Jai Jai Jai

The planet is passing through difficult times. Even the most optimistic are aware that the environment is degrading fast and it may be difficult to stop the ecological downfall; at the same time, one has rarely seen so much tension among nations.
There are however solid reasons to hope that global solutions can be found through dialogue. One such occasion is the yearly G20 (or Group of Twenty).
Collectively, the G20 economies amount for some 85% of the gross world product, 80% of world trade and two-thirds of the world population.
The G20 came into existence during the 2008 planetary financial crisis, when the world leaders had no choice but to collectively address issues.
Before his departure for Buenos Aires, Prime Minister Narendra Modi stated: “The G-20 seeks to promote multi-faceted cooperation among the twenty largest economies of the world. Through the ten years of its existence, G-20 has strived to promote stable and sustainable global growth.”
Though the theme of the Summit was “Building Consensus for Fair and Sustainable Development”, the world press was mainly excited about the ‘Dinner’.
Chinese President Xi Jinping was sharing a supper with his mercurial US counterpart, who has given him sleepless nights since several months, trying to ‘rebalance’ the world economy and principally the trade between the two largest world economies.
The South China Morning Post wrote: “Chinese and American officials may have spent weeks preparing for the high-stakes summit between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump, but any hopes of resolving the current trade war may ultimately hinge on their personal chemistry.”
The ‘successful dinner’ was the first face-to-face meeting between the two leaders since Trump started a trade war with China.
More than the Summit itself, it is perhaps the sideline encounters which had to be watched, they could ultimately help redesigning the political geography of the planet.
One was of particular significance for India as well as Asia.
Narendra Modi met Donald Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe for their first trilateral exchange to discuss major issues of global. It assumed significance at a time China is flexing its muscles in Asia, now known as the Indo-Pacific region.
After the meeting, Modi asserted that the three nations will "continue to work together on shared values. …If I put it diffirently, Japan, America, and India is ‘JAI’, meaning success. We are making a new beginning. …I believe, [JAI] will play a big role in promoting world peace and prosperity.”
While the Indian Prime Minister spoke of the convergence of vision between the three nations, Abe affirmed that he was happy to participate in the ‘first ever JAI trilateral’; as for Trump, he appreciated India's growth story.
The three leaders noted their cooperation on all global issues such as better connectivity, sustainable development, counter-terrorism and maritime and cyber security.
As another strong message to China, the JAI leaders spoke in a free, open, conclusive and rule-based order in the Indo-Pacific region, based on respect for international law and peaceful resolution of all differences.
Let us remember that China claims almost all of the South China Sea, rejecting the counterclaims of Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan.
It is today crucial for Delhi to ‘balance’ China, who has shown strong hegemonic tendencies, particularly in the South China Sea …and on Indian borders.
Modi, Trump and Abe have now agreed to cooperate in various ways and they stressed the importance to continue with the ‘Trilateral Format’ at multilateral conferences.
Incidentally, a RIC (Russia, India and China) meeting also took place and Modi had earlier a good meeting with Xi Jinping.
Delhi bats for pragmatic multilateralism, while defending its own interests.

The important India-Japan Relations

On New Year’s Eve, President Xi Jinping issued a stern warning to China’s neighbours: "We adhere to peaceful development, and resolutely safeguard our territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests. Chinese people will never allow anyone to get away with making a great fuss about it.”
Not only were Japan, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Taiwan clearly targeted, but India too, with more than 4,000 km of land border with the Middle Kingdom.

The dual aspects of the relations
It is what Prime Minister Narendra Modi probably had in mind when he paid his maiden visit to Japan in August-September 2014; Delhi and Tokyo have a common ‘competitor’ in Beijing.
In November 2016, during the Indian PM’s second visit to the Land of the Rising Sun, the Joint Statement first pointed to another aspect, namely the ancient cultural links between the two nations. The two PMs “appreciated the deep civilisational links between the people of the two countries, including the common heritage of Buddhist thought,” it asserted, though there is more to the relationship; the two leaders: “underscored their shared commitment to democracy, openness, and the rule of law as key values to achieve peaceful co-existence. They welcomed the high degree of convergence in the political, economic and strategic interests of the two countries that provides an enduring basis for a long-term partnership.”
The cultural and geostrategic aspects may force the two nations to work even closer together in the future.

India-Japan cultural ties through history
The cultural and spiritual dimension will continue to remain the foundation of the relationship.
Not only Swami Vivekananda, Rabindranath Tagore or Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, but many other Indians have been associated with and have been admirers of Japan. It is not a coincidence that the Japan-India Association, set up 113 years ago, is the oldest international friendship body in Japan.
Since civilisational contacts between India and Japan began some 1400 years ago (Buddhism was introduced to Japan in 538 CE), the two countries have never been adversaries. Bilateral ties have been singularly free of any kind of dispute – ideological, cultural or territorial.
During a lecture in Tokyo in 1916, Rabindranath Tagore told a Japanese audience: “the welcome… which flowed towards me, with such outburst of sincerity, was owing to the fact that Japan felt the nearness of India to herself, and realised that her own heart has room to expand beyond her boundaries and the boundaries of the modern time.”
Visva-Bharati was eventually the first Indian university to introduce Japanese language courses.
This setting will remain the backbone of the bilateral relations.
To come back to Modi’s first visit, Clint Richards wrote in The Diplomat: “While both leaders are keen to play up both their personal relationship and the size of the cooperation between the two countries, final agreement on key deals expected from the summit were lacking. While this does not mean the bilateral meeting was a failure, it does indicate that the two sides have a longer way to go.”
This visit was more a seed for the future, but the factor which accelerated the deepening of the partnership has been external: it is the irredentist presence of China in the neighbourhood.

The Chinese Factor
For long, Japan has been China’s favorite whipping boy.
When Tokyo published a Defence White Paper in 2015, Xinhua immediately asserted that the objective of the exercise was to “increasingly stir up the ‘China threat’ and create a tense atmosphere so as to strengthen its security policies, develop its defence system, and find an excuse for a closer Japan-U.S. military alliance.”
A Xinhua article noted: “Unlike previous years, this year's white paper placed the China 'threat' in a prominent position. …making the accusation that China's unilateral action is undermining the principle of freedom of navigation.”
It is unfortunately a fact.
It has been remarkably shown by Dr Monika Chansoria in her book Steering Asia to stability, China, Japan, and Senkaku Islands. She writes: “Changing the territorial status quo has been the unfinished business of the People’s Republic of China since its founding in 1949, when it set out to forcibly absorb the sprawling Xinjiang and Tibetan plateau - actions that increased the landmass of China by 44 per cent.”
The scholarly author continues: “Underlining the fact that China does not apply the rule of law at home, its ingenious principle to covet neighbours' territories is: ‘what IS ours is ours and what is yours is negotiable’.”
India has been at the receiving end of China’s attitude since Independence particularly in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh.
Chansoria quotes Maj Gen Zhang Zhaozhong of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), who mentions the ‘cabbabe’ strategy; it involves “asserting a claim, launching furtive incursions into the coveted territory, and erecting - one at a time - cabbage-style multiple layers of security around a contested area to deny access to a rival.”
In other words, you grab what you want or what you need for your security, cover it with a few ‘security layers’ and then offer ‘friendly’ discussions to the opposite party.
Beijing’s attitude has certainly brought Japan and India closer.

The November 2016 Visit: Multiple Partnerships
As Modi was leaving for Japan for his second visit, he tweeted that it would not to be an ordinary visit: Narendra Modi and his Japanese counterpart were to undertake a comprehensive review of the Special Strategic and Global Partnership outlined in the ‘India and Japan Vision 2025’ which was set forth in December 2015 during Abe’s visit to India. Modi has then tweeted “India is all set to welcome its great friend & a phenomenal leader, PM@AbeShinzo. His visit will further deepen India-Japan.”
The Joint Statement mentions myriad diverse projects with the ‘partnership’ in the background; the different sections emphasize ‘Synergising the Partnership’, ‘Building a Stronger Partnership for Safer and Stable World’, ‘Partnership for Prosperity’, ‘Working together for a cleaner and greener future’, ‘Laying the Foundation of a Future-oriented Partnership’, ‘Investing in People for a Durable Partnership’.
The partnership should take a very concrete shape with ‘the Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy’, the highlight of the visit. It reflects “a new level of mutual confidence and strategic partnership in the cause of clean energy, economic development and a peaceful and secure world,” says the Statement.
On the ground, it may take time to materialize (like the US and French ‘nuclear deals’), but the symbolic foundation is now set.
When the two leaders reaffirmed their commitment “to work together for India to become a full member in the remaining three international export control regimes”, including India’s entry in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Beijing was not pleased, but is it not legitimate for India and Japan to see their own interests first?
It is possible that this move triggered a harder line from China, especially the last section of the Statement which talks of “Working Jointly for Strengthening Rules-based International Order in the Indo-Pacific Region and Beyond,” but this is part of the Great Game of geopolitics.
The results of the US elections may have also played a role in the coming together of Japan and India. Former Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal wrote: “The Modi-Abe summit in Tokyo was important in itself for consolidating bilateral ties, but gained value as it took place in the shadow of Donald Trump's election to the American presidency.”
The Modi visit occurred soon after Donald Trump was elected as the next US President. Trump’s arrival on the world scene brings a lot of uncertainties and may open the doors to deep changes in the political equation in Asia (incidentally, Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, was the first foreign leader to rush to meet Trump, probably to get reassurance from Japan’s first ally). There is no doubt that in the new era of incertitude, Japan will need to work closely with India.

