The Barahoti saga: Failure of 'Nehru doctrine' and deceitful nature of Dragon

My article The Barahoti saga: Failure of 'Nehru doctrine' and deceitful nature of Dragon  appeared in Firstpost

Here is the link...

Hardly two months after the Panchsheel Agreement was signed, India discovered that all problems had not been solved. The first Chinese incursion took place in Barahoti in June 1954. This was followed by a series of intrusions numbering in the hundreds 

The Hindu recently reported that new posts of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had sprung up some six-seven kilometres north of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Middle Sector on the Indo-Tibet boundary, “while the frequency of patrolling has also significantly increased in certain areas,” it noted.
Citing sources in the Government, the newspaper asserted that China was actively expanding its network of ‘Xiaokang’ model villages (‘Xiaokang’ meaning ‘moderately prosperous villages’), along the Middle Sector of the LAC. These villages are said to be constructed with the main objective of ‘poverty alleviation’, but one could ask: is there a need for hundreds of such villages precisely on India’s northern borders …if there was no other purpose?
Obviously, these villages have a ‘dual use’; further, the fact both that Tibetans and Hans are settled there will quickly change the demography of the border areas, moreover providing bases or garrisons for the PLA when required.
The report also mentioned that the Chinese are “building villages at a rapid pace, sometimes as many as 300-400 houses in multi-storey blocks within 90-100 days. …Construction of a likely border settlement village was observed northwest of Tholing area [north of Chamoli district Uttarakhand] and a military complex is also under construction close by. Superstructures of buildings in both the locations are complete.”
China apparently uses prefabricated parts extensively to construct the houses at a quick pace.

Historical Background
The history of how Barahoti became a disputed area is interesting.
Let us remember that for centuries the Indo-Tibet frontier had been peaceful; however the Indian diplomats who negotiated the Panchsheel Agreement foolishly ‘avoided’ confirming India’s northern frontiers during the talks and in the final accord signed in April 1954. India still pays dearly for this monumental lapse.
The signature of the Panchsheel Agreement with China, through which India surrendered all its rights and responsibilities in Tibet while getting nothing in return, was a complete surrender to China; Delhi did not wait long to see the consequences of The ‘Nehru doctrine’ (to be friendly at any cost with China).

A Historical Background by the Intelligence Bureau
Let us go into the history of the so-called dispute; in July 1952, in a note ‘Border Disputes and Collection of Taxes by Tibetans in Garhwal District’, the Intelligence Bureau (IB) described the topography of the area (today’s Chamoli district of Uttarakhand): “The Garhwal-Tibet border can only be crossed through the Mana and Niti Valleys where there are open places and habitation, while the rest of the border area consists of snow-covered mountains studded with glaciers…”
The IB report continued its descriptions of the area: “There are four passes between Niti Valley and Tibet, namely: Gothing Pass, Damjin [Tunjun] Pass, Hoti Pass and Ghirti Pass. Niti, the Northern most village in the Indian territory, is situated 11 miles from Gothing Pass and Damjin Pass. There are few plains situated near these passes in the Indian territory.”
These passes marked the watershed line: north was Tibet (China after 1951), south was India.
The Intelligence note admitted that once in the 19th century, there was a short boundary dispute about Hoti Plain. Giving the background, it says: “About the end of the last [19th] century, the Tibetans had established a Customs Post at Hoti Plain. To stop this practice, the British Govt. had to send out a detachment of Gurkhas along with Shri Dharma Nand Joshi, Deputy Collector in 1890.”
The Tibetan official (called a Sarji, an emissary of the Tibetan Dzongpon or District Commissioner) usually crossed the border at Tunjun-la pass to announce the beginning of the trading season.
Though the access to the place was difficult, making it hard to keep a tab on the area, the British were quick to understand the plot and stop the Tibetan official to cross the pass.
Soon after the Chinese occupied Western Tibet in the early 1950s, they started claiming Barahoti as theirs. The IB recommended to the Government of India that it was essential that Delhi “should make it clear to the Govt. of Tibet and its Dzongpon that the Hoti Plain is Indian territory and the Tibetans have no right to establish any customs post there; nor can they exercise any authority in the area.”
But the Tibetan Government was fast losing its independence.

The Ink was Hardly Dry
Hardly two months after the Panchsheel Agreement was signed, India discovered that all problems had not been solved, as just announced in Parliament by the Prime Minister. The first Chinese incursion took place in Barahoti in June 1954. This was followed by a series of intrusions numbering into hundreds and culminating in the attack on India in October 1962.
The irony of the story of the first intrusion is that it was China which complained about the incursion of Indian troops… on India’s territory!
Though Barahoti was well inside India’s frontiers (clearly south of Tunjun-la, the watershed), arguments about the new ‘dispute’ continued with the exchange of hundreds of notes during the following months ...and years.
TN Kaul who had negotiated the Panchsheel Agreement, (before being sent back to Delhi for having an affair with a Chinese woman), philosophically explained later: “Territorial disputes have existed between near and distant neighbours through the ages. The question is whether they can and should be resolved by war, threat, use of force or through the more civilized and peaceful method of negotiation... Both sides still profess their faith in the Five Principles, and therein lies perhaps some hope for the future.”
The Five Principles had put Kaul and his colleagues to sleep.

1850 Map of Hoti

Where is Wuje?
In the meantime, the Chinese started calling Barahoti by the name of ‘Wuje’ creating more confusion in the minds of the Indian diplomats (the same tactic of changing the names of places is today used in Arunachal Pradesh).
During the following months, the Chinese would insist on sending a joint investigating team to this spot, something Delhi always refused. The main reason for Beijing to insist on a joint investigation team was that Beijing did not know that Barahoti was located south of Tunjun-la and therefore in India.

A New Note
Over the years, as the situation continued to deteriorate, a note was prepared by Jagat Mehta, Director (China) in the Ministry of External Affairs in 1961. It provides the background of Barahoti saga during the preceding years. Mehta writes: “The Chinese claim to the Barahoti became known to us in 1954, when the Indian and Chinese army faced each other in the small pasture ground. The suggestion for refraining from sending the troops was first made in 1955 and was reiterated in 1956; it was agreed that no troops should be sent by either party in 1957, and a conference to discuss the dispute regarding Bara Hoti was held in April – June 1958.”
At the end of the conference, it was agreed that “neither side should send forces in exercise of its supposed right during the talks and until the question was settled.”
At the same time, the Chinese reiterated again their desire for a joint investigation, while “persistently refused to specify the actual area of Wuje. When pressed, in a vague manner they said that Wuje covered 15 kms north to south and 10 kms, east to west, but no coordinates were given even with reference to this area.”
Mehta explained that India made it clear that Barahoti was a small pasture ground south of Tunjun-la: “during the talks we specified the relevant coordinates and pointed out that the area involved was 2 miles in length and ¾ of a mile in breadth. The Chinese did not agree to our suggestion for the complete neutralization of this area and hinted that they would continue to send civil officials, where upon we also informed them that we were reserving the right to send our own revenue officials to this area.”
The agreement was that the patrols should be unarmed; while India always kept its promise, already in 1958, China sent an armed detachment to the area after the Indian civil party withdrew in September.
Two points should be made to conclude: though it was not necessary for India to participate in a conference for Barahoti in 1958 as the area was clearly south of the watershed and therefore in India, Delhi agreed out of goodwill and for the sake of the ‘friendship’ with China. It did not help to find a solution for the issue.
The second point is that even after agreeing not to send armed patrols to the remote plain, Beijing did not keep its word. It was the beginning of a series of un-kept promises, which continues till today in Eastern Ladakh or Arunachal Pradesh.

The Unnecessary Controversy of Lapthal and Sangchamalla

Chinese Map of 1962 showing Lapthal
and Sangchamalla as a contiguous place

I continued with my study of the Central Sector.

Here a list of the previous posts on the subject.

In August 1980, SN Gopalkrishnan, Senior Research Officer of the Historical Division of the Ministry of External Affairs explained once again the factors on which are based a border's delineation.
Referring to the meetings of the Officials of India and China in 1960, he noted: “The Indian side brought forward clear and conclusive evidence to show that the alignment as shown by them in the Middle Sector had, throughout its length a traditional and customary basis reaching back through many centuries, and that, in addition, this boundary had been recognized by Chinese Governments and been confirmed through diplomatic exchanges, treaties and agreements. The Indian side also brought forward a large of representative evidence relating to different aspects of administration, to show that Indian Governments had exercised full, continuous and uninterrupted control over all the areas right up to the traditional alignment.”

The Importance of the Watershed 

As important as the customary  basis for the boundary between Tibet and India, the watershed factor determined the location of the border; in this case, a host of passes marked the frontier.
The Report described the area thus: “In the area of Wuje/Barahoti (approximately 79° 58' E, 30° 50' N), Sangcha (approximately 80° 09' E, 30° 45' N) and Lapthal (approximately 80° 08' E, 30° 44' N), the boundary line follows a continuous mountain ridge south of these three places, passes through Ma Dzo La (approximately 70° 55' E, 30° 55' N) south of Niti Pass, skirts the southern side of the U-Dra La River, and arrives at U-Dra La not far south-west of Kungri Bingri Pass.”

