India and its Saga of 'Reneged' International Promises

The 'broken' 17-Point Agreement

My article India and its Saga of 'Reneged' International Promises appeared in News Intervention

 Here is the link...

 Global Times is famous (or infamous) for saying that black is white and vice-versa; and at the end, arguing that everybody should admire Red China.
For the past five months, the tabloid has described the situation in Ladakh as of India’s own making; it continues the Communist Party long tradition of telling lies (remember the Great Leap Forward and its claims of bumper harvests at a time when more than 40 million Chinese died of starvation). Today, The Global Times continues to reverse the roles and change the facts.

Take the example of the joint statement and five-point consensus reached by the Indian and Chinese foreign ministers at the end of their recent meeting in Moscow. While admitting that it is “a substantial step in cooling down the current border situation, exceeding the expectations of most international observers,” The Global Times squarely put the blame on India: “The successful implementation of the joint statement, however, depends on whether the Indian side can truly keep its word,” as if Delhi is not keeping its word.
It is not difficult for the tabloid to find ‘experts’ to corroborate its conclusions; one Qian Feng, director of the research department of the National Strategy Institute at Tsinghua University in Beijing told the Communist publication: “given India's past history of breaking consensuses reached at such meetings, some Chinese experts stressed that it's still too early to pin high hopes on its implementation.”
However, the history of modern China is a tale of broken promises.
Hardly two months after Mao solemnly announced the birth of the People’s Republic of China from the Tiananmen Square, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) annexed Xinjiang, closing down the Indian Consulate General in Kashgar in the same stroke.
Delhi was told that the new regime would have to renegotiate all its former agreements, a position untenable in international law.
By taking over Xinjiang, Mao controlled the western borders of the Middle Kingdom, he could access trade with Central Asia and block any possibility of Soviet southward advance; for the first time, he also came in contact with the Indian frontiers, particularly the Aksai Chin area; a few years later, Beijing built a road across Indian territory linking up Xinjiang with Tibet.
The first broken promise was about the Indian Consulate in Kashgar, despite Beijing’s promises, it would never be reopened.
At the same time, Beijing repeatedly told the Uyghurs that the PLA had come to help them to develop the area; the Uyghurs still do not understand how they have been ‘helped’ during all these decades.
India foolishly kept the closure of its Kashgar  Consulate secret because “nothing could be done about it,” but that is another story.
Then came the invasion of the Roof of the World, called by Mao the ‘liberation’ of Tibet. A two-phase operation was meticulously planned by the Great helmsman; the first part culminated in the Battle of Chamdo in 1950, which saw the Tibetan forces being decimated; after the winter had passed, the Communist regime started the second phase, a diplomatic one; the weak Tibetan State was forced to put its thumbprint on an agreement allowing Communist China to take over the Land of Snows.
An ‘Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet’, better known as the ‘17-Point Agreement’ was signed (‘under duress’ according the Dalai Lama) in Beijing on May 23, 1951 by Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, the former Governor of the Eastern Province of Kham, then a prisoner of war.
The Tibetan delegates were ‘trapped’ into this (the seals of the Tibetan government had to be forged for the purpose, but never mind). The consequences for Tibet would be most momentous; not only Tibet would lose more than its independence, because here too, China would not keep its promises.
On September 9, 1951, soon after the Tibetans had signed on the dotted line, several thousand PLA troops entered Lhasa under the command of General Wang Qimei; subsequently 20,000 troops began to occupy the most strategic points on the Tibetan Plateau. India had a new neighbour.
The next step for Beijing was to subdue the Indian government with a well-orchestrated propaganda of ‘eternal friendship’ between the two Asian giants; the Hindi-Chini-Bhai-Bhai honeymoon between Delhi and Beijing began to flourish.
In April 1954, India and China signed the so-called Panchsheel Agreement about Tibet, to which the Tibetans were not even invited to participate. India’s long border with Tibet (now China) was wishfully deemed settled in the process; Delhi thought that by signing this hasty agreement, it had ‘fixed’ the border.
But two months later, the ink on the treaty had hardly dried, the Chinese troops walked into Indian territory; the PLA entered for the first time in Barahoti, a small flat grazing ground located in today’s Chamoli district of Uttarakhand.
It was another broken promise, the first two of the Five Principles (‘Panchsheel’) spoke of ‘Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty and Mutual non-aggression’.
In April 1958, for the first time, officials of India and China sat together to try and sort out the issue. It was a first rehearsal for the long negotiations which would take place in 1960; both led nowhere.
As a compromise in Barahoti, India agreed that Chinese ‘unarmed’ patrols could visit the place in summer till the case was solved; Beijing never kept its promise and repeatedly sent armed soldiers to Barahoti.
Sixty-two years after the negotiators agreed to be unarmed, the Chinese still cross the Tunjun-la and armed personnel walk into the desolate area.
Many more examples could be cited, i.e. the agreements of 1993, 1996 or 2005 on the borders which are often forgotten. For example, Article VII of the 2005 Guidelines said: “In reaching a boundary settlement, the two sides shall safeguard due interests of their settled populations in the border areas.” It was clearly referring to Tawang, but a few months later, Beijing started claiming again the area; to the long list of broken promises, one can add the decision for a disengagement arrived at during the recent five rounds of talks between the Corps Commanders in Ladakh. Where is the disengagement today?
Considering China’s track record in the matter, The Global Times should be less arrogant, but it is apparently impossible.

The Tibet factor in India-China relations

My article The Tibet factor in India-China relations appeared in The Sunday Guardian

Here is the link...

The virus which originated in Wuhan, China and the unexpected attack by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on Indian frontiers in Ladakh have forced India to re-look at her relations with China. After ambitious generals in Chengdu’s Western Theater Command sold the idea to Xi to advance the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh, the bonhomie between India and China has become past history; in the process, Xi Jinping has destroyed the trust built during the Wuhan Consensus in 2018 and the Chennai Connect in 2019.
Borrowing the words of Beijing’s tacticians, some in India have suggested using ‘ten thousand methods’ to tackle the Middle Kingdom.
Among the different ‘methods’, many speak of a ‘Tibet Card’.
Though the word ‘card’ may not be adequate, one can certainly speak of Tibet Factor in the India-China relations.
Since the beginning of the 20th century, the Tibetan nation had all the attributes of a sovereign State (a government, a language, a script, a flag, a (weak) army, coins, stamps, etc); for centuries, the Land of Snow had unhindered relations with India, first and foremost, in the cultural and spiritual domains (Tibetan Buddhism originates from Nalanda, let us not forget), but also economically with countless ‘silk’ roads across the Himalaya; in other words, there was a deep kinship.
All this came to a sudden end when Mao decided to ‘liberate’ Tibet.
The Great Helmsman was not interested in the civilization aspect, but purely in Tibet’s strategic assets; by invading Tibet, China gained not only a huge landmass, but access to the ‘water tower of Asia’, large mineral resources and a strategic position dominating the subcontinent. The welfare of the Tibetan masses was not the Communists’ concern.
In 1950, by weakness or idealism, the Indian government abandoned Tibet to its own fate …for the sake of world peace.
In a recently-published quadrilogy covering the period between 1947 and 1962, I described this momentous era: India became independent; China did its own revolution, resulting in the arrival of a new regime, more brutal in its approach, especially towards the periphery of the Middle Kingdom. While most of the African and Asian nations were decolonized, Tibet, a de facto independent nation came under the yoke of Communist China.
An unprepared and peaceful Land of Snows became part of the Chinese ‘Motherland’. The events that we are today witnessing in Ladakh have their origin in a series of blunders committed in the 1950s and 1960s.
In India, the tumultuous year 1950 saw the emergence of two factions: one led by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and KM Panikkar, his ambassador in Beijing, both obsessed with an imaginary friendship with New China and fixated on the ‘larger implications for World Peace’ for any decision concerning Tibet; the other, which immediately saw the strategic implications for India’s frontiers if Delhi let Tibet down, was led by Sardar Patel, the Deputy Prime Minster, with Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, the Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations as his main adviser, but also comprised of President Rajendra Prasad, C. Rajagopalachari, KM Munshi and others. They were fed with reports ‘from the ground’ by Harishwar Dayal, the brilliant Political Officer in Sikkim and Sumul Sinha, the Head of the Indian Mission in Lhasa, two sincere and far-sighted civil servants. At that time, India had a full-fledged Mission in Tibet as well as three Trade Agencies in Gyantse, Yatung and Gartok.
The dichotomy between the officers on the ground and the ‘visionaries’ in Delhi continued till October 1962, when China’s massive invasion in NEFA and in Ladakh brought the idealists back on earth.
One can trace the first blunder to December 1949 when India kept quiet after Beijing unilaterally closed down the Indian Consulate in Kashgar, Sinkiang (today Xinjiang).
By taking over Xinjiang, Mao controlled the western borders of the Middle Kingdom, he could access trade with Central Asia and block any possibility of Soviet southward advance; for the first time, he also came in contact with the Indian frontiers, particularly the Aksai Chin area, the object of today’s conflict; a few years later, Beijing built a road across Indian territory linking up Xinjiang with Tibet.
On November 7, 1950, a well-drafted appeal to the UN was sent from Kalimpong (as there were no postal facilities in Lhasa), pointing to the fact that “the Tibetans were racially, culturally and geographically far apart from the Chinese.” It also made a parallel with the situation in the Korean peninsula: “The attention of the world was then riveted on Korea where aggression was being resisted by an international force.” Similar happenings in Tibet were taking place with the world covering its eyes.
Delhi decided to bury the issue in the UN by telling the General Assembly that it would sort out the issue and find a peaceful solution. Interestingly, some years ago, a Canadian scholar, Claudia Johnston studied the issue; the outcome of her research was that the Tibetan Appeal was still a pending matter in the UN …waiting to be reopened.
Another very-little known, but consequential blunder was that Delhi accepted to downgrade its full-fledged Mission in Lhasa to a Consulate General in 1952. It was secretly done without the knowledge of the Indian Parliament. This action, initiated by KM Panikkar, practically brought down Tibet to the level of a province of China; Delhi thought it would please Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier; of course, India did not get anything in return.
Two years later, Delhi took the initiative to call a conference to discuss the trade and pilgrimage between Tibet and India.
One of the most immoral parts of what became the Panchsheel Agreement, was that Delhi ignored the existence of the Tibetan Government; Delhi only dealt with the new masters of the Roof of the World, without informing the Dalai Lama’s Administration. Strange for a government so vociferous about the decolonization of Africa or Asia, while Tibet enjoyed what the Indian Prime Minister himself described as an autonomy ‘verging on Independence’.
The “Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India” was signed on April 29, 1954 in Beijing. The talks would take four months to arrive at a settlement …forgetting the border in the process.
The ‘Panchsheel’ Agreement resulted in the unhindered advance of the Communist ideology and the PLA on the Tibetan plateau.
At the time, many senior Indian politicians and diplomats, educated in ‘modern’ ideas, thought the ‘old Lama hierarchy’ should be swept away and Tibet become a ‘modern’ country; they believed that the Chinese invasion was a chance to make a clean sweep of the old superstitions, beliefs or rituals. What a folly!

