The Importance of Yatung and Chumbi Valley

Yatung-by-night

Yatung (called Yadong by the Chinese) has been in the news recently.
One of the reasons might be the annual opening of the Nathu-la pass for trade between India and China (Yatung is also one of the routes for the Kailash-Mansarovar Yatra for Indian pilgrims).
China Tibet Online noted: “The Natho [Nathu] La Pass Trade Channel in Yadong [Yatung] County, Shigatse City, southwest China’s Tibet opened on the morning of May 1.”
Note the compulsory ‘China’s Tibet’!
Does it mean that Beijing has a doubt about the ownership of Land of Snows?
Nobody in India would think of writing ‘India’s Tamil Nadu’ or ‘India’s West Bengal’ or in the States, ‘United States’ Virginia’.
The official website, affiliated to Xinhua, informs its readers: “The Natho [Nathu] La Pass is the only land route trade pass between China and India, and it is a seasonal trade port.”
This is wrong statement as Lipulekh-la (Uttarakand) and Shipki-la (Himachal) are also opened for official trade between the two countries.
The article continues its description: “It opens each year between May and November and remains closed between December and April. While it is open, residents in the border regions of Yadong County in China and Sikkim in India can travel back and forth to conduct in normal trade activities using border residents’ certification cards.”
It adds that to monitor the “smooth operations of trade and daily border checks, civil police have already been deployed to the Yadong Border Entry and Exit Inspection Station and actively contacted joint inspection units to carry out convenient service measures.”
The border is clearly opened for traders only, not for Indian tourists (apart from the yatris who zoom through the town on their way to the base camp).
Further, we are told that the Chinese staff is taking Hindi and Nepali language classes, which is probably not the case of the Sikkimese staff (learning Chinese).

International Border Trade Festival
On May 30, China Tibet News announced that the First Yadong International Border Trade Tourism and Culture Festival was to be held from June 2 to 8: “During the festival, bonfire party, photography, calligraphy and painting exhibition, commodity fair, fitness activity, investment invitation and other activities will be held.”
Will this help promote trade?
Most certainly not, but the Chinese authorities are keen to develop Yatung as tourist spot.
The website says: “Yadong is one of the most pleasant border towns on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau. It has six kinds of comprehensive and professional natural tourism resources for tourists to choose, including historical and cultural tourism, natural ecological tourism, ethnic festival tourism, hiking adventure tourism, self-driving special tourism and border trade characteristic tourism. Besides, it is also rich in tourism resources, and its main attractions include Dromo Lhari [or Chomolhari] Snow Mountain, Natoi [Nathu] La Mountain Pass, Khambu Hot Spring, Dungkar Monastery, Kagyu Monastery, Phari Grassland, Ruins of the Customs of Qing Dynasty, Rinchengang Border Trade Market.”
The so-called occupation of the Chumbi Valley by the Manchus is a new way to rewrite history and show that these areas close to the Indian border have always belonged to China …and are part of the Silk Road, dear to Chinese President Xi Jinping.
(for the Qing Dynasty Custom House, read my Archeology and Politics).
Dungkar Gompa has historically been one of the main centers for the practice of the violently anti-Dalai Lama, Shugden cult.
The article does not mention the beautiful India House which has been destroyed by the Chinese authorities as a remnant of the Indian presence.

Nehru’s visit
When Prime Minister Nehru visited Yatung and the Chumbi Valley in September 1958, he asked to meet the Indian traders in the Yatung bazaar. There were some fifty Indian shops then.
KC Johorey, who served as Indian Trade Agent, remembers that as soon as he reached, the Prime Minister changed from riding kit and breeches into the sherwani and churidar pyjamas and put on a red rose; he then asked how far the bazaar was.
When Johorey told him a hundred yards down the hill, the Prime Minister started walking, and Nehru went down to the bazaar. The ITA had requested the Indian traders to wear a cap: “they were all with their caps on, even the panwallah.”
The Chinese were extremely upset with this unscheduled visit, but the Indians and Tibetans were delighted, they rushed towards Jawaharlal Nehru: “Somebody was touching his hands, somebody laying flat on the ground and somebody offering him flowers. The Indians were very well disciplined as they stood there.”
Colonel Lu, the local Political Commissar came and asked Johorey: “What is this? We did not have this programme, why have you come here?”
The ITA could only say: “He is my boss and your guest. You tell him; you tell him to go back as his security is your responsibility. I cannot ask Prime Minister what [he should] do or what not to do.”
Finally, Colonel Lu could not prevent the Tibetans from approaching and getting near the Prime Minister: “Some of them were crying. …Their sobbing and tears were more eloquent than any formal parlays. There was Tibetan disapproval of the Chinese at every stage.”
Sixty years ago, the Chinese were already not feeling uncomfortable with the Indian presence in the Valley.

