Historical Roots of India-China Border Conflict Lie in Mao Zedong’s Conquest Designs in Xinjiang and Tibet: Historian

My interview with The Epoch Times By Venus Upadhayaya: "Historical Roots of India-China Border Conflict Lie in Mao Zedong’s Conquest Designs in Xinjiang and Tibet: Historian".

Here is the link...

Since the bloody clash between Indian and Chinese soldiers in the remote Galwan region of the Himalayas in 2020, border tensions between the two neighbors have shown little sign of easing.
The decades-long border dispute finds its roots in the Chinese regime’s first leader Mao Zedong’s conquest designs in western regions of Xinjiang and Tibet, according to a leading historian on the issue.
Claude Arpi, a French-born Tibetologist now living in India told The Epoch Times that China’s aggression in the western sector in India’s northernmost Ladakh region started not long after Mao came to power in October 1949 when the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) People’s Liberation Army (PLA) marched into Tibet and Xinjiang, the two territories that today share a long border with India.

Until then the Chinese were not present on the Indian frontier and it was the Soviets who were “monitoring and controlling” the borders of East Turkestan, a Central Asian satellite state of the Soviet Union that is today known as the western frontier of Xinjiang, with India, according to Arpi.

By December 1949, the PLA, without artillery and with only a few hundred vehicles provided by the Soviets that had to be abandoned a few weeks in due to lack of fuel and spare parts, had descended on Xinjiang by foot.
“The PLA took over the entire Xinjiang and came at the gate of India in two months,” Arpi said.
Arpi, an author of two books on the 1962 India-China war and multiple other books on Tibet and the Sino-India territorial dispute, said that it’s obvious that Soviet leader Joseph Stalin knew of the CCP’s operations in East Turkestan but it’s not clear why the Soviets gave up this territory under their control to the Chinese communists.
“They probably thought that Mao would do the ‘dirty’ work and the Soviet control over these areas could continue as before,” he said.
At this time India had a consulate in Kashgar in East Turkestan that it had to close and its consul general had to escape on foot crossing the Karakoram mountains to reach Leh town in India’s Ladakh. It considered this closure as a fait accompli since a revolution had taken place.
The geopolitical placement of India’s northernmost dominion, Jammu and Kashmir in 1947, two years before Mao Zedong took over Xinjiang and came to India’s border–today that’s China’s western frontier.

Aksai Chin
At the junction between India-, China- and Pakistan- controlled territories today, there’s an uninhabited cold desert called Aksai Chin—also the only land connection between Xinjiang and Tibet.
By the time the CCP finished its conquest of Tibet in 1951 to 1952, Mao realized that Aksai Chin, the desert area in the north of Ladakh was strategically extremely important for the regime’s future.
“It was an uninhabited area, nobody could live there, but the Chinese decided to build a road there because it was the easiest way to connect the two new provinces [of Tibet and Xinjiang],” said Arpi. “That’s how in Aksai Chin today’s Chinese Highway G219 came into being. Was surveyed in 1952-53, China started building it in 1954 and it was inaugurated in July 1957.”
After marking the road in 1952, the CCP didn’t stop there. “In 1956 China agreed to a map that gets more or less half of the Aksai Chin and in 1959 it pushed it further south,” said Arpi.
India was born as a nation in 1947 and was taken unaware of the Chinese Communist Party’s activities in its dominion of Jammu and Kashmir which included the province of Ladakh and hence Aksai Chin.
The Indian administration in New Delhi came to know of G219 on its territory only after an Indian patrol party was detained by the Chinese in Haji Langar in September 1958. Haji Langar was an extreme Indian patrolling point in the north of Aksai Chin; It was also a place where Mecca-bound pilgrims were fed. The 1962 war between India and China ignited after Mao annexed Indian territory and built G219. India was defeated in the conflict and lost the Aksai Chai region in a matter of days.
The Epoch Times has obtained a booklet published by the government of India in 1963 entitled “Chinese Aggression in Maps.” and it’s a cartographic description of how without provocation the CCP entered the uninhabited Indian territory of Aksai Chai and how the Chinese claim lines unilaterally continued to change from 1956 to 1962.
The Indian administration in its booklet said the Chinese were claiming boundary lines in Ladakh according to their “bargaining convenience and progressively increasing extent of occupation of Indian territory through force.”
Arpi said even the international community was taken unaware of the Chinese activities in this desolate part of the world. “The Soviet Union might have known, but by that time, it was no more their ‘business,’” he said.
 “And after that the 1962 war took place, the PLA pushed south and occupied some other places that they have not vacated to date. China vacated some areas and some didn’t vacate. In the end, where is the LAC?” said Arpi, adding that China’s “bargaining convenience” continues untill date.
The Line of Actual Control (LAC) is a notional line of demarcation between India-controlled territory and China-controlled region. The Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai first spoke about the existence of the LAC during his visit to Delhi in 1960.
Arpi said nobody actually knows the specific position of the LAC; Zhou sent a map of what he considered was LAC in 1962 but it didn’t correspond to the reality on the ground in several places.
India and China started the process of exchanging maps only in 2000. Since then they have shared maps only of a central sector called the Barahoti area but nothing has been exchanged on Ladakh where there’s a massive military buildup on both sides today.
 “In 2002, there was a meeting, China brought maps of its own perceptions and India did the same. After 20 minutes China and India took back their maps, probably realizing that the perceptions were too far apart,” said Arpi.
 “It has however to be noted that detailed maps of the western sector have never been exchanged,” he added.
Arpi said the Chinese have continued with the same strategy of “salami-slicing”—encroaching on the territory a bit at a time—until recently when they tried to grab a few miles in the Himalayan Galwan region to gain a better altitude for a view of the strategic road Indians were building there. It ended in the June 2020 clash, a hand-to-hand fight where the PLA attacked the Indians with metal rods wrapped with barbed wire.
The clash killed 20 Indian soldiers and an estimated dozens of Chinese soldiers, though Beijing has only officially acknowledged a small handful of deaths.
“China grabs what it wants or what it ‘needs’, whether in Ladakh or in the South China Sea, and then says: ‘Now let us negotiate’. But later, nothing happens during the negotiations,” said Arpi.

Negotiations Between Armies
The 2020 conflict in Galwan led to heavy military build-up on both sides of the disputed border, and to ease tensions the two countries’ militaries started bilateral talks.
But despite 15 rounds of these talks between commanders on both sides little progress has been made. Arpi said it’s “remarkable” that for the first time the negotiations involve the army because the branch has better ground perception, and this is important in Ladakh, a high altitude plateau where height means gaining a strategic advantage over the other.
 “Modi government did a good thing to give the negotiation to the army, to the 15 Corps Commander in Leh. And of course, there is one additional secretary from the Ministry of External Affairs who has attended all these talks. Modern negotiations need to involve all the stakeholders,” said Arpi.
When Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi landed in India on March 24, India’s Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar said the bilateral ties between the two countries can’t be normal until the border tensions persist.
 “Is it not strange that there has been so much coverage about Ukraine; so much criticism of Putin, but nobody has said anything to Xi Jinping when in May of 2020 he started grabbing land in Ladakh. In that case, it is only because of the Indian Army with the Indian government’s support, that the Chinese advances were stopped,” said Arpi.
The historian noted that it would be very difficult for the CCP to concede in this dispute because domestically it has promoted disinformation and propaganda about the Galwan conflict, including pointing to India as the aggressor in the clash and covering up the total Chinese casualties.
“Today, if Beijing gives back some areas in Depsang [a disputed area in Aksai Chin], it’ll be known in China. It will be known by the members of the [CCP’s] Central Committee, the Politburo, it will be known by the media, and Xi Jinping will lose face. Xi Jinping is not in a position to lose face before November’s 20th Congress,” said Arpi, referring to an important CCP meeting where Xi is bidding for an unprecedented third term in power.
The CCP has also been seizing territory in the South China Sea as well where it is building and militarizing islands, Arpi said. While the West can only “make a lot of noise” and “put sanctions,” India is the only country that stood “physically, militarily” against the PLA, he said.
Venus Upadhayaya reports on wide range of issues. Her area of expertise is in Indian and South Asian geopolitics. She has reported from the very volatile India-Pakistan border and has contributed to mainstream print media in India for about a decade. Community media, sustainable development, and leadership remain her key areas of interest.
 