The Future of the Relationship
Even if only a few of the ‘partnerships’ mentioned earlier, materialize in the next couple of years, it will be a great step forward.
Defence is certainly an area were the collaboration could go a step deeper.
The two defence framework agreements on the transfer of defence equipment and technology and on security measures for the protection of classified military information can now be implemented.
The most promising development for India is the purchase US-2 amphibian planes from Japan to improve the Indian Navy’s surveillance capabilities. Modi noted that it symbolizes the high degree of trust between the two countries.
According to The Financial Times (FT): “The US-2 amphibian planes are known not only for their prowess in search and rescue operations, but also as a great addition to any country’s Navy in terms of surveillance.”
Developed by ShinMaywa of Japan, it is claimed to be the world’s best short takeoff and landing (STOL) amphibian aircraft, which can land on rough seas with a metre high waves. The FT added: “it will deepen the strategic partnership with Japan, but also it would send a message to China.”
The $1.65 billion defence deal needs now to be cleared by the Defence Acquisitions Council (DAC).
This type of defence collaboration should be encouraged and developed further.

Infrastructure Development
Japan has pledged to support India in its ambitious plan to develop infrastructure in the North-East.
The Official Development Assistance (ODA) provides bilateral aid consisting of concessional loans and grants, to developing countries.
The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), which coordinates the ODA’s projects has pledged for India an amount of 242.2 billion yen (some Rs 14,000 crores), out of which 67.1 billion yen are earmarked as loan assistance to the North East Road Network Connectivity Improvement Project.
The ODA projects are to identify technologies, infrastructure, and strategies to facilitate development. Tokyo has also agreed in principle to fund many critical Greenfield highway projects in Northeast India. The JICA is involved in a 400 km highway stretch in Mizoram between Aizawl and Tuipang; a 150 km highway in Meghalaya; two projects in Manipur; and one each in Tripura, Nagaland and Assam.
Could this scheme be extended to other Indian borders such as Arunachal, Sikkim and Ladakh? It would be an interesting collaboration which would bring an even brighter prospect to future bilateral relations.
During his visit to India in January 2015, Fumio Kishida, the Japanese Foreign Minister said that Tokyo considered Arunachal Pradesh as a part of India. The Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Hong Lei saw red, "We are seriously concerned about this and have lodged serious representation with the Japanese side. We hope Japan can fully understand the sensitivity of China-India border issues."
A few months later, in response to a question about the JICA financing projects in Arunachal Pradesh, Shinya Ejima, JICA’s chief representative in India asserted: "It depends upon the decision first by the Indian government and also the government of Japan. But, as far as JICA is concerned, I don't think there's any problem in Arunachal."
An enlarged collaboration in this field would make great strategic and technical sense.

Bhutan
Other small actions could be envisaged; just to cite one, the deepening of the relations between Bhutan and Japan could indirectly enhance the Indo-Nippon partnership. Japan through the JICA has been supporting the concept of Gross National Happiness (GNH). This type of support could be widened.
Though Japan has no official embassy in Thimphu, year 2016 marked the 30th anniversary of the establishment of relations between Japan and Bhutan.
India should encourage Bhutan and Japan to work out a greater collaboration for the sustainable development of the ‘happy’ Himalayan kingdom.
There are numerous areas of Indo-Japan collaboration; and fortunately, the profound trust between India and Japan, probably due to great civilizational and geopolitical convergences, will translate into a very special partnership in the future.
The fact that the present Foreign Secretary is married to a Japanese could be the symbol of this blooming relationship.

Mr Meng's visit to India

Meng Jianzhu with PM Modi

In the brouhaha created by the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States and Prime Minister Modi’s Grand Master Coup against black money, an event of great international importance has been missed by the Indian press.
Meng Jianzhu, Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Communist Party of China (CPC) visited Delhi and met PM Modi and Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh.
Meng is not an ordinary official; he is a member of the all-powerful Politburo of the CPC and the person looking after ‘security’ and intelligence in the Middle Kingdom. He has replaced the disgraced Zhou Yongkang, the biggest tiger to fall in Xi Jinping’s net in the latter’s fight against corruption.
What was Meng doing around?
Probably two things: China was nervous with Modi's visit to Japan (two days later) and India is tired of terrorism "Made in Pakistan".
That is why the PM remarked: “Terrorism poses the gravest threat to international peace and security”.
Can India and China find an understanding on the subject?
According to a PMO press release: “The Prime Minister welcomed the intensive exchange of high level visits between India and China over the last two years.”
Nothing new or special in this!
While ‘fondly’ recalling his visit to China in May 2015, as well as his trip to Hangzhou in September 2016 to attend the G-20 Summit, Modi told his visitor: “such visits contribute to building strategic understanding between the two countries”.
The PMO communiqué remained vague: “The two leaders discussed issues of mutual interest, including bilateral counter-terrorism cooperation. The Prime Minister said that terrorism poses the gravest threat to international peace and security, and welcomed increased cooperation between India and China on counter-terrorism related matters.”

Who should talk to Meng?
Meng Jianzhu’s visit apparently put the Indian establishment in ‘a piquant protocol situation’.
Strictly speaking, he has no ‘counterpart’ in the Indian government.
Beside the chairmanship of the Political and Legal Affairs Commission, Meng also heads the Central Public Security Comprehensive Management Commission. He is said to be far senior to the Chinese Home Minister and in a way to India’s National Security Advisor. The government finally opted for a meeting with Rajnath Singh, the no 2 in the Indian Cabinet.


Meeting Rajnath Singh
During his encounter with Singh, the latter is said to have appealed to Beijing “to support the international community’s efforts to designate as a dreaded terrorist the leader of the Jaish-e-Mohammed, a terrorist group already designated under the UN Resolution 1267.”
Pointing out that Pakistan is patronizing and financing terrorist groups, the Home Minister informed his guest that several leaders of terrorist groups including JeM leader Masood Azhar, Lashkar-eTaiba leader Hafiz Saeed and Hizbul Mujahideen leader Salahuddin could still freely roam in Pakistan. Meng was probably shown proofs that the Tehreek-e-Taliban and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi were financed and sponsored by the ISI.
Rajnath Singh would have argued that there is no good or bad terrorist: terrorism can't be one country’s problem only, it is a threat to global peace and security.
It had to be dealt globally …by China too!
The Home Minister also mentioned the case of the ULFA leader Paresh Barua, who is facing trial in India for heinous crimes and is believed to have taken refuge in the trijunction between India, Myanmar and China.
Singh also would have referred to the arrest of a Pakistani national in Guangzhou with fake Indian currency; Meng was asked to “clamp down on Pakistan’s nefarious designs to smuggle fake Indian currency into India through China.”
That was before the demonetization announcement.
According to the communiqué from North Block, the Minister suggested that India and China should soon conclude negotiations on a bilateral Agreement on Security Cooperation; it would include tackling transnational and cyber crimes (read Pakistan?).
Meng’s reactions are not known, though he is sure to have complained about the Dalai Lama’s forthcoming to Tawang and the ‘splittist’ activities of the Tibetan refugees in India.
We don’t know if the China Pakistan Economic Corridor, passing through Pakistan-occupied-Kashmir, figured in the discussion and if the recent developments on the border in Ladakh were discussed (the PLA tried to stop some irrigation work by the villagers of Demchok). Probably.
It is however certain that Meng, who was announced as President Xi’s Special Envoy has not come to Delhi just to hear a lecture from the Home Minister or the Prime Minister.
Let us not forget that it was just before Modi left to Japan for a crucial visit.
The Indian officials probably got a bit of a lecture from Meng too.

R.N. Ravi and Mr Meng

An earlier encounter
At the end of September, India and China had already agreed to cooperate ‘on counter-terrorism and security’ during their first dialogue on the subject in Beijing.
The Global Times reported: “The two sides exchanged opinions on the international and regional security situation and explained their respective anti-terrorism systems, mechanisms and legislation. They also reached consensus on measures to strengthen cooperation and to jointly deal with security threats.”
The dialogue was jointly chaired by Wang Yongqing, the Secretary General of the Commission for Political and Legal Affairs and R.N. Ravi, chairman of India’s Joint Intelligence Committee.
Interestingly Ravi met Meng Jianzhu, who told him that “terrorism is a common enemy of the global community.”
Meng then added that “strengthened counter-terrorism cooperation between China and India is conducive to the interests of the people of both countries.”
Again according to The Global Times, Meng voiced the hope that the two sides could start some counter-terrorism collaboration in order to protect regional security.
Where is Pakistan in this new scheme?
That was probably one of the topics discussed less than six weeks later in the polluted capital of India.