A New Tibet Policy
It is easier to commit a blunder than to repair its consequences, however in view of the present situation on the borders, it is necessary to take a first step and re-think what could be a new approach, not only towards Tibet and the Tibetan refugees, but also the entire Himalayan belt.
It would indeed be more advantageous to have a policy for the entire Himalaya, including Tibet, which have shared countless cultural, spiritual, strategic and economic similarities. The first step could be the creation of an Office of Northern Frontiers and Tibetan Affairs under the Prime Minister’s Office.
For the purpose, Delhi should start a dialogue with the Tibetans (for example with the present Dalai Lama’s representative in Delhi, who has a great knowledge in security issues) and the Himalayan States.
Some general principles should dictate the new policy.
First, India should look after her own interests and the security of the people living on the borders; it seems obvious, but it has not always been the case.
Another principle is that India’s policies or actions should not be dictated by what others will think or say, particularly how China will react to a particular decision. This tendency has lasted too long with no tangible gain for the country; for example, the 2018 notice circulated to all ministries/departments ordering that no Indian officials should meet the Dalai Lama had serious counter-productive effects.
It is unfortunate but it is a fact that India faces a country which still believes that power comes from the barrel of a gun; without emulating China, India needs to quietly and forcefully look after her own interests and be straightforward about it; a closer kinship between Delhi and Dharamsala is in the country’s interests.
Whatever over-all policy is adopted by the Government at a later stage, one element is critical: coordination. In view of the individualistic tendencies of the Indian bureaucracy, this is crucial in order to achieve the targeted aim of the policy between the different shareholders (Ministries of External Affairs, Defence; Home Affairs, Education, Culture, intelligence agencies, etc).
Without proper coordination, it will be just one more futile new policy.
The creation of such a Department would be the first step to strengthen the border areas, and use the goodwill of the Tibetans towards India; the rest will follow. But undoing the knots of the past will take time.

India, Tibet, Xinjiang: tales of China's Broken Promises

My article India, Tibet, Xinjiang: tales of China's Broken Promises was published by Strategic News International

Here is the link...

The Ladakh situation, especially the brutal killing of the Commanding Officer (CO) of the 16 Bihar regiment and 19 of his men, has generated a lot of debate in the printed media as well the TV studios; some observers noticed that India has the largest number of experts not only in cricket, but also in the medical field (COVID-19) and even in defense matters.
However, some comments which came from knowledgeable former diplomats who served in China or retired Army generals who had dealt with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), are worth noting.
In the first category, Ambassador Gautam Bambawale rightly explained on this channel that Beijing has broken one clause or another, of each and every agreement that it was signed with India since 1993 to maintain peace and tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
The fact that the mysterious line never existed, except in the Machiavellian mind of Zhou Enlai is not relevant here.

Some Other Examples
I would like to add a few examples of promises not kept by Communist China after 1949, which have tremendous implications on the present situation.
Hardly two months after Mao solemnly announced the birth of the People’s Republic of China from the Tiananmen Square, the PLA annexed Xinjiang …closing down the Indian Consulate General in Kashgar in the same stroke.
Delhi was told that the new regime would have to renegotiate all its former agreements, a position untenable in international law.
By taking over Xinjiang, Mao controlled the western borders of the Middle Kingdom, he could access trade with Central Asia and block any possibility of Soviet southward advance; he also came for the first time in contact with the Indian frontiers, particularly the Aksai Chin area, witnessing the present tension.
The capture of Xinjiang, formerly East Turkestan was perhaps one of the greatest strategic feats in modern military annals.
Mao Zedong’s words are telling about the mindset of the Chinese military leaders at that time: “People may ask if there is contradiction to abandon a territory gained by heroic battle. This is to put the wrong question. Does one eat to no purpose simply because he relieves himself later? Does one sleep in vain because one wakes up and goes about? These are illusions born out of subjectivism and formalism and do not exist in real life.”
The ‘real life’ meant controlling Xinjiang and Tibet …and the Aksai Chin, including Galwan, Hot Springs or Pangong tso areas and building a road linking the two new acquired provinces. This was done in the earlier 1950s.
The first broken promise was about the Indian Consulate in Kashgar, despite Beijing’s promises, it would never be reopened.
Further, Beijing repeatedly told the Uyghurs that the PLA had come to help them to develop the area; the Uyghurs still do not understand how they have been ‘helped’ during all these decades.
India kept the closure of its Consulate secret because “nothing could be done about it”.

The Case of Tibet
A few months later, Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, the Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs told the US Ambassador Loy Henderson: “India [is] at present so immersed in problem [of] maintaining world peace it was giving little thought to Tibet; in fact, he did not recall that Tibet was even mentioned during recent Commonwealth Conference.”
That was another blunder.
A two-phase operation was meticulously planned by Mao Zedong; the first part culminated in the Battle of Chamdo n 1950. which saw the Tibetan forces being decimated; after the winter had passed, the Communist regime started the second phase, a diplomatic one; the weak Tibetan State was forced to put its thumbprint on an agreement allowing Communist China to take over the Land of Snows.
An ‘Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet’, better known as the ‘17-Point Agreement’ was signed (‘under duress’ according the Dalai Lama) in Beijing on May 23, 1951 by Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, the former Governor of the Eastern Province of Kham, then a prisoner of war.
The Tibetan delegates were ‘trapped’ into this (the seals of the Tibetan government had to be forged for the purpose, but never mind). The consequences for Tibet would be most momentous; Tibet would lose its independence.
But there too, China did not keep its promises.
For example, Article 4 said: “The central authorities will not alter the existing political system in Tibet. The central authorities also will not alter the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama. Officials of various ranks shall hold office as usual.”
This and many other promises would never be kept.
Though the Agreement meant an obvious loss of autonomy for Tibet, which was bad for India’s frontiers, an attitude of hopelessness prevailed in Delhi during the following months and years. At the same time, Nehru was trying to solve ‘more important’ problems, i.e. Korea for example.
As soon as the Tibetans had signed on the dotted line, Mao sent the PLA in Tibet to ‘implement’ the clauses which were convenient to China.
On September 9, 1951, several thousand PLA troops entered Lhasa under the command of General Wang Qimei; subsequently 20,000 troops began to occupy the most strategic points on the Tibetan Plateau.
With no objection from the Government of India on the take-over of Tibet, Mao wanted the supremacy of the PLA to be established on the ground.
Once the military take-over of Tibet had been ‘legalized’ by the 17-Point Agreement, the Communist plans unfolded. The next step for Beijing was to subdue the Indian government with a well-orchestrated propaganda of ‘eternal friendship’ between the two Asian giants; the Hindi-Chini-Bhai-Bhai honeymoon between Delhi and Beijing began to flourish.
But over the next months and years, the Indian officials posted on the Roof of the World would discover the true objectives of the Communists; but nobody in Delhi or the Indian Embassy in Beijing was ready to listen to their reports.

The Panchsheel Agreement
In April 1954, India and China signed the so-called Panchsheel Agreement about Tibet, to which the Tibetans were not even invited to participate. India’s long border with Tibet (now China) was wishfully deemed settled in the process; Delhi thought that by signing this hasty agreement, it had ‘fixed’ the border.
But two months later, the ink on the treaty had hardly dried, the Chinese troops walked into Indian territory; the PLA entered for the first time in Barahoti, a small flat grazing ground located in today’s Chamoli district of Uttarakhand.
It was another broken promise, the first two of the Five Principles (‘Panchsheel’) spoke of ‘Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty and Mutual non-aggression’.
At that time, the Indian Government started noticing some cartographical aggression by Beijing; it was the beginning of the ‘Chinese Aggression in Maps’ (see maps).

