US and the Cartography of Ladakh

The Indian Government has asked US social media giant Twitter to explain within five working days why it showed Leh as part of Jammu and Kashmir instead of a separate Union Territory.
In case Twitter’s answer is not ‘satisfactory’, the government will proceed further: “we can block access to Twitter under the Information Technology Act, and a police case can be filed with up to six-month imprisonment,” said a government source.
In a notice to the micro-blogging platform owned by Jack Dorsey, the government said that they viewed the matter as “a deliberate attempt by Twitter to undermine the will of sovereign Parliament of India”, which had declared Ladakh as a Union Territory of India with its headquarters in Leh.
A Twitter spokesperson was vague, "Twitter remains committed to partnering with government of India and Ministry of Electronics and IT to serve the public conversation. Duly responded to the letter and as part of our correspondence, shared a comprehensive update with latest developments regarding geo-tag issue."
Earlier, Twitter had also shown Leh as part of China, after which the secretary of the Electronics and Information Technology Ministry had written to Jack Dorsey. In response, Twitter had made changes though it has not yet corrected the map to show Leh under the Union Territory of Ladakh; Leh still appears as part of Jammu and Kashmir.
For unknown reasons, the government has remained silent on Google maps showing Arunachal Pradesh as part of Shannan Prefecture of the Tibet Autonomous Region.
Why was no action taken?
Both the US firms should be punished according to the laws, if they refused to show properly the Indian territory.

Projection of the International Map of the World (1950)

It is not new, the United States have  published maps wrongly depicting the borders of India in the past.
For example, a "Projection of the International Map of the World" in 1950 shows Demchok in Ladakh as Tibetan territory and not Ladakhi.
Another map of "Tactical Pilotage Chart" published by the Director, Defence Mapping Agency in the US (Fairfax, Virginia) in 1995, also shows the entire Ladakh range (and Demchok) in Tibet.

 

 

 

 

 

Tactical Pilotage Chart (1995)

At the same time, maps of Tibet published by historian Tseton Shakabpa and former British diplomat HE Richardson show correctly the Kailash range south of Fukshe, being the frontier between India and Tibet (and not the Ladakh range).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Hugh Richardson's map (1962) showing correctly the Kailash range

It is particularly important at a time rumours are floating around that the government is ready to compromise and vacate the heights on the Kailash Range, South of the Pangong lake.
The 1960 Chinese claim line (some authors call it 1959 Line), does not follow any geographic or historical (customary or administrative) principles. It suddenly cut across from the Kailash to the Ladakh range without any basis (perhaps because the Chinese had never visited the area before 1962).

Tsepon Shakabpa map (1962) showing correctly the Kailash range

It is obviously regrettable that the US have mapped the area without any knowledge of the historical background or even consulting the Government of India.
Unless the Indian Government strictly deals with Twitter and Google, the farce will continue.

Chinese 1960 claim crosses from the Kailash to the Ladakh without any historical reason

Incidentally, there was no dispute between Ladakh (J&K) and Tibet in this area.
Richardson in his Précis mentioned the only disputed place which is Drokpo Karpo, north of Pangong tso.

The diplomat-historian wrote:

The Boundary
The area under dispute [Drokpo Karpo] is high, uninhabited, grazing land. It appears that the boundary, as in most grazing countries, had never been fixed. The claims of both sides, which neither would relax, are shown on the accompanying sketch map. No decision was possible. The Government of India did not think that the Kashmir Durbar's claim was likely to succeed, and suggested a graceful concession, but the Durbar declined.
In 1929, the government of India decided that the matter, which was of no real practical importance should be allowed to drop, and this hope has so far been fulfilled, although the Tibetan Government did touch on the question in 1937.

The issue was not solved at the time of Independence.
Anyhow, the Kailash range was clearly the border between Ladakh and Tibet in the South and Demchok was the last Ladakhi village, while Tashigang was the first Tibetan one.

The only disputed place between Ladakh and Tibet (Drokpo Karpo)

According to Google "Bumla, Cona [Tsona], Shannan, Arunachal Pradesh"

Tsona (Cona) is a county of Shannan City/Prefecture of the Tibet Autonomous Region

Constantly Changing Posts

This map appeared in a booklet entitled "Chinese Aggression in Maps", published in 1963 by the Publication Division of the Government of India. 

It shows China's moving claims in the Western Sector of the Sino-India boundary (formerly, the Eastern Turkestan-India frontier).
A quick look at the correspondence between Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Premier Zhou Enlai of China, as reprinted in the “Notes, Memoranda and letters Exchanged and Agreements signed between The Governments of India and China” (also known as 'White Papers') for the period between September to December 1959 is shockingly telling about today’s Chinese intentions in Ladakh.
The White Papers, published by Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, show that the Chinese were already masters at changing the posts ...and they continue despite the 'humanitarian' speeches of the New Helmsman, Xi Jinping.

September 8, 1959
The Chinese Premier wrote to the Prime Minister of India and referred to a letter from Nehru dated March 22, 1959.

Zhou said: “I find from your letter that there is a fundamental difference between the positions of our two Governments on the Sino-Indian boundary question. This has made me somewhat surprised and also made it necessary for me to take a longer period of time to consider how to reply to your letter. The Sino-Indian boundary question is a complicated question left over by history.”
It was the first time that ‘differences’ were admitted. 

Let us remember that between March and September 1959, tens of thousands of Tibetans had followed the Dalai Lama in exile in India. This partly explains China's new belligerence.

Zhou said: “I would like now to further explain the position of the Chinese Government in connection with the questions raised in Your Excellency's letter and in conjunction with the recent situation along the Sino-Indian border."
He started by the boundary separating China's Sinkiang [Xinjiang] and Tibet regions from Ladakh:

"Regarding the 1842 Peace Treaty between Ladakh and Tibet, Zhou argued that the Chinese Central Government did not send anybody to participate in the negotiations nor did it later ratify the treaty,  ...Moreover, this treaty only mentioned in general terms that Ladakh and Tibet would each abide by its borders, and did not make any specific provisions or explanations regarding the location of this section of the boundary.”

The Premier admitted: 

Map mentioned by Zhou Enlai (1854), though it did not represent the post-independence
Indian position, was 'fairly close' to the Chinese map, according to Zhou

 

“The marking of this section of the boundary on the map of "Punjab Western Himalaya and Adjoining Parts of Tibet" compiled by British John Walker by order of the Court of Directors of East India Company (which was attached to the British Major Alexander Cunningham's book ‘Ladakh’ published in 1854) corresponded fairly close to the Chinese maps,” but Zhou complained that later British and Indian maps “included large tracts of Chinese territory into Ladakh [Aksai Chin]. This was without any legal grounds, nor in conformity with the actual situation of administration by each side all the time.”