Admiral Sun and DM Manohar Parrikar

Meeting of China-India Defense and Security Consultation
As Meng arrived in Delhi, India and China were holding their 8th meeting of China-India Defense and Security Consultation.
China was represented by Sun Jianguo, the PLA’s deputy chief of the Joint Staff Department (and informal head of China’s intelligence and military diplomacy) and India by its Defense Secretary, Mohan Kumar.
Sun made the routine declaration “both countries have maintained frequent exchanges of visits and reached consensus on the development of bilateral ties in recent years.”
He added that “The Chinese military is willing to join hands with India army to maintain the exchanges on border defense, improve the mechanism of communication and strengthen border management and control so as to safeguard peace and stability in their border areas.”
Kumar was not very explicit too, “exchanges of visits and interactions between Chinese and Indian leaders have promoted the India-China strategic partnership of cooperation, which has also contributed to the common prosperity of the two countries as well as the world peace and development.”
Even if little is known of what transpired during these two important visits (especially Meng’s), the future of the CPEC and China’s protection of its all-weather friend must have received a lot of attention.
The fact is that for mega projects such as the CPEC, China can’t anymore ignore India.
India's relations with Japan and the new US President are bound to have been come up too. This probably explains the quick succession of 'exchanges' at the highest level of the security apparatus between India and China.

Steering Asia to stability

My review of Dr Monika Chansoria's book, Steering Asia to stability, China, Japan, and Senkaku Islands appeared in The Sunday Pioneer.

China, Japan, and Senkaku Islands:
Conflict in the East China Sea Amid and American Shadow 
by Dr Monika Chansoria
KW Publishers Pvt Ltd., New Delhi
ISB 978-93-83649-99-0
Price RS.980

This book is detailed, precise, legally well-researched. The author’s general principles can apply to any of China’s territorial claims. It’s perhaps high time for India to prepare such studies for its border with China from Ladakh to Arunachal, writes CLAUDE ARPI

This book, written by Dr Monika Chansoria, a Senior Fellow at the prestigious Centre for Land Warfare Studies, is timely for several reasons, but first and foremost because it describes the way Beijing conducts ‘diplomacy’ in its extended neighbourhood.

Chansoria writes: “Changing the territorial status quo has been the unfinished business of the People’s Republic of China since its founding in 1949, when it set out to forcibly absorb the sprawling Xinjiang and Tibetan plateau - actions that increased the landmass of China by 44 per cent.”
The scholarly author continues: “Underlining the fact that China does not apply the rule of law at home, its ingenious principle to covet neighbours' territories is: ‘what IS ours is ours and what is yours is negotiable’.”
India has been at the receiving end of China’s irredentism since Independence.
Chansoria quotes Maj Gen Zhang Zhaozhong of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), who mentions the ‘cabbabe’ strategy; it involves “asserting a claim, launching furtive incursions into the coveted territory, and erecting - one at a time - cabbage-style multiple layers of security around a contested area so as deny access to a rival.”
In other words, you grab what you want or what you need for your security, cover it with a few ‘security layers’ and then offer ‘friendly’ discussions to the opposite party.
The Chinese-speaking scholar continues: “The strategy bears all the hallmarks of modern Chinese brinkmanship, including reliance on stealth, surprise and a disregard for the risks of military escalation and seeks to ensure that the initiative remains with China.”
Similar tactics were used during the negotiations with India for the Panchsheel agreement in 1954; at that time China had just started building a road in the Aksai Chin.
This book is relevant because it is crucial for Indian strategists to understand the pattern used by Beijing, one could call it ‘grabbing with Chinese characteristics’: “construct a dispute, initiate a jurisdictional claim through periodic incursions, and then increase the frequency and duration of such intrusions, thereby establishing a military presence or pressuring a rival to cut a deal on China's terms.”
China is always one stage in advance on its opponent, which is often kept off balance. This is not only the story of the Senkaku Islands, but also the ‘rocks’ in the South China Sea, the Aksai Chin region of Ladakh or the LAC in Arunachal Pradesh or Uttarakhand (incursions are mildly called ‘transgressions’ by the shy Indian politicians). Beijing invariably follows the same pattern, if there is no resistance, no opposition, it continues to advance, till it is stopped by force at the risk of a conflict.
One could also cite the example of Tawang and other areas Arunachal Pradesh where historically the Tibetan ‘influence’ has never been more than ten percent of the landmass of the State, but which is today claimed by China as South Tibet in his entirity.
Unfortunately for Beijing, in the present case, the Japanese are not ready to be bullied.
Chansoria starts her study by the ‘Genesis of dispute in the East China Sea”. The fact that the author calls the Island in dispute as ‘Senkaku’, the Japanese name, shows which side of the dispute she stands.
China calls the Islands, Diaoyu (‘fishing platform’").
Chansoria however highlights the complexity of the issue: “The dispute over sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is structured around economic interests, domestic political compulsions, issues surrounding national identity and allegiance, requirements of international law and the long-standing baggage of historical grievances.”
The eight uninhabited islands, located in the East China Sea, northeast of Taiwan, east of the Chinese mainland and southwest of Japan's southernmost Okinawa prefecture, might be small, but are the object of a bitter quarrel which could explode anytime. The five volcanic islands and three rocky outcroppings have a total land area of only 6.32 sq km.
On January 14, 1895, the Japanese Cabinet had passed a formal Resolution incorporating the Senkaku Islands into its territory. Japan argued that before 1895, the islands were terra nullius (i.e. territory claimed by no nation). The Islands were placed under the jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefecture. This is the foundation of Japan’s legal basis for asserting its claim over the islands.
In May 1895, Japan and the Manchu (Qing) Dynasty signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki ending the Sino-Japanese war. Under the agreement, (considered today by China an ‘unequal treaty’), China ceded Taiwan/Formosa to Japan “together with all the islets appertaining or belonging to the said island of Formosa.” The Treaty did not specifically mention the Senkakus.
Today Beijing and Taipei argue that after World War II, the Allied declarations at Cairo and Potsdam restored to China territories taken through military aggression by the Japanese, and thus the islets should have been returned to China.
In October 1945, Japan relinquished authority over all territories seized or occupied (such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores), but in no agreement were the Islands of Senkakus mentioned; by default it remained part of Okinawa prefecture. Of course, China does not agree to this reading.
Chansoria goes into depth into the International Law, Legal Provisions and Conventions; the Resurgence of National in China and Japan (an important factor of the dispute), but also the Oil, Gas and Economics of the Conflict, (which understandably exacerbate the lust of the opponent and harden the respective positions) and finally the China-Japan-America Triangle (which makes any peacemakers lose faith in any possible negotiated solution).
Her last Chapter is on ‘Reigniting a Quiescent Volcano’.
Her conclusion points to the need “to steer Asia towards a regional order that maintains stability in the power equilibrium, thereby challenging a visibly coercive Sino-centric vision of the future Asia, especially within the Indo-Pacific.”
It is easier said than done, but the Modi government has taken many steps in this direction by establishing closer links with Japan, Vietnam or Australia.
The work of Chansoria is detailed, precise, legally well-researched.
The general principles described by the author can apply to any of China’s territorial claims.
It is perhaps high time for India to prepare such studies for its border with China from Ladakh to Arunachal. It may one day be usueful.

The McMahon Line is legal

My article The McMahon Line is legal appeared in NitiCentral.
Here is the link...