The Case of Barahoti
Every year, intrusions are reported in this area ‘perceived’ by China as its territory, even though the small basin is located south of watershed marked by the Tunjun-la pass.
In April 1958, for the first time, officials of India and China sat together to try and sort out the issue. It was a first rehearsal for the long negotiations which would take place in 1960. Both would lead nowhere.
As a compromise, India agreed that Chinese ‘unarmed’ patrols could visit the place in summer till the case was solved; Beijing never kept its promise and repeatedly sent armed soldiers to Barahoti.
Sixty-two years after the negotiators agreed to be unarmed, the Chinese still cross the Tunjun-la and walk into the desolate area.
Worse, on June 4, 2017, PTI reported: “Two helicopters of the People's Liberation Army of China hovered over Chamoli district in Uttarakhand, triggering concern in India's security establishment about the fourth such incursion into Indian airspace since March this year.”
This was two weeks before the beginning of the Doklam episode.
During the ‘Wuhan Consensus’, President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Modi tried to find a modus operandi on the border to avoid incidents such as in Doklam, but Chinese intrusions continued to take place and helicopter aerial violations were reported in 2018 and in 2019.

One could list many more broken promises, the minutes of a meeting held between China and India in 2012 proved that the mutual agreement not to disturb the trijunction Bhutan-Sikkim-Tibet, was not respected; on June 16, 2017, Beijing broke its promises and started to build a road in Doklam area.

Further examples could be cited.
With this mindset, it is not surprising that the Chinese troops did not respect the agreement reached at the meeting of the Corps Commanders on June 6 to disengage from Galwan and Hot Springs sectors … and to remain unarmed (a mace is after all a weapon, isn’t it?).
India should learn that Beijing respects its commitments only when it is convenient for its objectives or interests.
Tibetans and Uyghurs too, who were the first to suffer from broken promises, should remember this, if they want to negotiate one day a solution for the future of their motherland.

In 2019, why India must remain cautious of Chinese intentions

My article "In 2019, why India must remain cautious of Chinese intentions" appeared in Mail Today/DailyO

Here is the link...

New Delhi can play the duet but has to be ready for the duel.

China watchers are breathing easier; India and China are friends again.

On December 21, China's State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi arrived in New Delhi for a four-day visit to India.

During his stay in Delhi, Wang reiterated that the Chinese ‘dragon’ and Indian ‘elephant’ “should join each other in a duet, not a duel.” He spoke of both countries ‘ushering in an Asian Century’; it was reminiscent of the Nehru-Zhou Enlai duo. Wang co-chaired the first-ever meeting of the China-India High-Level Mechanism on Cultural and People-to-People Exchanges with his Indian counterpart, Sushma Swaraj.


Panchsheel parable

In an Oped in The Hindustan Times, Wang wrote: “China and India are each other's important neighbours and the world's two largest developing countries. Friendly exchanges and win-win cooperation between China and India will positively affect the evolution of a global landscape and human society.

The new 'bhai-bhai' atmosphere is the outcome of the ‘Wuhan consensus’; the informal Wuhan summit between President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Narendra Modi in April which ‘left a deep imprint’ on bilateral relations. One can only rejoice about the new relaxed mood.
This, however, reminds me of the euphoria when India and China signed the Panchsheel Agreement on Tibet in 1954.

It is usually forgotten that less than two months after the accord was inked, the Chinese started trespassing in Barahoti in Chamoli district. Since then, the ‘intrusions’ have unabatedly continued and will continue in 2019. This probably means India needs to remain vigilant.

One of the most memorable events which took place in 1978 was when 18 farmers in Xiaogang village, in Anhui Province, signed a secret agreement to divide collectively-owned farmland into individual pieces and drop the collectivisation of the Great Leap Forward, which resulted in some 40 million casualties.

Forty years later, the name Xiaogang is been used for a different project: the building of a large number of ‘model’ villages in Tibet, along the border with India.

On October 19, China Tibet News reported that since the beginning of 2018, Tsona County, north of Arunachal Pradesh’s Tawang District, has been “vigorously promoting the construction of border ‘Xiaogang’ villages” (the literal meaning of ‘Xiaogang’ is ‘moderately well off’ ). Tsona County alone has invested 519 million yuan (US$ 74 million) in the construction projects of nine border villages, benefiting 1,961 people from 617 households. Some 2.2 billion yuan (US$ 314 million) has already been spent and 40 per cent of the projects completed.

The Tibet turnstile

In May, China Tibet News explained that Lepo, the first village in Tibet, north of the border in Khenzimane (in Tawang district) boasted of rich vegetation and clear waters: “With impressive scenery and unique ethnic customs, Magmang ecological civilization village is also situated in Lepo Valley, Tsona County.” Magmang was awarded “China's beautiful leisure village” by the Ministry of Agriculture. China has 26 national key tourist attractions; including the Lepo Valley, near the Thagla ridge, which saw clashes between India and China in October 1962.

The new tourist scheme, "Slowing down the speed of tour, enjoying the sea of azaleas in Lepo Valley", prolonged the peak season, explained the Chinese authorities. It is probably not a coincidence that the Dalai Lama spent his last night in Tibet in Magmang on March 30, 1959, on his way to take refuge in India. The next day, he crossed the border at Khenzimane.

The model villages are officially linked to two themes: ‘poverty alleviation’ and ‘defense of the borders’. The local populations are said to be the ‘Guardians of the Sacred Land’.

Beijing has started duplicating what has been done in Nyingchi and Lhoka areas in Ngari prefecture, north of Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh; first and foremost, improving the infrastructure of the border by building Xiaogang villages.

Part of this scheme is to build three new airports in Purang, in Ngari prefecture of Western Tibet; in Lhuntse, north of Tawang district and a last one, near the Nepal border. The construction should this year and will be functional in 2021. The official objective of these airports is to strengthen the border's communications. Let’s not forget airports and highways on the plateau legally have a dual-use (civilian and military).

Enter the dragon
There is another aspect to the Communist Party’s policy on the Indian borders: recalcitrant Tibetans are relocated to places further away from ‘sensitive’ Indian borders. An article appeared in the French edition of China Tibet Online: ‘Relocation of the villagers of Lhodrak: mission over’, mentioning ‘relocation’ of Tibetan populations far from the border. Some Xiaogang villages are located north of Bhutan, near the eastern trijunction between India, China and Bhutan, an area disputed by China.
There is however a difference with the western trijunction (Doklam). India has no military presence in the area.
A new Type 15 light tank was also inducted by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on the Tibetan plateau. Chinese analysts say it is for “combat readiness in these sensitive regions.” Beijing’s defence ministry confirmed the deployment. In July, The PLA Daily claimed that Beijing moved military gear while conducting a long live-fire exercise at an altitude of 5,000 meters, on the plateau. The Western Theatre Command simultaneously moved the hardware by rail and road south of the Kunlun Mountains in northern Tibet.
All these trends show that India should remain watchful during the coming year and certainly not get carried away by any ‘Asian brotherhood’ slogans.
Play the duet, but be ready for the duel.

Diplomat TN Kaul's 'serious affair' with a Chinese girl and what all went behind 1954 Indo-China agreement on Tibet

Thuksey Rinpoche, Kushok Bakula, Indira Gandhi and TN Kaul in Ladakh

My article Diplomat TN Kaul's 'serious affair' with a Chinese girl and what all went behind 1954 Indo-China agreement on Tibet appeared in Mail Today/Daily O

Though Kaul was asked to return to India immediately, he took four weeks to come back to Delhi.


History is often politically distorted and it is sometimes only decades later that one discovers it. The image that successive governments left of the Panchsheel Agreement is that it was “the best thing” that Nehru did. Unfortunately, the facts do not tally with the myth.

Fate Sealed
The ‘five principles’ were just a small preamble of the “Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India" signed on April 29, 1954 in Beijing by the Indian Ambassador N. Raghavan and Zhang Hanfu, the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister of China; it was about mutual trading and pilgrimage rights.
On May 15, Nehru admitted to the Parliament that the agreement had settled the fate of Tibet, a peaceful independent nation, which was suddenly deprived of its autonomy: “So far as Tibet is concerned, it is a recognition of the existing situation there,” Nehru stated.
For the Prime Minister, the most important feature of the Agreement was not the fate of the Tibetans, but the ‘wider implications for world peace’.
That day, Nehru was in his revolutionary mood: “Now we must realise that this revolution that came to China is the biggest thing that has taken place in the world at present, whether you like it or not.”
During the debate which followed, most of the members from the Congress and the Communist Party were enthusiastic in their endorsement of the agreement. Acharya Kripalani however strongly attacked the Government policy: “We feel that China, after it had gone Communist, committed an act of aggression against Tibet.” A few years later, Kripalani, would call the Agreement, “Born in Sin”.
Historical documents, recently opened to the public, bring some light on how the accord was arrived at; retrospectively, it is clear that it has been the worst-negotiated treaty post-independence.
Whatever position and advantages India had in Tibet, were lost week after week during the four-month hard talks in Beijing, while the border issue was left hanging …it is still pending 64 years later.
One incident which has never been related outside South Block needs to be related.

