How the Tibetans were emancipated ...by the guns

Sixty four years ago...

I am reposting this very special document: the Report for the months of March, April and May 1959 sent by the Indian Consul General in Lhasa (Maj SL Chibber) to the Ministry of External Affairs in Delhi.
This Top Secret document is dated June 1, 1959.
Maj Chibber, an Indian Army officer from the Jat Regiment had already spent nine years in Tibet.
He came first to Tibet in 1950 to replace Maj SM Krishnatry, the Officer Commanding the Indian Escort in Gyantse (Krishnatry was from the Maratha Light Infantry Regiment).
After his tenure in Gyanste with the Escort, Maj Chibber served on deputation as Indian Trade Agent in Yatung and Gyantse. He took over as Consul General in Lhasa from PN Menon (father of former Foreign Secretary and National Secretary Advisor, Shivashankar Menon) in February 1957, when the Dalai Lama returned from his trip in India.
In September 1959, he was transferred as First Secretary to the Political Officer's Office in Gangtok (he would later be integrated into the Indian Foreign Service).

Different accounts
India's views on the dramatic events of March/April 1959 never appeared before.
It is worth mentioning that a Kindle book The 1959 Tibetan Uprising Documents - The Chinese Army Documents published early this year provided some documents from the Military Intelligence of the People's Liberation Army on the 1959 bloody events.
This publication provides several maps of the battle of Lhasa; it complements Maj Chibber's narration.
Another account of the events is given by Jianglin Li in her Tibet in Agony, "the first clear historical account of the Chinese crackdown in Lhasa in 1959. Sifting facts from the distortions of propaganda and partisan politics, she reconstructs a chronology...", says the preface of her book.
Incidentally, since 2009, China celebrates March 28 as the Serfs Emancipation Day.
It is an yearly holiday in the Tibet Autonomous Region. It is supposed to be the day that the 'reforms' could finally be implemented on the Roof of the World. On March 28, 1959 the Tibetan government had been declared 'illegal' by the People's Republic of  China and the so-called serves had been liberated Tibetans from feudalism and theocracy ...by the guns.
But as described by Maj Chibber, it is clear that the uprising of March 1959 was the revolt of the 'masses' against the occupiers.
Maj Chibber's conclusions are worth noting: "The future of Tibet is dark and only a miracle can save Tibet from the clutches of the Chinese Communist Colonialists."

My website contains a large collection of documents relating  to the March 1959 Uprising.
Click here to consult
Volume 48 of the Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru dealing with this event is also downloadable

Report for the months of March, April and May 1959 from the Consul General of India in Lhasa, Tibet

GENERAL
In the history of movement for free Tibet the month of March, 1959, will be most historic as during this month Tibetans high and low, in Lhasa, Capital of Tibet, openly challenged the Chinese rule in Tibet. They set up an organisation called – ‘Pho Mimang Ranchen Chi Chog’, meaning, ‘Tibetan Peoples Independent Organisation’, renounced the Sino-Tibetan Agreement of 1951, staged demonstrations to give vent to their anti-Chinese feelings and demanded withdrawal of the Chinese from Tibet. But this challenge, before the MIGHT OF CHINESE People’s Liberation Army, who on 20th March, 1959, started an all out offensive against the ill-organised, ill-equipped, untrained-Tibetans with artillery, mortors, machine guns and all types of automatic weapons, was short lived.
His Holiness the Dalai Lama, smelling danger, left Lhasa secretly on the night of the 17th March, 1959, with important members of his personal staff, three Cabinet Ministers and members of his family for Lhoka area (south of Lhasa), where at that time Khampas had full sway and from where it was easier for him to escape to India if need arose. Many other important and un-important-Tibetans followed him when the actual trouble started on the night of 19th March, 1959.
On the 28th March, 1959, the State Council of the Peoples Republic of China dissolved the local Tibet Government and transferred all its functions and powers to the Preparatory Committee for the Tibetan Autonomous Region, - which was set up by the Chinese on 22nd April, 1956, but due to various reasons was not functioning as desired by the Chinese, with Panchen Lama as its Acting Chairman, stating that Panchen Lama would act for the period the Dalai Lama was held in duress. Ngapho Shape [Ngabo Ngawang Jigme] and Phak-pa La [Phagpala Rinpoche] of Chamdo, a young incarnate Lama of Chamdo studying at Sera, were promoted as Vice Chairmen from their former positions of member of Standing Committee and Secretary General and member of Standing Committee respectively. Eighteen Tibetan members of the Committee who were labeled-traitors by the Chinese were dismissed and replaced by five Chinese and eleven Tibetans. The State Council also ordered the People’s Liberation Army stationed in Tibet to assume Military Control in Tibet except Shigatse, the seat of Panchen Lama. The Military Control commission in Lhasa was formally established on 23rd March, 1959.
During these months the Chinese with the help of their armed forces including air-force quelled the main Resistance Force in Lhoka area, carried out thorough – screening of Inhabitants in and around Lhasa, detained hordes of Tibetans and others on-slightest suspicion, impounded all the private vehicles except for a few belonging to pro-Chinese Tibetans but they were also not allowed to ply and thus made travel outside Lhasa impossible (their own Transport Department’s passenger service between Yatung/Shigatse/Gyantse and Lhasa was stopped many months before), promulgated dusk to dawn curfew, organized meetings and – rallies to condemn the former Tibetan Government and Imperialists, blamed Indians as expansionist and for interfering in the internal affairs of Tibet and rapidly installed Military Control Commissions in other places in Tibet. The preparatory Committee held two meetings after its reorganization, one under Chairmanship of the Panchen Lama and the other under General Chang Kuo-hua [Zhang Guohua] in absence of the Panchen Lama who had gone to Peking to attend the Second National People’s Congress Session there, and passed few resolutions.
In brief the booms of Chinese guns and fire from their weapons, which destroyed number of buildings including religious places, large scale killing of Tibetans followed by mass arrests, departure of Dalai Lama and high-ranking Tibetan officials from Lhasa completely shattered the morale of Tibetans in general and they were left with no other alternative but to bow before the Chinese.

Norbulinka Palce: in blue the Tibetan defences, in red the Chinese PLA movements

Tibet-China
The nationalist movement in Tibet, the climax of which reached on 10th March, 1959, had started sometime in 1955 in Kham, Eastern Tibet and then spread to west in Amdo region and north-east in Golok areas. In 1955 and 1957 it took shape of an open revolt against the Chinese regime in these areas. These people though did not succeed but they were a constant headache to the Chinese who had to resort to aerial bombing and deploy large number of forces to subjugate the local inhabitants. During operations number of monasteries were destroyed and the local people suffered heavy losses. Due to absence of proper means of communication and security measured adopted by Chinese to suppress the information the correct news of happenings in these areas-seldom reached out-side world. However, whatever little news trickled through traders and travelers contained horrible accounts of atrocities committed by the Chinese against the people of these areas, especially against the lamaseries. This naturally had an effect on the minds of Tibetans elsewhere and a stage had reached that some among these Tibetans who had thrown their lot with the Chinese previously, many became apprehensive and doubted Chinese promises of respect for religion and internal autonomy. The Khampas in east finding difficult to face the frontal attack of the Chinese troops resorted to guerilla tactics and moved towards the south where the Chinese garrisons were few and far between and the difficult terrain suited to hit and run type of war.
They were able to disrupt completely traffic on Sikang [Kham]-Tibet highway and managed to have a complete control of area called Lhoka (south of Tsangpo river) and some areas in north-east-of the river. In May, 1958, and later they were joined by Khampas and their kinds from Lhasa and elsewhere also. Number of monks from various monasteries, some Tibetan soldiers and other Tibetans also joined them. They were successful in their attacks on some convoys on Lhasa Shigatse road and Tsinghai Tibet highway.
There were also reports of air-drop of arms and ammunitions to these people in Lhoka area by unidentified planes. All the time the Chinese did not take any action against these Khampa, except on one or two occasions but pressed the Tibetan Government to suppress them. The Tibetan Government under pressure from Chinese sent Peace Missions comprising of monks and Iay officials to Kham and Lhoka areas but no useful purpose was served. – The Mission which went to Lhoka stayed on and never returned. It was said that the members of the Mission had joined the Khampas.
As a number of officials in the Tibetan Government did not like the presence of Chinese in Tibet no concrete stops were taken by the Tibetan Government and in all probabilities encouraged the movement secretly. All these encouraged the people in Lhasa, especially the intelligentsia and they thought it was high time for a general uprising. The Chinese did not sit quiet and were not blind to what was happening and were not taking chances by leaving thing to the Tibetan Government. They started preparing themselves for the show down; fortified their offices and residences with sand bags, dug trenches and prepared fire positions, all cadres were issued arms and ammunition and made to join militia under the pretext that these militia units were similar to those of China proper, stored rations and due wells on their promises and increased the strength of their troops considerably in and around Lhasa. The relations had been strained since a long time and at the close of the year 1958, the question was as to how and who should break the ice.
In January, 1959, General Tan Kwan San [Tan Guansan], Political Commissar, openly condemned Surkhang Shape, the senior most Cabinet Minister of the Tibetan Government, in a meeting of Chinese and Tibetans convened for congratulating Soviet Russia for their success on launching space rocket, for not taking any interest in the things Chinese were doing and threatened that if he (Surkhang) did not mend his ways he would be reduced to a labourer and if he still did not improve he would be done away with. This probably had a very serious affect on minds of the Tibetans who thought that if their highest official could be treated that way then there was no chance of survival for any one else. The anti-Chinese feeling among the Tibetans which had already mounted high further increased and the previous whisper campaign against the Chinese started tuning into open words and action.
During Monlam [Prayer Festival], the great prayer, 20,000 to 30,000 monks gather in Lhasa. Similarly large number of lay people of all classes from other parts of Tibet, including Kham, Golok and Amdo areas, come to Lhasa for pilgrimage and blessings of the Dalai Lama. Since 1954 this occasion was being utilized by the Tibetan nationalists for their anti-Chinese campaigns and exhorting people to rise against the Chinese. On two occasions anti-Chinese leaflets were thrown in Lhasa market square secretly and similarly hand written posters, containing Chinese anti-religious activities and atrocities committed by them, were displayed in the streets of Lhasa number of times.
The monks and other people who came from all over Tibet carried back these news and thus the anti-Chinese feelings among the masses were further intensified. Each Monlam after 1954 saw more and more of anti-Chinese feelings among the Tibetans. The incidents in which Tibetan and Chinese were involved and when the latter sided with their men aggravated hatred among the Tibetans against the Chinese.
In April, 1957, an armed Chinese who wanted to enter private apartment of Dalai Lama in Potala was arrested by the Tibetan soldiers on suspicion that he wanted to take life of the Dalai Lama and was sent by the Tashilhunpo authorities with the connivance of the Chinese. This naturally created wide spread resentment among the Tibetans, specially when the Chinese did not take any action against this man (he was simply returned to China).
During Monlam of 1959 two armed Chinese were arrested by the Tibetan soldiers during the Dalai Lama’s procession from Potala to main cathedral and the Tibetans charged those people with the same offence i.e. they had intention to kill the Dalai Lama and were agents of Tashilhunpo acting kill the Dalai Lama and were agents of Tashilhunpo acting under the direction of the Chinese. Under the pressure of the Chinese authorities the Tibetan Government handed over these people to them who after short while released them.
During Monlam, the Chinese took extra security measures. They distributed cash and their propaganda literature among the monks to gain their favour but in vain. By Monlam of 1959, the anti-Chinese sore only needed a pin prick to erupt it. The invitation to Dalai Lama by the Military Area Command to a Theatrical performance on the 10th March, 1959, provided an excuse to the nationalists to start their campaign openly in Lhasa against the Chinese.
The invitation, as far as we understand, was known only to a few top ranking Tibetan officials close to Dalai Lama. It seems that on the evening of 9th March and in the morning of 10th March Interested officials who know about the invitation quietly sent words to people in Lhasa asking them to come to Norbulingka to stop Dalai Lama from going to Chinese Military Headquarters as it was suspected that the Chinese might detain him and persuade him to go to Peking.
In the beginning, on the morning of 10th March, only few people came to Norbulingka but later when messages were sent from the office of the Sho Magistrate and the news got more currency men, women and children in large number started streaming towards Norbulingka. By about 10 A.M. about 15,000/20,000 people had assembled outside the summer palace.
Such a gathering of the public probably for the first time for a political issue in the history of Tibet after arrival of Communist Chinese. It is very difficult to say whether the danger envisaged by the Tibetan officials was real or they just used this excuse to stir up the minds of the public against the Chinese and thus start a mass movement against them.
The feelings, however, were running very high against the Chinese and the public was restless and any excuse would have served to mobilize them. Sawang Samdup Photrang, Cabinet Minister of Local Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Tibetan Army who was proceeding towards Norbulingka was stoned by the mob.