Soon before India started suffering from an acute Obama fever, a small incident took place which, though largely unnoticed, it made China extremely unhappy.
During his recent visit to Delhi, the Japanese foreign minister Fumio Kishida dared to speak about what Beijing calls “a Chinese territorial area adjacent to India as Indian Territory.” According to The China Daily, the Japanese diplomat was referring to Arunachal Pradesh
Beijing immediately lodged a strong protest: “We hope Japan fully understands the sensitivity of the China-India boundary question,” said Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei, who added that in his speech in New Delhi, “Kishida attracted media attention after referring to a southern area of China’s Tibet Autonomous Region as Indian Territory. …Beijing has taken notice of the report, expressed serious concerns, demanded Japan make a clarification and immediately manage damage control.”
Hong affirmed that Tokyo had earlier stated its position of “no taking sides in regard to the areas disputed by China and India” and promised Beijing that it will not get involved in the issue.
Later, Kishida’s clarification did not satisfy China.
Unfortunately for Beijing, the bullying tactics do not work with Japan.
Apart from the China’s official position expressed by Hong Lei, Beijing used one of its ‘scholars’ to add to the barrage of artillery against Kishida.
Geng Xin, who teaches at Renmin University in Beijing and is involved in Japan-based China Studies Think Tank, spoke to The Global Times, the Communist party mouthpiece. He affirmed that Kishida’s words had
“unveiled Japan’s intent of ‘uniting’ the countries that have territorial disputes with China, in an attempt to create a strong impression that Japan, along with China’s other neighboring countries, is bullied by a rising China.”
At the time of the incident, the website China Tibet Online explained Beijing’s position vis-à-vis the border:
“Arunachal Pradesh, which includes three areas in Tibet Autonomous Region -Monyul, Loyul and Lower Tsayul, is currently under Indian illegal occupation. The Chinese government’s stance on these areas, located between the illegal ‘McMahon Line’ and the traditional customary boundary between China and India, is that they have always been Chinese territory.”
Historical facts speak very differently.
Contrary to what China says today, the McMahon Line is very much legal: it was signed by the Prime Minister of Tibet (Lochen Shatra) and India’s Foreign Secretary (Sir Henry McMahon) in March 1914.
As importantly, during the last two millennia, the Chinese have never set a foot in Arunachal Pradesh (formerly NEFA), except for one short visit in one particular location in 1910.
Soon after their occupation of Lhasa in 1910, the troops of Zhao Erfeng, a Chinese warlord troops undertook the subjugation of Poyul, the region located north of the territory inhabited by the Abors in the Yarlung Tsangpo/Brahmaputra Valley. Zhao Erfeng also invited Chinese settlers to come and settle in Zayul, near Rima on the Tibetan side in the Lohit valley. During the summer of 1910, some Chinese officials posted near Rima, went as far south as Walong in Indian Territory where they planted boundary flags, in a place called Menilkrai.
This incident rang the bells in Delhi and London. Something had to be done.
This brief intrusion in the Lohit valley more than 100 years ago, does not means that the entire NEFA has always belonged to China.
In November 1913, the Secretary of State sanctioned what the British called a ‘promenade’. T.P.M. O’Callaghan, the Assistant Political Officer (APO), accompanied by an escort of the 1/8th Gurkha Rifles visited Rima at the invitation of the Tibetan authorities, and clarified the location of the border.
On May 6, 1914, Sir Archdale Earle, the Chief Commissioner of Assam wrote:
“Mr. O’Callaghan’s report confirms the information …that there are at present no Chinese troops anywhere in the neighbourhood of Rima.”
The APO had found Chinese markers at Menilkrai, near Walong (one set dated from 1910 and new markers had been placed in 1912 by the Chinese troops). O’Callaghan removed the markers, repositioned them upstream, near Kahao, just south of the McMahon Line.
O’Callaghan however suggested that a military post needed to be established at Walong:
“I am more than ever convinced of the necessity of the finishing of the road to our frontier and the opening of a post as near our frontier as soon as possible.”
Even before the McMahon Line was formerly delineated, there was no Chinese presence in NEFA.
It is however true that there were areas where the Tibetans had some influence (it represented some 10% of the NEFA’s/Arunachal’s territory); it was mainly in Tawang area; in today’s West Siang [Pachaksiri], Upper Siang [Tuting, Geling], and Lohit/Anjaw, where tribes affiliated with the Tibetans (Monpas, Mempas, etc…) lived.
This again does not make Arunachal ‘Chinese'; the Chinese never even visited these areas.
China knew this and admitted it. Take a letter from Jawaharlal Nehru to U Nu, his Burmese counterpart; on April 22, 1957, Nehru wrote: “I am writing to you immediately so as to inform you of one particular development which took place here when Chou En-lai (Zhou Enlai) came to India. In your letter you say that while premier Chou En-lai was prepared to accept the McMahon Line in the north (of Burma), he objected to the use of the name ‘McMahon Line’, as this may produce ‘complications vis-à-vis India’, and therefore, he preferred to use the term ‘traditional line’.”
Nehru continued: “[Zhou] made it clear that he accepted the McMahon Line between India and China, chiefly because of his desire to settle outstanding matters with a friendly country like India and also because of usage, etc. I think, he added he did not like the name ‘McMahon Line’.”
Whether he liked or not the ‘colonial’ connotation, the line remained the border and till September 1959, there was no dispute about the border!
NEFA/Arunachal as part of China is definitively a claim which followed the border tensions at the end of the 1950s and culminated in the 1962 War.
It is however true that the shyness of the Government of India, which still insists on an Inner Line Permit (or Protected Area Permit for foreigners) encourages the Chinese government to continue with its wild claims.
Delhi should assert once and for all that the entire Arunachal is Indian and therefore treat at par with the other Indian States and every Indian national should be allowed to freely visit the State, while, of course, keeping in mind the security issues.

Modi’s Vietnam outreach marks India’s new assertive foreign policy

My article Modi’s Vietnam outreach marks India’s new assertive foreign policy appeared in NitiCentral.

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Modi was clear about the ‘aligned’ policy when his Government decided to sell to Vietnam Brahmos short range cruise missiles (co-developed with Russia), a long-standing demand from Hanoi. The Congress Government had been hesitant, hiding behind reservations by Russia.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi has invented a new concept in Foreign Policy, ‘Assertive Alignment’.
Take Vietnam for example.
At the end of the meeting with the visiting Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, Modi asserted: “Our defence cooperation with Vietnam is among our most important ones. India remains committed to the modernisation of Vietnam’s defence and security forces. This will include expansion of our training programme, which is already very substantial, joint-exercises and cooperation in defence equipment.”
Modi was clear about the ‘aligned’ policy when his Government decided to sell to Vietnam Brahmos short range cruise missiles (co-developed with Russia), a long-standing demand from Hanoi. The Congress Government had been hesitant, hiding behind reservations by Russia. Modi was not shy to tweet: “My Government has promptly and purposefully intensified our engagement in Asia Pacific region, which is critical to India’s future.”
India is also likely to coach Vietnam Air Force pilots in flying Sukhoi SU-30 fighter planes. Quoting a source, The Times of India asserted: “The training would be on the pattern of the ‘underwater combat training’ already underway for Vietnamese sailors at the Navy’s submarine school in Visakhapatnam since October 2013.”
Perhaps touchier for Beijing, the two countries will also work on joint oil exploration in the South China Sea, a region disputed by China.
This comes after Narendra Modi’s visit to the United States where he reiterated that Washington was India’s ‘natural’ ally.
We have come a long way from the Krishna Menon days and his obsession with the American ‘imperialists’.
After their dinner at the White House, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Barack Obama issued a vision statement and wrote a joint editorial whose theme was ‘chalein saath saath’ (‘forward together we go’).
The joint editorial published on The Washington Post, while invoking Swami Vivekananda and Martin Luther King Jr., emphasised: “India and the United States are bound by common values and mutual interests.”
It speaks of India and the US building ‘a transformative relationship’, again far from the often aggressive stance of Nehru towards the United States.
Two days after Modi had left the US, Phil Reiner, senior director for India in the National Security Council at the White House declared that Modi’s meeting with President Barack Obama had ‘re-energised’ the strategic relationship between the world’s two largest democracies: “I would say that the assessment on our part is that the PMs visit was extraordinarily successful. It has provided a boost in terms of the vision and focus that we have for our bilateral relations,” he stated.
Narendra Modi also met some of the US top business leaders who promised to invest in India. In a survey, the US-India Business Council (USIBC) found that US businesses were ready to commit $42 billion over the next two-three years. IANS reported that what added to the investor confidence was Prime Minister Modi being very conversant with the business ‘nuts and bolts’.
The Prime Minister’s visit to Japan too was a special one. Modi’s first bilateral meet outside the subcontinent was also an ‘aligned’ exercise.
Interestingly, there was a cultural and spiritual dimension to the visit.
Whether it is Swami Vivekananda, Rabindranath Tagore or Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, many great Indians have been associated with Japan in the past and became admirers of Land of the Rising Sun.
Then, Modi reiterated his alignment with some of India’s neighbours, Nepal and Bhutan. Regarding Modi’s visit to Thimbu, The Times of India reported that Modi has “stepped up a charm offensive with neighbours to try to check China’s influence in the region.”
Before leaving, the PMO had released a statement putting the visit in perspective: “Bound by common interests and shared prosperity, India and Bhutan enjoy a unique and special relationship, which has been forged by ties of geography, history and culture. Therefore, Bhutan as the destination for my first visit abroad as Prime Minister is a natural choice. Relations with Bhutan will be a key foreign policy priority of my Government.”
All these moves demonstrate a more pro-active and ‘aligned’ foreign policy. Even with less ‘aligned’ nations, assertive engagement has been the motto.
When President Xi Jinping and his wife Peng Liyuan, landed in Ahmedabad on September 17, they had a taste of Modi’s hospitality first hand, a flavour of the friendly culture of Gujarat (as well as its delicacies) on the banks of a clean Sabarmati river.
Both India and China wanted to show the world that the two most populated countries of the planet can live harmoniously together.
Of course, the next day, the Chumar incident took place and Modi’s India had to remind the Chinese President of its position on the LAC. Whether the incident was the outcome of differences within the PLA or not, Delhi remained firm on the ground, while ‘engaging’ China.
It is perhaps time for historians to have a deeper look at India’s non-aligned policy.
Officially, the Non-Aligned movement came into being during the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, under the Chairmanship of the Yugoslav president, Josip Broz Tito in September 1961 in Belgrade.
It seems that the term ‘non-alignment’ was coined by VK Krishna Menon, the Indian (Communist) Representative to the UN during a speech in New York in 1952. Menon could obviously not have been ‘non-aligned’.
However, it is probably in Bandung in 1955, that Nehru firmly decided to go for the policy of ‘non-alignment’. The conference of Asian and African states, hosted by Indonesian president Sukarno brought together several ‘Third Word’ leaders and the Machiavellian Zhou Enlai. With most participants heavily tilting towards Soviet Union, the conference adopted a ‘declaration on promotion of world peace and cooperation’ and a collective pledge to remain ‘neutral’ in the Cold War.
Nehru was greatly influenced by his ‘friend’ Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier who also swore by the Five Principles (Panchsheel), which became the ideological foundation stone of the Movement. The principles such as ‘Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity’ or ‘Mutual non-interference in domestic affairs’ were music to the ears of the Chinese Premier, who thus could keep at bay those who were tempted to come to Tibet’s defence. Four years earlier, the Roof of the World had been invaded by a neo-imperialist China; it was indeed a very clever move on the part of Zhou!
The end of the non-alignment came on November 19, 1962 when a panicky Indian Prime Minister shot two missives to the US President imploring him to help his country.
Modi’s new Indian assertive foreign policy, ‘aligned’ with friends as well as less friendly countries, is refreshing. We are living in an interdependent world, and ‘non-alignment’, apart from the fact that it never served India’s interests, is not suited to the 21st century; ‘alignment’ and ‘engagement’ are.

