Tibet's so-called Peaceful Liberation: 70 year ago

My article Tibet's so-called Peaceful Liberation appeared in The Daily Guardian.

Here is the link...

As China plans to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the 17-Point Agreement, it is important to remember that the violence and subjugation Tibet has witnessed since 1950 cannot be termed as a ‘peaceful liberation’ of the region.

The history of Mao's China is a tale of well-planned and well-executed moves. All the events from 1949 onwards have unfolded in a perfectly calculated sequence: first, the invasion of Tibet in 1950; after a vague protest by the Indian Government and the adjournment of the Tibetan Appeal to the UN (at Delhi's instance), in 1951, the 17-Point ‘Agreement’ was signed. Then, in 1954, the ‘Panchsheel’ accord (which neutralized India under the Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai bluff) was inked and soon after the first incursions started on Indian soil. It was followed by the crushing of the Tibetan uprising in 1959, and finally in October 1962, the ‘teaching of a lesson’ to India for daring to give asylum to the Dalai Lama and his followers in March 1959.
This should not be forgotten at a time China plans to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the “Agreement between the Central People's Government and the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet”, also known as the 17-Point Agreement. The paramount question remains: has Tibet really been liberated?
Here too, Mao executed a meticulously planned two-pronged operation; the first part culminated in the Battle of Chamdo which saw the Tibetan forces being decimated; the Great Helmsman’s second step was ‘diplomatic’, the weak Tibetan State was forced to put its thumbprint on an agreement allowing Communist China to take over the Land of Snows.
In May 1951, the Tibetan delegates had no alternative but to accept that the “the Tibetan people shall return to the family of the Motherland of the People's Republic of China” and “drive out imperialist aggressive forces from Tibet.” (Article I)
Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, the former governor of Kham province at that time a prisoner of war, was nominated by the Communists as ‘head of the Tibetan delegation’; with his colleagues, Ngabo had to agree that “the local government of Tibet shall actively assist the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to enter Tibet and consolidate the national defenses.” (Article II)
One can ask: against who was this ‘defence consolidation’?
Very few realized then that it could only be against India; though the Indian officials posted on the Roof of the World would soon discover the true objectives of the Communists, nobody was ready to listen in Delhi.
This period coincided with the beginning of the Hindi-Chini-Bhai-Bhai, the honeymoon between Delhi and Beijing.
Several years ago, the Central Tibetan Administration claimed that the number of Tibetans who died of starvation, violence, or other indirect causes due to the invasion was approximately 1.2 million. Though this figure could not be confirmed, the Chinese occupation was far from ‘peaceful’.
Over the years, the age-old Indo-Tibet relations were gradually replaced by a cruder relation with the new occupiers of Tibet; the Indian kinship with Tibet progressively disappeared with the presence of the ‘Liberation Army’ (PLA) the plateau. This was witnessed with dismay by the Indian diplomats and officials posted in the Land of Snows till the 1962 War.
At the beginning, very few Tibetans had the courage to fight the ineluctable; most, whether from the aristocracy or the clergy, first collaborated with the occupying forces, but these years also witnessed the birth of a national conscience and a ‘people’s movement’, which unfortunately never got Delhi’s support.
Soon after the signature of the 17-Point Agreement, the arrival of the Chinese troops in Lhasa brought a famine in Lhasa. Delhi came to the rescue and fed rice the PLA for a couple of years via Sikkim.
The first and foremost consequence of the signature of the 17-Point Agreement was that the Land of Snows lost its sovereignty; Tibet had become a part of the ‘Great Motherland’. It was the first time in its 2,000 year-old history, that Tibet consented to be a province ‘within the boundaries’ of China in an official document.
The Tibetans were put in front of a fait accompli and the Government of India did react to the ‘Agreement’, even though some clauses were in clear contradiction with several articles of the 1914 Simla Convention, binding between India and Tibet.
Three weeks after the Agreement was inked, during a press conference, Nehru pretended that he was unaware: “I do not know much more about it than you probably know. The story about an agreement being reached between the People's Government in China and the Tibetan authorities has reached us too. That is all; no further development has taken place to our knowledge. It is not proper for me to react to something which is not complete, which is not fully known.”
Washing his hands of the tragedy, the Prime Minister remained extremely vague when asked about the status of Tibet: “Throughout this period some kind of Chinese suzerainty has been recognised in the past as well as Tibetan autonomy. We have certain interests there which are not political but which are cultural, etc, which we should like to preserve. These are our approaches and we should like to preserve our cultural and trade interests in a friendly way with the people concerned.”
The Chinese propaganda said that the Dalai Lama welcomed the Agreement, he would have sent a telegram to Mao: "the local government of Tibet as well as the Tibetan monks and laymen unanimously support this agreement, and will actively assist the PLA in Tibet to consolidate national defense, drive imperialist forces out of Tibet and safeguard the unification of the territory and the sovereignty of the motherland." The 16-year old probably never did.
Some 15 years ago, in an interview, the Tibetan leader told us: “when the Tibetan delegation was negotiating in Beijing they were reluctant to sign, but the Chinese told them clearly: ‘If you do not sign, it is very easy for us, we just have to give a signal to the army and the army will march into Tibet.’" The Tibetan leader concluded: “It is clear, there were only two choices: either to accept the agreement or to go through what they called a military 'liberation'. For some years, we derived some benefit, but later, it became plain military occupation.”
Today China has started the most wide-apread campaign since the Cultural Revolution, to teach the glorious history of the Communist Party to the Chinese people. The propaganda says: “hostile forces at home and abroad make use of the history of the Chinese revolution and the history of the new China, doing their utmost to attack, vilify and smear them, with the fundamental aim of inciting the over throw of the leadership of the Communist Party of China and our socialist system.”
But history can’t be changed. The Tibetans were not ‘peacefully liberated’ in 1951.

 

One year after Doklam standoff: Will Bhutan increase deployment to check activities of Chinese military?

1959 Chinese map of the border

My article One year after Doklam standoff: Will Bhutan increase deployment to check activities of Chinese military? appeared in Mail Today/DailyO

China has always been jealous of India's special relation with Bhutan, which it claims as its 'vassal state'.


