The Tiananmen Square massacre: a rehearsal in Tibet

There was a rehearsal for the Tiananmen incident which saw the Army taking over the Square and killing hundreds of students.
It happened in Lhasa, Tibet three months before the Square's crackdown; a young Party Secretary then demonstrated to the Elders in Beijing that he had the capacity to handle the most difficult situations.
He was suitably rewarded; a few years later, he became General Secretary of the Party and President of the People's Republic of China.
I am reposting here an article written in 2002 for Rediff.com.
As you can see, it pays to be tough in China.
At the Tiananmen's incident, I like the remarks made yesterday by Bill Bishop in his Newsletter Sinocism. He wrote:

I first came to China 25 years, to spend the second semester of my junior year at Peking University. We arrived in late January and I stayed until the third week of June. No one who was in Beijing then will ever forget the Beijing Spring and subsequent crackdown.
The one lesson I took away from those first few months in China is that it is always a mistake to underestimate what the Party will do to stay in power.
That lesson, which has held up very well over the last quarter century, is why I continue to believe that Xi Jinping is very serious about both economic reforms and reining in corruption. There is no shortage of people, inside and outside China, who believe Xi's efforts will fail without said political reform, but Xi and his colleagues appear to disagree. Political reforms in any Western or liberal sense seem even less likely now than they have in decades. 

China is not going to change soon and China will remain aggressive.
Te problem is that Beijing still believes that all its problems are due to her 'bad' and 'provocative' neighbours.
On May 30, The People’s Daily reported that Fu Ying, the Chairperson of the National People’s Congress Foreign Affairs Committee, suggested during a TV show that "all issues in the seas around China were caused by the provocative behavior demonstrated by China’s neighboring countries". 
She, of course, mentioned that Japan which 'faces the question of whether it will continue on the path of being a peaceful nation or not".
After saying that China will not give up on peaceful resolutions, Fu added that "however, strong responses are necessary when facing challenges. This position is also needed to maintain the peaceful and stable order in the entire region".
India too will have to cope with these strong 'peaceful' responses from Beijing.
 
From Roof of the World to Top of the Party
Claude Arpi
Rediff.com
December 10, 2002

The suspense ended on the last day of China's 16th Communist Party Congress in Beijing when the nine chosen ones emerged in the Great Hall of the People. Hu Jintao, freshly appointed general secretary of the party, was leading his eight comrades. China had a new leadership. Hu's presence was not much of a surprise as the world knew he had been groomed for years by his mentor and China's last emperor Jiang Zemin. However, there was speculation about who Hu, the 'grey man of the party,' really was.
Most international media repeated that very little was known about China's new boss. However, one part of his life is quite well documented: the period before he ascended to the standing committee of the CCP's Politburo in 1992.
At that time, the 'core leader of the Forth Generation' was for four years party secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region in Lhasa. It is interesting to have a closer look at the way Hu used his post in Tibet as a stepping stone to reach the top rung of the Middle Kingdom.
Hu always knew that to 'seek fame' does not help to climb the party's ladder. That is probably why he never liked to be in the limelight or give interviews to the foreign press. One can closely follow his steps by his declaration either on Lhasa television or through the official organs of the party.
Of his earlier years, we know little except that one of his best friends was Zhang Hong, who later became Deng Xiaoping's son-in-law. As a mechanical engineer, Hu was posted at different sites throughout China, but in 1980, he was noticed by Song Ping, the party boss in Gansu province and was rapidly promoted. He finally joined the Young Cadre Course at the party school in Beijing in 1981. It was there that he is supposed to have met Hu Yaobang, general secretary of the CCP, who became his first mentor.
The elder Hu was certainly one of the most remarkable leaders of modern China and a great reformer. Remember it is his funeral, after his sudden death during a meeting of the Politburo, which triggered the Tiananmen student revolution.
One of the most remarkable facts about the Elder Hu was that when he visited Tibet in 1980, he was so moved by the suffering of the Tibetan people under Communist rule, that he decided to address 5,000 officials assembled in Lhasa. He publicly admitted that the party 'has let the Tibetan people down' and he added: 'the life of the Tibetan people has not been notably improved' after the Chinese invasion in 1950.
When the Elder Hu tried to introduce reforms in China in the early eighties, he was violently opposed and criticized by conservative forces within the party. During this period, it seems Hu Jintao, who was first secretary of the Communist Youth League, defended him.
However, by the mid-eighties, the direction of the wind had begun to change in Beijing. This is when the Younger Hu showed he was already a Grand Master.
With the balance of power slowly shifting, the Elder Hu began losing to the most conservative elements led by Li Peng and Qiao Shi, and the Younger Hu realigned himself dexterously.
The changes in the party were reflected on the Tibetan question. After the Elder Hu's visit to Tibet in 1980, Beijing had for a few years an open Tibet policy. The Dalai Lama was allowed to send four fact finding delegations and two negotiating teams to Tibet and China. Discussions were held on the Dalai Lama's future role in Tibet. But in 1985, due to the changes in Beijing, the opening came to a sudden halt and a visit to Tibet and China by the Tibetan leader was cancelled.
Sensing the wind, Hu Jintao began leaning towards his new mentor Qiao Shi who was in charge of internal security in the Chinese cabinet.
In Tibet, events took a turn for the worse in September 1987 when some monks demonstrated in Lhasa against Chinese rule. During these days, hundreds of visitors and media persons were present in the Tibetan capital and the images of the repression which followed were reported the world over. In the following months, incidents continued to occur and several Tibetans lost their lives.
Beginning 1988, the Chinese leadership became more and more nervous as they felt they were losing face in the world's eyes. The monks, the very same people they were supposed to have 'liberated' from the clutches of the clergy, were now revolting against the 'motherland.' But worse for Beijing: if the situation was allowed to drift, China could follow the Soviet Union on the way to disintegration.
Something had to be done.
The first scapegoat was Wu Jinghua, the Elder Hu's protégé who lost his job as party secretary in Lhasa. Officially he had a heart attack during a meeting in June 1988 'due to a frigidly cold climate and the lack of oxygen, plus being overloaded with work for a long time.' His mistake was that he had scrupulously implemented the Elder Hu's policies towards Tibet.
In Beijing, Hu Yaobang was replaced by Zhao Ziyang who would be purged after the Tiananmen Square events.
The strong men in the Politburo were Li Peng and the Younger Hu's new mentor Qiao Shi who visited Tibet in July 1988. It is probably at that time that it was decided to appoint Hu Jiantao to replace Wu Jinghua as Tibet chief. It was to be the crucial turn in Hu's career. He probably knew he had to show results in very short time to repay the confidence placed in him by Qiao Shi. Hu knew he could not afford to fail. Had not Qiao Shi threatened of 'merciless repression' if the demonstrations were not immediately stopped?
The Younger Hu took over the rebellious region on January 12, 1989.
A Hong Kong paper Kuang Chiao Ching wrote at that time: 'If he can stabilize the situation in Tibet that would, of course, be the first step towards a rapid rise in Hu Jintao's political fortunes… If he rules Tibet successfully, perhaps the question on everyone's mind in the near future could be: Will Hu Jintao become a superstar on China's political stage?'
On January 19, Hu had a meeting with the People's Liberation Army. During his speech, he spoke about the 'the CCP Central Committee's new instructions on work in Tibet.' Referring to the PLA's role: indeed it was a bad omen for Tibetans, especially after Hu told the army: 'We must strengthen control of monasteries and temples.'
A week later a Beijing newspaper Zhongguo Xinwen She published an interview with Hu in which he described his two main tasks in Tibet: 'To safeguard the unification of the motherland, adopt a clear-cut stand to oppose separatism, and stabilize the situation in Tibet,' and then: 'to continue to carry out economic construction, make redoubled efforts to develop the commodity economy.' This would later be known as Hu's strategy of 'grasping with both hands.'
From that day, events moved very fast.
On January 23, Hu visited the Tashilhunpo monastery in Shigatse. He was accompanied by the Panchen Lama, the second highest ranking Tibetan Lama after the Dalai Lama. The official occasion was the consecration of a stupa containing the mortal remains of one of the previous Panchen Lamas. To everyone's surprise, during the function, the Panchen Lama denounced the Communist Party's role in Tibet: 'although there had been developments in Tibet since its liberation, this development had cost more dearly than its achievements. This mistake must never be repeated.'
Four days later, he passed away in mysterious circumstances. Though Tibetans believed he was murdered, it has never been proven. It is said the Panchen Lama had a serious quarrel with Qiao Shi just before he left for Tibet. Whether this was true or not, the stage was cleared for 'merciless repression.'
When a demonstration erupted on March 5, the People's Armed Police quickly took control of the situation. Chinese journalist Tang Daxian, who had connections in the party and witnessed some of the events, later wrote in London's The Observer that many events were stage managed by the PAP. Beijing had ordered repression. His information was that on March 6 alone, 387 Tibetans were massacred around the Central Cathedral in Lhasa.
The next day, Hu declared that 'the PAP following the instructions of the Central Committee (read Qiao Shi) had maintained the unity of the Motherland… the majority of Tibetans who had joined the disturbance… must be made to feel guilty and promise they would never do so again.'
Martial law was clamped on March 8. The tragic events in Lhasa seem to have been a rehearsal for an even more important episode: the student rebellion on Tiananmen Square three months later.
Hu Jintao told Xinhua news agency a few days after the events: 'We should maintain vigilance against possible activity by the handful of separatists and strike them with relentless blows. We should mete out more severe punishment to those who would start troublemaking after the declaration of martial law.' His ruthless implementation of his bosses' orders and the subsequent replay of Lhasa events at Tiananmen Square proved he was a leader who could be relied upon. When, after the massacre at the Square, Jiang Zemin replaced Zhao Ziyang, he remembered this.
Hu was to stay on for four more years in Tibet, though the job was done in three months. Hu never liked Tibet. He once told a journalist he 'disliked Tibet's altitude, climate and lack of culture.' During the following months and years, he began shuttling between Lhasa and Beijing where the real power was. There was a common joke about Hu amongst Tibetan cadres: 'Where is Hu?' The answer was: 'Hu is in Beijing Hospital.' He had to officially report sick each time he was going to Beijing!
In the following months, Hu further stabilized the situation by targeting Tibetan cadres 'harbouring separatist thoughts.' He believed the main 'evil' was religion, and particularly the monasteries which were 'using feudal and superstitious beliefs to swindle and harm people,' thereby delaying the 'socialist spiritual civilization' heralded by Jiang Zemin.
On April 30, 1990, martial law was finally lifted. Hu used his remaining years as party secretary to completely reverse the Elder Hu's policies. Instead of providing support to the Tibetans to safeguard their culture, the Younger Hu tried to assimilate it into Han culture. While the Elder Hu wanted the Tibetans to be autonomous and take their future into their own hands, he created schemes to bring in more Han officials and colonizers to the Roof of the World, further destroying Tibetan uniqueness.
During a visit to Tibet in 1990, Jiang Zemin echoed Hu's views: 'It is necessary to strengthen education in patriotism and socialism in the light of conditions in China and Tibet, so as to make the students know from childhood that Tibet is an inalienable sacred part of the big family of the motherland, and that there will be no socialist new Tibet if there is no CCP.'
It appears that during Jiang Zemin's visit to Tibet, a close relationship was established between the general secretary and his future protégé.
There is no doubt that the events of the three first months in Tibet earned Hu the admiration of many in Beijing. While the Chinese empire was on the verge of disintegrating and could have followed the example of the Soviet Union, his firm handling of the situation and obedience to party orders were rewarded in 1992 by a seat on the standing committee. It was the next step towards the summit.
It is probably true that in 1989 Hu saved China which could have plunged into the 'chaos' so feared by the Chinese emperors. Had Tibet been lost, no doubt other provinces such as Xinjiang would have followed in quick succession.
Now that the Younger Hu has reached the top, will he continue to 'grasp China with two hands' and tighten security to economically develop China? In many ways, China faces more serious problems now than 1989: unemployment, wild capitalism, corruption, regional aspirations, pollution, food problems are some of the issues the Younger Hu will have to tackle. For this, will he use force as his party elders had instructed him to do in Tibet, or will he choose the path of the Elder Hu, open up the system and ultimately give more power to the people, with all the risks it implies?
Only the future will tell, but he will certainly need more than two hands to grasp the future of the People's Republic.