The Most Serious Strategic Development on Indian Frontiers

The G216 under construction

One of the most secret projects of President Xi Jinping is to open a new link between Xinjiang and Tibet. The two restive Autonomous Regions border India, particularly the Ladakh region, which is witnessing a serious military confrontation since May 2020.

The Changthang National Nature Reserve
A few years ago, I wrote about the project of a road through the Changthang or ‘Northern plain’ (in Tibetan), which occupies a large part of the Tibetan plateau. With the approval of the State Council, the Changthang National Nature Reserve, located in northern Tibet, south of the Kunlun Mountains, had become a national reserve in April 2000.
The reserve spreads on a total area of 391,200 km2, which makes it the second largest nature reserve in the world, after the Northeast Greenland National Park.
With the recently-established adjoining reserves, there is now a total of 496,000 km2 of connected Nature Reserves.
The Changthang National Nature Reserve lies at an average elevation of 4,500 meters. Administratively, it comes under the Prefectures of Nagchu and Ngari of the Tibet Autonomous Region. Some parts of the Reserve are located in the County of Rutok, bordering Ladakh and particularly the occupied Aksai Chin.
Only a few Tibetan nomads permanently live there, but it is a paradise for wild animals such as wild yak (Bos grunniens), Tibetan wild ass or kiang (Equus kiang), Himalayan blue sheep or Bharal (Pseudois nayaur), Argali (Ovis ammon), Mongolian gazelle (Procapra gutturosa) and Tibetan antelope or chiru (Pantholops hodgsonii). The list of predators is also long; it includes snow leopards (Panthera uncia or Uncia uncia), Tibetan wolves (Canis lupus chanco), Turkestan lynx (Lynx lynx isabellinus) and Tibetan blue bears (Ursus arctos pruinosus).
This reserve will soon be disturbed by the bulldozers, GCBs and thousands of migrant workers.
China is planning a new highly-strategic highway in the area; this will forever change the ecology,  demography and military importance of the area.

Cutting through the Desert
On May 16, 2020, impressive pictures of workers driving bulldozers on a construction site in the Taklamakan Desert were released by Xinhua.
The caption explained: “The construction of Yuli-Qiemo highway, the third north-south route running through Taklamakan Desert, has entered the final rush. Workers of China Communications Construction Company Ltd are working on the largest dune in this project, with an estimated volume of 1.2 million cubic meters of sand to deal with.”
Xinhua’s caption continued: “They established camps next to the dune for the convenience of work, and receive daily necessities on a regular basis. The completion of the highway is expected to improve the transport conditions in southern Xinjiang and promote local development.”
The Yuli-Qiemo County Highway, 330 kilometers in length was the third north-south in the Taklamakan desert; soon there will be five road. The next one interests us (the fifth one is the G580).

The proposed G216 Highway

Old 216 National Highway
A new road will soon runs parallel the Yuli-Qiemo highway: the National Highway 216 (known as G216) linking northern Xinjiang to Kyirong County in Tibet (the border town with Nepal).
For India, the construction of the G216 will bring the greatest strategic change since the 1950s.
National Highway 216 runs from Altay City in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in direction Baluntai in Hejing County, where it joins China National Highway 218.
City name and distance from starting point:

Altay     0
Beitun     62
Fu Yun     202
Chakurtu Town     263
Ganhezi     629
Fukang     661
Urumqi     762
Ballenter     857

A few years ago, I had mentioned the possibility of having a second road-link between the two restive provinces of Tibet and Xinjiang (the first one is the G219 or Aksai Chin road, running through the Indian territory).
According to the 'National Highway Network Planning (2013-2030)', the G216 will run from Hongshanzui Port (in Altay County) to Luntai County, then to Minfeng County; Gerze County in Tibet, to finally reach Kyirong.
For obvious reasons, Beijing does not want to announce as yet that it has started the construction of highly-strategic road-link, which, China says, will serve the under-developed parts of Gerze county of Western Tibet (Ngari) ...before reaching Nepal.
For Beijing, it is an important part of Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) between Central and South Asia, but in case of conflict with India, he will be a great boon for the People’s Liberation Army.
The crossing of the Kunlun range is the trickiest part of the project.
How will the Chinese engineers managed to cross the mountainous range?
Once on the plateau, the terrain (via Gerze County) will be easier.
Today, many still believe that it is impossible to cross the Kunlun, but Beijing has probably done its home work and studied the 19th century Western explorers such as Sven Hedin or Aurel Stein who moved around the area and found slightly-easier passages to cut across the formidable natural barrier.
As we shall see, it is an old dream of the megalomaniac rulers of China.

The Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps
Incidentally, on May 14, 2020, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) announced that it would pump a lot of funds into transportation projects in 2020.
According to Xinhua: "The [Xinjiang] authorities will invest 9.5 billion yuan (about 1.34 billion U.S. dollars) in 60 major road projects, with plans to build or upgrade roads with a combined length of 2,281 km, according to the local transportation bureau. Of the investment, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps will allocate 5.7 billion yuan to its areas of jurisdiction in the southern part of Xinjiang."
Soon after the outbreak of the Corona virus, it was reported that the XPCC had already resumed work on a number of major transportation projects. It is ominous for the Ladakh border, where the Chinese have aggressively attacked India on the LAC.

The route of the new G216 Highway

An Environmental Impact Assessment
To come back to the Changthang Reserve, a few years ago, a “Public Announcement for the Environmental Impact Assessment [EIA] of the New Reconstruction Project of National Highway No. 216 (Tibet Area)” was made from Ngari Prefecture in Western Tibet.
According to the published abstracts of the EIA: "The State Environmental Protection Bureau of the National Highway 216 (Tibet area) area has basically completed the project environmental impact, for pollution prevention and control.”
The new section of the highway will be 857 kilometres in length and link Xinjiang to Tibet; the EIA says: “Control measures analysis and evaluation have been completed in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Interim Measures for Public Participation in Environmental Impact Assessment”.
Some ‘relevant’ contents of the EIA were then made public.
The Overview provided an idea of the route followed by the new highway starting from Xinjiang.
The Highway will be connecting Xinjiang and Tibet via Minfeng, before crossing the Kunlun range, which will be crossed slightly eastward compared to the earlier plans to use the Keryia Pass as an entry into Tibet.
One of the many worrying aspects of the project is that it crosses the highly eco-sensitive Changthang National Nature Reserve.
It will run for 110 km in the main reserve, about 270 km in the buffer zone and some 100 km in the ‘experimental area’. The total investment for the project is RMB 6.453 billion (more than 1 billion US dollars). 

