Our relations today are better than ever before...

Fifty-nine years ago, the Dalai Lama arrives in India

I have been quoted by three newspapers on the recent controversy created by the circular sent by the Cabinet Secretary to ministers and officials regarding a function to be held on April 1 to celebrate the beginning of the 60th anniversary of the Dalai Lama’s exile in India.
The Tibetan leader is to bless the occasion.
If The Indian Express is to be believed, instead of just informing the officials concerned of the 'sensitivity' of the coming months, the Cabinet Secretary, on the advice of the new Foreign Secretary, issued a circular to all officials.
This raises many questions: first of all, how was the circular ‘leaked’?
Was it 'leaked' on purpose? Just to please China?
It is a possibility.
More importantly why was a circular needed?
Later the spokesperson of the ministry of External Affairs denied any change in Tibet policy.
What is the point to change the policy to deny it later?
While trying to answer these questions, a note from N. Raghavan, the Indian Ambassador in China addressed to the Indian Prime Minister, at the end of the talks for the infamous Panchsheel Agreement (I am in the process of writing a book to show why it was ‘infamous’), is worth quoting.
It is an eye-opener (it was for meat least)

Here are the articles quoting me:

• In the New Indian Express by Ramananda Sengupta: No change in India’s stance on the Dalai Lama, says MEA after caution note 

• In The Times of India by Indrani Bagchi: India, China try to reset ties ahead of Modi’s SCO trip

• In The Wire by The Wire Staff: Decoding the Puzzle of the Indian Govt Circular Distancing Itself From Dalai Lama Event

A guard of honour by the Assam Rifles in Tawang

Note from N. Raghavan to Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, New Delhi

Raghavan noted: “For security reasons, I have not dealt with this aspect in my Annual Report for 1953.”
One understands why.
The Annual Report had a large distribution while the Note was secret.
The Panchsheel Agreement, which eventuality sealed the fate of Tibet, would be signed eleven days later. The Dalai Lama's government was not even informed of the 'Tibet' negotiations.

[Covering message]

Embassy of India in China
Peking
March 18, 1954.

Jai Hind.
I feel it my duty to send you a brief Note on Chinese attitude towards India.
It was drawn up on the basis of my own observations and experience as also of my study of Chinese relations with us since the advent of New China.
I have tried to take as objective a view as possible. The Chinese unlike our warm-hearted people, are not emotional by nature, and while the Indian people often display an emotional approach towards China, the Chinese themselves have none such towards India.
They are friendly no doubt, but their attitude is forthright and matter of fact.
Any friendship is evaluated from the standpoint of its usefulness to China.
Only towards the Soviet Union an attitude of emotionalism is cultivated; and that, perhaps for reasons of ideological affinity as well as utility.
[N. Raghavan]

Note on Sino-Indian Relations

What is the attitude of the Government of New China towards India? This is a vital question, the answer to which it is the duty of India's accredited representative at Peking to find out if possible. After a careful examination and objective analysis of the various trends, express and implied, observed for about 18 months, one cannot but help coming to certain conclusions. That there is a definite policy towards India is certain. Whether it is a settled one or subject to changes, it is yet difficult to say. The period, November 1952 to December 1953, the period of India's active participation in the settlement of the Korean question, was not only an extremely trying time in Sino-Indian relations, but was, to some extent, a period of revelations. China's attitude towards India was occasionally discernible without the usual trimmings or diplomatic window-dressings. However, in the examination of Chinese policy as such towards India and her Government, one has to discount statements and expressions of opinion made by Chinese Government spokesman and official journals in the heat of controversy due to dissatisfaction.
As far as observations go, the answer to the question as to what really is the attitude of the Chinese Government towards India is briefly as follows:

