Steering Asia to stability

My review of Dr Monika Chansoria's book, Steering Asia to stability, China, Japan, and Senkaku Islands appeared in The Sunday Pioneer.

China, Japan, and Senkaku Islands:
Conflict in the East China Sea Amid and American Shadow 
by Dr Monika Chansoria
KW Publishers Pvt Ltd., New Delhi
ISB 978-93-83649-99-0
Price RS.980

This book is detailed, precise, legally well-researched. The author’s general principles can apply to any of China’s territorial claims. It’s perhaps high time for India to prepare such studies for its border with China from Ladakh to Arunachal, writes CLAUDE ARPI

This book, written by Dr Monika Chansoria, a Senior Fellow at the prestigious Centre for Land Warfare Studies, is timely for several reasons, but first and foremost because it describes the way Beijing conducts ‘diplomacy’ in its extended neighbourhood.

Chansoria writes: “Changing the territorial status quo has been the unfinished business of the People’s Republic of China since its founding in 1949, when it set out to forcibly absorb the sprawling Xinjiang and Tibetan plateau - actions that increased the landmass of China by 44 per cent.”
The scholarly author continues: “Underlining the fact that China does not apply the rule of law at home, its ingenious principle to covet neighbours' territories is: ‘what IS ours is ours and what is yours is negotiable’.”
India has been at the receiving end of China’s irredentism since Independence.
Chansoria quotes Maj Gen Zhang Zhaozhong of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), who mentions the ‘cabbabe’ strategy; it involves “asserting a claim, launching furtive incursions into the coveted territory, and erecting - one at a time - cabbage-style multiple layers of security around a contested area so as deny access to a rival.”
In other words, you grab what you want or what you need for your security, cover it with a few ‘security layers’ and then offer ‘friendly’ discussions to the opposite party.
The Chinese-speaking scholar continues: “The strategy bears all the hallmarks of modern Chinese brinkmanship, including reliance on stealth, surprise and a disregard for the risks of military escalation and seeks to ensure that the initiative remains with China.”
Similar tactics were used during the negotiations with India for the Panchsheel agreement in 1954; at that time China had just started building a road in the Aksai Chin.
This book is relevant because it is crucial for Indian strategists to understand the pattern used by Beijing, one could call it ‘grabbing with Chinese characteristics’: “construct a dispute, initiate a jurisdictional claim through periodic incursions, and then increase the frequency and duration of such intrusions, thereby establishing a military presence or pressuring a rival to cut a deal on China's terms.”
China is always one stage in advance on its opponent, which is often kept off balance. This is not only the story of the Senkaku Islands, but also the ‘rocks’ in the South China Sea, the Aksai Chin region of Ladakh or the LAC in Arunachal Pradesh or Uttarakhand (incursions are mildly called ‘transgressions’ by the shy Indian politicians). Beijing invariably follows the same pattern, if there is no resistance, no opposition, it continues to advance, till it is stopped by force at the risk of a conflict.
One could also cite the example of Tawang and other areas Arunachal Pradesh where historically the Tibetan ‘influence’ has never been more than ten percent of the landmass of the State, but which is today claimed by China as South Tibet in his entirity.
Unfortunately for Beijing, in the present case, the Japanese are not ready to be bullied.
Chansoria starts her study by the ‘Genesis of dispute in the East China Sea”. The fact that the author calls the Island in dispute as ‘Senkaku’, the Japanese name, shows which side of the dispute she stands.
China calls the Islands, Diaoyu (‘fishing platform’").
Chansoria however highlights the complexity of the issue: “The dispute over sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is structured around economic interests, domestic political compulsions, issues surrounding national identity and allegiance, requirements of international law and the long-standing baggage of historical grievances.”
The eight uninhabited islands, located in the East China Sea, northeast of Taiwan, east of the Chinese mainland and southwest of Japan's southernmost Okinawa prefecture, might be small, but are the object of a bitter quarrel which could explode anytime. The five volcanic islands and three rocky outcroppings have a total land area of only 6.32 sq km.
On January 14, 1895, the Japanese Cabinet had passed a formal Resolution incorporating the Senkaku Islands into its territory. Japan argued that before 1895, the islands were terra nullius (i.e. territory claimed by no nation). The Islands were placed under the jurisdiction of Okinawa Prefecture. This is the foundation of Japan’s legal basis for asserting its claim over the islands.
In May 1895, Japan and the Manchu (Qing) Dynasty signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki ending the Sino-Japanese war. Under the agreement, (considered today by China an ‘unequal treaty’), China ceded Taiwan/Formosa to Japan “together with all the islets appertaining or belonging to the said island of Formosa.” The Treaty did not specifically mention the Senkakus.
Today Beijing and Taipei argue that after World War II, the Allied declarations at Cairo and Potsdam restored to China territories taken through military aggression by the Japanese, and thus the islets should have been returned to China.
In October 1945, Japan relinquished authority over all territories seized or occupied (such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores), but in no agreement were the Islands of Senkakus mentioned; by default it remained part of Okinawa prefecture. Of course, China does not agree to this reading.
Chansoria goes into depth into the International Law, Legal Provisions and Conventions; the Resurgence of National in China and Japan (an important factor of the dispute), but also the Oil, Gas and Economics of the Conflict, (which understandably exacerbate the lust of the opponent and harden the respective positions) and finally the China-Japan-America Triangle (which makes any peacemakers lose faith in any possible negotiated solution).
Her last Chapter is on ‘Reigniting a Quiescent Volcano’.
Her conclusion points to the need “to steer Asia towards a regional order that maintains stability in the power equilibrium, thereby challenging a visibly coercive Sino-centric vision of the future Asia, especially within the Indo-Pacific.”
It is easier said than done, but the Modi government has taken many steps in this direction by establishing closer links with Japan, Vietnam or Australia.
The work of Chansoria is detailed, precise, legally well-researched.
The general principles described by the author can apply to any of China’s territorial claims.
It is perhaps high time for India to prepare such studies for its border with China from Ladakh to Arunachal. It may one day be usueful.

