Krishna Menon’s Aksai Chin error

Chinese Memorial to those who died during the construction of the road

My article Krishna Menon’s Aksai Chin error appeared in The Mail Today and DailyO


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Menon was one of the strangest characters to have appeared on the political scene after independence.

During a recent visit to the national capital, as I was approaching the Central Secretariat in Lutyens’ Delhi, I passed a majestic statue of perhaps the most controversial Indian politician since independence. I could not help but wonder why India still honours someone who brought so much disrepute to the nation, particularly as defence minister between 1957 and 1962.

Legacy of a debacle
Though a well-researched book on Krishna Menon was published recently, the author did not elaborate on the implications of having the wrong person, at the wrong place in the years preceding the India-China border war.
Menon was one of the strangest characters to have appeared on the political scene after independence. PK Banerjee, the Indian chargé d’affaires in Beijing in 1962, who often encountered the arrogant politician, wrote in his memoir: “Krishna Menon’s appearance in the Indian political arena was as sudden as it was unexpected... He was enrolled as a barrister. He hardly had any legal practice …[but] became a protégé of Palme Dutt, a lawyer and founder member of the British Communist Party.”
A friend of India’s then Prime Minister, Menon soon became Indian High Commissioner in the UK and, in April 1957, he was appointed the defence minister: “In addition, for all practical purposes, he functioned as foreign minister de facto,” noted Banerjee. Menon was certainly brilliant in many ways, but 63 years later, India still suffers because of Jawaharlal Nehru’s mistaken choice. One of the many blunders that he committed was to post his favourites in positions where they should never have been; this eventually led to the resignation of the then Chief of Army Staff, General KS Thimayya. He also messed up the Aksai Chin issue.
Let us go back to the early 1950s. After the People’s Liberation Army entered Lhasa, the Chinese made plans to improve communications and built new roads on a war-footing. The only way to consolidate and ‘unify’ the Middle Kingdom was to construct a large network of roads. One of these roads was the Tibet-Xinjiang Highway (today infamously known as the Aksai Chin road). The first surveys were done at the end of 1951-52 and construction began in 1953. The official report of the 1962 China War prepared by ministry of defence gave a few examples showing that the construction of the road cutting across Indian soil on the Aksai Chin plateau of Ladakh was known to the Indian ministries of defence and external affairs, and this long before it was made public.

A daring mission
In early 1957, the Army selected an officer to go with a patrol and physically confirm the reports that China was building a road in the Aksai Chin area; the officer was Lt Col RS Basera of 1 Kumaon Rifles. Later, in a note Basera’s son wrote: “His mission was to be tough, exciting and most unique, as he had to proceed under cover to the vast plateau of Aksai Chin and confirm reports that the Chinese were constructing a motorable road from Kashgar to Lhasa.” Disguised as a yak herder, Basera was accompanied by Havildar Diwan Singh from the Corps of Engineers. They were to move with three genuine Ladakhi yak herders. During a briefing at the Headquarters in Leh, Basera was told that it was crucial to maintain utmost secrecy about the mission.

The Military Intelligence (MI) instructed them not to carry any documents that could disclose their identities, no notes should be taken. They were asked to memorise the map and the route: “They had to move in the easterly direction from Leh for about 250-300 km, till they reached the expected location of the new Chinese built road, in Aksai Chin. Initially, they would pass over difficult, undulating terrain, till they crossed the Karakoram Mountain Range and Shyok River,” wrote Basera’s son. Their mission was of national importance, said their handlers in the MI. After a long and adventurous journey, they finally entered Aksai Chin. On the third day, one of the herders suddenly pulled Basera's shoulder and showed him a dark line on the horizon; it was the road. The next morning, they walked in the direction of the road: “The otherwise sluggish yaks too moved forward with renewed energy, matching the sudden spring in the step of their handlers!”

Spanner in the works
At noon, they were now near the raised road, they mentally noted every detail of the road that was not yet tarred. They immediately decided to return and inform the authorities of their discovery. They were asked to report in Delhi. “At the end of the day they were told by a Lt Col from MI, that their report would be sent to defence minister Krishna Menon, who would then discuss it with the PM.”
According to the report written by Basera’s son, “the defence minister surprisingly supported the Chinese side, and even called it a friendly neighbour. He asked the MI director, if the area through which the road passed had been confirmed on a map.
The DMI told him the patrol had not carried a map for security reasons.” But that was not all, the Prime Minister and the defence minister, “more or less rebuked the DMI for sending the patrol. The PM told the defence minister that no more such patrols were to be sent to Aksai Chin till the matter had been thoroughly investigated,” as such patrols could easily vitiate the good relations between friendly neighbours.
When he was given the report, Lt Col Basera felt utterly disgusted: “The long and difficult patrol they had undertaken, now appeared to have been a futile, month-long exercise.” The greatest tragedy is that there must be hundreds of such files, but they are still buried in the almirahs of South Block. Does it help India to hide its own history?