The Standing Committee on external affairs, headed by Shashi Tharoor, former minister of state, was recently in the news. After several hearings on the Doklam episode, some of its conclusions were leaked to the media. Of course, one could ask: Are the MPs not under oath when they get confidential briefings? But it is perhaps too much to expect from some of the people’s representatives. Remember, on June 16 last year, Indian and Chinese troops faced each other for 73 days after India decided to stop the construction of a road on Bhutanese territory, near the tri-junction between India, China and Bhutan.

Chinese military
According to PTI, though the Committee report “did not clarify whether the committee was favouring increasing the deployment of Indian troops in the region,” Delhi should encourage Thimphu to ensure a larger deployment of its soldiers in the Northern Doklam area “to check the activities of Chinese military in the sensitive region.”
The above recommendation raises the crucial issue of the relation of Bhutan and China.
In this context, it is interesting to look into the past.
In June 1955, RK Nehru was foreign secretary, when he decided to pay an official visit to Bhutan. At that time, to go to Bhutan, the easiest way was to cross through the Chumbi Valley (north of Doklam) in Tibet, before proceeding to Paro. After a stay of a few days in Yatung, the main village of the Chumbi Valley where India had an important Trade Agency, Nehru left for Bhutan on June 14; he returned on June 26 and again stayed a couple of days in Yatung.
In his report, the foreign secretary wrote: “My visit to Bhutan via Yatung had been notified to the Chinese. We were given to understand that I would receive all facilities and courtesies. I received all the facilities needed, but no special courtesies were shown.”
Why? China was simply jealous of India’s special relation with Bhutan.
Nehru mentioned that South Block had notified Beijing about his visit: “but we were aware that they claim Bhutan as their vassal state. This claim was last made in 1910, but it has never been given up.”
The question may be different today, but the fact remains that the leadership in Beijing has always thought that it was natural for Bhutan to have ‘special’ relations with China. The then foreign secretary continued: “As recently as 1948, the claim was repeated. …The Chinese position in the past has been that we [India] cannot have special relations with Bhutan without their concurrence. I presume this is still their position, though it is not being asserted openly.”
Nehru admitted: “For all these reasons, they could have refused to give transit visas, but this would have led to a conflict. The alternative was to give visas, but to take no special notice of the visit. This is what they actually did.”
It was not the first time that China was trying to play the ‘Bhutan Card’.

First meeting
In August 1950, the Indian Mission in Lhasa reported an encounter between Bhutan’s commercial agent in Lhasa and General Zhang Jingwu, Mao’s representative in Tibet, who had just arrived in Lhasa; it was the first meeting between the Chinese general and a foreign ‘diplomat’ posted in Tibet.
It was quite farcical.
The agent had to state his name, age and functions; then he was required to explain why restrictions were imposed on Tibetan traders entering Bhutan.
The agent had to explain to the tough general that his government had stationed five or six men along her frontier merely to prevent Tibetans from stealing mules from villages in Bhutan.
Let us remember that at that time, India was responsible for Bhutan’s foreign relations; China was deeply unhappy about this.
On October 1, 1950, on the first anniversary of the People’s Republic, the Chinese gave a party in Lhasa.
Zhang gave special considerations to Bhutan: “of foreign representatives Bhutan Agent received much attention and encouragement verging on patronage,” wrote Sinha, the head of the Indian Mission.
The PLA general constantly praised the Bhutanese Agent, even “styled Envoy of the Independent Asian State of Bhutan.” Sinha informed Delhi “through [the] questions put to the Agent, [it was as if] Bhutan had nothing in common with India. Bhutan was ‘coolly told’ that it would be invited to send a Mission to Peking next year.”

Diplomatic relations
The Chinese were very much aware that the Dragon Kingdom’s diplomatic relations were taken care by Delhi, but it was clearly a calculated move to put Bhutan and India on the same diplomatic level.
Even the Tibetans were quite surprised about the “new status of Bhutan Agent and the fuss made of him.” Today like yesterday, though not ‘openly asserted’, the Chinese mindset remains the same; this partially explains why Beijing decided to start building a road near the tri-junction, without informing Thimphu or Delhi.
Beijing could not think that a ‘foreign’ country (India) would intervene and stop the work.
A few weeks ago, though Thimphu does not have formal diplomatic relations with its northern neighbour, Chinese vice foreign minister Kong Xuanyou spent three days in the Dragon Kingdom. It was the first high-level visit post-Doklam.
Kong, accompanied by the Chinese ambassador to India, met Bhutan’s King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck, Prime Minister Tshering Tobgay and foreign minister Damcho Dorji; they discussed ‘matters of mutual interest’, acknowledged Bhutan. Though Bhutan kept India ‘in the loop’ about Kong’s visit, there is no doubt that the Chinese pressure on Bhutan will increase in the coming months, especially as the parliamentary elections are coming soon in Bhutan.
In these circumstances, it is unsure Bhutan will agree to increase its deployment in the Doklam area.

The day Indian and Chinese officials met in Lhasa

Dekyilingka, the Indian Mission in Lhasa

I am posting below a fascinating description of the first encounter between a General Zhang Jingwu, (September 3, 1906 – October 27, 1971) of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and an Indian diplomat in Lhasa. It occured soon after the PLA arrived in the Tibetan capital.
At that time General Zhang was the Representative in Tibet of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China; he later became First Secretary of the Tibet Work Committee, overseeing the administration of Tibet.
Sumul Sinha, an IFS officer, was the head of the Indian Mission in Tibet; a year earlier, he had replaced Hugh Richardson, who had served at this post between August 1947 and August 1950 (he had earlier served the British).
During their first meeting, the Chinese general followed the diplomatic etiquette and appeared even enjoying his visit to Dekyilingka, the Indian Mission.
He is accompanied by a controversial Tibetan Alo Chonzed, then a leader of the Tibetan People’s Association.
Interestingly, Zhang told Sinha that “his Government would be agreeable to the establishment of an Indian Consulate General at Lhasa.”
It would happen at the end of 1952 when the Indian Mission would be downgraded into a Consulate General; practically, it meant that Tibet had lost the right to have direct foreign relations with India: Tibet was no more an independent country.

Copy of a Memorandum dated September 23, 1951

from Sumul Sinha, Officer in Charge, Indian Mission in Lhasa (Tibet)

to Harishwar Dayal, the Political Officer in Sikkim, Gangtok.