Calling a spade a spade in dealing with China

Recent PLA's maneuvers in Tibet (April 3)

A friend recently asked me: "In your opinion, how should the new government deal with China?"
I answered that first of all, I do not know who will be the next Prime Minister and then, perhaps more importantly, who will the PM's choice to look after Defence and External Affairs.
It will be indeed crucial choices and the relations with China (and the rest of the world) will depend on this choice.
But something came to me, whoever 'deals' with China will have to be frank and transparent. The person should not be scared to 'hurt China's sensitivities'.  
In this context, an interesting article was published by Xinhua yesterday.
It is a commentary on US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel's visit to China.
Xinhua says that Hagel "may well feel after wrapping up his four-day visit to China on Thursday that Beijing has become more frank with Washington and less hesitant to voice its dissatisfaction with some US moves."
It was indeed the case as several encounters were reported to have been quite 'tough'.
The Chinese Communist Party news agency explains: "By inviting Hagel to tour the 'Liaoning', China's sole aircraft carrier, and being honest about its grievances, China showed that it has nothing to hide."
Then it quotes Fan Changlong, the powerful vice chairman of China's Central Military Commission who "denounced Hagel's recent remarks to ASEAN defense ministers and Japanese politicians over their territorial disputes with China as tough and biased."
It is something that the Indian diplomats and politicians have always difficulty to do: to call a spade a spade. Remember Depsang Plains a year ago.
General Fan Changlong told Hagel in front of the press that the Chinese people, including himself, were dissatisfied with such remarks in Japan.
Xinhua adds: "The unusual harsh tone delivers a clear message: Beijing is resolved to defend its core interests, particularly territorial sovereignty, and will not allow any country to make waves."
Frankness should not be confined to the rooms of Zhongnanhai or South Block, but should be shared with the press and the public. It is something Delhi should definitely learn.
For once, I agree with a comment form Xinhua: "The frankness is expected to reduce the possibility of miscalculation by other countries when they gauge China's red lines, and consequently reduce rashness in their China policy-making."
The new Indian government if it wants to deal on an equal footing with China will have to be frank, straightforward and transparent ...and be able to draw 'red lines'.
If the Chinese news agencies can say: "As a responsible player in regional and global affairs, China expects the United States to respect its core interests, but has been repeatedly disappointed by the latter's double-faced tactics", why can't India does the same to China.
To take a concrete example, why can't Delhi tell Beijing openly, "if you are sincere in finding a solution for the border dispute, why can't you put the maps of your perceived LACs on the table. We are ready to put ours."
Or else, "please explain what are your ownership rights on the Depsang Plains or on Chumur in Ladakh? Why have your perceived LAC moved so much since 1959?" Many such questions should be asked frankly and publicly.
Xinhua says: "Regardless of disagreements in various fields, both Beijing and Washington clearly know they are friends, not enemies, and a healthy US-China relationship is a sine qua non for world peace and stability."
The same thing applies to India and China, but before being real friends, the differences should be openly displayed, discussed and known to the public.
It would be the best way to dismiss unsustainable claims.
Xinhua concludes: "If hard-nosed politicians in Washington can understand Beijing's frankness and resolve better, China-US ties will be more stable and the Asia-Pacific region will be more peaceful."
The 'hard-nosed' leaders in Beijing will understand better India if the next Foreign and Defence Ministers can speak in a straightforward and transparent manner.
The Indian public, which is mature enough, should always be taken into confidence.

Two Clarifications

This pre-1914 map shows Tawang as part of Tibet

Related to my previous posting, I came to know that a 'clarification' on what Lobsang Sangay, the Tibetan 'Prime Minister' (Sikyong) said in Washington DC, has been issued by his Office on May 16.
It does not exactly answer my concerns about India's territorial integrity, however an interview with the Dalai Lama, exactly 10 years ago, for India Abroad (the US-based weekly from the Rediff.com Group) clarifies the issue from the Dalai Lama perspective.
I am posting both.

Clarification on Sikyong’s talk at Council on Foreign Relations
May 16, 2013
This is to clarify some misinterpretation about Sikyong Dr Lobsang Sangay’s talk on Tibet at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) in Washington on 8 May 2013, which was covered by AFP and other media. 
In his talk at CFR, the Sikyong was referring to the socialist system of China at the national level. The Middle-Way policy seeks genuine autonomy within the framework of the Chinese constitution which obviously requires restructuring of the existing system to include all the Tibetan areas under one single administration and implementation of Chinese laws.
Also in an Op-Ed by Nicholas Kristoff in the New York Times on 6 August 2008, His Holiness the Dalai Lama had stated that he can accept the socialist system of China if genuine autonomy is granted to Tibetans.
The Sikyong has consistently maintained that the occupation of Tibet and repression of Tibetans are the causes of protest through self-immolation by Tibetans.

Interview with the Dalai Lama (Dharamsala, May 15, 1993)
Extracts:

Claude: Does China agree with you on the geographical definition of Tibet? Or do they consider only the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR), excluding the eastern provinces of Amdo and Kham from the purview of the discussions?

His Holiness the Dalai Lama: Since the Chinese constitution provides the principle of autonomy for all the Tibetan ethnic people, we are trying to get similar rights for all Tibetans [from the TAR and other provinces]. I do not know [if they will accept], we shall see. We have always been concerned by ALL Tibetans, not only the ones residing in the TAR. If we were seeking separation [from China], then, of course, demanding the other territories [the provinces of Amdo and Kham] would be something difficult [for the Chinese to accept]. But as we have decided to remain within the People’s Republic of China, then, it is reasonable that all the ethnic Tibetans get the same rights. How can we make discrimination between Tibetans inside TAR and those outside?

