China’s military might, now for Africa to see

My article China’s military might, now for Africa to see appeared in the Edit Page of The Pioneer.

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China is rapidly expanding its footprints across Africa, and its latest moves are in Djibouti where it is planning to construct its first overseas naval logistics support outpost. The West and India must keep a sharp eye
Was it a coincidence that, as China prepared to celebrate its Spring Festival, the Foreign Ministry in Beijing announced that China’s first overseas naval logistics support outpost, is going to be constructed in Djibouti, in the Horn of Africa? A few days earlier, Djibouti’s Foreign Minister, Mahamoud Ali Youssouf told Reuters, “We understand that some Western countries have worries about China’s willingness to have military outposts outside of China”, and added that they should not be too concerned.
Beijing asserted that the outpost was “essential to implement highly efficient logistical support”, as China needs to regularly send escort fleets to the Gulf of Aden and Somalia. In December, the Ministry of National Defence had already announced that China and Djibouti had reached a general agreement.
Every two years or so, the State Council (the Chinese Cabinet) publishes a White Paper on defence; each new WP has distinctive characteristics. In May 2015, Xinhua released its Ninth White Paper on National Defence, the theme being ‘active defence’. China Military Online, a website affiliated to the PLA, then explained: “The WP systematically expounded on the Chinese military’s missions and strategic tasks in the new era, and pointed out that the basic point is in making preparation for military struggle.” Is Djibouti naval base linked to this military concept?
At that time, Defence Ministry spokesperson Yang Yujun denied that China had any intention to build military bases overseas, as China “seeks no hegemony or military expansion”.

However, China had already started negotiating for a military base in Djibouti. Mr Ismail Omar Guelleh, the President of Djibouti, has openly admitted that discussions were ongoing. “The Japanese want to protect themselves from piracy, and now the Chinese also want to protect their interests, and they are welcome”, he said.
Beijing’s move should be seen in the context of the recently-announced reforms of the Chinese defence forces. On February 2, a commentary in The PLA Daily noted: “China’s move to establish five new theatre commands is a breakthrough and a historic step in setting up a joint battle command system for the military.”
On the previous day, the seven military area commands were merged into five new battle zones, the People’s Liberation Army wanting “a more efficient command chain for battles”.
Opening a naval base, or a ‘logistics support outpost’ in Djibouti, should be seen in the perspective of the general PLA reorganisation and diversification  for example, the creation of two new units, a Rocket Force and a Strategic Support Force. While the PLA Rocket Force will provide a reliable nuclear deterrence and nuclear counter-attack capabilities, the PLA Strategic Support Force will deal with hi-tech warfare in space and cyberwar, the ‘war of tomorrow’.
It was further announced that the four old PLA departments had now been divided into 15 new units; ‘diversify and rule’ seems to be President Xi Jinping’s new motto. The Djibouti Naval Base appears to be part of these ‘reforms’.
A year ago, Chinese Defence spokesperson Geng Yansheng, while defending a Chinese submarine’s docking at Colombo port, called “utterly groundless” the reports that China was setting up 18 naval bases in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Myanmar and several other nations in the western and southern Indian Ocean; he was then replying to the publication of an article in a Namibian newspaper announcing the setting up of these bases. A year later, the information has proved not so groundless. Further, it has now become ‘legal’ for China to carry out such operations abroad.
On December 27, Xinhua reported about a new counter-terrorism law which permits the PLA to get involved in anti-terror operations abroad: “According to the law approved by China’s top legislature, the PLA and China’s armed police forces could carry out counter-terror missions overseas with the approval of the Central Military Commission.”

Another development shows this new trend of foreign intervention: On February 5, China Military Online reported that after completing “tough winter training in the Gobi Desert of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, the PLA Navy’s Marine Corps and a special operation regiment began to embark on the journey returning to their stationed areas.”
Thousands of marines belonging to the PLA Navy carried out “a cross-region long distance maneuver covering over 5,900 km from southern province of Guangdong to northwest China's Xinjiang”. According to the military website, “The marines engaged in independent confrontational exercises, round-the-clock confrontational exercises lasting 72 hours.”
Why should marines belonging to the PLA Navy get training in the desert (and arctic) conditions in the Gobi Desert? The answer is that China has decided to extend its tentacles abroad and Djibouti is among the first spots selected. Last year, The China Daily explained: “Djibouti is a pivotal country in the Horn of Africa standing between the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. It is a key transfer stop for international humanitarian missions, including those of the United Nations.” The former French colony’s peaceful environment makes it an ideal place for a naval ‘outpost’.
A few months ago, the visit of General Fang Fenghui, the head of the Joint General Staff Department, to a Chinese warship in Djibouti, had already prompted fears of Chinese military expansionism. The Global Times defended the move saying that it was normal for a senior military official to visit PLA soldiers; when it urged the Western media “not to politicise or over-interpret the visit”, few believed it.
According to Duowei News, a media outlet run by overseas Chinese in the US, Djibouti would have ordered US troops to leave Camp Obock, their secondary military base in the country; the place would be given to China. Camp Lemonnier, the main US base hosting 4,000 US soldiers, is a major drone base in the region and is used by the US for gathering intelligence for its operations against the Islamic State and al-Qaida.
Today, not only is China constructing a three-billion-dollar railroad from Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital, to Djibouti, but it has also invested $400 million to modernise a port. The US seems unable to follow this rhythm. This has raised serious concerns in Washington, “given the prospect that 10,000 Chinese troops will occupy a base neighboring the main US base in Africa”, noted Duowei News.
The London-based Daily Telegraph remarked that the move may prompt the US “to relocate sensitive intelligence-gathering operations to more secure locations”.
India needs to carefully watch the developments and decide on the role it wants to play in the region, and act fast accordingly.

