India and its Saga of 'Reneged' International Promises

The 'broken' 17-Point Agreement

My article India and its Saga of 'Reneged' International Promises appeared in News Intervention

 Here is the link...

 Global Times is famous (or infamous) for saying that black is white and vice-versa; and at the end, arguing that everybody should admire Red China.
For the past five months, the tabloid has described the situation in Ladakh as of India’s own making; it continues the Communist Party long tradition of telling lies (remember the Great Leap Forward and its claims of bumper harvests at a time when more than 40 million Chinese died of starvation). Today, The Global Times continues to reverse the roles and change the facts.

Take the example of the joint statement and five-point consensus reached by the Indian and Chinese foreign ministers at the end of their recent meeting in Moscow. While admitting that it is “a substantial step in cooling down the current border situation, exceeding the expectations of most international observers,” The Global Times squarely put the blame on India: “The successful implementation of the joint statement, however, depends on whether the Indian side can truly keep its word,” as if Delhi is not keeping its word.
It is not difficult for the tabloid to find ‘experts’ to corroborate its conclusions; one Qian Feng, director of the research department of the National Strategy Institute at Tsinghua University in Beijing told the Communist publication: “given India's past history of breaking consensuses reached at such meetings, some Chinese experts stressed that it's still too early to pin high hopes on its implementation.”
However, the history of modern China is a tale of broken promises.
Hardly two months after Mao solemnly announced the birth of the People’s Republic of China from the Tiananmen Square, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) annexed Xinjiang, closing down the Indian Consulate General in Kashgar in the same stroke.
Delhi was told that the new regime would have to renegotiate all its former agreements, a position untenable in international law.
By taking over Xinjiang, Mao controlled the western borders of the Middle Kingdom, he could access trade with Central Asia and block any possibility of Soviet southward advance; for the first time, he also came in contact with the Indian frontiers, particularly the Aksai Chin area; a few years later, Beijing built a road across Indian territory linking up Xinjiang with Tibet.
The first broken promise was about the Indian Consulate in Kashgar, despite Beijing’s promises, it would never be reopened.
At the same time, Beijing repeatedly told the Uyghurs that the PLA had come to help them to develop the area; the Uyghurs still do not understand how they have been ‘helped’ during all these decades.
India foolishly kept the closure of its Kashgar  Consulate secret because “nothing could be done about it,” but that is another story.
Then came the invasion of the Roof of the World, called by Mao the ‘liberation’ of Tibet. A two-phase operation was meticulously planned by the Great helmsman; the first part culminated in the Battle of Chamdo in 1950, which saw the Tibetan forces being decimated; after the winter had passed, the Communist regime started the second phase, a diplomatic one; the weak Tibetan State was forced to put its thumbprint on an agreement allowing Communist China to take over the Land of Snows.
An ‘Agreement on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet’, better known as the ‘17-Point Agreement’ was signed (‘under duress’ according the Dalai Lama) in Beijing on May 23, 1951 by Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, the former Governor of the Eastern Province of Kham, then a prisoner of war.
The Tibetan delegates were ‘trapped’ into this (the seals of the Tibetan government had to be forged for the purpose, but never mind). The consequences for Tibet would be most momentous; not only Tibet would lose more than its independence, because here too, China would not keep its promises.
On September 9, 1951, soon after the Tibetans had signed on the dotted line, several thousand PLA troops entered Lhasa under the command of General Wang Qimei; subsequently 20,000 troops began to occupy the most strategic points on the Tibetan Plateau. India had a new neighbour.
The next step for Beijing was to subdue the Indian government with a well-orchestrated propaganda of ‘eternal friendship’ between the two Asian giants; the Hindi-Chini-Bhai-Bhai honeymoon between Delhi and Beijing began to flourish.
In April 1954, India and China signed the so-called Panchsheel Agreement about Tibet, to which the Tibetans were not even invited to participate. India’s long border with Tibet (now China) was wishfully deemed settled in the process; Delhi thought that by signing this hasty agreement, it had ‘fixed’ the border.
But two months later, the ink on the treaty had hardly dried, the Chinese troops walked into Indian territory; the PLA entered for the first time in Barahoti, a small flat grazing ground located in today’s Chamoli district of Uttarakhand.
It was another broken promise, the first two of the Five Principles (‘Panchsheel’) spoke of ‘Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty and Mutual non-aggression’.
In April 1958, for the first time, officials of India and China sat together to try and sort out the issue. It was a first rehearsal for the long negotiations which would take place in 1960; both led nowhere.
As a compromise in Barahoti, India agreed that Chinese ‘unarmed’ patrols could visit the place in summer till the case was solved; Beijing never kept its promise and repeatedly sent armed soldiers to Barahoti.
Sixty-two years after the negotiators agreed to be unarmed, the Chinese still cross the Tunjun-la and armed personnel walk into the desolate area.
Many more examples could be cited, i.e. the agreements of 1993, 1996 or 2005 on the borders which are often forgotten. For example, Article VII of the 2005 Guidelines said: “In reaching a boundary settlement, the two sides shall safeguard due interests of their settled populations in the border areas.” It was clearly referring to Tawang, but a few months later, Beijing started claiming again the area; to the long list of broken promises, one can add the decision for a disengagement arrived at during the recent five rounds of talks between the Corps Commanders in Ladakh. Where is the disengagement today?
Considering China’s track record in the matter, The Global Times should be less arrogant, but it is apparently impossible.

The curious case of Demchok

My article The curious case of Demchok appeared in the Edit Page of The Pioneer

Here is the link...

Of course, the Chinese intrusions into Indian territory are not innocent. Solutions are there which lie in the re-opening of the Demchok route. But is China ready to do this?

Despite the Wuhan consensus (or ‘Wuhan spirit’) arrived at after the one-on-one meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping in Hubei Province in April, China continues to needle India at different places along the 4,057-km Line of Actual Control (LAC). Last week, it was reported that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) intruded some 400 metres inside the Indian territory in the Demchok sector of eastern Ladakh and pitched five tents.
After a flag meeting between the local Brigade commander and his Chinese counterpart, the PLA accepted to remove three of the tents from the Cherdong-Nerlong Nallan area. It is said that a few ‘Chinese troops in civvies’ camped in the two remaining tents.
The Economic Times reported, “in the garb of nomads with cattle in tow, [the PLA] had intruded into the Indian territory in the first week of July and did not retreat despite Indian troops repeatedly conducting ‘banner drills’.”
The ‘spirit of Wuhan’ had clearly been forgotten.  One could ask: Is President Xi suffering from amnesia or is a local commander not aware of the ‘consensus?’  The latter would mean that Xi has not full control over the PLA, which is serious matter.

Demchok is special because for centuries, it has been a part of the kingdom of Ladakh and later of the Jammu & Kashmir state. On August 14, 1939, as he camped near Gartok, Dr Kanshi Ram, the British Trade Agent (BTA) in Western Tibet, reported to his boss, the political agent of the Punjab hill States in Simla. A few days earlier, he had begun his journey to the Tibetan border. He was accompanied by the Wazir Wazarat (District Commissioner) of Ladakh; both were to meet the Garpon (Governor) of Western Tibet for a tripartite inquiry into the alleged murder of a Tibetan.
They reached Demchok, the last Ladakhi village before the Tibetan border, on July 17; a few days later, Dr Ram reported: “On the night of July 21, the stream by the side of which we were camping suddenly rose to higher level and began to flow over our camping ground at midnight. We were abed as alarm was raised and …had to keep awake throughout the night. The next morning we crossed the stream and camped on the Tibetan border at a place of safety.” The ITA added: “This stream forms a natural boundary between Tibet and Kashmir at Demchok.”
This is interesting because it shows that before the Chinese invasion, the Indo-Tibet border in Ladakh was well-defined and agreed upon by the Government of British India (represented by the BTA), the State of Jammu & Kashmir (the Wazir) and the Tibetan Government (the Garpon).  Already, in 1684, after a war between Ladakh and Tibet, the Treaty of Tingmosgang had affirmed that “the boundary shall be fixed at the Lha-ri stream of Bde-mchok.” Bde-mchog was clearly Demchok.
After entering Tibet in the early 1950s, the Chinese ‘advanced’ into the Demchok sector, though no Chinese had ever been seen in the area earlier and a very large area around Demchok started to be claimed by Beijing.  In 1954, long negotiations preceded the signature on the ‘Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India’, known as the Panchsheel Agreement for its (in)famous preamble. The negotiations ended with India giving away all its rights in Tibet, while getting no assurance about a border demarcation from the Chinese Government in return.
During the talks, the issue of ‘trade marts’ were discussed; the Chinese negotiator agreed about Tashigong (in Tibet) and added “you could also have Demchok.” The move was clever: He was offering a Tibetan mart …on India’s territory. TN Kaul, the Indian negotiator, objected Demchok was in India. To Kaul’s utter surprise, Chen answered that India’s border was further on the west of the Indus. On Kaul’s insistence, his Chinese counterpart said: “There can be no doubt about actual physical possession which can be verified on spot but to avoid any dispute we may omit mention of Demchok”. It was a bluff and though Kaul repeated that Demchok was on India’s side, the Chinese did not budge.
On April 22, after more than four months of discussions, the Indian ambassador to China N Raghavan cabled the Foreign Secretary that Zhang Hanfu, the Chinese chief negotiator, had ‘virulently’ objected to inclusion of Demchok in the Agreement. It did not occur to the Indian negotiators to ask why. For centuries, the trade and pilgrimage route for the Kailash-Manasarovar region followed the course of the Indus, passed Demchok, the last Ladakhi hamlet, and then crossed the border to reach the first Tibetan village, Tashigong, some 15 miles inside Tibet.
Not only did the Chinese refuse to mention Demchok in the Agreement but bargained for nearly four months not to cite the Tashigong traditional trade route.  In retrospect, one can find two main reasons for the Chinese dragging their feet. One was the proximity of the ‘Aksai Chin Road’; preliminary work on the road had just started at the time of the Panchsheel negotiations. In 1954, Indian border forces visiting Demchok would have noticed that a road was clandestinely being built on Indian territory.
The second reason is as grave and is presently relevant.  After months of infructuous exchanges, Zhang Hanfu conceded that “traders customarily using this route might continue such use but an oral understanding to that effect between two delegations would suffice, [China] would not like in writing, even by implication, to have any reference to Ladakh.” It meant that China considered Ladakh a ‘disputed area.’ Kaul informed Delhi: “We have taken [the] position that Ladakh is Indian territory and route should be mentioned as its omission would be invidious.” But China did not accept the Indian contention and “after considerable argument [Zhang] agreed, but subsequently withdrew [his agreement].” India had finally to concur to the Chinese formulation. Demchok was mentioned nowhere. The present incursions are not innocent.
Is there a solution? Considering the ‘Nathu-la’ effect, reopening Demchok route could be an excellent Confidence Building Measure (CBM) between India and China.
Remember the skirmishes in Sikkim before the Nathu-la pass was opened in the 1960s? When the pass was officially reopened to trade in July 2006, it had the effect of fixing the border, drastically reducing the tensions, at least in this particular area. But is China ready to do this?