Another map of the proposed highway (G216)

Very few Information about the G216.
However, a Chinese website provides some details about the history of the road; it explains: “Xinjiang and Tibet are two giant autonomous regions occupying nearly one-third of China’s landmass; the boundary between the two autonomous regions is more than 1,300 kilometers.
It mentions the main issue for Beijing: “Due to the barrier of the Kunlun Mountains and the harsh natural environment of the northern Tibet Plateau, the number of practical passages is limited. …Therefore, in history, the Western Regions and the Tibetan Plateau were relatively independent geographical areas, and they did not communicate closely with each other. This can be seen in the distribution of ethnic groups in the autonomous regions, north and south of the (Kunlun). But this does not mean that there were no contacts between the two regions.”
It then makes an interesting remark: “the geographic tag corresponding to Tibet is the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau. However, the boundary between Tibet and Xinjiang is not divided according to the boundary of the plateau, but roughly the southern foot of the main Kunlun Mountains is Tibet. ...It means that a part of the land of the northern Tibet plateau is part of Xinjiang.”
The article adds: “Moreover, the southern and northern foothills of the Kunlun Mountains, especially the edge of the Aksai Chin Basin in the West, are home to a series of ethnic settlements such as Kirgiz (Kyrgyz), (Mountain/Selekul) Tajik, and Uygur, while the Tibetans are completely absent.”
It practically means that the Kunlun range is the natural frontier; we can deduct from this that the Chinese accept the Kunlun as the geographical border and therefore the Aksai Chin is part of Ladakh (India)? It seems a logical conclusion.
According to the same paper: “Most of the actual administrative rights in this area fall under Hotan (or Hetian or Khotan) in Xinjiang, and only a small part of the southern part belongs to the Ngari region in Tibet. In general, the arid climate to the north of this boundary line corresponds to the oasis civilization in Xinjiang, and the alpine climate to the south corresponds to the plateau civilization in Tibet. Its segmentation effect is quite obvious.”
The crossing of the Kunlun range is clearly the passage between two worlds.

Historical Background
The article observes: “Before the Tang Dynasty, the Western Regions and the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau did not have much contact.”
After the establishment of the ‘Tubo dynasty’ (from the 7th to 9th centuries AD, the Tibetan Empire was unified as a large and powerful empire; it ruled an area considerably larger than the Tibetan Plateau, stretching to parts of East Asia, Central Asia and South Asia; it is called by China the ‘Tubo Empire). The article notes: “Songsen Gampo gradually unified the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau and integrated the internal resources of the plateau, Tubo prospered and took the steps to conquer abroad.”
It admits that for centuries “the central government had limited control over the remote occupied areas.”
Later, the Tibetan Empire declined, and the oasis on the southern edge of the desert (Taklamakan in Xinjiang) gradually returned to the Uighurs.
The construction of the G216 will be the first large-scale meeting between the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau and the Western Regions (Xinjiang): “The road from the Western Regions to the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau is being  ...especially the tunnels that cross the Kunlun Mountains,” will make this possible.

Proposed routes in the early 1950s

Not an Easy Task to Cross
The website continues to explain: “Crossing the Kunlun Mountains is not an easy task. Compared with several other projects in Tibet, the difficulty coefficient is the highest.”
There were several ancient routes to Tibet crossing the Kunlun Mountains, but, though it is looks impossible, the Kunlun can be crossed, believe the Chinese engineers.
It says that ‘in the early days’ there were several passages through the Kunlun Mountains:

•    Keriya Trail 克里雅 古道, south of Keryia leading to Tibet
•    Keliyang trail 克里阳 古道, southwest of Hotan leading to Aksai Chin
•    Sanju ancient road 桑株 古道 south west of Hotan leading to Aksai Chin

The first route, the Keryia Trail “is the shortest of several ancient roads, and also the most difficult and dangerous one.”
It starts from Pulu (?) village in Hotan County in the north, crosses several mountain pass up to the Keryia Pass (the boundary between the New Tibetan Territory or Xinjiang) and Tibet: it runs between the western and the middle section of the Kunlun Mountains before reaching the Changthang uninhabited area in northern Tibet. After that, it uses the Tibetan transportation network to reach Garze and then Gartok.
The Keriya River is on the east. 

Shahidulla and the Sanju Trail

The second is the Keliyang Ancient Road. Because its starting point is located in the core area of the ancient Yerkand Khanate, it is also called the Yerkand Road. Starting from Keliyang Township in Pishan County on the northern slope of Kunlun Mountain in the north, passing Akernier Village and then running up the Keliyang River Valley, it crosses Keliyang Daban on today’s G219 National Highway Tibet Highway.

The third is the Sanju Ancient Road, also known as the Yarkand Road or Kunlun Mountain ‘Pack Horse’ Road. The terminus of the trail and that of the Keliyang Ancient Road is the same: Shahidullah (or Saidula). It starts from Sanju Township (Sanju Village) in Pishan County in the north, passes through Kangkeer Kirgizi Nationality Township, and climbs up the Sanju River Valley over Sanju-la (pass). During the Tang Dynasty, this was one of the routes used by the Tibetans to attack Hotan. Before the opening of the Xinjiang-Tibet Highway (G219), it was also used as one of the supply routes for the PLA troops entering Tibet.

A  1953 CIA Report
An interesting report if the CIA mentioned the road construction (including the Aksai Chni road) in 1953. I am quoting from it here:

Road Construction, Sinkiang to Tibet and Ladakh

1. In late 1952, the 2 Cavalry Regiment, commanded by HAN Tse-min, had its headquarters at Gartok (N 31-45, E 80-22). This regiment had 800 camels. A unit of this regiment, numbering 150 men, was garrisoned at Rutok (N 33-27, E 79-42). At the year’s end, 35 Uighurs and 3 or 4 Kazakhs from the Rutok detachment planned to desert and escape to Kashmir, but their plan was detected and the men put under arrest.
2. Another Chinese Communist regiment was stationed on the Tibetan side of the Tibet-Ladakh border near Koyul (N 32-53, E 79-13), between Gartok and Rutok.
3. The leader of the 2 Cavalry Regiment announced the following road-building projects:

a. Road from Khotan (N 37-07, E 79-55) to Rutok, under construction, to be completed in June or July 1953. (According to the Urumchi radio, this road has been completed ). [This is the Aksai Chin road]
b. Road from Rutok to Keryia (N 36-52, E 81-42), of which the construction is contemplated. [It was never built]
c. Motorable road from Khotan to Suget Karaul (N 36-20, E 78-07), under construction, and expected to terminate at Vabjilga. [Approximately N 35-50, E 78-15].
HAN Tse-min said that when these roads were completed, the Chinese Communists would close the Tibet Ladakh border to trade.

4. The Chinese Communists in Sinkiang were telling the people that Ladakh belongs to Sinkiang. [Approximately N 35-50, E 78-15].
5. The Maiksha [Approximately N 35-38, E 78-17] area has suitable terrain for the construction of airfields.

Point 4 is interesting. Beijing's mindset is probably the same today.

Ruins of Shahidulla Fort

Strategic situation of Shahidullah
‘Shahidullah’ means ‘martyr’ in Uighur, is located at the pass of the Karakash River Valley. The Chinese article states: “The Johnson Line was born during this period, and the background of aggression in those two years became the ‘territorial claim’ that India put forward on the Aksai Chin region.”
The article mentions General Zuo Zongtang (November 1812 – September 1885), a Chinese statesman and military leader of the late Manchu dynasty. In 1875, Zuo was appointed Imperial Commissioner to supervise military action against the Dungan Revolt (1862–1877) or Hui Muslim Minorities War which was fought at the end of the 19th-century in Western China, mostly during the reign of the Tongzhi Emperor (r. 1861–1875) of the Manchu).
By the late 1870s, Zuo had crushed the Revolt and recaptured Xinjiang Province from the ‘rebel’ forces. In 1878, in recognition of his achievements, Zuo was promoted from a first class count to a second class marquis.
Zuo established his base camp in Shahidullah as it was a hub of transportation in the Kunlun Mountains. The place could be reached through the Kudi Ancient Road to the north to Yecheng and Kashgar, and to the east via the Sanju Ancient Road or Kashgar. The ancient road in Liyang can reach Pishan and Hotan, to the south to the Aksai Chin Basin; Changthang in northern Tibet and the Ngari region in the East and the Karakoram Mountains in the West.
After 1949, Shahidullah continued to be a crossroad “with the peaceful liberation of Xinjiang and Tibet after the founding of the People’s Republic of China, the actual control of the two places returned to the central government. In order to strengthen the communication and ties between the two places, a building linking the two areas Highway issues urgently need to be put on the agenda,” says the article.
Today, Shahidullah, a town in Pishan County, is strategically located on the upper Karakash River, just to the north of the Karakoram Pass on the old caravan route between the Tarim Basin and Ladakh; it lies next to the G219 between Kashgar and Tibet, 25 km east of Mazar and 115 km west of Dahongliutan.
In 1951, when the People's Liberation Army built the Xinjiang-Tibet Highway (G219 or ‘Aksai Chin’ road) along the Keryia Ancient Road, it encountered Kunlun Mountain, near the Sulfur Daban.
The Ashkule volcano erupted on May 27, 1951 and many road workers were killed; thereafter, the plan to build a road through the Keryia route in Hotan County was abandoned and replaced by the G219 National Highway Xinjiang-Tibet Road as we know it today.