India, Japan, China and the National Interest Triangle

My article India, Japan, China and the National Interest Triangle has appeared on NitiCentral.

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In the past, Delhi would have prevaricated and made sure that both Beijing and Tokyo were kept happy. Modi makes clear advances.

The Chinese edition of The People’s Daily recently published an Op-Ed by Shen Dingli, Deputy Director of the International Affairs Institute of Fudan University, who recommended that Beijing should define its enemies, allies, and friends on the basis of China’s national interests. This seems a logical proposition.
After Independence, many foreign observers thought that when it came to strategic thinking, there was something wrong with India’s DNA. Nehru’s India lived in nebulous ideals, incapable to define and implement the country’s national interests, while preaching about the ‘largest interest of world peace’.
There is nothing wrong with world peace, but the Indian approach has often created more mess (take the stoppage of the military operation in Kashmir in 1947-1948 or the non-intervention in Tibet in 1950-1951) and ultimately, more chaos, war and suffering followed.
Hopefully, under the Narendra Modi Government, a genetic mutation is taking place and India will slowly be able to ‘egoistically’ think about her own interests; a position which will eventually command much greater respect from the country’s friends and foes …and bring peace.
China had never had existentialist problems like India.
As Shen Dingli explains in the above–mentioned Op-Ed, the most practical way to define one’s own interests, is to distinguish between enemies and friends in international relations. Using the US as an example, Shen asks: Should America be classified among friends, allies, or foes? Then, he defines China’s most important core interests such as “national sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity, and national unity”.
Each country must define its own ‘core interests’; obviously, India’s interests are different from China’s.
The fact that the US dares to sell weapons to Taiwan and threatens to use force to interfere in China’s internal affairs [i.e. China’s claims in the South China and East China Seas], makes the US go straight into the ‘enemy’ category.
However, according to Shen, because ‘sustainable social economic development’ is also one of Beijing’s core interests and due to the close economic cooperation with the US during the past 30 years, Washington could also come under the ‘friend’ category. As a result, the US will be treated by China as a friend in certain domains and as an ‘enemy’ in others.
Shen believes that Japan’s relationship with China fits in the same categories as the US. He does not however mention India.
Now, take Narendra Modi’s visit to Japan. In one way, it is simpler: Japan is a ‘friend’. The ‘genetic’ novelty of India’s position is that Modi is not shy to say it, it is even heard (and not appreciated) by Japan’s powerful neighbour.
On the eve of his departure for Tokyo, the PM wrote:
“I am keenly looking forward to my three-day visit to Japan at the invitation of my good friend, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, for the Annual Summit between India and Japan.”
‘My good friend’ is clearly a message to Beijing. In the past, Delhi would have prevaricated and made sure that both Beijing and Tokyo were kept happy.
Now Modi clearly says:
“Japan is one of our closest partners in political, economic, security and cultural realms. It is a key regional and global partner for us. Between our countries, there is only goodwill and mutual admiration. Buddhism from India has inspired Japan for over a millennium. We in India similarly draw inspiration from Japan’s vanguard role as the fountainhead of Asia’s modernization, resurgence and rejuvenation.”
The relation with Tokyo is important to Delhi, and today it is clearly enunciated:
“We will explore how Japan can associate itself productively with my vision of inclusive development in India, including the transformation of India’s manufacturing, infrastructure sectors, energy and social sectors. We will discuss how to boost our defence and security cooperation, including in defence technology, equipment and industry.”
In the past, Delhi would have been shy to preeminently display the importance of this relation, so as not to ‘upset’ China. That is not the case anymore.
China does the same. On August 29, the website China Military Online reported that General Fan Changlong, the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission and China’s senior most Army General participated in a symposium on the occasion of the 120th anniversary of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. He stressed the importance:
“to deeply summarize and rethink the historical lessons of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and undertake the historical responsibility of building a powerful Chinese military.”
He added that the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 left a profound trauma in China. It brought pain and sorrow to the Chinese nation and shame on the Chinese military:
“It is necessary to analyze the historical lessons of this war in an objective and dialectical way.”
China has always chosen its friends (and foes) according to its own economic or strategic interests. India too should ‘deeply summarise and rethink the historical lessons of the 1962 Sino-Indian War’.
China continues to select its ‘friends’ according to its interests. Between August 24 to 29, China hosted a ‘Peace Mission 2014’ with other States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Held at Zhurihe training base in Inner Mongolia, it is the largest joint military drill ever organised by China, according to Yang Yujun, a Chinese Defense Ministry spokesperson.
China is clearly looking for new friends in the region. It believes that it will help revive the ‘spirit’ of the New Silk Road, initiated by President Xi Jinping for “promoting economic cooperation, culture exchanges and friendly relationships” …and securing energy for China.
According to Xinhua, the proposal of ‘one belt and one road’ has brought new vibrancy to the cooperation among pan-Asia, Asia and Europe. But behind the rhetoric, the economic relations with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan are crucial to the Middle Kingdom’s energy policy.
Though Wang Ning, deputy chief of the PLA general staff and responsible for the drill, clarified that exercises are the sign of a new military alliance, it remains that Beijing needs the Central Asian States’ friendship to run its economic machine.
Officially, the drill only aims at countering ‘terrorist forces’, particularly the East Turkistan Islamic Movement, based in Xinjiang (and trained in Pakistan).
Yang stated that the exercise played an important role in deterring the ‘three evil forces’ of terrorism, separatism and extremism, safeguarding regional peace and stability and improving the military’s ability to coordinate the fight against terrorism.
The visit of Narendra Modi to Japan must be seen in this perspective: India, instead of the usual goody-goody attitude has for the first time decided to assert its national interests. It is crucial before President Xi’s visit to Delhi later this month.
In the meantime, President Xi Jinping has asked China’s military to think of technical and strategic ‘innovations’; he told his Politburo’s colleagues that the PLA must:
“strive to establish a new military doctrine, institutions, equipment systems, strategies and tactics and management modes for information warfare that had become central to modern combat.”
China will always be ready, similarly India should be.
By the way, is Islamabad a ‘friend’ or a ‘foe’ for Beijing? Difficult question, Mr Xi may be scratching his head!

India-Japan cultural ties through history

Rabindranath Tagore with The Mother (right) in Japan in 1916

My article India-Japan cultural ties through history appeared in NitiCentral.

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Prime Minister Narendra Modi is soon leaving for Japan. For several reasons, his visit will not be an ordinary one. In a statement issued by the PMO, Modi explains: “I will visit Tokyo and Kyoto, and will interact with all sections of Japanese society from students, political leaders to captains of industry.”
Though Modi could not make it in early July (due to the ongoing Parliament session), the visit will undoubtedly be special as it will be the Prime Minister’s first bilateral meet outside the subcontinent, further Japan is an important strategic partner for India.
But there is more. Apart from the first ever defence cooperation agreement between Japan and India which is expected to be signed, there is a cultural and spiritual dimension to the visit as well.
Whether it is Swami Vivekananda, Rabindranath Tagore or Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, many great Indians have been associated with Japan and have become admirers of the Land of the Rising Sun. There is a reciprocity too and it is not a coincidence that the Japan-India Association was set up 111 years ago in 1903. It is today the oldest international friendship body in Japan.
A Ministry of External Affairs’ backgrounder points out:

Throughout the various phases of history, since civilisational contacts between India and Japan began some 1400 years ago, the two countries have never been adversaries. Bilateral ties have been singularly free of any kind of dispute – ideological, cultural or territorial.