In our telegram No. 60, dated 21st September, 1951, we briefly reported General Chang Ching-wu’s [Zhang Jingwu] visit to our Mission with his staff on Thursday the 20th September. He was due to arrive at our Mission at 10 (Tibetan time), but was late by 30 minutes or so, not having made, as he said, any allowance for the distance between Trimon house and the Indian Mission at Dekyilingka.

General Zhang Jingwu

General Chang and party came riding but dismounted a few yards from the gate and walked up to the entrance of the Mission building. Chang and Alo [Chonzed] were riding ponies, presented to them by the Dalai Lama, with resplendent saddle-carpets made of expensive silk and satin. The officials were light grey uniform with caps to match, while their military escort (2 young soldiers of the P.L.A.) was in the normal outfit of the liberation army (khaki woolen battle dress), carrying automatic rifles and Mauser pistols. Chan was received at the entrance by members of my staff and brought upstairs, where I greeted him. He expressed very great concern over my health, and enquired whether I would accept over my health, and enquired whether I would accept the services of his physician.
I thanked him cordially for the offer, and told him that as I was on the road to recovery o hoped it would not be necessary to trouble his doctor. Chang then formally presented me with 3 copies of a booklet regarding ‘Deliberations and Agreement between the Central People’s Government and the local Government of Tibet on methods for the peaceful liberation of Tibet’ [known as the 17-Point Agreement].
Two copies in ordinary coarse paper were, he said, for general use. The other bound in red silk with printed characters in golden types was specially inscribed to me in Chang’s own calligraphy. The paper need in this copy is of a superior quality and the printing is excellent.
I am sending you herewith one of the two ordinary copies we have received from Chang for ‘general use’.
Along with it, I am sending you a copy of the People’s Daily dated 28th May 1951, which Chang also left with us, and Chang’s calligraphy declaring eternal friendship between China and India.
While the Chinese officers were entertained to lunch and tea upstairs, separate arrangements were made below to feed their guards. We put on a cinema show for the entire party and the following films were shown:

1.    Glimpses of Mahatma Gandhi.
2.    No. 22 and 26.
3.    Shantiniketan
4.    Festival Time

General Zhang Jingwu distributing alms

They thoroughly enjoyed the show, and said that they hoped soon to invite us to a show of Chinese films.
During the 7 odd hours Chang Ching-wu remained with us, he was in an emotional mood, at lunch, he was several times on his feet, toasting our Prime Minister [Jawaharlal Nehru] and eternal friendship between China and India.
Twice he went into flights of oratory in Chinese, denouncing war and declaring that he had sacrificed 26 years of his life for the younger generation, referring in particular to our wireless operator and to my Stenographer.
Although Chang had no further desire to carry arms, he was prepared at all times to take up the challenge of Imperialist bounds, particularly the Americans. He told us that he could discard his reserve and be frank and free with us because he was not a diplomat but a rough and rude soldier. He extended an invitation to me to visit his home in Peking and stay with him as his guest.
Confidentially, he announced to me that his Government would be agreeable to the establishment of an Indian Consulate General at Lhasa.
Chang and Alo have promised to repeat their visits to our Mission, and have asked us to allow them to join us at tennis whenever we play.
Chang was also in a mood to flatter himself.
He said General Yuan Chong-hsien, [Yuan Zhongxian] Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi, was his comrade, while the Chinese Ambassador in Rangoon was his departmental assistant.
Chang left early at 5 P.M. because he had arranged a meeting with General Wang Ching-ming [Wang Qimei] at 2:30 PM at Trimon house.
Wang Ching-ming sent a messenger with a note to remind Chang of the appointment, but Chang was persuaded to remain with us a little longer. But for his secretaries who were constantly pressing him to return, he would have stayed on till late in the evening.

How the Chinese fooled Nehru in Tibet

General Zhang Jingwu near Lhasa (August 1951)

While the Indian archives are still jealously kept by the Ministry of External Affairs (and other Indian ministries), the Chinese are slowly (and selectively) declassifying their archives.
A cable from General Zhang Jingwu, 'On Issues of Relations between China and India in Tibet' dating October 21, 1953, is one example.
A translation was recently released by Digital Archive of the Wilson Centre (International History Declassified). It belongs to the History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China.
Zhang Jingwu was one of the signatories of the infamous Seventeen-Point Agreement between the People's Republic of China and a Tibetan delegation (the so-called local government of Tibet).
Later, General Zhang became the representative in Tibet of the Central Committee of the Community Party of China; in July 1951, Zhang went to Yatung (via Hong Kong) to persuade the Fourteenth Dalai Lama to return to Lhasa. During the following years, he acted as Beijing’s representative in Tibet and was designated as Secretary of the Tibet Work Committee.
A few words about the background of General Zhang’s cable to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing: Nehru wanted to re-negotiate the Simla Convention (of 1914) with China, taking into accounts the new situation: Tibet was an independent nation anymore after the PLA invaded the Roof of the World in October 1950
In September 1952, before his transfer to Cairo, K.M. Panikkar, who had been ‘ambassador in Two Chinas’, had several meetings with Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier. The latter told the gullible Indian ambassador that the downgrading of the Lhasa Mission was only the first step to pave the way for negotiations on ‘all outstanding problems’. The conversion of the Indian Mission into a Consulate General in Lhasa was a tragedy in itself; unfortunately Nehru had readily agreed to the Chinese ‘proposal’.
I quote here from my book: Born in Sin, the Panchsheel Agreement.