Tibet and the 'Larger Issues'

Discussing 'larger issues'
Zhou Enlai, Panchen Lama, Mao, Dalai Lama, Liu Shaoqi (October 1954)

Recently the Dalai Lama made some remarks on Jawaharlal Nehru and the Partition of India.
Without going into the (unnecessary) controversy, it is interesting to see the views of the first Prime Minister of Independent India on what he called the ‘Tibetan émigrés’ in the early 1950s, three months after signing (without informing the Tibetans), The Agreement on trade and intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India (infamously remembered as the ‘Panchsheel Agreement’.
In a note dictated on June 18, 1954, Nehru answers some of the questions raised by BK Kapur, the Political Officer (PO) in Sikkim (from March 1952 to March 1955).
The PO was looking after Tibet (including Western Tibet till the Ladakh border), Bhutan and Sikkim).
The note gives some hints on Nehru’s policy vis-a-vis the Tibetans (‘Naturally, the Tibetans have our sympathy. But that sympathy does not take us far’).
It is addressed to the Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs (NR Pillai), the Foreign Secretary (RK Nehru) and Joint Secretary (TN Kaul). It is available in the Nehru Papers (Nehru Memorial Museum and Library)
Nehru’s note brings first and foremost the ‘larger issues’ which four years earlier, decided the Prime Minister to ‘drop’ a Tibet ‘verging independence’ (in Nehru’s own words), for the sake of a friendship with China.
These ‘larger issues’, the local officials (Harishwar Dayal before Kapur in Gangtok, Sumul Sinha in Lhasa or Maj SM Krishnatry in Gyantse) ‘could’ not understand them, at least according to the Prime Minister.
But one could ask: did Nehru understand that, with the arrival of the People’s Liberation Army on the plateau, India was in the process of losing its peaceful border with Tibet.
It has to be noted that June 1954 corresponds to the first Chinese intrusions in Barahoti in today’s Chamoli district to Uttarakhand.
This obsessive concern for ‘wider issues’ will lead India to an utter disaster in October 1962, when China attacked India in NEFA and Ladakh; India was not ready to defend its borders.
“Mr Kapur has not fully appreciated this wider policy of ours”, said Nehru, though more than 60 years later, it is clear that officers like Kapur had grasp a far truer image of China than the corridors of South Block.
Nehru commented “I do not like Mr Kapur talking about Chinese communists, although they are communists. He should talk about the Chinese Government.”
Unfortunately, Mao’s government was ‘Communist’ and proud to be; India paid dear to realize this.

The Note
The various questions raised in these notes and in Mr Kapur's letter an important not only in themselves, but because they are concerned with much larger issues. Indeed, they are concerned with our wider policy towards China and our general world policy.

2- Naturally, the Tibetans have our sympathy. But that sympathy does not take us far and cannot be allowed to interfere with a realistic understanding of the situation and of our policy. I have an impression that Mr Kapur has not fully appreciated this wider policy of ours. It is necessary, therefore, that he and others concerned should understand it and should realise that this policy is the only one which might be helpful to the Tibetans, not in the measure perhaps that they desire, but to some extent. Any other policy of encouraging the Tibetans to oppose Chinese over lordship over Tibet would be raising false hopes in the Tibetans which we cannot fulfil and is likely to react unfavorably on the Tibetans. It would, of course, be opposed to the principles we have laid down in our recent Agreement with China.

3- Mr Kapur talks that the Chinese Government is not likely to be influenced by considerations of non-interference, etc. At the same time he hints that we should also not be influenced by any such considerations, except in so far as that we should not do anything which might create obvious difficulties for us. That is neither a moral nor a practical proposition.

4- No country can ultimately rely upon the permanent goodwill or bona fides of another country, even though they might be in close friendship with each other. It is conceivable that the Western Atlantic alliance may not function as it was intended to and there might be ill will between the countries concerned. It is not inconceivable that China and the Soviet Union may not continue to be as friendly as they are now. Certainly it is conceivable that our relations with China might worsen, though there is no immediate likelihood of that. Therefore, we have always to keep in mind the possibly of a change and not be taken unawares. Adequate precautions have to be taken. If we come to an agreement with China in regard to Tibet, that is not a permanent guarantee, but that itself is one major step to help us in the present and in the foreseeable future in various ways. If there is an agreement at Geneva about the problems of Indo-China and Korea, that La no guarantee about the future, but it is certainly a big step forward to lessen tension which enables the countries concerned to think more objectively and peacefully and perhaps find a surer basis for peace. In spite of that agreement they will not give up their suspicions or their preparations, but other factors will also come into the picture. At present an objective and realistic understanding is made almost impossible by emotional responses. The Russians and the Chinese are full of charges against ‘Western Imperialism’ and aggression and all that. The Americans and others can only think in terms of Communist aggression and villainy, of international communism trying to dominate over the world and so on. All this prevents intelligent thought. If we wish to discuss these matters helpfully, we must avoid certain terms which create powerful reactions in the mind, such as imperialists, communists and the like. I do not like Mr Kapur talking about Chinese communists, although they are communists. He should talk about the Chinese Government. In the same way, I do not like people talking about the Iron Curtain. The mere mention of these words confuses thought and shows that we are not considering a matter objectively.

5- Of course, both the Soviet Union and China are expansive. They are expansive for evils other than communism, although communism may be made a tool for the purpose. Chinese expansionism has been evident during various periods of Asian history for a thousand years or so. We arc perhaps facing a new period of such expansionism. Let us consider that and fashion our policy to prevent it coming in the way of our interests or other interests that we consider important.

6-I can quite understand that many people in Tibet have been disappointed at the agreement between us in China over Tibet. This must be partly because of the colour put on it by the Chinese in Tibet. That agreement, however, was quite inevitable. It was a recognition of a certain factual situation which we could not possibly change. We have, in fact, at least got some advantage out of that agreement in other respects. If we had not had that agreement, the position would have been no better for us in Tibet and a little worse for the Tibetans. It certainly would have been worse for us from a wider point of view.

7- We must remember that our so-called interests in Tibet derive largely from our inheriting certain British interests to which they succeeded in establishing in the days of British expansionism. We became the inheritors of British imperialism to a slight extent. We were popular with the ruling classes of Tibet at this stage because they thought we would come in the way of Chinese expansionism. We could not do so in Tibet and we could not possibly hang on to privileges which had no meaning in the present state of affairs.

8- Mr Kapur says something about our not throwing cold water on various movements in Tibet against the Chinese though we should not associate ourselves with them, that we should allow them to simmer and not die out. Let us be clear about this. Whatever happens in Tibet proper is beyond our reach. We can neither help nor hinder it. The question is what we do in our own territory. Do we encourage this or not? It is clear that we cannot encourage it. Al best we can tolerate it, provided it is not too obvious or aggressive. A very delicate balance will have to be kept up.

9- Kalimpong is and has been a nest of intrigues and spies. It is not only a centre of Tibetan émigrés, but also of Communists (Chinese). Also of Americans, White Russians and many others. We tolerate all these persons and we can tolerate also the Tibetans of various kinds and views. But if any of these indulge in aggressive activities which might lead to violence, then obviously we cannot tolerate them. I am sure that the Tibetan émigrés in Kalimpong, etc, are in close touch with the Americans, White Russians, etc, and are being encouraged by them with money and in other ways. In fact, I heard that there was a question of their collecting arms also. All this seems to me childish and totally unrealistic.