Soon after Independence, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru gifted an Indian elephant to the Ueno Zoo in Tokyo. This special gift brought light into the lives of thousands of Japanese children who had suffered the trauma of the War. The elephant, named Indira after Nehru’s daughter, lived till 1983.
Officially, the first cultural agreement between India and Japan was signed in October 1956, establishing a scholarship system for young Japanese scholars to study in India. A year later, Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi travelled to India, and Jawaharlal Nehru visited Tokyo later in the year.
But the relations between India and Japan are much older and deeper.
India’s earliest documented direct contact with Japan dates from 752 CE when the Todaiji Temple in Nara was consecrated by an Indian monk, Bodhisena, who performed the eye-opening of a statue the Buddha Sakyamuni.
Buddhism had been introduced to Japan in 538 CE. The king of Baekje, a Korean principality, gifted a shiny image of the Buddha along with some scripture-scrolls and ornaments to the Japanese Emperor Kimmei.
Though some traditionalist clans opposed the new faith, considering their Shinto indigenous tradition as far more adapted to Japan, the influential Soga clan adopted Buddhism as a State religion.
In 604 CE, a Japanese prince, Shotoku issued a 17–Article Constitution quoting Buddhist and Confucian principles. Article II enjoined his subjects to:

Fervently respect the Three Treasures (the Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha).

Prince Shotoku ordered the Government to start building Buddhist temples. The most famous of them, the Horyu-ji temple, the world’s oldest wooden structure, still stands near the former capital of Nara.
It was because of this prince’s patronage and devotion to the Three Jewels that Buddhism was firmly established on Japanese soil.
During a lecture in Tokyo in 1916, the Great Poet Rabindranath told a Japanese audience:

While travelling in a railway train I met, at a wayside station, some Buddhist priests and devotees. They brought their basket of fruits to me and held their lighted incense before my face, wishing to pay homage to a man who had come from the land of Buddha. The dignified serenity of their bearing, the simplicity of their devoutness, seemed to fill the atmosphere of the busy railway station with a golden light of peace. Their language of silence drowned the noisy effusion of the newspapers. I felt that I saw something which was at the root of Japan’s greatness.

Tagore said he reached the conclusion that the welcome…

...which flowed towards me, with such outburst of sincerity, was owing to the fact that Japan felt the nearness of India to herself, and realised that her own heart has room to expand beyond her boundaries and the boundaries of the modern time.

The Nobel Laureate was a great admirer of traditional Japanese martial arts, particularly of jujutsu, the original form of judo.
Gurudev was determined to bring this art to India. In 1902 in Kolkata, during a meeting with Tenshin Okakura, the Japanese eminent writer and art critic, Tagore requested him to send judo instructors to Shantiniketan. Jinnutsuke Sano, a student of Keio University, eventually came to Tagore’s school, where he stayed from 1905 to 1908. It is how judo was first introduced to India. An interesting aspect of the training was that girls took part along with boys. Quite a revolution!
Rathindranath, Tagore’s elder son, later recalled:

Father had brought a jujutsu expert from Japan. We took lessons from him in order to prepare ourselves to fight the British! Had not the spirit and training of judo helped the Japanese to win the war?

Remembering the deep connection between Tagore and Japan, Visva-Bharati established a Japanese department in 1954 under the guidance of Probodh Chanda Bagchi. This made Visva-Bharati the first Indian university to introduce Japanese language courses.
Another eminent person who served as a bridge between India and Japan is the Mother, Sri Aurobindo’s French-born collaborator. She spent 5 years in Japan between 1915 and 1920. She beautifully described the Japanese genius, she wrote:

If you have — as we have had — the privilege of coming in contact with the true Japanese, those who kept untouched the righteousness and bravery of the ancient Samurai, then you can understand what in truth is Japan, you can seize the secret of her force. They know how to remain silent; and though they are possessed of the most acute sensitiveness, they are, among the people I have met, those who express it the least.

The Mother, who settled in Pondicherry and worked with Sri Aurobindo to create the Ashram, later recalled:

A friend here can give his life with the greatest simplicity to save yours, though he never told you before he loved you in such a profound and unselfish way. Indeed he had not even told you that he had loved you at all.

She spoke of the Japanese unselfishness which…

is not the privilege of the well-educated, the learned or the religious people; in all social ranks you may find it.  …The Japanese are taught from their infancy that life is duty and not pleasure.

This sense of unselfishness, of beauty, of love for nature, along the martial aspect of the Mahayana Buddhism touched many Indian souls.
Narendra Modi rightly noted, “The scale of innovation and level of precision among the people of Japan is admirable. Both our nations can learn a lot from each other.”
India has certainly a lot to learn from Japan, though cricket fans cleaning the stadium after a test may not happen just yet.

The Tiananmen Square massacre: a rehearsal in Tibet

There was a rehearsal for the Tiananmen incident which saw the Army taking over the Square and killing hundreds of students.
It happened in Lhasa, Tibet three months before the Square's crackdown; a young Party Secretary then demonstrated to the Elders in Beijing that he had the capacity to handle the most difficult situations.
He was suitably rewarded; a few years later, he became General Secretary of the Party and President of the People's Republic of China.
I am reposting here an article written in 2002 for Rediff.com.
As you can see, it pays to be tough in China.
At the Tiananmen's incident, I like the remarks made yesterday by Bill Bishop in his Newsletter Sinocism. He wrote:

I first came to China 25 years, to spend the second semester of my junior year at Peking University. We arrived in late January and I stayed until the third week of June. No one who was in Beijing then will ever forget the Beijing Spring and subsequent crackdown.
The one lesson I took away from those first few months in China is that it is always a mistake to underestimate what the Party will do to stay in power.
That lesson, which has held up very well over the last quarter century, is why I continue to believe that Xi Jinping is very serious about both economic reforms and reining in corruption. There is no shortage of people, inside and outside China, who believe Xi's efforts will fail without said political reform, but Xi and his colleagues appear to disagree. Political reforms in any Western or liberal sense seem even less likely now than they have in decades. 

China is not going to change soon and China will remain aggressive.
Te problem is that Beijing still believes that all its problems are due to her 'bad' and 'provocative' neighbours.
On May 30, The People’s Daily reported that Fu Ying, the Chairperson of the National People’s Congress Foreign Affairs Committee, suggested during a TV show that "all issues in the seas around China were caused by the provocative behavior demonstrated by China’s neighboring countries". 
She, of course, mentioned that Japan which 'faces the question of whether it will continue on the path of being a peaceful nation or not".
After saying that China will not give up on peaceful resolutions, Fu added that "however, strong responses are necessary when facing challenges. This position is also needed to maintain the peaceful and stable order in the entire region".
India too will have to cope with these strong 'peaceful' responses from Beijing.
 
From Roof of the World to Top of the Party
Claude Arpi
Rediff.com
December 10, 2002