During the first months of 1953, Nehru may have felt that the situation was settling down in Tibet and slowly the Tibetans were accepting the invasion of their country by the Liberation Army as a fait accompli.
In September 1953, Nehru wrote to his Chinese counterpart that India was anxious to come to a final settlement about “pending matters so as to avoid any misunderstanding and friction at any time”. Quoting a letter sent one year earlier, he said that “No further steps have been taken since then to negotiate a settlement”.
It appears that different visitors and informants were briefing Nehru about the situation inside Tibet. It was reported that everything was quiet on the Roof of the World. In early December 1953, Nehru mentions that, he had received a letter from George Roerich, the Russian painter and scholar living in Kulu giving him more information. After admitting that “our Intelligence has looked upon them [the Roerich] with some slight suspicion although they have never had anything to get hold of,” Nehru told T.N. Kaul, the Joint Secretary in the China Desk in the Ministry of External Affairs: “His [Roerich] general report to me has been that things are very calm in Tibet and both the people and the Lama hierarchy have adjusted themselves to the new order. This is chiefly so because the Chinese have refrained from interfering in anything. The Tibetans are, therefore, not so apprehensive as they used to be.”
As we have seen in the case of food supply to the Chinese troops and the sacking of the Tibetan Prime Ministers, the report was not completely true. The Chinese had begun interfering actively in the life of the Tibetans. In fact, they started meddling in the internal affairs of Tibet almost immediately after the signature of the 17-Point Agreement.
Nehru considered that the time had come to renegotiate the old Simla Convention signed in 1914 between the British and the Tibetans. He therefore decided to take the initiative and propose negotiations to resolve ‘all outstanding issues’. The talks were to begin in December 1953 in Beijing and were scheduled to last a maximum of six weeks. Unfortunately, they would take four months to reach a conclusion. Kaul, one of the main negotiators in Beijing described the preparations for the Conference thus: “Many meetings and discussions were held and it was decided to sound the Chinese. Not unexpectedly they welcomed the idea. It was decided to send a small delegation to Peking to discuss the matter and reach an agreement, if possible. The spade work had already been done by Panikkar, [N.] Raghavan and me in Peking. The new Indian Ambassador to China, N. Raghavan, was appointed the leader and I the deputy-leader of the Indian delegation. Director, Historical Division, External Affairs Ministry, the late Dr. Gopalachari, was a member. His knowledge of history and facts of the Sino-Indian border was an asset. We were authorised to co-opt such other members of the Embassy as we found necessary. It was a small delegation, as delegations go, but convenient and closely knit.”
Most of the correspondence or instructions during the following months was routed through Kaul, one of Nehru’s Kashmiri blue-eyed boys.

The Instructions
In early December, the Secretary General put up a Note in which he defined the main points for discussions at what became known as the Beijing Conference. The points were:

1. The question of India’s frontier with Tibet,
2. Indo-Tibetan trade and trade agencies,
3. Freedom of movement of Indian and Tibetan traders and pilgrims,
4. Passports and visas,
5. Telegraph, post office and hospitals
6. Security guards and escorts and
7. Special position of Bhutan.

On 3 December 1953, Nehru replied to this Note giving the framework for negotiations to be held in Beijing regarding the relations between India and China and India’s interests in Tibet. He clarified the position to be adopted by the Indian delegation during the Beijing Conference. More particularly on the border question, though he generally agreed with the points made by the Secretary General, he chose to remain faithful to the Panikkar doctrine, which says ‘remain silent about the border’. Nehru wrote: “We should not raise this question. If the Chinese raise it, we should express our surprise and point out that this is a settled issue. Further, during the last two years or so, when reference was frequently made about Indo-Chinese or Indo-Tibetan problems, there has never been any reference to this frontier issue and it is surprising that this should be brought up now. Our delegation cannot discuss it.”
Though Panikkar had been transferred more than a year earlier to Cairo, Nehru was still keen to consult him on China’s affairs. The former Ambassador had suggested a step further, he had written: “if China insisted on reopening the whole issues of the frontier, the Indian delegation could walk out of the conference and break off the negotiations.” Nehru was not as extreme as Panikkar, he did not recommend walking out of the Conference, his instructions were: “We should avoid walking out unless the Chinese insist on taking up this question. If such an eventuality occurs, the matter will no doubt be referred to us.”
To agree to discuss the border issue was for Panikkar an admission that there was a problem. But can wishful thinking take away an issue?
Nehru also believed that it was important to keep the trade marts alive as he envisioned an increase in the commercial exchanges with Tibet in the future. He wrote: “Tibet is our natural market and we should develop it normally.” He was in favour of keeping the trade agencies functional: “Gartok is important. Yatung especially, and, to some extent, Gyantse are likely to become more important as trade between India and Tibet increases. They are on the main route. Therefore, it is eminently reasonable that we should have some trade agents there or at least at Yatung.”

In October 1953, General Zhang sent his perceptions on these questions to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing. At that time, China was getting ready to seat for new negotiations with India.

Some points have to be noted:
•    In 1953, China still needs India, not only ‘for some international’ issues, but to supply the PLA in Tibet [see my post on the supply of Indian rice to the PLA]. It is only a year later that the Qinghai-Tibet and the Sichuan-Tibet roads will be opened rendering the PLA in Tibet non-dependent on the trade with India.
•    General Zhang speaks of China’s “insufficient understanding of imperialist privileges in Tibet”, but during the following months and years, Beijing will learn very fast; at the same time, India will be fooled in abandoning all its ‘privileges’ accrued from the Simla Convention. This is a great tragedy.
•    Zhang understood that the time was ripe to make China’s occupation ‘official’: “delaying the settlement of these issues is not good”. Beijing need to officialize its presence on the Roof of the World through a Treaty/Agreement. A few months later, the Panchsheel Agreement would be sign.
•    Zhang then brings Tawang “which is Indian according to the 1914 Simla Accord”. He says that if Beijing agrees to “the absence of territorial disputes”, China would “implicitly acknowledge and legitimize India’s occupation.” It is a fact that earlier, China has never complained about the Indian administration of Tawang and Kameng Frontier Division. It is probably in 1953 only that Beijing realized the Indian move by Major Bob Khathing and his men.
•    Zhang mentions that in July 1948 (in fact it was in July 1947] India notified the Tibetan government “that it would succeed the privileges of Britain in Tibet”. According to Zhang: “Tibet replied in October [1948] that signing a new treaty was acceptable but India must first return the lands occupied by Britain, e.g. Tawang, Bhutan, and Sikkim.” This obnoxious ‘offer’ is unfortunately true. In fact, Lhasa added Ladakh to the list. The Tibetans were living in another world.
•    Zhang states that “according to the discussions with Ngapoi [Ngapo Ngawang Jigme] and Liushar, such treaties were secretly signed and the Kashag, the Tibetan Cabinet did not know about the maps, when Tibet was forced to sign them”. This is obviously not correct because Lochen Shatra, the Tibetan Plenipotentiary in Simla, had informed Sir Henry McMahon that he had received his instructions from Lhasa to sign the maps. It is however possible that the Kashag in the 1940s was unaware of the details of the Simla Agreement, particularly the pilgrimage area south of the Line. I had dealt with this in detail in my book, 1962, the McMahon Line Saga.
•    Zhang makes 3 propositions to settle the border: abolish the Simla Accord, India’s withdrawal from Tawang and Lower Luoyu [Loyul, i.e. Siang Frontier Division] and China and India must discuss the dividing lines between both countries. Zhang concludes “It is in our interest to delay the settlement of these issues.”
•    Zhang admits that discussions have been held with Ngabo and Liushar, with both expressing their agreement. There is no doubt that, as the Chinese established their presence in Tibet, several Tibetan officials were on the Chinese side against India …and against Tibet. But this is another story.
•    Zhang’s suggestions are that India should drop all its so-called privileges in Tibet and in counterpart China should gain new privileges in India. It is what Nehru agreed to during the following months. It is called ‘negotiations with Chinese characteristics’, 'you lose everything and China wins everything'.