Details of the map above (around Pangong tso)

The remarks of the Chinese Premier refers to the Aksai Chin; but according to him, the dispute had begun with “the outbreak of the rebellion in Tibet, the border situation has become increasingly tense owing to reasons for which the Chinese side cannot be held responsible. Immediately after the fleeting of a large number of Tibetan rebels into India, Indian troops started pressing forward steadily across the eastern section of the Sino-Indian boundary.”
It was easy to put it on the Tibetans.
In conclusion, Zhou wrote: “I hope that Your Excellency and the Indian Government will, in accordance with the Chinese Government's request, immediately adopt measures to withdraw the trespassing Indian troops and administrative personnel and restore the long existing state of the boundary between the two countries.”
India had to stop trespassing into Indian territory.

September 26, 1959
Nehru replied on September 26, he noted: “I was greatly surprised and distressed to read it. You and I discussed the India-China border, and particularly the eastern sector, in 1954 in Peking and in 1956-57 in India.”
After referring to the McMahon Line, the Indian Prime Minister said: “when I received your letter of January 23, 1959, I had no idea that the People's Republic of China would lay claim to about 40,000 square miles of what in our view has been indisputably Indian territory for decades and in some sectors for over a century.”
It is rather surprising as Nehru knew that the Chinese had built a road across the Aksai Chin.

However, the Prime Minister gave his own rationale, Delhi had just been nice with China: 

“We did not release to the public the information which we had about the various border intrusions into our territory by Chinese personnel since 1954, the construction of a road across Indian territory in Ladakh, and the arrest of our personnel in the Aksai Chin area in 1958 and their detention. We did not give publicity to this in the hope that peaceful solutions of the disputes could be found by agreement by the two countries without public excitement on both sides.”

It is not necessary here to go into the other sectors of the boundaries touched upon by Nehru.
A Note on The Border Disputes was attached to the Prime Minister’s letter in which he complained about an Indian patrol being arrested: “Aksai Chin is a part of Ladakh. The Chinese Government have now admitted that in 1956 they built a highway from Tibet to Sinkiang, running for about a hundred miles through this territory. In September 1957, it was announced that this road had been completed. The next year Indian personnel [an army party under Lt Iyengar from the Madras Sappers] carrying out routine patrol duties were arrested near Haji Langar in north-east Aksai Chin, taken to Suget Karol and detained for five weeks. The leader of the Indian patrol was placed in solitary confinement, and all documents were seized.”

November 7, 1959
Zhou replied to Nehru’s letter of September 26, 1959; though in a meantime (on October 21)  a serious incident had taken place  within Indian territory, south of the Kongka Pass and 10 CRPF personnel had been killed.
In this communication, Zhou offered that each party should withdraw 20 kms from where they were: “to maintain effectively the status quo of the border between the two countries, to ensure the tranquility of the border regions and to create a favourable atmosphere for a friendly settlement of the boundary question.”
It was suggested that the armed forces of China and India “undertake to refrain from again sending their armed personnel to be stationed in and patrol the zones from which they have evacuated their armed forces.”
The innocuous proposal came back recently in the news, when Beijing planted a story in an Indian newspaper, mentioning that China had offered the fixation of a LAC in this very letter. There is of course no map attached to this proposal.

November 16, 1959
Nine days later, Nehru replied, mentioning that Delhi had given a note to the Chinese Ambassador in Delhi on November 4, with full details of the international boundary in Ladakh and the Konka-la incident.
Nehru agreed “that the two Governments should come to an agreement without delay, which would eliminate risks of border clashes.”
The Prime Minister went on: “you have suggested that the armed forces of China and India should withdraw twenty kilometers from the lines which they occupy at present. This, in your view, would effectively prevent any border clashes.”
Nehru, after mentioning the Central and the Eastern Sectors, pointed out: “Unfortunately, we do not yet know with any precision where the frontier line lies according to the claims of the Chinese Government. This is a matter for surmise based on small scale maps published in China. These maps themselves have not always been consistent, and different lines are sometimes indicated in them. I regret I cannot accept the contention that you have been in occupation of the area up to the frontier line shown in your maps. On the contrary, the Government of India have exercised jurisdiction up to the frontier line specified by them.”
Therefore, in the Ladakh area, both Governments should agree to the following interim measure: 

Map of 1956 showing the Chinese claims in Ladakh
The Line was reported on the GOI  map above

“The Government of India should withdraw all personnel to the west of the line which the Chinese Government have shown as the international boundary in their 1956 maps which, so far as we are aware are their latest maps.” At the same time the Chinese troops should withdraw their personnel to the east of the international boundary which has been described by the Government of India.”

Practically, it meant that the Indian troops could patrolled up to the Kunlun range, north of the Aksai Chin; Nehru added: “The area is almost entirely uninhabited. It is thus not necessary to maintain administrative personnel in this area bounded by the two lines on the east and the west.”
This was obviously not acceptable for Beijing who wanted to continue using the Aksai Chin road.

December 17, 1959
The next day Zhou replied. One could ask, why such a hurry?
China was probably nervous about India patrolling till the Johnston Line.
Zhou said that he was anxious to know if the proposal to stop patrolling in some areas only was: “to apply to the entire Sino-Indian border." he affirmed that "no different measure should be adopted in the sector of the border between China and India's Ladakh.”
Now comes the interesting part. After saying that was no reason to treat this sector of the border as a special case: “The line up to which each side exercises actual control in this sector is very clear, just as it is in the other sectors of the Sino-Indian border. As a matter of fact, the Chinese map published in 1956, to which Your Excellency referred, correctly shows the traditional boundary between the two countries in this sector, except for the Parigas area [Chinese name for Demchok] by the Shangatsangpu [Indus] River, India has not occupied any Chinese territory east of this section of the traditional boundary.” See map above by the brown arrows.

The letter continued to argue about the different sectors of the border.

December 21, 1959
Four days later, Nehru replied to say that he “deeply regret that you have not accepted the very reasonable proposals contained in my letter of 16th November.”
The Prime Minister affirmed: “I am always ready to meet and discuss with your Excellency the outstanding differences between our countries and explore the avenues of settlement. How can we, Mr. Prime Minister, reach an agreement on principles when there is such complete disagreement about the facts?”

December 26, 1959
A Note was given by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Indian Embassy. 