The case of Lapthal and Sangchamalla: Hazy Chinese Claims
As I have mentioned in previous posts, here too, the Chinese made hazy claims of pockets of ‘Chinese territory’ south of the main watershed.
One of the strangest cases is Lapthal and Sangchamalla; in the course of the meetings of the Officials, both parties presented their claims for the Central Sector (in today’s Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand).
Nilang-Jadhang area and Barahoti, Sangchamalla and Lapthal were clubbed together for discussion.
At the 15th meeting at Beijing on July 18, 1960, while answering the question of the Indian side, the Chinese suddenly stated that Barahoti (Wu-je), Sangchamalla and Lapthal formed one composite area on the Chinese side of the alignment claimed by them, and there was no Indian territory wedged between these three pockets.
It was a completely new claim which was put forward for the first time; it was contradicting the Chinese earlier official positions.
On September 8, 1959, in a letter to Jawaharlal Nehru, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai treated Wu-Je, Sangchamalla and Lapthal as three separate areas. In 1960, however, the Chinese suddenly included some 300 square miles of territory belonging to India, into the Tibetan territory.

The Lapthal-Sangchamalla area
I shall go more in details into this case.
Speaking of Nilang-Jadhang area and Barahoti, Sangchamalla and Lapthal, the Report explained: “Although these were separate areas, the Indian side, for convenience, dealt with them together. The Chinese alignment and description as given departed here also from the watershed, which was the natural, traditional and customary boundary in this area, to include the Nilang-Jadhang area and Barahoti, Sangchamalla and Lapthal in Tibet.”
The conclusion was that during the above mentioned meeting,  the Chinese had brought up a new claim on Indian territory: “[it] had been put forward for the first time, and which contradicted even the position of Premier Chou En-lai in his letter of 8 September 1959, wherein he had treated Wu-je, Sangchamalla and Lapthal as three separate areas.”
But China did not seem to know were Lapthal and Sangchamalla were located.

The Chinese Stand in 1958
Worse, at the third meeting of the Barahoti Conference held in Delhi on 24 April, 1958, , the Chinese representative, Counselor Fu Hao had stated that the area the Chinese called Wu-je was "from the south to the north about 15 kilometres approximately and from the east to the west may be a few kilometres less [and] that is, an area of about 200 square kilometres at most. So this area could not include Sangchamalla and Lapthal in fact, these two localities were not mentioned at all by the Chinese side at the Barahoti Conference, and Wu-je was regarded as a wedge of territory claimed by China and flanked on both sides by Indian territory.”
That fact was that Sangchamalla and Lapthal had never been claimed by either the Chinese or the Tibetan Government before; further, the Indian Government had been maintaining check-posts at these two places.
The Report continued: “In the winter of 1958, when according to usual practice, the Indian border check-posts retired south, Chinese patrols for the first time intruded into these two places; in 1959 the Chinese Government put forward a claim to these places; and now for the first time it was stated that Wu-je, Sangchamalla and Lapthal formed one composite area and the Chinese side claimed not merely these three places but also the territory lying between them, even though in the description given at an early stage of the meetings, Wu-je, Sangchamalla and Lapthal were specified as three separate places.”
This is called ‘changing the posts’.
Again the Indian negotiators had to show that the traditional and customary boundary in this sector lay along the watershed range, “on which were the passes of Tsangchok La, Mana, Niti, Tunjun La, Balcha Dhura, Kungri Bingri, Darma and Lipulekh. Nilang, Jadhang and Pulamsumda were in Uttarkashi district (formerly Tehri-Garhwal State), Barahoti in Garhwal district and Sangchamalla and Lapthal in Almora district, in Uttar Pradesh State.”
China was not too interested by these niceties.

Today deserted village of Milam

Travelers’ Accounts
The Indian officials cited Manson, who in The Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal wrote that he had visited Milam and the Unta Dhura Pass in 1842 and said that there was ‘two days' journey “from Melum to the Pass (Unta Dhura) and from thence four days to Neetee [Niti]; two alternate days no village to encamp at; the whole road within our own boundary.”
The road from Milam passes through Sangchamalla; and Lapthal is south of Sangchamalla; it meant that both places are in India.
About his visit to Milam in 1848-49 Strachey wrote: "Girthi is a deserted village on the stream which is named from it, about halfway between Topidhunga and Malari, on the Dhaoli in Garhwal; near it are said to be lead and copper mines but they are only occasionally worked, and then on the most insignificant scale. The Government, which possesses the proprietary right in all the mines of these mountains, has, I understand, not often made a larger sum than five rupees per annum from the Girthi workings.”
This also showed that the Girthi valley, lying south of the Tunjun La Pass was part of India.
The conclusion was that Sangchamalla and Lapthal were (and are) located south of Balcha Dhura; when Strachey who visited the Rakas-Tal and Mansarowar Lakes in 1848, he also stated that he set out from Sangcha on September 7, 1848 and ascended the summit of the Balcha ridge.

Chinese not sure about Sangchamalla and Lapthal
Till July 18, 1960, the Chinese Government had regarded Barahoti, Sangchamalla and Lapthal as separate areas; this was clearly shown by the fact that they had always been listed separately and enumerated singly. Even in the Chinese statement of August 30, 1960, Barahoti was referred to at one point as a place and not an area of considerable size, although later, the claim became a large area of about 300 square miles.
The Report mentioned that in the final Chinese statement on November 7, 1960, “they were uncertain as to what exactly they were claiming, for in the same paragraph reference was made to both a composite area and a number of areas.”
The Report observed: “while they referred to evidence which they believed would support their claim to parts of these three pockets of Barahoti, Sangchamalla and Lapthal, brought forward no evidence that would cover the whole composite area.”
The Indian negotiators, on the other hand, provided solid evidence to show that the whole area right upto the watershed had always been a part of India.
The Report concluded: “Sangchamalla and Lapthal have always been a part of Kumaon and the traditional pasture grounds of the people of Milan.”
The Indian negotiators did not accept the Chinese assertion, made without any evidence, that in 1941 that certain Tibetans rented these pastures to other Tibetans.
The Chinese negotiators had quoted a passage from Strachey who said that Lapthal was more accessible from Tibet: “But comparative accessibility has never been a criterion in the determination of a boundary.” 

In any case Strachey had also said that “from Sangchamalla he had proceeded north towards the boundary of Tibet. Lapthal was to the south of Sangchamalla and, therefore, the evidence about Sangchamalla covered Lapthal.”

Milam Village on the way to Kungri-Bingri pass

The Traditional Boundary
Sangchamalla and Lapthal are grazing grounds of Milam village in Patti Malla Johar of Pargana Johar, in the Almora District of Uttar Pradesh. Malla Johar is the northernmost Patti and Milam its principal and northernmost village.
According to The Gazetteer of Almora District of 1911: “The principal line of water-parting along the Tibetan frontier is a ridge of great altitude-the watershed is throughout a greater part of its length, a simple longitudinal range.”
From these official accounts, it is clear that the northern boundary of Milam is the Sutlej-Ganges watershed, and Sangchamalla and Lapthal lie south of this watershed. Malla Johar was included in the Chand Kingdom of Kumaon and paid taxes which “besides land revenue, included taxes on profits of trade, mines, looms, produce of jungles, musk, hawks and wild beehives. Taxes were to be paid in gold dust, but were often received for the sake of convenience in silver and kind. The revenue was imposed on the area in one sum and detailed assessments were left to the village headmen.”

Conclusions
The Report concluded that as far as Sangchamalla and Lapthal were concerned, the evidence submitted by India was conclusive: “The Gazetteer Map clearly showed the pasture grounds of Sangchamalla and Lapthal as the northern most parts of the Patti Malla Johar of the Almora District and Milam was the northernmost village in the Patti. It was, therefore, clear that Sangchamalla and Lapthal were included in the traditional boundaries of Milam. The revenue settlements for Milam and the census taken in the area had also included Sangchamalla and Lapthal. The area upto the border had been regularly visited by Indian officials.”
The Indian side noted “a change in the Chinese conception of their boundary, even during the course of these discussions. In the description of the Chinese alignment provided to the Indian side, it was alleged that in the Middle Sector, eight places of Chinese territory were under Indian occupation and that the boundary skirted these places on the south side. Lapthal and Sangchamalla were individually listed and mentioned as distinct from Barahoti (Wu-je).”
It further mentioned that earlier in the correspondence between the two Governments (as well as during the 1960 discussions), Barahoti, Lapthal and Sangchamalla had always been mentioned separately: “However, the answers given by the Chinese side to some of the questions of the Indian side seeking clarification of the Chinese alignment raised the suspicion that the claimed alignment did not just (as had been stated) skirt these places, but ran much further to the south and east of them and that these places were much nearer the traditional Indian boundary than to the line now claimed by China.”
The final conclusion was the Chinese claim was inflated “after the commencement of these discussions. As far as the Indian side was concerned, they contested the claim to these three pasture and camping grounds even when the area involved did not amount to more than ten to fifteen square miles.”
According to the Report, the Indian negotiators were most concerned that “the area, as finally claimed, was a sizeable one and, incidentally, included the Niti and Kungri Bingri Passes, which are border passes explicitly mentioned in the 1954 Agreement and where for decades India has exercised her traditional jurisdiction.”

The History of Barahoti Plain

Map of 1850 showing Barahoti in British India's territory

I continue with my study of the Middle Sector of the 4056-Kilometer boundary between India and China (this figure includes the areas occupied today by Pakistan – Gilgit and Baltistan). 