International Border Trade Festival
The Chinese authorities have now organized a 'trade' festival. Nyigar, director general of the Culture and Tourism Bureau of Yatung County, gave a speech at the opening function; he affirmed that Yatung “has always been a passage and border town leading to South Asia. It is the last stop of the Ancient Tea Horse Road, with rich historical and cultural deposits. We will focus on creating a high-end tourism route with characteristics of the border tourism destination in Tibet, and truly build cultural tourism into the pillar industry of the county.”
Once again, it is only a one-way tourism, as the Sikkimese traders have to return at night and Indian tourists are not permitted.
China Tibet Online observed that the First Yadong International Border Trade Tourism and Culture Festival wanted to “fully display the profound historical and cultural resources, magnificent tourism resources, fast and convenient border trade channel of Yadong County, improve its popularity and influence, drive the development of border trade, invigorate the county's economy, as well as increase the income of the masses.”
What is strange that tourism does not really increase the revenue of the masses.
According to Chinese statistics, in 2018, Yatung County received 119,870 tourists (an increase of 43% compared to the previous year), but the revenue from this activity was only 33 million yuan (5.3 million US $). It does not come much by head.
Worse during, the first quarter of 2019, Yatung received 43,620 tourists and got a revenue of 4.52 million yuan (730,000 US $). Obviously, the Chinese tourists are not spending much money (yuan 100 per head).
These ridiculous low figures are a mystery; either the authorities had their figures wrong or the visitors were not tourists!

Strategic location and Xiaogang Villages
It is true that the Chumbi Valley has been the base for Doklam operations in 2017, as well as for any military development in North Sikkim (Kampa Dzong area).
It is worth watching.
At the same time, it looks as if the authorities are encouraging migrants to come in the area.
On April 29, an article in China Tibet News said that Yatung County “has insisted on the construction of well-off villages.”
I have often mentioned on this blog, the Xiaogang villages built by Beijing near the Indian borders.
The Chinese website pointed out that it was “an important starting point in implementing rural revitalization strategy.”
What means a ‘revitalization strategy’ so close from highly sensitive border.
The article further explained that the county has adapted measures “to develop local industries, so as to ensure people living and working in happiness, peace and contentment”

Apparently the construction of nine 'well-off' villages has started in the Chumbi Valley “implementing characteristic agriculture and animal husbandry projects.”
The article also noted that Yatung has set up a Communist Party's Leading Group to look after the construction of the villages and promote their overall management: “To build featured small town, it has integrated Tibetan people's traditional living habits into urban construction, separated the production areas and living areas, stepped up infrastructure construction such as water, electricity, road as well as telecommunication, and improved public service facilities including village committee, clinic and culture activity room and others to follow the construction requirements.”
All this is for the local population, for the tourists or for the People’s Liberation Army?
There is no answer right now, but it is certainly part of ‘stabilization of the border’ dear to Chairman Xi, the boss of the Central Military Commission.
Another website carried a series of photos of Yatung-by-night with the following caption: “Photo shows the Yadong County in Shigatse City, southwest China's Tibet Autonomous Region, is quiet and bright under the dazzling light after nightfall. In 2017, Yadong County became one of the five counties that got rid of poverty in the region. The county is clean and its infrastructure is complete nowadays.”
Not fully completed as the train is expected to reach Chumbi Valley in 2030.

One year after Doklam standoff: Will Bhutan increase deployment to check activities of Chinese military?

1959 Chinese map of the border

My article One year after Doklam standoff: Will Bhutan increase deployment to check activities of Chinese military? appeared in Mail Today/DailyO

China has always been jealous of India's special relation with Bhutan, which it claims as its 'vassal state'.


The Standing Committee on external affairs, headed by Shashi Tharoor, former minister of state, was recently in the news. After several hearings on the Doklam episode, some of its conclusions were leaked to the media. Of course, one could ask: Are the MPs not under oath when they get confidential briefings? But it is perhaps too much to expect from some of the people’s representatives. Remember, on June 16 last year, Indian and Chinese troops faced each other for 73 days after India decided to stop the construction of a road on Bhutanese territory, near the tri-junction between India, China and Bhutan.

Chinese military
According to PTI, though the Committee report “did not clarify whether the committee was favouring increasing the deployment of Indian troops in the region,” Delhi should encourage Thimphu to ensure a larger deployment of its soldiers in the Northern Doklam area “to check the activities of Chinese military in the sensitive region.”
The above recommendation raises the crucial issue of the relation of Bhutan and China.
In this context, it is interesting to look into the past.
In June 1955, RK Nehru was foreign secretary, when he decided to pay an official visit to Bhutan. At that time, to go to Bhutan, the easiest way was to cross through the Chumbi Valley (north of Doklam) in Tibet, before proceeding to Paro. After a stay of a few days in Yatung, the main village of the Chumbi Valley where India had an important Trade Agency, Nehru left for Bhutan on June 14; he returned on June 26 and again stayed a couple of days in Yatung.
In his report, the foreign secretary wrote: “My visit to Bhutan via Yatung had been notified to the Chinese. We were given to understand that I would receive all facilities and courtesies. I received all the facilities needed, but no special courtesies were shown.”
Why? China was simply jealous of India’s special relation with Bhutan.
Nehru mentioned that South Block had notified Beijing about his visit: “but we were aware that they claim Bhutan as their vassal state. This claim was last made in 1910, but it has never been given up.”
The question may be different today, but the fact remains that the leadership in Beijing has always thought that it was natural for Bhutan to have ‘special’ relations with China. The then foreign secretary continued: “As recently as 1948, the claim was repeated. …The Chinese position in the past has been that we [India] cannot have special relations with Bhutan without their concurrence. I presume this is still their position, though it is not being asserted openly.”
Nehru admitted: “For all these reasons, they could have refused to give transit visas, but this would have led to a conflict. The alternative was to give visas, but to take no special notice of the visit. This is what they actually did.”
It was not the first time that China was trying to play the ‘Bhutan Card’.