For the first time, Beijing’s position was clarified in some details, though without maps.
Beijing reiterated that “China and India are two peace-loving, big countries with a long history of mutual friendship and with many great common tasks both at present and' in the future. Friendship between China and India is in the interests not only of the two peoples, but also of world peace, particularly of peace in Asia.”
It answered into some details a set of questions, again without provided any map.

•    Has The Sino-Indian Boundary Been Formally Delimited?
•    Where Is The Traditional Customary Sino-Indian Boundary Line?
•    What is the Proper Way To Settle The Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute?

The Chinese note pointed out: “The Indian Government has also referred to the talks between the two Prime Ministers in Peking in October 1954, expressing the view that Premier Chou En-lai's remarks about Chinese maps implied that the Chinese Government would revise its maps in accordance with Indian maps, that is to say, the Chinese Government had accepted the Indian Government's claim regarding the boundary.”
The Note argued that Zhou had never said that, ditto for the McMahon Line.
To conclude, the note answered the question: 

“Whether China wants to engage in aggression and expansion?” 

The Noted said: “Centering around the Sino-Indian boundary question, there has recently appeared in India a great deal of anti-Chinese pronouncements, which in cold war language slander China as ‘imperialism’, ‘expanding into India’ and ‘committing aggression’.' The Chinese people cannot but feel deep regret at such malicious attacks against China, which simply fly in the face of facts. …But at no time in future will China become a threat to its neighbouring countries, just as China does not believe that India, after it has grown strong as China fervently hopes, would become a threat to China; to say that the growth of China's population and industry would constitute a threat to its neighbours is utterly incomprehensible to the Chinese people.”
It strongly asserted: “So far as the question of boundary is concerned, China absolutely does not want one inch of another country's territory. There are undelimited boundaries between China and many of its neighbouring countries, but China has never taken, and will never take, advantage of this situation to make any changes in the actually existing state of affairs on the borders by unilateral action.”
A few weeks later, a map of Chinese claims will finally be published by Beijing. It would engulf large parts of India’s territory.
The question which remains: has China changed?

Outrageously changing the post once again (1960)

 

Chinese Aggression in Maps

Map of Chinese claims of 1960

According to a Press Release from the Ministry Of Eternal Affairs, the situation in Ladakh may de-escalate  in the next few days.
On July 5, the two Special Representatives of India and China agreed that maintenance of peace and tranquillity in the India-China border areas was essential for the further development of the bilateral relations: “In this regard they further agreed that both sides should complete the ongoing disengagement process along the LAC expeditiously.”
The Statement further said: “The two Special Representatives agreed that both sides should take guidance from the consensus of the leaders that maintenance of peace and tranquillity in the India-China border areas was essential for the further development of our bilateral relations and that two sides should not allow differences to become disputes. Therefore, they agreed that it was necessary to ensure at the earliest complete disengagement of the troops along the LAC and de-escalation from India-China border areas for full restoration of peace and tranquillity.”

This will not fully change the situation on the ground and moreover, there is no doubt that China's mindset will remain expansionist and that the posts will be changed again, whenever it will suit Beijing.

Chinese Aggression
In the present context, it is interesting to look at a small booklet released in January 1963 by the Publications Division of the Government of India; it contains a series of ten maps. The publication is called “Chinese Aggression in Maps.”
These maps are fascinating, especially after the unwarranted attack by the Chinese forces in Ladakh, particularly in Galwan, Hot Springs/Gogra and the Fingers area of Pangong tso (lake).
The Introduction de the booklet explains: “Brought together in this brochure are ten maps which graphically present the extent of the Chinese occupation of Indian territory through aggression from time to time; the fraudulent nature of the three-point proposal with which China launched a peace offensive after the large-scale invasion by Chinese forces on October 20, 1962; and the minimum condition which India has insisted on for the resumption of negotiations to settle the India-China boundary question.”

Most of the maps carry explanatory notes below.

It is a cartographic demonstration how Communist China has been changing the posts and will continue to change the posts.

The Historical Background

We have already dealt with this in previous posts.

The booklet's Introduction continued: “Falsehood and deception marked the Chinese Government's policy towards India till it culminated in the massive invasion of India's northern frontier, from Ladakh in the west to the North East Frontier Agency in the east, on October 20, 1962. A perusal of the maps printed in this brochure will make it clear that falsehood and deception are the warp and woof of the peace offensive with which China followed up its armed aggression.”

It further gave a historical background: “India was among the first countries to extend recognition to the People's Republic of China which came into being on October 1, 1949. In August 1950 when the forces of the People's Republic of China came into Tibet, the Government of China declared their willingness to solve the problem of Tibet by peaceful and friendly measures and their desire to "stabilise the China-India border". On receipt of this communication, the Government of India expressed their appreciation of the Chinese Government's intentions regarding Tibet and affirmed that ‘the recognised boundary between India and Tibet should remain inviolate’.”

Delhi expounded its position further: “Close and friendly relations developed between the Government of India and the People's Republic of China in the subsequent years and on 29th April, 1954, the two Governments concluded an Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet and India under which India gave up ail extra-territorial rights and privileges enjoyed in Tibet, and recognised Tibet as a region of China.”
As our four volumes of the history of relations between India and Tibet have shown, that was pure folly, to give away the privileges without getting anything in return. But it was the Hindi-Chini bhai bhai days.

Already the Issue of the Maps
But already, the Chinese maps were showing large chunks of India’s territory; the 1963 booklet stated: “The question of Chinese maps which were showing an incorrect boundary alignment between India and China was raised by Prime Minister Nehru with Prime Minister Chou En-lai in October 1954 and again in November 1956. The Government of India were given to understand in October 1954 that the Chinese maps referred to by the Prime Minister of India were merely a reproduction of old Kuomintang maps and that the present Government had no time to revise them. In November 1956, Prime Minister Chou En-lai told the Indian Prime Minister that in the case of Burma, the Government of China bad accepted the formalisation of the boundary in 1914 (the McMahon Line) and proposed to recognise it with India also - that is the Eastern sector of the Indian alignment. Prime Minister Chou En-lai said he would consult the Tibetan authorities in this regard.”

The Aksai Chin Road
But China was not India’s friend or brother: “Surreptitious Chinese intrusions into Indian territory in Ladakh started in 1957. The clearing of the Aksai Chin Road was the first step. An Indian patrol party on its normal rounds was detained by the Chinese forces near Haji Langar in September 1958. The Government of India protested against this detention and also against the clearing of the motor road by the Government of China across the Aksai Chin area of Indian territory. These surreptitious intrusions continued in the Ladakh area and there were some other incidents between Indian patrols and the Chinese soldier. The Government of India, in the belief that these were instances of irresponsible behaviour of the Chinese local authorities, lodged protests against these intrusions and incidents.”
The fact that Delhi had been knowing for years about the Aksai Chin is not mentioned.