Wrong person at wrong time

My article Wrong person at wrong time appeared in the Edit Page of The Pioneer
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Nehru made a wrong choice of making Menon Defence Minister. Though the trauma of the 1962 war remains, many things have changed. The CDS should help in neutralising threats

India’s controversial Defence Minister VK Krishna Menon was recently in the news, courtesy a well-researched book, which did not elaborate enough on the implications for the country on account of having a wrong person at the wrong place and at the wrong time. Menon was one of the strangest characters, who appeared on the political scene after independence. PK Banerjee, the Indian chargé d’affaires in Beijing in 1962, who often encountered the haughty politician, wrote in his memoir: “Krishna Menon’s appearance in the Indian political arena was as sudden as it was unexpected... he had his education and was enrolled as a Barrister. He hardly had any legal practice …[but] became a protégé of Palme Dutt, a lawyer and founder member of the British Communist Party.”
How, after independence, he was suddenly nominated as the Indian High Commissioner in the UK is still not clear. A few years later, he came back to India and was made the Defence Minister: “In addition, for all practical purposes, he functioned as Foreign Minister de facto,” noted Banerjee. Menon was certainly brilliant in some ways. He joined the Union Cabinet as a Minister without a portfolio in 1956. It was former Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru who appointed him as the Defence Minister in April 1957.
Sixty-three years later, India still suffers because of Nehru’s choice. One of the many blunders that he committed was to stop using the seniority system in the Army, replacing it with the so-called merit-based method of promotion; in fact, posting his favorites in positions where they should have never been. This eventually led to the resignation of the then Chief of Army Staff, General KS Thimayya.
Let’s take a look at a few examples of the wrongs committed by Defence Minster Menon at the time when the Chinese troops attacked India in the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) and in Ladakh. It was only after meeting Wing Commander Jag Mohan (Jaggi) Nath, the first of the six officers who have been twice decorated with the Maha Vir Chakra (MVC), India’s second highest war-time military award, that I realised that the outcome of the 1962 war could have been completely different had India used its Air Force.
Nath received his first MVC for his role in reconnaissance missions between 1960 and 1962 over the Aksai Chin and Tibet. His missions proved immensely useful to learn everything about the Chinese military build-up on the Tibetan plateau. Unfortunately, the political leadership (first and foremost the Defence Minister) refused to believe the hard evidence gathered during of his sorties. After one of his missions over the Aksai Chin and Tibet, a message came that Nehru, Menon and their favorite General, Biji Kaul, wanted to be briefed about Nath’s reconnaissance sorties.
Along with former Air Vice Marshal DAM Nanda, the then Deputy Chief of the Air Force, Nath went to South Block to meet Menon. They were waiting outside the Minister’s room when Kaul came and he started talking non-stop: “I know, I know, these fellows [the Chinese] are there. They asked me to throw them back. I can throw them back, not a problem! But they will be back the next day. It has to be planned out properly.”
Nath was surprised that Gen Kaul would speak this way in front of a junior officer: “I was a low-level officer” but [Kaul] continued shouting: “You saw the Chinese soldiers.” I said, “Yes, sir, I saw them.” “OK, go to the Defence Minister”, he finally said.
Nanda and Nath finally landed up in Menon’s office.  Nath recalled: “He did not ask anything”, he just said, “Did you see the Chinese soldiers?” I answered: “Yes sir, I saw them.” “That’s alright, you can go.” That was it. Nath concluded: “There was a total breakdown.”
In a secret report written as he was forced to resign in November 1962, the flamboyant Defence Minister wrote: “China is reported to have the third largest Air Force in the world. This may well be true.” Though Menon was aware of the fuel issue: “[China] had inadequate  fuel capacity in terms of war requirements,” he ignored the findings of the brave airman, who explained: “If we had sent a few airplanes [into Ladakh or NEFA], we could have wiped the Chinese out and everything could have been different in the 1962 war. The political leadership did not believe me that China had no Air Force…” Unfortunately, the then Chief of Air Staff did not have the courage to put his foot down. This led to one of the greatest tragedies in India’s modern history. Mao had bluffed Nehru and it worked.
Another sad story about the 1962 episode was recounted by Lt Col (later Maj Gen) KK Tewari, the Commander of the Signal Regiment of the Corps based in Tezpur (Assam), responsible in the early 1960s for the Tawang sector of the NEFA. Tewari wrote: “On the 19th [October], Brig Dalvi [Commander of the 7th Infantry Brigade] talked to the General Officer Commanding [GOC] at Zimithang [near the Tibet border] on the telephone. He was pleading with the latter to let him move up to a tactically sound defensive position.” He described the existing position along the river where he had been ordered to stay by the Corps Commander [BM Kaul] before his departure for Delhi as a “death trap.” Brig Dalvi was told “not to flap but to obey orders and stay put. He was visibly upset and was very abrupt on the telephone to his boss. He passed the telephone to me.”
Tewari told the GOC that the Chinese were moving down the Thagla Ridge like ants. He could also see at least half a dozen mortars, which were not even camouflaged: “The Chinese could not be there for a picnic, their attack was imminent on a massive scale,” he added. But Dalvi and his men were told that they had been informed by the “higher authorities in Delhi” that the Chinese would not attack …at a time they had already attacked.
Today, though the trauma of the 1962 thrashing remains, many things have changed on the ground. The creation of a post of Chief of Defence Staff should go a long way in overcoming the complete lack of coordination between the three services experienced in 1962. This, however, will not absolve Nehru’s wrong choice of making Menon the Defence Minister, a post he occupied for five crucial years.

