South Block’s mistakes will now be corrected by Army

My article  South Block’s mistakes will now be corrected by Army appeared in The Daily Guardian

Indian diplomats have committed several blunders while negotiating with the Chinese in
the past. It is thus heartening to have the Army commandeer border talks this time around.

The most vital concern today is not to lose the advantages gained on the ground at a negotiating table, as it has often happened in the past. So far, nothing has been lost during the seven rounds of border talks conducted in Ladakh, by Lt Gen Harinder Singh, the commander of the Leh-based 14 Corps.

After five months since the beginning of the standoff with China in eastern Ladakh, it is time to draw up a temporary balance sheet of the conflict. Militarily, India’s position changed for the better on the night of 29-30 August, when Tibetan commandos occupied the ridges south of Pangong Lake. It was an important strategic victory, but also a psychological one, showing that the Tibetans are with India in the battle against China’s hegemonic advances.

The most vital concern today is not to lose the advantages gained on the ground at a negotiating table, as it has often happened in the past. So far, nothing has been lost during the seven rounds of border talks conducted in Ladakh, by Lt Gen Harinder Singh, the commander of the Leh-based 14 Corps. However, to have transferred the ‘ground’ negotiation from the Ministry of External Affairs is a victory in itself. In the past, the MEA has often been the weak ‘diplomatic’ link, as the mandarins are often satisfied by simply ‘cutting the apple in two’. The ‘original sin’ of the present situation on the Indian border is due to this particular weakness. While it had been known for years that China was building a road across the Aksai Chin, South Block had kept quiet, probably to not offend Mao and his cohorts.

 On 18 October 1958, the then Foreign Secretary had politely written to the Chinese Ambassador that Delhi’s attention had been drawn to the fact that China had built a road “across the eastern part of the Ladakh region of the Jammu Kashmir state, which is part of India. This road seems to form part of the Chinese road known as YehchangGartok or Sinkiang Tibet highway, the completion of which was announced in September 1957.”

The Indian official had complained: “In view of [this], it is matter of surprise and regrets that the Chinese government should have constructed a road through indisputably Indian territory without first obtaining the permission of the Government of India and without even informing the Government of India.” With the danger of such a preposterous reaction looming large over Ladakh, one can only rejoice that the government has involved mainly the Army in the talks. As mentioned in a previous column, it was nevertheless positive that Naveen Srivastava, the MEA Joint Secretary dealing with China, was present in Moldo/Chushul.

 Lt Gen P.G. Kamath, a defence analyst (and a ‘thinking general’) recently wrote, “I have always been rubbing the point that the MEA is a relic of the Nehruvian era and is unable to respond to the extremely fluid and dynamic geostrategic imperatives. To make matters worse, we have put a career diplomat in charge of the MEA.” However, the presence of S. Jaishankar, with his ‘chromosomic’ antecedents (his father being one of the sharpest Indian strategists) and his long experience in the Ministry, has definitively brought improvements, though the minister has had to deal with the antiquated work culture and old mindset of an ‘elite’ corps, who has a tendency to think that they know everything.

The problem is compounded by a series of innumerable blunders committed by South Block over the decades — to give a few examples, the Nehru government remaining quiet when the Indian Consulate in Kashgar was closed by China in December 1949, (“we can do nothing about it, the times have changed”); the weak protests made when Tibet was invaded 70 years ago; and, in 1954, the Panchsheel Agreement not only giving away the Indian rights in Tibet to China, (which included military escorts), but worse, the border issue not even being brought to the table, with the consequences that we see today in Ladakh. The first three ‘principles’ promised “mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty”, “mutual non-aggression”, and mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs.” By accepting that Tibet belonged to China, India could no longer claim her genuine interests in Tibet. Today, what makes things more complicated is that the Indian diplomacy accepted the concept of a Line of Actual Control (LAC) which has never existed on a map or on the ground.

The recent blitzkrieg from Beijing about a November 1959 LAC is pure Information Warfare (IW) using some gullible Indian newspapers. Where is the Line that Zhou Enlai mentioned on 7 November 1959 to Nehru? Is there a map? On what is it based — on a clearly-defined watershed, on customary rights of the local grazers, on land or house taxations? No, it is pure Chinese bluff. But there is worse: the MEA has inked several agreements with China, forgetting to define the main object of the accords — the LAC. It is hard to believe that Delhi signed on the dotted line without any definition or map of the LAC, leaving sufficient space to Beijing to change the posts. On 7 September 1993, India and China entered into an agreement “in accordance with the Five Principles” which speak of the “Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the LAC,” but nowhere is the LAC itself defined, though it says, “… pending an ultimate solution to the boundary question… the two sides shall strictly respect and observe the LAC between the two sides.” It is truly amazing, but there is no map of the LAC in the Western Sector even today.