Claude: What do you mean by “genuine autonomy” for Tibetans with the People’s Republic of China?

His Holiness the Dalai Lama: Foreign Affairs and defense will be carried by the Central government. In other words, Tibetans should have the final authority in all the matters that they can handle better. For example, for large scale factories, we might not be able to manage, so we will take Chinese expertise and help. Of course, for Foreign and Defense, which are themselves large subjects, we need the help of the Chinese.

Claude: Suppose tomorrow, the Chinese accept your formula and you leave with them defense matters. The next day, they plan a war against India. What will you do in such a case?

His Holiness the Dalai Lama: (Thinking deeply). As a Tibetan, it is impossible to think of shooting an Indian. In fact, once a few Indian journalists came here, they were seating where you are today and I explained to them the concept of “genuine autonomy”. I told them jokingly “it is unthinkable for a Tibetan to open fire towards India, so let the Chinese do that”. It was a joke (laughing). But in case such a serious situation develops, of course, I will try my best to cool down the conflict, first as a person devoted to peace and against violence, I will express myself and try [to solve the conflict].Then the best part of my life has been spent in India. India is also the home of our spirituality, the home of Buddhadharma. For me, the sino-indian relations are so important; conflict should be avoided at any cost. It is what I think.

Claude: Do you see any role for India to facilitate an acceptable solution between the Tibetans and Beijing?

His Holiness the Dalai Lama: Theoretically, morally India should do something, but how much India can do, I do not know.

Claude: You proposed to transform Tibet into a “zone of Ahimsa”. Will it not help solving many security problems for India?

His Holiness the Dalai Lama: Yes, certainly.

Beijing's Map Aggresion Now and Then

Chinese maps showing Arunachal as part of China

Yesterday, Xinhua reported that China "has inked for the first time South China Sea islands on its new official maps in equal scale to that of the Chinese mainland."
The National Administration of Surveying, Mapping and Geoinformation (NASMG) announced that "the new vertical-format maps of China, published by Sinomaps Press, include more than 130 islands and islets in the South China Sea, most of which have not been featured on previous maps of China."
Zhou Beiyan, the editor of the new maps declared: "The old maps, which were in horizontal format, only featured bigger islands such as the Xisha, Zhongsha and Nansha islands. These were illustrated in the bottom-right corner at half the scale used for the Chinese mainland."
The new maps will not be available to the public until the end of January.
But according to the Communist mouthpiece: "The maps will be very significant in enhancing Chinese people's awareness of national territory, safeguarding China's marine rights and interests and manifesting China's political diplomatic stance.
The publisher of the maps asserted that "the new vertical maps have marked clearly the major South China Sea islands and demonstrated their geographic relations with surrounding island countries as well as surrounding islands and islets".
This reminds me of the map aggression against India in the early 1950s, at the time the infamous Panchesheel Agreement was negotiated and the foolishness of the Indian Governement which did not react to the Chinese 'map' aggression.
I post here a telling excerpt from my book, Born in Sin: the Panchesheel Agreement.

Nehru’s Visit to Beijing in October 1954
The visit of the Indian Prime Minister to Beijing marks the apogee of the ‘friendship’ between India and China and perhaps also the first beginning of the doubts in Nehru’s mind. 
For the first time on October 19, 1954, the Indian Prime Minister met Mao in the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. The Great Helmsman began the talks by dwelling “on the age-old associations and the new friendship between China and India”.
This remark speaks for itself. While the Indian leaders were speaking of 2000 years of friendship, Mao was speaking of ‘new friendship’.
Nehru had two talks with Mao, but neither party raised the Tibetan issue or the border question. Mao was more interested to know the reaction of the Indian leader on the use of the atomic bomb . It is during this meeting that Mao first termed the bomb as a ‘paper tiger’ .
During the three meetings between Nehru and Zhou Enlai, once again the ‘small matters’ were not discussed, except for a short mention about the Chinese maps which showed large parts of India and Burma within the Chinese territory. Nehru hesitantly told Zhou:

As regards maps, I just casually mentioned to you some of the anxieties of our neighbours. We are not worried on this point. Our frontiers are clear but I mention it in the case of Burma because questions of this kind become a handle in the hands of enemy. Supposing we publish a map showing Tibet as a part of India, how would China feel about it? But as I said, I am sure, the maps were old maps and you did not mean it.

Finally at the end of meeting, Nehru dared ask Zhou a question directly linked to the six-month old Agreement on Tibet. As with the 17-Point Agreement three years earlier, the Chinese had scant respect for the provisions of the Sino-Indian Agreement. Though always ready to use its preamble, the Chinese leaders treated the Agreement as a mere piece of paper, at least as far as the main clauses were concerned. This was less than six months after the signature. For a simple matter such as the rights to go on a pilgrimage, the Indians (and Tibetans) were harassed. Nehru explained as mildly as possible to his counterpart the difficulties encountered by the pilgrims:
There is a small matter which I may take this opportunity to mention to you. Some complaints have recently been received from pilgrims going to Tibet. Some of them are apparently being harassed by guards and I hope that Your Excellency will look into the matter. As you are aware, every summer there is a large pilgrim traffic between India and Tibet. As an example of the sort of harassment to which these pilgrims are subjected, I would mention that one of my friends was stopped by the border guards who told him that he could not be regarded as a pilgrim because he was not wearing a monk's gown.
The Indian Prime Minister had still not realised that the Five Principles were a one-way road; but he was much too engrossed in his future role not only as the ‘neutral’ chairperson of the cease-fire commission for Indochina but also the self-appointed leader of the newly independent nations of Asia and Africa.
Two small incidents indicate the future direction in which the relations between India, Tibet and China would go.
During the course of his visit, Nehru had occasion to meet the young Dalai Lama  for the first time. As we have seen, Tibet and the border issue had been totally ignored in the talks with the Chinese leaders. This encounter with the young Lama was for Nehru like a mirror reminding him of the main provisions of the treaty (i.e. Tibet). The Dalai Lama recalls:
We [in Tibet] had heard his name. India also was a country very close to our mind. I had personally heard about Nehru.
When we heard that we will meet him, there was a bit of excitement.
Pandit Nehru led by Zhou Enlai and many Chinese dignitaries were lining up when he reached the place where I was standing.
Zhou Enlai said: ‘This is the Dalai Lama.’ Nehru remained motionless, no speech, not looking in the eyes.
He just stood in front of me, without speech, without moving, motionlessly he remained like that. I was a bit embarrassed. I told through the Chinese interpreter: ‘I have heard a lot about you, and today I am very happy to meet you’.
Nehru did not give a particular response, he seemed maybe happy, then he went to the next person. That was my first experience [with him].
[That day] I thought and felt that from Nehru’s side, there will be no support for Tibet and no support for the Dalai Lama. During a short moment, many things that occurred from 1949 till 1954 [passed] in his mind, like lightning, that is my feeling.
Was this strange silence of the Indian Prime Minister a sign that he had begun to realize that he had betrayed his own statement four years earlier in the Lok Sabha ?
Another incident is worth relating. Sultan M. Khan, then an official  in the Pakistani Embassy in Beijing remembers:
Sino-Indian relations continued to get closer, and Nehru received a very warm welcome on his visit in 1954. A few days after his visit, the Indian Embassy held a reception at which I overheard an Indian diplomat, who had acted as Nehru’s interpreter, telling some of his colleagues that just before his departure for Shanghai, Nehru was in a very sombre mood, and had said to senior members of his delegation that after his talks with Mao, he was pessimistic about the relations with China, and foresaw a conflict in the future. The Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 was far away and seemed unlikely in 1954 in the hey-day of Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai. I do not know on what basis Nehru foresaw this, but the 1962 war  was of India’s making.
Perhaps after hearing Mao’s comment on the atomic bomb, Nehru was unsure of the success of his Five Principles. Though one cannot be certain of the veracity of Khan’s comments, they appear to have some truth. It is certain that in June-July 1954 the Chinese leaders had got the support that they needed from India at a very crucial moment of their history. It helped them to impose their view in Geneva. Six months later, their needs were not the same and this partly explains Mao’s tough talk with Nehru.

They missed an opportunity for 'wider considerations'

The Special Representatives of India and China have began their 15th Round of talks on the border issues.
The discussions were postponed when Beijing objected to the participation of the Dalai Lama in the Global Buddhist Congregation in December.
Shiv Shankar Menon, India's National Security Adviser, and Chinese State Councillor Dai Bingguo are leading the two delegations.
This round should cover "the range of long-standing territorial disputes and other issues" an official communique said.
Dai said: "While working hard to develop itself, China is fully committed to developing long-term friendship and cooperation with India ...there does not exist such a thing as China's attempt to 'attack India' or 'suppress India's development'".
I am posting here a chapter of my book, Born in Sin, the Panchsheel Agreement. In the early 1950's India lost an opportunity of solve the border issue when she had all the cards in her hands, the Indian politicians then decided to give these cards away to show her great magnanimity. 
At that time, Delhi was only interested by 'larger issues'.
India still pays for the foolishness of its leaders.