 

 

 

 

The previous posts looked at:

• Sumdo-Kaurik (Chuva-Chuje)
  
• Shipki-la 
• Nilang-Jadhang (Tsang-chok-la)
• The Strange Case of Pulamsumdo

I shall now look at a place which has often been in the news: Barahoti.

Here too the Chinese claim to the area are fictitious (not to say frivolous) as the area is clearly located south of the watershed. 

The Traditional Boundary
On November 20, 1950, during a question and answer session in the Parliament, Prime Minister Nehru was asked: “Will the Prime Minister be pleased to state whether India has got any well-defined boundary with Tibet?”
His answer was: “The border from Ladakh to Nepal has probably not been the subject of any formal agreement between India, Tibet and China but it is well established by custom and long usage. The Historical Division are investigating if there are any formal agreements. There have been a few boundary disputes in this area but they have been peacefully settled.”
It is a historical fact that the Indo-Tibet frontier had been peaceful. It is probably why the Indian diplomats who four years later negotiated the Panchsheel Agreement foolishly ‘forgot’ to mention the border during the talks (and in the final text). India would pay dearly for this lapse.
Over the years, China have kept changing the posts, claiming new areas, often not knowing the coordinates of the places.
In this context, it is interesting to study the historical background of the ‘disputed’ area, called Barahoti by India and Wu-Je by China.

The Beginning of the Story
In June 1890, the Foreign Department in Delhi received a report from the Commissioner of Kumaon, reporting the visit to Bampa of the Agent of the Jaghphoon (Dzongpon) of Dapha (Daba) in Tibet. The subject of the letter was “Tibetan encroachments on the Garhwal frontier.”
The Under-Secretary in a Foreign Department asked for a map of area: “in the 1879 map shows to be within the border, although the borderline is not coloured. And we have an older map still, I recollect, where it is marked within the Kumaon border. We should first obtain the 1884 sheet however.”
A few days later, the Department got the proper map: “I have now got the 1884 sheet nod several other maps from the Intelligence Branch. Bara Hoti [now written Barahoti]  is within the British frontier, but last year the Tibetans were in possession much lower down, on our side, than Bara Hoti. They prevented the Assistant Commissioner passing within two days' march of Hoti - a proceeding the Commissioner of Kumaon thought perfectly reasonable and harmless.”
A discussion then took place in the Government, it was concluded that one Colonel Erskine was wrong to say that the map of 1884 brought “a large slice of country including Bara Hoti within the British boundary, all the territory shown as British in 1884 was also shown as British in 1850, and it was never shown as anything else on the map of 1879 is only the colouring of the boundary was omitted - probably by some mistake of the draftsman.”
The British decided to act.

A Report about the Encroachment
The telegram had come from a ‘native’ news reporter which had written that “a Tibetan official has come down to Bampa (which is 20 miles or more below [south of] Hoti, but does not say what following he has. He [the Tibetan official] claims Hoti as Tibetan territory, and the place will, no doubt, be occupied again by the Tibetans this summer. But a further report has been sent for, and DO [Demi-Official] orders need be passed on the present correspondence. Hundes is the Tibetan district immediately across the frontier; and by ‘Hunias’ the people of Hundes is meant.”
The Tibetan name of the district is Tsada (or Zanda).

Establishing a Picket in Barahoti
On July 18, 1890, the Chief Secretary to the Government of The North-Western Provinces and Oudh, submitted a report about “the re-establishment of a Tibetan picket at Bara Hoti”.
The Deputy Secretary in Delhi noted: “It will be remembered that last year and the year before a considerable number of Tibetans came into the Niti District, set up a custom house at Bara Hoti, turned back the Assistant Commissioner while on tour, and otherwise virtually took possession of the country down to near Malari. They came in both times, in spring and returned for the winter, to their own side of the range. It was recommended that a party or about 20 Gurkhas should go up in September and turn them out.”
The official further mentioned that in fact a large expedition of 200 sepoys had been sent by the military authorities, but so much delay occurred that “the force did start from Sobha till the 8th November and did not reach Bara Hoti till nearly the end of the month, by which time the Tibetans had retired for the winter.”
The issue continued to be discussed: “It is now reported that a very few unarmed Tibetans have returned to Bara Hoti and it is a question whether it is worthwhile to take any notice of them. If anything is done at all it should be as an ordinary matter of police duty - a small party of police being sent to drive them out. But if so, it should be done while they are still there and the winter should not be waited for. On the other hand, it may be considered that last year's expedition [with the 200 sepoys] may be considered as practical evidence that the country belongs to India, and that our claim has been practically made good. In this case there might be no necessity to take any action until the Tibetans make themselves obnoxious again at, or about, Bara Hoti. The only political significance about the affair is its resemblance to the Sikkim question.” The British were then facing problems with the Tibetans in North Sikkim crossing over the ridge line and sending their yaks to graze in British territory.
The Ministry of External Affairs’ conclusion was: “The Tibetans come in and assert a claim to territory, and behind them come the Chinese and support this claim on their own account-no matter how preposterous it is - and a troublesome international question arises. The way to obviate the greater difficulty is obviously, to nip the smaller one in the bud.”
The Chinese threat will materialize in 1954. We shall come to it, though the Chinese were nowhere in the picture at this time.
On July 17, 1890, the Secretary of the Ministry replied to the note: “Although only a few men have come to Hoti and are unarmed, it is evident they have come as officers of their Government with the intention of exercising authority, for they have been summoning the-people and taking bonds from them. I should think we might tell the Government of the North-Western Provinces that they should not allow these Tibetans to exercise authority in Hoti, and that they should take such steps as they think necessary to prevent them and to make it perfectly clear that Bara Hoti is British territory. Probably this could be best effected by sending one of the Civil Officers of Kumaon on tour to Bara Hoti.”
Two days later, another note provided more information: “Tibetans came to Hoti and invited our people to go to a mart in Tibet to trade. They asked them to undertake not to introduce diseased goats and not to invade Tibet, and they asked for the letter which the Commissioner of Kumaon had last year sent to one Natbu Padhan, then they went away.”
Delhi’s conclusions were: “Now if this is so, it appears to me that the Tibetans have by their actions acknowledged Hoti to be within our border and made no attempt to exercise authority there. But the report is by no means lucidly written, and if the North-Western Provinces can send of an officer… it will be well, fur it would save two purposes to make clear our assertion of authority at Hoti, and to obtain real information.”
But let us have a look at the original report.

The Letter from the Local Sarpanch
The letter ‘not lucidly written’ had been translated into English; it had come from Durga Dutta, Patwari, Mana Painkhanda and was dated July 1, 1890.
Dutta wrote: “On making an enquiry (I find) that the Dupa officers' servants, one Sarji [messenger of the Tibetan Commissioner or Dzongpon] of Urgyal by name, with two men with him, brought on the 19th May of the current year, salt on 50 goats and gave it to their mitrae or customers of villages Gamsali, Bampa and Farkya. After two or three days, they went away with rice on the goats, and a copy in their Tibetan language of the khat which the Commissioner had given to Nathu Padhan from Ramri. Again, the same Sarji returned with two men on 10th June, called together to Gamsali all Padhans from above Soonagiri and Jelam to Niti and told them that the Dupa [Daba?] officer was gone on a pilgrimage to Kailas(h), and that the Padhans should give in their usual bonds about ‘Ragbyadh’ (meaning that they should not bring diseased goats, etc.) as also (a bond) of bringing ‘Pal tan’ (meaning that they should not bring a British force). All Padhans gave bonds about ‘Ragbyadb’, but with regard to ‘Paltan’ they replied that it was not in their power whether a force did or did not come and they could not give a bond about it.”
The letter continued: “The Sarjis went away. Again, for the third time, the same three persons on three yaks (Chanur Gao) returned on 27th June vid Char Hoti and said that Jagponam the Dapa officers bad returned fro in pilgrimage and three guards had come with them and stationed themselves as usual at Hoti, and that the Dapa officers had sent a word to the natives of the 'Ghata that they should fear nothing from (the Tibetans) but come for trade as usual and bring the original khat. A letter also came for Johar Singh Bampa (complaining) that he had not come (to Thibet) for two years, that the man who had quarelled with him had been summoned and the quarrel would be settled. But Johar Singh won't go. Having said this and given the letter, they went away. It is said that on 24th, 26th and 27th June, Fonya, Nathu Padhans and other natives of this Ghata went to Hundes.”
The letter concluded: “Sir, all natives of this Ghata went to Hundes yesterday, and to-day via Raj Hoti and Char Hoti for trade. Some five who had remained are ready to start on the 3rd instant. They (the Sarjis) did not come armed. The purpose for which they came has been given in detail (in this report). It is also known that the same Sarjis used to come two or three times every year formerly also.”

The Final Conclusion
On July 31, 1890, the Officiating Deputy Secretary in Foreign Department wrote to the Chief Secretary of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh: “It appears from the report submitted by Durga Dutta, Patwari, that some Tibetans recently came to Bara Hoti unarmed, and invited the people to a mart in Tibet for purposes of trade, and that the head of the party also asked for the letter which the Commissioner of Kumaon had last year sent to one Nathu, Padhan. The Tibetans appear to have made no attempt on this occasion to exercise any authority on this part of the frontier, and are reported to have since returned to Hundes [Tibet].”
The final conclusion was: “If the circumstances have been correctly reported by Durga Dutta, the action of the Tibetans may be considered to operate as an admission that Hoti is within the British border. The reports received on the subject are however not very clear and I am to suggest that, if His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor sees no objection, an officer may be deputed to Bara Hoti to enquire into the exact circumstances of the case, and that a further report may be submitted for the information of the Government of India. This visit will, it is hoped, have the effect also of making clear the assertion of British authority at Bara Hoti.”
It was to remain at that for the next fifty years.
It is only in the early 1950s, that the Tibetans tried to revive the issue, this time probably under the instigation of the Chinese.