The Aggression Continues
The note however pointed out: “In September 1959, the Government of China, for the first time, laid a formal claim to 50,000 square miles of Indian territory in Ladakh and in the North East Frontier Agency. This led to exchange of communications at a high level, between the two Prime Ministers. The two Prime Ministers met in Delhi in 1960, and this was followed by the meeting between officials of the two sides in pursuance of the decision taken at the meeting of the two Prime Ministers. Further intrusions by the Chinese, however, continued. By 1961, the Government of India considered it necessary, in view of progressive Chinese intrusions, to take limited defence measures to contain these surreptitious Chinese advances into Indian territory.”
That was the beginning of the Forward Policy, but it was far too late, as India had occupying most of the Aksai Chin area of Ladakh.

The Final Blow
The Indian note nonetheless added: “Foiled in their attempt to take over further Indian territory in Ladakh, the Chinese started further aggression in the Eastern sector of the India-China boundary in the NEFA region on 8th September 1962. After a couple of probing attacks, Chinese forces mounted a carefully prepared and well-planned all-out attack on 20th October 1962 on Indian defence forces in the Eastern as well as Western sectors of the India-China border. Having acquired, as a result of their initial successes, a further slice of about 2,500 square miles of Indian territory, the Chinese Government started their first peace offensive-the Chinese three point proposal--on 24th October. When India refused to accept the military dictates of the aggressor, the Chinese, after re-group­ ing and further preparations, mounted another massive offensive from 15th to 19th November, 1962. On the morning of 21st November, the Chinese started their second peace offensive with the same object of retaining the gains of their calculated and cold­ blooded aggression-the so-called unilateral cease-fire and withdrawal proposals of 21st November, 1962.”

Wedded to Peace??
The conclusion was that “The Government and people of India are, by their history and tradition, wedded to the ways of peace. They have always been and are in favour of peaceful settlement of differences between nations. Peace and peaceful settlements can, however, be pursued only on the basis of decency, dignity and self-respect. It would be fatal to compromise with aggression or submit to the military dictates of the aggressor. The first essential before we can revert to paths of peace and peaceful settlements is the undoing of all the consequences of aggression. This means that at least the status quo as it prevailed before the latest Chinese aggression started on 8th September, 1962, should be restored.”
It will never be.

Map No 2
We shall just look at Map No 2 ('Line Separating Indian and Chinese Forces on September 7, 1962'), as it shows how China has always changed the posts.

The caption said: “This map depicts the three lines which have figured most prominently in the correspondence between the Governments and Prime Ministers of India and China after the massive invasion of India which was launched by Chinese forces on October 20, 1962."

The November 1959 Line

The first line shows the disposition of Chinese posts in Ladakh in November 1959.

The captions says: "It will be seen that at that time there was strictly speaking no ‘line of control’ but only a series of Chinese posts on Indian territory.”

This line joined the then Chinese posts at Spanggur Post, Khurnak Fort, Kongka Pass and Shamallungpa and ran northward, past Haji Langar, to join the Aksai Chin Road.
Another shows the line of contact between Indian and Chinese forces immediately prior to September 8, 1962, the date on which Chinese forces invaded Indian territory in the Eastern sector also. India has made the reasonable proposal that there should be a restoration of the positions along this line as the minimum condition for resumption of negotiations with China.

Finally, another line showed the limits of the further area occupied by Chinese forces after the massive aggression which they launched against India, both in the Western and Eastern sectors on October 20, 1962. China now falsely claims that this was the line of actual control by Chinese forces in November 1959. …The area between the September 7, 1962, line and the 'line of actual control of 1959' as falsely claimed by China represents the further aggrandisement of Indian territory by China as a result of its latest aggression. India insists that this area of further aggression should be vacated by the Chinese and the position of the Indian and Chinese forces prior to 8th September restored, before there can be a resumption of negotiations to settle the India-China boundary problem.

Chinese map showing the correct alignment in Galwan area

Today’ s Situation

Since the beginning of May, China has been trying to change the posts again, mainly in three places, namely, Galwan, Hot Spring and the Fingers areas of Pangong tso (lake).

Let us look at Galwan first.

According to Chinese maps, the Chinese claims stops some 10 kilometers from the confluence of the Galwan and the Shyok rivers.

The above map is very clear.

Now, China would like to annex the Indian territory till the confluence. There is no historical justification to this, but strategically, it will allow the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to obstruct the new 220-km long road between Darbuk-Shyok-DBO  ( Daulat Beg Oldie ) which is to reduce the travel time between Leh to DBO from 2 days to 6 hours.

Another Chinese map shows a similar alignment

Chinese map showing the correct alignment in Galwan area

During the 1960 meetings' of the Officials,  China defined its 'perception' of the boundary.

At that time, nobody was speaking of Line of Actual Control (LAC).
India asked: "The Indian side would like to have some heights of peaks and location
of passes on this particular ridge."

China assured:

"From 78° 5' East, the line turned south-west to a point Long. 78° l' E. and Lat. 35° 21' N., where it crossed the Chip Chap river. After this, it turned south east along' the mountain ridge and passed through two peaks Peak 6845 metres and Peak 6598 metres. The co-ordinates of Peak 6845 M were Long. 78° 12' E, Lat. 34° 57' N. The co-ordinates of Peak 6598 M were Long. 68° 13' E., Lat. 34° 54' N. After the alignment passed over the two peaks, it went south along the mountain ridge, where it crossed the Galwan river at Long. 78° 13' E, Lat. 34. 46' N. It then passed over Peak 6556 M and followed the watershed between the Khugrang Tsangpo river and its tributary the Changlung river, crossed the Changlung river at Long. 78° 53' E, Lat. 34° 22' N, and reached the Kongka Pass."

In Galvan area,  the point which has been reported on the map below. It corresponds with the Indian alignment; the small difference is due to the poor surveying tools at that time.

Google Map with the Chinese claims of 1960 in Galwan area

Chinese logic: by advancing the line towards the confluence with the Shyok, China would have had the perfect position for its howitzers to destroy the new road, when required...

Hot Spring/Gogra Area

The second site of Chinese intrusions is Hot Spring/Gogra area.

Like Galwan it was not a disputed place earlier.

The coordinates given by the Chinese in 1960 correspond to the Indian position, it is therefore clearly a new front opened by China with no historical basis.

Strategically, it allows China to block rear reinforcements to reach Galwan.