 Then, on 29 November 1996, an agreement “on Confidences Building Measures in the Military Field along the LAC” was negotiated, “believing that it serves the fundamental interests of the peoples of India and China to foster a long-term goodneighbourly relationship in accordance with the five principles.” Both parties were “convinced that the maintenance of peace and tranquility along the LAC in the India-China border areas accords with the fundamental interests of the two peoples.” Yet again, the LAC was not defined or delineated. In 2000, both sides agreed that they would initiate a process for the clarification and determination of the LAC in all sectors of the boundary.

A meeting took place in March 2000, where maps of the middle sector were exchanged. On 17 June 2002, both sides met again and maps of the Western Sector were seen by both sides for about 20 minutes, before the Chinese withdrew their maps. Ten years later, in January 2012, there was still no map when both sides established “a Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination” which mentioned a non-existent LAC: “Firmly believing that respecting and abiding by the LAC pending a resolution of the Boundary Question between the two countries.” Then, on 23 October 2013, an official accord acknowledged “the need to continue to maintain peace, stability and tranquility along the LAC in the India-China border areas and to continue implementing confidence building measures in the military field along the Line of Actual Control.” It spoke in particular of “flag meetings or border personnel meetings at designated places along the LAC.” But where is this LAC? This time, the Indian Army will make sure that China does not escape without the proper definition of a line that the Indian jawans can defend. The nation has its fingers crossed.

The Line of Control which Never Was

China has recently triggered a controversy about an imaginary Line of Actual Control of 1959, which never existed.

If one goes through the Notes, Memoranda and letters Exchanged and Agreements signed
between The Governments of India and China, Part 2, (September - November 1959), also known as White Papers 2, where the entire correspondence between India and China has been made available by the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, there is nowhere question of a 'Line of Actual Control' in 1959.

Ditto for the White Paper 3 November 1959 –March 1960.

China is only trying to create confusion on India by mentioning a Line which never existed.

Caption of the map published above
This map depicts the three lines which have figured most prominently in the correspondence between the Governments and Prime Ministers of India and China after the massive invasion of India which was launched by Chinese forces on October 20, 1962. The first line shows the disposition of Chinese posts in Ladakh in November 1959. It will be seen that at that time there was strictly speaking no "line of control" but only a series of Chinese posts on Indian territory. The November 1959 'line' would be one that joined the then Chinese posts at Spanggur Post, Khurnak Fort, Kongka Pass and Shamallungpa and ran northward, past Haji Langar, to join the Aksai Chin Road.
The second line shows the line of contact between Indian and Chinese forces immediately prior to September 8, 1962 - the date on which Chinese forces invaded Indian territory in the Eastern sector also. India has made the reasonable proposal that there should be a restoration of the positions along this line as the minimum condition for resumption of negotiations with China.
The third line shows the limits of the further area occupied by Chinese forces after the massive aggression which they launched against India, both in the Western and Eastern sectors on October 20, 1962. China now falsely claims that this was the line of actual control by Chinese forces in November 1959. Under the unilateral declaration of November 21, 1962, China has proposed that Indian and Chinese forces should withdraw 20 kilometres on either side of this tine, which they claim as the November 1959 line but which was actually reached by them only after their latest aggression.
The area between the September 7, 1962, line and the 'line of actual control of 1959' as falsely claimed by China represents the further aggrandisement of Indian territory by China as a result of its latest aggression. India insists that this area of further aggression should be vacated by the Chinese and the position of the Indian and Chinese forces prior to 8th September restored, before there can be a resumption of negotiations to settle the India-China boundary problem.