1. To remain correct and friendly, without being warm and cordial, in their relations with the Government of India.
2. To prepare the way for the cultivation of warm and cordial relations with the 'People of India', as distinct from the Government of India. (The publicity line is such as to lead one to think that the Chinese Government enjoy the confidence and admiration of the Indian people to a greater extent than even the Indian Government!)
3. To wait for the emergence (in which the Chinese are Led to believe) of a "People's Government" of India and to do what they can to advance and accelerate such emergence.
4. Until then, to 'play down' India and belittle the achievements of her present Government (including their contribution to world peace and progress) or at least to keep the Chinese nation in ignorance of them.
5. To the extent possible, without offending India or her Embassy at Peking, to project India as a capitalist country, suffering from all the economic and political ills of capitalism, colonialism and feudalism; and as such, still not free, but awaiting ultimate liberation by her people (meaning the Communist Party).
6. To make use of India and her independent role in international affairs, but to see as far as possible that by doing so, India does not increase her stature in the international fields so that China's ultimate role as the leading Asian Power will in no manner be affected or threatened.

New India is considered an anachronism, a half- way house at best, in the transition from capitalism and semi-colonialism to Communism and "Popular Democracy".
As a corollary to the Chinese attitude it was observed that China gave publicly no credit to the Indian Government for its impartial assistance in the solution of the Korean problem because, to the Chinese mind, no credit was due. It was thought that the Indian Government could not have pursued any policy other than one of utmost assistance to China as the Indian people would not have allowed anything else to be done.
While the Chinese let no occasion pass without singing peans of praise of the Soviets and their contribution to Peace, and while no opportunity was missed to acknowledge the deep gratitude of the Chinese people and Government to the fraternal Soviet people and Government, not a line was publicly uttered or published in praise of India and no word of acknowledgement or thanks has so far appeared in the Chinese Press for the great and universally acclaimed contributions of India and her Government to a Korean Armistice.
India had more than her fair share of blame, criticism and condemnation in the Press and at Party meetings whenever she did not adopt the Chinese line, but little or no approbation or appreciation evenwhen India did something palatable to the Chinese.
The only public reference to India's great role in the Korean Armistice negotiations was a reference by Prime Minister Chou En-lai at a reception to a team of visiting Indian Artists in July, 1953, when he acknowledged with thanks the assistance given by the Indian Ambassador at Peking; but even this was blacked out from the Press Reports of the speech. Since the friendly policy of the Indian Government is not placed to its credit but is ascribed to public pressure which it cannot possibly withstand, it is not surprising that the Chinese Government did not - as even President Eisenhower did - send any formal letter of appreciation on the work of the Indian Custodian Force or of the Indian Chairman of the NNRC, to the Government of India.
Even during the days of 'the illegal Indian Resolution' as well as the 'illegal handing over of the Prisoners to the detaining sides' the Chinese line was to show that the objectionable steps taken by India were against Indian opinion.
The view of the Chinese Government that while the Government of India endeavours to remain neutral, it is not a free Government but is subjected to direct influences of Britain, and indirectly of U.S., is also occasionally visible. It was significant that according to a report that reached the Embassy of a speech delivered by one of the leading Chinese statesmen at a Secret Session of the Government Council in February 1953, the Chinese view was, more or less, as follows:-

Indian Government, as it is today, is a capitalist Government and to that extent, not reliable; India, as she is today, cannot be considered a friend, but is useful, as she is more or less certain to remain neutral in any conflict. As such, friendly relations are to be carefully maintained.