The battle around the Chakpori Hill

Another victim was Phak-Pa Khanchung Sonam Gyatso (brother of Chamdo Phak-Pa La Rimpoche), who was shot dead and his body was taken round the streets of Lhasa in most humiliating manner. We understand that the mob mistook Sawang Samdup Photrang as Sawang Ngapho who is an out and out pro-Chinese and hated by Tibetans.
In the meantime the wishes of the public were passed on to Dalai Lama who through Sawang Surkhang and Kalon Lama Luishar assured the public over the loud-speakers that he would not go to the party. The mob had also by this time formed a Committee representing all classes including Tibetan Army, monasteries and officialdom. This Committee decided to declare Tibet as independent from 10th March, 1959, denounced the Sino-Tibetan Agreement of 1951, and to request Dalai Lama not to go to any function of the Chinese including the meetings of the Preparatory Committee.
Tibetan officials, lay and monk, present in Lhasa except for a few pre-Chinese, started going towards Norbulingka to attend meetings there. In the above mentioned Committee it was also decided that a deputation representing all sections of Tibetans should call on Foreign Representatives and other foreigners in Lhasa viz. Consul General for India, Consul General for Nepal, Bhutan Agent and the Kashmiri Muslims, to apprise them of the situation and the decisions taken. Accordingly they visited us first.
Realising that it might create misunderstanding with the Chinese, in the first instance we snowed our disinclination to meet them as it was their internal matter. On their instance, however, the Consul-General met them but offered no comments. Later the deputation visited the Consul General for Nepal, Bhutan Agent and the Kashmiri Muslims. The situation was fast deteriorating and people fearing danger to the life of Dalai Lama assumed the responsibility of guarding Norbulingka with whatever arms and ammunition they had. On the assurance given by the Dalai Lama that he would not go to the party the public gathered outside Norbulingka formed a procession and went round the streets of Lhasa shouting anti-Chinese slogans and declaring themselves as independent.
The things started happening quickly from 11th March onward the Tibetan officials (both lay and monk) held series of meetings, the Tibetans destroyed the bridge on Chinghai Tibet highway on north of Potala, destroyed Water Controlling Station on Kyi-chu-river on south of Norbulingka, Tibetan troops were posted at strategic points and in the outlying parks around Norbulingka, the Tibetan guards of the Kusung Regiment discarded their Chinese dress and put on Tibetan-dress, voluntary armed guards from the public also joined the Tibetan soldiers in Norbulingka for doing the guard duties round the clock, the Tibetan employees of the Chinese and students of the Chinese schools were asked to abandon their jobs and to leave schools.
As a result the Chinese schools closed and majority of the Tibetan employees with Chinese left their jobs. Pro-Chinese officials (very few in number) and the Tibetan employees who did not leave their jobs, with their families were asked by the Chinese to move to the Chinese Military Headquarters or other areas which were fully guarded by Chinese soldiers. The meetings which were being hold in Norbulingka by Tibetan officials were also attended by the Representatives of the committee. What actually transpired in those meetings is difficult to say but we understand that they mostly discussed how to approach the Chinese and as far as possible to have peaceful negotiations but use of force if necessity arose was also agreed upon.
Since all the Shapes and other high ranking Tibetan officials were attending those meetings it became evident that Tibetan Government had now openly challenged the Chinese rule and were supporting the people’s movement. It is quite likely that in these meetings it was visualized that peaceful negotiations with the Chinese might not be possible as the latter would never agree to their demand of free Tibet and withdrawal of Chinese from Tibet and for that the Tibetans thought it essential to prepare themselves for an armed retaliation.