10- Even one of the major and much advertised efforts of the Americans to bring down the People's Government of China through Formosa is now recognised to be futile. Is it then in the slightest degree conceivable that some petty violent effort organised by Tibetans and others on our border would produce results in Tibet? This can only be thought of in terms of some aggressive Americans as a diversion from their larger world policy or in case a big war occurs. From the Tibetan point of view, it can only prove harmful. There is not the least chance in the world of China leaving Tibet or being driven out of Tibet unless China is defeated in war. Of that there appears to be no chance. Therefore, these adventurous tactics beyond the borders of Tibet have no meaning and call only embarrass and prove harmful. We need not come in the way if they are peaceful and unobtrusive but I quite agree with SG [Secretary General] that we should explain our policy and the world situation to the people from Tibet so that they may not misunderstand us. It is clear that if they indulge in any aggressive action and the Chinese Government complains to us, we shall have no alternative left but to take some steps against them, at any rate to curb them. We shall certainly not hand them over to the Chinese State, because they have a right of asylum in our country and we can give them the fullest assurance about this. At the same time we cannot permit our territory to be used as a base of operations against the Chinese.

11- The real argument in favour of Tibetan freedom or autonomy is the nature of the country. It is most inhospitable to others, it cannot maintain large numbers of foreigners and the like. If the Tibetans are stout enough to keep up a spirit of freedom, they will maintain a large measure of autonomy and the Chinese will not interfere. If the Tibetans actively rebel, they will be ruthlessly put down by the Chinese and even their autonomy will go. They are between the Soviet Union and China and one or other of these two Powers will have a dominating political influence there. We in India cannot exercise it for geographical as well as other reasons. As a friendly Power to China we can be helpful occasionally hi the diplomatic field.

12- The brother of the Dalai Lama [Gyalo Thondup], whom I met some years ago, is obviously connected with various under-ground activities. Some time back we warned our officers not to get entangled in them. That warning should be given again. That does not mean that we should be unfriendly to him. It simply means that we should be friendly and frank and should explain the limitations of the position.

13- We must remember that Tibet has been cut off from the world for a long time and, socially speaking, is very backward and feudal. Changes are bound to come there to the disadvantage of the small ruling class and the big monasteries. Religion may continue to be a powerful force to hold the Tibetans together, but social forces are also powerful. Thus far the Chinese have been careful not to interfere with social customs, religion, etc.
So far as I know, they have not even interfered with the land system which is feudal. I can very well understand these feudal chiefs being annoyed with the new order. We can hardly stand up as defenders of feudalism.

14- I want to make one thing perfectly clear, and this should be made clear to the Tibetans who are in India, that there is no question of our handing them over to the Chinese. They have every right to live in India or to seek asylum in India and we shall respect that.

15- As regards the Tibetan Mission in Kalimpong, we need not take any step about it and so far as we are concerned, they can continue for the present, but I rather doubt If they will be allowed to continue by the Chinese authorities. We must make sure, however, that the Tibetan Mission, as the Joint Secretary says, is not used as a cover for something else.

16- As regards the Dalai Lama's treasure which is now in Gangtok, I do not see the point of transferring it to Calcutta or elsewhere. First of all we have no direct knowledge of the Dalai Lama's wishes. Secondly, so long as it is in India, it does not much matter whether it is in Gangtok or in Calcutta. It is under our control. If adequate guards are not there, we should make arrangements for proper protection. Any attempt to move it will probably get some kind of publicity. It Is far better to allow this matter to lie low. If at any time the Chinese claim it, then we shall have to consider what we should do about it. For the present, our view should he that it is a private treasure of the Dalai Lama and it is for the Dalai Lama to dispose of it.

17- Our policy thus should be an observance, in letter and spirit of our agreement with China in regard to Tibet, at the same time we continue our friendly feelings for Tibet and her people and make it clear that our traditional friendship with them continues. This, however, cannot lead us to any course of action which is against our agreement with China and which we think will be harmful even to Tibet and her people. For the rest, we have to be vigilant and wide awake.

18- SG suggests a holiday camp for soldiers at Kalimpong. This is not a bad idea and it might be investigated.

19- Our general position as contained in this note should be explained to Mr Kapur.

20- Mr Mullik [Bhota Nath Mullik, Director, Intelligence Bureau between 1950 and 1964], should also be made to understand it. I shall be seeing him also. We have to be very careful about our activities in Kalimpong because of the espionage and counter-espionage that is continually going on there.

Chinese War Preparations in Tibet ...in 1953

On April 29, 1954, a ‘momentous’ event took place in Beijing.
An Agreement between the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India was signed.
Prime Minister Nehru later said that it was the best thing he had done in his political career.
Well, it was not so good for the Tibetans who lost their centuries-old independence.
It was not good for India too: she ended giving up all its rights in Tibet (telegraph lines, post offices, dak bungalows, military escort in Gyantse and Yatung, etc.), while getting no assurance on the border demarcation from the Chinese government, on the contrary.
But it was good for China, which consolidated (and legalized) its presence in Tibet.
The Agreement has remained in history for its ‘lovely’ preamble.
It says: “Being desirous of promoting trade and cultural intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India and of facilitating pilgrimage and travel by the peoples of China and India. Have resolved to enter into the present Agreement based on the following principles:

1. mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty,
2. mutual non-aggression,
3. mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs,
4. equality and mutual benefit, and
5. peaceful co-existence.

A two-thousand years old nation disappeared from the world map in the name of these principles.
Too bad said the diplomats in South Block, principles are more important.
It was the culmination of the Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai era.
Several authors have written that China later ‘betrayed’ India (one of them is B.N. Mullik, the IB Chief, who wrote: The Chinese betrayal; my years with Nehru).
But has China really betrayed India or was Delhi simply living in another planet?
It is not that the corridors of power in Delhi were not aware that China was preparing to ‘defend’ its frontiers.
Against whom, one could ask, if not India?
The first PLA troops arrived in Lhasa September 1951. A couple of thousands of them.
Less than 2 years later, despite the extremely difficult terrain, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) reached every border posts of Tibet (north of Lohit, Siang and Kameng Frontier Divisions in NEFA; in the Chumbi Valley between Sikkim and Bhutan, in Taklakot in the Kailash Manasarovar area or in Tashigong, the gate to Ladakh).
On February 12, 1953, a Top Secret report from the Indian Consulate in Lhasa (A.K. Sen was then the Consul General) was sent to the Ministry of External Affairs (Nehru was holding the portfolio). Probably due to the length of the message, it reached (deciphered) South Block on February 26 only.
The report refers to a query from the External Affairs Ministry (No. 27641 27th December 1952) asking details about the PLA’s presence on the plateau.
It shows that as early as February 1953, Delhi knew what was going in Tibet.
Then, where is the question of betrayal?
The issue of deployment of the PLA in Tibet was never taken by the negotiators, N. Raghavan, the India Ambassador in China and T.N. Kaul, the Chargé d’Affaires, who for months discussed the content of the infamous Panchsheel Agreement.
Why? Because India was a peace-loving country!!
Around the same time, the Ministry of Defence had ordered the Indian Army to cut 10,000 troops every year for a few years.
This is the sad tragedy of newly-independent India.
Today, the country still pays the price of the folly of the Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai policy.
It has to be noted that by the end of 1954, the Qinghai-Tibet Highway and Sichuan-Tibet Highway were opened to traffic (earlier India had to supply rice to the Chinese troops posted in Tibet!!).
In 2014, celebrating 60 years of the ‘bloodlines of Tibet’, China Tibet Online affirmed: "The running of the Qinghai-Tibet Highway and Sichuan-Tibet Highway not only accelerates the social and economic developments in Tibet, but is of great significance to link the plateau with the rest of the world"
The Qinghai-Tibet and Sichuan-Tibet highways (4,360 km) were both officially opened into traffic on December 25, 1954, "ending Tibet’s history of no modern highway".
This Report dates from nearly two years before the opening of the highways.

Here us the Report. It is quite comprehensive:
“All map references are to the map of Tibet, sheets Eastern and Western, prepared by the Survey of India.”

1. General
The total strength of Chinese troops in the whole of Tibet is estimated between 20,000 and 25,000 but including road workers the number would exceed. The Chinese admit it was their plan to have a force of 60,000 troops but the supply position forced them to abandon it for the time being although they said the present strength was NOT enough to guard the borders. There is NO doubt that with the completion of the Chamdo-Lhasa Road within the next two years more troops would be brought in. Chamdo is now connected with Kantse [Kangding?] by a motorable road.
Disposition of troops at present appears to be conditioned by

(1) road construction
(2) handling of supplies
(3) regulating movement of troops along important routes
(4) manning border outposts and
(5) garrison duty.

Concentration at the outposts cannot be considered to be heavy. They are well scattered in small detachments and are kept frequently on the move. This mobility would enable them to be concentrated at any place in an emergency with ease.

2. Questionnaire
The headquarters of the Army in the whole of Tibet is in Lhasa known as the Military Area Headquarters and is located in Maga Sarpa House.
Local Headquarters are believed to be at

•    Jyekundo (967330)
•    Chamdo (972312)
•    Giamda ( 931300)
•    Nagchuka (920315)
•    Kongbo (940298)
•    Pemako (953295)
•    Zayul (973288)
•    Tsona (921280)
•    Gyantse
•    Shigatse
•    Gurgunsa (Gartok)
•    and Chumbi Valley.