A Truce that was not to be

My article A Truce that was not to be appeared in the Mail Today

One of the strangest characters who appeared on the political scene after India’s Independence was VK Krishna Menon.
PK Banerjee, the Indian chargé d’affaire in Beijing in 1962, who often encountered the arrogant politician, wrote in his memoirs: “Krishna Menon's appearance in the Indian political arena was as sudden as it was unexpected. …he had his education and was enrolled as a Barrister. He hardly had any legal practice …[but] became a protégé of Palme Dutt, a lawyer and founder member of the British Communist Party.”


An Unlikely Minister
Why after Independence, he was suddenly nominated Indian High Commissioner in UK, is not clear.
A few years later, he came back to India and was made Minister of Defence: “In addition, for all practical purposes, he functioned as Foreign Minister de facto,” noted Banerjee.
The Nehru Memorial and Museum Library (MNNL) recently opened the VK Krishna Menon Papers to the public. The first surprising thing to note is that a politician can walk away with so many government documents; of course it has been done by many bureaucrats too (scholars nevertheless rejoice to be able to access these ‘stolen’ files, as the ‘official’ ones remained classified in the different ministries).
In the case of Krishna Menon, he was certainly a smart politician; it can be seen from the fact that he did not leave many ‘traces’ behind.
I was hoping to find the records of his meeting with Marshal Chen Yi, the tough Foreign Affairs Minister of China.
A few years ago, The Hindu quoting declassified Chinese documents asserted that on July 23, 1962, Chen Yi met Krishna Menon in Geneva over breakfast. The Chinese Foreign Ministry reported that Menon suggested that both sides make clear their perception of the western boundary: “both sides could establish posts, but they would not attack each other. There should be a distance between posts of each side …Mr. Chen instantly opposed the suggestion.” The Aksai Chin was Chinese, he argued.
Sixty seven years later, it is a tragic fact that we still have to depend on Chinese archives to know what happened in 1962; I had hoped that a report of the breakfast with Chen would be in the Krishna Menon Papers; unfortunately, it was not. Another problem is that the brash Indian Defence Minister often believed that he did not need to keep proper minutes of his meetings.
However, I found the undated and unsigned transcript of his 1960 encounter with Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier; it is an important document as it is the only record not available in the Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru which consecrate some 300 pages to Zhou’s meetings with Indian leaders (the Prime Minister alone had 17 hours of talk with his Chinese counterpart to try to unlock the disputed border issue).