Chinese Irredentism and the Great Rejuvenation

“The great rejuvenation of Chinese nation is an unstoppable historical trend that won't be diverted by the will of any individual country or person,” 

is how a Chinese ‘expert’ reacted after the announcement of the verdict of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) on China Military Online.
The International Tribunal in The Hague had just announced its ruling on a reference by the Philippines over the South China Sea (SCS); the Philippines had objected to Beijing violating its sovereign rights in the SCS.
The court ruled China had no legal basis to claim any historic right to the natural resources in most of the areas of the SCS. It also ruled that such rights must not exceed what’s permitted by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
Further there was no evidence China had historically controlled the waters or its resources exclusively. The court maintained it had jurisdiction to consider historic rights and maritime entitlements.
The ruling is a terrible blow in the face for the land- (and sea-) grabbing Middle Kingdom.
China was quick to release a statement on “China's territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea.”
The longish statement/justification was obviously ready in anticipation of the verdict of the Court. Beijing reaffirmed “China' s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea, enhance cooperation in the South China Sea with other countries, and uphold peace and stability in the South China Sea.”
It then detailed the different Islands and rocks ‘belonging’ to China and adds: “Since its founding on October 1, 1949, the People' s Republic of China has been firm in upholding China' s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea.” It quotes internal laws and conventions which mean nothing in International Law.
Beijing’s main argument is that the SCS disputes are inseparable from sovereignty issues and as such, the issues were beyond the scope of the UNCLOS, which was referred by the tribunal in its ruling.
Well, the argumentation is weak to say the least, even if Chinese citizens have reacted angrily to a ruling.

An irredentist attitude
Remember the great historian Dr. RC Majumdar’s statement decades ago. He rightly assessed the Chinese way of behaving: “There is one aspect of Chinese culture that is little known outside the circle of professional historians. It is the aggressive imperialism that characterized the politics of China throughout the course of her history, at least during the part of which is well known to us. Thanks to the systematic recording of historical facts by Chinese themselves, an almost unique achievement in oriental countries... we [historians] are in position to follow the imperial and aggressive policy of China from the third century BC to the present day, a period of more than twenty-two hundred years... It is characteristic of China that if a region once acknowledged her nominal suzerainty even for a short period, she should regard it as a part of her empire forever and would automatically revive her claim over it even after a thousand years whenever there was a chance of enforcing it.”
Though written long ago, it is shows that Chinese mindset.

Angry reactions
As mentioned earlier, the Chinese reaction was violent.
According to The Quartz: “Patriotic netizens have called for war against the Philippines, a boycott of the country’s products, and created a somewhat racist cartoon to mock Filipinos. They’re jumping the Great Firewall to spit vitriolic, expletive-laden insults on Twitter, and over 20,000 Chinese citizens have signed an open letter to protest against the court ruling. Many can’t believe the Philippines brought a complaint to an international tribunal to begin with.”
Will this help? Certainly not.

Implementations?
Though it will be difficult to implement the judgment, it could however create jurisprudence. The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) is not a UN court, but “organiser of arbitral tribunals to resolve conflicts between member states, international organizations, or private parties,” it remains a very respectable and respected institution.
The range of legal issues taken by the PCA can involve territorial and maritime boundaries, sovereignty, human rights, international investment, and international and regional trade.
The first effect of the ruling of the Court may to calm down the irredentist ardours of the Middle Kingdom, at least for some time.
It is a first international warning to China: if Beijing wants to become a ‘normal’ State, it has to follow the rules accepted by the rest of the world community.
Beijing has to decide in which category it wants to be listed: with the rogue States like North Korea or with ‘normal’ States?