If China has a policy or programme of immediate or long-term friendship with India, one would naturally expect to see some signs of it. At least the people of the country would have been prepared. The tendrils of the gigantic Publicity Octopus of the Government of China would have tried to reach all parts of the country in a programme of kindling friendly interest in India and her people. It is true that for centuries China remained self-centred. No other country seemed to exist for China. The same tradition might, to some extent, be persisting even today.
But people are taught about Soviet Russia and Sino-Soviet relations with meticulous finesse, day in and day out. For all the protestations of Asian patriotism by Chinese leaders in private conversations, there is absolutely nothing done to stimulate the interest of the Chinese people in other countries of Asia or to educate them on China's affinity, or at least friendliness towards them. India is no exception. At best, she might be occupying a special position in Chinese policy - neither friend, nor foe.
At times, one is led to wonder whether there exists a lurking feeling in some Chinese circles or rivalry - even of jealousy - a fear that India may be a threat to Chinese leadership of Asia, a role which China aspires one day to play. It is curious to observe that even references to ancient connections between India and China or to India's past contributions to Chinese culture are studiously avoided (except in unreported speeches at banquets to visiting Indian delegations).
Not only nothing is done to popularise India, but anything that might enhance her prestige is not very happily received. The anniversary of India's Republic Day usually passes unnoticed. No news paper or other journal ever mentions names like Gandhi or Tagore.
No Indian happening appears to be of the slightest interest, unless it be a C.P.I. Congress or election victory, a Lucknow students strike or a 'Peace' Committee Resolution. India, apart from pro-Chinese extracts from Indian newspapers and especially from the Commsunist journals, remains practically blacked out in the Press of this country.
None of the thousands of bookshops in China sells any book on India - whether cultural, political or economic.
While delegations of a particular colour are invited from India, invitations by the Government of India or public bodies for Conferences held in India are not welcomed or accepted. Uninvited Indian tourists do not appear to be welcome. Exchanges of students and scholars between the two countries are discouraged. Indian film publicity (Indian Information Service documentaries) has never been in demand as in other friendly countries.
Though there was little or no adverse publicity against India for the last year or so, except in so far as India had failed to toe the Chinese line concerning Korea, no information was vouchsafed to the public concerning the great strides that the Indian people under the leadership and guidance of their Government had been making in various fields.
Perhaps it is felt that any publicity concerning Indian achievements would not be helpful to the new regime in China in its propaganda to establish Chinese superiority in all fields. The Chinese people should be made to feel superior.
The only country that can do better than China is the Soviet Union. The studied silence on major happenings in India and visible indifference to India's domestic and international achievements were, therefore, understandable.

A few significant features of the situation are, however, encouraging. They are:

1. That India's Prime Minister is now deemed a sincere friend, and a reliable Asian Statesman, though the line adopted is that he should not be confused with the Government of India.
2. Indian Government's opinion is valued and the present tendency is not to estrange the Government of India, but to welcome its cooperation and assistance. It was significant and indicative of China's anxiety to retain the goodwill of the Indian Government, that a hostile contribution that appeared in a Symposium issued by the Chinese Foreign Affairs Institute, a semi-official publication, in May, 1953, was withdrawn in 3 days, on an informal protest by the Indian Embassy to the Asian Department of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
3. In the arid of desert of impersonal relations, the personal cordiality and confidence occasionally extended by the Prime Minister of China to successive Ambassadors of India in their dealings might be considered of some value for the improvement of Sino-Indian relations on a long term basis. In a country governed from the top, this relationship has been found to be of paramount importance.
4. Though little, favourable to India, is publicised, there seems to be an inner conviction gaining ground among the people that India is an agency for good in world affairs, that Indians are peaceful and peace-loving and that they should be encouraged not only in their good neighbour policy, but also in their efforts at world Peace.
5. Our relations today are better than ever before.

[N. Raghavan]

The First Days in Exile: a Letter from the Dalai Lama to Nehru

Tibetan road workers in the Himalaya

A few months ago, I posted on this blog, the report from the Government of India about the first days of the Dalai Lama in India in March/April 1959.
During the following months, the Tibetan leader was followed in exile by thousands of Tibetan refugees.
The situation soon became difficult to handle for the Indian Government as well as for the Dalai Lama's administration.
I am posting here extracts from Freedom in Exile: The Autobiography of The Dalai Lama. It shows the situation as the Dalai Lama saw it evolving at the end of 1959 and early 1960.
A letter from the Tibetan leader to Jawaharlal Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister is also posted.
Eventually, the Dalai Lama shifted to his new quarters in Dharamsala in April 1960.