A Historical Note from the Intelligence Bureau
In July 1952, in a note “Border Disputes and Collection of Taxes by Tibetans in Garhwal District” the Intelligence Bureau described the topography of the Himalaya in this area of today’s Uttarakhand: “The Garhwal-Tibet border can only be crossed through the Mana and Niti Valleys where there are open places and habitation, while the rest of the border area consists of snow-covered mountains studded with glaciers. In the Mana Valley, the last village on the Indian side is Mana which is situated at 26 miles from Mana Pass, which lies on the boundary of Tibet and India. From Mana the route to Tibet following along Saraswati river and there are no grazing grounds or other places of habitation on the way which could be occupied or claimed by the people of Tibet. There is no border dispute in this Valley, although some rumours have been heard, that the Tibetans claim territory upto Kanchanganga, which is situated about one mile south of Badri Nath. There are no grounds for attaching any importance to such rumours.”
This refers probably to the Nilang-Jadhang dispute which we have already studied. There were definitively old Tibetan claims in areas south of Tsangchok-la pass.
The IB Report continues its descriptions of the area: “There are four Passes between Niti Valley and Tibet, namely - Gothing Pass [Niti], Damjin [Tun Jun] Pass, Hoti Pass and Ghirti Pass. Niti, the northern most village in the Indian territory, is situated at 11 miles from Gothing Pass and Damjin Pass. There are few plains situated near these passes in the Indian territory.”
The Intelligence admits that it appears that there is an old boundary dispute about Hoti Plain, which in fact consists of two plains called Bara Hoti and Chhota Hoti, both situated near the Chor Hoti Pass.
It refers to the 1890 episode mentioned above.

The history background of the ‘dispute’ is then explained: “About the end of last century the Tibetans had established a Customs Post at Hoti Plain. To stop this practice, the British Govt. [Government] had to send out a detachment of Gurkhas along with Shri Dharma Nand Joshi, Deputy Collector, in 1890. This had a salutary effect and the Tibetans removed their post. It appears that for some time past the Tibetans have again been establishing a Police-cum-Customs post at Hoti during the trading season.”
The access of the place is difficult, but from there, a tab can been kept on the area. It has also to be noted that the access is much easier from the Tibetan side than from the Indian. Over the years, this will make it easier for the Chinese to intrude.
The Intelligence Bureau continues: “It is quite possible that if the Tibetans are not stopped from establishing their post at Hoti Plain, they might eventually claim it to be their own territory. Since there is no habitation or cultivation in this area, the Garhwal authorities hardly ever visit the area or take any action to denote that it lies within their jurisdiction.”
Along the Himalaya watershed, there were quite a few areas were Tibetans authorities tried to change the border for the sake of their traders and shepherds. The IB report further remarked: “It may be mentioned that last year [1951] when some Indian traders established their trade at Hoti Plain for buying wool etc. from the Tibetans living near the border, the Dzong-Pon [District Commissioner] of Dhapa (Tibet) [Daba in Western Tibet] sent his Serjis (or sarjis - ‘messengers’) to Hoti Plain to serve notices on the Indian traders to appear before him.”
The IB recommended to the Government of India: “It is, therefore, essential that the Govt. of India should make it clear to the Govt. of Tibet and its Dzongpon that the Hoti Plain is Indian territory and the Tibetans have no right to establish any Customs post there; nor can they exercise any authority in the area.”
The report added: “We understand that the Deputy Commissioner Garhwal has already suggested to the U.P. Govt. that he and the Supdt. [Superintendent] of Police should visit Hoti with a detachment of Garhwal Rifles and Armed Police, and that they should hoist the Indian flag there in order to establish their own authority and stop the Tibetans from establishing their Customs post.”
It is what the ITBP still do every year, though now they often encounter Chinese troops patrolling the high-altitude plain.
The Intelligence Bureau concluded: “A number of Indian traders from Niti and Mana Valleys visit Tibet every year for purposes of trade. They have to pay certain taxes inside Tibet. However, in case of Mana Valley, the Serjis of the Dzong-Pon [Dzongpon] of Chaprong [Tsaparang] realize Rs.22/- from the people of Mana as Singthal i.e. Land Tax. This collection is made in Indian territory when the Serji comes to announce that the Pass is open. The Serjis are also provided with free food and fuel. It is reported that in the records of the Dzong-Pon this levy is entered as Land Tax and not as Trade Tax. No such collection is made from the villagers of Niti Valley. We feel that the Tibetan tax-collectors should not be allowed to collect taxes inside the Indian territory. The traders could pay this amount which is really a Trade Tax, when they visit the Tibetan markets.”
A similar situation had arisen in Nilang/Jadhang area.
On April 24, 1952, the ministry had received the opinion of Ministry of Defence (MOD): “the guiding principle in the new circumstances must be the Government of India’s ability to vindicate what they would regard as the appropriate frontier, since it would be idle to claim territory which could not be effectively protected or controlled.”
Nilang is mentioned in a previous post, but it is worth quoting the MOD, as the Ministry remarks can apply to any border posts: “The area under dispute is an extremely difficult country physically and climatically with hardly any communications. It therefore follows that operations in the area will have to be confined to short periods and undertaken by specially trained infantry organized on an ad hoc basis with very scanty artillery support and no support whatsoever from either tanks or aircraft. The administrative problems connected with an operation would be considerable. Even if the defence area were narrowed down to the protection of the villages Nilang and Jadhang, with the present resources of the army, it would be well nigh impossible to guarantee the integrity of the above villages. It will be equally difficult to afford hundred per cent protection to the small inhabited localities lying with the Indian frontier within the Indian frontier in this area.”
Therefore, the MOD conclusion was “Whatever solution the E.A [External Affairs] Ministry adopt, it would be subject to the conditions set out above so far as the defence of the frontier will be concerned.”
Like for the case of Nilang/Jadhang, in Barahoti, it was decided to assert Indian customary rights in the area. Not doing so, could have had serious consequences for the entire Himalayan frontier.

The View from the Ministry of External Affairs
A few months later, in September 1952, an official of the Ministry of External Affairs pointed out: “Last year there was some trouble over the opening of market for trading with Western Tibet at Hoti instead of the established market known as Nabra in Tibet. The local Tibetan officials who used to collect certain dues from our traders suffered a loss and resented the functioning of the Hoti market. There is, however, no indication that the Tibetans wanted to establish a customs post at Hoti.”
The issue was referred to G. Mukharji, the Home Secretary of the Uttar Pradesh Government who, on December 27, 1952, wrote back to the Foreign Secretary. Note that the subject line of the letter read: “Border disputes and collection of taxes by Tibetans in Garhwal district.”
Lucknow acknowledged the receipt of the Intelligence Bureau’s note mentioned above and affirmed that the State Government had been keeping the Government of India in the loop as far as the developments along the Indo-Tibetan border were concerned.
The Home Secretary further asserted that there was no case of “encroachment has so far been reported though at one or two places tax collectors from Tibet did come in but were persuaded to go back.”
He added that “it is rather embarrassing that tax collectors should come in at all and it is, therefore, requested that the matter may be settled finally with the Tibetan Government do not come in to India for purposes of tax collection.”
Mukharji concluded: “Until this is done, it is feared that similar visits will be paid in future also creating unnecessary embarrassment for Government as well as for our people on the border.”
He also answered the question about the practicability of the State Government stationing a small force of armed police on the border. Quoting from an earlier communication, he reiterated that “it would not be possible to stop any intruders from coming into our territory with the help of small police guards alone.”
He further pointed out that it would be difficult for the State Government to make adequate police arrangements in such remote areas “on account of difficulties of climate and terrain.”
He mentioned the creation of a Border Security Force which is “at present under examination with the Government of India” and stated “a force of that kind alone can be trained and equipped to function in those remote and difficult areas. Until that force is properly established, the State Government find it difficult to meet the situation by posting armed police in those areas.”
It is only on October 24, 1962, four days after the Chinese massive attack that the Indo-Tibetan Border Police was raised on. But this did not stop the Chinese from trespassing every year since then.