'Honey Tray'
On March 13, 1954, NT Pillai, the Secretary General of the Ministry wrote to the Prime Minister about the private life of the glamorous Indian Chargé d’affaires in Beijing who had written to Nehru about his private life. After quoting the second marriage of V. Shankar, a staff member of the embassy, Pillai wrote “Kaul's letter has left me somewhat dazed. …Here are two able young men - serious minded, practical, shrewd, even ambitious - cutting themselves away from their moorings, with apparently little thought of where they are going to drift.”
TN Kaul, the Chargé d’affaires was having a ‘serious affair’ with a Chinese girl and wanted to marry her: “One feels sad and subdued at the sight of this volcanic eruption of deep-seated emotions. For all the actors in this human drama, both willing and unwilling, …[it is] as a member of a profession with a code of behaviour, that I must consider the situation before us.”
The Secretary General was deeply upset: “Every Foreign Service officer is expected to obtain the Government's permission before he marries a foreigner. Had Kaul been an unmarried man, a widower, or divorcee, his request for permission to marry a Chinese girl would have caused us enough worry, if only because we know nothing of the antecedents of the girl.”
Not only did Kaul have a lawfully-wedded wife and two children, but more critically for India, he was conducting tricky the negotiations with China.
Even in normal times, this is called a ‘honey trap’; in this case, India’s relations with Tibet and the fate of the common border depended on the outcome of the talks.
Pillai rightly pointed out: “If the new partner is to be a foreigner, even the legality of the alliance is open to doubt, and the Government cannot by according their administrative approval, legalise what is not permissible under the law.”
Pillai said that in the case of Shankar, he was sent back to his Province, “we cannot treat Kaul very differently. At the same time I do not suggest we should threaten him with expulsion from the ICS.”

Missed Opportunity
Pillai considered Kaul’s request for two months’ leave ex-India on the conclusion of his duty in Peking unreasonable: “It is his duty to return to India and report to us on the negotiations in which he has participated. With his past record, he will not, we hope, shirk his obvious duty.”
This entire episode is flabbergasting to say the least.
Was the intransigence of the Chinese negotiators connected to the fact that they had a hold on Kaul? It is difficult to say for certain.
In any case, it was unheard of that a senior diplomat, holding crucial talks for his nation, could have at the same time an affair with an ‘unknown’ lady from the opposite side.
The Prime Minister immediately replied to Pillai’s note: “I would like Kaul to return to India as soon as possible without waiting for end of Tibetan talks which I presume are nearing completion.” The next day, Ambassador Raghavan took over the negotiations.
Though he was asked to return to India immediately, Kaul took four weeks to come back to Delhi. The Prime Minister ‘spoke’ to him; he was however transferred as Joint Secretary in charge …of China, where he officiated several years. Later, he became Ambassador to Soviet Union, America and Foreign Secretary.
India not only lost her advantages in Tibet, but it missed an incredible opportunity to settle her border with China; a gentle neighbour was lost while the guilty officer was forgiven …and promoted.
Is there another country in the world where this could happen?

Tibet and the 'Larger Issues'

Discussing 'larger issues'
Zhou Enlai, Panchen Lama, Mao, Dalai Lama, Liu Shaoqi (October 1954)

Recently the Dalai Lama made some remarks on Jawaharlal Nehru and the Partition of India.
Without going into the (unnecessary) controversy, it is interesting to see the views of the first Prime Minister of Independent India on what he called the ‘Tibetan émigrés’ in the early 1950s, three months after signing (without informing the Tibetans), The Agreement on trade and intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India (infamously remembered as the ‘Panchsheel Agreement’.
In a note dictated on June 18, 1954, Nehru answers some of the questions raised by BK Kapur, the Political Officer (PO) in Sikkim (from March 1952 to March 1955).
The PO was looking after Tibet (including Western Tibet till the Ladakh border), Bhutan and Sikkim).
The note gives some hints on Nehru’s policy vis-a-vis the Tibetans (‘Naturally, the Tibetans have our sympathy. But that sympathy does not take us far’).
It is addressed to the Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs (NR Pillai), the Foreign Secretary (RK Nehru) and Joint Secretary (TN Kaul). It is available in the Nehru Papers (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library)
Nehru’s note brings first and foremost the ‘larger issues’ which four years earlier, decided the Prime Minister to ‘drop’ a Tibet ‘verging independence’ (in Nehru’s own words), for the sake of a friendship with China.
These ‘larger issues’, the local officials (Harishwar Dayal before Kapur in Gangtok, Sumul Sinha in Lhasa or Maj SM Krishnatry in Gyantse) ‘could’ not understand them, at least according to the Prime Minister.
But one could ask: did Nehru understand that, with the arrival of the People’s Liberation Army on the plateau, India was in the process of losing its peaceful border with Tibet.
It has to be noted that June 1954 corresponds to the first Chinese intrusions in Barahoti in today’s Chamoli district to Uttarakhand.
This obsessive concern for ‘wider issues’ will lead India to an utter disaster in October 1962, when China attacked India in NEFA and Ladakh; India was not ready to defend its borders.
“Mr Kapur has not fully appreciated this wider policy of ours”, said Nehru, though more than 60 years later, it is clear that officers like Kapur had grasp a far truer image of China than the corridors of South Block.
Nehru commented “I do not like Mr Kapur talking about Chinese communists, although they are communists. He should talk about the Chinese Government.”
Unfortunately, Mao’s government was ‘Communist’ and proud to be; India paid dear to realize this.

The Note
The various questions raised in these notes and in Mr Kapur's letter an important not only in themselves, but because they are concerned with much larger issues. Indeed, they are concerned with our wider policy towards China and our general world policy.

2- Naturally, the Tibetans have our sympathy. But that sympathy does not take us far and cannot be allowed to interfere with a realistic understanding of the situation and of our policy. I have an impression that Mr Kapur has not fully appreciated this wider policy of ours. It is necessary, therefore, that he and others concerned should understand it and should realise that this policy is the only one which might be helpful to the Tibetans, not in the measure perhaps that they desire, but to some extent. Any other policy of encouraging the Tibetans to oppose Chinese over lordship over Tibet would be raising false hopes in the Tibetans which we cannot fulfil and is likely to react unfavorably on the Tibetans. It would, of course, be opposed to the principles we have laid down in our recent Agreement with China.

3- Mr Kapur talks that the Chinese Government is not likely to be influenced by considerations of non-interference, etc. At the same time he hints that we should also not be influenced by any such considerations, except in so far as that we should not do anything which might create obvious difficulties for us. That is neither a moral nor a practical proposition.

4- No country can ultimately rely upon the permanent goodwill or bona fides of another country, even though they might be in close friendship with each other. It is conceivable that the Western Atlantic alliance may not function as it was intended to and there might be ill will between the countries concerned. It is not inconceivable that China and the Soviet Union may not continue to be as friendly as they are now. Certainly it is conceivable that our relations with China might worsen, though there is no immediate likelihood of that. Therefore, we have always to keep in mind the possibly of a change and not be taken unawares. Adequate precautions have to be taken. If we come to an agreement with China in regard to Tibet, that is not a permanent guarantee, but that itself is one major step to help us in the present and in the foreseeable future in various ways. If there is an agreement at Geneva about the problems of Indo-China and Korea, that La no guarantee about the future, but it is certainly a big step forward to lessen tension which enables the countries concerned to think more objectively and peacefully and perhaps find a surer basis for peace. In spite of that agreement they will not give up their suspicions or their preparations, but other factors will also come into the picture. At present an objective and realistic understanding is made almost impossible by emotional responses. The Russians and the Chinese are full of charges against ‘Western Imperialism’ and aggression and all that. The Americans and others can only think in terms of Communist aggression and villainy, of international communism trying to dominate over the world and so on. All this prevents intelligent thought. If we wish to discuss these matters helpfully, we must avoid certain terms which create powerful reactions in the mind, such as imperialists, communists and the like. I do not like Mr Kapur talking about Chinese communists, although they are communists. He should talk about the Chinese Government. In the same way, I do not like people talking about the Iron Curtain. The mere mention of these words confuses thought and shows that we are not considering a matter objectively.

5- Of course, both the Soviet Union and China are expansive. They are expansive for evils other than communism, although communism may be made a tool for the purpose. Chinese expansionism has been evident during various periods of Asian history for a thousand years or so. We arc perhaps facing a new period of such expansionism. Let us consider that and fashion our policy to prevent it coming in the way of our interests or other interests that we consider important.

6-I can quite understand that many people in Tibet have been disappointed at the agreement between us in China over Tibet. This must be partly because of the colour put on it by the Chinese in Tibet. That agreement, however, was quite inevitable. It was a recognition of a certain factual situation which we could not possibly change. We have, in fact, at least got some advantage out of that agreement in other respects. If we had not had that agreement, the position would have been no better for us in Tibet and a little worse for the Tibetans. It certainly would have been worse for us from a wider point of view.

7- We must remember that our so-called interests in Tibet derive largely from our inheriting certain British interests to which they succeeded in establishing in the days of British expansionism. We became the inheritors of British imperialism to a slight extent. We were popular with the ruling classes of Tibet at this stage because they thought we would come in the way of Chinese expansionism. We could not do so in Tibet and we could not possibly hang on to privileges which had no meaning in the present state of affairs.

8- Mr Kapur says something about our not throwing cold water on various movements in Tibet against the Chinese though we should not associate ourselves with them, that we should allow them to simmer and not die out. Let us be clear about this. Whatever happens in Tibet proper is beyond our reach. We can neither help nor hinder it. The question is what we do in our own territory. Do we encourage this or not? It is clear that we cannot encourage it. Al best we can tolerate it, provided it is not too obvious or aggressive. A very delicate balance will have to be kept up.