Outposts known to us are at

• Shika ( 971284)
• Tsona Pome (950300)
• Tsari (934287)
• Galinkha and Champithang (Chumbi Valley)
• Phari (892277)
• Penam (892292)
• Lhariguo (934308)
• Sok (938319)
• Pemba Go (950308)
• Denchin (955315)
• Shobando (959308)
• Lho Dzong (963308)
• Riwoche (965314)
• Taklakot (812303)
• Rudok (797335)
• Gyanima (808308)
• Khoodynath (814302)
• Tashigong (796326) [At that time, China was not claiming Demchok as yet]

Of these outposts Shika is a border post.
Tsona a garrison post whereas Galinkha and Chumpithang [Chumbi] are for handling supplies and constructing roads as well.
Duty of the rest would fall under categories 1, 2, 3, and 5 of paragraph 1 above.
With the information available it is NOT possible to answer all sub paras of the questionnaire in respect of all the posts. Certain conclusions can be drawn from observation at Lhasa, Gyantse and Chumbi Valley.
These are contained in the following general remarks:-

(ii) Sub para (b) (c) (f):
The basic weapons are rifles Sten TMG pistols revolvers and grenades. Their summer uniforms are of khaki cotton with soft peak cap. In winter cotton padded khaki coat and trousers. Those working in the fields or in colder regions are supplied with woolen trousers and fur lined coat. Officers wear woolen clothes in the winter. Turn-out is untidy as the clothes are seldom properly tailored or ironed.

(iii) Sub para (d) (e) (g) (h):
They are toughened up through a system of training peculiar to the Liberation Army. Apart from an hour of drill very early in the morning almost all are required to perform extensive agricultural work. Discipline is exemplary and is maintained very rigidly. Other exercises include range practice.
NO operational exercise has been reported as yet.

(iv) Sub para (i) (j) (l) (m): 
In the initial stage all rations were locally purchased such as barley flour, yaks and sheep the villagers were forced to supply these on payment.
Except for certain quantity of rice which is now transported from South China through India they still depend on local supplies. Procurement points have been established in certain areas in South Tibet and the supplies as also other equipment are moved by pack transport.
Troops are quartered in requisitioned/purchased houses in towns and among villages elsewhere immediately on arrival.
Construction of barracks and camps follow as soon as materials are available.
The chain of command is through Lhasa.
Communication is through a fairly well established wireless link.

(v) Sub para (n) (o): 
Some recruitment from the locals in Kham is reported. Three Regiments of the Tibetan Government Army are also under Command of the Chinese Army in Tibet although they are allowed to maintain their entity.
These and the local recruits are being trained in the use of normal arms. The relation between these locals and the Chinese troops is formal rather than cordial.

(vi) Sub para (r) (s) (t): 
The troops are told constantly that they are in Tibet to liberate their brethren and must be prepared to endure usual hardships for cause till regular supplies by the overland route is available. The mental state of the Chinese soldiers has to be understood in this context. Undoubtedly the average soldier feels the pinch of inadequate food, long separation from their families. A few had been seen weeping on quiet. Amenities are provided in the form of games and theatrical shows. The latter however reach the bigger establishments only.
Descriptions are few. So far only about a dozen reported.
The strict discipline and death penalty discourage desertion. Cases of execution were reported for loss of arms even.

(vii) Specific information regarding sub paras (a) (k) (p) and (q) in respect of all the posts mentioned in para 2 above are given below. Omission.
As regards 4 sub para (d) NO information available. Of the special weapons Bazooka has NOT been reported from anywhere while only one outpost according to an unconfirmed report has A.A. guns:-
 Shika. 1289500.

• Detachment of 50 at Drowa Gompa (971288)
• 100 at Pogchu (near Sama 970283)
• 400 at Menkong (983285)
• 200 at Nguchu (near the Indian border) detachments of unknown strength are also reported to be at Markham (98597)
• Dayul Gompa (993293)
• Sango Chyo (973293)
• Petu (983288)
• Sama(983288)
• Rima (971284)
• Sangu (2 miles North of Sama 970283)
• and Donge (1 mile East of Shika).

Local Headquarters is at Zayul.
(1) Special weapons - 3 inch mortars, M.M.G., L.M.G. and large quantity of ammunition.
Defensive trenches reported to be constructed at Shika.

(2) Details about Zayul and Pemako NOT available.

(3) Tsona
Troops- 3000 Detachment of 500 at Naysimbi (exact location NOT indicated in map but somewhere in 9228) 500 at Takpo (929289). Special weapons - L.M.G., 2 inch mortar. Mountain guns reported.

(4) Pome
Troops - 200. Local Headquarters at Kongbo. Special weapons - mountain guns.

(5) Tsari
Troops- 200. Local Headquarters at Kongbo.

(6) Kongbo
Troops - 200,

(7) Chumbi Valley
Headquarters at Galinkha 4 miles towards Phari from Yatung.
Troops at Galinkha and Chotenkarpo, about a mile South is 1000. Detachment of 100 at Chumbi South of Yatung,
900 at Rinchengang (889275), Geiling and Pema (nearby),
400 at Champithang (Indo Tibetan border).
Special weapons - mountain guns, L.M.G., M.M.G., 3 and 2 inch mortars, A.A. guns (at Galinkha - report unconfirmed),
Telephone line between Galinkha and Richengang erected.
Barracks under construction at Galinkha, Chotenkarpo, Chumbi.
Rinchengang and Champithang.
17 store - houses built at Chotenkarpo and 20 wooden sheds with tarpauline covers at Champithang.
Rations also stored at Rinchengang, Chema South of Chumbi, Chumbi and Galinkha.
A party of about 121 were reported to be constructing she is similar to those in Champithang near Langmarpo (Tibet - Bhutan border, 8 miles from Yatung). They were armed with bren and rifles.

(8) Phari
Troops - 800.
Important supply procurement point and station for facilitating troop movement. Local Headquarters at Gyantse. Special weapons - L.M.G. 2 and 3 inch mortars.
Trenches dug around the houses requisitioned.
A wireless station ha s been established at PANGDATSANG's house (Tibetan Trade Commission at Yatung).

(9) Gyantse
Troops including small supply of equipment

• Detachments at Tuna (893280)
• Dochen(993282)
• Kala (895284)
• Samada (896285)
• Khangma (898286) - 15 to 20 hundred. Special weapons- L.M.G. and light mortars.
• Wireless station at Phunkhang house with internal telephone. Barracks under construction.

(10) Penam
Troops – 500.
Local Headquarters - Gyantse.

(11) Shigatse
Troops about 3 to 4 thousand.
Special weapons - L.M.G., 3 inch mortars. Wireless station established. Accommodation in PANCHEN LAMA's summer residence.

(12) Lhasa

• Troops including Dechen (914299)
• Medu Gongkar about 30 miles N.E. of Dechen - 5 to 7 thousand. Special weapons - L.M.G., mountain guns, light mortars.
• Wireless station link with China at Mentopa house.
• 11 sets for internal communication, 2 working for 24 hours. Accommodation in about 10 houses purchased and in camps. Barracks under construction.
• Installations: A hydro-electric power station is to be installed soon. A number of pill boxes accommodating 8 sentries each erected in Lhasa town.

(13) Giamda
Troops - 350.
Road workers 5 to 10 thousand. Barrack construction.

(14) Lhariguo
Troops – 30.
Local Headquarters – Giamda.

(15) Nagchuka
Troops- permanently stationed - 200. A Commissariat office to arrange transport and supplies for troops moving from towards Lhasa reported. Supplies received from Jyekundo.

(16) Sok
Troops - 400,
Local Headquarters – Nagchuka.

(17) Pembago
Troops - 50.
Local Headquarters - Chamdo.

(18) Denchin
Troops – 400.
Local Headquarters- Chamdo.

(19) Shobando
Troops – 30.
Local Headquarters – Chamdo.

(20) Lho Dzong
Troops - 100.
Local Headquarters – Chamdo.

(21) Chamdo
Troops - 500
Wireless station established.

(22) Riwoche
Troops – 100.
Local Headquarters – Chamdo.

(23) Jyekundo
Troops - about 5000 including 1700 locals.

(24) Western Tibet
Information as to Western Tibet relatively scanty unfortunately. In 1950 the Chinese advanced towards Rudok and Taklakot with about 500 troops. The present strength could NOT have been increased beyond 2 to 3 thousand due to difficulty in obtaining supplies. They are reported to be at Rudok, Gyanima, Gargunsa (Gartok Headquarters), Taklakot, Khojernath, and Tashigong.
The latter 3 act as check posts. Caravans of dzos, yaks, camels carrying supplies from Lhasa via Shigatse reported. Some supplies are also obtained from Sinkiang. Special weapons - (noticed at Khojernath) L.M.G.
Wireless link with Lhasa.

3. Communications.
(a) The overland route to China from Lhasa via Chamdo and Kantse is under construction.
Motorable road up to Chamdo from Kantse has been completed.
At the time of writing reports indicate that it was extended 2 stages beyond Chamdo towards Lhasa. The Giamda - Lhasa road is also nearing completion. Other roads under construction are: Medu Gongkar - Lhasa road, Nathula - Gyantse via Phari and Yatung. Contemplated projects are: Giamda - Chamdo, Chamdo-Shika, Gyantse - Shigatse, Shigatse- Gartok, Rudok - Yarkand ( a start is reported to have been made), Nagchuka - Lhasa, and Shigatse - Shekar Dzong (871286).