The Panchsheel Negotiations
In December 1953, the talks for an agreement on trade and pilgrimage started in Beijing. It resulted in the infamous Panchsheel Agreement. Looking at the way Indian diplomats were ready to bend backward to any Chinese demands, Mao Zedong and his colleagues would find more and more outstanding issues to rise. But in May-June 1954, they were still awaiting the outcome of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China.
The Indian diplomats thought that by naming six passes for the traders and pilgrims, they had delineated a border.
What a folly!
India tried to include other passes: “Traders and pilgrims from India and Western Tibet may travel by the routes traversing the following localities and passes,” but it was not accepted by China.
The passes/routes mentioned by Delhi were: Tashigong, Gartok; Spanggur Tso To Rudok; Chiakang, Churkang, Ruksom; Tashigong, Churkang, Ruksom; Rudok, Ruksom, Rawang; Bodpo La; Shipki La; Keobarang; Shimdang; Gumrang (Khimokul); Tsang Chok La; Muling La; Mana Pass; Niti Pass; Tunjun-la; Marhi La; Shalshal Pass; Kungri Bingri Pass; Darma Pass; Lampiya Dhura (Lampiya Lekh); Mangshadhura and Lipu Lekh.
But Delhi capitulated, China was then a friend and ultimately only 6 passes were named.
The fact that India did not insist on this list, turned into a tragedy; as a result China will soon claim the area south of Tunjun-la (and Tsang Chok-la as well). The Indian negotiators had clearly not done their homework.
In a short note on the ‘talks’ for the Panchsheel Agreement written after the signature, the Foreign Secretary noted: “It would also be desirable for us to establish check-posts at all disputed points as soon as possible so that there may be no opportunity for Chinese to take possession of such areas and face us with a fait accompli.
In this connection the opening remarks of Premier Zhou Enlai that “there are bound to be some problems between two great countries like India and China with a long common border… but we are prepared to settle all such problems as are ripe for settlement now” are significant.
The note said: “We immediately countered this by saying that we had mentioned all outstanding questions in this region, and stressed this several times later the Chinese did not pursue the matter further. It is, however, likely that the Chinese may raise or create border problems if we are slow in advancing our administration right up to our frontiers, especially in the disputed areas which are fortunately not many. This is also a matter which requires further examination and consulates between the Ministries of external Affairs, Home Affairs and Defence.”
The former Indo-Tibet border (now Sino-Indian) was forgotten in the process. 

The Ink was Hardly Dry
It took only two months for India to discover that all problems had not been solved. The first Chinese incursion in the Barahoti area of Uttar Pradesh occurred in June 1954. This was the first of a series of incursions numbering in the hundreds which culminated in the attack of October 1962 ...and which continues till date.
The ink was hardly dried on the Panchsheel Agreement, when the Chinese entered Barahoti; a first note was given by the counsellor of China in India to the Ministry of External Affairs dates July 17, 1954.
The irony of the story is that it is China which complained about the incursion of Indian troops… on India’s territory!
Though Barahoti was well inside Indian territory, the exchange of notes continued during the following months and years. This exchange is the first of more than one thousand Memoranda, Notes and Letters exchanged by the Governments of India and China over the next ten years, published in the White Papers on China.
TN Kaul who had negotiated the Agreement philosophically explained later: “Territorial disputes have existed between near and distant neighbours through the ages. The question is whether they can and should be resolved by war, threat, use of force or through the more civilized and peaceful method of negotiation... Both sides still profess their faith in the Five Principles, and therein lies perhaps some hope for the future.
The Five Principles had put Kaul and his colleagues to sleep.
Some officials soon realized the blunder. John Lall, who later served as Diwan in Sikkim, commented: “Ten days short of three months after the Tibet Agreement was signed the Chinese sent the first signal that friendly co-existence was over… Significantly, Niti was one of the six passes specified in the Indo-Chinese Agreement by which traders and pilgrims were permitted to travel.”
Friendly co-existence had perhaps never existed.

The ‘Dispute’ Starts
On July 17, 1954, a note handed over by the Chinese Counsellor in Delhi to South Block briefly mentioned for the first time the issue. The Chinese asserted that “over thirty Indian troops armed with rifles crossed the Niti pass on 29 June 1954, and intruded into Wu-Je [Barahoti] of the Ali [Ngari] Area of the Tibet Region of China. (Wu-Je is about one day’s journey from the Niti Pass). The above happening is not in conformity with the principles of non-aggression and friendly co-existence between China and India, and the spirit of the Joint Communiqué issued recently by the Prime Ministers of China and India.”
How Barahoti, a pass between Tibet and India, suddenly got a Chinese name is still today a mystery.
The note continued: “It is hoped that the Government of India would promptly investigate the matter, and order the immediate withdrawal of the Indian troops.”
Probably adepts of Sun Tzu or the Art of War, the Chinese had decided to attack to justify their un-defendable position.
On 13 August 1954, the Chinese Counsellor in Delhi delivered another note to South Block, providing more detail on the so-called Indian intrusion: “further investigations reveals that they were a unit of 33 persons attached to the local garrison in U.P., India. The unit was under the command of an officer called Nathauja [according to Chinese pronunciation] who was a deputy commander of the troops stationing at Kanman [Chinese pronunciation]. Together with the officer, there was a local official named Sopit Singh [Chinese pronunciation] of Chinal tribe in U.P., who was also a district magistrate of Walzanjapur [Chinese pronunciation] district. Besides, there were a doctor, radio-operators and soldiers. They were putting up in 17 tents.” This was not in conformity with the Five Principles, the Chinese diplomat added.
Finally, on August 27, 1954, India woke up of its stupor: “We have made thorough enquiries regarding the allegation ... our further investigations have confirmed that the allegation is entirely incorrect. A party of our Border Security Force is encamped in the Hoti Plain which is south-east of Niti pass and is in Indian territory.”
The most ironic part of the story was that the Chinese were confused about the exact location of Wu-Je. The Minister of External Affairs (MEA) stated: “none of our troops or personnel have crossed north of the Niti pass, as verbally mentioned by the Chinese Counsellor.”
The Indian notes also pointed that some “Tibetan officials tried to cross into our territory in Hoti plain without proper documents, which is not in conformity with the Agreement.” The ministry could only hope that Beijing will instruct the Tibetans “not to cross into Indian territory as we have instructed our authorities not to cross into Tibetan territory.”
The correspondence was to continue for months and years in the same vein. It will soon become a regular yearly feature.
A year later, on June 28, 1955, the MEA wrote: “Tibetan officials attempted to enter in our territory in the Hoti plain. We have now received a report that a party of Chinese are camping at Hoti with 5 tents and 20 horses and that they have entered our territory without proper documents.”
The note further requested that “instructions be issued immediately to these personnel to withdraw across the border over the Tunjun-la and to refrain from entering Indian territory unless they are in possession of proper documents.”
Again it was repeated that it was not in conformity with the principles of non-aggression and friendly co-existence enounced in the 1954 Agreement.
An Indian official, SK Roy, Special Officer Frontier Area (or SOFA), met a Chinese official in Delhi on June 28, 1955 in connection of the Chinese intrusions, the Chinese informed the MEA that their Government “has times and again instructed the personnel of the frontier garrison not to move a single step beyond the Chinese border. Our investigations have confirmed that in the course of the last year and the current one there never has been any case of Chinese personnel crossing the border in the vicinity of the Niti Pass.”
This shows that the India-Tibet border has become the India-China border.
On July 11, 1955, the Chinese handed over a reply to TN Kaul: “Another batch of more than 30 Indians soldiers crossed into Wu-Je of the Tibet Region of China on 25 June 1955 and engaged in constructing fortifications at places very close to our garrison forces stationing there.”
On July 18, 1955, India replied to Chinese note saying it was not representing the factual position: “The troops mentioned were not in the Tibet region of China but at the Bara Hoti, on the Hoti plain in India which is south of the Tunjun-la.”
It also pointed out that the Indian troops withdrew in September 1954, because the outpost is a seasonal post; the MEA had some doubt if Barahoti were the same place; it admitted: “We are not aware of the exact location of Wu-Je, though the Counsellor of the Chinese Embassy mentioned that it was 12 kilometers north of the Tunjun-la, but we are quite confident that our troops have not, under any circumstances, crossed the border into Tibet Region of China.”
Another note was given to the Chinese embassy in Delhi on August 18, 1955. It had received a report that the Sarji, a Tibetan official, who had come with the Chinese troops in the Hoti plain had tried to “realise grazing tax from Indian herdsmen grazing goats in the area. This is a new development which we would request the Chinese authorities to stop forthwith.”
The exchanged continued during the following months.
On September 26, 1955, the Chinese embassy in Delhi mentioned the informal note given by SK Roy on August 18: “Our repeated investigations made in Wu-Je area of the Tibet Region have proved that no Chinese personnel has ever crossed the border. On the contrary, it was the Indian troops that intruded into Wu-Je which has always belonged to Dabasting [Daba Dzong?] of the Tibet Region within the Chinese boundary.”
The note added: “the Indian troops are still stationing at Wu-Je, and are incessantly carrying out reconnaissance activities on the Chinese Garrison. Hence the situation is rather serious.”
The Chinese conclusion was that “since no Chinese personnel has crossed the border, there could not have been such situation as stated in your informal note.”
On November 5, South Block gave another note to the Chinese stating that there was clearly a misunderstanding on the location of Wu-Je: “We are quite definite that our personnel have at no time intruded into the Wu-Je area of the Tibet region of China but have throughout remained at Bara Hoti which is 2 miles south of the Tunjun-la.”
It was emphazised that Chinese troops had come south of the Tunjun-la and camped at Bara Hoti alongside the Indian troops: “We would like to repeat that we are most anxious to avoid any possible incident and we, therefore, suggest that strict instructions should be issued that no personnel from the Tibet region of China should cross into India without due permission.”
It repeats once more that the India troops “have not entered the Wu-Je area because they have never crossed the Tunjun-la, the border pass ...and Wu-Je was stated by Mr. Kang to be 12 kilometres north of this pass.”
On the same day, it is also pointed to the Chinese that as the Indian detachment was approaching Damzan, which is 10 miles south of the Niti Pass (and therefore clearly in Indian territory), they were stopped by 20 Chinese soldier.
The Chinese troops sent a message to the Indians they could not go via Damzan without the permission from the Chinese authorities at Gartok. The Indian troops insisted on going via Damzan as it was clearly Indian territory: “if the Chinese party used force to stop [them], they would be responsible for the consequences.”
Finally, Delhi asserted that “great restraint [had been] exercised by our detachment. The Chinese soldiers did not try to stop our detachment but wanted to remain on the Indian territory at Damzan without due and proper permission.” The Indian note then gives the coordinates of Damzan, south of the Niti Pass, one of the passes named in the Panchsheel Agreement.
 