The entire operation seems to have been planned to open more disputed places in Ladakh and protect these areas.

Google Map with the Chinese claims of 1960 in Hot Spring area

Fingers at the Pangong tso (lake)

The third location of intrusions is the Fingers area on the northern bank of the Pangong tso.

Here too Chinese maps tally with the Indian position.

The reluctance of the Chinese to vacate the area from finger 4 to 8, has to historical sanction.

Chinese map showing the correct alignment in Pangong tso area

This map was published in the 1980s in Lhasa by the Communist government.

It shows clearly that the line crosses the lake in the east of the Fingers and Sirijap.

Chinese map showing the correct alignment in Pangong tso area

Same remark for the previous Chinese map.

Enlarged Chinese claims of 1960

When one enlarges the 1960 posted above, it is more difficult to say where exactly passes the Chinese claim line, but it is certainly east of the Fingers.

This map of StratNews Global (below) shows the approximate location of the Indian LAC.

It tallies with the above Chinese maps, therefore China should have no claim from Finger 4 to 8.

But today, Beijing is ready to fight a war for areas that it did not even claim before.

It is called wild expansionism.

The Fingers and Sirijap areas

Conclusions

One can only conclude that China has always changed the posts, at least since 1949, when Mao decided to annex Xinjiang (Eastern Turkestan).

India is paying today for the inaction and acquiescent attitude of the Indian government then.

It is a fact that tears after years the line has moved; it keep moving even today.

Even if Beijing accepts a disengagement today or tomorrow and partially withdraw to its April position, it will have opened new fronts in Ladakh, new 'disputed' places which were non existing earlier.

Some mad generals in Chengdu will have to be seriously reigned in by the Communist Party in Beijing if China wants to regain a semblance of trust from India's part.

Maps now and then

Recently published Chinese Map
Large tracks of Indian territory are shown as Chinese

My article Map Now and Then appeared today in The Statesman.

Here is the link...
 
Why is Delhi so quiet? Probably because ‘China and India are friends’! Friends like in 1954? It is very ominous.  It is perhaps time for Delhi to distribute the maps of India's borders. It will be useful for the general public, the press and for the Indian officials 

Last week, Beijing published its first official vertical national map of China, incorporating vast areas of the South China Sea. The South China Morning Post (SMCP) commented that the new map gave “equal weight to both land and sea, in [Beijing’s] latest move emphasising its claims of sovereignty over the disputed waters.”
Earlier maps showed the islands in the South China Sea on a smaller scale, in a separate box-out in a bottom corner of the map. Mainly due to the prominence given to the South China Sea on the new map, during several days, most commentators concentrated on the South China Sea; finally, the MEA decide to take note of the new map.
Why? Probably because the Indian media had discovered that the new map showed Arunachal Pradesh as part of China. South Block could not keep quiet anymore, especially at a time the Indian Vice-President was visiting China …to celebrate 60 years of “peaceful co-existence”.
The MEA was, however, quick to dismiss the new map by saying that “cartographic depiction did not change the reality that Arunachal was part of India.” The MEA spokesman further elaborated: “The fact that Arunachal Pradesh is an integral and inalienable part of India has been conveyed to the Chinese authority on several occasions including at the very highest level.”
What is more shocking is the fact that the spokesperson forgot to mention the central sector (Uttarakhand and Himachal) where large chunks of Indian territory (such as Barahoti and Nilang) appear on the Chinese map also …and similarly not a word for the Aksai Chin and areas around the Pangong Tso in Ladakh!
Why has the MEA nothing to say about these vast areas of India’s territory? It is all the more difficult to understand after the Indian press had reported: “On June 24, four Chinese high-speed interceptor boats were spotted moving from Srijap I posts around 8.25 am to Srijap VIII, VI and V detachments on the northern banks of the [Pangong] lake. Twenty minutes later, Indian troops on the four American-made boats moved from Thukang base and intercepted Chinese vessels. The two sides first were locked in a face-off and then conducted a so-called banner drill to remind the other side of the Line.”
According to South Block sources, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) boats came 5.5 kilometres into the Indian side of the Pangong Lake (Tso) on 24 June. The incursion lasted over two hours, involving four high-speed Chinese interceptor boats that were pushed back by Indian troops, on their US-built interceptor vessels.
The Hindustan Times quoted government sources to affirm that the lake has seen 12 face-offs between Indian and Chinese troops this year alone: “In 2013, there were no less than 18 face-offs between Indian and Chinese troops in Pangong Tso due to serious difference in perception on the LAC and also due to massive Chinese infrastructure build-up close to the line.”
The non-reaction of the MEA is particularly surprising when one looks at the new Chinese map which shows large parts of Ladakh as belonging to China. China is a regular offender. A few months after the signature of the infamous Panchsheel Agreement, Nehru visited China. On his return, he wrote a note entitled ‘Implications of China Visit’; it was an internal note intended for the MEA officials. He described in detail his visit to Beijing (in October 1954): “During my visit to China, I had a number of talks with the Chinese leaders. I had long talks with Premier Zhou Enlai separately. I also had joint talks with Chairman Mao Zedong and his principal colleagues, Vice Chairman Zhu De, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Peoples’ Congress Liu Shaoqi; Premier Zhou Enlai...”
The Prime Minister was accompanied by the Secretary General of the MEA, NR Pillai, and India’s Ambassador in Peking, N. Raghavan.
In other words, it was a Sino-Indian Summit.
The maps of China were discussed. Like today, they showed several parts of India’s territory as belonging to China. Nehru writes: “I referred to Chinese maps which still showed portions of Burma and even of India as if they were within Chinese territory. So far as India was concerned, I added, we were not much concerned about this matter because our boundaries were quite clear and were not a matter for argument. But many people took advantage of these old maps and argued that China had an aggressive intent, or else why continue to use these maps. In Burma also this caused apprehension.”
Zhou Enlai cleverly replied that “these maps were old ones and China had not done any surveying to draw new maps. Their boundaries even with Mongolia and the Soviet Union were still not clearly demarcated and there were discrepancies. I [Nehru] pointed out that this might be so. So far as India was concerned, I repeated, there was no doubt about our boundaries and I was not worried about them. But I wondered how China would feel if a part of Tibet had been shown as part of India in our maps.”
Amazing (and sad), while Beijing still speaks about the Five Principles, 60 years later, the situation on the ground is repeating itself. Let us not forget that China’s Survey and Mapping Administration has approved the controversial map published by Hunan Map Press, which in its announcement said the map was of “great significance in safeguarding the nation’s water sovereignty and territorial integrity”.
Why is Delhi so quiet? Probably because ‘China and India are friends’! Friends like in 1954? It is very ominous.
Another similarity with 1954:  60 years ago too, Beijing had ‘no problem’ with India; China’s problem was with the American imperialists.
During the Panchsheel commemoration, President Xi Jinping vowed that no violations of territorial integrity would be tolerated, adding though that no nation (read the US) should be allowed to monopolise global affairs. Xi however made it clear: “Sovereignty is the reliable safeguard and fundamental element of national interest. Sovereignty and territorial integrity should not be infringed upon. This is the hard principle that should not be cast aside at any time”.
And then, he started indirectly bashing the US: “All nations should be given equal footing in the global security framework, and share equal rights.”
Su Hao, a professor with China Foreign Affairs University, told SCMP: “The message is that China is not the source of the problem, and it is some external force violating principles of international relations and making chaos in the region.”
One more ‘detail’, but which is vital for India; on the new Chinese map, the size of the Chumbi Valley, located between Sikkim and Bhutan, is really bloated. Does China plan to grab more territory from Bhutan?
A few months before his 1954 visit to Beijing, Nehru had taken up the issue of Indian maps with the MEA Secretary-General. At that time, India was foolishly showing most of the Ladakh border as ‘undefined’. Nehru wrote: “All our old maps dealing with this frontier should be carefully examined and, where necessary, withdrawn. New maps should be printed showing our Northern and North-Eastern frontier without any reference to any ‘line’. These new maps should also not state that there is any un-demarcated territory. The new maps should be sent to our embassies abroad and should be introduced to the public generally and be used in our schools, colleges etc.”
It is perhaps time for Delhi to distribute the maps of India’s borders. It will be useful for the general public, the press and for the Indian officials.