First meeting
In August 1950, the Indian Mission in Lhasa reported an encounter between Bhutan’s commercial agent in Lhasa and General Zhang Jingwu, Mao’s representative in Tibet, who had just arrived in Lhasa; it was the first meeting between the Chinese general and a foreign ‘diplomat’ posted in Tibet.
It was quite farcical.
The agent had to state his name, age and functions; then he was required to explain why restrictions were imposed on Tibetan traders entering Bhutan.
The agent had to explain to the tough general that his government had stationed five or six men along her frontier merely to prevent Tibetans from stealing mules from villages in Bhutan.
Let us remember that at that time, India was responsible for Bhutan’s foreign relations; China was deeply unhappy about this.
On October 1, 1950, on the first anniversary of the People’s Republic, the Chinese gave a party in Lhasa.
Zhang gave special considerations to Bhutan: “of foreign representatives Bhutan Agent received much attention and encouragement verging on patronage,” wrote Sinha, the head of the Indian Mission.
The PLA general constantly praised the Bhutanese Agent, even “styled Envoy of the Independent Asian State of Bhutan.” Sinha informed Delhi “through [the] questions put to the Agent, [it was as if] Bhutan had nothing in common with India. Bhutan was ‘coolly told’ that it would be invited to send a Mission to Peking next year.”

Diplomatic relations
The Chinese were very much aware that the Dragon Kingdom’s diplomatic relations were taken care by Delhi, but it was clearly a calculated move to put Bhutan and India on the same diplomatic level.
Even the Tibetans were quite surprised about the “new status of Bhutan Agent and the fuss made of him.” Today like yesterday, though not ‘openly asserted’, the Chinese mindset remains the same; this partially explains why Beijing decided to start building a road near the tri-junction, without informing Thimphu or Delhi.
Beijing could not think that a ‘foreign’ country (India) would intervene and stop the work.
A few weeks ago, though Thimphu does not have formal diplomatic relations with its northern neighbour, Chinese vice foreign minister Kong Xuanyou spent three days in the Dragon Kingdom. It was the first high-level visit post-Doklam.
Kong, accompanied by the Chinese ambassador to India, met Bhutan’s King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck, Prime Minister Tshering Tobgay and foreign minister Damcho Dorji; they discussed ‘matters of mutual interest’, acknowledged Bhutan. Though Bhutan kept India ‘in the loop’ about Kong’s visit, there is no doubt that the Chinese pressure on Bhutan will increase in the coming months, especially as the parliamentary elections are coming soon in Bhutan.
In these circumstances, it is unsure Bhutan will agree to increase its deployment in the Doklam area.

When the snows melt

My article When the snows melt appeared in The Mail Today and in DailyO

Here is the link...

Every year during the months of May and June, the high passes of Himalayas witness activity as the Chinese cross over and intrude on Indian territory.

The Himalayan snows will soon start melting. Every year during the months of May and June, the high passes witness activities not in consonance with the majestic peace-conducive surrounding peaks. This year again, the Chinese will cross over and intrude on the Indian territory, or to put it nicely like the spokesperson of the ministry of external affairs does, “in what we perceived our side of the border”.

Perceptions
The fact is there are today two Lines of Actual Control (LAC) on the 3,488km-long frontier: the LAC "perceived" by India and the Chinese one. It is said that there are as many as 23 spots where there are differences of "perception" from Ladakh to the east of Arunachal state; at most of these places, "transgressions" are bound to happen.
A year after the Doklam episode, is India ready to tackle the situation? China is undoubtedly prepared, far more than last year when the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) got surprised by India’s decision to defend Bhutan and not permit a road on the latter’s territory.
During the last few weeks, the Chinese media is full of the news about exercises conducted by the PLA on the Tibetan plateau. And it is not only the ground forces which are practising; the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) often joins in.
On April 10, The Global Times reported that a PLAAF brigade, belonging to the Eastern Theatre Command, “successfully hit all targets with four rocket-propelled grenades after it conducted its first live-fire drill on a plateau (read Tibet), a move hailed by experts as a significant progress on the military’s capability in cross-regional missions”.
The PLA Daily, the flagship newspaper of the Chinese forces, added: “In order to make the exercise more challenging, the unnamed brigade chose a target that was only one-tenth the size of a simulated target.” Song Zhongping, a military expert, explained to The Global Times:
“Ballistic trajectories are different on high plateaus as the air is thinner at altitude, which demands greater ability from pilots to project and adjust the firing. The oxygen deficit on plateaus is also physically challenging for pilots.”
You may say that it is just a PR exercise to impress Indian forces on the other side of the Himalayas. The Communist tabloid recently announced that the PLA “has strengthened its power and management in border defence by developing new types of equipment that can be used in all environments, including those with extremes of temperature and topography.” Though no particular border is specified, it is clearly a message to India.
The Beijing Evening News gave a long list of new gadgets to defend China’s borders: “A satellite early-warning monitoring system is planned in some border areas… difficult to enter and patrol.” It clearly points to some remote places in Arunachal Pradesh, still considered by Beijing as part of Chinese territory.