Jurisprudence?
Take the example of Arunachal Pradesh.
For years, China has been trying to claim the entire Indian State as hers, with no historical justification, except for the fact that a small part of State (Tawang) has once upon a time paid monastic taxes to a monastery near Lhasa. Chinese claims are clearly not tenable in international law.
Arunachal may be the most glaring case, but the above is also true for many areas in Ladakh, in Uttarakhand or Himachal … and in POK as well.
Without any historical basis, Beijing has regularly claimed large chunks of its neighbours’s territory.
The ruling of the PCA should remind China that all the nations live on the same planet and commonly agreed rules should be followed by all.
Though in 1959, the International Commission of Jurists had condemned China’s Human Rights violation in Tibet, it is the first time that the issue of territoriality involving China has been looked into, analyzed and a judgment delivered. This creates a precedent which has other serious implications.
The Chinese President may say that “the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s verdict will not affect Beijing’s territorial sovereignty and maritime interests in the fiercely contested waters,” it will definitively create a jurisprudence with the possibility of more States approaching the PCA.
During a meeting with European Council President Donald Tusk and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, President Xi Jinping stated that China will not accept any proposition or action based on an international tribunal’s ruling over the disputed SCS: “We firmly insist on maintaining peace and stability in the South China Sea, and on directly negotiating for a peaceful resolution on relevant disputes with states that are directly involved, based on the respect of history and in accordance with international laws,” Xi said.
Today, China only accepts the common rules favorable to China.
After the La Hague verdict, it may not be acceptable for the world community any more.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
In April 2015, Xi arrived in Islamabad bringing with him generous gifts for Pakistan: an eye-popping $46 billion worth of planned energy and infrastructure investment to boost Pakistan's flagging economy. This included 10,400 megawatts to Pakistan's national grid through coal, nuclear and renewable energy projects. It sounded like a Chinese Dream for Islamabad!
Beijing wanted to help Pakistan to develop a China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which will eventually link up its pet project, the two New Silks Roads (also known as ‘One Belt, One Road’).
In other words, the Chinese-sponsored port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea will be connected through the Karakoram Highway, to the Xinjiang province in China’s Far West and Central Asia …and later Middle East, Africa and Europe. The ‘corridor’ will have railways, roads, optical fiber cables, dams (to produce the necessary electricity), pipelines, you name it!
Observers marveled at Beijing kindness (and wealth), but don’t be fooled by the Chinese generosity: Beijing is investing for Beijing!
The important point for India is that several of the CPEC’s crosses over the Indian territory in Kashmir. It is not acceptable and ultimately India could, as a last resort, take one day the Philippines way.

A Belligerent Mood
The ‘expert’ quoted earlier, wrote in the China Military Online: “The new China didn't bow to power or hegemony at its weakest moment. Now the rising China is more resolved to defend its own interests. Certain countries should be fully aware that no matter how many tricks they play, whatever actions they take, they won't change the fact that South China Sea Islands and adjacent waters all belong to China, or stop China's steps to become stronger, let alone shake Chinese military's resolve and will to staunchly defend national sovereignty and security.”
With a wounded ego, the Middle Kingdom can become even more belligerent; in any case the reference to the PCA shows that if Beijing does not accept the verdict, it will be difficult to be considered as a ‘normal’ State by the world community.

Of grazers, yaks and a few fishermen

My article Of grazers, yaks and a few fishermen appeared in the Edit Page of The Pioneer today.


Here is the link...

China is satisfied to have ‘stabilised’ the situation in the South China Sea; Beijing got what it wanted, ie an extension of its territory far away from the coastal line of the Middle Kingdom. The next stage is the Pacific