The battle for the Ramoche temple

A call for volunteers was made and the Tibetan Government started issuing arms and ammunitions to the volunteers and also supplemented the weapons and ammunitions of the Tibetan troops.
Nearly 10 thousand monks from various monasteries in an around Lhasa and lay people from the town volunteered, themselves. There was a report at that time that the villagers around Lhasa also volunteered to fight for the cause of freedom and life of Dalai Lama. Regular public meetings were held in the town and at Sho, below Potala, where young and old of both sexes took oath to fight against the Chinese and offer one person from each house.
A Women’s procession was also organized and about 5,000 women visited this Consulate and requested that we should accompany them to the Chinese to witness their talks. We politely refused to accede to their request. Similarly they requested Consul General for Nepal, Bhutan Agent and other foreigners in Lhasa. But none of them agreed to accompany them.
So far the Chinese had not taken any action even though there was provocation on one or two occasions. They, however, ordered their personnel to remain within their barracks and they tried to persuade the public through loud-speakers not to be misled by bad elements. Tibetan officials and Shapes (Surkhang, Shasur and Liushar) were severely criticized and blamed for the trouble. The non-interference attitude of Chinese was puzzling the Tibetans. We feel that the Chinese were preparing themselves and waiting for reinforcements and probably also for orders from Peking. It may be stated here that the Chinese had already enough troops in Lhasa but they were very young and inexperienced. The Chinese probably also wanted additional troops to crush the uprising not only in Lhasa but all over Tibet.
By 17th March all the strategic places between Norbulingka and Chakpuri/Potala were occupied either by Tibetan soldiers or volunteers. Since our area happens to be in between Norbulingka and Chakpuri number of volunteers and soldiers could be seen with arms and ammunitions at nearby places. Some of them for their convenience used to cross through our area though we tried various methods to stop them.
A rumour was afloat on 17th March that the Chinese had fired three mortor shells from their motor station in Chandannagar which is on north-east of Norbulingka towards latter. Between the 11th March and the evening of the 19th March the Tibetan troops sounded alarms number of accidentally by the in-experienced volunteers or fired to test their weapons or tried their skill on target shooting.
On 18th morning we came to know that the Dalai Lama had left Norbulingka on the previous night and was proceeding towards Lhoka area. We also noticed that number of Tibetan troops had considerably reduced and their places taken up by volunteers. Now it looked that fighting would start any time.
What actually made the Dalai Lama leave suddenly can only be told by him or his advisers but we feel that his advisers probably came to know of some plans of the Chinese that put fear in them and made them leave. The plan might have been about the whole sale arrest by the Chinese of all the Tibetan officials and others taking part in the movement. We don’t think that the departure was decided on the 17th March only. The Dalai Lama might not have thought of it but his advisers must have planned it immediately after the trouble started on the 10th March, 1959.
On the 17th March there was rumour that some Khampas had come to Liu Dzong about 6 to 8 miles from Lhasa on the south bank of Kyichu river on the way to Lhoka area. These Khampas probably came to escort the Dalai Lama and party upto Lhoka, from this it appears that the Plan was made earlier. The other reason could be that the Tibetans had a mind to attack Chinese positions and before that they wanted Dalai Lama to be away to a safe area. At that time Lhoka area was safest. They must have also thought that if situation worsened they would be able to take Dalai Lama to India from there easily (the actual events prove this).
The situation continued to be very tense on 18th and 19th March. All sorts of rumours were afloat, such as that Chinese had announced that they would finish Lhasa in one hour and they were only waiting for an opportune moment. There was also a report that Chinese had thrown stones on the Women’s procession on the morning of 19th March and injured few of them.
On the night of 19th March we went to bed as usual but the inner feelings were, after seeing the feverish activities of the Tibetans during the past two days, that the hour of danger was not far off. To avoid any confusion in the event of any trouble, I had issued clear instructions a couple of days earlier to all the members of staff to shut immediately to the main Consulate building when the we had started keeping our dresses handy during night so that when there was any danger we could immediately dress up and take shelter on the ground floor. When we heard bursts of fire from the automatic weapons at 01:50 hours local time on 20th March, it was not a surprise to us. From my bed-room window I saw continuous flash coming from a light machine gun which was firing from a position on the bund along the Kyi-chu river about 8 to 9 hundred yards away; from our observations during day we knew that the Tibetans were occupying all area on South of our Consulate upto bank of Kyi-chu river and as such the gun firing must be of Tibetans.
The fire from all types of weapons including heavy guns could be heard from all sides. It is very difficult to say as to who fired the first shot but as the firing started from Norbulingka side (this is also stated by one Shan Chao in his diary published in Peking Review dated May 5, 1959) it seems that the Chinese had sent some troops on the other side of the river with intention either to surround Norbulingka or reconnoitre the position of Tibetans who on seeing the Chinese troops started firing.
If the Tibetans were to start they would not start firing in their own area without the presence of Chinese and should in normal course had gone forward and started the battle where the Chinese were holding the ground. The intense firing continued for over an hour. At about 6 AM. some Tibetans came to the Consulate and among them I recognized Khenchung Thupten Zangpo and a junior monk official of Kundeling Monastery. Khenchung Thupten requested for our intervention saying that it would be disastrous for Tibetans if the fighting continued. He also mentioned that uptil then they had an upper-hand in the fighting. We regretted our inability to do anything and simply told him that we would inform Government of India about the situation. We thought the things had quietened down but suddenly at 8 A.M. the firing of mortors and heavy guns resumed and this time it was more intensive than earlier.
Since it was coming from Lhasa side, it was evident that the Chinese had now launched an whole sale attack on the Tibetans. Artillery from both sides was in action and the targets were not far from our area. The Chinese artillery was aiming at Tibetan’s gun position on the south hill of Chakpuri [Chakpori] and Kundeling Monastery. We could also see that the Tibetan heavy gun was also firing from its position on the south hill of Chakpuri towards Chinese Military Headquarters.
The volume of the fire was increasing every moment. In the meantime I had spoken to the Political Officer in Sikkim on the radio telephone and from the wireless station I could see the shells bursting on east of our area, about 100 years from where I was speaking. Seeing the danger I ordered the wireless operator to shift to the main building where I had already kept a spare set for emergency purposes but due to some technical difficulties we could not open our set that day. By 11 A.M. local time we noticed that Tibetan heavy gun had stopped firing, probably its ammunition stock had exhausted and Tibetans on Chakpuri hill started retreating towards Norbulingka. Soon after the Chinese occupied the Chakpuri and its side hills.
Booms of the guns and fire from automatics could be heard from north and south-side indicating that the battle was in full swing. From Chakpuri Chinese started firing from their machine guns towards Norbulingka and bullets were hitting parks south of our area, our area and parks after Kundeling Dzasa’s house. Some bullets also hit the Consulate building and a Tibetan water carrier who happened to come out of her quarter for naturals call was hit in the chest – she died after two days. Now the Chinese artillery and armoured cars started moving towards Norbulingka both on south as well as on the north side of our area.
At about 2 P.M. local time the Chinese artillery started shelling Norbulingka and in the meantime their troops covered by armoured cars moved along slowly. The Tibetans in the parks south of our area were still putting up resistance and only after Chinese had intensified their fire that they retreated and the Chinese were able to proceed beyond our area by about 4 P.M. During the day many Tibetans withdrew to our area with their bag and baggages and requested us for shelter but as they were armed and the situation was such that had we given them shelter we might have very well became the target of the Chinese guns and as such we persuaded them to leave our area. They, however, left behind their cycles, beddings, rations etc.
The Chinese troops entered our area at about 4:30 P.M. and according to our men the Chinese fixed their guns to fire at the main building but on seeing the Indian national flag withdraw and proceeded towards Kundeling Dzasa’s house. On their way they fired at the residential quarters of our staff and the hospital. The firing was deliberate and aimed and it was only sheer luck that the inmates escaped unhurt. From the Chinese soldiers actions of not firing at the main building prove that they had instructions not to fire at the Consulate and their action of firing at the residences was probably due to their ignorance of the extent of our area and took these Houses as belonging to Kundeling Dzasa.
Bullets from the Chinese machine guns passed through our area from 11 A.M. to 4 P.M. and about 60 of them including the aimed ones had hit the Consulate buildings and later we picked up over 100 sharpenels from the Consulate garden and from the immediate vicinity and roof of the main building where we all except for few members of staff who due to intense firing could not shift were taking shelter.
By about 5:30 P.M. we noticed green very light signals fired from Norbulingka side indicating that they had complete control over these areas and the firing ceased. Later we saw heavy vehicles running on the south of our area. They were clearing their own casualties and this carried on till midnight. Though it was quiet around our area but the fire from heavy guns and automatic guns could be heard from north and east sides.
We could not know exactly what was happening in Lhasa and elsewhere but we could hear the fire of heavy guns and automatic weapons throughout the night of 21/22 March and this went on till 23rd March. Large number of Tibetans was taken prisoners – nearly 5,000 – and about 2 to 3 thousand killed or wounded. For continuous three to four days we noticed smoke coming from the Norbulingka side, probably the Chinese were burning the dead bodies. It is not possible for us to estimate the number of casualties on the Chinese side but they seemed to be heavy.
On the 21st March afternoon, Vice Director of Foreign-Bureau came in an armoured car from south side (this is not the normal route to our area) and from this it seemed that the Chinese had not yet been able to clear completely the Lhasa Norbulingka road on our north. He besides telling us that who local Government had revolted and it was an internal matter and no force on earth could take Tibet from China, asked us to shift to Foreign Bureau on grounds of safety.
We told him that we would prefer to stay on our own premises and if necessary they could arrange protection here itself. He also told that where their troops were stationed they would afford protection to the foreign nationals but where there were none he advised that they should withdraw. He wanted me to ask my nationals to strictly abide by the orders of their Government and stay indoors where the rebellious elements were active.