Surveillance
The newspaper also speaks of a surveillance camera network built in border regions, “the density of coverage is set to increase to cover blind spots”. Add to this, a far greater informatisation and mechanisation of an entire range of equipment to provide an early warning. The level of automation of the PLA’s equipment is also said to have greatly increased; it includes the usage drones and setting up of unmanned monitoring systems.
The Pangong Lake, located an altitude of 4,250m, which shares shores with India and Tibet is specifically mentioned; the PLA will be using new patrol boats made of non-metallic materials: “The craft has a top speed of 40km per hour and can resist ice collisions.”
And of course a BeiDou enhanced satellite navigation with a real-time communication system. As a bonus, scout vehicles have water filters, a kitchen and a toilet and… a new type of hot water bottle that can keep water hot for 24 hours.
In the meantime, PTI has reported a new incident in Arunachal Pradesh; for once, it is China that lodged a protest against the Indian Army for "transgressing" in Asaphila, a strategic border area in Upper Subansiri district.
When the Chinese raised the issue during a "Border Personnel Meeting" (BPM) on March 15, the Indian Army had to explain that the area belongs to India and it regularly carries out patrols there.

Model village
It appears that Asaphila has been specifically mentioned by the Chinese because it lies south of the village of Yume, adopted by Xi Jinping, the PLA’s Helmsman, during the 19th Congress in November 2017.
Since then, the 34-inhabitants hamlet has become a "model" village for entire China and one of the sisters, who originally received a missive from Xi, has already become a deputy to the National People’s Congress. For India, Beijing’s’ message is: “Please don’t come close to a village adopted by the Emperor!” And is India ready? Not really.
A few days ago, Lt gen PG Kamath, a former commandant of the Army War College in Mhow wrote a strongly-worded article about India’s "Hard Power Deficit": “India’s passive acceptance of China’s dominance is proof of our ‘hard power deficit’ and acceptance of a country of a tributary status to the Middle Kingdom.”
Though perhaps an exaggeration, Kamath quoted the report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence which was "a proof of our inability to stand up to China." He particularly complained about “a meagre defence budget that is inadequate even to foot the committed liabilities, let alone modernisation.” This is, unfortunately, a fact.
Will China force India to wake-up? Not sure, the elephant is always thick-skinned and slow; the dragon is definitively swifter.
It does not augur well.

Why drones are the future of warfare

Swarm attacks buy cheap drones in Syria

My article Why drones are the future of warfare appeared in Mail Today/DailyO

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There is no doubt that drones could leave the infantry jobless in a few decades from now. Does India realise this?

On January 5, something happened in Syria which will remain as a first in the history of warfare. Though it was not widely covered by the world media, it may prove to be a game changer.
The website of Global Risk Insights reported that the Russian forces stationed in Syria suffered a case of swarm attack by drones. Despite the fact that the UAVs were rather crude, it was certainly a new development.
What happened?

Russian bases
Two Russian military bases in Syria – one in Hmeymin and a logistic and supply base in Tartus – were targeted by a swarm of 13 GPS-guided drones carrying improvised explosives. While seven drones were shot down by anti-aircraft missiles, six were hacked by a cyberwarfare unit. Upon landing, three drones exploded causing extensive damage to Russian fighter planes; three others were captured intact by Russian forces.
Quoting experts, Global Risk Insights said that “despite the attack itself not necessarily being spectacular by terrorist standards, this event heralds a near future where technologies like swarm drones will be increasingly employed by violent non-state actors and terrorist organizations.”
The cost of a drone was estimated at 1000 Euros (Rs 75000).
In a recent issue consecrated to The Future of War, The Economist observed: “In the 19th century the speedy victory of the Prussian army over France in 1870 convinced European general staffs that rapid mobilisation by rail, quick-firing artillery and a focus on attack would make wars short and decisive.” In the 1930s, strategists started believing that “aerial bombardment of cities would prove devastating enough to prompt almost immediate capitulation.”
Then in 1990-91, America demonstrated during the first Gulf war what “a combination of its precision-guided munitions, new intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance methods, space-based communications and stealth technology could achieve.”
Then September 11 took place and wars ‘took a different course’.
The Economist’s report argued: “Potentially the biggest change to the way wars are fought will come from deploying lots of robots simultaneously.”
It quoted Paul Scharre, an autonomous-weapons expert at CNAS who has pioneered the concept of swarming: “collectively, swarms of robotic systems have the potential for even more dramatic, disruptive change to military operations. Swarms can bring greater mass, co-ordination, intelligence and speed.”
There is no doubt that drones could leave the infantry jobless in a few decades from now. Does India realize this?
In October 2017, The South China Morning Post mentioned “high-altitude spy drones could help China dominate ‘near space’ – a region of the Earth’s atmosphere that is at the heart of a modern-day space race.”
Near space, which starts some 20km above sea level, has always been considered a ‘death zone’ for drones: “thin air at this altitude makes it hard to generate lift, while extremely low temperatures mean electronic components like batteries are prone to fail,” explained the Hong Kong newspaper: “However, a new type of Chinese-developed drone that is undergoing testing appears to have overcome such difficulties.”
Till then, the Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk was the highest flying drone, having reached an altitude of about 19km; that was before a Chinese research facility in Inner Mongolia successfully tested an experimental drone at an altitude of 25km.