(b) In Shika: Menkong - Rima track was widened. Shika - Somchu track improved for 2 way mule traffic. In Chumbi Valley: Champithang - Yatung track is kept in constant repair for mule traffic carrying rice from India. A cart road between Phema and Chotenkarpo constructed.

(c) In Chumbi Valley: Bridge on the river Amugam (Brahamaputra) under construction. The bridge near Yatung Bazar to be strengthened to take load of bullock carts. In Shika:

• Wodden bridge over Lohit river near Shika
• At Sapchu between Sama and Sangu and
• A number of wooden bridges between Rima and Sama capable of bearing load of pack mules constructed. Wooden bridges over 2 rivers near Nagchuka built.

4 and 5. Transport.
The normal transport are pack animals. The Chinese still depend on local transport supplied by the villagers without putting a great strain on the resources of the people.
Circumstances indicate the Chinese are forming pack transport units of their own. One such unit of 80 dzos (cross between yak and cow) was seen at Gyantse.
Camel caravans were reported between Lhasa and Chusul (40 miles South of Lhasa) and towards Shigatse.

Number of animals at the following posts are known to us:-

• Lhasa: 5 to 7 hundred mules and ponies, 500 camels.
• Chumbi Valley: 2 to 3 hundred mules believed to be loaned from the PANCHEN LAMA’S Estate for transport of rice.
• Phari: about 50 mules.
• Gyantse: 100 mules.
• Penam: 150 mules.
• Shigatse: at least 600 camels. The total strength of animals now with the Chinese is believed to be round about 5 to 6 thousand.
• 3 jeeps were reported to have been brought into Lhasa of which two are seen.

6. Airfields and landing grounds.
An airfield is reported near Chamdo. Two planes are said to be arriving daily from China. Air dropping near Giamda and Pembago reported. NO information is available about landing grounds or air strips in any other area. The proposed site for constructing a landing ground for Lhasa Area is said to be near Medu Gongkar.

7. Nothing to report.

8. Propaganda.
(a) Through lectures, theatrical shows, posters, leaflets.
(b) (i) The main object of the propaganda directed towards the troops is to build up their morale stress on the strength of new China and her powerful ally the U.S.S.R. and as such is quite effective.
(ii) The local people are still mentally hostile towards the Chinese. The Chinese propaganda, at times puerile, does NOT sink into the religious Tibetan minds. There had been instances of destruction of the posters an d leaflets displayed by the Chinese. But the Chinese believe in harping on whatever they have to say with the strongest of conviction. Future results unpredictable.

Deciphered 27/2/53

It's time to stand up to China over Ladakh

My artcile It's time to stand up to China over Ladakh appeared in Mail Today.

Here is the link...

Does Beijing still consider Ladakh a ‘disputed territory’. If not, why not open Demchok? Pictured: Chinese president Xi Jinping
 
As Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi arrives in Delhi for his second visit to India, it is interesting to recall one of the most unknown episodes of the history of modern India.
Let's recall the negotiations which, in 1953-54, preceded the signature on the “Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India”, known as the Panchsheel Agreement for its lofty preamble.

Negotiations
The negotiations ended with India giving away all its rights in Tibet (telegraph lines, post offices, dak bungalows, military escort in Gyantse and Yatung, etc), while getting no assurance on the border demarcation from the Chinese government.
The talks were held in Beijing among Zhang Hanfu, China’s Vice- Minister of Foreign Affairs, N. Raghavan, the Indian Ambassador to China, and TN Kaul, his Chargé d’Affaires.
It lasted from December 1953 till April 1954.
Why so long? One reason appears in a cable sent by Raghavan to Delhi in which he informs the Foreign Secretary that Zhang was “virulently objecting to inclusion of Tashigong in Agreement.”
For centuries, the trade and pilgrimage route for the Kailash-Manasarovar region (and then onward to Lhasa) followed the course of the Indus, passed Demchok, the last Ladakhi village, and then crossed the border to reach the first Tibetan hamlet, Tashigong, some 15 miles inside Tibet.
Not only did Zhang refuse to mention Demchok in the agreement, but also bargained for nearly five months to not cite Tashigong.
Retrospectively, one can find two main reasons for the Chinese dragging their feet.
One was the proximity of the National Highway 219, later known as the ‘Aksai Chin Road’, cutting across the Indian territory in northern Ladakh. Though China had started constructing the highway, Delhi was to discover its existence only four years later.
In 1954, Indian border forces visiting Demchok could have noticed what was clandestinely being built; though the road was not within firing range for the Indian artillery, Beijing did not want to take a risk.
It did not occur to the Indian negotiators that something momentous was happening on the other side of the range.
The second reason is also grave and presently very relevant. After months of infructuous exchanges, Zhang Hanfu conceded that “traders customarily using this route might continue such use but an oral understanding to that effect between two delegations would suffice, (China) would not like in writing, even by implication, to have any reference to Ladakh.”
But why to not name this ancient route in the agreement, as it was done for the passes elsewhere? The answer is that China considered Ladakh a ‘disputed area’.
Kaul told Delhi: “We have taken (the) position that Ladakh is Indian territory and route should be mentioned as its omission would be invidious.”
But China did not accept the Indian contention and “after considerable argument (Zhang) agreed, but subsequently withdrew (his agreement). (He) suggests we would consider exchange of letters which will not form part of Agreement...”
Bargaining continued. India had finally to concur to the Chinese formulation. Demchok was mentioned nowhere, but article IV of the agreement says: “Traders and pilgrims of both countries may travel by the following passes and route: (1) Shipki La pass, (2) Mana pass, (3) Niti pass, (4) Kungri Bingri pass, (5) Darma pass, and (6) Lipu Lekh pass. … Also, the customary route leading to Tashigong along the valley of the Indus river may continue to be traversed in accordance with custom.”

History
You may think that it is past history, but it is not. China today continues to adamantly refuse to reopen the Demchok-Tashigong route to the abode of Lord Shiva, while insisting on a long and tortuous route via Nathu-la in Sikkim.
External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj should definitely raise this question with her Chinese counterpart when they meet.
The people of Ladakh have for years asked for the reopening of the ancient route.
Why is Beijing so reluctant to let people and goods flow again over the Himalaya?
Why can’t China allow the devotees wanting to visit Kailash-Manasarovar to use the easiest route, i.e. via Demchok?

Smuggling
It is not that there are no ‘exchanges’ along the Line of Actual Control.
Not far from Demchok, a place called Dumchule witnesses a good deal of smuggling happening between Tibet and Ladakh.
Local herders visit a Tibetan mart on the other side of the range, bringing back Chinese goods to Ladakh. If while visiting the bazaar in Leh, you wonder how there are so many Chinese bowls or other cheap stuff, the answer is Dumchule.
But the situation is not healthy; apart from the fact that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) can gather intelligence on what is happening on the Indian side, (that is why they close their eyes on the traffic) and worse, Indian pilgrims are not allowed to cross into Tibet and proceed to Mt Kailash.
To officially reopen the Demchok-Tashigong road would be the best confidence building measure (CBM) between India and China.
After all under its One Belt, One Road scheme, China constantly speaks of opening new routes or corridors.
Does Beijing restrict these projects to its ‘friends’ only (i.e. Pakistan and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor or Nepal in Zham and Kyirong)?
Let us hope that Wang will understand that it is in China’s interests to regularise the situation in Ladakh.
He should also clearly spell out China’s position: does Beijing still consider Ladakh a ‘disputed territory’.
If not, why not open Demchok?

How the Chinese fooled Nehru in Tibet

General Zhang Jingwu near Lhasa (August 1951)

While the Indian archives are still jealously kept by the Ministry of External Affairs (and other Indian ministries), the Chinese are slowly (and selectively) declassifying their archives.
A cable from General Zhang Jingwu, 'On Issues of Relations between China and India in Tibet' dating October 21, 1953, is one example.
A translation was recently released by Digital Archive of the Wilson Centre (International History Declassified). It belongs to the History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China.
Zhang Jingwu was one of the signatories of the infamous Seventeen-Point Agreement between the People's Republic of China and a Tibetan delegation (the so-called local government of Tibet).
Later, General Zhang became the representative in Tibet of the Central Committee of the Community Party of China; in July 1951, Zhang went to Yatung (via Hong Kong) to persuade the Fourteenth Dalai Lama to return to Lhasa. During the following years, he acted as Beijing’s representative in Tibet and was designated as Secretary of the Tibet Work Committee.
A few words about the background of General Zhang’s cable to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing: Nehru wanted to re-negotiate the Simla Convention (of 1914) with China, taking into accounts the new situation: Tibet was an independent nation anymore after the PLA invaded the Roof of the World in October 1950
In September 1952, before his transfer to Cairo, K.M. Panikkar, who had been ‘ambassador in Two Chinas’, had several meetings with Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier. The latter told the gullible Indian ambassador that the downgrading of the Lhasa Mission was only the first step to pave the way for negotiations on ‘all outstanding problems’. The conversion of the Indian Mission into a Consulate General in Lhasa was a tragedy in itself; unfortunately Nehru had readily agreed to the Chinese ‘proposal’.
I quote here from my book: Born in Sin, the Panchsheel Agreement.