Description of the G219
The article then describes the G219 starting from Yecheng and crossing the Kunlun Mountains to the Aksai Chin Basin via the Akazi Ancient Road and then continuing southward to the Changthang plateau of Northern Tibet, before reaching the Indus River in Ngari: “After the G219 national highway arrives at Ngari Town (Senge Tsangpo or Shiquanhe in Chinese), it has basically completed its mission of connecting the two districts of Tibet. After that, other national highways or a combination of county highways can be used to reach Lhasa.”
An interesting detail, the article: “After the Kongka Pass incident occurred in 1959, India threatened to blow up the New Tibet Highway [Aksai Chin Road]. For the Chinese side, it is [therefore] absolutely necessary to construct some alternate routes.” It sounds like ‘fake news’.
The website also mentions (with photos) that some of the sections Xinjiang-Tibet Highway are in extremely poor conditions: “The pavement has not been repaired so far. Collapses often occur, and alternate routes are needed.”

The Kanxiwar Memorial

The New Road
The article clearly states that according to the national highway network plan, during the period 2013-2030, two new corridors will be built to connect Xinjiang with Tibet.
The first one is the G580 National Highway, Hotan-Moyu (Karakach)-Uluwati-Inditashidaban-Kanxiwar (the boundary of Hotan County and Pishan County): “Although the main body is only in Xinjiang, it can keep the Xinjiang-Tibet passage far away India’s actual control area and shortening the distance between Tibet.”
Incidentally, a War Memorial is located in Kanxiwar; it is said that the tombs of the Chinese soldiers who died during 1962 conflict with India (Rezang-la battle) are kept here.

Other Roads
The other main road will soon be the G216 National Highway, which, as we have seen starts from the Hongshanzui Port in Northern Xinjiang, and then passes through the Luntai Desert Highway to Minfeng, then Gerze and finally to Kyirong Port in Shigatse City, at the border with Nepal: “Its main section is almost parallel to the ancient Keryia Road and is located on the east side of the ancient road, creating a closest connection line from Urumqi to Lhasa.”
The author adds: “In addition, the Hotan area also has a local road network ‘three horizontal and three vertical’ plans, and these ‘three verticals’ are all related to crossing the Kunlun Mountains.”
One of the verticals is the G580 National Highway; the second vertical is the Keryia Highway constructed almost along the route of the Keryia Ancient Road. The key section is Xianbai Baza-Pulu Village-Keryia Pass-Red Tu Daban in Keryia County.
The three verticals are the Sanju Highway constructed almost along the route of the Sanju Ancient Road, Muji-Sanju-Kangkel-Sangzhudaban-Shahidullah in Pishan County: “As a result, the highway across the Kunlun Mountains has become a network,” concludes the website.

The projected Tibet-Xinjiang Railway Line

The New Tibet-Xinjiang Railway
Even more interesting, the article mentions the new Tibet-Xinjiang railway going through the Aksai Chin: “Since the final route plan of the Xinjiang-Tibet Railway has not yet been released, Yecheng Station, which is temporarily regarded as the starting point of the Xinjiang-Tibet Railway, will also be continuously improved for the Xinjiang-Tibet highway network. If the Yecheng Station is not really when the train arrives, Moyu (Karakash) Station or Hotan Stations will be the starting point, “because the starting point of the other roads is to continue southward into Tibet from the vicinity of Hotan.”

Will India protest if a railway line is laid across the Indian territory?

A Bridge between Xinjiang and Tibet
The article concludes: “The difficult passages between Tibet were used as a bridge for warfare and trade communication between the two major geographic regions [Xinjiang and Tibet] in ancient times.”
In modern times, they have become an important network for China to maintain the peaceful reunification of the western frontier. Tourists also deeply appreciate the vastness of China's territory while moving on these routes.
In addition, the original Xinjiang-Tibet G219 highway will be extended from both ends, Yecheng in Xinjiang and from Sakya in Tibet towards Kampa Dzong, Tsona, Lhuntse, Metok, Zhayul.

India’s big blunders and China changing the posts

My article India’s big blunders and China changing the posts appeared in The Daily Guardian

Here is the link...

The border dispute with China since May 2020 seems to be a repeat of the episode which took place in the 1950s. The then Indian leadership made a mistake by keeping it away from the public and the media. What remains to be seen now is whether Delhi has learnt its lesson and will do better this time.

One of the greatest tragedies of post-Independence India is having let China occupy the Aksai Chin plateau and with barely any protest. The nation still suffers the consequences of this blunder today in Ladakh.

The fact that China occupied this part of north Ladakh and built a road on Indian territory was known to the Indian leadership as early as 1952, when the first surveys were conducted by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The Chinese started to build the road sometime in 1954, but the issue only came up for discussion between Jawaharlal Nehru and Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier, in September 1959, more than two years after the road was inaugurated.

A year earlier, on 18 October 1958, Foreign Secretary Subimal Dutt had sent a feeble protest to Beijing: “It had come to the Government of India’s [GoI] notice that a road had been constructed by the PRC [People’s Republic of China] across the eastern part of the Ladakh region of the J&K State, which is part of India.” The note continued: “It is a matter of surprise and regret that the Chinese Govt should have constructed a road through indisputably Indian territory without first obtaining the permission of the GoI and without even informing the Government of India.” The note sounded more as an encouragement to go ahead than anything else.

In September 1959, the Prime Minister, who knew that the Chinese had built the road, explained India’s rationale to his Chinese counterpart: “We did not release to the public the information which we had about the various border intrusions into our territory by Chinese personnel since 1954, the construction of a road across Indian territory in Ladakh, and the arrest of our personnel in the Aksai Chin area in 1958 and their detention. We did not give publicity to this in the hope that peaceful solutions of the disputes could be found by agreement by the two countries without public excitement on both sides.”

 Delhi did not want ‘to make things worse’, probably fearing a violent reaction from Beijing, but what can be worse than the 1,00,000 troops facing each other now, in the harsh winter of Ladakh. One can’t rewrite history but we can learn from it: Had the Indian public and media known about the road in 1953-54, India might not have been facing China in Ladakh today!

However, is the mindset of today’s babus different from what it was in the 1950s and 1960s? Undoubtedly, it is more difficult to keep such secrets today, but the babus’ modus operandi and motto remain the same: Keep everything secret. They probably feel that they derive their power from the fact that they control the information, forgetting that silence and secrecy have often, as in the case of the Aksai Chin, endangered the interests of the nation.

I am particularly thinking of the fact that since the beginning of the India-China Special Representatives’ process in 2003, the public has never been informed that the Line of Actual Control (LAC) was a myth and that there were actually two Lines of Perception, and that anything could happen in between. Why was the Indian public not informed that the Chinese had refused to provide maps of their ‘perceptions’?

Beijing has no scruples in changing the posts, whenever it is convenient. The correspondence between Nehru and Zhou Enlai for the period between September and December 1959 brings some light on the treacherous intentions of the Chinese in Ladakh today. On 8 September 1959, Zhou Enlai wrote to his Indian counterpart: “I find from your letter that there is a fundamental difference between the positions of our two Governments on the Sino-Indian boundary question.” Two weeks later, Nehru replied that he was ‘greatly surprised and distressed’ to be told that there was a dispute on the border: “[in January 1959], I had no idea that the People›s Republic of China would lay claim to about 40,000 square miles of what in our view has been indisputably Indian territory.”