Friends like in 1954?

On November 14, 1954, Nehru wrote a note entitled 'Implications of China Visit'; it was an internal note for the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA).
The Indian Prime Minister describes in detail his visit to Beijing (in October 1954):

During my visit to China, I had a number of talks with the Chinese leaders. I had long talks with Premier Chou En-lai separately. I also had joint talks with Chairman Mao Tse-tung and his principal colleagues, viz., Vice Chairman Chu Teh, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Peoples' Congress, Liu Shaochi, Premier Chou En-lai, Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee, Sung Ching-ling (Madame Sun Yat-sen), Vice Premier Chen Yen and the Chinese Ambassador in India. On our side in these joint talks, we had our Secretary General, N.R. Pillai, and our Ambassador in Peking, N. Raghavan. We both had interpreters with us.

Of current interest are Nehru's remarks about the maps of China published by Beijing showing several parts of India's territory as belonging to China. Nehru writes:

…I referred to Chinese maps which still showed portions of Burma and even of India as if they were within Chinese territory. So far as India was concerned, I added, we were not much concerned about this matter because our boundaries were quite clear and were not a matter for argument. But many people took advantage of these old maps and argued that China had an aggressive intent, or else why continue to use these maps. In Burma also this caused apprehension.
Premier Chou [Zhou Enlai] replied that these maps were old ones and China had not done any surveying to draw new maps. Their boundaries even with Mongolia and the Soviet Union were still not clearly demarcated and there were discrepancies. I [Nehru] pointed out that this might be so. So far as India was concerned, I repeated, there was no doubt about our boundaries and I was not worried about them. But I wondered how China would feel if a part of Tibet had been shown as part of India in our maps.

Last week, this came back to my mind when Beijing published its first official vertical national map incorporating the vast areas of South China Sea.
The South China Morning Post (SMCP) commented that the new map gave "equal weight given to both land and sea, in [Beijing's] latest move emphasising its claims of sovereignty over the disputed waters."
Earlier maps showed the islands in the South China Sea on a smaller scale, in a separate box-out in a bottom corner of the map.
For a few days, most commentators concentrated on the South China Sea due to the prominence given to the South China Sea on the new map, but on Saturday, the Indian MEA finally reacted.

In red, areas claimed by China in the Central Sector

Why? Because they discovered that the new Chinese map shows Arunachal Pradesh as part of China.
The Indian press commented: "The MEA dismissed the new map issued by Chinese authorities this week by saying cartographic depiction did not change the reality that Arunachal was part of India."
The MEA spokesman said: "The fact that Arunachal Pradesh in integral and inalienable part of India has been conveyed to Chinese authority at several occasions including at the very highest level."
What is most shocking is the fact that the spokesperson forgot to mention the Central Sector (Uttarakhand and Himachal) were large chunks of Indian territory (such as Barahoti and Nilang) appear on the Chinese map and not a word for the Aksai Chin and areas around the Panggong tso in Ladakh too.
The MEA has nothing to say about these vast areas of the Indian territory?
Amazing and sad!
Let us not forget that China’s Survey and Mapping Administration has approved the map published by Hunan Map Press, which in its announcement said the map was of 'great significance in safeguarding the nation’s water sovereignty and territorial integrity'.

Click to enlarge

Here is a Chinese map of Ngari region (Central Sector).
Why is Delhi so quiet?
We will probably be told "Don't worry, China and India are friends". Like in 1954?

Sixty 60 years ago too, Beijing had 'no problem' with India. China's problem was with American Imperialism, so it liked to say.
While President Xi Jinping vowed that no violations of territorial integrity will be tolerated, he added that no nation (read the US) should be allowed to monopolise global affairs.
Xi was speaking on the occasion of  the 'celebrations' of the infamous Panchsheel. Xi however made it clear: "Sovereignty is the reliable safeguard and fundamental element of national interest. Sovereignty and territorial integrity should not be infringed upon. This is the hard principle that should not be cast aside at any time".
And then, he started indirectly bashing the United States: "All nations should be given equal footing in the global security framework, and share equal rights."
Su Hao, a professor with China Foreign Affairs University told SCMP: "The message is that China is not the source of the problem, and it is some external force violating principles of international relations and making chaos in the region."
One more 'detail', but which is vital for India, on the new Chinese map, the size of the Chumbi Valley located between Sikkim and Bhutan, seems really bloated to me.
Does China plans to grab more territory from Bhutan?