From Freedom in Exile: The Autobiography of The Dalai Lama

In December, I made the six-hour journey down to Delhi once more, this time as the first leg of a new pilgrimage. I wanted to spend more time at the places I had visited at the beginning of I957. On my way I called on the Prime Minister once more. I was somewhat anxious of what he might have to say to me on account of the UN resolution and I half expected him to be annoyed. In fact, he congratulated me warmly. I began to see that, despite his occasional heavy-handedness, he was a man of great magnanimity. And once again, I was reminded of the meaning of the word 'democracy'. Even though I had rejected his opinion, there was no change whatever in his attitude towards the Tibetans. As a result, I felt more disposed than ever to listen to him. This was exactly contrary to my experience in China. Nehru did not smile much. He would sit quietly listening with that tremulous lower lip protruding slightly, before making his reply, which would always be frank and honest. Above all, he gave me complete freedom to follow my own conscience. The Chinese, on the other hand, had always been full of smiles and deceit.
…From Delhi I proceeded to Bodh Gaya. Whilst there, I received a deputation of sixty or more Tibetan refugees who were also making a pilgrimage. A very moving moment followed when their leaders came to me and pledged their lives in the continuing struggle for a free Tibet.
…Shortly after returning to Mussoorie, I learned that the Indian Government had plans to move me to permanent accommodation at a place called Dharamsala. This was unexpected news and quite alarming. I found Dharamsala on the map and discovered that it was another hill station, like Mussoorie, but in a considerably more remote location.
…In the meantime, I made the first of many-visits to the northern provinces, where thousands of my people were now engaged on road building. I was heartbroken when I saw them. Children, women and men were all working side by side in gangs: former nuns, farmers, monks, officials, all thrown together. They had to endure a full day's hard physical toil under a mighty sun, followed by nights crammed into tiny tents. Nobody was yet properly acclimatised to the conditions and even though it was a bit cooler than in the transit camps, heat and humidity still exacted a frightening toll. The air was fetid and thick with mosquitoes. As a result, sickness was universal and often fatal, thanks to the already weakened state of people's constitutions. Worse still, the work itself was quite risky. Much of it was done on steep mountain-sides and the dynamite they used claimed its own share of casualties.
...Even today, quite a few old people carry scars from this terrible labour and are maimed and crippled. And although now the fruit of their labours is clearly visible, at the time there were moments when the whole venture seemed pointless. It took only one fierce downpour of rain to wash away their efforts in a slick of red mud. Yet for all this, despite their desperate situation, the refugees showed me deep, personal respect and listened closely when I said that it was vital for us to remain optimistic. I was very moved.
...These first visits to the road camps made me aware of a new problem, however. The children of the roadworkers were suffering badly from malnutrition and their mortality rate was very high. So I contacted the Indian Government, which hurriedly organised a new transit camp dedicated specifically to their needs. At the same time, an initial batch of fifty children was sent to Mussoorie, where the first of our schools had been set up.

While he was in pilgrimage in Bodh Gaya, the Dalai Lama sent a detailed letter about the terrible situation of the refugees.
Apparently, the Indian Government acted immediately on the Tibetan leader suggestions/demands: on February 1, 1960, the first refugees were resettled in Bylakuppe (Karnataka).

A letter from the Dalai Lama to Jawaharlal Nehru about the rehabilitation of Tibet refugees in India as published in the Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru (Series II, Volume 57)

SECRET/PERSONAL

Bodhgaya
January 30, 1960.

Your Excellency,
I hope that you are enjoying good health, in spite of your heavy and arduous duties of State. I am sorry to encroach upon your precious time but knowing your great sympathy for myself and my people, I venture to do so without further delay.