Recently, this writer read an article in the Taipei-based WantChinaTimes, which said, “China is equipping its maritime militia, with more armed fishing boats bolstering its muscle in the disputed South China Sea.” This reminded the writer of an interview with an MP from Ladakh. The writer was explained the various tactics used by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army to intrude into the Indian territory in the mountainous region. “The easiest way”, said the MP, “was to push Tibetan ‘herders’ with their yaks into Indian grazing grounds and then watch. If no immediate response was forthcoming from the Indian side, the territory de facto became Chinese”.Sending ‘grazers’ and yaks in the Himalaya or pushing ‘fishermen’ onto the South China Sea or in the Pacific is on the same page of Sun Tzu’s Art of War; it is the easiest way to conquer territory.
The Taiwanese publication quotes Zhang Hongzhou, a researcher from the Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, “Equipped with armed civilian fishing boats, China’s maritime militia is one of the less studied agencies in the exercise of Chinese maritime power,” said Zhang during a two-day conference held at the Center for Naval Analyses in Virginia, US.
Zhang cited a report by the Tokyo-based diplomat, “They are usually deployed by the Chinese Government to carry out various types of missions in disputed waters, from rescuing stranded vessels to conducting controversial island landings. To enhance their activities, Beijing is for the first time considering the formation of the country’s first fishing fleet.”
According to the same report, President Xi Jinping recently told the maritime militia that their mission is “not only to lead fishery activities in the region but also to collect oceanic information and support the construction of artificial islands and reefs.”
In other words, China can expand its territory using a state-owned fishing boat fleet. This applies to the Pacific too. On the anniversary of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army (August 1), the official PLA daily stated that the challenges facing China are extremely severe and there is a risk of chaos and war.
According to the mouthpiece of the Chinese Army, there are growing risks along its sea and land borders. The PLA paper believed that although China says it is a threat to nobody, “(it) needs to update equipment and has to be able to defend what is now the world’s second-largest economy.”
The front-page article added, “The situation surrounding our country is generally stable, but the risks and challenges are extremely severe, and the possibility of chaos and war on our doorstep has increased. …The maritime security environment is more complicated, and the undercurrents in the East and South China seas have been gushing up.”
Around the same time, China’s Defence Minister Chang Wanquan affirmed that “the nation was committed to being a force for peace, but would not compromise on core principles like Taiwan”. He added, “We will uphold the principle that people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are one family and go down the path of peaceful development of relations, (but will) resolutely oppose and hold back the plots of Taiwan independence separatists.”
But Taiwan is not really the priority today, Beijing has other plans. For the moment, China is satisfied to ‘have stabilised the situation’ in the South China Sea; Beijing got what it wanted, ie an extension of its territory far away from the coastal line of the Middle Kingdom, and this, without much objection/opposition from the US and weaker neighbours.
On the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations forum, Foreign Minister Wang Yi could declare with a straight face that China has stopped reclamation work in the South China Sea. Even if Southeast Asian nations expressed their fear that China’s construction will destabilise the region, Mr Wang affirmed, “China has already stopped.” He said, “You look, who is building? Take a plane and look for yourself.”
With the South China Sea’s phase ‘completed’, the next stage is clearly the Pacific. A report, prepared in November 2014, by the Air Force Command Academy (a Beijing-based think tank for the PLAAF) said that “China’s Air Force needs to broaden its air surveillance and attack capabilities in the western Pacific including the area near Japan to ensure its command of the skies.”
According to The South China Morning Post, the report also “stressed the need to develop and enhance nine types of ‘strategic equipment’ with an eye specifically towards the United States and its pivot to Asia.”
Though not officially released, the think-tank’s study set the vision for China’s air strategy till 2030. It lists the US, Japan, Taiwan, India and Vietnam as ‘threats’ in military airspace.
It recommends “broadening Beijing’s scope of surveillance from the so-called ‘first island chain’ (linking Okinawa, Taiwan and the Philippines) to the ‘second island chain’ (which includes Japan’s Izu Island chain, Guam and New Guinea).”
The report suggests that Beijing “should enhance the ability to attack US bases within the ‘second island chain’ with a new type of strategic bomber and ‘deter US military intervention’ in the event of a defence operation involving Chinese islands.”
For this, new equipment is required. The report cites terminal high altitude area defence ground-based interceptor system, a high-speed air-launched cruise missile, a large transport plane, an airship that moves in the upper atmosphere, a next generation fighter, unmanned attack aircraft, Air Force satellites and precision-guided bombs.
The report also mentions “the ability to attack US bases on the China side of the second archipelago line with strategic bombers and deter US military intervention in the event of a defence operation involving Chinese islands.”
Vassily Kashin, senior research fellow at the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies in Moscow, citing The Global Times, the mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party, also asserts that the PLAAF intends to expand its ‘area of control’ to the western Pacific.
The Global Times asserted that the aims mentioned in the report are realisable, “The PLA’s Navy and Air Force have been increasingly active in the area between what the Chinese military call the ‘first island chain’ and the ‘second island chain’.”
It is said that China is in the process of setting up an effective observation system for the area between the first and second island chains, including surveillance satellites, manned aircraft or drones, as well as warships and submarines.
Without waiting for sophisticated new equipment, fishermen can be extremely useful to Beijing to fulfill its new aims. The good old ways!

China: Opening a New Front in the Pacific

A few years ago, I had interviewed the MP from Ladakh. He had explained to me the various tactics used by the Chinese PLA to intrude into Indian territory in his mountainous region.
The easiest way was, he said, by pushing Tibetan ‘herders’ with their yaks into Indian grazing grounds and then watch. If no immediate response was forthcoming from the Indian side, the territory de facto became Chinese.
This came back to mind, when I read an article in WantChinaTimes: “China is equipping its maritime militia, with more armed fishing boats bolstering its muscle in the disputed South China Sea.”
Sending ‘grazers’ and yaks in the Himalaya or pushing ‘fishermen' on the seas on the same page of the Art of War; it is the easiest way to conquer territory.
The Taiwanese publication quotes Zhang Hongzhou, a researcher from  the Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore: “Equipped with armed civilian fishing boats, China's maritime militia is one of the less studied agencies in the exercise of Chinese maritime power,” said Zhang during a two-day conference held at the Center for Naval Analyses in Virginia, US.
Zhang cited a report by the Tokyo-based Diplomat: “They are usually deployed by the Chinese government to carry out various types of missions in disputed waters, from rescuing stranded vessels to conducting controversial island landings. To enhance their activities, Beijing is for the first time considering the formation of the country's first fishing fleet.”
According to the same report, President Xi Jinping recently told the maritime militia that their mission is “not only to lead fishery activities in the region but also to collect oceanic information and support the construction of artificial islands and reefs.”
In other words, China can expand its territory using a state-owned fishing boat fleet.
But that is not all.