On the 22nd March about midday one Chinese Military Officer along with few soldiers came and informed us that he would be posting guards around our area. Few Tibetans who had managed to stay in the servants quarters surrendered to him. The Chinese officer requested that he would like to see the servants quarters to make sure that no bad element was hiding there to which we agreed. We were completely cut off from out-side as guards would not allow any one to come in or go out of our area. They would not even allow our water carriers to go out to fetch drinking water.
On the 25th March I was called to Foreign Bureau, travelling in their car, and told that as the rebellion had been put down basically there was no need for us to shift to Foreign Bureau. During my trip to Foreign Bureau and back I noticed that a considerable damage had been done to the Kundeling Monastery, some damage to Medical College at Chakpuri Monastery, Potala was hit at 7 to 8 places and the Sho village had received a considerable quantity of fire from automatic weapons as we could see that white wash of nearly all the houses had come off completely.
At the Foreign Bureau I noticed and was also told that Tibetans had done quite a lot of damage to their buildings from the artillery fire from Ramoche monastery. On the same day one of our nationals, Miss Sahabir along with her sister-in-law, managed to come to our area and from her we learnt that the Chinese had destroyed some portions of the main cathedral, shelled houses of Tibetan officials, took prisoners and the people were made to surrender through threats that the main cathedral would be completely destroyed. In the mean time Chinese had set up a Military Control Commission started taking census in and around Lhasa.
Strict restrictions were imposed on the movements of people and no one was allowed to leave Lhasa. A dusk to dawn curfew was also promulgated. Soon after the situation in Lhasa was in hand they sent their troops towards Lhoka and according to Chinese they took complete control of that area by about 18th April. From whatever we could see it area by about 18th April.
From whatever we could see it appears that they deployed a large force and with the help of air-force suppressed the Tibetans in the Lhoka area. In Lhasa the Chinese arrested practically all the Tibetan officials and number of other Tibetans, especially traders and intelligentsia on slightest suspicion and they are still hold under detention. Since no proper system of justice exists there is no question of any appeal. Anyone arrested is doomed for months together whether he is guilty or not. During the period of detention one is made to do manual work.
The Chinese confiscated millions of rupees worth of property of the Tibetan officials who either left for India or took part in the rebellion and also of those monasteries from where operations against them were carried out. The confiscated Tsampa (barley atta) was distributed by the Chinese among the beggars and destitutes and to this they gave much publicity to show that they were kind. Repairs to main-Cathedral and Norbulingka was started in order to show that they had respect for the religious places.
Blame for all these happenings has been thrown on bad elements. Simultaneously they started their propaganda campaign against the Tibetan officials, imperialists and reactionary elements. Besides the street corner meetings which were routine for a month or so rallies were arranged on 15th April and 1st May in which locals including monks from various monasteries were ordered to joint People out of fear attended and listened to the speeches made by the pro-Chinese Tibetans and Chinese. The speeches were centered round one theme i.e. the Tibetan Government and its officials in collusion with the foreign reactionaries were responsible for all this trouble.
The Chinese also rounded up all the Khampas, Amdowas, Sinkiangese, Golokpas and many Chinese civilians who were doing trade or other petty business and sent them back to their respective areas. Their families were also given option to follow them. The prisoners captured in Lhoka area, who were mostly Khampas were also sent away from Lhasa. Though the Chinese said that they were being returned to their homes – but people feared that they were sent to work on China-Tibet railway.
All the able bodied prisoners are being utilized as forced labour either at Nanchen Hydro Electric Project or other construction works. There are reports that in addition to the population census Chinese are collecting detailed information regarding private property owned by an individual including number of heads of cattle etc. all – over Tibet. The Chinese are showing utter disregard for the will of the Tibetans and are going ahead with their plans for in Tibet on the similar lines as in China proper.
The Peking and Lhasa Radios were silent about happenings in Tibet till the 28th March, 1959, though the trouble had started from the 10th March and the free world Radios were giving news about fighting from the 20th March. The Chinese, only after taking complete control of the situation in Lhasa, announced on the 28th March, 1959, the State Council’s order asking the Tibet Military Area Command in Tibet to put down rebellion, dissolved the Tibet local Government and asked the Preparatory Committee to take its – functions. The same day the Peking Radio also broadcast the proclamation of the Tibet Military Area Command and the Hsinhua [Xinhua] News Agency’s communiqué on rebellion in Tibet.
The communiqué said that out of total population of 1,200,000 only about 20,000 were rebel bandits, in other words nationalists, and this included some people from Kham. We feel that the actual position was other way round and not some Khampas but many of them and large number of Amdowas, Golokpas had joined the crusade, some actively and openly and others gave their moral support.
The anti-Chinese feelings existed all over Tibet since Chinese entry in 1950 but only bayonets of the Peoples Liberation Army were keeping these suppressed. If the broad masses of the Tibetans were with them, as the Chinese claim, then there was no reason to have military rule all over Tibet as they did not feel the necessity in Shigatse, seat of the Panchen Lama and where they were confident that nothing would go against them, and also when the rebellion in Lhasa and Lhoka had been quelled.
They suspected every Tibetan and according to talk of the town-it-was only after threats and show of force that the Chinese were able to establish their military administrations in other places in Tibet after establishing it in Lhasa by force. Even now except for their hirelings they do not trust Tibetans in general. The dusk to down curfew continues and the general security measures have not-so-far been relaxed. Except for about 500 prisoners the rest still continue to be in detention. The prisoners released were probably unfit for manual work and their release effected for propaganda campaign to show to Tibetans their magnanimity towards the prisoners.
Almost 99 per cent of the Tibetans did not want Chinese rule though many of them were leading hard life under the feudal system. The main reason for this was the ‘fear’ that the Godless Chinese Communists, not allow them to profess their religion after they completely took over control of things in Tibet. They were prepared to sacrifice everything for religion and for life of the Dalai Lama. The peoples challenge met with failure and proved disastrous for Tibet. The failure was mainly due to inexperience both on part of the leaders and the masses.
The people should have on no account resorted to an armed revolution and similarly at no cost the Tibetan Government should have associated with the movement and encouraged the armed up-rising. The Chinese used force with no reserve for carrying out reforms in adjoining provinces of Tibet including Kham, Eastern Tibet but as for Central Tibet they were careful and as far as possible wanted to use peaceful means i.e. by winning over Tibetans by hook or crook. The reason for this was probably that while they could carry out their reforms by force in those places without outside world knowing about their methods but in case of latter they knew that things would leak out through foreign missions, traders and pilgrims going to India and Nepal and this would bring bad name and material for propaganda for free world.
They were quite aware of the opposition for reforms and for that they postponed these for six years from 1st January, 1957, with a provision that even after six years these would be carried only if people were prepared for it. Whether their offer of postponement was genuine or not it is difficult to say but one thing is clear that the Chinese never lost any opportunity to enforce on Tibetans any item of reforms and they kept a critical eye on all Tibetan officials and day to day functioning of the Tibet Government.
An incident in Gyantse gave them an opportunity to introduce a resolution in the Preparatory Committee exempting Tibetan employees and students from payment of taxes to their Tibetan masters. No Tibetan official could be promoted or granted leave for going outside Tibet on business or pilgrimage, unless it was approved by the Chinese. These coupled with the news of maltreatment to the high ranking Lamas and others by the Chinese in the liberated areas (Lamas and dignitaries being used for manual work, deprived of all privileges and properties etc.) was worrying the Tibetans in Central Tibet as the promised period of the postponement of reforms was coming to an end.
They preferred to risk their lives rather than to undergo the Chinese ‘Liberation’. On the other hand the Chinese were looking for an opportunity, if possible an armed uprising, to take things in their hands, and unfortunate for Tibet such an opportunity did arise on 10th March.
The Tibetan’s apprehension of Chinese way of treatment was not wrong as the events after the revolution are proving. The high ranking officials and Lamas, who could not escape to India or stayed behind after the Dalai Lama’s departure, are being subjected to humiliation. Servants, subjects and disciples are forced to beat their former masters and Gurus. They are also employed for manual work including carriage of rubbish etc. for manure. Beating in one case was so severe that the person died the next day while another high ranking official (Tsarong Dzasa) died couple of days before he was scheduled for such a treatment, probably on account of shock.
They have a mind to eliminate the upper class as it is alleged that this class was responsible for the uprising and luring workers and peasants to rally around them.
We have no authentic information as to what actually transpired in Lhoka area, which was under the complete control of the Khampas, when the Chinese forces carried a three prong drive against the defenders of the faith there. According to the Chinese 2000 rebels were either killed, wounded or captured, many surrendered while some fled to India.
The Chinese are adopting all methods to bring the Tibetans into their fold and it is feared that in due course the Tibetans will lose their individual identity and culture. The Chinese do not even call the Tibetans as Tibetans. Many Tibetans have already done away with their pig-tails and Bakoos (Tibetan cloak) and instead started wearing Chinese dress, to please Chinese masters. Unless something extraordinary happens we do not think the Tibetans have any chance of getting independence or real regional autonomy in foreseeable future as the Chinese have now established themselves so firmly that they will not care about anything even world opinion and will go ahead with their policy of annihilating the Tibetan race.
They would not bother about the Tibetans who have left Tibet, not even for His Holiness the Dalai Lama. They would write off these as traitors. They, however, would not mind Dalai Lama’s return on their terms. The Chinese are not missing him as in his place they have Panchen Lama who harps their tune and is good enough to fill in the formalities of the office and as religious pontiff. As for the broad masses, who have great faith in the Dalai Lama, will under intimidation accept the Panchen Lama as their religious guide in due course of time Chinese are also taking steps to see that the religion does not play an important role in the life of the Tibetans in the coming generation. For this they are vigorously enrolling children of all classes and imparting education on the communist lines.
The future of Tibet is dark and only a miracle can save Tibet from the clutches of the Chinese Communist Colonialists.
(Source: National Archives of India)