China kept its claims on Indian territory undisclosed till 1959 though it had already, in 1957, surreptitiously cleared a motor road across the uninhabited Aksai Chin area of Ladakh. Territorial claims were put forward for the first time by the Chinese Prime Minister in September 1959, based on a Chinese map published in 1956.  In December 1959 he affirmed the boundary on this map as the correct boundary claimed by China. This claim was for about 50,000 square miles of Indian territory in Ladakh and in the North East Frontier Agency. Since then the Chinese claim line has varied according to China's bargaining convenience and the progressively increasing extent of occupation of Indian territory through force.
The Chinese claim line of 1956 in the Western sector is shown in the above map. In 1960, during talks between officials of the two Governments, the Chinese advanced tl1eir claim line further into Indian territory. The 1960 claim line is also shown in the map. This line, which broadly corresponds to the line of present Chinese control shown in Map 2, was actually reached by the Chinese forces only after their latest massive aggression of October 20, 1962. China now falsely claims this as the line up to which it exercised actual control in November 1959.
The points up to which Indian police patrols went from time to time till 1958, in exercise of normal administrative functions, are shown in the above map. They reveal the preposterous nature of the 1956 Chinese claim line, let alone their latest claim line which cuts even deeper into Indian territory.

India is soft on Chinese intrusions (cont.)

As the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has done it again in Ladakh, I republished an old post of 2013.
According to PTI, earlier this week, the Chinese troops entered almost 6 kilometer deep inside the Indian territory in the Panggong lake area.
This led to a stand-off between the Indo-Tibetan Border Force (ITBP) and the PLA: “The incident occurred on March 8 when a platoon of at least 11 PLA men led by a colonel-rank officer crossed over the Line of Actual Control at ‘Finger VIII’ Sirjap-I area close to the Pangong lake,” says PTI.
The Chinese soldiers came with four vehicles - two light, one medium and one heavy - from across border post and reached 5.5 km deep inside the Indian territory.
The Indian sources said the Chinese soldiers were soon ‘countered and engaged’ by a patrol of the ITBP.
The confrontation lasted for a few hours “after which the situation got defused and the other side retreated.”
The Chinese intruders were led by a colonel-rank officer and two majors.
Apparently, China has managed to construct a road up to Finger-IV area which also falls under Sirijap area and is five-km deep into the LAC.
When will it stop?
Not soon, considering that Beijing does not even want to exchange maps of the LAC.
 

My September 2013 post
Making a statement in the Parliament on the reported Chinese intrusions in Ladakh, Defence Minister AK Antony asserted that there is "no question of India ceding any part of its territory to China".
The Opposition parties had rightly demanded that the government should clarify some media reports on an official note from the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) which had been submitted to the Prime Minister's Office. 
The NSAB is said to have alleged (though it was denied later) that Indian troops are not being allowed to patrol the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and that 640 sq km of Indian territory has been occupied by China.
Mr. Antony is right in the sense that the LAC, in fact the LACs (there are today one the 'perceived' Indian and one 'perceived'  Chinese LAC) have never been defined or demarcated.
So, where is the Indian territory and where is the Chinese territory?
The Minister has however forgotten to mention that the NSAB Report pointed out that an LAC was agreed by Zhou Enlai in his letter to Nehru on November 8, 1959. 
Have the Chinese changed their views since?
The fact that China refuses to exchange maps of 'their' today's perceptions tends to show that the Chinese perceptions have greatly move since 1959 (and continue to move south-westernwards).
Five years ago, I had interview for Rediff.com, Thupstan Chhewang, then the Member of Parliament for Ladakh, intrusions were already happening. It continues the same way, except for the fact that yesterday's grazers have been replaced by regular Chinese soldiers.

India is soft on Chinese intrusions
Rediff.com
March 27, 2008
In 1995, after years of protests, the people of Ladakh were finally granted a special status with the formation of the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council. This resulted in some degree of autonomy.
From 1995 to 2004, Thupstan Chhewang, 60, was chairman of the council, trying to lead the erstwhile Buddhist kingdom into modernity, without losing its traditional roots. Since 2004, Chhewang represents Ladakh in the Lok Sabha as an independent member.
Claude Arpi met him to find out the progress of education and development in the Himalayan region, and also about the Chinese incursions in the border areas, the state of the environment and the effects of global warming in Ladakh and the relations between the Muslim and Buddhist populations of this most strategic part of Jammu and Kashmir.

There has been a lot of reports of Chinese intrusions in Arunachal Pradesh, are you facing the same problem in Ladakh?

Yes, off and on. Of course, it is much worse in Arunachal. But in Ladakh also we consistently have Chinese incursions; some of them very serious. For example, the Chinese started building a road on the other side of the Pangong Lake on Indian territory. It was only after the construction had started that it came to the notice of the government of India. It has now been stopped and we have constructed a road right up to the border.

There are reports of incidents with speed boats on the Pangong Lake. Where is the LAC (Line of Actual Control) across the lake? How do you determine the line?