Born in Sin
Chapter 7  

In September 1952, before his transfer to Cairo, Panikkar had several meetings with Zhou Enlai who told the Ambassador that the downgrading of the Lhasa Mission was only the first step to pave the way for negotiations on ‘all outstanding problems’.
During the first months of 1953, Nehru may have felt that the situation was settling down in Tibet and slowly the Tibetans were accepting the invasion of their country by the Liberation Army as a fait accompli.
In September 1953, Nehru wrote to his Chinese counterpart that India was anxious to come to a final settlement about “pending matters so as to avoid any misunderstanding and friction at any time”. Quoting a letter sent one year earlier, he said that “No further steps have been taken since then to negotiate a settlement”.
It appears that different visitors and informants were briefing Nehru about the situation inside Tibet. It was reported that everything was quiet on the Roof of the World. In early December 1953, Nehru mentions that, he had received a letter from George Roerich, the Russian painter and scholar living in Kulu giving him more information.  After admitting that “our Intelligence has looked upon them [the Roerich] with some slight suspicion although they have never had anything to get hold of,” Nehru told T.N. Kaul, the Joint Secretary in the China Desk in the Ministry of External Affairs:
His [Roerich] general report to me has been that things are very calm in Tibet and both the people and the Lama hierarchy have adjusted themselves to the new order. This is chiefly so because the Chinese have refrained from interfering in anything. The Tibetans are, therefore, not so apprehensive as they used to be. 
As we have seen in the case of food supply to the Chinese troops and the sacking of the Tibetan Prime Ministers , the report was not completely true. The Chinese had begun interfering actively in the life of the Tibetans. In fact, they started meddling in the internal affairs of Tibet almost immediately after the signature of the 17-Point Agreement.
In the same letter Nehru requested Kaul to meet Roerich  “to gain some information about conditions in Tibet, the Dalai Lama, the Panchen Lama, etc.”
Nehru considered that the time had come to renegotiate the old Simla Convention signed in 1914 between the British and the Tibetans. He therefore decided to take the initiative and propose negotiations to resolve ‘all outstanding issues’. The talks were to begin in December 1953 in Beijing and were schedule to last a maximum of six weeks. Unfortunately, they would take four months to reach a conclusion. Kaul, one of the main negotiators in Beijing  described the preparations for the Conference thus:
Many meetings and discussions were held and it was decided to sound the Chinese. Not unexpectedly they welcomed the idea. It was decided to send a small delegation to Peking to discuss the matter and reach an agreement, if possible. The spade work had already been done by Panikkar, Raghavan and me in Peking. The new Indian Ambassador to China, N. Raghavan, was appointed the leader and I the deputy-leader of the Indian delegation. Director, Historical Division, External Affairs Ministry, the late Dr. Gopalachari, was a member. His knowledge of history and facts of the Sino-Indian border was an asset. We were authorised to co-opt such other members of the Embassy as we found necessary. It was a small delegation, as delegations go, but convenient and closely knit.
Most of the correspondence or instructions during the following months will be routed through Kaul, one of Nehru’s Kashmiri blue-eyed boys.

The Instructions
In early December, the Secretary General put up a Note  in which he defined the main points for discussions at what became known as the Beijing Conference. These points were:
1.    The question of India’s frontier with Tibet,
2.    Indo-Tibetan trade and trade agencies,
3.    Freedom of movement of Indian and Tibetan traders and pilgrims,
4.    Passports and visas,
5.    Telegraph, post office and hospitals
6.    Security guards and escorts and
7.    Special position of Bhutan.
On 3 December 1953, Nehru replied to this Note giving the framework for negotiations to be held in Beijing regarding the relations between India and China and India’s interests in Tibet. He clarified the position to be adopted by the Indian delegation during the Beijing Conference. More particularly on the border question, though he generally agreed with the points made by the Secretary General, he chose to remain faithful to the Panikkar doctrine: “remain silent about the border”:
We should not raise this question. If the Chinese raise it, we should express our surprise and point out that this is a settled issue. Further, during the last two years or so, when reference was frequently made about Indo-Chinese or Indo-Tibetan problems, there has never been any reference to this frontier issue and it is surprising that this should be brought up now. Our delegation cannot discuss it.
Though Panikkar had been transferred more than a year earlier to Cairo, Nehru was still keen to consult him on China’s affairs. The former Ambassador had suggested a step further, he had written: “if China insisted on reopening  the whole issues of the frontier, the Indian delegation could walk out of the conference and break off the negotiations.” Nehru was not as extreme as Panikkar, he did not recommend walking out of the Conference, his instructions were: “We should avoid walking out unless the Chinese insist on taking up this question. If such an eventuality occurs, the matter will no doubt be referred to us.”
To agree to discuss the border issue was for Panikkar an admission that there was a problem.   But can wishful thinking take away an issue?
Nehru objected to the inclusion of some parts in Pakistan occupied Kashmir in the discussions. He pointed out that India was not in possession of these territories .
He also believed that it was important to keep the trade marts alive as he envisioned an increase in the commercial exchanges with Tibet in the future. He wrote: “Tibet is our natural market and we should develop it normally.” He was in favour of keeping the trade agencies functional: “Gartok is important. Yatung especially, and, to some extent, Gyantse are likely to become more important as trade between India and Tibet increases. They are on the main route. Therefore, it is eminently reasonable that we should have some trade agents there or at least at Yatung.”
The Prime Minister noted the case of a small village/principality called Minsar which was under the suzerainty of the Maharaja of the Jammu & Kashmir State . This principality located near Mount Kailash was supposed to provide the revenues to maintain the temples around the sacred mountain and the holy lakes. Being inside the Tibetan territory, Nehru thought that India should renounce her rights as a gesture of goodwill. He wrote:
Regarding the village of Minsar in Western Tibet, which has belonged to the Kashmir State, it is clear that we shall have to give it up, if this question is raised. We need not raise it. If it is raised, we should say that we recognize the strength of the Chinese contention and we are prepared to consider it and recommend it.
But the matter will have to be referred to the Kashmir Government. The point is that we should not come to a final agreement without gaining the formal assent of the Kashmir Government. 
However, it does not appear that the Chinese raised the question and no reference seems to have been made to the Kashmir government.
The Indian rights to this small town were inherited from the Peace Treaty between Ladakh and Tibet signed in Tingmosgang in 1684. Apart from the confirmation of the delimitation of the border between Western Tibet and Ladakh, the Treaty said:
But the king of Ladakh reserves to himself the village of Minsar in Ngari-khor-sum, [Western Tibet] that it may be independent there; and it sets aside its revenue for the purpose of meeting the expense involved in keeping up the sacrificial lights at Kang-rin [i.e., Kailash], and the Holy lakes of Mansarowar and Rakshas Tal.
The note of the Ministry also mentioned some disputed areas in Hunza which is located in the part of Kashmir occupied by Pakistan. Nehru indicated that India could “hardly discuss these with them [the Chinese] and we can point out that all this area is under dispute with Pakistan.”
As for trade, Nehru felt that it should be restricted to the trade between India and Tibet. This remark once more proves that the purpose of the Beijing Conference was mainly to ‘update’ the Trade Regulations of 1914. We have to add that the Commerce Ministry had agreed with Nehru about the restriction of the Agreement to the trade with Tibet. Nehru noted that Tibet was India’s ‘natural market’ and that it should be developed. But here again, as in the case of food supply, he was ready to bargain:
As regards prohibited articles, this prohibition should generally continue. But we might be a little more generous in regard to petrol, etc. A few thousand gallons does not make any difference to us, nor does it make any great difference on the other side from the military points of view. But, as a bargaining counter, we might agree to relax our rules to a small extent.
A point was then raised by the Prime Minister: the right of Free Transit. According to a Convention signed in Barcelona in 1921, Tibet and China could claim free transit for goods from India. Nehru commented that the question of free transit of foreign goods from India hardly arise because China hardly purchases foreign goods. However, he thought that it would be interesting if China claimed the right under the Barcelona Convention of 1921: “That itself would slightly weaken China’s attempt to bypass or reject old conventions and customs.”
The Sikkim road, as we saw earlier, had been used for carrying food grains to the PLA. The interesting point here is: were the Chinese ready to recognize old treaties and conventions? In fact, the raison d’être of the Beijing Conference was that the Chinese  were refusing to recognise the Simla Convention which they considered an ‘imperialist’ (or ‘unequal’) treaty signed on behalf of India by the British Empire.
It is perhaps Nehru’s perception that old treaties or conventions could be discarded or sent to scrap which most weakened the Indian stand. It is certainly a wrong interpretation in international law  and it made it easy for the Chinese to tell their Indian counterparts “look here, McMahon was an imperialist, McMahon line is an imperialist fabrication, it is illegal ”.
On the one hand, India was ambiguous about the rights and obligations that she had inherited from the British and on the other hand she wanted the McMahon line to be recognised as the international border.The Indian stand lacked logic: in accepting that Tibet was only ‘a region of China’ and that China was entitled to discuss the Tibetan issue, without even referring the matter to the Tibetan authorities , India was not only nullifying the role and presence of the Tibetans during the Simla Convention, but also invalidating the main outcome of the Convention namely the McMahon Line. The disastrous consequences of this stand can still be seen nearly fifty years later .
Regarding the Karakoram High Road , Nehru held a pessimistic view, he thought that it was ‘exceedingly unlikely’ that India regain the territories annexed by Pakistan: “I do not know that it will serve any useful purpose for us to ask for the restoration of the old trade route between Sinkiang and Kashmir. That route passes through territory held by Pakistan. It is exceedingly unlikely that we shall get back this territory. However, there is no harm in mentioning this.”
Regarding Bhutan, Nehru did not want anything to be mentioned but in case the matter was raised by the Chinese, he directed the negotiators to make it  “clear that External Affairs of Bhutan are under our direct guidance,” the Chinese will have to deal with us in regard to External Affairs relating to Bhutan.”
This was the framework for the Beijing Conference.