During the first months of 1953, Nehru may have felt that the situation was settling down in Tibet and slowly the Tibetans were accepting the invasion of their country by the Liberation Army as a fait accompli.
In September 1953, Nehru wrote to his Chinese counterpart that India was anxious to come to a final settlement about “pending matters so as to avoid any misunderstanding and friction at any time”. Quoting a letter sent one year earlier, he said that “No further steps have been taken since then to negotiate a settlement”.
It appears that different visitors and informants were briefing Nehru about the situation inside Tibet. It was reported that everything was quiet on the Roof of the World. In early December 1953, Nehru mentions that, he had received a letter from George Roerich, the Russian painter and scholar living in Kulu giving him more information. After admitting that “our Intelligence has looked upon them [the Roerich] with some slight suspicion although they have never had anything to get hold of,” Nehru told T.N. Kaul, the Joint Secretary in the China Desk in the Ministry of External Affairs: “His [Roerich] general report to me has been that things are very calm in Tibet and both the people and the Lama hierarchy have adjusted themselves to the new order. This is chiefly so because the Chinese have refrained from interfering in anything. The Tibetans are, therefore, not so apprehensive as they used to be.”
As we have seen in the case of food supply to the Chinese troops and the sacking of the Tibetan Prime Ministers, the report was not completely true. The Chinese had begun interfering actively in the life of the Tibetans. In fact, they started meddling in the internal affairs of Tibet almost immediately after the signature of the 17-Point Agreement.
Nehru considered that the time had come to renegotiate the old Simla Convention signed in 1914 between the British and the Tibetans. He therefore decided to take the initiative and propose negotiations to resolve ‘all outstanding issues’. The talks were to begin in December 1953 in Beijing and were scheduled to last a maximum of six weeks. Unfortunately, they would take four months to reach a conclusion. Kaul, one of the main negotiators in Beijing described the preparations for the Conference thus: “Many meetings and discussions were held and it was decided to sound the Chinese. Not unexpectedly they welcomed the idea. It was decided to send a small delegation to Peking to discuss the matter and reach an agreement, if possible. The spade work had already been done by Panikkar, [N.] Raghavan and me in Peking. The new Indian Ambassador to China, N. Raghavan, was appointed the leader and I the deputy-leader of the Indian delegation. Director, Historical Division, External Affairs Ministry, the late Dr. Gopalachari, was a member. His knowledge of history and facts of the Sino-Indian border was an asset. We were authorised to co-opt such other members of the Embassy as we found necessary. It was a small delegation, as delegations go, but convenient and closely knit.”
Most of the correspondence or instructions during the following months was routed through Kaul, one of Nehru’s Kashmiri blue-eyed boys.

The Instructions
In early December, the Secretary General put up a Note in which he defined the main points for discussions at what became known as the Beijing Conference. The points were:

1. The question of India’s frontier with Tibet,
2. Indo-Tibetan trade and trade agencies,
3. Freedom of movement of Indian and Tibetan traders and pilgrims,
4. Passports and visas,
5. Telegraph, post office and hospitals
6. Security guards and escorts and
7. Special position of Bhutan.

On 3 December 1953, Nehru replied to this Note giving the framework for negotiations to be held in Beijing regarding the relations between India and China and India’s interests in Tibet. He clarified the position to be adopted by the Indian delegation during the Beijing Conference. More particularly on the border question, though he generally agreed with the points made by the Secretary General, he chose to remain faithful to the Panikkar doctrine, which says ‘remain silent about the border’. Nehru wrote: “We should not raise this question. If the Chinese raise it, we should express our surprise and point out that this is a settled issue. Further, during the last two years or so, when reference was frequently made about Indo-Chinese or Indo-Tibetan problems, there has never been any reference to this frontier issue and it is surprising that this should be brought up now. Our delegation cannot discuss it.”
Though Panikkar had been transferred more than a year earlier to Cairo, Nehru was still keen to consult him on China’s affairs. The former Ambassador had suggested a step further, he had written: “if China insisted on reopening the whole issues of the frontier, the Indian delegation could walk out of the conference and break off the negotiations.” Nehru was not as extreme as Panikkar, he did not recommend walking out of the Conference, his instructions were: “We should avoid walking out unless the Chinese insist on taking up this question. If such an eventuality occurs, the matter will no doubt be referred to us.”
To agree to discuss the border issue was for Panikkar an admission that there was a problem. But can wishful thinking take away an issue?
Nehru also believed that it was important to keep the trade marts alive as he envisioned an increase in the commercial exchanges with Tibet in the future. He wrote: “Tibet is our natural market and we should develop it normally.” He was in favour of keeping the trade agencies functional: “Gartok is important. Yatung especially, and, to some extent, Gyantse are likely to become more important as trade between India and Tibet increases. They are on the main route. Therefore, it is eminently reasonable that we should have some trade agents there or at least at Yatung.”

In October 1953, General Zhang sent his perceptions on these questions to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing. At that time, China was getting ready to seat for new negotiations with India.

Some points have to be noted:
•    In 1953, China still needs India, not only ‘for some international’ issues, but to supply the PLA in Tibet [see my post on the supply of Indian rice to the PLA]. It is only a year later that the Qinghai-Tibet and the Sichuan-Tibet roads will be opened rendering the PLA in Tibet non-dependent on the trade with India.
•    General Zhang speaks of China’s “insufficient understanding of imperialist privileges in Tibet”, but during the following months and years, Beijing will learn very fast; at the same time, India will be fooled in abandoning all its ‘privileges’ accrued from the Simla Convention. This is a great tragedy.
•    Zhang understood that the time was ripe to make China’s occupation ‘official’: “delaying the settlement of these issues is not good”. Beijing need to officialize its presence on the Roof of the World through a Treaty/Agreement. A few months later, the Panchsheel Agreement would be sign.
•    Zhang then brings Tawang “which is Indian according to the 1914 Simla Accord”. He says that if Beijing agrees to “the absence of territorial disputes”, China would “implicitly acknowledge and legitimize India’s occupation.” It is a fact that earlier, China has never complained about the Indian administration of Tawang and Kameng Frontier Division. It is probably in 1953 only that Beijing realized the Indian move by Major Bob Khathing and his men.
•    Zhang mentions that in July 1948 (in fact it was in July 1947] India notified the Tibetan government “that it would succeed the privileges of Britain in Tibet”. According to Zhang: “Tibet replied in October [1948] that signing a new treaty was acceptable but India must first return the lands occupied by Britain, e.g. Tawang, Bhutan, and Sikkim.” This obnoxious ‘offer’ is unfortunately true. In fact, Lhasa added Ladakh to the list. The Tibetans were living in another world.
•    Zhang states that “according to the discussions with Ngapoi [Ngapo Ngawang Jigme] and Liushar, such treaties were secretly signed and the Kashag, the Tibetan Cabinet did not know about the maps, when Tibet was forced to sign them”. This is obviously not correct because Lochen Shatra, the Tibetan Plenipotentiary in Simla, had informed Sir Henry McMahon that he had received his instructions from Lhasa to sign the maps. It is however possible that the Kashag in the 1940s was unaware of the details of the Simla Agreement, particularly the pilgrimage area south of the Line. I had dealt with this in detail in my book, 1962, the McMahon Line Saga.
•    Zhang makes 3 propositions to settle the border: abolish the Simla Accord, India’s withdrawal from Tawang and Lower Luoyu [Loyul, i.e. Siang Frontier Division] and China and India must discuss the dividing lines between both countries. Zhang concludes “It is in our interest to delay the settlement of these issues.”
•    Zhang admits that discussions have been held with Ngabo and Liushar, with both expressing their agreement. There is no doubt that, as the Chinese established their presence in Tibet, several Tibetan officials were on the Chinese side against India …and against Tibet. But this is another story.
•    Zhang’s suggestions are that India should drop all its so-called privileges in Tibet and in counterpart China should gain new privileges in India. It is what Nehru agreed to during the following months. It is called ‘negotiations with Chinese characteristics’, 'you lose everything and China wins everything'.

 

The Dalai Lama with General Zhang Jingwu in the 1950s

Here is General Zhang Jingwu’s cable dated October 21, 1953.