2. It is now almost a year since I came to India for asylum, and several thousand Tibetans followed me. You personally, and the Indian Government and people, have all shown us the greatest sympathy and regard during the time of our travail, and have given invaluable help in looking after such a large number of refugees despite their preoccupations with a multitude of other important and pressing problems. I need not say how deeply grateful myself and my followers have been to yourself and the Government and people of India for their sympathy and great assistance.

3. It is, however, my fervent desire that the bulk of the Tibetan refugees in India should not remain a permanent burden on the Government of India, nor on the various relief committees who have been helping them in various ways so far. I feel that since the stay of these refugees in India would now unfortunately seem likely to be for an indefinite period, steps should be initiated without further loss of time for their permanent rehabilitation so that as many of them as possible may within a short period be able to become self-supporting. A few thousand Tibetans are already doing road work in Sikkim and perhaps some more may be receiving opportunities for manual work elsewhere. While this has no doubt helped somewhat to relieve the problem of those Tibetan refugees for the time being, I feel that merely engaging these refugees on manual work against wages in Governmental construction projects may not fulfil the ultimate need for their permanent or semi-permanent resettlement.

4. In the case of monks, I am extremely grateful for the kind decision made by the Government of India to establish two camps at Buxa and Dalhousie and to support them in order that they may continue their religious studies and practices for the sake of keeping the Tibetan faith and culture alive in friendly India even if, as seems to be unfortunately the possibility, it should be destroyed under the onslaught of Chinese Communism in my own country.

5. What I say below would apply to the vast majority of Tibetan refugees who are laymen, or not high lamas, who should be enabled to stand on their own feet through some modern vocations.

6. Among the Tibetan refugees are many who had engaged themselves in pastoral activities in their own country. They would feel at home in similar work in India. The cultivators, I suggest, may be settled on agricultural land. There are several for whom sheep or horse-breeding can prove to be useful and customary vocations. Quite a number can do forest work.
I earnestly trust that India with its vast area may be able to provide some opportunities for all these categories of Tibetan refugees, by allotting to them some agricultural land and some facilities for breeding sheep and horses in suitable places. Some virgin forest land would also be very helpful for the settlement of some of the refugees who can initially clear the forests and simultaneously do some timber business, and later on cultivate the cleared areas. A number of Tibetans are good at handicrafts or small-scale industries, and may be enabled to utilise their skill to advantage. There are yet others for whom trade has been a traditional occupation. Some encouragement in this field, for example the grant of special licences, opportunities to invest whatever money some of them may possess, etc., would greatly benefit these persons and render them self-supporting.

7. As far as I know, there are at present approximately 13,000 Tibetan refugees who came to India since March last year. Besides, there are about 8000 Tibetans of the poorer classes who had been in India earlier in the usual course but who could not return to Tibet due to the changed conditions there, and now have become destitutes and refugees. Thus there may be about 21,000 Tibetans altogether at present in India, who are in great need of some opportunities for semi-permanent rehabilitation. I give below a rough breakdown of this total number of refugees, categorised broadly under different vocations which may be suitable for them:-
Total number of refugees: 21,000 approx.

Deduct

1.    Monks and others whom the Govt. of India have already kindly agreed to support:-

(a) Monks at Buxa    1500
(b) Monks at Dalhousie    300 appr.
(c) Aged monks and aged laymen at Dalhousie    700 appr.

2. Self-supporting    500 appr.

Total    3000

Remaining number: 18,000 approx.
Categorisation:

(a) For vocational training    2000 appr.
(b) Young persons (below 20 years of age) for school, etc. education    2000 appr.
(c) Able bodied persons who can be suitably settled as:   
Cultivators    9000 appr. Herdmen (including horse and sheep breeding work)    3000 appr. Forest Workers  2000 appr.

Total    18000

(These are only very approximate figures, intended to serve as a working basis for consideration of rehabilitation schemes. The exact figures would have to be determined after a census is completed and also with reference to the extent of the facilities which it may be possible for the Government of India kindly to provide-under the various categories.)    