Follow the Core

Follow the Core Leader

During the recent US-China Summit, Yang Jiechi, member of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party and senior-most Chinese diplomat, bluntly told US Secretary of State Antony Blinken: “The Chinese people are wholly rallying around the Communist Party of China. Our values are the same as the common values of humanity. Those are: peace, development, fairness, justice, freedom and democracy.”
He continued for several minutes criticizing the US for its human rights record, “we do not believe in invading through the use of force, or to topple other regimes through various means, or to massacre the people of other countries, because all of those would only cause turmoil and instability in this world.”
India has recently had a different experience of China in Ladakh.
However, there is an abyss between the Chinese leaders’ words and what is happening in the Middle Kingdom.
One typical example is the grand celebrations of the so-called Serf Emancipation Day on March 28; it is the greatest lie ever concerning Tibet.
What is this ‘emancipation’?
March 28, 1959 marks the end of the massacre of the Tibetan population in Lhasa and the placing of a tight control over the Tibetan capital by Beijing; the Dalai Lama was sacked as chairman of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and was replaced by a more pliant Panchen Lama; the Dalai Lama had just fled the Roof of the World to take refuge in India.
The Alzeimerish communist party has forgotten the 40 or 50 million deaths during the Great LeaP Forward, the 10 million or so Chinese who perished during the cruel Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution or closer to our times, the Tiananmen massacre in 1989, still ‘celebrates’ the Emancipation of the Tibetans.
Several non-Tibetan accounts of the events of March 1959, including the popular uprising, the flight of the Dalai Lama, the massacre of the Tibetan population and finally the so-called ‘emancipation’ — all this in less than three weeks — are today in the public domain.
In his ‘Report for the months of March, April and May 1959’ sent to the Ministry of External Affairs, Maj SL Chibber, the Indian Consul General in Lhasa said: “In the history of movement for free Tibet, the month of March, 1959, will be most historic …during this month Tibetans high and low, in Lhasa, capital of Tibet, openly challenged the Chinese rule … the might of [the] PLA, who on March 20, 1959, started an all-out offensive against the ill-organised, ill-equipped and untrained Tibetans with artillery, mortars, machine guns and all types of automatic weapons, was short-lived.”
Chibber continued: “On March 28, 1959, the State Council of the People’s Republic of China dissolved the local Tibet Government and transferred all its functions and powers to the Preparatory Committee for the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR).”
RS Kapur, another Indian official posted as Indian Trade Agent in Gyantse, wrote in his Annual Report for the Year 1959: “The year 1959 will go down as the most important year in the history of Tibet. It marked an end to the way of life of the Tibetan people. The Dalai Lama, who felt that he could no longer function effectively, left his country in March. …With Opposition out of the country, Chinese got a free hand and they went all out to subjugate the country. People have been deprived of their movable and immovable property.”
He further asserted: “While the heart of Tibet was bleeding, the free world only made speeches. With the end of the debate on Tibet in the United Nations, Tibetans lost all hopes of their survival, stared at the sky with blank eyes and asked: Where is God? Where is Buddha?”
Another publication, ‘The 1959 Tibetan Uprising Documents — The Chinese Army Documents’, released a few years ago, used documents from the PLA’s Military Intelligence, corroborated Chibber’s version of the 1959 bloody events.
But sixty-two years later, the Chinese media is full of the ‘liberation and emancipation’ of the serfs in 1959; numbers of interviews have been published by Xinhua and its affiliates; one mentions a place called Khesum “the name of a manor in Tibet, and also the name of a living hell for 302 serfs there.”
The actual fact is that it was the ordinary people, the ‘masses’ in Communist jargon who revolted against the occupiers in 1959. The Chinese propaganda wants us to believe that “the misery and serfdom that defined the Khesum of old are [today] nothing more than a distant memory.” Everything is fine in Tibet, according to Beijing.
Another article in China Daily notes: “This year marks not only the 100th anniversary of the founding of the CPC, but also the 70th anniversary of the peaceful liberation of Tibet. …Seventy years ago, under the guidance of the CPC, Tibetan people started to enter a new era of progress, prosperity and openness.”
Quoting a puppet legislator, it continues in the same vein: “Over the past 70 years, Tibet has stepped out of the primitive society of agriculture and animal husbandry, and transformed into a society of industrialization and information."
Xinhua quotes a former ‘serf’ Pasang, born in 1934 in a village near Shigatse: “In the old times, the family of Basang had to pay various taxes to serf owners, under whom the family led a miserable life. The taxes imposed were more numerous than ripples in the water and stars in the sky.”
Today all over Land of Snows, the Tibetans have to take oath and swear by the Party. Take the case of Nyalam, close to Tibet-Nepal border, there has been “an upsurge of learning and propagating the Communist Party history” says China Tibet Network.
The people in Nyalam are actively promoting the study of the Party history: “Learn Party History, Increase your Confidence [in the Party], Inherit the Red Gene,” is the motto.
Everyone has to learn from the Party’s history, “so that everyone deeply can feel the Chinese Communists' hard work, perseverance, and wholeheartedly seeking happiness for the people.”
Even the PLA is not exempted: “Events marking the Party's centenary will include theoretical seminars and themed forums, as well as a massive exhibition at the Military Museum of the Chinese People's Revolution. All activities will display the military's love of the Party, the nation and the people” notes a PLA communiqué.
Referring to Xi Jinping’s leadership: “Every soldier should be loyal to the core, uphold the core, follow the core;” the objective is to make soldiers "appreciate the glorious truth about Xi Jinping's Thought on Socialism with Chinese characteristics.”
The American society (like the Western) might not be perfect, but can a totalitarian regime like the present one in China, lecture others about ‘emancipation’ or ‘liberation’. The fact is Tibetans, like the Uyghurs, have been enslaved by the Communist Party.

The Dalai Lama crosses the Indian border - rare documents

Today it is 62 years that the Dalai Lama arrived in India.
On the occasion of the 59th anniversary of the arrival of the Dalai Lama in India, I had posted on my website a very large collection of historical documents related to the flight of the Tibetan leader.
Click here to consult them.

Of particular interest, the reports of the Political Officer, Har Mander Singh about his first encounters with the Dalai Lama and his Cabinet ministers.
Some words are unfortunately missing in the file which seems to be attacked by white ants.
The file is from the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library.

Incidentally, an account based on Chinese Military Intelligence was recently published: The 1959 Tibetan Uprising Documents: The Chinese Army Documents (China Secrets Book 16) Kindle Edition
It gave another view on the escape of the Dalai Lama to India.
Supposing that the assertion in this book is right, it is also very much possible that the Dalai Lama and his entourage did not know that Mao had ordered “Let him go, if he wants to go.”
The fact that the Dalai Lama ‘crossed the Himalaya under permanent danger of being caught or even killed by the Chinese’, can’t be doubted.
The author of the 1959 Tibetan Uprising Documents himself admits that Mao would have changed his mind on March 17, 1959 and asked the PLA to stop the Tibetan leader.
Here are an extract of the 1959 Documents.

Misjudgment on the Escape of the Dalai Lama
Another legend related to the 1959 Tibetan uprising is the ‘escape’ of the Dalai Lama to India. Supposedly he managed to barely get away from advancing Chinese army units and crossed the Himalaya under permanent danger of being caught or even killed by the Chinese.
This rather romantic legend is disproved for many years. At least by the 1990s when new Chinese archive material became available it became clear that it was Mao himself who instructed the Tibet Military District "To let him go (over the border with India) if he wants to go." Mao issued this order on March 12. He seems to have changed his mind somewhat on March 17 and asked the army in Lhasa to stop him, but then it was too late. After receiving this surprising message, the high commanders of the Tibet Military District just decided to do nothing about it. [A good description of those events are in the back published by the Harvard University Press in 2016 and written by Jianglin Li with the title Tibet in Agony, Lhasa 1959, pages 216 to 225.]
Looking at all the original papers available to this author, there is no indication for a search or hunt after the Dalai Lama by any Chinese unit. Units like those stationed in Tsetang and located between Lhasa and the Indian border never received orders to go out and search for the Dalai Lama.
Another option would have been to send those Chinese soldiers stationed in Shigatse and Yadong [Yatung] in the direction of Southern Tibet to cut-off his escape route. Those garrisons just stayed in the same locations during March. The ultimate option would have been the use of paratroopers to block the main mountain passes. In the end, nothing was done, and Mao was not pushing for action.

Accompanied by an Assam Rifles' escort

More interesting is the first report of the Dalai Lama's arrival in India

Report on the entry of His Holiness the Dalai Lama into India.
Phase I- Chuthangmu to Lumla

April 5, 1959

On the 27th March, 1959, Shri TS Murty, Assistant Political Officer (APO) Tawang, received instructions about the possibility of the Dalai Lama seeking entry into India. He reached Chuthangmu to receive the party at 09:00 hours on the 31st March, 1959.
The advance party of the Dalai Lama under a comparatively junior officer had already reached Chuthangmu on the 29th March. They stated that the main party consisting of the Dalai Lama, his family, ministers and tutors were expected to enter our territory at 14:00 hours on the 31st March, that there was no sign of the Chinese pursuit and that the party was bringing a small number of porters and would be needing many more from our area.
At 1400 hours on the 31st March, the Dalai Lama and his party reached Kenze Mane [Khenzimane] which demarcates the frontier in Chuthangmu area. His holiness was riding a yak and was received by the Assistant Political Officer, Tawang. They proceeded to the checkpost without halting at the frontier.
Dronyer Chhempu [Chenpo or Lord Chamberlain], Personal Assistant to the Dalai Lama met the Assistant Political Officer in the evening and it was agreed that all porters brought by the party from Tibet would be sent back and that porterage arrangements thereafter would be made by us. It was also agreed that all pistols and revolvers, except those in possession of the Dalai Lama, his family and ministers (excluding their servants), and all rifles would be handed over to us for safe custody and that these could be collected at the frontier by those members of the body guard who were to return to Tibet after escorting the Dalai Lama to the plains or that alternatively, we would keep that in our custody and obtain disposal orders from the Government. It was further decided that a list of all Tibetan officers and of entering our territory would be prepared and handed over to the Assistant Political Officer.
The same evening, Shri Kumar, ACTO of the SIB [Subsidiary Intelligence Bureau] in Chuthangmu brought to the Assistant Political Officer [TS Murty], the copy of letter dated the 26th March from the Dalai Lama addressed to Prime Minister [of India] and requested that it should be delivered to the addressee. He stated that two messengers from the Dalai Lama carrying the original letter had already passed through Chuthangmu on the 29th and that he had transmitted the English translation over the wireless to Shillong. He had asked the messengers to hand over the letter to him for dispatched but they had insisted on carrying it themselves and had proceeded to the plains via Bhutan.
On the morning of the 1st April, 16 rifles and 9 pistols/revolvers were handed over to us for safe custody.
The Dzongpon [District Commissioner] of Tsona [in Tibet] who arrived in the meantime was refused entry after discussion with senior Tibetan officers.
At 09:00 hours the Assistant Political Officer was summoned by the Dalai Lama. Following points were made by His Holiness during conversation with him:
The policy of the Chinese was becoming increasingly anti-religious; the masses of Tibet were restive and he was no longer able to make them put up with the Chinese rule; the Chinese had attempted to endanger his person; Tibet should be free; his people would fight to win their freedom; he was confident that India’s sympathies are with the Tibetans; the seat of his Government had shifted from Lhasa to Ulgelthinse in Lhuntse Dzong and the Government of India should be informed of this very early.
At about 1800 hours, Lobsang [one word missing, probably, Lobsang Samten, brother of...] of the Dalai Lama, reached Chuthangmu and was [one word missing].
The party moved to Gorsam Chorten.
At 1500 hours, the Dalai Lama called the Assistant Political Officer and wanted to know if he had received any news of international developments in regard to his escape, especially the line adopted by India, the UK and the USA in this regard.
The Assistant Political Officer said that he had no information.
On the following day the party moved to Shakti and on 3.4.59 it reached Lumla.