It is true that no Chinese had ever set foot in the area in the early 1950s. It is unfortunate that today, Beijing continues to change, despite speeches of the New Helmsman, Xi Jinping, about a community of “shared future for mankind”.

In September 1959, Zhou explained: “The Punjab Western Himalaya and Adjoining Parts of Tibet compiled by British John Walker by order of the Court of Directors of East India Company (published in 1854) corresponded fairly close to the Chinese maps.” This line, though not acceptable by India, was mid-way between the present Chinese claims and India’s traditional boundary, coinciding with the Kunlun watershed.

On 21 October 1959 a serious incident took place within Indian territory, south of the Kongka Pass and 10 CRPF personnel were killed—that was a turning point.

With the situation fast deteriorating on the border, on 7 November, Zhou offered that each party should withdraw 20 km from where they were: “to ensure the tranquillity of the border regions and to create a favourable atmosphere for a friendly settlement of the boundary question.” Less than two weeks later, Nehru replied: “Unfortunately, we do not yet know with any precision where the frontier line lies according to the claims of the Chinese Government. This is a matter for surmise based on small scale maps published in China. These maps themselves have not always been consistent, and different lines are sometimes indicated in them.” China would refuse to exchange maps and kept publishing maps with different alignments, though the lines kept moving more and more inside India’s territory.

On 16 November, the Prime Minister suggested the Indian troops withdraw “all personnel to the west of the line which the Chinese Government has shown as the international boundary in their 1956 maps which, so far as we are aware are their latest maps.” At the same time the Chinese troops should return north of the Aksai Chin. This was obviously not acceptable for Beijing who wanted to continue using the newly-built road. Zhou replied the next day: “The line up to which each side exercises actual control in this sector is very clear… As a matter of fact, the Chinese map published in 1956, to which Your Excellency referred, correctly shows the traditional boundary between the two countries in this sector;” clearly confirming that China stood by the 1956 Line, faraway from Beijing’s claims in the area today. A few weeks later, China advanced further its line, engulfing large parts of India’s territory.

The situation since May 2020 seems to be a repeat of the Chinese advances in 1959. The question which remains here is: Has India learnt its lesson? Let us hope that it has.

The Line of Control which Never Was

China has recently triggered a controversy about an imaginary Line of Actual Control of 1959, which never existed.

If one goes through the Notes, Memoranda and letters Exchanged and Agreements signed
between The Governments of India and China, Part 2, (September - November 1959), also known as White Papers 2, where the entire correspondence between India and China has been made available by the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, there is nowhere question of a 'Line of Actual Control' in 1959.

Ditto for the White Paper 3 November 1959 –March 1960.

China is only trying to create confusion on India by mentioning a Line which never existed.

Caption of the map published above
This map depicts the three lines which have figured most prominently in the correspondence between the Governments and Prime Ministers of India and China after the massive invasion of India which was launched by Chinese forces on October 20, 1962. The first line shows the disposition of Chinese posts in Ladakh in November 1959. It will be seen that at that time there was strictly speaking no "line of control" but only a series of Chinese posts on Indian territory. The November 1959 'line' would be one that joined the then Chinese posts at Spanggur Post, Khurnak Fort, Kongka Pass and Shamallungpa and ran northward, past Haji Langar, to join the Aksai Chin Road.
The second line shows the line of contact between Indian and Chinese forces immediately prior to September 8, 1962 - the date on which Chinese forces invaded Indian territory in the Eastern sector also. India has made the reasonable proposal that there should be a restoration of the positions along this line as the minimum condition for resumption of negotiations with China.
The third line shows the limits of the further area occupied by Chinese forces after the massive aggression which they launched against India, both in the Western and Eastern sectors on October 20, 1962. China now falsely claims that this was the line of actual control by Chinese forces in November 1959. Under the unilateral declaration of November 21, 1962, China has proposed that Indian and Chinese forces should withdraw 20 kilometres on either side of this tine, which they claim as the November 1959 line but which was actually reached by them only after their latest aggression.
The area between the September 7, 1962, line and the 'line of actual control of 1959' as falsely claimed by China represents the further aggrandisement of Indian territory by China as a result of its latest aggression. India insists that this area of further aggression should be vacated by the Chinese and the position of the Indian and Chinese forces prior to 8th September restored, before there can be a resumption of negotiations to settle the India-China boundary problem.

China kept its claims on Indian territory undisclosed till 1959 though it had already, in 1957, surreptitiously cleared a motor road across the uninhabited Aksai Chin area of Ladakh. Territorial claims were put forward for the first time by the Chinese Prime Minister in September 1959, based on a Chinese map published in 1956.  In December 1959 he affirmed the boundary on this map as the correct boundary claimed by China. This claim was for about 50,000 square miles of Indian territory in Ladakh and in the North East Frontier Agency. Since then the Chinese claim line has varied according to China's bargaining convenience and the progressively increasing extent of occupation of Indian territory through force.
The Chinese claim line of 1956 in the Western sector is shown in the above map. In 1960, during talks between officials of the two Governments, the Chinese advanced tl1eir claim line further into Indian territory. The 1960 claim line is also shown in the map. This line, which broadly corresponds to the line of present Chinese control shown in Map 2, was actually reached by the Chinese forces only after their latest massive aggression of October 20, 1962. China now falsely claims this as the line up to which it exercised actual control in November 1959.
The points up to which Indian police patrols went from time to time till 1958, in exercise of normal administrative functions, are shown in the above map. They reveal the preposterous nature of the 1956 Chinese claim line, let alone their latest claim line which cuts even deeper into Indian territory.

Jawaharlal Nehru ignored intelligence report of Chinese road in Indian territory in 1957: Book

The Indian Minister on his way to Bhutan via Tibet

My Volume 4 was reviewed by Rajeev Deshpande in The Times of India: Jawaharlal Nehru ignored intelligence report of Chinese road in Indian territory in 1957: Book

Here is the link...

Jawaharlal Nehru ignored intelligence report of Chinese road in Indian territory in 1957: Book
NEW DELHI: In early 1957, an audacious secret mission into Aksai Chin that saw an Indian Army officer and a havildar join a group of yak grazers in disguise actually provided first-hand evidence that China had illegally built a road in territory claimed by India.
Unfortunately, the efforts of Lt Col R S Basera of Kumaon Regiment and Havildar Diwan Singh of the Corps of Engineers went abegging despite the immense risks and hardships they undertook as then defence minister V K Krishna Menon and then PM Jawaharlal Nehru remained sceptical about the road’s exact location. It would be a full two year later before the Indian government admitted in Parliament that the road had indeed been built.
In a soon to be out book, ‘End of an Era, India Exits Tibet’, well-known China expert Claude Arpi has set out in exhaustive detail, based on Nehru Memorial Library papers, de-classified Indian and Chinese documents and personal interviews, how even voluminous reports by its own agencies about the ominous consolidation of China’s occupation of Tibet failed to prod India into action.
The theme of the book is about India losing all its influence in Tibet, helping China press aggressive claims along the border with India. This came at the cost of letting down opinion in Tibet that looked up to “Chogyal Nehru” and felt India could come to their aid in preventing “Sinofication” of their culture and ways.
Arpi’s research however, indicates that India did have options. At the time, the Indian Air Force was clearly superior to China’s military air arm and could have aided in helping Tibetan resistance, which was significant. The diplomacy itself, given India’s strong presence through trading centres, could have been forceful.
Indian reports from Tibet spoke of the speed with which motorable roads were being built but failed to stir New Delhi. The roads enabled Chinese troops to reach India’s borders quickly. The long preparation saw Mao Zedong, annoyed by the asylum to Dalai Lama and Nehru’s attempts to “undermine” China’s leadership in the Third World, to order attacks on Indian positions on October 1962.
Lt Col Basera’s trip actually reached the road and took its measurements. But on return, Menon and Nehru asked the director of military intelligence if the road could be confirmed by a map. The secret patrol had, however, carried no maps for security reasons.
This was not the only evidence of the road. Even earlier, British mountaineer Sidney Wignall went to Tibet with the knowledge of the Indian military. He was captured but released at a high pass and reached India after an incredible journey. His report of the Aksai Chin road was dismissed by Menon in Nehru’s presence as CIA propaganda.