9- Kalimpong is and has been a nest of intrigues and spies. It is not only a centre of Tibetan émigrés, but also of Communists (Chinese). Also of Americans, White Russians and many others. We tolerate all these persons and we can tolerate also the Tibetans of various kinds and views. But if any of these indulge in aggressive activities which might lead to violence, then obviously we cannot tolerate them. I am sure that the Tibetan émigrés in Kalimpong, etc, are in close touch with the Americans, White Russians, etc, and are being encouraged by them with money and in other ways. In fact, I heard that there was a question of their collecting arms also. All this seems to me childish and totally unrealistic.

10- Even one of the major and much advertised efforts of the Americans to bring down the People's Government of China through Formosa is now recognised to be futile. Is it then in the slightest degree conceivable that some petty violent effort organised by Tibetans and others on our border would produce results in Tibet? This can only be thought of in terms of some aggressive Americans as a diversion from their larger world policy or in case a big war occurs. From the Tibetan point of view, it can only prove harmful. There is not the least chance in the world of China leaving Tibet or being driven out of Tibet unless China is defeated in war. Of that there appears to be no chance. Therefore, these adventurous tactics beyond the borders of Tibet have no meaning and call only embarrass and prove harmful. We need not come in the way if they are peaceful and unobtrusive but I quite agree with SG [Secretary General] that we should explain our policy and the world situation to the people from Tibet so that they may not misunderstand us. It is clear that if they indulge in any aggressive action and the Chinese Government complains to us, we shall have no alternative left but to take some steps against them, at any rate to curb them. We shall certainly not hand them over to the Chinese State, because they have a right of asylum in our country and we can give them the fullest assurance about this. At the same time we cannot permit our territory to be used as a base of operations against the Chinese.

11- The real argument in favour of Tibetan freedom or autonomy is the nature of the country. It is most inhospitable to others, it cannot maintain large numbers of foreigners and the like. If the Tibetans are stout enough to keep up a spirit of freedom, they will maintain a large measure of autonomy and the Chinese will not interfere. If the Tibetans actively rebel, they will be ruthlessly put down by the Chinese and even their autonomy will go. They are between the Soviet Union and China and one or other of these two Powers will have a dominating political influence there. We in India cannot exercise it for geographical as well as other reasons. As a friendly Power to China we can be helpful occasionally hi the diplomatic field.

12- The brother of the Dalai Lama [Gyalo Thondup], whom I met some years ago, is obviously connected with various under-ground activities. Some time back we warned our officers not to get entangled in them. That warning should be given again. That does not mean that we should be unfriendly to him. It simply means that we should be friendly and frank and should explain the limitations of the position.

13- We must remember that Tibet has been cut off from the world for a long time and, socially speaking, is very backward and feudal. Changes are bound to come there to the disadvantage of the small ruling class and the big monasteries. Religion may continue to be a powerful force to hold the Tibetans together, but social forces are also powerful. Thus far the Chinese have been careful not to interfere with social customs, religion, etc.
So far as I know, they have not even interfered with the land system which is feudal. I can very well understand these feudal chiefs being annoyed with the new order. We can hardly stand up as defenders of feudalism.

14- I want to make one thing perfectly clear, and this should be made clear to the Tibetans who are in India, that there is no question of our handing them over to the Chinese. They have every right to live in India or to seek asylum in India and we shall respect that.

15- As regards the Tibetan Mission in Kalimpong, we need not take any step about it and so far as we are concerned, they can continue for the present, but I rather doubt If they will be allowed to continue by the Chinese authorities. We must make sure, however, that the Tibetan Mission, as the Joint Secretary says, is not used as a cover for something else.

16- As regards the Dalai Lama's treasure which is now in Gangtok, I do not see the point of transferring it to Calcutta or elsewhere. First of all we have no direct knowledge of the Dalai Lama's wishes. Secondly, so long as it is in India, it does not much matter whether it is in Gangtok or in Calcutta. It is under our control. If adequate guards are not there, we should make arrangements for proper protection. Any attempt to move it will probably get some kind of publicity. It Is far better to allow this matter to lie low. If at any time the Chinese claim it, then we shall have to consider what we should do about it. For the present, our view should he that it is a private treasure of the Dalai Lama and it is for the Dalai Lama to dispose of it.

17- Our policy thus should be an observance, in letter and spirit of our agreement with China in regard to Tibet, at the same time we continue our friendly feelings for Tibet and her people and make it clear that our traditional friendship with them continues. This, however, cannot lead us to any course of action which is against our agreement with China and which we think will be harmful even to Tibet and her people. For the rest, we have to be vigilant and wide awake.

18- SG suggests a holiday camp for soldiers at Kalimpong. This is not a bad idea and it might be investigated.

19- Our general position as contained in this note should be explained to Mr Kapur.

20- Mr Mullik [Bhota Nath Mullik, Director, Intelligence Bureau between 1950 and 1964], should also be made to understand it. I shall be seeing him also. We have to be very careful about our activities in Kalimpong because of the espionage and counter-espionage that is continually going on there.

Our relations today are better than ever before...

Fifty-nine years ago, the Dalai Lama arrives in India

I have been quoted by three newspapers on the recent controversy created by the circular sent by the Cabinet Secretary to ministers and officials regarding a function to be held on April 1 to celebrate the beginning of the 60th anniversary of the Dalai Lama’s exile in India.
The Tibetan leader is to bless the occasion.
If The Indian Express is to be believed, instead of just informing the officials concerned of the 'sensitivity' of the coming months, the Cabinet Secretary, on the advice of the new Foreign Secretary, issued a circular to all officials.
This raises many questions: first of all, how was the circular ‘leaked’?
Was it 'leaked' on purpose? Just to please China?
It is a possibility.
More importantly why was a circular needed?
Later the spokesperson of the ministry of External Affairs denied any change in Tibet policy.
What is the point to change the policy to deny it later?
While trying to answer these questions, a note from N. Raghavan, the Indian Ambassador in China addressed to the Indian Prime Minister, at the end of the talks for the infamous Panchsheel Agreement (I am in the process of writing a book to show why it was ‘infamous’), is worth quoting.
It is an eye-opener (it was for meat least)

Here are the articles quoting me:

• In the New Indian Express by Ramananda Sengupta: No change in India’s stance on the Dalai Lama, says MEA after caution note 

• In The Times of India by Indrani Bagchi: India, China try to reset ties ahead of Modi’s SCO trip

• In The Wire by The Wire Staff: Decoding the Puzzle of the Indian Govt Circular Distancing Itself From Dalai Lama Event

A guard of honour by the Assam Rifles in Tawang

Note from N. Raghavan to Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, New Delhi

Raghavan noted: “For security reasons, I have not dealt with this aspect in my Annual Report for 1953.”
One understands why.
The Annual Report had a large distribution while the Note was secret.
The Panchsheel Agreement, which eventuality sealed the fate of Tibet, would be signed eleven days later. The Dalai Lama's government was not even informed of the 'Tibet' negotiations.

[Covering message]

Embassy of India in China
Peking
March 18, 1954.

Jai Hind.
I feel it my duty to send you a brief Note on Chinese attitude towards India.
It was drawn up on the basis of my own observations and experience as also of my study of Chinese relations with us since the advent of New China.
I have tried to take as objective a view as possible. The Chinese unlike our warm-hearted people, are not emotional by nature, and while the Indian people often display an emotional approach towards China, the Chinese themselves have none such towards India.
They are friendly no doubt, but their attitude is forthright and matter of fact.
Any friendship is evaluated from the standpoint of its usefulness to China.
Only towards the Soviet Union an attitude of emotionalism is cultivated; and that, perhaps for reasons of ideological affinity as well as utility.
[N. Raghavan]

Note on Sino-Indian Relations

What is the attitude of the Government of New China towards India? This is a vital question, the answer to which it is the duty of India's accredited representative at Peking to find out if possible. After a careful examination and objective analysis of the various trends, express and implied, observed for about 18 months, one cannot but help coming to certain conclusions. That there is a definite policy towards India is certain. Whether it is a settled one or subject to changes, it is yet difficult to say. The period, November 1952 to December 1953, the period of India's active participation in the settlement of the Korean question, was not only an extremely trying time in Sino-Indian relations, but was, to some extent, a period of revelations. China's attitude towards India was occasionally discernible without the usual trimmings or diplomatic window-dressings. However, in the examination of Chinese policy as such towards India and her Government, one has to discount statements and expressions of opinion made by Chinese Government spokesman and official journals in the heat of controversy due to dissatisfaction.
As far as observations go, the answer to the question as to what really is the attitude of the Chinese Government towards India is briefly as follows:

1. To remain correct and friendly, without being warm and cordial, in their relations with the Government of India.
2. To prepare the way for the cultivation of warm and cordial relations with the 'People of India', as distinct from the Government of India. (The publicity line is such as to lead one to think that the Chinese Government enjoy the confidence and admiration of the Indian people to a greater extent than even the Indian Government!)
3. To wait for the emergence (in which the Chinese are Led to believe) of a "People's Government" of India and to do what they can to advance and accelerate such emergence.
4. Until then, to 'play down' India and belittle the achievements of her present Government (including their contribution to world peace and progress) or at least to keep the Chinese nation in ignorance of them.
5. To the extent possible, without offending India or her Embassy at Peking, to project India as a capitalist country, suffering from all the economic and political ills of capitalism, colonialism and feudalism; and as such, still not free, but awaiting ultimate liberation by her people (meaning the Communist Party).
6. To make use of India and her independent role in international affairs, but to see as far as possible that by doing so, India does not increase her stature in the international fields so that China's ultimate role as the leading Asian Power will in no manner be affected or threatened.