To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
Your correspondence dated 7 October [1953] and the two types of Indian documents have been received. Research shows that the assumption that “India intends to capitalize this opportunity to have some benefit in Tibet,” as mentioned in your correspondence, is very accurate. Based on the information that we have at hand about Tibet, we still need Indian cooperation in some international issues. However, India is capitalizing on our temporary difficulties in Tibet, particularly our insufficient understanding of imperialist privileges in Tibet and the ideal solution to border disputes, as well as our need for India’s cooperation in various areas, to gain benefits by offering a general solution to the Tibet issue.
As a matter of fact, there have always been disputes on some issues, e.g. commercial exchanges and representative offices, because we have always claimed our sovereignty over Tibet. Delaying the settlement of these issues is not good and therefore a solution to them is applauded. If such disputes continue to occur in the years to come, our relations with India may be aggravated with the instigations of some bad-willed nations. Therefore, it is correct to engage in negotiations with India as mentioned in your correspondence.
According to the Indian documents, they emphasize that “India and China have no territorial disputes” (Nehru, the Indian politician, also stated so during his speech in the Upper House of the Parliament). This is where the plot of India lies. Today, India occupies the Dawang [Tawang] Region according to the 1914 Simla Accord. However, it claimed the absence of territorial disputes just to force us into implicitly acknowledging and legitimizing their occupation. We must stay alert in this regard.
According to the information at hand and the results of negotiations with Ngapoi [Ngawang Jigme] and [Thupten Tharpa] Liushar, they reiterated that there were no public or secret treaties with foreign countries except for the Simla Accord. We assumed the Dalai [Lama] might have purchased arms from Britain and India but it is hard to make sure if they have signed any formal treaty. After its independence, India notified Tibet in July 1948 that it would succeed the privileges of Britain in Tibet. Tibet replied in October that signing a new treaty was acceptable but India must first return the lands occupied by Britain, e.g. Tawang, Bhutan, and Sikkim. In December, India replied and asked Tibet to promise to maintain the status quo then regarding India-Tibet relations before a new treaty was established (i.e. the old treaties should remain effective). Otherwise, trade between Tibet and India would be out of the question (the document has been delivered to me). This is the base of Tibet-India relations.
Other than some conventional practices, the so-called ‘status quo’ is based on the Simla Accord among Britain, India, and China, the Tibet-Britain commercial treaties, and the Tibet-Britain declaration and attached maps (these documents have been delivered to me. Please refer to the correspondences dated 16 September for details). The accord includes eleven articles. It recognizes the effectiveness of the treaties established on 1809 [probably meaning 1890], 1904, and 1906 and repeals the two commercial treaties signed in 1893 and 1908. According to the discussions with Ngapoi and Liushar, such treaties were secretly signed and Xiazha (the signatory [the Kashag, the Tibetan Cabinet] did not know about the maps) when Tibet was forced to sign them. It is also said that “such treaties shall be abolished if India recognizes that Tibet is part of China.” The so-called McMahon Line was established in the Simla Accord. However, Tibet later found that two holy mountains were located in the Indian territory land and raised its demurral. Britain then agreed to shift the line southward and have Sera [Sela?] as the border (some of the documents have been delivered to me). However, this line is already over Sera [Sela?] and reaches Tawang now.
According to the foregoing information, one of the main Tibet issues facing India involves these treaties and the bilateral borders, i.e. the Simla Accord and the so-called McMahon Line. We are of the opinion that:

1. We must declare abolishment of the old accord, i.e. the Simla Accord, which was not recognized by the former Chinese Government;
2. India must withdraw from Chinese Tawang and Lower Luoyu [Loyul] which it currently occupies;
3. China and India may discuss the dividing lines between both countries. It is impossible to fundamentally settle the issues regarding the accord and the border. It is in our interest to delay the settlement of these issues. However, we have to make further declarations. Otherwise, we would be deemed to have implicitly acknowledged the status quo and hence be put in a rather disadvantaged position.

Other than the issues of the accord and the border, we should negotiate with India to settle other issues as mentioned in the correspondences, e.g. trade, troops, pilgrimage (border entry and exit), and commercial representative facilities. These issues can and must be settled. According to the correspondences received from India last February, the two types of documents received recently, and the Indian propaganda in the newspapers, India intends to capitalize on the current situation to gain certain benefits, e.g. legitimization of three representative offices in Gyantse, free entry for pilgrimage, expansion of trade territories, withdrawal of Indian troops, and other issues. In addition to the proposals made on 24 March 1952, we have also come up with the following supplementary solutions according to the present conditions:

1. Indian troops and officials should be withdrawn.
2. Postal facilities shall be taken back. The local postal administration of the Tibetan Government has reached Pali [Phari Dzong]. With our assistance, the postal services will not be a problem even after the Indian postal facilities are withdrawn.
3. Indian radio facilities shall also be withdrawn or transferred to us (at a reasonable price). Cabled facilities shall be transferred to us at a reasonable price. We have established our telecommunication facilities at Yadong [Yatung] , Gyantse, and Lhasa and international telecommunication services may also be established there. The telephones may be withdrawn by India or transferred to us.
4. All posthouses [Dak Bungalows] relating to posts and telecommunications shall be withdrawn.
5. The Xiasima [?] administration shall also be withdrawn.
6. Commerce in Gartok [Western Tibet] cannot be stopped right now and shall be continued. The Indian commercial representative may acknowledge the conventional practice, i.e. conducting trade where designated during a certain period in the year. However, we must dispatch our commercial representative to Simla or Kalimpong in exchange.
7. As a consulate general already exists in Lhasa, the Indian commercial representatives in Yadong and Gyantse shall be cancelled. If India still asks to maintain them, they may be converted into consulates although only Yadong may be allowed to accommodate them and we must have a consulate or formal commercial representative in Kalimpong in exchange. We believe having one representative facility in Kalimpong is to our benefit.
8. Regarding the radio stations that the Consulate General of India has in Lhasa and the possible establishment of radio stations by India’s representative facilities at Yadong and Gartok in the future, we believe that our representative facilities in India must also set up radio stations in exchange. Otherwise, neither side shall set up radio facilities. We have a telecommunication bureau (Ngari Prefecture Government has dispatched personnel to the radio station) and we can send the telegraphs.
9. Trade locations: trade shall be conducted at Gartok and Puguanzong [Purang Dzong] in Ngari Prefecture and in Yadong, Gyantse, or Lhasa. India proposes Kalimpong, Calcutta, Simla, Gandu [Gangtok?], or Siliguri as its trading places.
10. Regarding frontier entry and exit for trading purposes, we are of the opinion that free entry and exit may be allowed on a mutually beneficial basis, without the need for any passport or visa. However, both countries shall issue a license to their respective merchants as evidence. When it becomes mature one or two years later, relevant rules on entry and exit visas may be established.
11. Taxation issue: we recommend following conventional practices one to two years before the Customs is established, i.e. no import and export taxes shall be levied.
12. Locations shall be designated for pilgrimage purpose: we designate Mt. Kailas and Lake Manasarovar in Ngari and India designates Lumbini (where Sakyamuni died) and Varanasi (where Sakyamuni recited sermons for the first time) for pilgrimage purposes. Both countries may further designate the routes of pilgrimage.
13. It is recommended that both countries establish relevant articles or agreements to replace historical treaties and accords regarding the foregoing issues.

Discussions have been held with Ngapoi and Liushar on the foregoing issues and they both expressed their agreement. In addition, the Foreign Office has collected some materials on Tibet’s foreign relations, imperialist privileges in Tibet, and India’s conditions in Yadong and Gyantse. The Tibetan government has submitted the Simla Accord and other documents as reference materials in the negotiations. We recommend that Yang Gongsu [head of the Foreign Bureau in Lhasa] should take various types of materials and accords to Beijing for negotiations. After any new agreement is reached, he can also return to Tibet and make preparations according to the spirit and provisions of the agreement. It is expected to benefit the foreign affairs work of Tibet.
Please consider the abovementioned proposals and provide your feedback as soon as possible.
[General] Zhang Jingwu
21 October 1953

Friends like in 1954?

On November 14, 1954, Nehru wrote a note entitled 'Implications of China Visit'; it was an internal note for the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA).
The Indian Prime Minister describes in detail his visit to Beijing (in October 1954):

During my visit to China, I had a number of talks with the Chinese leaders. I had long talks with Premier Chou En-lai separately. I also had joint talks with Chairman Mao Tse-tung and his principal colleagues, viz., Vice Chairman Chu Teh, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Peoples' Congress, Liu Shaochi, Premier Chou En-lai, Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee, Sung Ching-ling (Madame Sun Yat-sen), Vice Premier Chen Yen and the Chinese Ambassador in India. On our side in these joint talks, we had our Secretary General, N.R. Pillai, and our Ambassador in Peking, N. Raghavan. We both had interpreters with us.

Of current interest are Nehru's remarks about the maps of China published by Beijing showing several parts of India's territory as belonging to China. Nehru writes:

…I referred to Chinese maps which still showed portions of Burma and even of India as if they were within Chinese territory. So far as India was concerned, I added, we were not much concerned about this matter because our boundaries were quite clear and were not a matter for argument. But many people took advantage of these old maps and argued that China had an aggressive intent, or else why continue to use these maps. In Burma also this caused apprehension.
Premier Chou [Zhou Enlai] replied that these maps were old ones and China had not done any surveying to draw new maps. Their boundaries even with Mongolia and the Soviet Union were still not clearly demarcated and there were discrepancies. I [Nehru] pointed out that this might be so. So far as India was concerned, I repeated, there was no doubt about our boundaries and I was not worried about them. But I wondered how China would feel if a part of Tibet had been shown as part of India in our maps.

Last week, this came back to my mind when Beijing published its first official vertical national map incorporating the vast areas of South China Sea.
The South China Morning Post (SMCP) commented that the new map gave "equal weight given to both land and sea, in [Beijing's] latest move emphasising its claims of sovereignty over the disputed waters."
Earlier maps showed the islands in the South China Sea on a smaller scale, in a separate box-out in a bottom corner of the map.
For a few days, most commentators concentrated on the South China Sea due to the prominence given to the South China Sea on the new map, but on Saturday, the Indian MEA finally reacted.