Defence technology
Two months later, according to The Drive – The War Zone, researchers from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) National University of Defense Technology (NUDT), conducted an experiment involving approximately two dozen of small fixed wing unmanned aircrafts. Citing an official PLA publication, the website said: “the test consisted of the entire group of drones acting as a swarm to complete a simulated reconnaissance mission. The individual aircraft operated together as a single entity and performed certain, unspecified portions of the flight autonomously.”
Shen Lin Cheng, the head of NUDT’s Institute of Artificial Intelligence Sciences explained: “We have precise short, medium and long term objectives, which are consistent with those set by the government on the modernization of the Chinese armed forces by 2020, 2035 and 2050.”
Already in June 2017, the state-owned China Electronics Technology Group Corporation flew some 120 unmanned fixed wing aircrafts; the entire formation acted either as one entity or in small groups breaking away with separate objectives.

US and China
The US is not left behind; in October 2016, the Department of Defense's Strategic Capabilities Office's tested with its Perdix, a miniature air-dropped unmanned aircraft.
Two months later, the US Department of Defence issued a communiqué announcing that one of the world’s largest micro-drone swarms had been successfully demonstrated at China Lake, California.
Note the name ‘China Lake’.
The test conducted consisted of 103 Perdix drones launched from three F/A-18 Super Hornets. The micro-drones demonstrated ‘advanced swarm behaviors’ such as collective decision-making, adaptive formation flying, and self-healing.
The DoD release added: “The demonstration is one of the first examples of the Pentagon using teams of small, inexpensive, autonomous systems to perform missions once achieved only by large, expensive ones.”
In the meantime, drones belonging to SF Express, China’s biggest private courier company have been drafted by the PLA Air Force in Yunnan and Shaanxi provinces, to explore new kinds of logistics support. The South China Morning Post reported: “In the Yunnan drill, a company drone delivered urgently needed spare parts for a damaged radar in a rugged mountainous area in about an hour after the request was made, less than half the time it would have taken to truck in.”
Whether it is for the State or non-State actors, the drones are here to stay and will be extensively used in future conflicts.
The question is what is India doing?
Incidentally, China has not returned the Indian drone which accidentally fell in the Chumbi Valley.

So, who has a Cold War mindset?

Chinese map of Sikkim showing the trijunction at Batang La
It is what the joint Survey of 1956 had confirmed

My article So, who has a Cold War mindset? appeared on Thursday in the Edit Page of The Pioneer

Here is the link...

It is ironical that while it is the Middle Kingdom which is getting ready for another stand-off, it loudly objects to New Delhi protecting its side of the border