New India is considered an anachronism, a half- way house at best, in the transition from capitalism and semi-colonialism to Communism and "Popular Democracy".
As a corollary to the Chinese attitude it was observed that China gave publicly no credit to the Indian Government for its impartial assistance in the solution of the Korean problem because, to the Chinese mind, no credit was due. It was thought that the Indian Government could not have pursued any policy other than one of utmost assistance to China as the Indian people would not have allowed anything else to be done.
While the Chinese let no occasion pass without singing peans of praise of the Soviets and their contribution to Peace, and while no opportunity was missed to acknowledge the deep gratitude of the Chinese people and Government to the fraternal Soviet people and Government, not a line was publicly uttered or published in praise of India and no word of acknowledgement or thanks has so far appeared in the Chinese Press for the great and universally acclaimed contributions of India and her Government to a Korean Armistice.
India had more than her fair share of blame, criticism and condemnation in the Press and at Party meetings whenever she did not adopt the Chinese line, but little or no approbation or appreciation evenwhen India did something palatable to the Chinese.
The only public reference to India's great role in the Korean Armistice negotiations was a reference by Prime Minister Chou En-lai at a reception to a team of visiting Indian Artists in July, 1953, when he acknowledged with thanks the assistance given by the Indian Ambassador at Peking; but even this was blacked out from the Press Reports of the speech. Since the friendly policy of the Indian Government is not placed to its credit but is ascribed to public pressure which it cannot possibly withstand, it is not surprising that the Chinese Government did not - as even President Eisenhower did - send any formal letter of appreciation on the work of the Indian Custodian Force or of the Indian Chairman of the NNRC, to the Government of India.
Even during the days of 'the illegal Indian Resolution' as well as the 'illegal handing over of the Prisoners to the detaining sides' the Chinese line was to show that the objectionable steps taken by India were against Indian opinion.
The view of the Chinese Government that while the Government of India endeavours to remain neutral, it is not a free Government but is subjected to direct influences of Britain, and indirectly of U.S., is also occasionally visible. It was significant that according to a report that reached the Embassy of a speech delivered by one of the leading Chinese statesmen at a Secret Session of the Government Council in February 1953, the Chinese view was, more or less, as follows:-

Indian Government, as it is today, is a capitalist Government and to that extent, not reliable; India, as she is today, cannot be considered a friend, but is useful, as she is more or less certain to remain neutral in any conflict. As such, friendly relations are to be carefully maintained.

If China has a policy or programme of immediate or long-term friendship with India, one would naturally expect to see some signs of it. At least the people of the country would have been prepared. The tendrils of the gigantic Publicity Octopus of the Government of China would have tried to reach all parts of the country in a programme of kindling friendly interest in India and her people. It is true that for centuries China remained self-centred. No other country seemed to exist for China. The same tradition might, to some extent, be persisting even today.
But people are taught about Soviet Russia and Sino-Soviet relations with meticulous finesse, day in and day out. For all the protestations of Asian patriotism by Chinese leaders in private conversations, there is absolutely nothing done to stimulate the interest of the Chinese people in other countries of Asia or to educate them on China's affinity, or at least friendliness towards them. India is no exception. At best, she might be occupying a special position in Chinese policy - neither friend, nor foe.
At times, one is led to wonder whether there exists a lurking feeling in some Chinese circles or rivalry - even of jealousy - a fear that India may be a threat to Chinese leadership of Asia, a role which China aspires one day to play. It is curious to observe that even references to ancient connections between India and China or to India's past contributions to Chinese culture are studiously avoided (except in unreported speeches at banquets to visiting Indian delegations).
Not only nothing is done to popularise India, but anything that might enhance her prestige is not very happily received. The anniversary of India's Republic Day usually passes unnoticed. No news paper or other journal ever mentions names like Gandhi or Tagore.
No Indian happening appears to be of the slightest interest, unless it be a C.P.I. Congress or election victory, a Lucknow students strike or a 'Peace' Committee Resolution. India, apart from pro-Chinese extracts from Indian newspapers and especially from the Commsunist journals, remains practically blacked out in the Press of this country.
None of the thousands of bookshops in China sells any book on India - whether cultural, political or economic.
While delegations of a particular colour are invited from India, invitations by the Government of India or public bodies for Conferences held in India are not welcomed or accepted. Uninvited Indian tourists do not appear to be welcome. Exchanges of students and scholars between the two countries are discouraged. Indian film publicity (Indian Information Service documentaries) has never been in demand as in other friendly countries.
Though there was little or no adverse publicity against India for the last year or so, except in so far as India had failed to toe the Chinese line concerning Korea, no information was vouchsafed to the public concerning the great strides that the Indian people under the leadership and guidance of their Government had been making in various fields.
Perhaps it is felt that any publicity concerning Indian achievements would not be helpful to the new regime in China in its propaganda to establish Chinese superiority in all fields. The Chinese people should be made to feel superior.
The only country that can do better than China is the Soviet Union. The studied silence on major happenings in India and visible indifference to India's domestic and international achievements were, therefore, understandable.

A few significant features of the situation are, however, encouraging. They are:

1. That India's Prime Minister is now deemed a sincere friend, and a reliable Asian Statesman, though the line adopted is that he should not be confused with the Government of India.
2. Indian Government's opinion is valued and the present tendency is not to estrange the Government of India, but to welcome its cooperation and assistance. It was significant and indicative of China's anxiety to retain the goodwill of the Indian Government, that a hostile contribution that appeared in a Symposium issued by the Chinese Foreign Affairs Institute, a semi-official publication, in May, 1953, was withdrawn in 3 days, on an informal protest by the Indian Embassy to the Asian Department of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
3. In the arid of desert of impersonal relations, the personal cordiality and confidence occasionally extended by the Prime Minister of China to successive Ambassadors of India in their dealings might be considered of some value for the improvement of Sino-Indian relations on a long term basis. In a country governed from the top, this relationship has been found to be of paramount importance.
4. Though little, favourable to India, is publicised, there seems to be an inner conviction gaining ground among the people that India is an agency for good in world affairs, that Indians are peaceful and peace-loving and that they should be encouraged not only in their good neighbour policy, but also in their efforts at world Peace.
5. Our relations today are better than ever before.

[N. Raghavan]

The abiding mystery of Kashgar

Indian (and Pakistani) Consulate in Kashgar: today a restaurant

My article The abiding mystery of Kashgar appeared in the Edit Page of The Pioneer

Here is the link...

After years of silence over the sudden closure of the Indian Consulate in Kashgar, China, keen to have India as part of OBOR, is ready to reopen the consulate

Post-Independence, one of the most mysterious events which occurred in the early 1950s (and perhaps earlier), is still shrouded in veils; it is the closure of the Indian Consulate in Kashgar.
In a speech in the Parliament in December 1953, Nehru said, "Some major changes have taken place there [Kashgar]. …But when these changes, revolutionary changes took place there [we had to close our Consulate]."
At that time, nobody questioned these changes.
Though the Karakoram Pass was still witnessing a large number of caravans carrying on trade between Kashmir and Central Asia, Delhi accepted the closure of its Kashgar consulate as a fait accompli, just because a 'revolution' had taken place.
It is not that there was no opportunity to clarify why the Kashgar Consulate was closed, but strangely the issue was never raised, though a Top Secret note prepared for the Panchsheel Agreement negotiations in November 1953, says, "We could ask the Chinese Government to restore the normal traditional trade between Sinkiang and Kashmir, which has been completely stopped now. In fact, we had to close down our Consulate General in Kashgar and all our Indian traders have returned."
However, the Indian negotiators kept mum as Delhi was not keen to offer 'a bargaining counter for China to open more Consulates in India'.
Some documents recently declassified by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) bring some light on the 'revolutionary' events in Xinjiang in the early 1950s, particularly a summary of the happenings between 1950 and 1953. A section entitled 'Treatment of Foreigners' says: "The consulates general of Pakistan and India were closed in November 1949. Shortly after the Chinese Communist Army arrived in later December 1949 and in January 1950, restrictions were placed on the movements of people."
Why before the Chinese arrived? Again a mystery!