The suspense ended on the last day of China's 16th Communist Party Congress in Beijing when the nine chosen ones emerged in the Great Hall of the People. Hu Jintao, freshly appointed general secretary of the party, was leading his eight comrades. China had a new leadership. Hu's presence was not much of a surprise as the world knew he had been groomed for years by his mentor and China's last emperor Jiang Zemin. However, there was speculation about who Hu, the 'grey man of the party,' really was.
Most international media repeated that very little was known about China's new boss. However, one part of his life is quite well documented: the period before he ascended to the standing committee of the CCP's Politburo in 1992.
At that time, the 'core leader of the Forth Generation' was for four years party secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region in Lhasa. It is interesting to have a closer look at the way Hu used his post in Tibet as a stepping stone to reach the top rung of the Middle Kingdom.
Hu always knew that to 'seek fame' does not help to climb the party's ladder. That is probably why he never liked to be in the limelight or give interviews to the foreign press. One can closely follow his steps by his declaration either on Lhasa television or through the official organs of the party.
Of his earlier years, we know little except that one of his best friends was Zhang Hong, who later became Deng Xiaoping's son-in-law. As a mechanical engineer, Hu was posted at different sites throughout China, but in 1980, he was noticed by Song Ping, the party boss in Gansu province and was rapidly promoted. He finally joined the Young Cadre Course at the party school in Beijing in 1981. It was there that he is supposed to have met Hu Yaobang, general secretary of the CCP, who became his first mentor.
The elder Hu was certainly one of the most remarkable leaders of modern China and a great reformer. Remember it is his funeral, after his sudden death during a meeting of the Politburo, which triggered the Tiananmen student revolution.
One of the most remarkable facts about the Elder Hu was that when he visited Tibet in 1980, he was so moved by the suffering of the Tibetan people under Communist rule, that he decided to address 5,000 officials assembled in Lhasa. He publicly admitted that the party 'has let the Tibetan people down' and he added: 'the life of the Tibetan people has not been notably improved' after the Chinese invasion in 1950.
When the Elder Hu tried to introduce reforms in China in the early eighties, he was violently opposed and criticized by conservative forces within the party. During this period, it seems Hu Jintao, who was first secretary of the Communist Youth League, defended him.
However, by the mid-eighties, the direction of the wind had begun to change in Beijing. This is when the Younger Hu showed he was already a Grand Master.
With the balance of power slowly shifting, the Elder Hu began losing to the most conservative elements led by Li Peng and Qiao Shi, and the Younger Hu realigned himself dexterously.
The changes in the party were reflected on the Tibetan question. After the Elder Hu's visit to Tibet in 1980, Beijing had for a few years an open Tibet policy. The Dalai Lama was allowed to send four fact finding delegations and two negotiating teams to Tibet and China. Discussions were held on the Dalai Lama's future role in Tibet. But in 1985, due to the changes in Beijing, the opening came to a sudden halt and a visit to Tibet and China by the Tibetan leader was cancelled.
Sensing the wind, Hu Jintao began leaning towards his new mentor Qiao Shi who was in charge of internal security in the Chinese cabinet.
In Tibet, events took a turn for the worse in September 1987 when some monks demonstrated in Lhasa against Chinese rule. During these days, hundreds of visitors and media persons were present in the Tibetan capital and the images of the repression which followed were reported the world over. In the following months, incidents continued to occur and several Tibetans lost their lives.
Beginning 1988, the Chinese leadership became more and more nervous as they felt they were losing face in the world's eyes. The monks, the very same people they were supposed to have 'liberated' from the clutches of the clergy, were now revolting against the 'motherland.' But worse for Beijing: if the situation was allowed to drift, China could follow the Soviet Union on the way to disintegration.
Something had to be done.
The first scapegoat was Wu Jinghua, the Elder Hu's protégé who lost his job as party secretary in Lhasa. Officially he had a heart attack during a meeting in June 1988 'due to a frigidly cold climate and the lack of oxygen, plus being overloaded with work for a long time.' His mistake was that he had scrupulously implemented the Elder Hu's policies towards Tibet.
In Beijing, Hu Yaobang was replaced by Zhao Ziyang who would be purged after the Tiananmen Square events.
The strong men in the Politburo were Li Peng and the Younger Hu's new mentor Qiao Shi who visited Tibet in July 1988. It is probably at that time that it was decided to appoint Hu Jiantao to replace Wu Jinghua as Tibet chief. It was to be the crucial turn in Hu's career. He probably knew he had to show results in very short time to repay the confidence placed in him by Qiao Shi. Hu knew he could not afford to fail. Had not Qiao Shi threatened of 'merciless repression' if the demonstrations were not immediately stopped?
The Younger Hu took over the rebellious region on January 12, 1989.
A Hong Kong paper Kuang Chiao Ching wrote at that time: 'If he can stabilize the situation in Tibet that would, of course, be the first step towards a rapid rise in Hu Jintao's political fortunes… If he rules Tibet successfully, perhaps the question on everyone's mind in the near future could be: Will Hu Jintao become a superstar on China's political stage?'
On January 19, Hu had a meeting with the People's Liberation Army. During his speech, he spoke about the 'the CCP Central Committee's new instructions on work in Tibet.' Referring to the PLA's role: indeed it was a bad omen for Tibetans, especially after Hu told the army: 'We must strengthen control of monasteries and temples.'
A week later a Beijing newspaper Zhongguo Xinwen She published an interview with Hu in which he described his two main tasks in Tibet: 'To safeguard the unification of the motherland, adopt a clear-cut stand to oppose separatism, and stabilize the situation in Tibet,' and then: 'to continue to carry out economic construction, make redoubled efforts to develop the commodity economy.' This would later be known as Hu's strategy of 'grasping with both hands.'
From that day, events moved very fast.
On January 23, Hu visited the Tashilhunpo monastery in Shigatse. He was accompanied by the Panchen Lama, the second highest ranking Tibetan Lama after the Dalai Lama. The official occasion was the consecration of a stupa containing the mortal remains of one of the previous Panchen Lamas. To everyone's surprise, during the function, the Panchen Lama denounced the Communist Party's role in Tibet: 'although there had been developments in Tibet since its liberation, this development had cost more dearly than its achievements. This mistake must never be repeated.'
Four days later, he passed away in mysterious circumstances. Though Tibetans believed he was murdered, it has never been proven. It is said the Panchen Lama had a serious quarrel with Qiao Shi just before he left for Tibet. Whether this was true or not, the stage was cleared for 'merciless repression.'
When a demonstration erupted on March 5, the People's Armed Police quickly took control of the situation. Chinese journalist Tang Daxian, who had connections in the party and witnessed some of the events, later wrote in London's The Observer that many events were stage managed by the PAP. Beijing had ordered repression. His information was that on March 6 alone, 387 Tibetans were massacred around the Central Cathedral in Lhasa.
The next day, Hu declared that 'the PAP following the instructions of the Central Committee (read Qiao Shi) had maintained the unity of the Motherland… the majority of Tibetans who had joined the disturbance… must be made to feel guilty and promise they would never do so again.'
Martial law was clamped on March 8. The tragic events in Lhasa seem to have been a rehearsal for an even more important episode: the student rebellion on Tiananmen Square three months later.
Hu Jintao told Xinhua news agency a few days after the events: 'We should maintain vigilance against possible activity by the handful of separatists and strike them with relentless blows. We should mete out more severe punishment to those who would start troublemaking after the declaration of martial law.' His ruthless implementation of his bosses' orders and the subsequent replay of Lhasa events at Tiananmen Square proved he was a leader who could be relied upon. When, after the massacre at the Square, Jiang Zemin replaced Zhao Ziyang, he remembered this.
Hu was to stay on for four more years in Tibet, though the job was done in three months. Hu never liked Tibet. He once told a journalist he 'disliked Tibet's altitude, climate and lack of culture.' During the following months and years, he began shuttling between Lhasa and Beijing where the real power was. There was a common joke about Hu amongst Tibetan cadres: 'Where is Hu?' The answer was: 'Hu is in Beijing Hospital.' He had to officially report sick each time he was going to Beijing!
In the following months, Hu further stabilized the situation by targeting Tibetan cadres 'harbouring separatist thoughts.' He believed the main 'evil' was religion, and particularly the monasteries which were 'using feudal and superstitious beliefs to swindle and harm people,' thereby delaying the 'socialist spiritual civilization' heralded by Jiang Zemin.
On April 30, 1990, martial law was finally lifted. Hu used his remaining years as party secretary to completely reverse the Elder Hu's policies. Instead of providing support to the Tibetans to safeguard their culture, the Younger Hu tried to assimilate it into Han culture. While the Elder Hu wanted the Tibetans to be autonomous and take their future into their own hands, he created schemes to bring in more Han officials and colonizers to the Roof of the World, further destroying Tibetan uniqueness.
During a visit to Tibet in 1990, Jiang Zemin echoed Hu's views: 'It is necessary to strengthen education in patriotism and socialism in the light of conditions in China and Tibet, so as to make the students know from childhood that Tibet is an inalienable sacred part of the big family of the motherland, and that there will be no socialist new Tibet if there is no CCP.'
It appears that during Jiang Zemin's visit to Tibet, a close relationship was established between the general secretary and his future protégé.
There is no doubt that the events of the three first months in Tibet earned Hu the admiration of many in Beijing. While the Chinese empire was on the verge of disintegrating and could have followed the example of the Soviet Union, his firm handling of the situation and obedience to party orders were rewarded in 1992 by a seat on the standing committee. It was the next step towards the summit.
It is probably true that in 1989 Hu saved China which could have plunged into the 'chaos' so feared by the Chinese emperors. Had Tibet been lost, no doubt other provinces such as Xinjiang would have followed in quick succession.
Now that the Younger Hu has reached the top, will he continue to 'grasp China with two hands' and tighten security to economically develop China? In many ways, China faces more serious problems now than 1989: unemployment, wild capitalism, corruption, regional aspirations, pollution, food problems are some of the issues the Younger Hu will have to tackle. For this, will he use force as his party elders had instructed him to do in Tibet, or will he choose the path of the Elder Hu, open up the system and ultimately give more power to the people, with all the risks it implies?
Only the future will tell, but he will certainly need more than two hands to grasp the future of the People's Republic.

A new Chinese aggression?

My article A New Chinese Aggression has been posted in NitiCentral.

Here is the link...