Sd/-Har Mander Singh
Political Officer
April 5, 1959

Relaxing on the way...

Here is another document related to the first encounter between the PO and the Tibetan leader

Top Secret

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION WITH SENIOR TIBETAN OFFICERS
AT LUMLA

APRIL 3, 1959.

Lyou Hsia [Liushar] Thubten, Foreign Minister, Kungo Shase [Shashur Shape], Minister and Chichyap Khempu [Kempo], Secretary to the Dalai Lama came to see me soon after their arrival in Lumla. It was meant to be a social gathering but the Chapes [Shapes] spoke about some important matters while they were with me. Shri [TS] Murty, Assistant Political Officer, Tawang, was also present.

2. After the usual formalities the Foreign Minister briefly recounted the circumstances under which the Dalai Lama was forced to leave Tibet. He said that the relations between China and accepted as a spiritual leader by the Chinese Emperors. There was exchange of visits between the leaders of the two countries which brought them together. The Government of Tibet was, however, in possession of documents refuting Chinese claim of suzerainty over them and in support of theirs being an independent country. In recent past they had endeavoured to regulate their relationship scrupulously on the basis of the 17 point Treaty with China. The attitude of the Chinese after their “peaceful liberation of Tibet” had become increasingly anti-religious. For example, in order to popularize communism they had circulated a story in a periodical issued from Thachido, [Dartsedo or Kanding in Chinese] a town on Sino-Tibetan border, that Prince Sidhartha was forced to leave his kingdom because of the popular feeling against kingship and that he had attained ‘Nirvana’ because he had ultimately realized that peoples’ will was more important than that of the kings.

3. The Dalai Lama himself felt that they should work in and harmony with the Chinese. Indeed during his visit to India was advised by the Indian Prime Minister himself to cooperate with the Chinese in the interest of his country. In spite of [word missing] effort to accommodate the Chinese viewpoint, the Chinese interfere in the religious affairs of the Tibetans had [word missing]. They had desecrated several monasteries in Kham Province and had also killed several incarnate Lamas.

4. On the 10th March, the Dalai Lama was invited to attend cultural show in the Chinese area. The people came to know of this invitation and feared that it may be an attempt to remove the Dalai Lama from the scene or exert undue pressure on him. The news spread in Lhasa City and soon a large crowd gathered around the palace and prevented him from attending the Chinese function.

5. On the 11th, a procession of women went to the office of the Consul General, India and asked him to intervene on their behalf with the Chinese. They made a similar request to the Nepalese Consul General also. Their main demand was that the news about the Chinese interference in the religious affairs of the Tibetans and of their attempt to remove the Dalai Lama from Lhasa should be given publicity in the world press.

6. This kind of unrest continued for seven days. At 4 p.m. Lhasa time, on the 17th, the Chinese fired two mortar shells which fell only eighty yards short of the [word missing]. This convinced the Kashag that the Dalai Lama’s life [was endangered] and, therefore, they persuaded him to escape from [the Norbulinka] at 10 p.m. the same night with the Dalai Lama dress [word missing] clothes.

7. They had been listening [word missing] news ever since and had also been getting information through their sources. According to their information, the Chinese came to know of the Dalai Lama’s escape on the 19th March and shelled the Potala, the summer palace and the Gompa at Chakpori on the 20th March.

8. The Dalai Lama’s party escaped via the Southern route. There was a Chinese garrison of about 600 at Tsethang. They were surrounded by the rebel troops and Tibetan Government forces and could not, therefore, interfere with the movement of the party. On reaching Ulgelthinse in Lhuntse Dzong, they established the seat of the exile Government there temporarily on the 26th March. For the present, the Government would be run by the lay and monk commissioners of Southern Tibet known as Lhojes. They had sent instructions to Lhasa that all Government officers and records should be moved to this place.

9. Except for Tsedang there were no Chinese in Southern Tibet.

10. After leaving Ulgelthinse they spotted an aircraft flying over them near Tsona and feared that their party might be bombed but fortunately they were able to reach the Indian frontier without incident.

11. They reached the frontier at 2 p.m. on the 31st March and were received by Shri [TS] Murty, Assistant Political Officer, who brought them to Chuthangmu. They had felt very relieved after entering Indian territory.

12. They had heard the Chinese announcement that the Dalai Lama was forced to escape on the advice of 18 officers who were accompanying him and that these officers had been declared traitors. It was quite obvious, therefore, that they had no place in Communist Tibet.

13. They were quite prepared to negotiate with the Chinese for their return to Tibet and would welcome India’s good offices in this direction. They intended, however, to insist on complete [word missing] for Tibet and would continue their fight till their country was liberated.

14. I said that while we wanted friendship with all countries including China, we had much closer cultural and religious ties with Tibet and were, therefore, happy to receive them in our territory. I also said that our country’s good offices could be effective only if opposing parties had faith in our impartiality. It was, therefore, essential that no attempt should be made by bands of Khampas or Tibetan Government troops to violate the frontier. I said that I shall be grateful if they could suitably pass this on to the correct quarters. Our Government was, however, always prepared to grant asylum on humanitarian considerations and a case was already on record where we had brought the family of a favour Khmpa rebel to Tawang for medical treatment on these very considerations.

15. We briefly discussed the future programme of the party. The Foreign Minister indicated that they might like to stay upto ten days in Tawang. I explained briefly the disadvantages of their prolonged stay in Tawang and said that we could perhaps make them more comfortable in Bomdi La. I made it clear, however that we were prepared to accede to the Dalai Lama’s wishes in the [word missing]. The Foreign Minister said that it would be possible to cut down [word missing] Tawang to about three days.

16. I also said that we shall provide the facilities for travel beyond Tawang to all persons [word missing] the Dalai Lama but there was danger that stray persons escaping from Tibet may take this opportunity and come in along with the main party. It was, therefore, important that the list of persons authenticated by the party should be as comprehensive and accurate as it was possible to make it. The Foreign Minister agreed to this suggestion.

Sd/- Har Mander Singh
Political Officer
April 3, 1959.

The Tibet Factor in India-China Relations

Seventy Years Ago: Tibet Invaded
October 7, 2020 marks the 70th anniversary of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) crossing the Upper Yangtze and entering into the territory controlled by Lhasa.
While invading Eastern Tibet, Beijing asserted that it was ‘liberating’ the Land of Snows. Today, seven decades later, the Tibetans, particularly the first ‘liberated’ populations of Eastern Tibet, still disagree with this interpretation. Tragically, in the process, India lost a peaceful border shared with a Buddhist nation.
The Battle of Chamdo, the first and only encounter between the Tibetan and Chinese forces, is interesting to look at for several reasons.
Tibet, a Buddhist nation was not military and tactically ready to oppose the seasoned troops of Mao (and some of China’s brilliant commanders). From the start, The Land of Snows stood no chance, especially without outside support from India or the West.
Further, many in Tibet still believed that increasing the number of japa (recitation) or parikramas (circumambulations) around the monasteries and stupas of Kham, would be sufficient to make the Truth Prevail. As Robert Ford, the British radio operator posted in Chamdo, remarked ‘The gods are on our side’ was the mantra most oft-repeated in the town, “but it seemed to me that something more Churchilian was needed.”
For the Chinese, it was a well-prepared operation (a ‘police operation’ would have said Marshal Peng Dehuai) in 2 stages: the fall of Chamdo, the capital of Kham province during the Fall of 1950 and then the advance to Lhasa during the next season.
India was fooled into believing that Communist China wanted a ‘negotiated’ settlement with the Tibetans: it was never the case. Marshal Liu Bosheng in a message in August 1950 made it clear that he was going to ‘liberate’ Tibet.
Opposite the Chinese strategists was Ngabo Shape , the Tibetan Commissioner for the Kham province, a weak leader, ready to surrender; he was obviously not the military chef de guerre that Tibet needed at that point in time to coordinate the defence of the different border posts.
It has to be noticed that Mao Zedong entered the Korean campaign on the same day  as the PLA crossed the Yangtze and started its operations in Tibet. It shows the confidence the Communist leadership had in the local PLA commanders.
The PLA summary of the battle and the recommendations distributed by the PLA after the Battle of Chamdo tend to show that it was an excellent preparation for the Chinese troops for another battle 12 years later on the Himalayan slopes. Against India this time!