Enlargement of the new Chinese map

China has 3-D topographic maps of Ladakh

The Zorawar Fort, near Demchok occupied by China

As Deputy Chief of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA), Lt. Gen. Wang Guanzhong arrives in India for the annual Defence Dialogue, some interesting news has just come from China, which apparently possess the latest 3-D topographical maps of the Ladakh front.
It raises an important question: will the Indian Defence Secretary R K Mathur, when he receives Lt. Gen. Wang Guanzhong, discuss an exchange of maps in Ladakh/Aksai Chin?
Probably not! It is a pity.
According to PTI, “The talks are expected to cover defence exchanges, joint military exercises as well as steps to increase confidence building measures between the two forces in the light of the signing of the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA).”
A fourth round of military exercises, to be held in India, should also be discussed.
The Defence Dialogue will be followed by a Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) on March 18-19. The Indian delegation will be headed by Deputy Chief of the Planning Commission Montek Singh Ahluwalia.
Regarding the Defence Dialogue, the Indian Defence Secretary will probably be too shy to raise the issue of exchanging maps showing the Indian and Chinese ‘perceptions’ of the Line of Actual Control.
In any case, Lt. Gen. Wang Guanzhong would certainly say that he is not in a position to supply proper maps of Beijing’s ‘perceptions’.
However, an article in The People’s Daily recently boasted of high quality of 3D topographic maps available in Lanzhou Military Area Command, which looks after the Ladakh front, particularly places such as Daulat Beg Oldi, Chumar or Demchok.
The People’s Daily reported: “Chinese military has unveiled its world advanced three-dimensional (3D) topographic map of Lanzhou city”.
It explained: “A measuring and mapping information center under the Lanzhou Military Area Command (MAC) of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) used world-advanced 3D printing technology in the topographic map-making and successfully developed China’s first 3D topographic map on November 20, 2013.”
Rest assured that the maps are not for Lanzhou City only.
This practically means that the Chinese troops posted in the Aksai Chin and other parts of Ladakh possess the most accurate maps of these disputed areas. The Communist mouth piece affirmed: “Compared with the traditional man-made sand tables, the latest 3D topographic map has lighter weight and portability. Obsolete maps were used as the printing materials instead of professional and expensive printing materials such as gypsums. It has cut down the cost to the maximum and made the map highly promotable [portable?].”
The People’s Daily, quoting an official of the Lanzhou MAC, further asserted: “The 3D topographic map can provide accurate and reliable basis for military topographic analysis, for commanders to make decisions and for troop units to carry out their missions, thus it possesses high military application values.”
Wang Mingxiao, the director of the research team told the Chinese newspaper: “The research team had been dedicated to upgrade the map by improving the precision of the A4-sized 3D topographic map from the previous 1.0 mm to present 0.1 mm, and shortening the printing time from the previous 24 hours to 8 hours. They also expanded the scope of the 3D topographic map as well.”
However Lt. Gen. Wang Guanzhong is bound to tell the Indian Defence Secretary that China can’t provide maps of what it 'perceives' as China’s Line of Actual Control.
Beijing still believes that its interests are better served, if confusion over the LAC continues to prevail.

Beijing's Map Aggresion Now and Then

Chinese maps showing Arunachal as part of China

Yesterday, Xinhua reported that China "has inked for the first time South China Sea islands on its new official maps in equal scale to that of the Chinese mainland."
The National Administration of Surveying, Mapping and Geoinformation (NASMG) announced that "the new vertical-format maps of China, published by Sinomaps Press, include more than 130 islands and islets in the South China Sea, most of which have not been featured on previous maps of China."
Zhou Beiyan, the editor of the new maps declared: "The old maps, which were in horizontal format, only featured bigger islands such as the Xisha, Zhongsha and Nansha islands. These were illustrated in the bottom-right corner at half the scale used for the Chinese mainland."
The new maps will not be available to the public until the end of January.
But according to the Communist mouthpiece: "The maps will be very significant in enhancing Chinese people's awareness of national territory, safeguarding China's marine rights and interests and manifesting China's political diplomatic stance.
The publisher of the maps asserted that "the new vertical maps have marked clearly the major South China Sea islands and demonstrated their geographic relations with surrounding island countries as well as surrounding islands and islets".
This reminds me of the map aggression against India in the early 1950s, at the time the infamous Panchesheel Agreement was negotiated and the foolishness of the Indian Governement which did not react to the Chinese 'map' aggression.
I post here a telling excerpt from my book, Born in Sin: the Panchesheel Agreement.

Nehru’s Visit to Beijing in October 1954
The visit of the Indian Prime Minister to Beijing marks the apogee of the ‘friendship’ between India and China and perhaps also the first beginning of the doubts in Nehru’s mind. 
For the first time on October 19, 1954, the Indian Prime Minister met Mao in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. The Great Helmsman began the talks by dwelling “on the age-old associations and the new friendship between China and India”.
This remark speaks for itself. While the Indian leaders were speaking of 2000 years of friendship, Mao was speaking of ‘new friendship’.
Nehru had two talks with Mao, but neither party raised the Tibetan issue or the border question. Mao was more interested to know the reaction of the Indian leader on the use of the atomic bomb . It is during this meeting that Mao first termed the bomb as a ‘paper tiger’ .
During the three meetings between Nehru and Zhou Enlai, once again the ‘small matters’ were not discussed, except for a short mention about the Chinese maps which showed large parts of India and Burma within the Chinese territory. Nehru hesitantly told Zhou:

As regards maps, I just casually mentioned to you some of the anxieties of our neighbours. We are not worried on this point. Our frontiers are clear but I mention it in the case of Burma because questions of this kind become a handle in the hands of enemy. Supposing we publish a map showing Tibet as a part of India, how would China feel about it? But as I said, I am sure, the maps were old maps and you did not mean it.