 

The Dalai Lama with General Zhang Jingwu in the 1950s

Here is General Zhang Jingwu’s cable dated October 21, 1953.

To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
Your correspondence dated 7 October [1953] and the two types of Indian documents have been received. Research shows that the assumption that “India intends to capitalize this opportunity to have some benefit in Tibet,” as mentioned in your correspondence, is very accurate. Based on the information that we have at hand about Tibet, we still need Indian cooperation in some international issues. However, India is capitalizing on our temporary difficulties in Tibet, particularly our insufficient understanding of imperialist privileges in Tibet and the ideal solution to border disputes, as well as our need for India’s cooperation in various areas, to gain benefits by offering a general solution to the Tibet issue.
As a matter of fact, there have always been disputes on some issues, e.g. commercial exchanges and representative offices, because we have always claimed our sovereignty over Tibet. Delaying the settlement of these issues is not good and therefore a solution to them is applauded. If such disputes continue to occur in the years to come, our relations with India may be aggravated with the instigations of some bad-willed nations. Therefore, it is correct to engage in negotiations with India as mentioned in your correspondence.
According to the Indian documents, they emphasize that “India and China have no territorial disputes” (Nehru, the Indian politician, also stated so during his speech in the Upper House of the Parliament). This is where the plot of India lies. Today, India occupies the Dawang [Tawang] Region according to the 1914 Simla Accord. However, it claimed the absence of territorial disputes just to force us into implicitly acknowledging and legitimizing their occupation. We must stay alert in this regard.
According to the information at hand and the results of negotiations with Ngapoi [Ngawang Jigme] and [Thupten Tharpa] Liushar, they reiterated that there were no public or secret treaties with foreign countries except for the Simla Accord. We assumed the Dalai [Lama] might have purchased arms from Britain and India but it is hard to make sure if they have signed any formal treaty. After its independence, India notified Tibet in July 1948 that it would succeed the privileges of Britain in Tibet. Tibet replied in October that signing a new treaty was acceptable but India must first return the lands occupied by Britain, e.g. Tawang, Bhutan, and Sikkim. In December, India replied and asked Tibet to promise to maintain the status quo then regarding India-Tibet relations before a new treaty was established (i.e. the old treaties should remain effective). Otherwise, trade between Tibet and India would be out of the question (the document has been delivered to me). This is the base of Tibet-India relations.
Other than some conventional practices, the so-called ‘status quo’ is based on the Simla Accord among Britain, India, and China, the Tibet-Britain commercial treaties, and the Tibet-Britain declaration and attached maps (these documents have been delivered to me. Please refer to the correspondences dated 16 September for details). The accord includes eleven articles. It recognizes the effectiveness of the treaties established on 1809 [probably meaning 1890], 1904, and 1906 and repeals the two commercial treaties signed in 1893 and 1908. According to the discussions with Ngapoi and Liushar, such treaties were secretly signed and Xiazha (the signatory [the Kashag, the Tibetan Cabinet] did not know about the maps) when Tibet was forced to sign them. It is also said that “such treaties shall be abolished if India recognizes that Tibet is part of China.” The so-called McMahon Line was established in the Simla Accord. However, Tibet later found that two holy mountains were located in the Indian territory land and raised its demurral. Britain then agreed to shift the line southward and have Sera [Sela?] as the border (some of the documents have been delivered to me). However, this line is already over Sera [Sela?] and reaches Tawang now.
According to the foregoing information, one of the main Tibet issues facing India involves these treaties and the bilateral borders, i.e. the Simla Accord and the so-called McMahon Line. We are of the opinion that:

1. We must declare abolishment of the old accord, i.e. the Simla Accord, which was not recognized by the former Chinese Government;
2. India must withdraw from Chinese Tawang and Lower Luoyu [Loyul] which it currently occupies;
3. China and India may discuss the dividing lines between both countries. It is impossible to fundamentally settle the issues regarding the accord and the border. It is in our interest to delay the settlement of these issues. However, we have to make further declarations. Otherwise, we would be deemed to have implicitly acknowledged the status quo and hence be put in a rather disadvantaged position.

Other than the issues of the accord and the border, we should negotiate with India to settle other issues as mentioned in the correspondences, e.g. trade, troops, pilgrimage (border entry and exit), and commercial representative facilities. These issues can and must be settled. According to the correspondences received from India last February, the two types of documents received recently, and the Indian propaganda in the newspapers, India intends to capitalize on the current situation to gain certain benefits, e.g. legitimization of three representative offices in Gyantse, free entry for pilgrimage, expansion of trade territories, withdrawal of Indian troops, and other issues. In addition to the proposals made on 24 March 1952, we have also come up with the following supplementary solutions according to the present conditions:

1. Indian troops and officials should be withdrawn.
2. Postal facilities shall be taken back. The local postal administration of the Tibetan Government has reached Pali [Phari Dzong]. With our assistance, the postal services will not be a problem even after the Indian postal facilities are withdrawn.
3. Indian radio facilities shall also be withdrawn or transferred to us (at a reasonable price). Cabled facilities shall be transferred to us at a reasonable price. We have established our telecommunication facilities at Yadong [Yatung] , Gyantse, and Lhasa and international telecommunication services may also be established there. The telephones may be withdrawn by India or transferred to us.
4. All posthouses [Dak Bungalows] relating to posts and telecommunications shall be withdrawn.
5. The Xiasima [?] administration shall also be withdrawn.
6. Commerce in Gartok [Western Tibet] cannot be stopped right now and shall be continued. The Indian commercial representative may acknowledge the conventional practice, i.e. conducting trade where designated during a certain period in the year. However, we must dispatch our commercial representative to Simla or Kalimpong in exchange.
7. As a consulate general already exists in Lhasa, the Indian commercial representatives in Yadong and Gyantse shall be cancelled. If India still asks to maintain them, they may be converted into consulates although only Yadong may be allowed to accommodate them and we must have a consulate or formal commercial representative in Kalimpong in exchange. We believe having one representative facility in Kalimpong is to our benefit.
8. Regarding the radio stations that the Consulate General of India has in Lhasa and the possible establishment of radio stations by India’s representative facilities at Yadong and Gartok in the future, we believe that our representative facilities in India must also set up radio stations in exchange. Otherwise, neither side shall set up radio facilities. We have a telecommunication bureau (Ngari Prefecture Government has dispatched personnel to the radio station) and we can send the telegraphs.
9. Trade locations: trade shall be conducted at Gartok and Puguanzong [Purang Dzong] in Ngari Prefecture and in Yadong, Gyantse, or Lhasa. India proposes Kalimpong, Calcutta, Simla, Gandu [Gangtok?], or Siliguri as its trading places.
10. Regarding frontier entry and exit for trading purposes, we are of the opinion that free entry and exit may be allowed on a mutually beneficial basis, without the need for any passport or visa. However, both countries shall issue a license to their respective merchants as evidence. When it becomes mature one or two years later, relevant rules on entry and exit visas may be established.
11. Taxation issue: we recommend following conventional practices one to two years before the Customs is established, i.e. no import and export taxes shall be levied.
12. Locations shall be designated for pilgrimage purpose: we designate Mt. Kailas and Lake Manasarovar in Ngari and India designates Lumbini (where Sakyamuni died) and Varanasi (where Sakyamuni recited sermons for the first time) for pilgrimage purposes. Both countries may further designate the routes of pilgrimage.
13. It is recommended that both countries establish relevant articles or agreements to replace historical treaties and accords regarding the foregoing issues.

Discussions have been held with Ngapoi and Liushar on the foregoing issues and they both expressed their agreement. In addition, the Foreign Office has collected some materials on Tibet’s foreign relations, imperialist privileges in Tibet, and India’s conditions in Yadong and Gyantse. The Tibetan government has submitted the Simla Accord and other documents as reference materials in the negotiations. We recommend that Yang Gongsu [head of the Foreign Bureau in Lhasa] should take various types of materials and accords to Beijing for negotiations. After any new agreement is reached, he can also return to Tibet and make preparations according to the spirit and provisions of the agreement. It is expected to benefit the foreign affairs work of Tibet.
Please consider the abovementioned proposals and provide your feedback as soon as possible.
[General] Zhang Jingwu
21 October 1953

The Chinese arrive in Lhasa...

As the 1500th post on this blog, I am publishing today an exceptional historical document.
It is the 'Monthly Report' of the Officer-in-Charge of the Indian  Mission in Lhasa (for the month ending September 15, 1951).
The Chinese had just arrived in the Tibetan capital preceded by General Zhang Jingwu, the Representative of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.
A few weeks earlier (on August 17), the Dalai Lama had returned from his exile, near the Indian border (in the Chumbi Valley near Yatung). General Zhang had visited the Dalai Lama in Yatung to convince him to come back to Lhasa.
Sumul Sinha, the Indian IFS officer posted in Lhasa, reports the happenings of August-September in a tragicomic way.
For example, the 'return' to Lhasa from Ngabo Ngawang Jigme (Ngapho in the text), who had 'signed' the 17-Point Agreement with the Communist Party in Beijing in May, is being given a amusing touch. In Beijing, Ngabo had cut his hair to please the Chinese and look 'modern'. Now, he had to wait outside Lhasa for his braid to grow, (as per the Tibetan tradition, a minister had to wear braided hair). Fortunately for Ngabo, he got a special derogation (probably under Chinese pressure) and could enter the Tibetan capital (under Chinese military escort as he was not very popular amongst the Tibetans).
The description of General Zhang Jingwu is also funny; he is compared to Friar Tuck, Robin Hood's companion. 
Sumul Sinha also describes the poster war on the walls of the capital.
And unfortunately, the 'Ladakhi' cinema halls had to soon close to give place to the propaganda movies of the Communist Party.
The report is addressed to Sinha's direct boss, Harishwar Dayal, the ICS officer posted as Political Officer in Sikkim. Usually copies were sent to the Ministry of External Affairs, the Prime Minister's Office, etc.
A great read!

SECRET

From: The Officer in Charge,
Indian Mission, Lhasa.

To: The Political Officer in Sikkim,
Gangtok.
Memorandum No. 3(10)-L/51.
Dated, Lhasa, Tibet, the 15th September, 1951.

Monthly Report of the Indian Mission, Lhasa for the period ending 15th September, 1951

I.    EXTERNAL RELATIONS:

(a)    Sino-Tibetan Relations:

(i)  The Chinese in Lhasa are making determined efforts to adjust themselves to their new environment. Their immediate pre-occupation is with the problem of settling down in the weird and unfamiliar surroundings of Lhasa. So far they have not interfered with Tibetan administration. In fact no serious effort has been made on either side to establish more than formal relations.

(ii)  General Chang [General Zhang Jingwu, Representative of the CPC’s Central Committee] continued to receive during the period under review a number of Tibetan visitors of high official standing, most of whom called on him, as is customary, with gifts befitting his exalted status. Being suspicious by nature, Chang is highly critical of this much honoured Tibetan custom. He dislikes receiving presents, and hardly conceals his disapproval when visitors unsuspectingly arrive at his door with servants laden with gifts. Besides he is not armed with presents which he could send in return for those he is receiving. One unfortunate visitor, Dzasa Tsarong, who called on Chang with 9 human-loads of presents was singled out for harsh treatment. Tsarong’s gifts were returned, and he was warned not to tempt the Chinese with bribes.