8. In addition, I understand that some 4,000 to 5,000 Tibetans who had entered Nepal are wanting to come to India and settle in this country. I would request that they may kindly be allowed to do so if they ask for facilities to stay in India and be resettled.

9. After careful deliberation, I am convinced that the time has come when I must request you for your help in offering these several thousand refugees some opportunities to settle down semi-permanently in India and live more or less like a community with some regular occupations. The places where they are so settled might as far as possible be near to one another.

10. I do sincerely hope that you would very kindly consider my request sympathetically, so that permanent or semi-permanent rehabilitation measures can commence at an early date. I have only indicated the broad lines along- which I would request you to consider this rehabilitation problem. I shall be most grateful if the details could be worked out by competent authorities in the Government of India, for the purpose of implementation. I shall be able to nominate some experienced officers of mine, to assist the Government of India in this matter, since their services will be of help to all concerned.

11. I have had fairly long discussions on this subject with Shri Apa. B. Pant, Political Officer in Sikkim, who was kind enough to visit me at Varanasi. I found that his views in regard to the need for rehabilitation of these refugees are not at variance with my own, which I have tried to indicate above. I do not wish to burden you with too long a letter and have, therefore, taken the liberty of requesting the Political Officer to explain to you and to the officers concerned in the Government of India, in greater detail, the rehabilitation needs as I have tried to visualise from the point of view of the Tibetans. The greatest need, I-venture to suggest, is to settle these refugees as early as possible in a manner that would enable them to live like a community and to earn their living through normal work.

12. Until such time as permanent measures can be implemented, I hope that the Government of India and the Central Relief Committee would continue the kind assistance they have been giving. I would also request that the question of rehabilitating the 8,000 Tibetans referred to in pare 7 above, (they are mostly in the Darjeeling/Kalimpong area) may kindly be sympathetically taken up at an early date. These Tibetans are in a dire plight and I understand many of them have been begging for their living.

13. During my recent stay at Sarnath and Bodh Gaya, I have come to know that there are some one thousand or more Tibetans at present in these two places, 'who are in an extremely pitiable condition, and trying to live by begging. These persons had come from Western Tibet, through Nepal, and did not go to any refugee camp. I fear that in the summer season they will suffer badly unless settled in a suitable place. May I request that the problem of settling these Tibetans may also kindly be considered urgently?
With apologies for having to trouble you with my woes, and with my profound regards and best wishes,

Yours sincerely,
DALAI LAMA

You want independence and do not want bloodshed? Impossible!

A few days back, I posted the transcript of the 4-hour talk between Jawaharlal Nehru, the Indian Prime Minister and the newly-exiled Dalai Lama (in April 1959 in Mussoorie).
Here is the Dalai Lama's version of this momentous event. 
It has appeared in the Dalai Lama's autobiography, Freedom in Exile (Chapter 8 - A Desperate Year).
The fact that the Dalai Lama is calling this particular chapter, 'A Desperate Year' is telling.
One can see from the transcript posted earlier that Nehru is sometimes quite tough with the young Tibetan leader, who puts it politely "I went on in spite of the growing evidence that he could be a bit of a bully".
It is true that Nehru was under pressure from the Parliament; many legislators wanted him to do more for Tibet.
And he was stil very enamoured with 'socialist' China.
The Dalai Lama is particularly heavily quizzed on the content of the letters that he wrote to General Tan Guansan (Acting Representative of the Central People's Government in Tibet and Political Commissar of the Tibet Military area Command).
The interpreter mentioned by the Dalai Lama is Sonam P. Kazi, a Sikkimese working for the Ministry of External Affairs; he was on deputation in Mussoorie. He was the only person present during the meeting except for the Foreign Secretary (Subimal Dutt) who took the notes.
As often with people he considered 'junior', Nehru spoke tough (not to say contemptuously): "Nehru thought of me as a young person who needed to be scolded from time to time". He even banged the table.
It must have been a difficult experience for the young Lama.
He says: "I began to realise that my future, and that of my people, was far less certain than I had imagined."
And no question of Independence, hammered the Prime Minister.
It was probably the first seed of the 'Middle Path' approach. 
Remember, Nehru told the Dalai Lama: "We have yet to maintain good relations with China - a middle but difficult course. Does D.L. [Dalai Lama] agree with this?" "Yes" could only answer the young Tibetan leader. 
Interestingly, during the last week of March 1959, Nehru several times informed the Parliament and Indian leaders that the number of refugees from Tibet was not very large (hundred or so) and that he did not expect many to cross the border. 
Apparently the Dalai Lama had fresher news. He wrote in his memoirs: "It quickly became clear, however, that we were faced with more immediate problems than the question of Tibetan independence. No sooner had we arrived in Mussoorie than we started to receive reports of large numbers of refugees arriving not only in India but also in Bhutan. Immediately, l sent some of my officials to receive them at the camps hastily opened by the Indian Government".
An important point which does not appear in the Dalai Lama's version but which was very much present in Nehru's mind: Tibet is a backward country. The Prime Minister was probably convinced by his Chinese counterpart, Zhou Enlai that a good dose of 'reforms' was necessary and the take-over by 'modern', 'socialist' China was a great opportunity for 'old' Tibet to 'reform'.
In a letter to G. Parhsarathy (Telegram to Indian Ambassador to China, April 29, 1959) Nehru said: 