India’s Wider Considerations
The briefing as retold by Kaul is very different from the Note sent by Nehru to the Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs. While we just saw that the Note dealt with down-to-earth problems of trade, pilgrimage or even the border question, Kaul mentioned only what he calls ‘broad guidelines’ for negotiations which is in fact a very vague general policy. Whom should we believe? What was the true briefing of the negotiators? We should perhaps have look at Kaul’s guidelines before tentatively answering this question.
In his book “Diplomacy in War and Peace” , Kaul wrote: “Before our departure for Peking, the following broad guidelines were formulated.”
Kaul then began explaining that Nehru's idea was “to evolve a method of peaceful and friendly co-existence with the Peoples' Republic of China, in spite of our different political, social and economic systems.” For the Indian diplomat, it was the first time in history that ‘a modus vivendi between a communist and a non-communist country’ was to be worked out and in very specific terms.
He continued by quoting Lenin’s idea of ‘peaceful co-existence’, the Charter of the UNO, the Kellog Pact  and other documents which were ‘general declaration’ of intentions.
Nehru wanted to go a step further: it is what Kaul considered unique in the negotiations. For the first time, a bilateral agreement between two sovereign independent countries was to be signed insisting on peaceful co-existence. One can seriously question the interpretation of Kaul. These five principles are the plain and ordinary principles on which normal relations between independent nations are based, but for Kaul considered that Nehru was the first world statesman to formulate these ideas and ideals into a code of conduct governing bilateral relations and that it was remarkable that these principles could apply to two countries with different social ideologies and forms of government.
The negotiations lasted from the last day of 1953 till the end of April 1954. If we analyze Kaul’s report, we see that his contention that a consensus evolved week after week, seems more an after-thought than a hard reality.
What was supposed to be merely a trade agreement, to replace the Simla Convention and Anglo-Tibetan Trade Regulations of July 1914, took a disproportionate magnitude and became a full-fledged philosophical and ideological exercise of diplomatic idealism .. Nevertheless, we should not forgot that the primarily purpose of the Beijing Conference was to regulate the trans-border trade and traffic between India and Tibet and replace the earlier Trade Regulations which were, for Nehru and Mao, ‘imperialist’ in nature.
Ideologically Kaul gave his own justification for the ‘briefing’ before the Agreement:
In India, one school looked upon China as the main threat to India's security in the North and North-East. It was further developed by some into a thesis that India should align herself with America and the West to meet this threat, as she could not meet it alone. 
In Kaul’s opinion, this thesis however firstly overlooked the fact that it was not easy for the Western powers to get involved in a war between China and India, and for them to provide help to the Indian subcontinent. Secondly, “it also ignored the fact that a country like India, with its tradition, history, culture, policy of non-alignment, and its size and potential, could not become the client-state of any other power.”
The main argument was that as the world was living in the middle of the Cold War, India should not ‘push’ China further into the Russian camp. On the contrary, an alliance between the Asian giants could augur a loosening of the Cold War, creating the space for a third ‘neutral’ block. But this theory does not consider the fact that Mao’s China was not interested in creating a third pole. Though they had strong divergences with Moscow , Beijing nevertheless always remained in the socialist world.
General Samuel B. Griffith, the famous expert in Chinese warfare  wrote an interesting analysis of Communist military strategy:
Chinese political dogma postulates certain axioms fundamental to long-term grand strategy. Principal among these is the stereotyped concept of a bipolar world in which the forces of ‘imperialism’ are inexorably arrayed against the forces of ‘socialism’. This concept specifically excludes the possibilities of ‘non-alignment’ and neutralism. There can be no middle way, no third road, no fence straddling. A nation must, in Mao’s word, ’lean’ to one side or the other.
As Panikkar had wished few years earlier, it was perhaps Kaul’s intention to ‘convert’ Mao. Once more, one wonders at the connection between this naive and romantic diplomacy and the trade regulations for Tibet. But Kaul continued with another argument which is more difficult to follow:
They [the proponents of the first school of thought] forgot the facts of geography and geo-politics that India was physically much closer to China and Russia and their combined hostility could prove a much more serious threat to India than only China's or that of the West… 
He then described the other trend in the Indian politics:
The other school was represented by the doctrinaire wing of the Indian communists who saw in the liberation of China the panacea for India's troubles, and therefore, wanted India to go the Chinese way. They wanted to have an alliance with both China and Russia and go communist. They were supported by some camp followers and fellow travellers who waxed eloquent on the sentiment of Asian brotherhood and "Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai.”
It is surprising that Kaul could analyze the situation as though the Communists in India were the only proponents of the Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai policy.  Kaul concluded that: “Nehru belonged to neither school of thought. He was a realist, proud of India's heritage and conscious of its destiny.” But history is witness that none else than Nehru and his advisors fathered the Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai policy which ballooned into incredible proportions in the mid-fifties before being punctured in October 1962.
Kaul said that he had tried to recapture Nehru's thoughts and added that Nehru: “believed in non-alignment because his pride in India would not allow any other country or group of countries to dominate our policies.” Unfortunately this attitude was not supported by the necessary strength and consistency  and ultimately collapsed on the slopes of the NEFA.
The historian Parshotam Mehra in a well-researched book Negotiating with the Chinese: 1846-1987 brings forward another aspect of the India’s China policy when he quotes J.S. Grant, the Acting British High Commissioner in Delhi:
A perceptive contemporary British observer of the Indian scene who called New Delhi's attitude towards China as 'the most complex piece in the puzzle of Indian foreign policy' was convinced that 'fear is really their [Indians'] basic motive.' New Delhi, he argued, was 'horrified at the possibility of war' and was determined 'at all costs to avoid any involvement in any clash with China: In the event, it had resolved 'to cultivate and retain friendly relations with China' for achieving which it was prepared to pay 'almost any price .'
As indicated earlier, in its wish to align with China, India could not remain non-aligned. Thus one often comes across a violently anti-American stance in Nehru’s writings (and even more in Krishna Menon’s). Both had probably many good reasons to hold such views, particularly when they realized the biased attitude of the West on the Kashmir issue, but to be caught in a vicious circle of reaction and counter-reaction could certainly not be the basis of a foreign policy. The more Nehru’s government reacted to the West, the more the West tended to believe that Pakistan was a surer bet and a safer ally.
Around that time, South Block saw the Beijing Conference as an opportunity to ‘break’ the alliance between the Soviet and the Chinese, thereby creating a third ‘neutral’ pole. The Indian diplomats were certainly presumptuous to presume that India could break the axis Moscow-Beijing.
The theory of a non-aligned movement and more particularly the motivations behind India’s move to come closer to China to counterbalance the two blocks (preventing China from leaning towards Russia) can now be seen as a myth.
One can accuse China of many things, but as long as Mao was alive, the communist ideology remained unwavering. In spite of its own ‘fraternal’ problems with Russia. China never considered India a natural ally, the Chinese leaders had too much contempt for India to do so.
Kaul may have thought: ”Mao's China, though communist, had its own brand of communism which had not yet become dogmatic as in Stalin's Russia,” but movements like the Great Leap Forward or the Cultural Revolution have proven him wrong.
Another of Nehru’s motivations for signing an agreement with China was that it would be the first of long series of bilateral agreements between the various free nations of Asia. Burma and Indonesia were the next in Nehru’s mind. Slowly, the scope of the movement would increase. He thought that it would eventually bring peace which would spread, first in Asia and then in the world. A movement of peaceful coexistence of which he would represent a sort of radiating centre.
While Indian diplomats seemed obsessed with ‘broader perspectives’ and ‘larger issues’, in contrast, the Chinese were very down to earth with their problems: they had objectives which had to be reached, and no philosophy or emotion was involved. This reminds us of the message written by a Chinese Emperor on a Stone Pillar in Lhasa after a war between Tibet and Nepal: the Emperor wrote : “If a people abandon military pursuits and make literature their chief object, they become unable to safeguard their former position. This should be known.”
The Indian diplomats never understood that the Chinese could think or react differently from them. To convert them to Indian philosophy was a mere utopia. Again Kaul confused the issues, putting thereby the Indian side in a position of inferiority vis-à-vis China:
Negotiations would be restricted to trade and cultural inter-course between India and the 'Tibet region of China’. However it was important not to lose sight of the broader perspective and larger interests of putting Sino-Indian relations on a proper footing.
The border question was not to be raised by us. We would not express any doubts about the border. If the Chinese raised it we would affirm that the border was traditional, historical and well defined by treaties, geographical and other features. 
The Beijing Conference was to redraft the Simla Convention and the Trade Regulation of 1914, but the border which was the direct and main outcome of this Convention was not to be raised as an issue!
We can conclude that though this general policy vis-à-vis China may have been discussed informally, it seems clear from the detailed instructions of the Indian Prime Minister that the Beijing Conference was about the regulation of trade with Tibet. It is another matter that, in delaying an early agreement, the Chinese managed to derail the main purpose of the Conference and sidetrack it onto the vague level of eternal friendship (or brotherhood) between India and China.
Here again we quote again General Griffith:
Generally, the Chinese are predisposed to indirect, rather than direct, means, an approach summarized in the phrase “sheng tung; chi hsi” (“Uproar in the East; Strike in the West”). This was a basic ingredient in the successful operations carried on by the Eight Route Army and its predecessor and successor armies. Obviously, the principle is not confine to tactical application.
For Mao and Zhou, there was only one struggle. Diplomacy and armed struggle were two aspects of the same combat. In the case of the Beijing negotiations, the Indian delegation themselves were creating the ‘uproar’ with their ‘wider’ issues, China would strike on the only point which mattered to it at that time: official recognition of Tibet as a ‘region’ of China.