China has difficulties to digest the Doklam episode for which Beijing (or at least the People's Liberation Army) was fully responsible. Senior Colonel Wu Qian, spokesperson of the Ministry of Nation Defense (MND), in his regular monthly Press conference spoke in a derogatory manner: “I have noticed many China-related remarks made by this Indian general lately.” ‘This general’ is the Chief of Army Staff, General Bipin Rawat, who had just said India needed to shift its focus to the northern border. A logical and normal statement after last year’s confrontation at the tri-junction between Sikkim, Tibet and Bhutan?
Col Wu continued: “I would like to stress that Donglang [Doklam] is China’s territory and the remarks from the Indian side also shows that illegal border crossing of the Indian troops is a clear fact. We hope that the Indian side will draw lessons from the incident.”He also spoke of India’s ‘Cold War mentality’.
A look at the facts: In 2012, the Governments of India and China had reached an agreement that the location of the tri-junction would be finalised in consultation with the concerned countries. On June 30, 2017, the Ministry of External Affairs issued a statement: “Any attempt, therefore, to unilaterally determine tri-junction points is in violation of this understanding.” The finalisation of the boundary was to take place during the Special Representatives’ talks.
In June-July 1956, a tour of the Sikkim-Bhutan-Tibet frontier from the tri-junction area was conducted by the Ministry of External Affairs, the Survey of India, along with Bhutanese officials. The location of the boundary was reconfirmed on the watershed principle, but also on the basis of the reports of the local inhabitants: “The Bhutan-Tibet frontier starts in the vicinity of Batang La and runs along the La Hen Chum ridge via Sinchu La and then along the Amo Chu upto Chilim Chon.” The description continues till the Chomo Lhari, in North-West Bhutan.
Interestingly, the factors which weighed in favour of the confirmation of this boundary were, firstly, “[in] the west of Amo Chu, the published Chinese maps themselves appeared to include the Doklam pastures (south of Batang La and Sinchu La line) in Bhutan; and secondly, the east of Amo Chu, the Bhutanese had strong claims over the pastures of the Langmarpo valley (south of Tendji ridge).”
Why did China need to suddenly change the status quo and start building a road on the Bhutanese territory?
It was apparently the initiative of a Chinese General, with the knowledge of President Xi Jinping (who was probably not briefed on the details of the operation and its implications).
In an informed piece, The Indian Express recently questioned: “Who in the Chinese hierarchy ordered the extension of the track in Dolam from the point it had been constructed up to in 2003, to the Jampheri ridge?”
According to the newspaper, the road construction was ordered by General Zhao Zongqi, commander of the Western Theatre Command facing India; Zhao had, for two decades, served in Tibet.
The Indian Express said: “Even before the face-off in Doklam, Chinese border troops had been telling Indian soldiers in daily interactions at multiple points on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) that General Zhao had walked each of these tracks with military patrols over 20 years, and had been rarely confronted by the Indians. As the Indian deployment has increased over the past decade, General Zhao is unwilling to accept the challenge to Chinese claims. Not only in Doklam, but also at other places on the LAC.”
It might partly be speculation, but there is no doubt today about the involvement of General Zhao, who probably had forgotten to read the agreement arrived at by the Indian and Chinese diplomats in 2012 about the status quo at the tri-junction. Amongst other things, it shows that China does not always speak with one voice.
While the PLA talks of a Cold War mindset, pointing a finger at India, China is not ready to restart the usual Border Personnel Meetings (BPM) along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Only two BPMs took place on the occasion of the Republic Day, both in Ladakh region (in DBO and Chushul area). Why was no BPM held in Bumla, Kibithu in Arunachal and Nathu-la in Sikkim?
Why has the Indian drone, which accidentally fell in the Chumbi Valley, not yet been returned? Why has information on the flow of the Sutlej and Pareechu rivers in Himachal and the Yarlung Tsangpo/Brahmaputra still not been shared with India?
The Central Water Commission recently raised serious concerns over the Pareechu and even sought the Ministry of External Affair’s help: “We wrote to the Ministry. China stopped sharing information about the tributary’s flow last year. They said that the water monitoring site across the border is damaged,” AK Gupta, the Commission’s regional director told The Hindustan Times.
On New Year’s Eve, President Xi Jinping delivered an 11-minute televised speech to extend his greetings to all Chinese and… friends all over the world. Xi said that Beijing is dedicated to safeguarding peace. “China will act as a builder of world peace, a contributor to global development and an upholder of the international order.”
Will this translate in peace on the border in 2018? Probably not! Soon after, the PLA intruded in Tuting sector of the Siang Valley of Arunachal Pradesh. The irony is that while China itself is getting ready for another standoff, Beijing loudly objects to Delhi protecting its side of the border.
The China Daily recently reported: “Investment in infrastructure in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) is helping to lift 628 villages along the border out of poverty.” The Chinese newspaper further asserted: “After getting access to electricity and the construction of new roads, tea farmers and herdsmen in a village some 200 kilometres southwest of Lhasa in Tsona county founded a cooperative that provides skill training and job opportunities for villagers.”
Lepo, the first Tibetan village north on the McMahon Line in the Tawang sector, is said to have received several thousands of visitors last year and to have adequate lodging facilities.
China also admitted: “Starting last year, more than 100 million yuan (Rs 99.4 crore) has been invested in infrastructure in villages of less than 100 families as a part of a broader construction project to build model villages in the border area.”
There are many such examples on the Tibetan side of the McMahon Line.
In the meantime, it is refreshing that the new Indian Ambassador in China, Gautam Bambawale told The Global Times: Our interaction must be based on equality and mutual benefit. Also, in the India-China border areas, especially at some sensitive points, it is important not to change the status quo. We need to be clear about this.”
It is indeed China which did not respect its engagements. Year 2018 may not be serene despite the peaceful vows of President Xi.

Rules of play: Avoid unnecessary reactions

My article Rules of play: Avoid unnecessary reactions appeared on Thursday in the Edit Page of The Pioneer

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Post the Doklam stand-off, one may think that a new page in Sino-Indian relations has been turned. But unless China drops ‘unrealistic' claims on the boundary, no progress can be made