And the story goes on...

The entire study is available on my website.

Signs of trouble in central sector too

My article Signs of trouble in central sector too appeared in The Economic Times

Here is the link...

On August 11, Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) Gen Bipin Rawat informed the Parliament's Public Accounts Committee (PAC) that the Indian armed forces in Eastern Ladakh were ready to handle any eventualities along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). He added that the troops were well-prepared for a long haul.
The parliamentary committee wanted to hear from the top brass, about the need for procurement of high-altitude clothing for the soldiers.
This clearly means the Chinese intrusions in Ladakh will not end soon; it is therefore time to ask: is there a possibility of the PLA opening a second front in the Central Sector of the northern boundary?
On May 17, IANS reported that Chinese helicopters violated Indian airspace twice in Himachal Pradesh in April: “The first intrusion was reported on April 11 and the second on April 20. In both incidents, a Chinese helicopter was observed flying on the Indian side of the international border close to Sumdo in Spiti subdivision,” an official told the agency.
Furthermore, activities of Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) seem to have recently increased along the frontier in this sector. The Hindustan Times reported: “China has accelerated work of road construction along the Indian border in Tango and Yamrang regions, which are close to Chitkul and Charang villages on the Indian side.” Though it is not clear where these Tibetan villages are located (for the simple reason that China keeps changing the names of the localities), it is rather worrisome.
In this context, it is worth looking at the ‘historic’ claims made by Beijing in the Central Sector. For Beijing, there are four ‘disputed’ areas which stretch over the states of Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand; namely Chuva-Chuje near Sumdo in Kinnaur district, an area south of Shipki-la (pass) in the same district, Nilang-Jadhang and Barahoti-Lapthal-Sangchamalla in Uttarakhand, to which should be added Lipulekh, recently engulfed in Nepal’s new maps.
On July 30, 1980, the historical division of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) sent a secret note to the East Asia (EA) Division, dealing with China; they wanted to know if there was any Chinese claims in the Central sector.
The note described the area thus: “This sector of the boundary has natural features of watersheds, mountain passes and river valleys.” These geographical features marked the border.
It was explained that during the 1960 talks with China, the Indian officials brought forward conclusive evidence: “to show that the alignment had throughout its length a traditional and customary basis reaching back through many centuries.”
In November 14, 1962, while the border war with China was raging, in a letter to Zhou Enlai, Nehru told his counterpart: “The Chinese government has never had any authority south of the main Himalayan watershed ridge, which is the traditional boundary in this sector.” The Indian Prime Minister however admitted that “Tibetan officials along with some Chinese troops did intrude into Barahoti on various occasions since 1954;” in 1958, as an unnecessary compromise, Delhi agreed to both sides withdrawing their armed personnel from the locality, “[even though] Indian civilian personnel have throughout been functioning [there].”
Interestingly, all these Chinese claims, including the 1960 Line that Beijing would today like to make the LAC in Ladakh, are not based on any of the principles normally used to demarcate a boundary, i.e. watershed, river, customary routes, grazing rights, etc.
As long as Beijing uses its own variable rules, promoting first and foremost its own interests and refusing to follow universally recognised conventions, it is difficult to envisage a quick solution and India should be ready to deal with trouble in these ‘dormant’ Chinese claim areas in the Central Sector.

Tibet and the 'Larger Issues'

Discussing 'larger issues'
Zhou Enlai, Panchen Lama, Mao, Dalai Lama, Liu Shaoqi (October 1954)

Recently the Dalai Lama made some remarks on Jawaharlal Nehru and the Partition of India.
Without going into the (unnecessary) controversy, it is interesting to see the views of the first Prime Minister of Independent India on what he called the ‘Tibetan émigrés’ in the early 1950s, three months after signing (without informing the Tibetans), The Agreement on trade and intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India (infamously remembered as the ‘Panchsheel Agreement’.
In a note dictated on June 18, 1954, Nehru answers some of the questions raised by BK Kapur, the Political Officer (PO) in Sikkim (from March 1952 to March 1955).
The PO was looking after Tibet (including Western Tibet till the Ladakh border), Bhutan and Sikkim).
The note gives some hints on Nehru’s policy vis-a-vis the Tibetans (‘Naturally, the Tibetans have our sympathy. But that sympathy does not take us far’).
It is addressed to the Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs (NR Pillai), the Foreign Secretary (RK Nehru) and Joint Secretary (TN Kaul). It is available in the Nehru Papers (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library)
Nehru’s note brings first and foremost the ‘larger issues’ which four years earlier, decided the Prime Minister to ‘drop’ a Tibet ‘verging independence’ (in Nehru’s own words), for the sake of a friendship with China.
These ‘larger issues’, the local officials (Harishwar Dayal before Kapur in Gangtok, Sumul Sinha in Lhasa or Maj SM Krishnatry in Gyantse) ‘could’ not understand them, at least according to the Prime Minister.
But one could ask: did Nehru understand that, with the arrival of the People’s Liberation Army on the plateau, India was in the process of losing its peaceful border with Tibet.
It has to be noted that June 1954 corresponds to the first Chinese intrusions in Barahoti in today’s Chamoli district to Uttarakhand.
This obsessive concern for ‘wider issues’ will lead India to an utter disaster in October 1962, when China attacked India in NEFA and Ladakh; India was not ready to defend its borders.
“Mr Kapur has not fully appreciated this wider policy of ours”, said Nehru, though more than 60 years later, it is clear that officers like Kapur had grasp a far truer image of China than the corridors of South Block.
Nehru commented “I do not like Mr Kapur talking about Chinese communists, although they are communists. He should talk about the Chinese Government.”
Unfortunately, Mao’s government was ‘Communist’ and proud to be; India paid dear to realize this.

The Note
The various questions raised in these notes and in Mr Kapur's letter an important not only in themselves, but because they are concerned with much larger issues. Indeed, they are concerned with our wider policy towards China and our general world policy.

2- Naturally, the Tibetans have our sympathy. But that sympathy does not take us far and cannot be allowed to interfere with a realistic understanding of the situation and of our policy. I have an impression that Mr Kapur has not fully appreciated this wider policy of ours. It is necessary, therefore, that he and others concerned should understand it and should realise that this policy is the only one which might be helpful to the Tibetans, not in the measure perhaps that they desire, but to some extent. Any other policy of encouraging the Tibetans to oppose Chinese over lordship over Tibet would be raising false hopes in the Tibetans which we cannot fulfil and is likely to react unfavorably on the Tibetans. It would, of course, be opposed to the principles we have laid down in our recent Agreement with China.

3- Mr Kapur talks that the Chinese Government is not likely to be influenced by considerations of non-interference, etc. At the same time he hints that we should also not be influenced by any such considerations, except in so far as that we should not do anything which might create obvious difficulties for us. That is neither a moral nor a practical proposition.

4- No country can ultimately rely upon the permanent goodwill or bona fides of another country, even though they might be in close friendship with each other. It is conceivable that the Western Atlantic alliance may not function as it was intended to and there might be ill will between the countries concerned. It is not inconceivable that China and the Soviet Union may not continue to be as friendly as they are now. Certainly it is conceivable that our relations with China might worsen, though there is no immediate likelihood of that. Therefore, we have always to keep in mind the possibly of a change and not be taken unawares. Adequate precautions have to be taken. If we come to an agreement with China in regard to Tibet, that is not a permanent guarantee, but that itself is one major step to help us in the present and in the foreseeable future in various ways. If there is an agreement at Geneva about the problems of Indo-China and Korea, that La no guarantee about the future, but it is certainly a big step forward to lessen tension which enables the countries concerned to think more objectively and peacefully and perhaps find a surer basis for peace. In spite of that agreement they will not give up their suspicions or their preparations, but other factors will also come into the picture. At present an objective and realistic understanding is made almost impossible by emotional responses. The Russians and the Chinese are full of charges against ‘Western Imperialism’ and aggression and all that. The Americans and others can only think in terms of Communist aggression and villainy, of international communism trying to dominate over the world and so on. All this prevents intelligent thought. If we wish to discuss these matters helpfully, we must avoid certain terms which create powerful reactions in the mind, such as imperialists, communists and the like. I do not like Mr Kapur talking about Chinese communists, although they are communists. He should talk about the Chinese Government. In the same way, I do not like people talking about the Iron Curtain. The mere mention of these words confuses thought and shows that we are not considering a matter objectively.

5- Of course, both the Soviet Union and China are expansive. They are expansive for evils other than communism, although communism may be made a tool for the purpose. Chinese expansionism has been evident during various periods of Asian history for a thousand years or so. We arc perhaps facing a new period of such expansionism. Let us consider that and fashion our policy to prevent it coming in the way of our interests or other interests that we consider important.