Both sides have speed boats to man the border. The lake is about 120 km long, some 40-45 km are with us, the rest with China. It means some 30 percent of the lake is Indian. The lake is very narrow, I am not very sure how the LAC is determined on the lake, but it is close to the shore.

Are the Chinese entering Indian territorial waters?

Once a Chinese patrol chased an Indian party four or five kilometers inside the Indian side of the lake. They captured the crew of the Indian boat, and took them prisoner.

When was it?

It happened some three to four years ago.

I was told that in Arunachal the Chinese send grazers and if the Indian side does not react, they occupy the place. Is the same thing happening in Ladakh?
We have the same problem in Ladakh in places like Chumur and Skagjung which are very rich in pasture and preserved as a winter pasture for the Changpa tribals. There is also a place called Dungti where a motorable bridge was constructed to take cattle and animals for grazing on the other side of Indus which is well within our borders. It was removed because China objected to it. Skagjung is the main pasture where the entire nomad population of the Changthang area comes. The nomads depend on this pasture for their survival. The Chinese used to intrude in winter. In Chumur sector, the Chinese object to grazing our cattle claiming the area is theirs, which is not true.

Why is the government of India not saying anything?

They are very soft. Like in Chumur, the Chinese send their cattle for grazing, though it is very much Indian territory. When they are asked to go away, the Chinese say it is their territory. Our government agencies do nothing. Instead of encouraging nomads from Changthang to go there (it is legitimately our territory), they advise them to stay away. This is the type of situation that we are facing.

Do you mean to say that while the Indian Army is asking Ladakhi nomads not to go, the Chinese are encouraging theirs to go there?

Yes, exactly.

It is the same pattern as in Arunachal.

Yes, it is the same.

Five years ago, you mentioned that you were lobbying to get the border post in Demchok opened which will allow Indian pilgrims to go to Kailash/Mansarovar by road.

A delegation from Ladakh recently met the prime minister, the home minister and the leader of the Opposition to request them to take up the matter with China. During these meetings, we also objected to plans to cede to China any territory under Chinese occupation, places like Aksai Chin or Lingzinthang. We requested the prime minister to allow the Demchok road to be opened for the Kailash Yatra as well as trade and commerce. Some trade is already illegally taking place, but we want it to be legalised. China has already set up a market near Demchok.

When Premier Wen Jiabao came in April 2005, some guidelines to solve the border issue were agreed upon. It stated that uninhabited places could be exchanged. Does it mean that the government is ready to exchange Aksai Chin?

Exactly, but it is not acceptable to us. We cannot accept that just because some parts of Ladakh are uninhabited, they can be given away. There are many places elsewhere which are uninhabited, if the Chinese claim them, are we going to give them away? Ladakh is a large area; just because there is so much vacant land, do you think that we should cede these areas? We don't agree to these guidelines.

In the Ngari region of western Tibet, a lot of Chinese have settled recently. Is it one of the reasons why the Chinese refuse to open the Demchok road?

I don't know, but in any case, why should the Chinese not allow tourists? We are ready to accept whatever control (they would like to put in place). There is the existing LAC, we always abide by this line as the international border. Today, China is opening to trade and international commerce in a big way. Why not Demchok road? If it is opened for tourism, lakhs of people, especially Hindus, will use the road to go on pilgrimage to Kailash. The road can go right to the base of Kailash. The present road (through Uttarkhand) is very tedious. Old people can't go. It will not be the case with Demchok road. Hindus will benefit, but China will also benefit. They will get a lot of revenue from the pilgrims and also earn goodwill.

Why do they refuse?

Earlier there were some reservations from the Indian side, but now India has agreed, the only reservation is from the Chinese side. But I am told that during the last meeting (between the Indian National Security Advisor and his Chinese counterpart) before the visit of Dr Manmohan Singh to Beijing, it was discussed by the two sides in Delhi and the Chinese might be more inclined to accept.

What is the progress on Union territory status for Ladakh?

It will take a long time. It might come only with a solution of the Kashmir issue. We can only try to persuade the government. The present Congress government is not inclined at all to grant UT status to Ladakh.

Can't the people of Ladakh build more pressure?

As you know, the Indian system is based on electoral politics. We have a small population. Only the large states with large populations are heard today. Although Ladakh is a very strategically located area, nobody listens to us because our population is small. But we will not give up, we will continue our efforts.

The rest of the interview is  available on Rediff.com