India and the larger perspectives
In early 1953, Nehru had once again explained to the Lok Sabha his decision to press for the recognition of China by the UN as it was: “not a question of any one of us liking or disliking the present Government in China or approving or disapproving of China's revolution, but it is a question of one of the biggest countries in the world not being represented there, not being recognised there.”
Since Mao’s take over of China at the end of 1949, Nehru had constantly, in all fora, been the champion of the recognition of Communist China’s status. Many in Nehru’s circle thought that this kindness would be repaid one day and that China would return the help and support given by India. Nehru’s first ‘confirmation’ of this view came in June 1953, when an agreement was concluded in the Korean war between the UN and the Northern Command on the repatriation of the prisoners of war in Korea. The resolution, finally accepted by China was very similar to the one proposed earlier by New Delhi. The fact that under the Armistice Agreement it was at the insistence of China that India was named Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission vindicated Nehru’s view that China had now become India’s friend.
The Indian Communists pushed harder than anybody in North Korea’s and China’s favour. During a debate in the Lok Sabha on 23 December 1953, a communist member, Hiren Mukherjee urged the Government to provide as much help to the Chinese and the North Koreans as possible in order to enable them to gain their objective [to take over the South]. But many dissident voices were heard both from the socialist benches as well as the Hindu Mahasabha.
V. G. Deshpande  criticized India's unnecessary interest in the Korean question and observed: "So far as Korea is concerned we had been warning the Prime Minister that he should not ... go out of his way to please or displease other countries so that China may be recognized..."
The nomination of India as Chairman of the Neutral Commission for Korea encouraged South Block to see the situation very positively; China’s attitude towards India was changing. Kaul view of the situation was optimistic:
The Tibet problem was, for the moment, out of the way. India's attitude on Korea and refusal in the UNO to brand Peking as aggressor had made an impact on the Chinese leaders. India's leading role in repeatedly pressing for the right of the Peking Government to represent China in the UNO was a principled and consistent stand which China appreciated. India's efforts to bring about a cease-fire in Korea impressed China of India's helpful and positive role in international affairs. 
With Tibet and Korea out of the way: wider perspectives could now be tackled.
Kaul had another argument: he thought that the only way to stop China from dominating her neighbours, was to have a formal agreement with China. Unfortunately, history has shown that China has never been too attached to pieces of papers or agreements. If Mao considered the atom bomb a ‘paper tiger’, one can imagine what a mere piece of paper was!
Kaul analyzed the situation differently:
… there was danger of a strong, united, isolated and expansionist communist China dominating her neighbours. India would be the main obstacle in this. But Nehru argued that if India and China could work out a modus vivendi of respecting each other's sovereignty and integrity and non-interference in internal affairs, it would be a step away from the cold war and prevent its penetration into Asia.
China had more urgent tasks ahead than to take on India, but Beijing did use the Beijing Conference as a unique opportunity to formalize its occupation of Tibet. Another Chinese interest was the ‘non-interference’ provision: it could help them to keep the Americans away in the Indochinese peninsula.
Kaul concluded: “This was the best time to make a rapprochement with China. It might still be possible to reach a tacit understanding on our border and other problems peacefully.”
We should not forget that though Tibet had been ‘liberated’ , the treaty signed between the British and the Tibetan government in Simla in 1914 was still in force. It had to be replaced by new one where the ‘ownership’ of China would be accepted once and for all by India. Once again, the situation demonstrates the confusion and incoherence of the Indian side. On the one hand Nehru said that there was no border problem and the issue should not be mentioned and on the other hand, Kaul said that it was the occasion to reach an understanding on the border.
The Indian diplomat further analyse: “It seemed there were also two main trends of thought in China. One, represented by Chou En-lai, hoped for a peaceful, cooperative co-existence with India. The other represented by the so-called "radicals" wanted to humiliate India. Mao was perhaps, somewhere in the middle.”
Kaul was also certainly wrong in his analysis of the political currents within the Chinese leadership. Mao was the supreme leader and the other members of the Politburo merely executed his strategy.
As for the negotiation, it had been decided that if there were any doubts during the course of the talks, these would be referred to Delhi for final decision.

China has to be careful

My article on the Chinese reaction to bin Laden's death appeared in today's The New Indian Express.


China has to be careful
The New Indian Express
21 May 2011
Operation Geronimo created a geopolitics tsunami not only in South Asia, but in the entire world. Was Osama bin Laden’s elimination the end of terrorism? His death was commented, analysed and the consequences examined all over the planet. On the eastern horizon, the Chinese leadership was not indifferent to Osama’s ‘elimination’ and more particularly, to the way the operation was conducted. Beijing hailed Osama’s death as a positive step, while keeping it low key. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jiang Yu said: “We believe his death is a milestone and a positive development of the international anti-terrorism effort. Terrorism is the world public enemy and China has also fallen victim to it.” She was probably hinting at the 2009 Xinjiang events.
The Global Times commented that “it should have been much easier”, considering that the US and its allies are so powerful. The Communist newspaper believed that “lack of justice in Washington’s policies toward the Middle East and neighbouring regions”, was one of the reasons for the long delay in catching bin Laden. A day after the Operation, Zhang Xin, the director of the military channel at China Central Television wrote on Sina.com (China’s most active microblogging site): “(bin Laden) single-handedly confronted the world’s sole superpower, the US… He is the greatest national hero in the history of the Arab world.”
Some comments were more extreme: “Comrade bin Laden... dedicated his youth and life to the greatest undertaking in this world—struggle against American imperialism. His sacrifice will only inspire countless people who are against world hegemony to continue forth!” It has to be noted that this type of remark is not censored by Beijing’s Great Firewall; the Communist leadership is probably not unhappy to send indirect messages to Washington. Many Chinese citizens also celebrated bin Laden’s death on microblogging sites such as Sina Wibo. They believed that he was responsible for the deaths of Han people in Xinjiang.
On May 7, an article in China Review News predicted that China will be the next target of US anti-terrorism ‘war’. It argued that before 9/11, President Bush viewed China as the main strategic rival and then when “Osama bin Laden gave a vicious blow to the US, Bush became a different person and turned to cooperate with China”. The conclusion was “9/11 changed the foundations of Sino-US relations and gave China a 10-year golden opportunity to regain strength.”
Though it was not officially stated, one factor has deeply disturbed Beijing: the US commandos intervention in a foreign country without the permission, or the knowledge, of the country. China fears that one day a similar intervention (overt or covert) could occur there. What if World Power No. 1 or the ‘world community’ were to decide, like in the case of Libya, that China does not behave properly with its people (in Tibet and Xinjiang for example), can they intervene?
True, China is larger than Libya, but this explains Jiang’s reaction to US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s comparison between the recent turmoil in the Arab world and China’s tough response to its opponents. Jiang accused Clinton of using inappropriate language: US had no business “to put China on par with countries in western Asia and north Africa”. Beijing has always taken refuge behind the Panchsheel declaration which asserted “mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs”.
In the immediate future, the quarrel between Washington and Islamabad leaves some place for Beijing to maneuver and reinforce its presence in the AfPak region (let us not forget that Afghanistan is extremely rich in coveted minerals). Pakistan Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani’s four-day visit to Beijing from May 18 should be seen in this context. Stratfor strategic website affirms: “Shortly after the US raid that killed Osama bin Laden and violated Pakistani sovereignty, (the visit) is intended to send Washington a message that Islamabad has other patrons it can turn to for help.” However, to replace the US by China is not an easy proposition: “Pakistan will find its leverage over Washington dramatically reduced at a time when its dependence on China has grown, which will lead to tensions in that relationship as well.” Beijing is in a dilemma: sending army personnel to PoK and discreetly supporting some terrorist groups may only help China’s interests in the region in a short term.
Osama’s death will, however, not change the terrorist scenario in Pakistan. If Beijing decides to use the LeT or JeM to destabilise India, it may not be easy to ‘manage’ these groups in a way that their actions do not spill over into Uyghur-inhabited areas which witnessed ethnic clashes in July 2009. Ultimately, it could be to Beijing’s disadvantage, though in 2009 the CCP signed a formal agreement with the Jamaat-i-Islami in which Pakistan’s main Islamic party agreed ‘not to become involved with Uyghur Muslims of Xinjiang’. The Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal has a similar understanding.
For Beijing, the real dilemma is that if it wants to be a responsible ‘world power’, it needs to be careful while supporting an unreliable ‘all-weather friend’; it’s a risky game which may not bring stability in the region. Is it Beijing interest? Probably not.