Emergence of a ‘Liberated’ World
Looking back into the fifteen-year period before the India-China War (1947-1962), one can see that the world witnessed earth-shaking changes: India became independent; China did its own revolution, resulting in the arrival of a new regime, more brutal in its approach, especially towards the periphery of the Middle Kingdom; most of the African and Asian nations were decolonized. However, at the same time, a de facto independent nation came under the yoke of Communist China; hardly two months after the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Xinjiang was annexed, opening the door to Western Tibet which would be occupied a few months later, thereby changing the status of India’s Northern frontiers.
An unprepared and peaceful Land of Snows became part of the Chinese ‘Motherland’ in a two-pronged strategic move, i.e. the military fall of Chamdo and Eastern Tibet in October 1950 and then in May 1951, a ‘diplomatic’ coup, forcing a 17-Point Agreement on a weak and disunited Tibetan nation. Mao was indeed a master strategist.
Tibet lost its independence and India’s serene northern frontier vanished. Even though at that time, India had some excellent strategic thinkers, the Government in Delhi decided not to use their competence; their conclusions and recommendations were not accepted by the then Prime Minister.
The tumultuous last six months of 1950 saw the emergence of two factions in India: one led by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and KM Panikkar, his ambassador in Beijing, both obsessed with an imaginary friendship with New China and fixated on the ‘larger implications for World Peace’ for any decision concerning Tibet; the other, which immediately saw the strategic implications for India, if Delhi let Tibet down, was led by Sardar Patel, the Deputy Prime Minster with Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, the Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations as his main adviser, but also comprised President Rajendra Prasad, C. Rajagopalachari, KM Munshi and others. They were fed with reports ‘from the ground’ by Harishwar Dayal, the Political Officer in Sikkim and Sumul Sinha, the Head of the Indian Mission in Lhasa, two sincere and far-sighted civil servants. At that time, India had a full-fledged Mission in Tibet as well as three Trade Agencies in Gyantse, Yatung and Gartok.
This tragic dichotomy between the officers on the ground with first hand information and the ‘visionaries’ in Delhi continued throughout these fifteen years.
Today China speaks of ‘poverty alleviation’ for the Roof of the World, but what has the Communist regime been doing since they entered Lhasa in September 1951, if the Tibetans have remained poor 70 years later?
The truth is that Mao was only interested in the strategic assets of Tibet; China gained not only a huge landmass, but the access to the ‘water tower of Asia’, large mineral resources and a strategic position dominating the subcontinent. The Tibetan masses were nowhere in China’s periscope.
At that time, the Indian government decided to ignore the Tibetan issue, probably due to a lack of vision and courage, despite the warnings of Sardar Patel and his colleagues. This move would have tremendous consequences; some that continue to be felt even 70 years later, for example, on the Northern borders of India, particularly in Eastern Ladakh.

The Tibetan appeal at the UN
On the same day that the Deputy Prime Minister Patel, wrote his prophetic letter to Nehru , a well-drafted appeal sent from Kalimpong  pointed to the fact that “the Tibetans were racially, culturally and geographically far apart from the Chinese.” It also made a parallel with the situation in the Korean peninsula: “The attention of the world was then riveted on Korea where aggression was being resisted by an international force.
Similar happenings in Tibet were taking place with the world covering its eyes: … [The problem is] largely the outcome of unthwarted Chinese ambitions to bring weaker nations on her periphery within her active domination,” said the Appeal, which continued: “As a people devoted to the tenets of Buddhism, Tibetans had long eschewed the art of warfare, practised peace and tolerance and for the defence of their country, relied on its geographical configuration and on non-involvement in the affairs of other nations.”
It added that the Chinese, in their natural urge for expansion, “have wholly misconstrued the significance of the ties of friendship and interdependence that existed between China and Tibet.”
Some twenty years ago, Claudia Johnston, an independent researcher in International Law at the University of Victoria, Canada, wrote a fascinating paper, Tibet: The International Mistake of the Century.
The outcome of her research was that the Tibetan Appeal was still a pending matter in the UN …waiting to be reopened: “The UN and individual Member States, have been conducting their decisions based on the false assumption that Tibet is not a ‘State’, but ‘an internal affair’ of China. UN official records show this to be a mistake.” Tibet was then a legal State.
As a result, “the issue of Tibetan Statehood remains unconsidered by the United Nations. United Nations mechanisms for ‘States’ to employ peaceful solutions to ‘Disputes’ have not been utilised.”
All this was done …at the request of India.
From the start, Nehru was pessimistic about the outcome of the UN appeal: “We doubt whether a discussion of Tibetan problem in General Assembly or in Security Council will yield any useful result,” wrote the Prime Minister. The friendship with China was already too important to be sacrificed for the fate a weak neighbour like Tibet.
The Prime Minister frankly admitted that though Beijing had repeatedly expressed itself in favour of Tibetan autonomy “but of course we do NOT know what their idea of autonomy is.”
He thought: “We do NOT think that legal argument will be helpful or that [General] Assembly should attempt more than appeal to two parties to come to a peaceful settlement. Condemnation of China will NOT help Tibet; and neither Security Council nor Assembly is in any position to render physical aid to Tibet.”
As a result China was not condemned and could complete its task of entering Lhasa without hindrance; in Sun Tzu’s jargon, ‘liberating Tibet without waging war’.
In the course of the discussions at the UN in New York, most of the representatives indicated that India was the nation most concerned and that they would follow India’s lead. In a note, Nehru sadly asserted: “I think it may be taken for granted that China will take possession, in a political sense at least, of the whole of Tibet.”  
He further admitted that for the Tibetan people the “autonomy can obviously not be anything like the autonomy, verging on independence, which Tibet has enjoyed during the last forty years or so.”
His final words were: “We cannot save Tibet, as we should have liked to do so, and our very attempts to save it might bring greater trouble to it. It would be unfair to Tibet for us to bring this trouble upon her without having the capacity to help her effectively.”
The strange argument was: if we do anything to help Tibet, it will upset the Chinese and the fate of Tibet would be worse.
The case was eventually ‘put in abeyance’ at India’s demand.
Let us remember that Sardar Patel was by then a dying man and nobody else could stand up to Nehru.
But today China stubbornly continues to occupy Indian territory in Ladakh; however if the Western Theatre Command generals manage to convince President Xi Jinping that India should be taught more lessons, there are plenty of old issues for India to reopen; the UN appeal is one of them.

The Panchsheel Agreement: a Turning Point
One of the most immoral actions of the Indian Government was to ignore the existence of the Tibetan Government during its dealing with the new masters of the Roof of the World, particularly during the talks for the 1954 Tibet Agreement. It was wrong of the government to be vociferous about the decolonization of Africa or Asia, while at the same time ignoring the occupation by force of Tibet, a gentle neighbor at its gates, which enjoyed what the Indian Prime Minister himself described as ‘verging on Independence’.
The “Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India”, remembered as the Panchsheel Agreement, was signed on April 29, 1954 in Beijing. At the end of 1953, negotiations started for an accord on Tibet, taking into account the new situation, i.e. China’s occupation of the plateau. The talks were to be settled in a couple of weeks; it would take four months to arrive at a settlement …but forgetting the border.
The Panchsheel Agreement resulted in the unhindered advance of the Communist ideology and Mao’s army on the Tibetan plateau. Having received the green light from Nehru, the Communists imposed a new way of life, less compassionate, less enlightened over the Roof of the World.
The Chinese officials in Tibet did not look favorably upon the Dalai Lama’s aspiration to radically change the Tibetan society while still maintaining its 2,000-year old tradition. This would have cast a shadow on the Communist Party.
It is however true that many senior Indian politicians and diplomats, educated in ‘modern’ ideas, thought the ‘old Lama hierarchy’ should go and Tibet become a ‘modern’ country; they believed that the Chinese invasion was a chance to make a clean sweep of the old superstitions, beliefs or rituals.

The Slow Take-over of the Plateau
Soon after the Tibet Agreement was signed, the Chinese leadership took a radical approach towards Tibet, though, for a couple of years, the main emphasis was the building of the infrastructure needed to ‘stabilize the revolution’ on the plateau.
This period was marked by a general deterioration of the situation in Central Tibet and the slow take-over of the institutions by the PLA and the representatives of the Communist Party’s Central Committee.
The Tibetans were at a loss, should they collaborate with the Communists or revolt against the Chinese occupation? Interestingly, it was the poorer sections of the society who started to rebel, while the high clergy and the aristocracy were not unhappy with the Chinese ‘largesse’ (which often included collaboration).
Over the years, the situation slowly changed with the Chinese getting bolder and establishing themselves by force, imposing their law on the local Tibetan officials as well as the Indian representatives. The pilgrims to Mt Kailash and the traders from the Himalayan region and Ladakh started to face harassment. It was only a beginning.
As the situation in Lhasa and elsewhere in Tibet continued to deteriorate, strengthening the Indian borders was imperative. For the purpose, an Indian Frontier Administrative Service was created and several ex-Army officers were recruited. This was one of the positive outcomes of the exacerbated tensions on the borders. These remarkable officers performed miracles on the frontiers. One wishes that the government would today recreate such a service.
By 1955, the construction of the Tibet-Sinkiang Highway cutting across Ladakh, had started and the roads heading towards the NEFA (now Arunachal Pradesh) and Sikkim had already been completed. The significance of these moves was ignored by Delhi; we are seeing the consequences today in Ladakh.

The Nehru-Zhou Talks in 1956
The visit of the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama to India in 1956-57 should be seen in this perspective. The former was hesitant to return to Lhasa. He finally decided to return and give a chance to the Communists to ‘reform’ Tibet in a peaceful manner. It was not to be.
In 1956, during bilateral talks with his Indian counterpart , Zhou Enlai gave his rationale for invading Tibet ‘only’ in 1950: “The Ching [Manchu] Emperor appointed Governors to Tibet and troops were also stationed in Lhasa. The British wanted to go into Tibet under the pretext that Russia wanted to get into Sikang . Russia also made the same pretext, namely, that Britain was trying to get into Tibet, to get into Sikang. Exactly because of this rivalry and balance of power, Sikang and Tibet were never taken actually [by China].”
This is a strange argument; the truth was that the Tibetan nation was an independent country with all the attributes of a sovereign State (a government, a language, a script, a flag, a (weak) army, coins, stamps, etc); further, for centuries, the Land of Snow had close relations with India, first and foremost in the cultural and spiritual domains (Tibetan Buddhism originates from Nalanda, let us not forget), but also politically and economically with countless ‘silk’ roads across the Himalaya; in other words, there was a deep kinship.
Zhou continued to explain: “But there are many still who are not acquainted with these facts. Even the Pakistan Prime Minister recently  told me that he always thought Tibet to be independent. Even the Simla Conference admitted Chinese suzerainty over Tibet.”