The Possibility of Chaos and War
On the anniversary of its founding  (August 1), the official PLA Daily stated that the challenges facing China are extremely severe and there is a risk of chaos and war.
According to the mouthpiece of the Chinese Army, there are growing risks along its borders, including in the disputed waters of the South and East China seas.
The PLA paper believes that: “China says it is a threat to nobody, but needs to update equipment and has to be able to defend what is now the world's second-largest economy.”
The front-page article adds: “The situation surrounding our country is generally stable, but the risks and challenges are extremely severe, and the possibility of chaos and war on our doorstep has increased. …The maritime security environment is more complicated, and the undercurrents in the East and South China seas have been gushing up."
The PLA paper adds: “The mission of protecting national unity, territorial integrity and development interests is difficult and strenuous."
At the same time, Defence Minister Chang Wanquan affirmed that “the nation was committed to being a force for peace, but would not compromise on core principles like Taiwan,” adding: “We will uphold the principle that people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are one family and go down the path of peaceful development of relations, [but will] resolutely oppose and hold back the plots of Taiwan independence separatists."
But Taiwan is not a priority to today, Beijing has other plans.

Next Target: the Pacific
Perhaps more importantly than Taiwan, China which appears to be satisfied to ‘have stabilized the situation’ in the South China Sea. It means that Beijing got what it wanted, i.e. an extension of its territory far away from the coastal line of the Middle Kingdom, and this, without much objection/opposition from the United States and weaker neighbours.
Foreign Minister Wang Yi declared yesterday that China has stopped reclamation work in the South China Sea.
Why?
On the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations forum, while Southeast Asian nations expressed their fear that China's construction will destabilized the region, Wang affirmed: "China has already stopped."
Wang said: "You look, who is building? Take a plane and look for yourself."
Now that the job is done, Wang called on the ASEAN countries “to speed up talks on how claimant states should conduct themselves in the waters.”
With the South China Sea’s phase ‘completed’, the next stage is clearly the Pacific.
A report, prepared by the Air Force Command Academy (a Beijing-based think tank for the PLAAF), in November 2014, said that “China’s air force needs to broaden its air surveillance and attack capabilities in the western Pacific including the area near Japan to ensure its command of the skies.”
According to The South China Morning Post (SCMP), the report also “stressed the need to develop and enhance nine types of ‘strategic equipment’ with an eye specifically towards the United States and its pivot to Asia.”
Though not officially released, the think-tank’s study set the vision for China’s air strategy till 2030. It lists the US, Japan, Taiwan, India and Vietnam as ‘threats’ in military airspace.
It recommends “broadening Beijing’s scope of surveillance from the so-called ‘first island chain’ [linking Okinawa, Taiwan and the Philippines] to the ‘second island chain’ [which includes Japan’s Izu Island chain, Guam and New Guinea].”
The report suggest that Beijing “should enhance the ability to attack US bases within the ‘second island chain’ with a new type of strategic bomber and ‘deter US military intervention’ in the event of a defence operation involving Chinese islands.”
For this, new equipment is required. The report cites Terminal High Altitude Area Defence ground-based interceptor system, a high-speed air-launched cruise missile, a large transport plane, an airship that moves in the upper atmosphere, a next-generation fighter, unmanned attack aircraft, air force satellites and precision-guided bombs.
The report also mentions “the ability to attack US bases on the China side of the second archipelago line with strategic bombers and deter U.S. military intervention in the event of a defence operation involving Chinese islands.”
Rukmani Gupta, an analyst at IHS Janes told the SCMP: “If China’s air force is able to undertake regular and continuous surveillance and attack operations up until the second island chain, this would represent the capability to undertake aerial out-of-area operations, necessitating a recalibration of military strategy by other actors in the region.”
Without waiting for sophisticated new equipment, the fishermen can be extremely useful to Beijing to fulfill their designs.
The good old ways!

Chinese diplomacy is a culinary delight

Chinese 'sailors' on the 'Yongshu' Reef in the South China Sea

My article Chinese diplomacy is a culinary delight appeared today in the Edit Page of The Pioneer.

Here is the link...

