the Kyirong border caused severe damage to the roads.
6. On August 29, 2017, Kyirong border in Tibet was reopened for foreign travelers.

In April 2017, I posted this article, also on the infrastructure

Bridge over the Tsangpo

Last week, Xinhua announced the construction of a new 'scientific' observation station in Metok, north of Upper Siang district of Arunachal Pradesh: “The Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) will build a new observation station in Tibet, to assist research and monitoring of the ecological system in the southeast of the Autonomous Region,” said an official release.
The station is located in Deshing village of Metok County, north of the McMahon Line.
It will cover 2,600 square meters and will be completed by October 2017.
Zhu Liping, a researcher with Qinghai-Tibet Plateau Research Institute (under the CAS) explained: “Rich in bio-diversity, Metok plays a special role in the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau ecosystem."
It is also one of the most strategic places on the plateau.
Officially, it will be not only used for observing vegetation, glaciers, lakes and atmosphere, but also researching and monitoring bio-diversity and its impacts on climate change.
It is too close to India to believe that it will only observe wild animals and glaciers; specially when one knows that this area, the lowest part of the plateau, has very few glaciers.
The CAS also affirmed that the station is the latest of a series of observatories located in places such the Namtso lake, north of Lhasa and Mount Chomolangma (Everest).
The observatory may be watching birds, but let us not forget that any infrastructure development on the plateau has a dual use (civil and military).
It will certainly take a look at the 'birds' in Tuting Circle of Upper Siang too.

A Bridge over the Yarlung Tsangpo
Around the same time, Kangba TV announced the construction of a bridge at Mingze, (Mingtse?), near Tsetang on the way between Lhasa and Nyingtri (Nyingchi).
On March 25, the first bridge over Yarlung Tsangpo River on the Lhasa-Nyingchi Railway line was completed.
A press release said that: “as the first completed bridge among the 16 ones over Yarlung Tsangbo River, it has accumulated valuable experience for bridge construction on high altitude areas.”
It is crucial portion of the 435 km Lhasa-Nyingchi Railway which is estimated to be finished in 7 years (as it started in November 2015, the line should be completed in 2022).
The train will run at a speed of 160km/h; in 2022, it will take less than 3 hours to travel (or bring troops) from Lhasa to Nyingchi.
The 3,376 m Mingze Bridge is one of key projects of Lhasa-Nyingchi Railway. It has 105 pier bodies, out of which 44 are on the Yarlung Tsangpo.

Lhasa-Lhoka (Shannan) Express Highway
Apart from the railway line, China is building a Lhasa-Lhoka (Shannan) Express Line (Highway), also part of the Lhasa-Nyingchi Highway.
On March 6, 2017, China Tibet News published some pictures of workers on the Lhasa-Lhoka Express Line driving an engineering vehicle. The news agency commented: “At present, the Lhasa-Shannan (Lhoka) Express Line project goes well. This project started on August 26, 2016. The whole line is 47.46 kilometers with bidirectional four roadways. [It is] designed speed is 80 kilometers per hour. The project can not only bring the benefits of development to both Lhasa and Shannan [Lhoka], but also has a positive significance to improving people’s livelihood and driving the accelerated development of the whole region’s economy industry chain.”
The highway will run in parallel to the train.
Both will have dual use.

New terminal opens at Nyingchi airport
But that is not all.
Xinhua announced the second-largest airport terminal in Tibet has started its operations in Nyingchi: “The new terminal, the sixth to open in Tibet, is located at Nyingchi Mainling Airport. It covers an area of 10,300 square meters and will be able to handle 750,000 passengers and 3,000 tons of cargo throughput annually by 2020.”
It is said that it will allow the airport to open new air routes, for example to Xi'an, Shaanxi Province. This will allow to greatly increase the traffic on the existing routes to Lhasa, Guangzhou, Kunming, Chongqing and Shenzhen.
Nyingchi is located at an average elevation of 2,950 meters above sea level.
Xinhua says: “The city has attracted more visitors in recent years thanks to tourist attractions such as its peach blossom festival.”
More than three millions according to Chinese statistics.
Incidentally, the Bayi Township owned by the People’s Liberation Army and located nearly is also served by the same airport.
The Indian border will be provided a good access to the PLA …in case.

The Lhasa-Nepal Railway
The other railway line from Lhasa/Shigatse to Kyirong on the Nepal border has been delayed by the 2015 earthquake whose epicenter was near Kyirong.
The area is fast recovering and according to Xinhua the total volume of trade at the border port of Kyirong hit 3.4 billion yuan (490 million U.S. dollars) in 2016, a 4.5-fold increase year over a year.
The magnitude 8.1 earthquake on April 25, 2015 had forced the closing of Zham and Kyirong ports. In October 2015, Kyirong was reopened for trade.
Slowly, Kyirong should take over Zham’s trade function, which used to clear about 90 percent of land-borne trade between China and Nepal before the earthquake, says the official Chinese news agency.
Yin Weifeng, deputy director of the Lhasa customs indicated: “Gyirong port is expected to become a major route for trade between China and Nepal.”
Nepal seems very keen on this.

Wu Yingjie and Nepal's Prime Minister

Nepal Prime Minister visits Tibet
On March 28, Wu Yingjie, Tibet’s Party Secretary met with visiting Nepalese Prime Minister Prachanda. The chairman of the Standing Committee of the Autonomous Region People's Congress, Lobsang Gyaltsen and Che Dralha, the head of the Tibetan government were in attendance.
Wu Yingjie extended a warm welcome to Tibet to Prachanda: “The Nepalese government has always firmly adhered to the One-China policy and does not allow foreign forces to use Nepal's territory to engage in anti-China activities,” affirmed Wu.
Wu Yingjie pointed out that throughout the history, Chinese and Nepalese have been like 'lips and teeth’, like brothers.
Prachanda Prime Minister was on his way back from the annual Boao Forum for Asia; he had later stopped over in Beijing to meet President Xi Jinping and Vice Premiers Zhang Gaoli and Wang Yang. “The visit has achieved fruitful results”, according to Xinhua.
During his encounter with Wu, Prachanda said that Nepal highly appreciates the Chinese philosophy of fraternity, honesty, gratitude, and tolerance, and Nepal would continue to firmly adhere to the One-China policy and would not allow any forces (read Tibetan refugees) to engage in any anti-China activities in Nepalese territory.
On March 29, Prachanda returned to Nepal after spending some hours visiting the Tibetan capital.