Of grazers, yaks and a few fishermen

My article Of grazers, yaks and a few fishermen appeared in the Edit Page of The Pioneer today.


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China is satisfied to have ‘stabilised’ the situation in the South China Sea; Beijing got what it wanted, ie an extension of its territory far away from the coastal line of the Middle Kingdom. The next stage is the Pacific

Recently, this writer read an article in the Taipei-based WantChinaTimes, which said, “China is equipping its maritime militia, with more armed fishing boats bolstering its muscle in the disputed South China Sea.” This reminded the writer of an interview with an MP from Ladakh. The writer was explained the various tactics used by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army to intrude into the Indian territory in the mountainous region. “The easiest way”, said the MP, “was to push Tibetan ‘herders’ with their yaks into Indian grazing grounds and then watch. If no immediate response was forthcoming from the Indian side, the territory de facto became Chinese”.Sending ‘grazers’ and yaks in the Himalaya or pushing ‘fishermen’ onto the South China Sea or in the Pacific is on the same page of Sun Tzu’s Art of War; it is the easiest way to conquer territory.
The Taiwanese publication quotes Zhang Hongzhou, a researcher from the Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, “Equipped with armed civilian fishing boats, China’s maritime militia is one of the less studied agencies in the exercise of Chinese maritime power,” said Zhang during a two-day conference held at the Center for Naval Analyses in Virginia, US.
Zhang cited a report by the Tokyo-based diplomat, “They are usually deployed by the Chinese Government to carry out various types of missions in disputed waters, from rescuing stranded vessels to conducting controversial island landings. To enhance their activities, Beijing is for the first time considering the formation of the country’s first fishing fleet.”
According to the same report, President Xi Jinping recently told the maritime militia that their mission is “not only to lead fishery activities in the region but also to collect oceanic information and support the construction of artificial islands and reefs.”
In other words, China can expand its territory using a state-owned fishing boat fleet. This applies to the Pacific too. On the anniversary of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army (August 1), the official PLA daily stated that the challenges facing China are extremely severe and there is a risk of chaos and war.
According to the mouthpiece of the Chinese Army, there are growing risks along its sea and land borders. The PLA paper believed that although China says it is a threat to nobody, “(it) needs to update equipment and has to be able to defend what is now the world’s second-largest economy.”
The front-page article added, “The situation surrounding our country is generally stable, but the risks and challenges are extremely severe, and the possibility of chaos and war on our doorstep has increased. …The maritime security environment is more complicated, and the undercurrents in the East and South China seas have been gushing up.”
Around the same time, China’s Defence Minister Chang Wanquan affirmed that “the nation was committed to being a force for peace, but would not compromise on core principles like Taiwan”. He added, “We will uphold the principle that people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are one family and go down the path of peaceful development of relations, (but will) resolutely oppose and hold back the plots of Taiwan independence separatists.”
But Taiwan is not really the priority today, Beijing has other plans. For the moment, China is satisfied to ‘have stabilised the situation’ in the South China Sea; Beijing got what it wanted, ie an extension of its territory far away from the coastal line of the Middle Kingdom, and this, without much objection/opposition from the US and weaker neighbours.
On the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations forum, Foreign Minister Wang Yi could declare with a straight face that China has stopped reclamation work in the South China Sea. Even if Southeast Asian nations expressed their fear that China’s construction will destabilise the region, Mr Wang affirmed, “China has already stopped.” He said, “You look, who is building? Take a plane and look for yourself.”
With the South China Sea’s phase ‘completed’, the next stage is clearly the Pacific. A report, prepared in November 2014, by the Air Force Command Academy (a Beijing-based think tank for the PLAAF) said that “China’s Air Force needs to broaden its air surveillance and attack capabilities in the western Pacific including the area near Japan to ensure its command of the skies.”
According to The South China Morning Post, the report also “stressed the need to develop and enhance nine types of ‘strategic equipment’ with an eye specifically towards the United States and its pivot to Asia.”
Though not officially released, the think-tank’s study set the vision for China’s air strategy till 2030. It lists the US, Japan, Taiwan, India and Vietnam as ‘threats’ in military airspace.
It recommends “broadening Beijing’s scope of surveillance from the so-called ‘first island chain’ (linking Okinawa, Taiwan and the Philippines) to the ‘second island chain’ (which includes Japan’s Izu Island chain, Guam and New Guinea).”
The report suggests that Beijing “should enhance the ability to attack US bases within the ‘second island chain’ with a new type of strategic bomber and ‘deter US military intervention’ in the event of a defence operation involving Chinese islands.”
For this, new equipment is required. The report cites terminal high altitude area defence ground-based interceptor system, a high-speed air-launched cruise missile, a large transport plane, an airship that moves in the upper atmosphere, a next generation fighter, unmanned attack aircraft, Air Force satellites and precision-guided bombs.
The report also mentions “the ability to attack US bases on the China side of the second archipelago line with strategic bombers and deter US military intervention in the event of a defence operation involving Chinese islands.”
Vassily Kashin, senior research fellow at the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies in Moscow, citing The Global Times, the mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party, also asserts that the PLAAF intends to expand its ‘area of control’ to the western Pacific.
The Global Times asserted that the aims mentioned in the report are realisable, “The PLA’s Navy and Air Force have been increasingly active in the area between what the Chinese military call the ‘first island chain’ and the ‘second island chain’.”
It is said that China is in the process of setting up an effective observation system for the area between the first and second island chains, including surveillance satellites, manned aircraft or drones, as well as warships and submarines.
Without waiting for sophisticated new equipment, fishermen can be extremely useful to Beijing to fulfill its new aims. The good old ways!