(iii) Chang Ching-wu is not even returning calls made on him. Sometimes, his gaunt assistant, Alo Phutang [a Communist cadre also know as Le Yuhong], pays a return call, but not Chang. The only person on whom Chang deigned to call was His Holiness. They met at Chang’s request on 22nd August in a room near the barracks of Norbu Lingka where some years back late Sir Charles Bell used to meet the XIII Dalai Lama. One important result of this meeting seems to be that Chang has temporarily acquiesced in the retention by the Dalai Lama of his body-guard of 4,000 odd men.

(iv) A rather comic feature of the Chinese in Lhasa is their air of boredom, not unmingled with a trace of disappointment in it at finding the Tibetans, unexpectedly as it were, so much below par. The austere Tibetans, and their barren mountains, have little to offer to the Chinese in the way of amusements, cuisine and sophisticated company. But already the Chinese have been quick to revive their national game of Mah-jongg, and have expressed some impatience for a dance and theatre hall, which in the form of a request has already been conveyed to the Tibetan Government for an early decision.

(v) The Chinese are entering Lhasa as if they were groups of migrant-colonists and not invaders, but this, though a matter of convenience to them, has had a soothing effect on Tibetan nerves for the latter would have gravely alarmed had the Chinese marched into Lhasa in overwhelming force. The occupation of Tibet by Chinese troops is being wisely stretched out over a period allowing the Tibetans enough time to get used to the change.

(vi) On 7th September an advance party of Chinese troops, a dozen in number, arrived in Lhasa. On 8th September 9 Chinese technicians arrived with their equipment by way of India. On the following day (9th September), a larger party of 573 men and women, headed by General Wang Ching-ming [Wang Qimei, commanding the advance troops of the Eighteenth Army Corps], entered Lhasa with the flourish of trumpets and the beat of drums. The party included a dozen women who are reported to be stage artists, and officials who will man the administrative and military committee to be set-up under the terms of the Peking agreement.
General Wang is short, rotund and merry, almost like Friar Tuck of fictional fame, and indeed is said to bear a certain resemblance to a bouncing ball.

(vii)    To house the new Chinese in Lhasa, the Tibetan Government had to remove their wireless station from Maga Sapa [New Army Camp]. The duty of clearing, renovating and furnishing the main-building and attached barracks of Maga Sapa fell on the Commander-in-Chief, Dzasa Kusangtse, and the Foreign Secretary, Dzasa Liushar, who we learn did a praise-worthy job of it. On arrival, Wang Ching-ming and his party were taken Maga Sapa where they are now living as guests of the Tibetan Government. They lost no time in putting up a telephone line between Trimon House (where General Chang is staying) and Maga Sapa.

(viii) In addition to finding accommodation for the Chinese, the Tibetan Government have been favoured with a complementary request to provide food and rations for two months for the entire Chinese party, as Chinese rations will be long in reaching Lhasa. These concessions having been gained, the Chinese went on to sound the Tibetan Government whether they would have any objections if Chinese planes from Kantse air-dropped supplies in Lhasa. To this they added for propaganda effect that Chinese planes from Kantse could do the round trip to and from Lhasa in about 5 hours. Tibetan Governement are not likely to refuse the request which will transfer the burden of feeding Chinese troops, whose numbers are expected to increase, to the Chinese themselves. Indeed, the Chinese pressed home their advantage by informing the Tibetan Government that more Chinese troops are shortly expected in Lhasa from Kham. According to Tibetan sources a few Chinese commissariat officers have already been posted at Nagchuka to arrange transport and supplies for troops moving towards Lhasa via Nagchuka (the Northern route). On the main Southern route the Chinese have left garrisons at all important centers like Pemba Go, Lhariguo and Giamda. At Giamda there are at present 350 Chinese soldiers, and some of these may later drift into Lhasa.

(ix) The Chinese are taking every possible precaution to ensure the safety of roads leading from Chamdo to Lhasa. They are stationing troops in batches of 30 at all important stages on Riwoche-Nagchuka route with the avowed intention of protecting caravans bringing rations from Kham. That route has for long been infested by brigadans of the wild Golok tribes. The total number of troops being thus deployed on the Northern route is said to be 700.

(x) Meanwhile, there appears to be a concentration of about 10,000 Chinese troops in the Chamdo area. They seem to be supervising mainly the construction and repair of roads to Chamdo, and in particular they are said to be extending a cart road from Derge Gonchen to Chamdo. While communications in Kham are being rapidly improved, those in Sikang are said to be in a state of disrepair.

(xi) General Chang has also evinced a certain philanthropic interest in the beggars and monks of Lhasa. He has asked the Tibetan Government to supply him with statistics of vagrants (including monks) in Lhasa with the laudable intention of distributing alms to them. Tibetans suspect him, however, of harbouring other intentions not so laudable.

(xii) The Ladhaki proprietors of the local cinema house have been warned not to exhibit films without having them first censored by the Chinese. The purpose obviously is to make sure that there is no competitive propaganda.

(xiii) The Chinese have already made known their intentions of showing their own films and of staging dramas in Lhasa for the benefit of the Tibetans. Their intention appears to be to stage these performances first in Norbu Lingka as it is imperative that the education of His Holiness should precede that of His followers.

(xiv) The arrival of a large Chinese party under Wang Ching-ming coincided with a poster campaign in Lhasa. The city walls were pasted with bilingual (Tibetan and Chinese) propaganda leaflets and posters on 9th September. These posters which bear the red seal of the People’s Republic of China announce the terms of the Peking agreement and call on all races allied to Chinese to rise up and stand united.

(xv)    The appeal is racial, ideological and in part an assurance to the Tibetans. It assures Tibetans that the men of the liberation army will conduct themselves in a manner beyond reproach and will cause no inconvenience to the people. The liberation army had entered Tibet with the noble mission of wiping out imperialist influence, and of affording protection to Tibet against rapacious imperialists. It goes on to promise respect for Tibetan institutions and way of life. Forced labour will be abolished, and people’s regime established in Tibet.
Some posters feature pictures of Mao Tse-tung and General Chu Teh, the architects of the Chinese revolution.

(xvi) One poster is exclusively devoted to a tirade against Anglo-American-KMT imperialists and their arch-agent Robert Ford, whose picture appears on the poster wherein his guilt is revealed. The poster accuses him of having disrupted Sino-Tibetan amity, of having worked for British imperialists while in the pay of Tibetan Government, and of having poisoned great Lama Getak of Kham.