Finally at the end of meeting, Nehru dared ask Zhou a question directly linked to the six-month old Agreement on Tibet. As with the 17-Point Agreement three years earlier, the Chinese had scant respect for the provisions of the Sino-Indian Agreement. Though always ready to use its preamble, the Chinese leaders treated the Agreement as a mere piece of paper, at least as far as the main clauses were concerned. This was less than six months after the signature. For a simple matter such as the rights to go on a pilgrimage, the Indians (and Tibetans) were harassed. Nehru explained as mildly as possible to his counterpart the difficulties encountered by the pilgrims:
There is a small matter which I may take this opportunity to mention to you. Some complaints have recently been received from pilgrims going to Tibet. Some of them are apparently being harassed by guards and I hope that Your Excellency will look into the matter. As you are aware, every summer there is a large pilgrim traffic between India and Tibet. As an example of the sort of harassment to which these pilgrims are subjected, I would mention that one of my friends was stopped by the border guards who told him that he could not be regarded as a pilgrim because he was not wearing a monk's gown.
The Indian Prime Minister had still not realised that the Five Principles were a one-way road; but he was much too engrossed in his future role not only as the ‘neutral’ chairperson of the cease-fire commission for Indochina but also the self-appointed leader of the newly independent nations of Asia and Africa.
Two small incidents indicate the future direction in which the relations between India, Tibet and China would go.
During the course of his visit, Nehru had occasion to meet the young Dalai Lama  for the first time. As we have seen, Tibet and the border issue had been totally ignored in the talks with the Chinese leaders. This encounter with the young Lama was for Nehru like a mirror reminding him of the main provisions of the treaty (i.e. Tibet). The Dalai Lama recalls:
We [in Tibet] had heard his name. India also was a country very close to our mind. I had personally heard about Nehru.
When we heard that we will meet him, there was a bit of excitement.
Pandit Nehru led by Zhou Enlai and many Chinese dignitaries were lining up when he reached the place where I was standing.
Zhou Enlai said: ‘This is the Dalai Lama.’ Nehru remained motionless, no speech, not looking in the eyes.
He just stood in front of me, without speech, without moving, motionlessly he remained like that. I was a bit embarrassed. I told through the Chinese interpreter: ‘I have heard a lot about you, and today I am very happy to meet you’.
Nehru did not give a particular response, he seemed maybe happy, then he went to the next person. That was my first experience [with him].
[That day] I thought and felt that from Nehru’s side, there will be no support for Tibet and no support for the Dalai Lama. During a short moment, many things that occurred from 1949 till 1954 [passed] in his mind, like lightning, that is my feeling.
Was this strange silence of the Indian Prime Minister a sign that he had begun to realize that he had betrayed his own statement four years earlier in the Lok Sabha ?
Another incident is worth relating. Sultan M. Khan, then an official  in the Pakistani Embassy in Beijing remembers:
Sino-Indian relations continued to get closer, and Nehru received a very warm welcome on his visit in 1954. A few days after his visit, the Indian Embassy held a reception at which I overheard an Indian diplomat, who had acted as Nehru’s interpreter, telling some of his colleagues that just before his departure for Shanghai, Nehru was in a very sombre mood, and had said to senior members of his delegation that after his talks with Mao, he was pessimistic about the relations with China, and foresaw a conflict in the future. The Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 was far away and seemed unlikely in 1954 in the hey-day of Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai. I do not know on what basis Nehru foresaw this, but the 1962 war  was of India’s making.
Perhaps after hearing Mao’s comment on the atomic bomb, Nehru was unsure of the success of his Five Principles. Though one cannot be certain of the veracity of Khan’s comments, they appear to have some truth. It is certain that in June-July 1954 the Chinese leaders had got the support that they needed from India at a very crucial moment of their history. It helped them to impose their view in Geneva. Six months later, their needs were not the same and this partly explains Mao’s tough talk with Nehru.

Perceptional intrusions and self-goals

According to PTI, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police has not noticed any 'intrusion bid by China in Arunachal during past 2 years'.
Strange!
A few days ago, I mentioned on this blog that in February, Northeast Today reported a 'spurt in Chinese intrusions in Chaglagam'.
Of course, the ITBP or the Army will argue that these are not 'real' incursions; it is due simply due to the different 'perceptions' that the Chinese have of the LAC.
In other words, there are only 'perceptional intrusions'.
In an article in The Business Standard, respected journalist Sunanda K. Datta-Ray says: "With friends at home scoring ‘own goals’, India doesn’t need enemies abroad."
He elaborates: "For hundreds of years up to 1801 the kings of England also styled themselves kings of France. In short, England claimed France. But did French maps during those centuries show France as “disputed” territory? That would have been an “own goal” in soccer parlance. The French wouldn’t have tolerated it."
Obviously, the French are better at football ('soccer' for the Anglo-saxons).
Datta-Ray continues: "Yet, an 'own goal' loomed large in Kolkata’s Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) Auditorium last Monday with 'DISPUTED' printed boldly under Arunachal Pradesh in a large map of India’s Northeast. General Shankar Roy Choudhury twirled his impressive moustache centre stage, Lt-Gen Johnny Mukherjee looked relaxed on the left, Maj-Gen Arun Roye strutted at the podium. The director-general of the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), 'Ambassador' Rajesh Bhatia, said little but said it in the ponderous tones of an elder statesman. An unassuming 'Ambassador' Aloke Sen dispensed pragmatic wisdom. An even more retiring scholar, Sanjay Pulipaka of the Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute for Asian Studies, dispensed little-known information on internal developments in Myanmar. ('Ambassador' is in inverted commas because this handle is both pretentious and irregular but that’s another story.)"
Datta-Ray rightly says: "The map proclaimed loud and clear that India accepts China has a case in demanding Arunachal Pradesh, refusing visas to people from there and objecting to dignitaries visiting the state!"
He adds: "The Chinese wouldn’t similarly shoot themselves in the foot (or should it be the head?). Their maps don’t admit any dispute over Aksai Chin or the strip of Kashmir acquired from Pakistan. On the contrary, K P S Menon, a seasoned diplomat who was, if anything, soft on China and the Soviets, thought China’s attitude was “cunning”. He recalled seeing a map in the Military Academy in Chengtu showing large portions of Kashmir and to the south of the McMahon Line as Chinese."
In my forthcoming book, The McMahon Line Saga, I show that right from the beginning of the 20th century, the Manchus and then Nationalist China had started their cartographic aggression against British India.
Though the British were far better at 'soccer', this did not prevent the Chinese to continue with their own Game.
But India to continue scoring against India, is another issue. 

'No intrusion bid by China in Arunachal during past 2 years'
September 21, 2012
PTI
Kimin (Arunachal Pradesh): The Indo-Tibetan Border Police on Friday said there was no report of any intrusion by China into the territory of Arunachal Pradesh in the last two years.
"There is no report of any such intrusion into the Indian territory in the past two years. The Indo-China border is peaceful and there is no hostile activities from either side," ITBP DG Ranjit Sinha said in reply to a query on a media report on Chinese activities along the LAC.
He said the Indian perception of the LAC was different from Beijing's and there was no breach of trust between the two parties.
"Troops from both sides occasionally visit the LAC as a regular exercise to get themselves acquainted with the environment. We conduct border personnel meetings at regular intervals to develop trust and friendship between both the neighbouring countries," he said.
The ITBP, raised as a guerrilla-cum-intelligence-cum- fighting force in the wake of Chinese aggression in 1962, at present has 50 battalions of which 20 are deployed on the Indo-China border.
"The force, which was converted to an armed force in 1976, mans the 3,488 km Indo-Tibet border from Karakoram Pass in Ladakh to Jachep-La in Arunachal Pradesh at altitudes ranging between 9000 and 18,700 feet," Sinha added.
PTI