Beijing can't afford to have many enemies. When it becomes too ‘hot' on one front, it needs to make friends on another. It is making friends the way that one slowly cooks seafood to make ‘Buddha jump over the wall’

News agency Xinhua recently admitted that the ‘rift’ over the South China Sea between Beijing and Washington has heightened tensions in the region, “but dispute over this body of water is only ‘an episode’ in China-US relations, instead of a flashpoint as portrayed or feared by many”.
The Chinese news agency further commented: “At a time when the futures and fortunes of China and the United States are more closely intertwined than they have ever been, it is imperative for them to always look for the bigger picture, and prevent such solvable tensions evolving into dangerous tinderbox.”
Behind these words, it is clear that Beijing can’t afford to have too many enemies at the same time and when it becomes too ‘hot’ on one front, Beijing needs to make friends on another.
What about the Middle Kingdom’s other foes, namely, individuals or groups opposing the party within China? Beijing is trying to deal with them in a novel way, which might also apply to ‘external unfriendly’ powers.
In your opinion, what could make Buddha jump over a wall? According to a Chinese saying, it is a special stew made of seafood and poultry: It is apparently so yummy that even Buddha would jump over a wall to taste it.
Why is it so tasty? Simply, because the ingredients have slowly simmered for a long, very long time over a low flame. President Xi Jinping recently mentioned the famous dish: “Make friends, the way that one slowly cooks seafood and poultry stew to make ‘Buddha jump over the wall’,” he advised.
He was then speaking about ‘internal friends’ during a United Front Work conference. The UFW Department is a party organ which makes the link between the Chinese Communist Party and non-party organisations, including business people like Mr Jack Ma’s Alibaba, but also Tibetans, Uyghurs or ‘compatriots’ from Taiwan.
During the conference, Mr Xi explained that the UFW aims at making more friends, adding: “However, in order to make this kind of friend, you can’t hurry it as if you are cooking fast food, but rather you should put in the kind of effort as if you are slowly cooking the famous Chinese dish.”
To demonstrate his point, the Chinese President cited the case of former Premier Zhou Enlai and his ‘friendship’ with the 10th Panchen Lama: “On April 27, 1950, when the Panchen Lama arrived in Beijing for the first time: that night he was received by Premier Zhou and invited to dinner. They discussed everything from customs, traditions, and daily life to the victory of the Chinese revolution and the future of Tibet. Premier Zhou’s openness and sincerity deeply influenced the Panchen Lama.”
Mr Xi then compared the Panchen Lama and the Dalai Lama: “In 1956, the Indian Government invited the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama to India to participate in celebrations for the 2,500th anniversary of Sakyamuni Buddha achieving nirvana. The Panchen Lama fought against separatist forces and returned home on schedule, in a sharp contrast to the Dalai Lama who delayed his return.”
This example means that ‘friends’ have to obey to the party; the Dalai Lama did not. Before returning to Tibet, the Dalai Lama attended a religious function in Kalimpong and this despite the objections of Zhou Enlai who considered Kalimpong ‘a nest of spies’. The Panchen Lama ‘obeyed’ and immediately returned to Tibet.
Mr Xi’s conclusion is interesting, prospective friends “should be treated with the same effort required to make the dish, with more contacts, more close talks, more assistance and emphasising respect, equality and sincerity”. But like the Panchen Lama, they should listen to the party.
China’s ‘external’ neighbours too should ‘listen’ to Beijing, for the purpose, they may need to be ‘cooked’ over a long time. In recent months, China has been extremely aggressive in the South China Sea, extending her territorial waters by nearly 1,000 kilometers.
Beijing pretended to be furious when Washington sent a P-8A Poseidon surveillance aircraft to monitor China’s deployments in the region; land-reclamation however relentlessly continued.
Attack being the best defence, Liang Fang, a professor at China’s National Defence University, violently accused the US ‘of launching its Asia’s repivot’ in The Global Times and “blockade China and unite with its allies Japan and the Philippines against China”, though he said that “China’s land reclamation efforts on disputed islands and reefs in the South China Sea will reduce the US’s projection power in the region.” He also added: “This makes the South China Sea a major strategic hotspot, which will decide the new world order.”
In other words, China is fighting a battle to dominate its close neighbours and stop the US from any interference in these designs.
In the meantime, sina.com published a sideshow with pictures taken on one of the reefs in the South China Sea. It shows good-looking female sailors (most probably models) posing on ocean breakwalls, while watering vegetable gardens, with pigs in a pen in the background. The title is “Gratifying results on China’s Yongshu Reef: Building vegetable greenhouses and growing fruit trees.”
It means that China had already succeeded in establishing its presence far away from its coastal areas; now, the next stage: To make friends, starts. General Fan Changlong, the powerful vice chairman of China’s Central Military Commission, visited Washington for the purpose and after a meeting with the US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter, he declared: “The two nations should take the higher ground to look into the far future by paying more attention to other, more important regional and international issues.”
As Xinhua nicely put it, the relationship between Beijing and Washington has matured; the news agency spoke of “a new type of major-country relations, which features mutual benefits and a win-win cooperation.” Obviously, as the Chinese girls/models show, Beijing’s work on the reefs is over.
While taking on the US in the South China Sea, Beijing has been ‘cooking’ Tokyo. Reuters reported that in July, Japan and China “will conclude an agreement to define procedures for communication between their naval vessels and military aircraft during unexpected encounters to reduce the risk of confrontation.” One way to make friends without renouncing any claims!
What about India? Here too, Beijing wants to gain time. While turning down Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s proposal to exchange maps of the Line of Actual Control, a move which seemed most reasonable, Beijing has started speaking of a new sauce, ie comprehensive measures. Mr Huang Xilian, an official in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs told a group of Indian journalists in Beijing: “We have to seek some kind of comprehensive measures, not only one measure to control and manage the border to ensure peace and tranquility along the border.”
But does it make sense to be cooked into becoming China’s ‘friend’, when LAC maps can’t even be exchanged?