The Communists arrive in Urumqi

Though 'closed', the Indian Consulate continued to function normally during several months, but in the Fall of 1950, the Indian Consul General, Capt Ram Sathe (later Indian Ambassador in China) had to leave Kashgar …by the most treacherous land route, via the Karakoram pass.
Col PN Kaul, who later served in Lhasa as Consul General, mentions in his memoirs: "Our consul general in Kashgar, RD Sathe of the Indian Foreign Service and an ex-Army officer, and his wife also arrived in Leh during the winter of 1950, after their long and difficult journey from Kashgar. From distant Urumchi (Tiwah), the capital of Sinkiang, came the American consul general, Paxton, and his young wife. They had to stay with us before they could be airlifted. They had an exciting story to tell of their flight from Sinkiang. …Another person who dropped in over the passes later was the British vice-consul from Kashgar." All the foreign diplomats (except the Soviets) had no choice but to escape the Communist 'revolution'.
A few other reports from the CIA give a clearer picture of the happenings in Xinjiang. On March 21, 1951, the CIA notes: "the Chinese troops stationed in Sinkiang use systematic, disciplined violence for political reasons, …[while] rations, ammunition and military stores are received from the USSR."
The entire trade with Soviet Union and Central Asia was suddenly nationalised "and it is planned to nationalise the land. Sinkiang supplies wool, cotton and leather to the USSR, and in return receives kerosene, gasoline and old fish-plates from the USSR"
As a result, hundreds of Indian traders had to flee Kashgar; they travelled in appalling conditions before reaching Leh and Srinagar.
The CIA report continues: "almost all food in Sinkiang is being sent via Kashgar to the USSR by Russian trucks. Even the farmers have little food, and there is acute distress in the cities." At the time, there is not yet any active rebellion: "Russians are working in each Sinkiang government department."
Worse for the 'foreigners': "The Communists in Sinkiang spread anti-Pakistan, anti-British and anti-American propaganda, but because of the dislike of the Turki [Uyghur] population for the Communist Government, the propaganda has little effect."
Two years later, another report remarks: "the authorities were engaged in liquidating large numbers of people accused of having participated in the 1944 revolt against Chinese rule. [Sinkiang was then made an autonomous province supported by the USSR]."
Restrictions have greatly increased, notes the CIA: "it is necessary to obtain police permission before inviting guests to one's home. Further, the traditional fortification walls surrounding the two cities of Kashgar were torn down by forced labor: "All women in both cities were compelled to work at removing the debris resulting from the destruction. The men of Kashgar were being forced to work on the construction of roads and buildings."
During the last months of 1952 "the Government was vigorously pursuing its program for the redistribution of land. Every man agreeing to work in the fields was given 10 mows [a mow equals 0.1647 acres] of land which had been confiscated from wealthy landowners."
The report adds: "By the end of 1952 all profitable business, including the silk industry in Khotan, was under Government control. Private business was discouraged, and almost all shops had been turned into Government owned cooperative stores. The salaries paid to shopkeepers were barely enough to cover their living expenses. …any person found with gold or silver in his possession was suspected of engaging in black-market traffic in these metals, a crime, and was subjected to official interrogation concerning the manner in which he obtained it." These were the 'revolutionary' changes mentioned by Nehru.
What is striking is the omnipresence of the Soviets who, "posing as engineers, were in almost every town in southwestern Sinkiang."
Meanwhile, propaganda goes on full swing: "In every administrative unit youth organizations had been established to carry on propaganda work aimed at reactionary elements in the population. Pictures of Mao and Stalin were displayed in almost every home."
The officials in the Government of Sinkiang Province assured the people that "the Chinese in the administrative structure were there simply to teach the natives of Sinkiang the art of governing, and that soon the full Governmental administrative responsibility would be turned over to the people of Sinkiang." It is ironic that more than sixty years later, the Han cadres still control the restive province.
Reading these detailed CIA reports makes one understand the chaotic atmosphere in Xinjiang and particularly in Kashgar.
In October 1953, a short sentence at the end of a monthly report sent to Delhi by the Indian Ambassador to China, reads: "Indian Consulate General at Kashgar was closed by us during the month and Indian members of our staff started on their return journey home by the overland route."
No comment, no detail was given.
Returning to 2017, China is today keen that India should join the One Belt One Road initiative, in this case, the Indian Consulate in Kashgar should be reopened. It would be one proof of China's sincerity.

On China, when shall we learn the lessons?

My article On China, when shall we learn the lessons? appeared in the Edit Page of The Pioneer

Here is the link ...

In dealing with Beijing, New Delhi has since the 1950s been persuaded by the myth of Chinese warmth for India and Indian interests. The much-heralded Panchsheel was a disaster that few are willing to accept

Several years ago, during a conference in an Indian university, the chief guest, a senior Indian diplomat who had served in the UN, suddenly cited the Panchsheel Agreement between India and China: “It was the best thing that Nehru did as Prime Minister”, he said. Having worked on the subject, I was flabbergasted. How could an intelligent person who has seen the files and is supposed to understand geopolitics, say this? The agreement was independent India's worst sell-out.
India gave away its assets and rights in Tibet (military escorts, trade agencies, trade mats, dak bungalows, telegraph lines, Indian enclave, etc) while getting nothing in return. But in the mind of many romantic thinkers, the ‘Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India’, signed April 29, 1954, in Beijing, has remained glamorous for its preamble, containing the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence.
For TN Kaul, who was one of the Indian negotiators, India was just getting rid of her colonial past: “But, more important was the fact that they were vestiges of imperialist domination and violated the principle of equality, Jawaharlal Nehru’s policy was not a replica of British policy.” At that time, most Indian diplomats, having to imitate the voice of their master, sang the same tune, though Tibet, an independent nation for nearly 2,000 years, lost its freedom in the deal. Lhasa had not even been consulted.
For the Indian Prime Minister, it represented “an attempt, the first in post-World War II history, to put bilateral relations between the two big countries of Asia on a principled basis.” When Nehru presented the agreement in Parliament, he was in his revolutionary mood; he proclaimed: “Now we must realise that this revolution that came to China is the biggest thing that has taken place in the world at present, whether you like it or not.”
In the same speech, he  summed-up the Panchsheel Agreement thus: “No one should invade the other, no one should fight the other... this is the basic principle which we have put in our treaty.” Forgetting that China had just invaded Tibet, Nehru concluded, “In my opinion, we have done no better thing than this since we became independent… I think it is right for our country, for Asia and for the world.”
That a diplomat could repeat the same thing 50 years later, greatly surprised me; he had obviously failed to remember that eight years after the signature, Nehru was ‘betrayed’ by Zhou Enlai, when Communist China attacked India.
But was he really betrayed? I recently came across a fascinating document which shows that some diplomats were fully aware of China’s game. On March 18, 1954, five weeks before the signature, N Raghavan, the Indian Ambassador to China (who was negotiating the agreement in Beijing), sent a personal note to the Prime Minister: “It was drawn up on the basis of my own observations and experience as also of my study of Chinese relations with us since the advent of New China. I have tried to take as objective a view as possible”, he wrote.
The Ambassador told the Prime Minister, “The Chinese, unlike our warm-hearted people, are not emotional by nature, and while the Indian people often display an emotional approach towards China, the Chinese themselves have none such towards India… Any friendship [in China] is evaluated from the standpoint of its usefulness to China.”
Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai was entirely an Indian myth.
The Ambassador’s note shows that Nehru had been warned several years before the situation deteriorated on the border, culminating with a short war in October 1962.
Raghavan remarks: “After a careful examination and objective analysis of the various trends, expressed and implied I came to certain conclusions.” He saw two main periods during his tenure.
The first one was between November 1952 and December 1953, “the period of India’s active participation in the settlement of the Korean question, was not only an extremely trying time in Sino-Indian relations, but was, to some extent, a period of revelations”.
The Ambassador wrote to the Prime Minister that China remained “correct and friendly, without being warm and cordial”, but the communists “prepare the way for the cultivation of warm and cordial relations with the ‘People of India’, as distinct from the Government of India”.
Beijing waited the “for the emergence of a ‘People’s Government’ and to do what they can to advance and accelerate such emergence”, but until then, they “play down India and belittle the achievements of her present Government including its contribution to world peace and progress”, Raghavan noted.
The Chinese aim was to project India “as a capitalist country, suffering from all the economic and political ills of capitalism, colonialism and feudalism; …awaiting ultimate liberation by her people”.
Beijing made sure that “India does not increase her stature in the international fields so that China’s ultimate role as the leading Asian Power will in no manner be affected or threatened”. This sounds familiar to this day, ie thwarting India’s bid to join the NSG or have a seat in the Security Council.
Raghavan notes that China never gave credit to the Indian Government for its role in the Korean conflict because, “to the Chinese mind, no credit was due”. The Ambassador added: “It was thought that the Indian Government could not have pursued any policy other than one of utmost assistance to China as the Indian people would not have allowed anything else to be done.” During a Party’s secret session in Beijing in February 1953, it was stated: “Indian Government, as it is today, is a capitalist Government and to that extent, not reliable; India, as she is today, cannot be considered a friend, but is useful, as she is more or less certain to remain neutral in any conflict.”
Raghavan admitted, “It is true that for centuries China remained self-centered. No other country seemed to exist for China.” He added: “At times, one is led to wonder whether there exists a lurking feeling in some Chinese circles of rivalry — even of jealousy — a fear that India may be a threat to Chinese leadership of Asia.”
Later, when Beijing did not need Delhi anymore for the Korean conflict, India was completely ignored; Raghavan's conclusion was: “Perhaps it is felt that any publicity concerning Indian achievements would not be helpful to the new regime in China in its propaganda to establish Chinese superiority in all fields.”
Nehru did not listen to the warning. Has the situation changed today? Today, South Block is more busy tweeting than looking into the past. It is a real pity. What about the mindset in Beijing? Has that changed since 1954?
If it has, Beijing should demonstrate it by siding with India in the latter’s fight against terrorism.

Panchesheel: it is right for our country, for Asia and for the world or Born in Sin?