New Highways in Xinjiang ..for Pakistani fish?

Beijing has decided to invest US $ 24.8 billion (170 bn yuan) for constructing a network of highways in Xinjiang …for improving connectivity with Pakistan. This is the official justification.
China plans to also use this huge amount (some 50% the amount of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor) to build a “trade hub by linking countries along the Silk Road Economic Belt.”
Xinjiang will further invest some US $ 1.18 bn (8.1 bn yuan) in railways construction and US $ 0.7 bn (4.8 bn yuan) in civil aviation projects. It is said to be an increase of 50 per cent compared to 2015.
Zhang Chunlin, director of the Xinjiang Development and Reform Commission stated that the region “has never seen such a huge investment in road construction.”
This investment should surpass the total funding from 2011-2015 for transportation infrastructure in the restive Uyghur-dominated region.
Zhang added that building a highway network in a region, one-sixth of China's territory, is a priority: “Without the highways, oil, coal and agricultural products of Xinjiang cannot be shipped out of the region smoothly and logistics costs will remain high.”
Zhang remarked that Beijing “sees Xinjiang, which borders countries including Kazakhstan, Pakistan and Mongolia, as a key trade centre for the economic belt.”
In the mind of Beijing’s leadership, this massive investment is also linked to the presumed ‘separatist’ activities of Uyghur leaders such as Rebiya Kadeer, as well as the presence of the Indian front nearby.

Doubtful benefits
In the meantime, The Global Times, the mouthpiece of the Communist Party reported that for the first time, the Uyghurs will be able "to eat seafood imported from Pakistan by container cars through the Khunjerab Pass in January. This successful trial is expected to improve overland trade between China and Pakistan via the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which accounts for 2 percent of the overall trade between the two countries."
But are the Uyghurs eating fish?
Nobody has asked this question.
The Global Times explains that the first batch of Indian Ocean seafood shipped by container cars arrived in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region through the Khunjerab Pass on January 13, marking the first time that ­Taxkorgan Tajik Autonomous county, ­Kashgar prefecture, has received imported seafood.
The article adds: "The highway, also known as China-Pakistan Friendship Highway, which connects Xinjiang and northern Pakistan, stretches more than 1,000 kilometers across the Karakoram, Himalayas and Hindu Kush mountains."
It also admits that though the CPEC is supposed "to bring earth-shaking changes to Pakistan's economy," it has yet to do so "due to factors including lack of necessary infrastructure and low consumer demand in western China."
It gives an example: "an oil and gas pipeline in Pakistan linking the Middle East and China has not been connected, and thus the country can't get oil transit fees, ...though the Karakoram Highway is expected to boost overland trade between the two neighbors, objective factors make it hard to measure to what extent the corridor will contribute to its bilateral trade," it concludes.
It is rather a frank assessment.

Restiveness in Xinjiang
Recently, the spokesperson of the Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that China ‘resolutely’ opposes the visit of Rebiya Kadeer, the Uygur leader to Taiwan and her participation ‘in any activities on the island.’
An Fengshan, spokesperson for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, had mentioned earlier China’s opposition to the Taiwan Solidarity Union’s invitation Kadeer to Taiwan in March: “It is a well-known fact that Rebiya Kadeer is among the heads of the separatist 'East Turkistan' forces. …The invitation by the 'Taiwan independence' secessionist force is intended to make trouble and will certainly harm cross-Strait relations."

Restiveness of the local Muslim populations is certainly one of the reasons for the mega infrastructure, but it is also necessary for Xi’s Dream project, i.e. the new Silk Roads, particularly a better connectivity between the Mainland and Central Asia …and Pakistan.
Xinhua admits: “Currently, there is one highway linking Xinjiang and other parts of China to the east.”
Does the news agency mean the NH 219 linking Xinjiang to Tibet?

The Defence of India's border
In any case, the strengthening of the defence of the Middle Kingdom, particularly the Western Theater Command facing India, is a vital issue for Beijing.
As mentioned a few weeks ago on this blog, Beijing plans a second highway between Tibet and Xinjiang. It will link the NH 219 to the NH 315 running south of Xinjiang towards Qinghai (via the ‘nuclear’ sites in Lop Nor).
It will be a game changer, but the Indian media and the government seem to be sleeping.

'So it was all for nothing': The Aksai Chin road

Here is another article posted 5 years ago on the Aksai Chin.

Sydney Wignall is dead. He died on April 4 in London.
But who is Sydney Wignall? Very few have ever heard of him in India!
His obituary in The Telegraph (London) says: "Sydney Wignall, who has died aged 89, was an adventurer who, in 1955, led the first Welsh Himalayan Expedition with the intention of climbing Gurla Mandhata, at 25,355ft the highest peak in Chinese-occupied Tibet; in his book Spy on the Roof of the World, he recounted how he was captured by the Red Army and held in jail accused of being a CIA spy."
He was not a CIA agent; though he worked for the Indian Military Intelligence.
The Economist also remembers him: "Few things annoyed Sydney Wignall more than the thought that the world’s least accessible places were divided up among the great powers. To go where he wanted among the wilds and snows—to cross that pass undetected, to find lakes unmarked on charts, to see what lay on the other side of the hill—was a fever in him.”
Though he died unknown in India, Wignall has done something great for India.
In 1955, Wignall led a Welsh Himalayan expedition to climb the Gurla Mandhata, a peak dominating the Manasarovar and Rakshastal lakes, not far from Mount Kailash, near the tri-junction between Tibet, Nepal and India.
The expedition was officially sponsored by the Liverpool Daily Post and Life magazine.
 Unknown to the public, Wingnall had agreed to collect information on the strategic road bordering India’s northern borders.
Already during the mid-fifties, the Indian army strongly suspected the Chinese of wanting to construct a road linking their new acquired provinces of Tibet and Xinjiang. Was the road crossing Indian territory?
It is in London that Wignall was first contacted by Lt.-Col. H. W. Tobin, the Vice-president of the Himalayan Club and editor of the Himalayan Journal. Tobin asked Wignall if he would “do some friends a favour”. He was later introduced to an Intelligence officer, code-named ‘Singh’ from the Indian High Commission in London.
Wignall was briefed by ‘Singh’ about the Chinese presence in Western Tibet and the possibility of the existence of a military road.
Different incidents occurred in the early fifties which should have woken the Government of India out of its soporific Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai dream-world.
First, the harassment of the Indian Trade Agent in Gartok which was without doubt linked with the work which had started on the Tibet-Xinjiang highway; in 1953, the Chinese even forced Nehru to close the Indian Agency as the presence of an Indian official was embarrassing for the PLA.
Then Brig S.S. Mallik, the Indian Military Attaché in Beijing made some references to the Chinese road-building activities in a report to the Government around that time; a year later, the Military Attaché would confirm the construction of the strategic highway through Indian territory in Aksai Chin.
The mission given to Wignall by the soon to-be Indian Army Chief, General K.S. Thimayya to Wignall, was to check this information. It was thought that the Chinese would not suspect an innocuous group of foreign mountaineers.
Let us remember that at that time, there was no NTRO with sophisticated satellites able to follow the movement of vehicles in these remote areas; ‘human intelligence’ was still the prime source of information. Wignall was therefore asked to get proof of the existence of the road.
Unfortunately, Wignall and his companions were captured soon after they crossed the border town of Taglakot (known as Purang in Tibetan).
They however had the opportunity to witness the Chinese road-building activities.
Although the Official Report of 1962 War prepared by the Ministry of Defence mentions the famous road, it does not give any detail about Nehru's biggest blunder: ignoring for several years that a road being built on Indian territory.
The Official Report states: “China started constructing motorable road in summer 1955. …On 6 October 1957, the Sinkiang-Tibet road was formally opened with a ceremony in Gartok and twelve trucks on a trial run from Yarkand reached Gartok.”
It was Wignall who had informed the Government of India about the Chinese scheme.
Wignall was eventually caught by the Chinese Army, interrogated and kept prisoner for several weeks.
He was later released in the midst of winter in a high altitude pass. The Chinese thought he would never survive the blizzard or find his way back to India. After an incredible journey, he managed to reach India and was able to report to Lt-Col ‘Baij’ Mehta, his contact in the Military Intelligence.
The army authorities in turn, informed the Prime Minister and V. K. Krishna Menon, the arrogant Defense Minister.
Wignall was later told by his army contact: "Our illustrious Prime Minister Nehru, who is so busy on the world stage telling the rest of mankind how to live, has too little time to attend to the security of his own country. Your material was shown to Nehru by one of our senior officers, who plugged hard. He was criticised by Krishna Menon in Nehru's presence for ‘lapping up American CIA agent-provocateur propaganda.’ Menon has completely suppressed your information.”
'So it was all for nothing?' I [Wignall] asked.
'Perhaps not,' Singh, Wignall's contact, responded. 'We will keep working away at Nehru. Some day he must see the light, and realise the threat communist Chinese occupation of Tibet poses for India.
Nehru saw the Light on October 20, 1962. Unfortunately, it was way too late.
General Thimayya, who became Army Chief in 1957, was forced to retire in 1961. He said in his valedictory address to the Indian Army Officer Corps: “I hope that I am not leaving you as cannon fodder for the Chinese communists.”
The Government of India did not acknowledge that already in 1955, it had information about the Aksai Chin road. The issue was discussed for the first time in the Lok Sabha in August 1959 only.
Wignall later wrote that he was interrogated by General Zhang Guohua, the Commander of the Tibet Military District who later took an active part in the 1962 war with India.
Wignall and his companions were beaten up; they were told: “You intended disguising your illegal armed invasion of China.” Wignall was asked to: “sign the confession that you are a Western Fascist Lackey Imperialist Running Dog of the American CIA and we will be very good to you. Otherwise you will be severely punished.”
It is from General Zhang that Wignall heard that Beijing claimed the Aksai Chin, the NEFA, as well as parts of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan.
Several years ago, I had the occasion to correspond with Wignall about his master coup, I realized that the Chinese interrogation techniques remained the same. Other prisoners, like Robert Ford, the British radio operator in Chamdo, Eastern Tibet who spent 5 years in Communist jails, reported the same way of interrogating prisoners, the same psychological tactics to break the morale of the ‘imperialist spies’.
Some Indian PoWs’ account, after 1962 Chinese attack are also similar.
One of the most distressing parts of this story is that when Wignall offered his manuscript to Indian publishers, he was politely told they could not publish 'this stuff' in India. He had no other choice but to publish his book in the UK.
The only reward he received was “profuse thanks” from his Indian Army contact and some cricket bats and balls for the children of a Nepalese village school that the expedition team visited before entering Tibet.
That is not much for helping India.