6-I can quite understand that many people in Tibet have been disappointed at the agreement between us in China over Tibet. This must be partly because of the colour put on it by the Chinese in Tibet. That agreement, however, was quite inevitable. It was a recognition of a certain factual situation which we could not possibly change. We have, in fact, at least got some advantage out of that agreement in other respects. If we had not had that agreement, the position would have been no better for us in Tibet and a little worse for the Tibetans. It certainly would have been worse for us from a wider point of view.

7- We must remember that our so-called interests in Tibet derive largely from our inheriting certain British interests to which they succeeded in establishing in the days of British expansionism. We became the inheritors of British imperialism to a slight extent. We were popular with the ruling classes of Tibet at this stage because they thought we would come in the way of Chinese expansionism. We could not do so in Tibet and we could not possibly hang on to privileges which had no meaning in the present state of affairs.

8- Mr Kapur says something about our not throwing cold water on various movements in Tibet against the Chinese though we should not associate ourselves with them, that we should allow them to simmer and not die out. Let us be clear about this. Whatever happens in Tibet proper is beyond our reach. We can neither help nor hinder it. The question is what we do in our own territory. Do we encourage this or not? It is clear that we cannot encourage it. Al best we can tolerate it, provided it is not too obvious or aggressive. A very delicate balance will have to be kept up.

9- Kalimpong is and has been a nest of intrigues and spies. It is not only a centre of Tibetan émigrés, but also of Communists (Chinese). Also of Americans, White Russians and many others. We tolerate all these persons and we can tolerate also the Tibetans of various kinds and views. But if any of these indulge in aggressive activities which might lead to violence, then obviously we cannot tolerate them. I am sure that the Tibetan émigrés in Kalimpong, etc, are in close touch with the Americans, White Russians, etc, and are being encouraged by them with money and in other ways. In fact, I heard that there was a question of their collecting arms also. All this seems to me childish and totally unrealistic.

10- Even one of the major and much advertised efforts of the Americans to bring down the People's Government of China through Formosa is now recognised to be futile. Is it then in the slightest degree conceivable that some petty violent effort organised by Tibetans and others on our border would produce results in Tibet? This can only be thought of in terms of some aggressive Americans as a diversion from their larger world policy or in case a big war occurs. From the Tibetan point of view, it can only prove harmful. There is not the least chance in the world of China leaving Tibet or being driven out of Tibet unless China is defeated in war. Of that there appears to be no chance. Therefore, these adventurous tactics beyond the borders of Tibet have no meaning and call only embarrass and prove harmful. We need not come in the way if they are peaceful and unobtrusive but I quite agree with SG [Secretary General] that we should explain our policy and the world situation to the people from Tibet so that they may not misunderstand us. It is clear that if they indulge in any aggressive action and the Chinese Government complains to us, we shall have no alternative left but to take some steps against them, at any rate to curb them. We shall certainly not hand them over to the Chinese State, because they have a right of asylum in our country and we can give them the fullest assurance about this. At the same time we cannot permit our territory to be used as a base of operations against the Chinese.

11- The real argument in favour of Tibetan freedom or autonomy is the nature of the country. It is most inhospitable to others, it cannot maintain large numbers of foreigners and the like. If the Tibetans are stout enough to keep up a spirit of freedom, they will maintain a large measure of autonomy and the Chinese will not interfere. If the Tibetans actively rebel, they will be ruthlessly put down by the Chinese and even their autonomy will go. They are between the Soviet Union and China and one or other of these two Powers will have a dominating political influence there. We in India cannot exercise it for geographical as well as other reasons. As a friendly Power to China we can be helpful occasionally hi the diplomatic field.

12- The brother of the Dalai Lama [Gyalo Thondup], whom I met some years ago, is obviously connected with various under-ground activities. Some time back we warned our officers not to get entangled in them. That warning should be given again. That does not mean that we should be unfriendly to him. It simply means that we should be friendly and frank and should explain the limitations of the position.

13- We must remember that Tibet has been cut off from the world for a long time and, socially speaking, is very backward and feudal. Changes are bound to come there to the disadvantage of the small ruling class and the big monasteries. Religion may continue to be a powerful force to hold the Tibetans together, but social forces are also powerful. Thus far the Chinese have been careful not to interfere with social customs, religion, etc.
So far as I know, they have not even interfered with the land system which is feudal. I can very well understand these feudal chiefs being annoyed with the new order. We can hardly stand up as defenders of feudalism.

14- I want to make one thing perfectly clear, and this should be made clear to the Tibetans who are in India, that there is no question of our handing them over to the Chinese. They have every right to live in India or to seek asylum in India and we shall respect that.

15- As regards the Tibetan Mission in Kalimpong, we need not take any step about it and so far as we are concerned, they can continue for the present, but I rather doubt If they will be allowed to continue by the Chinese authorities. We must make sure, however, that the Tibetan Mission, as the Joint Secretary says, is not used as a cover for something else.

16- As regards the Dalai Lama's treasure which is now in Gangtok, I do not see the point of transferring it to Calcutta or elsewhere. First of all we have no direct knowledge of the Dalai Lama's wishes. Secondly, so long as it is in India, it does not much matter whether it is in Gangtok or in Calcutta. It is under our control. If adequate guards are not there, we should make arrangements for proper protection. Any attempt to move it will probably get some kind of publicity. It Is far better to allow this matter to lie low. If at any time the Chinese claim it, then we shall have to consider what we should do about it. For the present, our view should he that it is a private treasure of the Dalai Lama and it is for the Dalai Lama to dispose of it.

17- Our policy thus should be an observance, in letter and spirit of our agreement with China in regard to Tibet, at the same time we continue our friendly feelings for Tibet and her people and make it clear that our traditional friendship with them continues. This, however, cannot lead us to any course of action which is against our agreement with China and which we think will be harmful even to Tibet and her people. For the rest, we have to be vigilant and wide awake.

18- SG suggests a holiday camp for soldiers at Kalimpong. This is not a bad idea and it might be investigated.

19- Our general position as contained in this note should be explained to Mr Kapur.

20- Mr Mullik [Bhota Nath Mullik, Director, Intelligence Bureau between 1950 and 1964], should also be made to understand it. I shall be seeing him also. We have to be very careful about our activities in Kalimpong because of the espionage and counter-espionage that is continually going on there.

Trespass on Barahoti: We had it coming

My article Trespass on Barahoti: We had it coming appeared in The Asian Age/Deccan Chronicle.

Here is the link...

An improved infrastructure should be provided to the Indian Army and the paramilitary forces to man the area.

According to PTI, on June 3, two helicopters of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) hovered over the Barahoti bowl in Chamoli district in Uttarakhand.
The news agency repotted that the choppers, which returned to the Chinese side after about five minutes, “could have carried out aerial photography of Indian ground troops during what was possibly a reconnaissance mission.”
The choppers were identified as the Zhiba (WZ-9) attack helicopters.
Incidentally, on the same day, Lt Gen He Lei, vice president of the PLA’s Academy of Military Science addressed the plenary session of the 16th Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore.
Representing China, Gen He affirmed in front of his colleagues from Asia and the West: “China has always worked to maintain, build and contribute to international and regional peace and has firmly followed the path of peaceful development although it is faced with multiple security challenges.”
Whether it is in the South China Sea (SCS) or Barahoti, the Chinese break the rules that they pretend to uphold; intruding areas, occupying them and later telling the other stakeholders: “let us discuss”. Opponents, placed in front of a fait accompli, are most of the time unable to give a fitting answer (this is even the case of Donald Trump in the SCS).
In the present situation, Chamoli’s Superintendent of Police, Tripti Bhatt told The Hindustan Times that the helicopter(s) entered the Indian airspace from Tibetan side; however, she refused to confirm that it was a Chinese helicopter. This raises several questions.
First, for such sensitive issues, there should be only ONE spokesperson, whether from the Defence Ministry or the Indo-Tibet Border Police (ITBP) who gives factual infor
mation to the press.
Then, photos or videos should be provided to the media, which hopefully can help the Indian public to better understand what China does.
Then an improved infrastructure should be provided for the Indian Army and the paramilitary forces to man the area. This is the result of the neglect of the Himalayan frontier with China for the past 60 years.
Finally, there are no ‘minor’ issues when the Indian borders are concerned. Barahoti, which witnessed the first Chinese intrusions on Indian soil in 1954 is indeed a telling case.
Every summer, the Indian media cries foul: “The Chinese have come again”. “The Chinese Dragon struck again”, scream reports originating from this ‘inaccessible’ part of Uttarakhand.
Last year, The Times of India reported: “It all began on July 22, when an Indian team of 19 civilians led by a Sub Divisional Magistrate first entered into the area in Barahoti. …Three days later for the first time, China sent a helicopter to the area.”
The Government of India, as usual, played down the incident. As a result, this year, two choppers have come …in June and next year more will come.
Last year another serious issue cropped up, as per an agreed protocol signed in 2005 and reiterated in 2013 with China, the ITBP personnel were not carrying firearms, while Chinese were carrying arms and wearing uniforms.
But how did the story start?
In July 1952, in a secret note, the Intelligence Bureau described the topography of the Himalaya in this area: “The Garhwal-Tibet border can only be crossed through the Mana and Niti Valleys where there are open places and habitation, while the rest of the border area consists of snow-covered mountains studded with glaciers. …There are four passes between Niti Valley and Tibet”. One of them was Tunjun-la, north of Barahoti.
A couple of years earlier, some Tibetans officials had entered the tiny bowl of Barahoti. The IB explained the background of the so-called dispute: “About the end of last century the Tibetans had established a Customs Post at Hoti Plain. To stop this practice, the British Government had to send out a detachment of Gurkhas along with the Deputy Collector in 1890. This had a salutary effect and the Tibetans removed their post. It appears that for some time past the Tibetans have again been establishing a Police-cum-Customs post at Hoti during the trading season.”
As in most areas in the Himalaya, the access is far easier from the Tibetan side than from the Indian. Over the years, this greatly facilitated the Chinese intrusions.
The 1952 IB note continued: “It is quite possible that if the Tibetans are not stopped from establishing their post at Hoti Plain, they might eventually claim it to be their own territory.” The IB then recommended: “It is, therefore, essential that the Govt. of India should make it clear to the Govt. of Tibet and its Dzongpon [District Commissioner] that the Hoti Plain is Indian territory and the Tibetans have no right to establish any Customs post there.”
At that time, the Uttar Pradesh Government asserted that no case of “encroachment has so far been reported though at one or two places tax collectors from Tibet did come in but were persuaded to go back.”
The above incident was enough for China to claim the area as ‘hers’. It happened as soon as the negotiations for the Panchsheel Agreement, (which only deals with trade and pilgrimage between Tibet and India) were completed in April 1954. It was soon obvious that the Indian diplomats had goofed up, they had ‘forgotten’ to discuss the Indo-Tibet border.
Though the ‘smart’ Indian negotiators in Beijing had been sent a complete list of the Himalayan passes, they believed that by naming six passes only, they had delineated a border.
As a result of India not insisting on all the passes, China started claiming several areas south of the watershed, in particular the area south of the Tunjun-la pass, where Barahoti is located.
It is only much later that South Block understood the meaning of Premier Zhou En-lai’s opening remarks, at the time of signature: “there are bound to be some problems between two great countries like India and China with a long common border… but we are prepared to settle all such problems as are ripe for settlement now”.