In red, areas claimed by China in the Central Sector

Why? Because they discovered that the new Chinese map shows Arunachal Pradesh as part of China.
The Indian press commented: "The MEA dismissed the new map issued by Chinese authorities this week by saying cartographic depiction did not change the reality that Arunachal was part of India."
The MEA spokesman said: "The fact that Arunachal Pradesh in integral and inalienable part of India has been conveyed to Chinese authority at several occasions including at the very highest level."
What is most shocking is the fact that the spokesperson forgot to mention the Central Sector (Uttarakhand and Himachal) were large chunks of Indian territory (such as Barahoti and Nilang) appear on the Chinese map and not a word for the Aksai Chin and areas around the Panggong tso in Ladakh too.
The MEA has nothing to say about these vast areas of the Indian territory?
Amazing and sad!
Let us not forget that China’s Survey and Mapping Administration has approved the map published by Hunan Map Press, which in its announcement said the map was of 'great significance in safeguarding the nation’s water sovereignty and territorial integrity'.

Click to enlarge

Here is a Chinese map of Ngari region (Central Sector).
Why is Delhi so quiet?
We will probably be told "Don't worry, China and India are friends". Like in 1954?

Sixty 60 years ago too, Beijing had 'no problem' with India. China's problem was with American Imperialism, so it liked to say.
While President Xi Jinping vowed that no violations of territorial integrity will be tolerated, he added that no nation (read the US) should be allowed to monopolise global affairs.
Xi was speaking on the occasion of  the 'celebrations' of the infamous Panchsheel. Xi however made it clear: "Sovereignty is the reliable safeguard and fundamental element of national interest. Sovereignty and territorial integrity should not be infringed upon. This is the hard principle that should not be cast aside at any time".
And then, he started indirectly bashing the United States: "All nations should be given equal footing in the global security framework, and share equal rights."
Su Hao, a professor with China Foreign Affairs University told SCMP: "The message is that China is not the source of the problem, and it is some external force violating principles of international relations and making chaos in the region."
One more 'detail', but which is vital for India, on the new Chinese map, the size of the Chumbi Valley located between Sikkim and Bhutan, seems really bloated to me.
Does China plans to grab more territory from Bhutan?

Enlargement of the new Chinese map

China takes India for a ride, not pilgrimage

The Panchsheel Agreement of 1954 between India and China was supposed to be the bedrock of an ‘eternal’ friendship between the two nations; the accord guaranteed that the nations would mutually respect each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; that they would not aggress each other or interfere in each other's internal affairs. It also spoke of equality and mutual benefit in bilateral relations and peaceful co-existence. Nice words.
The Agreement lapsed in April 1962 and 6 months later, India and China fought a bitter war over Tibet, which was the main object of the Agreement (‘On Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India’).
The unique objective of the agreement was to regulate trade and pilgrimage from India to Tibet and verse-versa.
Article III says: “The High Contracting Patties agree that pilgrimage by religious believers of the two countries shall be carried on ‘in accordance with custom’:
(1) Pilgrims from India of Lamaist, Hindu and Buddhists faiths may visit Kang Rinpoche [Mt. Kailash] and [Lake] Manasarovar in Tibet Region of China
(2) Pilgrims from Tibet Region of China of Lamaist and Buddhist faiths may visit Banaras, Sarnath, Gaya and Sanchi in India.
(3) Pilgrims customarily visiting Lhasa may continue to do so
The Agreement further specifies some points of entry into Tibet: “Traders and pilgrims of both countries may travel by the following passes and route: Shipki-la pass, Mana pass, Niti pass, Kungri Bingri pass, Darma pass, and Lipulekh pass. Apart from the first one located in Himachal Pradesh, the others passes lie in today’s Uttarakhand.
Even more interesting, Article IV mentions: “Also, the customary route leading to Tashigong along the valley of the Indus River may continue to be traversed in accordance with custom.”
This is the customary Ladakh road via Demchok, which was for centuries used by the India pilgrims to visit Western Tibet and the Kailash area.
It is today closed, and Beijing adamantly refuses to reopen it.
Sixty years ago, it was also agreed that “diplomatic personnel, officials and nationals of the two countries shall hold passports issued by their own respective countries and visaed by the other party”.
It means that for an Indian pilgrim to go on the Kailash-Manasarovar yatra, he just needed a valid passport and a visa from China.
At the same time, “inhabitants of the border districts of the two countries who cross the border to carry on petty trade or to visit friends and relatives may proceed to the border districts of the other party as they have customarily done heretofore and need not be restricted to the passes and route specified [mentioned] above and shall not be required to hold passports, visas or permits.”
It is how the relations between the Himalayan region and Tibet had worked for centuries; that was great. India and Tibet were neighbours and friends. However after the Chinese invasion in 1950, the number of passes started to shrink.
Today the situation has drastically changed for the worse, though diplomats of both China and India still profess to be friends.
On February 12, 2014, a communique of the Press Information Bureau (PIB) reported that the issue was mentioned in the Parliament.
Preneet Kaur, the Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs announced in the Lok Sabha that her Ministry had fixed the dates and modalities of the Kailash Manasarovar Yatra-2014. It will be organized from 8 June to 9 September. Some 18 batches, each with a maximum of 60 Yatris, will leave for the Holy Mountain. The last date to file an online application is 5 March 2014 and the deadline to submit an application is 10 March 2014.
What is shocking is the ridiculously small number of ‘yatris’ allowed to cross over to Tibet (through one of the most treacherous routes, the Lipulekh pass, near the trijunction between India, Tibet and Nepal).
PTI gives the details of the Kailash Manasarovar yatra organized by the Ministry of External Affairs over the last 3 years. In 2011, 761 yatris travelled to Tibet in 16 batches; in 2012, 774 in 16 batches and last year only 53 in 1 batch (the pilgrimage had to be cancelled due to bad weather).
The fact that this difficult route has been selected shows that China is not interested to let Hindu pilgrims visit the abode of Lord Shiva. It is not the case for Chinese pilgrims.
Xinhua recently published a piece on the holy mountain, which explains: “There is an old Tibetan saying that Buddhists should take a ritual walk around lake in the year of goat, while around mountain in the year of horse. According to legend, Sakyamuni was born in the Year of Horse, therefore, taking one round of ritual walk around the mountain in the horse year is equivalent to 13 rounds, which is highly efficacious and meritorious.”
2014 is a horse year. Xinhua promotes the ritual walks around the Mt. Kang Rinpoche, (the Tibetan name of the Kailash) “as one of the holy mountains in Ngari Prefecture of Tibet”.
The mouthpiece of the Communist Party tells its readers: “It is firmly believed as the center of the whole world by Hinduism, Tibetan Buddhism, native Bonism and ancient Jainism. Every year, believers from India, Nepal and other countries travel thousands of miles to Ngari for praying in the Mt. Kang Rinpoche.”
You may not believe it, but the Communist newspaper further ads: “the 2014 Horse Year will be a grand festival for the Buddhist, whose long-cherished wish of the whole life is nothing but a pilgrimage to the Mt. Kang Rinpoche. They believe that one circle around the mountain could wash away all the sins of the life, ten circles will save themselves from the pain of hell, while one hundred circles will make them go to heaven and become Buddha.”
The Chinese yatris will get a bonus: the local authorities will provide them ‘religious knowledge about ritual walk around mountain’ and the Tibet Biodiversity Image Survey Tibet (TBIS), some information on the biological diversity of the area.
While the Chinese pilgrims will enjoy the Chinese-built infrastructure on the Tibetan plateau, the Indian yatris will slog along on the perilous Lipulekh route. Mrs. Kaur stated in the Lok Sabha: “the main route of the yatra on the Indian side was badly affected last year, which forced the Yatra-2013 to be cancelled after the first batch.”
What is worse is that the Chinese government does not want to provide any alternate route. Mrs. Kaur admitted: “The Government of India has been discussing with the Government of China the issue of opening additional routes to Kailash-Manasarovar. The Chinese side has been citing difficulty in opening alternate routes on the ground that it would involve travel over longer distances on their side through difficult terrain, with poor road conditions and lack of proper infrastructure for accommodation and communication.”
Why is Beijing refusing to open the Demchok road in Ladakh or the Nathu-la in Sikkim? Has Delhi strongly taken up the issue with Beijing?
Xinhua reported that during the 17th meeting of Special Representatives on the border issue, National Security Advisor Shivsharkar Menon and his Chinese counterpart State Councilor Yang Jiechi “had in-depth exchanges of views on the China-India border problem, bilateral relations and international and regional issues of mutual interest”.
Xinhua asserted that “China and India have agreed to make common efforts to seek an early achievement of a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable framework for solving the border problem.”
What about the facilities for pilgrims which existed 60 years ago?
Though Xinhua stated that the two countries will join hands to ensure a successful ‘China India Year of Friendly Exchanges’ to promote friendship between the people of the two countries, this does not translate into any concrete improvements for the Indian yatris.
So why pretend that China and India are strategic cooperative partners and “the strengthening of bilateral relations to promote common development conforms to the common interests of the two countries and their people.” It is just empty words.
Common men in India would like to circumambulate Mt. Kailash and take a holy dip in the Manasarovar and Beijing today does not allow them to do so.