Zhou did not know about the McMahon Line
The Chinese Premier then tried to justify China’s new claims in the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA), i.e. the McMahon Line: “People like me never knew about it [the Line] till recently. The then Chinese Government, namely, the warlords in Peking and the KMT naturally knew about it. Perhaps U Nu might have told Your Excellency [Nehru] that we studied this question and although this Line was never recognised by us, still apparently there was a secret pact between Britain and Tibet and it was announced at the time of the Simla Conference. And now that it is an accomplished fact, we should accept it. But we have not consulted Tibet so far.”
The clever Chinese statesman then mentioned the Panchsheel Agreement: “In the last agreement which we signed about Tibet , the Tibetans wanted us to reject this Line; but we told them that the question should be temporarily put aside. I believe immediately after India's independence, the Tibetan Government had also written to the Government of India about this matter. But now we think that we should try to persuade and convince Tibetans to accept it. This question also is connected with Sino-Burmese border and the question will be decided after Dalai Lama's return to Lhasa. So, although the question is still undecided and it is unfair to us, still we feel that there is no better way than to recognise this Line.”
The Indian Prime minister gave a nehruvian answer, with the consequences that India experiences on the border today: “The border is a high mountain border and sparsely populated. Apart from the major question, there are also small questions about two miles here and two miles there. But if we agree on some principle, namely, the principle of previous normal practice or the principle of watershed, we can also settle these other small points. Of course, this has nothing to do with the McMahon Line.”
His Chinese counterpart answered: “Yes, the question can be solved and we think it should be settled early.” That was in 1956.
Nehru then ‘excused’ some Indian mayors who wanted ‘to make out Tibet as an independent country’, he said: “Reference by a Mayor has no significance. He does not know much politically and probably very little about China and Tibet. They would generally only know about the great religious significance of Tibet to Indians and that is all that they must be stressing.” The Prime Minister concluded: “Our policy has been to deal with the Chinese Government about Tibet …We are naturally interested in what happens in Tibetans one of our near neighbours but we don't want to interfere. Our main interest is from the point of view of the pilgrims not only Buddhist pilgrims but Hindu pilgrims too for whom Kailash and Manasarovar are sacred places and abodes of God.”
The Indian Prime Minister’s last words were: “Your Excellency [Zhou Enlai] has said that Tibet is backward and cut off. But it cannot remain long that way. They are a deeply religious people and they are naturally afraid that their religion and customs would be upset. I myself personally think that changes are inevitable in Tibet, but I would like Tibetans to feel that they themselves have brought about the changes. As Your Excellency has said, Tibet is a part of China but with full autonomous powers. Then I don't understand why there should be any trouble in Tibet at all.”
Severe troubles had already started in Eastern Tibet.

The Events of March 1959: the Background
On June 1, 1959, Maj SL Chibber sent his report for the months of March, April and May 1959  to the Political Officer in Gangtok and the Ministry of External Affairs in Delhi; he reported about the crucial months in the life of the Tibetan nation which witnessed the uprising of the Tibetan population in Lhasa and the departure of Tibet’s temporal and spiritual leader in exile. This is a unique and remarkable document as it is the only eye-account by a ‘foreigner’.
Before going into the details of those historic months, Maj Chibber gave the background of the events of March 1959 in the Tibetan capital: “The nationalist movement in Tibet, the climax of which was reached on 10th March, 1959, had started sometime in 1955 in Kham, Eastern Tibet and then spread to west in Amdo region and north-east in Golok areas. In 1955 and 1957, it took shape of an open revolt against the Chinese regime in these areas. These people though did not succeed but they were a constant headache to the Chinese who had to resort to aerial bombing and deploy large number of forces to subjugate the local inhabitants.”
Chibber described the happenings in Kham: “During [the] operations, number of monasteries was destroyed and the local people suffered heavy losses. Due to absence of proper means of communication and security measured adopted by Chinese to suppress the information the correct news of happenings in these areas-seldom reached out-side world. However, whatever little news trickled through traders and travelers contained horrible accounts of atrocities committed by the Chinese against the people of these areas, especially against the lamaseries. This naturally had an effect on the minds of Tibetans elsewhere and a stage had reached that some among these Tibetans who had thrown their lot with the Chinese previously, many became apprehensive and doubted Chinese promises of respect for religion and internal autonomy.”
The Consul said that the Khampas finding, it difficult to face frontal attacks from the Chinese troops resorted to guerilla tactics and “moved towards the south where the Chinese garrisons were few and far between and the difficult terrain suited to hit and run type of war.”
He remarked that at the beginning the Chinese did not take any action against these Khampa, “except on one or two occasions but pressed the Tibetan Government to suppress them.”
Under pressure from the Chinese authorities, the Tibetan Government tried to reach a compromise by sending some Peace Missions of monks and lay officials to Kham and Lhoka areas, but this did not help, according to the Consul “most Tibetan Government officials did not like the presence of Chinese in Tibet.”
The rejection of the Chinese occupation by the Tibetan populations was the turning point in the history of Modern Tibet.

The Events of March 1959
The first-hand account of Maj Chibber is important, because the Chinese propaganda would like us to believe that during these dramatic weeks of March 1959, they ‘emancipated’ the serfs. But in fact, the opposite happened; recounting the events that he witnessed in Lhasa, Chibber observed: “In the history of movement for free Tibet the month of March, 1959, will be most historic as during this month Tibetans high and low, in Lhasa, capital of Tibet, openly challenged the Chinese rule in Tibet. They set up an organisation called ‘Pho Mimang Ranchen Chi Chog’, meaning, ‘Tibetan Peoples Independent Organisation’; renounced the Sino-Tibetan Agreement of 1951; staged demonstrations to give vent to their anti-Chinese feelings and demanded withdrawal of the Chinese from Tibet.”
The Indian Consul General first reported about the Might of Chinese People’s Liberation Army, “who on 20th March, 1959, started an all out offensive against the ill-organised, ill-equipped, untrained-Tibetans with artillery, mortars, machine guns and all types of automatic weapons.”
The revolt was short lived: “His Holiness the Dalai Lama, smelling danger, left Lhasa secretly on the night of the 17th March, 1959, with important members of his personal staff, three Cabinet Ministers and members of his family for Lhoka area (south of Lhasa), where at that time Khampas had full sway and from where it was easier for him to escape to India if need arose. Many other important and un-important-Tibetans followed him when the actual trouble started on the night of 19th March, 1959,” noted Chibber.
On March 28, 1959, the State Council dissolved the ‘local’ Tibet Government; the Kashag was no more and its functions and powers were transferred to the Preparatory Committee for the Tibetan Autonomous Region.
A Chinese communiqué announced that the Panchen Lama would be Acting Chairman, “for the period the Dalai Lama was held in duress .”
A Military Control Commission was established in Lhasa on March 23, 1959. Chibber also remarked that the Chinese Transport Department’s passenger service between Yatung, Shigatse, Gyantse and Lhasa had been stopped several months earlier. A dusk to dawn curfew was promulgated, while meetings to criticize the former Tibetan Government, the ‘imperialists’ and the Indian ‘expansionists’ were organized to denounce their interference in the internal affairs of Tibet.
Military Control Commissions were also installed in other areas in Tibet. Soon after the events of March, the Preparatory Committee held two meetings, one under the Chairmanship of the Panchen Lama and the other under General Zhang Guohua as the Panchen Lama had gone to Beijing to attend the Second National People’s Congress Session.
The Consul General commented: “the booms of Chinese guns and fire from their weapons, which destroyed number of buildings including religious places, large scale killing of Tibetans followed by mass arrests, departure of Dalai Lama and high-ranking Tibetan officials from Lhasa completely shattered the morale of Tibetans in general and they were left with no other alternative but to bow before the Chinese.”
Today, the Tibetans in exile still celebrate March 10 as their Uprising Day. Will the Day be commemorated one day in Lhasa by the Tibetans?
It is impossible to answer.
In March 1959, India could only witness the events, without taking an active part.
A couple of weeks later, the Dalai Lama took refuge in India, creating a new narrative in the India-China relations.

What can be done to untie the past knots?
Delhi should officially start a dialogue with the Tibetans in exile. One possibility is to immediately set-up a mechanism with the Dalai Lama’s representative in Delhi , to discuss the issues of mutual interests. It should not be done in a hushed-up way.
Some general principles should dictate the new policy.
First, India should look after her own interests and the security of the people living on the borders; it seems obvious, but it has not always been the case.
Another principle is that India’s policies or actions should not be dictated by what others will think or say, particularly how China will react to a particular decision. This tendency has lasted too long with no tangible gain for the country; for example, the 2018 notice circulated to all ministries/departments ordering that no Indian officials should meet the Dalai Lama, had serious counter-productive effects.
It is unfortunate but it is a fact that India faces a country which still believes that power comes from the barrel of a gun; without emulating China, India needs to quietly and forcefully look after her own interests and be straightforward about it; a closer kinship between Delhi and Dharamsala is in the country’s interests.
Whatever over-all policy is adopted by the Government at a later stage, one element is critical: coordination. In view of the individualistic tendencies of the Indian bureaucracy, this is crucial in order to achieve the targeted aim of the policy between the different shakeholders (Ministries of External Affairs, Defence, Home Affairs, Education, Culture, intelligence agencies, etc).
Without proper coordination, it will be just one more futile new policy.
The creation of a Department, coordinating the different aspects of the Tibet policy would be the first step to strengthen the relations with Tibet; India should use the goodwill of the Tibetans towards India; the rest will follow. But undoing the knots of the past will take time.
It is however necessary if India wants to play a role of leader in the world affairs and have peace and prosperity on her frontiers.