(xvii) While the Chinese assiduosly paste these posters on the walls of Lhasa, the Tibetans with intrepid zeal continue to remove them as fast as they go up. the posters appear and disappear with amazing rapidity. In this battle of posters, the Tibetan Government have no part, and they show an air of supreme unconcern and disinterestedness. Why, they say, should they interfere when the Chinese did not even consult them before putting up the posters? Why should they preserve them unasked from the claws of the riff-raff? Meanwhile the disconsolate Chinese have asked their compatriots in the bazaar to keep an eye on the posters and to stop people from removing them.

(xviii) To sum-up, the Chinese have no cause yet for exultation. They have contend with an unconvinced populace about their rights to rule over Tibet. Their officers move in Lhasa protected by armed guards. A few Chinese soldiers maintain a daily patrol in Lhasa.

General Zhang Jingwu

II.    INTERNAL:

(i) In the midst of great popular rejoicing, the Dalai Lama returned to His capital on 17th August after an absence of nearly 8 months. Large enthusiastic crowds thronged the route from Norbu Lingka to far beyond Drepung for a glimpse of the yellow-silk draped dandy which bore away His august person. To the fore and rear of the dandy rode his ministers and other high dignitaries of the land. A reception was held at Kentse Lubting where officials of Lhasa had fore-gathered to pay their homage. From there, His Holiness was carried in a palanquin draped in gold by attendants dressed in the imperial yellow of the Manchus. The Dalai Lama’s return to Lhasa is not without significance; it has put heart into his staunch and unflinching followers who almost despaired of his return. Even those disgruntled sections who were consorting with the Chinese felt the nearness of His presence and became wary, if not less active in the dangerous and highly dubious cause they have chosen for themselves. But the Dalai Lama is not the same man who left his capital hastily for refuge in Yatung: his authority is much shorn. He went to Yatung with the hope of increasing his bargaining power against the Chinese; he returned with much of his authority gone.

(ii)  There is much cause for regret and despair, little for hope. The problem that he is facing, young and inexperienced as he is, is not an easy one even for those of riper years. Doubtless, he shares the disappointment of many of his followers in the Government of India, of whom they expected guidance and supporting verging on the miraculous during the critical days of their exile, and in their negotiations in Peking. They went to Yatung, they say, to be near India; but at Yatung they found themselves further away from India than when they were in Lhasa.

(iii) Hope, however has not been abandoned, and it is centered on Ngapho Shape [Ngabo Ngawang Jigme] whose popularity with the Chinese is beyond dispute. Ngapho wrote from Giamda with customary humility asking for three months leave to grow his hair the full ceremonial length before he ventured to enter Lhasa. But with great show of indulgence, the Tibetan Government assured him that he could enter Lhasa sans the ornamental braid.

(iv) And so Ngapho entered Lhasa on 12th September with an armed escort and his assistants. He was received by Tibetan officials of and below the rank of Dzasa and by Wang Ching-ming and Alo Phutang. Chinese troops provided a guard of honour, and there were other Chinese who carried red banners welcoming the hero back to Lhasa and hailing him as the deliverer of Tibet. 12 Chinese women provided music for the occasion with drums and cymbals, and danced to the tune. Thus the Chinese contributed in making Ngapho’s entry into Lhasa a dramatic and musical event.

(v) Howbeit, the fact remains that Ngapho allowed Chinese troops under Wang Ching-ming to precede him to Lhasa, thereby suggesting that he is not without some fear of possible attempts on his life. Nor is he quite certain that he will be free of censure for his achievement in Peking. His colleagues at the Peking talks have disowned all responsibility for the signing of the agreement against the express orders of their Government. That responsibility is squarely laid on Ngapho’s shoulders.

(vi) Tibetans seem to realise that mutual recrimination at this stage will not help their cause. Their task is to enlist Ngapho’s help and through him seek to revise some of the unpleasant provisions in the Agreement, particularly those relating to the setting-up of an administrative and military committee and the stationing of Chinese troops in Tibet. With naive confidence, the Tibetan Government hope to reopen talks on these matters with the Chinese through Ngapho’s intercession, and have some of the obnoxious provisions of the Agreement revised. Their hope is built on Ngapho’s prestige with the Chinese.

(vii) Despite their many distractions, the Tibetan Government continue to function and observe their annual routine as though nothing had happened to disturb their peace. The Shoton [yogurt festival] dance festival was held on the lawns of Norbu Lingka for 5 days from the 2nd to the 6th September. The Chinese were invited on the 3rd September, and were represented at the festival by Alo Phutang. We were invited on the 4th September and were asked to lunch by the Chikyap Khempo. The seating arrangements were the same for the Chinese, and for members of our Mission.

III.    ECONOMIC:

(i) In the first week of September the rate of exchange went up to 4 Sangs and 3 Shokangs to the rupee. In the 2nd week of September, the rate was 4 Sangs and 4 Shokangs to the rupee. This appreciation in the value of the rupee is largely due to the rapid fall in the wool price.

(ii) A certain amount of Chinese gold has entered Lhasa market. These are being brought by traders from Sikang, Chinghai and Kham, and are sold in bars weighing 13.5 tolas each at Rs. 115/- a tola. Chinese silver dollars are being sold in Lhasa at 15 Sangs each.

(iii) Ngapho’s trading instincts are no less than those of his colleagues in the Tibetan Government. He sold 2000 Khes of grain to the Chinese from his estate at ‘Ngapho’, and charged 45 Sangs per Khe.

(iv) Dzasa Tsarong’s latest passion is to promote Sino-Tibetan trade, and have a fair share of the trade in his hands. All is fish that comes to his net. He is trying to rope in through devious methods Chinese officials in Lhasa into his trade plans.

SOCIAL & PERSONAL

The following officials were entertained at the Mission during the month:

Dzasa Lobzang Samten (Dalai Lama’s elder brother).
Sholkhang Jetung Kusho.
Kazi Tse Ten Tashi.
Dzasa Liushar and Sampho Dzasa.

We made our annual pilgramge to Drepung on 11th September and handed over Rs. 1057/- to the Abbots for distribution to the monks. The Abbots thanked us for the generous donation, reminded us that it was a long standing practice, and expressed the hope that the Government of India would not allow it to fall into disuse.

I was unwell throughout the month and had to cancel several of my engagements.

(S. Sinha)
Officer in Charge.