The next round of border talks between India and China is expected to be held in Delhi next month. Other bilateral issues may also be discussed when the Special Representatives, Ajit Doval, the National Security Advisor meets the Chinese State Councillor Yang Jiechi. Doval will probably first congratulate Yang, who has recently been promoted to the Chinese Communist Party’s Politburo. It will be the first encounter between the two countries after President Xi Jinping’s election for a second term and the 20th round of border talks, four months after the end of the 73-day long Doklam stand-off at the trijunction between Sikkim, Tibet and Bhutan.
While the Indian Press has been restrained about the forthcoming talks, it has not always been the case for China. The sharp tongue of Hua Chunying, one of the spokespersons of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, did not help smoothen passions during the Doklam episode. One still remembers the bad names she gave to Doval, Union Finance Minister Arun Jaitley, the then Defence Minister or the Army Chief.
Though some commentators are ‘cooler’, it is not the case for all. Qian Feng, an expert at the Chinese Association for South Asian Studies told The Global Times: “The talks, coming months after the stand-off, will put managing a crisis on the top agenda as future disputes remain possible, and both sides need to manage the disputes and avoid confrontation.”
One may think that a new page in the Sino-Indian relations is turned but some Chinese ‘experts’ remain extremely aggressive. The same Chinese tabloid quoted Hu Zhiyong of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences’ Institute of International Relations; he said: “India should also be more realistic and show more sincerity in maintaining the fragile ties that returned to normal after the BRICS Summit in September. …If India refuses to make a deal on the issues and continues to send senior officials to the disputed border, the talks will not yield tangible results.”
What does ‘realistic’ mean? To accept China’s stand on the tri-junction in the Doklam area or in Ladakh? The tabloid specifically mentioned Arunachal Pradesh: “Indian Defense Minister Nirmala Sitharaman visited the South Tibet area (which India calls Arunachal Pradesh) to inspect defense preparedness.”
Unless China drops these ‘unrealistic’ claims on the boundary, no progress can be made. The question is: Why create an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion before the talks start. Probably, China is not interested to see any progress in the border talks. Further having disowned the 2012 agreement that the status quo at the tri-junction should be maintained till a solution is agreed between Bhutan, India and China, Beijing feels that the best form of defense is aggression.
About her visit to some border posts in Arunachal Pradesh, Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman rightly (and politely) said the North-Eastern State is Indian territory and the country is not concerned about someone else’s opinion on it. China had objected to Sitharaman’s first visit to the border state, saying her tour of the ‘disputed area’ was not conducive to peace in the region.
“What is the problem? There is no problem. It is our territory, we will go there,” Sitharam told a media person.
Another unnecessary reaction of the Chinese media: After The Economic Times reported that India plans to construct 17 highway tunnels totaling 100 kilometers along the line of actual control, The Global Times bitterly complained. The party mouthpiece quoted Xie Chao, an ‘expert’ at Tsinghua University’s Department of International Relations, who said that “boosting border infrastructure has been Indian’s consistent policy.” A poor joke, when one knows the reality.
Another ‘expert’, Zhao Gancheng, director of the Center for Asia-Pacific Studies at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies stated that “the tunnel building along the border is a further fermentation after the Doklam stand-off.”  He reiterated China’s baloney stand: “On June 18, Indian troops illegally crossed the border and trespassed into Chinese territory in Doklam.”
Fermentation or not, India is decades behind China in the field of border infrastructure, but Zhao dared to criticise India in The Global Times: “Although some Indian senior officials made a friendly gesture toward China after the stand-off, India has pursued its previous policy along the border — developing infrastructure as well as troop mobility.”
The communist mouthpiece commented; “The Indian Government is playing two cards over the border issue, the situation of which will be a ‘new normal’ for the China-India border.” Xie Chao warned: “It is the Chinese Government’s responsibility to safeguard border safety and China won’t take the initiative to seek military force to tackle border problems. But a balanced force along the border will make China cope with the tensions.”
Is it not double standards? While India is far behind China which develops infrastructure at a swift pace, the slightest improvement on the Indian side is condemned by Beijing and its ‘experts’ as an aggressive move. All this was before the ‘Quads’ meet on the side of the Asean meet in Manila. Officials from the US, India, Australia and Japan met, raising the possibility of a bloc to counter-balance China’s fast-paced strategic expansion.
It might be an occasion for the Chinese spokespersons and ‘experts’ to complain, with a reason. Already a week earlier, Hu Zhiyong had said to The Global Times: “The US and Japan are stepping up their efforts to cozy up to India as a balance to China, which gives India more ‘confidence’ to play tricks behind China’s back on the border issue.”
Hu further asserted: “However, the US is merely fooling India and its real intention is to increase weapons sales to the country, and India should be more realistic in that China will not lose if a military conflict erupts after another border dispute.”
Now, Beijing has something concrete to whine about. The South China Morning Post gave the background: “The idea of the quadrilateral security initiative of ‘like-minded’ democracies was first raised by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2007, but wary of their relations with China, India and Australia hesitated to take part initially.”
The Hong Kong newspaper added: “Analysts said the Quad meeting was not a coincidence given that Trump appeared keen to promote his Indo-Pacific concept as the cornerstone of his Asia strategy and worked hard to strengthen ties with its allies and partners, including India and Vietnam, to counterbalance China.”
Immediately, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang reacted saying that regional cooperation should neither be politicised nor exclusionary. During his meeting with Prime Minister Modi, President Trump also mentioned regional security and he pledged to boost bilateral trade and security ties. Modi would have told Trump that India-US ties were becoming broader and deeper. “You too can feel that India-US ties can work together beyond the interest of India, for the future of Asia and for the welfare of the humanity in the world.”

The Indian government might well be asking, 'what will China do next?'

My article The Indian government might well be asking, 'what will China do next?' appeared in Mail Today/Daily Mail (UK).