The Aksai Chin Blunder

One of the Nehru Government’s biggest historical blunders has been the Aksai Chin road built by China on Indian soil without Delhi noticing it.
Among the several lakhs of recently released historical documents by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), a couple of Information Reports dating from 1953 bring some light on the issue.
Let us look at some facts.
On October 6, 1957, a Chinese newspaper, Kuang-ming Jih-pao reported: “The Sinkiang-Tibet – the highest highway in the world – has been completed. During the past few days, a number of trucks running on the highway on a trial basis have arrived in Ko-ta-k’e in Tibet from Yecheng in Sinkiang [Xinjiang]. The Sinkiang-Tibet Highway… is 1179 km long, of which 915 km are more than 4,000 meters above sea level; 130 km of it over 5,000 meters above sea level, with the highest point being 5,500 meters.”
The reporter spoke of: “thirty heavy-duty trucks, fully loaded with road builders, maintenance equipment and fuels, running on the highway on a trial basis” heading towards Tibet.
The Aksai Chin road was opened. It should have been obvious, even for the blind Intelligence Bureau Director, B.N. Mullick and others in Delhi that the Chinese had built a road on Indian soil; still, it took nearly two more years for the news to become public in India.
Early 1958, five months after the ‘official’ opening, Subimal Dutt, the Indian Foreign Secretary wrote to Nehru: "there seemed little doubt that the newly constructed 1,200 kilometre road connecting Gartok in Western Tibet with Yeh [Yecheng] in Sinkiang passes through Aksai Chin."
Dutt suggested sending a reconnoitering party ‘in the coming spring’ to find out if the road had really been built on the Indian territory.
The next day, Nehru agreed for the reconnoitering party, but added: “I do not think it is desirable to have air reconnaissance. In fact, I do not see what good this can do us. Even a land reconnaissance will not perhaps be very helpful.”
The Prime Minister then suggested: “our maps should be sent to the Chinese. …But I think it would be better to do this rather informally.”
Indian territory had been occupied but the Prime Minister wanted to remain informal about it.
Eventually the reconnoitering party went and while some jawans were captured, several others were killed.

On October 18, 1958, the Indian Foreign Secretary handed over an 'informal note' to the Chinese Ambassador in Delhi: “The attention of the Government of India has recently been drawn to the fact that a motor road has been constructed by the Government of the People’s Republic of China across the eastern part of the Ladakh region of the Jammu Kashmir States, which is part of India.”
While detailing the route of the road, Dutt reminded China about India’s ‘old established frontiers'. The Foreign Secretary’s conclusion was: “It is matter of surprise and regrets that the Chinese Government should have constructed a road through indisputably Indian territory without first obtaining the permission of the Government of India and without even informing the Government of India.”
Indeed, it was regrettable.
Delhi was ‘furious’; the Chinese workers who constructed the road did not have a proper passport and visa: “No applications for visas from Chinese personnel working on the road or from Chinese travellers traversing this road have ever been received by the Government of India,” says the note which continues in a surreal tone, “as the Chinese Government are aware, the Government of India are anxious to settle these petty frontier disputes so that the friendly relations between the two countries may not suffer.”
Till today, the ‘petty’ dispute still continues to spoil the Sino-Indian relations.
But that is not all. A year later, Prime Minister Nehru hid the truth in the Parliament. The issue first came up on April 22, 1959 during a discussion on Chinese maps displaying Indian territory as China’s.
An MP, Braj Raj Singh queried: "May I know whether Government's attention has been drawn to the news item published in several papers alleging that the Chinese have claimed some 30,000 sq. m. of our territory and they have also disputed the McMahon line?" This was clearly related to the Aksai Chin as well as the eastern sector.
Nehru answer: “I would suggest to Hon. Members not to pay much attention to news items emanating sometimes from Hong Kong and sometimes from other odd places. We have had no such claim directly or indirectly made on us.”
The Prime Minister deliberately ‘omitted’ to mention the Aksai Chin.
It was only in August 1959 that Nehru dropped the bombshell in Parliament: the ‘Tibet-Sinkiang highway’ had been built through Indian territory.

The CIA’s take on the issue
A recently-released note of the CIA dating July 15, 1953, deals with “Chinese Communist Troops, West Tibet” and “Road Construction, Sinkiang to Tibet and Ladakh”. It says that late 1952 the 2 Cavalry Regiment, commanded by Han Tse-min, had its headquarters at Gartok (the main trade centre in Western Tibet). We are told the regiment has 800 camels and 150 men garrisoned at Rutok (written Rudog in the US document), in the vicinity of the Panggong lake, shared with Ladakh.
The same report affirms that another PLA’s regiment is stationed on the Tibetan side of the Tibet-Ladakh border, near Koyul in the Indus Valley in Ladakh.
According to the US document, the 2 Cavalry’s commandant announced the Chinese intention to built new roads in the area.