China in Pakistan

In August 2010, Selig Harrison, a former foreign correspondent in India (he interviewed Nehru after the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict) wrote in The New York Times, an Op-Ed entitled China's Discreet Hold on Pakistan's Northern Borderlands. He argued:

While the world focuses on the flood-ravaged Indus River valley, a quiet geopolitical crisis is unfolding in the Himalayan borderlands of northern Pakistan, where Islamabad is handing over de facto control of the strategic Gilgit-Baltistan region in the northwest corner of disputed Kashmir to China.
The entire Pakistan-occupied western portion of Kashmir stretching from Gilgit in the north to Azad (Free) Kashmir in the south is closed to the world, in contrast to the media access that India permits in the eastern part, where it is combating a Pakistan-backed insurgency. But reports from a variety of foreign intelligence sources, Pakistani journalists and Pakistani human rights workers reveal two important new developments in Gilgit-Baltistan: a simmering rebellion against Pakistani rule and the influx of an estimated 7,000 to 11,000 soldiers of the People’s Liberation Army.
China wants a grip on the region to assure unfettered road and rail access to the Gulf through Pakistan. It takes 16 to 25 days for Chinese oil tankers to reach the Gulf. When high-speed rail and road links through Gilgit and Baltistan are completed, China will be able to transport cargo from Eastern China to the new Chinese-built Pakistani naval bases at Gwadar, Pasni and Ormara, just east of the Gulf, within 48 hours.
Many of the PLA soldiers entering Gilgit-Baltistan are expected to work on the railroad. Some are extending the Karakoram Highway, built to link China’s Sinkiang Province with Pakistan. Others are working on dams, expressways and other projects.

At that time, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Jiang Yu affirmed: “The story that China has deployed some military in the northern part of Pakistan is totally groundless and out of ulterior purposes. Some people are making fabrications to destroy relations between China, Pakistan and India but their attempt will arrive nowhere".
While the chill between Washington and Islamabad increases, the Chinese are more and more present in infrastructure projects in Pakistan as this article of Reuters shows. 
This should worry India. 
But can India worry for anything apart from cricket?

China Eximbank to lend Pak $1.7bn for train system
Reuters
April 28, 2011
ISLAMABAD: The Export-Import Bank of China will loan Pakistan $1.7 billion to develop a city-wide train system in the eastern city of Lahore, a senior Pakistani government official said on Wednesday.
The 15-year loan will be disbursed in the next five years, and negotiations with Eximbank are under way to finalise other details, Khawaja Ahmed Hassan, chairman of the Lahore Transport Company (LTC), said.
“The bank agreed to lend us the money with a two-year grace period, and our aim is to get it at six per cent interest,” he told Reuters.
The Punjab government recently agreed to award the 27 km (16.7 mile) train line contract project to the Chinese company China North Industries Corp (Norinco). In 2008, a French company had estimated the cost of the project at $2.4 billion.
The Chinese “were very kind and they brought down the cost of the project to $1.7 billion,” Hassan said.
He said the project was likely to begin by the end of 2011.
Lahore, the capital of Punjab province, Pakistan’s most populous and prosperous province, is home to more than five million people.
Officials expect the new transport system, the first of its kind in the country, will substantially decrease road traffic.
“There will be a big change. If we are able to bring here the system which we saw in China, thousands of vehicles (will) eventually go off the road,” Hafiz Nauman, a provincial lawmaker and senior member of the LTC, said.
He said another Chinese company will supply 111 buses to the city in June.
Seen as an “all-weather friend” to Pakistan, China has invested heavily in infrastructure development, particularly in the strategic and mineral-rich southwest, bordering Iran and Afghanistan.
China Three Gorges Corp, China’s largest hydropower developer, is ready to invest $15 billion in Pakistan’s troubled energy sector, an investment that could add 10,000 megawatts to Pakistan’s main grid over the next 10 years, a senior company official told Reuters in an interview on April 7.
China is a main supplier of military and defence hardware to Pakistan, and has helped the country build nuclear power plants.

Damage-control diplomacy?

'Opacity' is a key-word in Chinese politics.
Why suddenly last year, the leadership found new 'core issues' to fight for and why these core issues have suddenly been dropped from Beijing's agenda, is a matter of pure speculation.
One can always say that the 'generals' have been put back in their places (or send back to their barracks), at least for the time being. 
It does not explain why they had come out in the first place.
One point seems certain, the power struggle for the 2012 leadership change has started.
Another intriguing issue!
Why did Vice President Xi Jinping praise the departing U.S. ambassador, Jon Huntsman, calling him 'an old friend of the Chinese people'?
Huntsman had earlier challenged the CCP's clampdown on protesters and sided with Chinese dissidents.
When Huntsman called on him with a delegation of US Senators, Vice President Xi said: "I must take the opportunity to say a few words about Ambassador Huntsman. His term is coming to an end and we are reluctant to see him go. You are an old friend of the Chinese people".
Xi continued: "Let me express our appreciation for your contributions. We will never forget what you have done, I hope that wherever you work in the future that you come back to China often and continue to make contributions to friendship and cooperation between our two people."
The same Huntsman was earlier criticized the Chinese government when he was seen with demonstrators in a crowd that gathered on Beijing's Wangfujing shopping street. Online messages had called for a pro-democracy gathering inspired by the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt.
Is the praise of Huntsman part of a 'damage-control' policy or is Xi just preparing his Presidency? Future will tell us.
The 'damage-control' was also apparent when President Hu met Dr Manmohan Singh during the BRICS meet.
The 'Kashmir' visa issue seems to have been dropped for the time being.

Hu Jintao deploys his damage-control spin doctors; Now if only the generals would cooperate
East-Asia-Intel.com, April 13, 2011
INSIDE CHINA    
Willy Lam
Call it damage-control diplomacy. Since President Hu Jintao's American visit in January, Chinese diplomats and "official" academics have been trying to reassure the world of Beijing's non-aggressive, "peaceful development" diplomatic posture.
Throughout 2010, Beijing alienated a number of its Asia-Pacific neighbors through measures including revving up territorial disputes with countries including Japan, Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines. Relations between China and the U.S. also became tense in the wake of large-scale war games that the American Navy and Air Force were holding with Asian countries in China's backyard.
Spearheading Beijing's fence-mending effort is well-known Peking University foreign-policy professor Wang Jisi, who is also a senior member of President Hu's personal think tank. In an article in the mass-circulation Global Times newspaper and Web site earlier this week [April 13], Wang pointed out that China had no ambition of displacing the U.S. as the world's No. 1 power.
"It's unrealistic to think that China can reach parity with the U.S. in one to two decades," Wang pointed out. "The development of China's soft power is particularly lagging behind. China's voice is weak within international opinion. It's far from 'world No. 2.' "
In the current issue of Foreign Affairs, Wang further pointed out that for the foreseeable future, the focus of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership will continue to be economic development and maintaining domestic harmony. Wang in particular criticized unnamed commentators for making inflammatory statements about extending of China's "core interests" to cover the South China Sea and other parts of Asia.
Wang indicated that apart from Taiwan, "the Chinese government has never officially identified any single foreign policy issue as one of the country's core interests. Last year, some Chinese commentators reportedly referred to the South China Sea and North Korea as such, but these reckless statements, made with no official authorization, created a great deal of confusion," he added.
Other liberal academics, including well-known international relations expert Professor Chu Shulong at Tsinghua University, have blasted People's Liberation Army generals for inappropriately "intervening in China's foreign and security-related policymaking."
It remains a fact, however, that within China's labyrinthine foreign-policy establishment — which is headed by the CCP Leading Group on Foreign Affairs (LGFA) — the generals are having a bigger say. For example, President Hu, who chairs the LGFA as well as the party's Central Military Commission, is on occasion known to have sided with PLA representatives rather than career diplomats on issues including relations with the U.S., Japan, Taiwan, and in particular, North Korea.
Moreover, the diplomats — as well as government advisers such as Professors Wang and Chu — are powerless to prevent the generals from aggressively flexing their muscle. A classic example was the test-flight of the Jian-20 stealth jetfighter on January 11 this year, the same day that visiting Defense Secretary Robert Gates had his meeting with President Hu.
In the past fortnight, official Chinese papers and Web sites have run pictures of what is billed as China's "first aircraft carrier," which is actually a remodeled version of the Varyag flattop that the PLA bought from Ukraine a few years ago. While some military analysts believe that news about the Varyag was put out to distract attention from the couple of indigenously designed aircraft carriers that the PLA Navy is building, the graphic photographs have served to demonstrate the generals "commitment to hard-power projection" and to closing the military gap with the U.S.
The generals' clout is also tipped to grow after "crown prince" Vice-President Xi Jinping takes over power from President Hu at the 18th CCP Congress scheduled for next year. Xi, the putative Head of the Gang of Princelings (a reference to the offspring of party elders), is on very friendly terms with the more than 100 princeling PLA officers who hold the rank of major-general or above. Xi is expected to replace Hu as CMC Chairman — China's equivalent of commander-in-chief — at or soon after the 18th Congress.
(Willy Lam is a Hong Kong-based China scholar and journalist specializing in Communist Party politics and foreign policy.)