China floats dangerously over troubled waters of South China Sea

My article China floats dangerously over troubled waters of South China Sea appeared in NitiCentral.

Here is the link...

Some watchers have predicted a ‘crack’, others a ‘collapse’, all might be wrong, but the fact remains that the Middle Kingdom has entered troubled waters, not only in the South China Sea.
Chinese-language Radio Free Asia (RFA) recently reported about a meeting between three foreign scholars and Wang Qishan, the all-powerful head of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), the organisation responsible for chasing the ‘tigers’ and the ‘flies’ and enforcing the Communist Party of China’s rule and discipline over the country.
Guess what? The ‘scholars’ were Japanese, a nation not always on best terms with the Chinese leadership.
The meeting took place in Zhongnanhai, the Party’s secluded headquarters, on April 23. The Japanese scholars were Stanford University academics: renowned political scientist Francis Fukuyama, economist Masahiko Aoki, and former CITIC Securities’ head, Tatsuhito Tokuchi.
According to RFA: “Wang was talking most of the time”, but later, Tatsuhito Tokuchi, Wang’s long-time friend, posted the speech of the CCDI’s boss on the Internet.
The South China Morning Post (SCMP) said that the detailed report appeared on a website affiliated with the Tsinghua University’s Centre for Industrial Development and Environmental Governance. It was penned by Tokuchi, a member of the centre’s council.
RFA affirmed that “a key message that Wang passed on in this meeting was that his anticorruption campaign faces severe difficulties.”
It is difficult to comprehend why Wang needed to pass this sort of serious message through the Japanese academics. It probably means that all is not well in Wang’s current anti-corruption campaign, which started soon after Xi assumed power in November 2012.
Wang would have explained his dilemma to the Japanese:
“If I stop, the public will be disappointed and the result may be social turmoil. If I proceed, some cliques will fight back and even fight to the death.”
It is worrying for China’s stability if the anti-corruption campaign has reached such a stalemate. RFA commented:

“Another key message was that Wang promised his opponents that he will not seek a complete systematic reform that will fundamentally prevent corruption.”

It means that corruption is so deeply engrained in Chinese society that it is practically impossible to fully eradicate.
Nobody doubts that corrupt officials in China badly resent Wang’s campaign and are waiting to strike back.
RFA rightly commented:
“It is rare for a politburo standing committee member to have a discussion with visiting foreign scholars. Wang’s high-profile meeting with them and the posting of his talk through an official channel is a big taboo for high-ranking Party officials.”
It also means that today Wang can do what other officials have never done, i.e. speak to ‘foreigners’, knowing that his words will be immediately reported in China as well as abroad. With Xi, he still remains the most powerful man in the Kingdom, but for how long?
The situation is indeed serious. The social media has regularly reported Communist officials committing suicide. In May, Chen Tianhong, the head of a town in Jiangsu province, jumped to his death from the 21st floor of the government building. It was the third suicide of a Communist cadre officially reported by Chinese media in a month.
In March, four officials jumped to their deaths on three consecutive days.
The SCMP earlier wrote:

“The number of suicides recorded by officials has risen sharply in recent years, which analysts said was inevitably linked to Xi’s anti-graft campaign. More than 100 ‘tigers’ – corrupt senior officials – and many low-level cadres ‘flies’ have been purged.”

On May 29, China Military Online announced that the military authorities released a list of two more PLA generals who had been investigated: Maj. Gen. Fuyi, former commander of the Zhejiang Provincial Military Command and Maj. Gen. Zhou Minggui, vice director of the political department of the PLA Nanjing Military Region. This brought the tally to 35 officers of the rank of major general and above, investigated since the beginning of the year. One can easily imagine the resentment, the fear, the bitterness and the suspicion (against those who have managed to slip through the CCDI’s net), created by Wang’s campaign.
The SCMP affirmed:

“Since the PLA changed track earlier this year and started releasing updates on the graft crackdown in the military, five of the army’s seven area commands have lost their logistics chiefs to corruption investigations. The exceptions are Nanjing and Jinan.”