I am leaving Delhi for three days. Recent developments in Tibet have raised difficult problems not only for India but for China also and of course for Tibet itself. I can appreciate to some extent Chinese attitude, constituted as Chinese are at present. We realise that Tibet is very backward. Nevertheless the regimented and virulent attacks on India in China and their insistence on patent falsehoods have surprised and distressed me.

Nehru could understand 'to some extent' the Chinese attitude even after the Dalai Lama had told him that tens of thousands of his countrymen have been killed. 
What disturbed Nehru was the personal attacks against him in the Chinese official media. It culminated by an Editorial of The People's Daily on May 6,  1959. It was entitled: 'The Revolution in Tibet and Nehru's Philosophy'.
It begin thus:

The war of rebellion unleashed by the handful of traitors in Tibet has been quelled. With the ignominious defeat of the rebels, the sanguinary conflict they created has ended over the overwhelming portion of Tibet. Now Tibet faces a peaceful revolution, that is, the democratic reforms in Tibet referred to in the resolution of the National People's Congress and which the broad masses of people in Tibet have long expected and urgently demanded.
This is a revolution the continuation in Tibet of the great people's revolution which swept the Chinese mainland around 1949. Because of obstruction by the former Tibet Local Government this revolution has been delayed in Tibet during the past eight years since the peaceful liberation of Tibet. The revolution to be carried out immediately after the putting down of the rebellion will be a peaceful one, that is to say, a revolution without bloodshed. The Tibetan people will pursue a policy of redemption toward those of the upper classes in Tibet who have not taken part in the rebellion-almost the same policy adopted in the Han areas towards the national bourgeoisie. Ample conditions exist for the Tibetan people to do so, because they are backed up by China's hundreds of millions of people, who have already completed democratic reforms and the socialist transformation.

The same longish Editorial speaks of 'Mr. Nehru Deplorable Error':

In discussing Tibetan society, although Nehru does not oppose reforms and does not deny the part vested interest played in the rebellion, still on the whole he not only fails to touch on its externally cruel system of exploitation, but virtually lumps together the vast majority of the exploited with the tiny minority of the exploiters. On this basis, he denies that a handful of upper strata reactionaries are responsible for the rebellion in Tibet, describes the just action of the Chinese people in putting down the rebellion as a 'tragedy' and expresses sympathy for the rebellion.
Thus, he commits a most deplorable error. As friends of India and as the people whose affairs Nehru is discussing, we deem it necessary to point out this error. If one agrees with Nehru's logic, not only the revolution in Tibet, but the whole Chinese revolution would be impermissible. It will be recalled that before liberation the area of China inhabited by the Han nationality had basically not emerged from the orbit of feudal society, although it was not serfdom. It, too, had always been called a static, unchanging isolated society...