China did not know that Barahoti was south of Tunjun-la in 1958

Less than two months after the signature, India discovered that all problems had not been solved: the first Chinese incursion in the Barahoti area of Uttar Pradesh occurred in June 1954. This was the first of a series of incursions numbering in the hundreds which culminated in the attack of October 1962
Correspondence went on for four years and in 1958 a conference was held to sort out the issue. China refused to admit that the watershed marked the frontier and that Tunjun-la pass had for centuries been the traditional border.
After the failure of the 1958 talks, the Foreign Secretary Subimal Dutt wrote: “Each side has put forward its arguments in favour of its case. The Chinese are contesting our arguments and we are, of course, contesting theirs. The only positive suggestion made by the Chinese is that there should be a joint local enquiry.”
But India refused when it discovered that was just a pretext for China to find out the exact location of the place. They thought that Barahoti (they call it Wuje) was north of Tunjun-la. It seems a joke; unfortunately, the Chinese intrusions still continue today.
More than 60 years later, the case of Barahoti shows that for the Chinese, there is no big or small issue, every inch is a victory, and the second lesson is that there is no short cut to building a proper infrastructure.
And India should not hesitate to send drones to the area if and when required.

China’s border tactics unchanged

Indian patrol in the Barahoti Plain in the 1950s

My article China’s border tactics unchanged appeared in The Asian Age/Deccan Chronicle
 
Here is the link...

Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi’s visit to New Delhi on Saturday will not change anything in the mindset of the leadership in Beijing, and the intrusions (transgressions?) will continue. It is important, therefore, that the Indian public is aware about the history of our borders.

In July 1952, the Intelligence Bureau sent New Delhi a worrying report about the Garhwal-Tibet border; after explaining that the border in this area could “only be crossed through Mana and Niti Valleys, where there are open places and habitation, the rest of the border area consists of snow-covered mountains studded with glaciers,” it mentioned one area, Hoti, used by Indian traders going to Tibet during the warm season.
The report warned that at the end of the 19th century, the Tibetans had once established a customs post in Hoti Plain: “To stop this practice, the British government had to send out a detachment of Gurkhas along with Dharmanand Joshi, deputy collector, in 1890. This had a salutary effect and the Tibetans removed their post,” the IB report noted.
But once the Chinese appeared on the scene and occupied the plateau in 1950-51, the Tibetans became bolder: “It appears the Tibetans have again established a police-cum-customs post at Hoti during the trading season,” the 1952 IB report said. It added: “It’s quite possible that if the Tibetans aren’t stopped from establishing their post at Hoti Plain, they might eventually claim it to be their own territory. Since there is no habitation or cultivation in this area, the Garhwal authorities hardly ever visit the area or take action to denote that it lies within their jurisdiction.”
For centuries, the dzongpon (commissioner) of Daba in Tibet had sent serjis (messengers) to Hoti Plain in Indian territory to announce that the trading season had begun. As Indian traders went to Tibet, there were charged some “hospitality” taxes corresponding to the facilities they got from the Tibetan authorities (fodder for animals, etc).
In 1952, the Tibetans again shifted their “customs” camp to Barahoti. The IB then suggested sending a detachment of the Garhwal Rifles and local armed police to hoist the Indian tricolour in Barahoti “to stop the Tibetans from establishing their customs post”.
That is how the Barahoti “dispute” started. It took a nastier turn two years later, when China had established its presence in western Tibet.
It’s important to remember that the Indian and Chinese governments had signed the “historic” Panchsheel Agreement on trade and pilgrimage in Tibet in April 1954. India gave away all its rights in the Land of Snows (telegraph lines, post offices, dak bungalows, military escorts in Gyantse and Yatung), but got no assurances on the border demarcation from Beijing.

In the negotiations, Indian diplomats clearly showed that the traditional and customary boundary followed the watershed range; the passes of Mana, Niti, Tun Jun La, Balcha Dhura, Kungri Bingri, Darma and Lipulekh marked the border in the area. China agreed to name five of them in the agreement, but flatly refused to mention Tsang Chok La, Tun Jun La and Balcha Dhura.
Why? Simply because Tun Jun La is north of Barahoti in Garhwal and Balcha Dhura north of Sangchamalla and Lapthal in Almora district. Not naming these passes allowed China to later claim that these areas were located south of the watershed. The Indian negotiators were fooled... but then China, at that time, was a great friend!
The ink barely dried on the Panchsheel that China started making claims on the Indian territories. On August 13, 1954, a note from the Chinese embassy in New Delhi complained: “Over 30 Indian troops armed with rifles crossed the Niti Pass on June 29, 1954, and intruded into Wu-Je (Chinese name for Barahoti).” Beijing pretended to be shocked, saying “this not in conformity with the principles of non-aggression and friendly co-existence between China and India.” So while China had entered Indian territory, it was now blaming India!
Beijing later protested that on July 17, a 33-person unit had entered its territory... in Barahoti: “The unit was under the command of an officer called Nathauja (Chinese pronunciation), a deputy commander, the district magistrate of Walzanjapur district as well as a doctor, a radio operator and soldiers, all living in 17 tents.”
After investigations, India replied on August 27 that it was found “the allegation is entirely incorrect. A party of our Border Security Force is encamped in Hoti Plain, which is southeast of Niti Pass and in Indian territory. None of our troops or personnel have crossed north of Niti Pass.”
It is how the saga of incursions in the central sector of the Indo-Tibet (now Sino-Indian) border began.
A new terminology has been found by bureaucrats in New Delhi. It is called a “transgression”, but it doesn’t change the historical fact: Barahoti is south of the Himalayan watershed marking the border.
In 1958, New Delhi decided to try to negotiate a settlement with Beijing. Fu Hao, Chinese counsellor in New Delhi, met a MEA joint secretary several times. The Chinese suggested a joint local inquiry. Foreign secretary Subimal Dutt sent a note to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru: “Our case is that Barahoti is an area of about one and a half square miles. We have given the exact position with reference to its latitude and longitude. The Chinese have not defined which area they mean by Wu-Je... an area south of Tun Jun La.” Dutt then added: “If the Chinese claims are conceded, the international boundary would lie south in what is undoubtedly Indian territory.”
The foreign secretary said: “The Chinese are apparently keen on a local inquiry because they will thereby be in a position to define the exact borders of the area which they are claiming.” But Beijing didn’t know where Wu-Je or Barahoti was located.
Subimal Dutt then concluded: “We should emphatically refuse to take any oral evidence locally. Barahoti is more easily approachable from the Tibet side than from our side. The Chinese would be able to produce any number of Tibetans to say what they (want) these people to say.”
He went on: “The Chinese government is not prepared to accept our northern border as shown on our maps, as these maps are supposed to have been prepared by British colonialists surreptitiously. They are also not prepared to accept passes mentioned in the 1954 agreement as border passes... thereby indirectly repudiating the principle of watershed as marking the international boundary.”
All this shows that the Chinese still use the same tactics (whether in the South China Sea today or earlier in Aksai Chin or Barahoti); they occupy a territory that they deem important for their own interests and later emphatically declare it has always been “Chinese territory”, which is sacred and will be defended by force if necessary.
Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi’s visit to New Delhi on Saturday will not change anything in the mindset of the leadership in Beijing, and the intrusions (transgressions?) will continue. It is important, therefore, that the Indian public is aware about the history of our borders.