The ‘Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India’ was signed April 29, 1954 in Beijing.
It has remained (in)famous for its preamble, containing the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence; the Agreement became known as the Panchsheel Treaty (from Pali, panch: five, sheel: virtues)
Soon after the signature one could hear the refrain: “The Government of India found its old advantages in Tibet (military escorts, trade agencies, trade mats, dak bungalows, telegraph lines, etc..) of little use and in any case the Chinese exercised full control in Tibet.”
For P.N. Kaul, who was one of the Indian negotiators, India was just getting rid of her colonial past: “But, more important was the fact that they were vestiges of imperialist domination and violated the principle of equality, Nehru's policy was not a replica of British policy and he did not want any irritants of no practical value.”
Tibet had been an independent nation for nearly 2000 years; in one stroke India was given away the Land of Snows’ independence under the pretext that India’s presence in Tibet was an imperialist remnant.
However for Nehru, it represented for “an attempt, the first in post-World War II history, to put bilateral relations between the two big countries of Asia on a principled basis. Its success would depend on the intentions and motives, the national aspirations and interests, the leadership and implementing machinery on each side.”
When the Prime Minister presented the ‘Agreement’ in the Parliament he was in his revolutionary mood; he proclaimed: “Now we must realise that this revolution that came to China is the biggest thing that has taken place in the world at present, whether you like it or not.”
In the same speech Nehru spoke described the content of the Agreement Panchsheel: “Live and let live, no one should invade the other, no one should fight the other... this is the basic principle which we have put in our treaty.”
He had forgotten that China had invaded Tibet three years earlier.
He later summed up the Parliamentary debate by saying: “in my opinion, we have done no better thing than this since we became independent. I have no doubt about this... I think it is right for our country, for Asia and for the world.”
A few years later, he felt ‘betrayed’ by Zhou Enlai and Communist China.
But was he really betrayed?
I recently came across an interesting document which shows that Nehru had been warned about China, even before signing the Agreement.
On March 18, 1954, five weeks before the signature, N. Raghavan, the Indian Ambassador to China, wrote a personal note to the Prime Minister: “It was drawn up on the basis of my own observations and experience as also of my study of Chinese relations with us since the advent of New China. I have tried to take as objective a view as possible.”
The Ambassador tells the Prime Minister: “The Chinese unlike our warm-hearted people, are not emotional by nature, and while the Indian people often display an emotional approach towards China, the Chinese themselves have none such towards India. …Any friendship [in China] is evaluated from the standpoint of its usefulness to China.”
Raghavan explains: “For security reasons, I have not dealt with this aspect in my Annual Report for 1953.”
I am posting here the Ambassador’s ‘Top Secret’ Note to the Prime Minister.
It is worth reading this note as it shows that Nehru had been warned several years before the situation on the border became tense, which eventually ended up in a short War in October 1962.
The Panchsheel Agreement had lapsed 6 months earlier.

NOTE ON SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS
by N. Raghavan

What is the attitude of the Government of New China towards India? This is a vital question, the answer to which it is the duty of India's accredited representative at Peking to find out if possible. After a careful examination and objective analysis of the various trends, express and implied, observed for about 18 months, one cannot but help coming to certain conclusions. That there is a definite policy towards India is certain. Whether it is a settled one or subject to changes, it is yet difficult to say. The period, November 1952 to December 1953, the period of India's active participation in the settlement of the Korean question, was not only an extremely trying time in Sino-Indian relations, but was, to some extent, a period of revelations. China's attitude towards India was occasionally discernible without the usual trimmings or diplomatic window-dressings. However, in the examination of Chinese policy as such towards India and her Government, one has to discount statements and expressions of opinion made by Chinese Government spokesman and official journals in the heat of controversy due to dissatisfaction.
As far as observations go, the answer to the question as to what really is the attitude of the Chinese Government towards India is briefly as follows:

1. To remain correct and friendly, without being warm and cordial, in their relations with the Government of India.
2. To prepare the way for the cultivation of warm and cordial relations with the 'People of India', as distinct from the Government of India. (The publicity line is such as to lead one to think that the Chinese Government enjoy the confidence and admiration of the Indian people to a greater extent than even the Indian Government!)
3. To wait for the emergence (in which the Chinese are Led to believe) of a "People's Government" of India and to do what they can to advance and accelerate such emergence.
4. Until then, to 'play down' India and belittle the achievements of her present Government (including their contribution to world peace and progress) or at least to keep the Chinese nation in ignorance of them.
5. To the extent possible, without offending India or her Embassy at Peking, to project India as a capitalist country, suffering from all the economic and political ills of capitalism, colonialism and feudalism; and as such, still not free, but awaiting ultimate liberation by her people (meaning the Communist Party).
6. To make use of India and her independent role in international affairs, but to see as far as possible that by doing so, India does not increase her stature in the international fields so that China's ultimate role as the leading Asian Power will in no manner be affected or threatened.

New India is considered an anachronism, a half-way house at best, in the transition from capitalism and semi-colonialism to Communism and "Popular Democracy".
As a corollary to the Chinese attitude it was observed that China gave publicly no credit to the Indian Government for its impartial assistance in the solution of the Korean problem because, to the Chinese mind, no credit was due. It was thought that the Indian Government could not have pursued any policy other than one of utmost assistance to China as the Indian people would not have allowed anything else to be done. While the Chinese let no occasion pass without singing peans of praise of the Soviets and their contribution to Peace, and while no opportunity was missed to acknowledge the deep gratitude of the Chinese people and Government to the fraternal Soviet people and Government, not a line was publicly uttered or published in praise of India and no word of acknowledgement or thanks has so far appeared in the Chinese Press for the great and universally acclaimed contributions of India and her Government t o a Korean Armistice. India had more than her fair share of blame, criticism and condemnation in the Press and at Party meetings whenever she did not adopt the Chinese line, but little or no approbation or appreciation even when India did something palatable to the Chinese.
The only public reference to India's great role in the Korean Armistice negotiations was a reference by Prime Minister Chou En-lai at a reception to a team of visiting Indian Artists in July, 1953, when he acknowledged with thanks the assistance given by the Indian Ambassador at Peking; but even this was blacked out from the Press Reports of the speech. Since the friendly policy of the Indian Government is not placed to its credit but is ascribed to public pressure which it cannot possibly withstand, it is not surprising that the Chinese Government did not - as even President Eisenhower did - send any formal letter of appreciation on the work of the Indian Custodian Force or of the Indian Chairman of the NNRC, to the Government of India.

Even during the days of 'the illegal Indian Resolution' as well as the 'illegal handing over of the Prisoners to the detaining sides' the Chinese line was to show that the objectionable steps taken by India were against Indian opinion.
The view of the Chinese Government that while the Government of India endeavours to remain neutral, it is not a free Government but is subjected to direct influences of Britain, and indirectly of U.S., is also occasionally visible. It was significant that according to a report that reached the Embassy of a speech delivered by one of the leading Chinese statesmen at a Secret Session of the Government Council in February 1953, the Chinese view was, more or less, as follows:-
Indian Government, as it is today, is a capitalist Government and to that extent, not reliable; India, as she is today, cannot be considered a friend, but is useful, as she is more or less certain to remain neutral in any conflict. As such, friendly relations are to be carefully maintained.
If China has a policy or programme of immediate or long-term friendship with India, one would naturally expect to see some signs of it. At least the people of the country would have been prepared. The tendrils of the gigantic Publicity Octopus of the Government of China would have tried to reach all parts of the country in a programme of kindling friendly interest in India and her people.
It is true that for centuries China remained self-centered. No other country seemed to exist for China. The same tradition might, to some extent, be persisting even today. But people are taught about Soviet Russia and Sino-Soviet relations with meticulous finesse, day in and day out.
For all the protestations of Asian patriotism by Chinese leaders in private conversations, there is absolutely nothing done to stimulate the interest of the Chinese people in other countries of Asia or to educate them on China's affinity, or at least friendliness towards them. India is no exception. At best, she might be occupying a special position in Chinese policy - neither friend, nor foe.
At times, one is led to wonder whether there exists a lurking feeling in some Chinese circles or rivalry - even of jealousy - a fear that India may be a threat to Chinese leadership of Asia, a role which China aspires one day to play. It is curious to observe that even references to ancient connections between India and China or to India's past contributions to Chinese culture are studiously avoided (except in unreported speeches at banquets to visiting Indian delegations).
Not only nothing is done to popularise India, but anything that might enhance her prestige is not very happily received. The anniversary of India's Republic Day usually passes unnoticed. No news paper or other journal ever mentions names like Gandhi or Tagore.
No Indian happening appears to be of the slightest interest, unless it be a C.P.I. Congress or election victory, a Lucknow students strike or a 'Peace' Committee Resolution. India, apart from pro-Chinese extracts from Indian newspapers and especially from the Communist journals, remains practically blacked out in the Press of this country.
None of the thousands of bookshops in China sells any book on India - whether cultural, political or economic. While delegations of a particular colour are invited from India, invitations by the Government of India or public bodies for Conferences held in India are not welcomed or accepted. Uninvited Indian tourists do not appear to be welcome. Exchanges of students and scholars between the two countries are discouraged. Indian film publicity (Indian Information Service documentaries) has never been in demand as in other friendly countries.
Though there was little or no adverse publicity against India for the last year or so, except in so far as India had failed to toe the Chinese line concerning Korea, no information was vouchsafed to the public concerning the great strides that the Indian people under the leadership and guidance of their Government had been making in various fields. Perhaps it is felt that any publicity concerning Indian achievements would not be helpful to the new regime in China in its propaganda to establish Chinese superiority in all fields.
The Chinese people should be made to feel superior. The only country that can do better than China is the Soviet Union. The studied silence on major happenings in India and visible indifference to India's domestic and international achievements were, therefore, understandable.