China has done it again. One would have thought that after the 4 day- Plenum of the 18th CPC Central Committee (held from November 9 to 12) that the new leadership would have began focusing their energies on reforms; but no, they have taken a most controversial and dangerous course, destabilizing the region and upsetting the neighbours.
In India, we still remember the events of April, when the People’s Liberation Army planted their tents in Depsang Plain of Ladakh.
On November 23, the Chinese Ministry of National Defense issued a statement announcing the establishment of the East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone, “in accordance with the Law of the People's Republic of China on National Defense (1997), the Law of the People's Republic of China on Civil Aviation (1995) and the Basic Rules on Flight of the People's Republic of China (2001).” Well, not accordance with friendly relations with its neighbours!
The statement then gives the coordinates of “outer limit of China's territorial sea”, which engulfs the South China Sea and the islands in dispute with Japan.
A day later, the Chinese Air Force (PLAAF) admitted that I had conducted a air patrol over the zone: “Reconnaissance and early-warning aircraft and warplanes were deployed.”
Beijing defined thus an Air Defense Identification Zone: “it is a zone that can extend in some cases up to 300 miles beyond the territorial sea. It’s established by some countries off their coasts for security reasons. When entering the zone, all aircraft are required to identify themselves, report flight plans, and inform ground control of their exact position.”
A few days earlier, the Third Plenum had delivered 2 new Leading Groups: one on reforms (it was expected) and more surprisingly, a National Security Committee (NSC).
It was then explained: “The general objective of the approved reforms is to improve and develop socialism with Chinese characteristics …development is still the key to solving all problems in China.”
A statement concluded with “the need to deepen reforms in order to build a moderately prosperous society, and a strong and democratic country, as well as realize the Chinese dream of national rejuvenation.”
A host of measures were initiated ‘to ensure that the authority of the constitution and laws is upheld’.
Beijing admitted that the most important factor which needed to be monitored is what the Party calls ‘stability’. According to Xi Jinping, the new economic policies can only be implemented if China is stable: "State security and social stability are preconditions for reform and development", said the President, adding that only when the nation is safe and society is stable, could reform and development constantly advance.
Will the new aggressive foreign policy make China stable? Certainly not!
‘Stability’ was the justification for the creation of the NSC which will deal with internal as well external issues: “China is facing two pressures: internationally, the country needs to safeguard its sovereignty, security and development interests; domestically, political security and social stability should be ensured”, explained Xi, adding: “The variety of predictable and unpredictable risks has been increasing remarkably, and the system has not yet met the needs of safeguarding state security.”
Reuters believed, “it will enable the government to speak with a single voice when it comes to dealing with crises at home and abroad.”
Does the latest move, to create Air Defense Identification Zone have been taken with a ‘single voice’? We have to wait several decades to know.
But in the wake of the Plenum, military schools have been asked to review their curriculums ‘to boost real combat abilities’. According to an official PLA statement, “the reform will also unify teaching materials, innovate in teaching methods for combat command and hone a performance-based reward and penalty mechanism for students.”
It was also said that the PLA will “better co-ordinate the work of its different military and geographical branches”.
The Plenum also decided to optimize the PLA’s size and structure and also adjust and improve the proportion between various troops, and reduce non-combat institutions and personnel.
In the process, there is an increase of aggressiveness; recently, the Chinese military's National Defense University, the General Political Security and General Staff Departments, the Chinese Academy of Social Science and the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations jointly released a documentary titled ‘Silent Contest’; though widely circulated from June to October, it was later blocked by the authorities.
The movie, which is pure anti-American propaganda, asserts that the United States has used 5 methods to subvert China: 1) Political Infiltration, 2) Cultural infiltration, 3) Ideological infiltration, 4) Organizational infiltration, and 5) Political interference and social penetration.
Washington’s ‘conspiracy’ is said to be at the root of all evils in the Middle Kingdom: social conflicts, officials' corruption, human rights protests, spread of Christianity and advocacy of a ‘constitutional government’.
Is the latest move an indirect attack on the US?
Fumio Kishida, Japan’s foreign minister immediately condemned the new China’s air defense zone over disputed islands. He said that the Chinese declaration is a dangerous escalation that could lead to a miscalculation or accident; this, in turn, could start an armed confrontation and the US would automatically be dragged into the conflict.
The US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel warned that the American government viewed the Chinese move “as a destabilizing attempt to alter the status quo in the region.” He also reaffirmed that the United States would stand by its security treaty obligations with Japan.
Where does all this lead us?
White House spokesman Josh Earnest told reporters that the fact that China wants airlines to inform Beijing when they are entering airspace over disputed islands in the East China Sea is ‘unnecessarily inflammatory,’ adding that there should be common ground “to reach a resolution that doesn't involve inflammatory, escalating rhetoric or policy pronouncements by any side, and that's how we hope this situation will be resolved."
It is however not in China’s habit to back out of its position.
While the new NSC is supposedly designed to increase the coordination and the integration between the police, military, intelligence and diplomatic services; it is doubtful if the diplomatic angle has not been taken into consideration in this case.
The Chinese propaganda still affirms: “China is a stabilizer for world peace and security, and the new commission is like a performance guarantee for the stabilizer and will in turn bring benefits to the whole world. If China can be safer, the whole world will be safer as well.”
The facts speak differently.

Worse than the Japanese earthquake

To put it mildly, the Indian media is very poorly informed on the different energy options for India. 
It is fashionable to put all the ills on nuclear energy (we have seen it through the debate after the visit of Dr Manmohan Singh in the US in September 2005), but has India other options if it wants to continue to grow at 8% or 9%?
To believe that solar or wind can be a solution is just unrealistic, not to say unscientific. 
This does not mean that all the precautions should not be taken when Delhi decides to acquire nuclear plants. The safest possible solutions with all the necessary guarantees should be chosen.
One of the main issues if India decides to go for French or Russian technologies is the rampant corruption of the Indian operators and their sub-contractors. How to insure that the concrete slabs will be built according to the proper norms and not according to CWG norms? The contract between the supplier and the operator should take this into account, otherwise nuclear could be a boon for new rajas (with Japanese consequences).
Once again, the hydro-power is far more dangerous than the nuclear in seismic zones like the Tibetan plateau or the Northeast. Read this article in The Telegraph and you will understand. 

Chinese earthquake may have been man-made, say scientists
An earthquake that killed at least 80,000 people in Sichuan last year may have been triggered by an enormous dam just miles from the epicentre
The Telegraph
Malcolm Moore in Shanghai  02 Feb 2009
The 511ft-high Zipingpu dam holds 315 million tonnes of water and lies just 550 yards from the fault line, and three miles from the epicentre, of the Sichuan earthquake.
Now scientists in China and the United States believe the weight of water, and the effect of it penetrating into the rock, could have affected the pressure on the fault line underneath, possibly unleashing a chain of ruptures that led to the quake.
Fan Xiao, the chief engineer of the Sichuan Geology and Mineral Bureau in Chengdu, said it was "very likely" that the construction and filling of the reservoir in 2004 had led to the disaster.
"There have been many cases in which a water reservoir has triggered an earthquake," said Mr Fan. "This earthquake was very unusual for this area.
There have been no seismic activities greater than a magnitude seven quake along this particular seismic belt before."
The 7.9 magnitude quake struck last May and left more than five million people homeless. It remains a raw and emotional topic for most Chinese, and the government has been quick to quash any suggestion that Zipingpu may have been responsible for the catastrophe. Researchers have been denied access to seismological and geological data to examine the earthquake further.
Zipingpu is only one of nearly 400 hydroelectric dams in the earthquake zone. Mr Fan said the government had been warned of the danger of building so many large-scale projects in a seismically active area, but that the warnings had gone unheeded.
"I not only opposed the construction of Zipingpu, but also the overdevelopment of the reservoirs on Minjiang River. There are ten major reservoirs on the main river, 29 on its tributaries and a lot more smaller-scale reservoirs, all of which block the flow of the entire river, and are very hazardous to the local geology," he said.
Although Sichuan is an earthquake-prone region, many scientists were caught by surprise by the magnitude of the quake. Christian Klose, a scientist at Columbia University's Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory, said there had not been any "major seismic activity" on that fault line for millions of years.
He argued that the sudden shift of a huge quantity of water into the region could have simultaneously relaxed the tension between the two sides of the fault, allowing them to move apart, and also increased the direct pressure enough to cause a violent rupture. The effect was "25 times more" than a year's worth of natural stress from tectonic movement, he said.
Although the official government line is that its massive construction projects had nothing to do with the quake, some state researchers in Beijing have called for a full investigation. Lei Xinglin, of the China Earthquake Administration, said that the Zipingpu reservoir "clearly affected the local seismicity and it is worthwhile to study the role it played in triggering the earthquake further". He added that firm conclusions remain "premature" however.
There is a history of earthquakes triggered by dams, including several caused by the construction of the Hoover dam in the US, but none of such a magnitude.