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Post-Doklam, many observers, whether in the defence services or government circles, have been thinking “what could China do next to put India’s in its place.”
Of course, Luo Zhaohu, the Chinese Ambassador in India, spoke of ‘turning the page to a new chapter’. Can India believe him?
In an oped in a national newspaper, Luo says that the outcome of the August BRICS Summit in Xiamen (China) went beyond his expectations: “An important consensus has been reached to enhance mutual trust, focus on cooperation, and manage differences.” Luo even quotes the Chinese President: ‘the dragon and elephant should dance together’.
Mr Luo is lucky that the Indian media is Alzheimerish and has already forgotten the nasty words used by Chinese officials against Indian leaders during the Doklam episode, because Delhi did not allow mighty China to build a road on Bhutan’s territory.

Chinese woman
 Incidentally, how could Beijing have engaged in this misadventure without a sort of ‘clearance’ from its man on the spot (in India)?
On its part, China has not forgotten the standoff on the ridge near the trijunction; while the Ambassador speaks of ‘turning a page’, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) cancelled the ceremonial border personnel meetings (BPM) to mark China's National Day on October 1.
Several times every year, the PLA and the Indian Army meet at five designated Border Personnel Meeting (BPM) points along the 3,488-km long Line of Actual Control (LAC); in Ladakh (Chushul and DBO), in Arunachal (Bumla and Kibithoo) and in Nathu-la in Sikkim.
Local commanders (usually the brigade commanders) meet their Chinese counterparts to sort out differences on local issues, but also to get know each other. This is an excellent confidence building measures during which ‘gifts’ such cigarettes, liquors, etc are exchanged. The fact that it was not held on October 1 shows that the PLA is not ready to close the chapter.
India Today commented: “the suspension of scheduled confidence-building measure between the two militaries comes at a time when China appears to be reaching out to India to normalise relations after the Doklam stand-off.”
But that is not all: the annual joint exercise between the Indian Army and the PLA will not be held in 2017.
Called ‘Hand-in-Hand’, it was held in Pune last year. The Indian and Chinese troops simulated counter-terrorism scenarios and worked together during a couple of weeks. Again a good CBM cancelled. In March 2017, Delhi wrote to Beijing to start the initial planning process; no answer from China.
China has also not provided data for the Sutlej and the Yarlung Tsangpo, as per the agreement signed by the two countries. Some vague excuses have been given for not doing so.
In this morose context, an incident took place in Dharamsala, the hometown of the Dalai Lama in Himachal Pradesh.
On October 1 (incidentally, the Chinese National Day), a Chinese woman, a long-term guest in India, holding a US passport, physically assaulted a Tibetan woman “hurling verbal abuses and also vandalizing a part of the photo exhibition set up by our NGO near the Dalai Lama’s Temple, in McLeod Ganj,” according to the Police complaint.

Physical assault
 A Dharamsala-based Tibetan NGO called Gu-Chu-Sum, started by former Tibetan political prisoners, had organized a photo exhibition to mark the 30th anniversary of 1987 Tibetan unrest in Tibet. The exhibition was held at proximity of the main Temple.
According the complaint: “While hundreds of other foreigners, Indian tourists and local people visited the exhibition, this Chinese woman, Ms Zhu Wenqi, 44, objected to the photo exhibition saying that she was angry with these photo exhibits. She was visibly restless and beyond control. Ms Wen shouted verbal abuses against all Tibetans saying that these photos insult China.”
She attacked Namgyal Dolkar Lhagyari, a Member of the Tibetan Parliament and Gu-Chu-Sum president, when the latter tried to pacify her; the correspondent of Voice of America (Tibetan language) who was filming the scene, was hit in the face and thrown on the floor by Zhu.
The NGO told the police “We fear she may unleash more such violent abuses. Her presence in here is clearly a threat to the peace and tranquility of Dharamsala.”
Though there is no proof that the Chinese lady is linked to the regime in Beijing, the attack however raises serious issues.

Troop movement
 First for the Dalai Lama’s security: Zhu recently appeared on a photo with a group of Chinese inside the Cathedral. Are all the followers/students of the Tibetan leader properly screened?
Second, how did Zhu get a five-year visa to ‘study’ in India? Who provided the guarantee for her visa?
Even presuming that she was a genuine ‘student’ at the time of application, is there a way to keep a tab on all ‘Buddhist’ and other seekers gravitating around Dharamsala? How far is the Himachali town infiltrated by the Chinese intelligence? All these questions need to be answered.
For the past fifty-five years, the Tibetan refugee community has been an exemplary and peaceful community in India. This should remain so and the Tibetans should not be disturbed by unwarranted elements.
Whatever the results of the enquiry, Delhi needs to realize that the Chinese ‘answer’ to Doklam may not be visible on a mountain ridge in Arunachal Pradesh or Ladakh, but may be ‘asymmetric’.
Today, it is obvious that the Doklam page has not been turned; for example, as Indian Foreign Secretary landed in Paro to take stock of the relations with Bhutan, there are persistent rumors that the PLA has massed troops in the Chumbi valley, north of Doklam.
Delhi needs to remain fully alert and ready to tackle any situation, military or otherwise.