It was indeed quite a 'desperate' situation for the Dalai Lama.
 
Extracts: Freedom in Exile)
On 24 April, Pandit Nehru himself arrived in Mussoorie. We talked together for over four hours, assisted by a single interpreter. I began by telling him everything that had happened since I had returned to Tibet — largely, as I reminded him, at his insistence. I went on to say that I had done just as he had suggested and dealt fairly and honestly with the Chinese, criticising them where necessary and trying hard to keep to the terms of the ‘Seventeen Point  Agreement'. I then explained that I had not originally intended to seek India's hospitality but that I had wanted to establish my Government at Lhuntse Dzong. Only the news from Lhasa had changed my mind. At this point he became rather irritated. 'The Indian Government could not have recognised it even if you had,' he said. I began to get the impression that Nehru thought of me as a young person who needed to be scolded from time to time.
During other parts of our conversation he banged the table. 'How can this be?' he asked indignantly once or twice. However, I went on in spite of the growing evidence that he could be a bit of a bully. Finally, I told him very firmly that my main concern was twofold: 'I am determined to win independence for Tibet, but the immediate requirement is to put a stop to the bloodshed.' At this he could restrain himself no longer. 'That is not possible!' he said in a voice charged with emotion. 'You say you want independence and in the same breath you say you do not want bloodshed. Impossible!' His lower lip quivered with anger as he spoke.
I began to realise that the Prime Minister found himself in an extremely delicate and embarrassing position. In the Indian Parliament, another tense debate on the Tibetan question had followed the news of my escape from Lhasa. For years now, he had been criticised by many politicians over his handling of the situation. And now, it seemed to me, he was showing signs of a guilty conscience at having been so insistent that I return to Tibet in 1957.
Yet at the same time it was clear that Nehru wanted to protect India's friendly relations with China and was determined to adhere to the principles of the Panchsheel memorandum, despite the Indian politician Acharya Kripalani's description of it as having been 'born in sin to put the seal of our approval on the destruction of an ancient nation'. He made it quite clear that the Government of India still could not contemplate taking issue with the Chinese over the question of Tibetan rights. For now, I should rest and not make any plans for the immediate future. We would have the opportunity for further discussions on other occasions. Hearing this, I began to realise that my future, and that of my people, was far less certain than I had imagined. Our meeting ended cordially enough but, as the Prime Minister left, l experienced a profound feeling of disappointment.
It quickly became clear, however, that we were faced with more immediate problems than the question of Tibetan independence. No sooner had we arrived in Mussoorie than we started to receive reports of large numbers of refugees arriving not only in India but also in Bhutan. Immediately, l sent some of my officials to receive them at the camps hastily opened by the Indian Government.
From these new arrivals l learnt that, after their initial bombardment of the Norbulingka, the Chinese had turned their guns on to the Potala and the Jokhang, slaughtering and wounding thousands. Both buildings were badly damaged. The Chakpori Medical School was totally destroyed. No one knows how many people were killed during this onslaught, but a PLA document captured by Tibetan freedom fighters during the 1960s stated that between March 1959 and September 1960, 87,000 deaths through military action were recorded. (This figure does not include all those who died as a result of suicide, torture and starvation.)
As a result, countless thousands of my people tried to leave Tibet. Many died, either directly at the hands of the Chinese, or from wounds, malnutrition, cold and disease. Those who managed to escape across the border did so in a state of abject dereliction. And although there was food and shelter for them on arrival, the relentless Indian sun began to exact a pitiless toll from them. There were two main transit camps, one at Missamari, close to Tezpur, the other at Buxa Duar, a former British prisoner-of-war camp located close to the Bhutanese border in the north-east.