The Chinese Way

Last week, I posted the story of Kissinger finding propaganda material against "American imperialists" in his guest house when he arrived in Beijing in 1971. Forty years later, the mindset of the leadership of the Middle Kingdom has not changed.
Obama should have played the Tibetan National Anthem for Hu Jintao.

Chinese Pianist Plays Propaganda Tune at White House
US humiliated in eyes of Chinese by song used to inspire anti-Americanism
By Matthew Robertson
Epoch Times
Jan 22, 2011 
Chinese Pianist Plays Anti-American Song at White House Dinner (NTD Television)Lang Lang the pianist says he chose it. Chairman Hu Jintao recognized it as soon as he heard it. Patriotic Chinese Internet users were delighted as soon as they saw the videos online. Early morning TV viewers in China knew it would be played an hour or two beforehand. At the White House State dinner on Jan. 19, about six minutes into his set, Lang Lang began tapping out a famous anti-American propaganda melody from the Korean War: the theme song to the movie “Battle on Shangganling Mountain.”
The film depicts a group of “People’s Volunteer Army” soldiers who are first hemmed in at Shanganling (or Triangle Hill) and then, when reinforcements arrive, take up their rifles and counterattack the U.S. military “jackals.”
The movie and the tune are widely known among Chinese, and the song has been a leading piece of anti-American propaganda by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for decades. CCP propaganda has always referred to the Korean War as the “movement to resist America and help [North] Korea.” The message of the propaganda is that the United States is an enemy—in fighting in the Korean War the United States’ real goal was said to be to invade and conquer China. The victory at Triangle Hill was promoted as a victory over imperialists.
The song Lang Lang played describes how beautiful China is and then near the end has this verse, “When friends are here, there is fine wine /But if the jackal comes /What greets it is the hunting rifle.” The “jackal” in the song is the United States.
The name of the song is “My Motherland,” originally titled “Big River.” In an interview broadcast on Phoenix TV, the first thing Lang Lang is quoted as saying is that he chose the piece.
He then said, “I thought to play ‘My Motherland’ because I think playing the tune at the White House banquet can help us, as Chinese people, feel extremely proud of ourselves and express our feelings through the song. I think it’s especially good. Also, I like the tune in and of itself, every time I hear it I feel extremely moved.”
He expressed this idea more frankly in a later blog post, writing: “Playing this song praising China to heads of state from around the world seems to tell them that our China is formidable, that our Chinese people are united; I feel deeply honored and proud.”

Known in Advance
Whether Lang Lang’s decision to play “My Motherland” was entirely his own is impossible to confirm. That his choice was known in advance to CCP officials is very likely.
Cheng Xiaonong is a former assistant to former CCP General Secretary Zhao Ziyang. He now lives in New Jersey and is a commentator on Chinese politics.
Cheng said that “The White House had to report in advance to the Chinese delegation and so the Chinese delegation would have certainly known Lang Lang’s program.”
Cheng believes, however, that the Chinese delegation would see no reason to suggest a change in the program. “The program is not against the interests of China. In fact, it is the opposite.”
In addition to the Chinese delegation likely knowing of the program in advance, CCP officials connected to Phoenix TV would also have known.
Phoenix TV is based in Hong Kong and its signal may be seen throughout China by satellite. Its interview with Lang Lang was broadcast at 7 a.m. Beijing time on Jan. 20, which is 6 p.m. D.C. time on Jan. 19—shortly before the state dinner. The interview was not live—it was filmed on another day in advance of the broadcast.
Phoenix TV, nominally independent, is known to have very close ties to the CCP. The scholar Anne-Marie Brady, whose research focuses on China’s media and propaganda, has said that Phoenix TV is more loyal to the Chinese regime than the official state-run media.
At a minimum, the staff at Phoenix TV knew in advance that Lang Lang planned to play the song. Given the close ties between the network and the CCP and the sensitivity of anything broadcast about Hu’s state visit, CCP officials not knowing this in advance would be unusual.
 The music he is playing is the theme song from an anti-American propaganda movie about the Korean War. (Screenshot from Youtube) Propaganda
“My Motherland” having been played at the White House will be seen as a propaganda triumph in China.
“In the eyes of all Chinese, this will not be seen as anything other than a big insult to the U.S.,” says Yang Jingduan, a Chinese psychiatrist now living in Philadelphia who had in China been a doctor in the Chinese military. “It’s like insulting you in your face and you don’t know it, it’s humiliating.”
Yang sees Lang Lang choosing this tune as an expression of the deeply anti-American propaganda that is constant in China.
“This deeply anti-American chauvinism has been fanned by the CCP for years; Lang Lang is expressing the feelings of this generation of angry young people,” Yang said.
A well-known example of such feelings was seen on Sept. 11, 2001, when Chinese chat rooms were filled with young people celebrating this act of terror as an American defeat.
Excited at this coup, patriotic Chinese have been circulating the clip for the last several days. One netizen wrote “the right place, right time, right song!”
The phrase “right place, right time, right song” echoes Chinese propaganda and is a declaration of victory over the United States. Chinese have been taught that the United States lost the Korean War. A U.S. general is quoted in the propaganda as describing the Korean War as being “the wrong war at the wrong time in the wrong place with the wrong enemy,” which is taken as an admission of defeat. In fact, the quote is from Gen. Omar N. Bradley testifying to Congress as to why the United States should not extend the Korean War into China.
Another Chinese commenting on a forum responded to the Lang Lang performance by writing, “Defeat America, defeat Obama” (writing Obama’s name with the wrong first character, one meaning “sunken” or “dented.”)
Others wrote comments like: “omg!”; “Didn’t they know?”; “Where was the U.S. foreign affairs?” and “Very good. My impression of Lang Lang has really changed.”
More moderate Chinese have expressed disappointment at the attitudes of their countrymen. A sinovision blog quotes “Professor A” saying : “Everyone knows this Shangganling is from a ‘Resist America, Support Korea’ film, and I think Lang Lang would know that too. If he knew the song’s background and still chose to play it, then you can guess his motivation, or intellectual capacity. If he didn’t know, then mainland China’s education system is in more of a mess than I thought...
“Suppose for a moment that Obama was invited to a banquet in China, and he invited an American artist who had performed in China for many years to play an American war song against China, what kind of reaction do you think the Chinese government and people would have? … I think the American government still doesn’t know the background of this song—if they knew, wouldn’t they be offended?”

Humiliating the US
In a press release on Jan. 21, the well-known democracy activist Wei Jingsheng commented on Lang Lang’s performance at the White House. Wei underscores how U.S. administrations have failed to understand the CCP.
He said, “These [Chinese communist] dictators... will not want the same values and civilization as the democratic West.  They have no hesitation to use subterfuge and insult to the best of their advantage against the people at home, as well as against their hosts abroad, even in the White House.”
Whether Chinese officials intended Lang Lang to play this piece, its performance at the White House fits a general pattern of Chinese propaganda attacking the United States. Subtle details are seized on and used to humiliate the United States before the Chinese people.
When Nixon visited China, a photo was taken of him getting off the plane to greet Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai. Nixon has a big smile and extends his hand out to Zhou. Zhou had a bum arm at the time. He stood with a rigid face and held his hand close to his body.
The photo was widely used in all of the Chinese media to help support the idea that Nixon’s visit was a victory for China. Chinese schoolchildren were told, “See how long Nixon’s arm is stretched out? That shows the United States is reaching out to us.”
When President Obama visited China in November 2009, he toured the Imperial Palace. Obama exited through the Shen Wu Men, which may be translated as Gate of Divine Prowess. CCTV reported that he exited through the Shun Zhen Men, which may be translated as “Gate of Obedience and Purity.”
In fact, the Gate of Divine Prowess is the outer gate and everyone must exit through it. However, Chinese media would not accord President Obama the honor of going through the “Gate of Divine Prowess.”
Neither the White House nor the Chinese Embassy responded to phone calls requesting comment on this story.
Comment: ChinaReports@epochtimes.com