But the ‘purification’ process (or the purge in Marxist terms) is not only going on full swing in the PLA, all fields are ‘affected’.
According to the latest statistics, from November 2012 to April 2015, 124 top officials (alias ‘tigers’) in state-owned enterprises have been ‘investigated’ for corruption; State-run energy companies are said to account for a quarter of all fallen state-owned enterprise (SOE) executives.
China News Service reported that executives working in the mainland’s infrastructure sector were the second largest group to be probed by the top corruption watchdog CCDI.
Wang Tianpu, the second-highest ranked official of China’s largest oil refiner has recently been detained and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and China National Offshore Oil Corporation have both lost their president or vice-president in the battle.
In the midst of this all-out internal war, Wang Qishan ruled out any chance of an independent judiciary.
In his encounter with the Japanese scholars, he admitted that the Communist Party was struggling, it was not easy: ‘it is like a doctor operating on himself’.
According to Tatsuhito Tokuchi, Wang mentioned the rare case of a Russian surgeon removing his own appendix to illustrate the difficulty of ‘self-renewal’ and ‘self-purification’: “We realise that it is only a beginning … and we need to keep going,” commented Wang.
Zhuang Deshui, an anti-corruption expert at Peking University told the SCMP:
“The authorities might have thought in the beginning that hitting ‘tigers and flies’ would have some deterrent effect. But as the number of corruption cases and the ranks of purged officials kept growing, certain interest groups and senior officials – maybe even including those more senior than Zhou – were also involved.”
In its May issue, Trend Magazine, based in Hong Kong, discussed the colloquial term ‘Iron Hat King’:
“The CCP likes to play political games by using argot to criticise someone without disclosing his name.”
The Chinese media said that there is no ‘Iron Hat King’ in the anticorruption campaign. It means that there is no king who will forever enjoy their royal immunity; in other words, even former top officials can be subjected to corruption charges. The article suggested that former President Jiang Zemin is the ‘Iron Hat King’. His court (or clique) comprises of Zeng Qinghong (the ‘Qing Prince’), a former Politburo’s Standing Committee member, Bo Xilai, the ‘crown prince’, Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, the Central Military Commission’s members and Zhou Yongkang, the former Security czar, today in jail.
It would mean that the CCDI is coming close to Jiang, the former President. That would explain why it is not easy for Wang and Xi.
The democratic tradition in India, though sometimes chaotic, brings far more stability to the nation. When an ‘Iron Hat King’ or even a Party is too corrupt, he is just removed by the masses at the time of the next elections. It is what happened to the Indian Dynasty last year.

Democracy comes to China ...by sea

A runway of 2700 meters for tourists or the military?

The Chinese media recently reported about 'a tiny Chinese prefecture coming out of the water' (in South China Sea).
On July 17, probably in response to Vietnam's advances in the area, China officially created a new prefecture, responsible for administering 'its' territories in the South China Sea.
The prefecture is called: Sansha, 'san' meaning three and 'sha' is an abbreviation for the three groups of islands in the area, Xisha (Paracel Islands), Zhongsha and Nansha (Spratly Islands). 
The new administrative center is located on the island of Yongxing (also known as Woody Island), the largest of the Paracel Islands, occupied from 1932 by the French and then by the Japanese, and finally by the Chinese. It is also claimed by Vietnam as part of its territory.
The particularity of the new town: it has an area smaller than a Chinese university campus (2.13 km2) and a population of 444 inhabitants (in 2010).
It will however admister the largest and most southerly area of the People's Republic of China.
Residents of Sansha are mostly military and government officials. 
According to Xinhua, Beijing has set up an organizing committee to create a legislative body for Sansha.
The committee was set up by the Standing Committee of the Hainan Provincial People's Congress in Haikou, capital of China's southernmost island province. Xinhua says that the Committee will organize the elections for the first municipal congress which will have 60 'directly elected' delegates.
Can you believe it!
It is the State Council, China's cabinet, which approved the establishment of Sansha to "improve China's management of the region and help coordinate efforts to develop the islands and protect the marine environment".
Wu Shicun, the Director of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies told the Chinese news agency that the fishermen, the oil-gas, and tourism resources in the South China Sea would thus be better protected.
Beijing would like Sansha to administer some 200 islets, sandbanks and reefs of the Paracel, Zhongsha and Spratly Islands, covering 13 km2 in island area and 2 million km2 of water.

But there is another story.
Xinhua also reported that China's central military authority has approved to form and deploy a military garrison in the newly established city of Sansha.
It affirmed: "Sources with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Guangzhou Military Command said that the Central Military Commission (CMC) had authorized it to form a garrison command in the city."
It added: "The garrison command will be a division-level command under the PLA's Hainan provincial sub-command, responsible for managing the city's national defense mobilization, military reserves and carrying out military operations. The PLA's Sansha Garrison Command will be under the dual leadership of the Hainan provincial sub-command and the city's civilian leaders."
Does it mean that the PLA in Sansha will be under an 'elected' government?
It would be a first in China.
Why not to replicate the experiment in the Tibetan autonomous prefectures?