• A road from Rutok to Keriya, south of the Taklamakan desert in Xinjiang (the construction is ‘contemplated’ says the report); on the eastern edge of the Aksai Chin.
• A motorable road from Khotan to Suget Karaul ending at Vanjilga (at the western end of the Aksai Chin)
• A road from Khotan (or Hotan) to Rutok to be completed in June or July 1953 (according to Urumchi radio, it was already completed, says the CIA).

The latter road is clearly the Aksai Chin road (now Highway 219), though the alignment may have been slightly different from the present one and it was probably not usable by heavy vehicles (only 4 years later, heavy trucks will be able to ply on the road).
It is difficult to believe that the information available with the US Intelligence agency was not known to their Indian counterpart.
The Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai wave (or was it a tsunami?) was most likely too strong. Further, Nehru’s collaborators (Mullick in particular) probably did not know where India’s frontier lay. Were they interested to know?
The Chinese local commander, Han Tse-min asserted that “when these roads were completed, the Chinese Communists would close the Tibet Ladakh border to trade.” It is what they did a year later soon after the signature of the infamous Panchsheel Agreement.
Even better, the CIA document says that Han declared that “the Chinese Communists in Sinkiang [Xinjiang] were telling the people that Ladakh belongs to Sinkiang.”
Ten days later, another CIA note detailed the trade between Ladakh and Xinjiang, giving the coordinates for each place: “The Tibetan traders who visit Leh, are from the Chang Tang area, an arid plateau region in northern Tibet [plain between Xinjiang and Tibet], bounded on the north by the Kunlun Mountains and on the south by Trans-Himalayan Mountains. These traders follow the Chushul [in Ladakh] route from Tibet to Leh. Border check posts on this route are at Chushul and Koyul.”
The note continues: “The Tibetan traders carry tea, incense and veils for sale in Leh; on their return they carry dried fruit, soap, cigarettes and sugar. Traders from Leh carry wheat flour, barley and eggs to Tibet, and return with wool and silver coins.”
This shows how flourishing the trade was in 1953 …for a couple of years more. All this ended once the Aksai Chin became fully operational.
The July 24 note provides details of the traditional routes used by the caravaners; one runs from Khotan to Sugat Karaul and Shahidulla Mazar and then to Kargilik and Kashgar; another one goes through the Karakoram pass and the Depsang Plain.
The CIA remarks: “The only Chinese in northwestern Tibet are the Chinese Communist troops, seven or eight hundred of whom are stationed along the Tibet-Ladakh border. They first appeared in northwestern Tibet in 1951, having come from the Khotan.”
In the spring of 1953, no construction of airfields could be spotted near Rutok: “although the terrain in that area is suitable for such construction”, but there was already a military radio station, “as in every military district in Xinjiang.”
The note added that there is “general discontent among the Tibetans as a result of the Chinese Communist occupation. The Chinese were in complete control of trade and business.”
Delhi was not concerned. It would continue sleeping for several more years, with the result that the Indian territory is still occupied today.
The CIA papers tend to prove that the Government knew about the Aksai Chin road much earlier that thought.

India, China and the 'long march of deep military reform'

Recent PLA's exercises somewhere in Xinjiang

My article India, China and the 'long march of deep military reform' appeared in The Daily Mail.

Here is the link...

China has a Dream: to ensure economic prosperity, social stability, and a decent life to its citizens, but also to become a powerful nation; in fact it dreams to become one day the most powerful nation of the planet.
Military power will play a crucial role in the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.
This explains the in-depth military reforms undertaken by President Xi Jinping a year ago.
China is really serious about this.
On December 5 in Beijing, President Xi Jinping, who is also Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) attended a two-day meeting during which he called for “a smaller army with better combat capability and optimized structure.” Some 230 high-ranking military officials as well as the 11 CMC members were in attendance.
Xi told the generals: “If China is to build a strong world-class army. …We must seize the opportunity and make breakthroughs.”
Xi spoke about the informationized modern warfare and emphasized the importance of joint operations. He called for readjusting and optimizing the military's structure: “new type of forces must be developed, the ratios between different types of forces must be rationalized, and the number and the scale of the military be downsized.” Xi added: “Quantity should be reduced, quality improved to build a capable and efficient modernized standing army."
This raises two important questions. While undertaking these reforms, has China not taken a too large bite, which is now difficult to chew?
The other question is: what does this mean for India?
Xinhua remarked that December 2015 “marked a fresh start in the history of the Chinese Armed Forces, as the nation embarked on a long march of deepening military reform.”
The official news agency added: “China has entered a key stage of transforming itself from a big country to a strong power, which calls for greater courage in advancing military reform.”
On December 31, new services were created, namely, the PLA Army, the PLA Rocket Force and the PLA Strategic Support Force and a few weeks later, the seven erstwhile Military Regions were regrouped into five PLA Theater Commands.
Xinhua admitted: “Despite the remarkable achievements, arduous tasks remain;” therefore, the comparison with the Long March.
The creation of a PLA Strategic Support Force is a plunge into the future as it will deal with cyber and space warfare, probably the keys of tomorrow’s conflicts.
But changing mindsets and controlling vested interests is not an easy proposition. Peter Wood, the Editor of the China Brief of the Jamestown Foundation noted that Chinese publications “calling for the PLA to ‘cast off’ old concepts about the predominance of the Ground Forces are further indication that the transition has not gone smoothly.”
For the new Forces, “to work together in coordinated campaigns also remains a key bottleneck for the PLA,” is not obvious.
This major hurdle is far from being overcome.
Regarding India: it is high time India undertakes reforms, in which the role of the ground forces (Indian Army) need to be rebalanced with the Navy and the Air Force, giving a greater role to ‘informationized warfare’.
There are other issues which need to be reviewed: take for example the appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). In December 2015, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar said that the post of CDS “could be a reality soon”. He then added that the Prime Minister “marked defence reforms as a priority and stressed that ‘jointness at the top’ was a need long overdue.”
The CDS would coordinate between the three services, the strategic command responsible for the nuclear weapons …and one day, the cyber and space commands.
The creation of a post of CDS was already recommended by a Group of Ministers in 2001. But what happened since then? Practically nothing.
Another example of the apathy of the Indian system is the Indian National Defence University (INDU).
Planned since decades, the government finally approved the setting up of the INDU at an estimated cost of 2.95 billion in Haryana in 2010.
On the occasion of the laying of the foundation stone by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2013, Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne, the then chairman of the chiefs of staff committee asserted that “India needs military leaders who can critically analyse, demonstrate professional acumen and are capable of meeting the threats & challenges at the tactical, operational & strategic levels."
What has happened to the INDU? Lost in the corridors of South Block?
In the meantime, Kanwa Asian Defense, a Chinese-language publication reported that China's military build-up is coming closer to India. 
Beijing's military would have placed more missiles and fighter jets along the Indian border: “The weapons have been deployed in Tibet and in the western region of Xinjiang along with airborne early warning and control systems.”
Kanwa said that Chinese troops have placed the J-11, the J-10 and the Kongjing-500 (airborne early warning and control or AEW&C aircraft) in rotational deployment. The Shenyang J-11 is a twin-engine jet fighter, developed to compete with fourth-generation fighters.
On December 3, 2016, a PLA website showed pictures of airmen “assigned to an aviation regiment under the PLA Western Theater Command performing flight checks on a J-11 fighter jet prior to a round-the-clock flight training exercise under realistic combat environment at a military airfield.”
The airport is located near the Indian border.
Kanwa also said that in Korla (Xinjiang), China may have deployed troops for the launch of midrange ballistic missiles and in Hotan, north of the Aksai Chin, J-10 and H-6K strategic bomber would have been spotted.
Is it not high time for the Indian defence forces to seriously embark on its Long March to modernization?

Exercise of  the Western Theater Command (in Xinjiang)

Photo obviously taken at another location

Troops exercising in Southern Tibet

J-11 fighter planes exercising in Tibet (Western Theater Command)