Tryst with Zhou
The visit of Zhou Enlai in Delhi in April 1960 was clearly a turning point and the last opportunity to settle the Sino-Indian boundary issue peacefully.
As they met, Zhou Enlai told Menon that he had been told by Nehru that he wanted to see him; this was not a fact, noted Menon. Zhou then insisted that Menon spoke first.
The Defence Minister told the Premier that India’s foreign policy was “we were by far the best of friends and the world also thought so.” The minutes were obviously not taken in a professional manner and the English is often poor; for example when Zhou explained that despite “the Tibetan affair [the flight of the Dalai Lama], both in the world and even here although a great many of our people understand, they were very shocked” (sic).
The clever Zhou said that friendship with India was the basis of China’s foreign policy, and whatever happened does “not make any difference to this.”
Zhang Hanfu, the Chinese Vice-minister remained ‘inscrutable’ during the monologue, watching every move of Zhou, noted Menon.
Interestingly, for the Eastern Sector of the boundary, though China did not recognize the McMahon Line, “[Zhou] suggested that we leave it alone.” This meant that Beijing was ready to accept the Line minus the ‘imperialist’ name (McMahon); the Premier however objected to the Indian advance in Khinzemane (north of Tawang) and in Longju (in Subansiri Frontier Division).
Zhou then mentioned the Western Sector.

The Hint of a Swap
He said there had never been any delimitation and only an old treaty (of 1842), which did not mention any area; the Aksai Chin was part of Sinkiang (today’s Xinjiang) and the road built by China was on Chinese territory.
Zhou also spoke of Chinese total sovereignty over Tibet and the autonomy granted to the Tibetans. Though he had no problem with the Dalai Lama, he was shocked by the reception given to him in India. Menon noted: “I think he referred at this stage, though I am not quite sure, about a considerable amount of talk against China in India.”
The entire transcript is in this vein. It is rather surprising, not to say shocking, that such vital talks were handled in such an amateurish manner.
There was a second round of talks: “I think he [Zhou] said much and I think there is no purpose in repeating what he said about the past, but about the frontiers. …I cannot remember the whole of the conversation.”
The conversation had lasted two hours (apparently Zhou had spoken Nehru to say that he wanted another half hour with Menon). Zhou was testing the ground for a ‘swap’: India acknowledges that the Aksai Chin as Chinese and Beijing recognizes NEFA as India. The duo met a third time during the dinner; Zhou again alluded to a deal.
It is evident that these crucial talks for the nation were conducted in an extremely unprofessional manner, without briefing, debriefing or proper note-taking. A chance was probably missed, leading two years later, to the worst possible debacle for India.

Why suppress right to historical knowledge?

My article Why suppress right to historical knowledge? appeared in the Edit Page of The Pioneer


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While India has touched benchmarks in many fields, the fact that the Government continues to confiscate modern Indian history not only demonstrates immaturity but shows lack of self-confidence

One of the biggest failures of the present Government has been its ignorance of the importance of post-Independence history. Four years after it was elected to bring about some transparency, hardly anything has changed in this field. Take for example the VK Krishna Menon Papers, held at the Nehru Memorial Museum & Library (NMML); they are still kept under wraps and remain inaccessible to researchers and scholars.
The situation is so ridiculous that when the Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru published a large corpus of historical documents (more than 300 pages) related to Zhou Enlai’s visit in India in April 1960, the crucial meetings with Menon were unavailable. Why should the fact that Menon often humiliated competent Armed Forces’ officers, in some cases with the backing of the Prime Minister, be kept secret?
In many ways, Menon with his well-known arrogance and brashness was responsible for the debacle against China in 1962, but nothing has been done to unearth the ‘truth’. Why has the Government not bothered to open the Krishna Menon Papers? The reality is that very few politicians or bureaucrats are interested in modern history (it has sadly been true for all Governments since Independence); the distant past of the Mahabharata is perhaps too attractive.
More than four months after the Central Information Commission (CIC) directed the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) to make public the records of the Raj Narain Committee — constituted in 1977 to look into the mysterious death of former Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri in 1966 in Tashkent — nothing has happened.
We are facing two issues here: One, no interest of the Government (this includes the Ministry of External Affairs) about modern history; two, very few scholars have the necessary knowledge to go through the files to decide if there is anything which can jeopardise India’s ‘security’ or ‘national interests’. In my experience of years of working in the archives, particularly with the Jawaharlal Nehru Collection (known as Nehru Papers and available at the NMML), very few documents (perhaps one out of tens of thousands) would need to remain ‘classified’. Another irony, the famous Henderson-Brooks report, which for years has been circulating freely from the Internet, is still classified. What does it mean? Nobody in the Government has taken the time to go through it. Why? Because it is so much faster and easier to put a blanket ‘classified’ tag on everything than to make the effort to look into, keeping in mind the ‘national interests’ and blackened a few sentences, if necessary.
In fact, it would be in the ‘national interests’, if most of these so-called secret papers, including the Krishna Menon Papers, were put in the public domain or at least opened to genuine researchers. Interestingly, the CIC recently held that the “people’s right to know the truth …cannot be brushed aside”. In its September 24 order, the Commission said that “in view of the startling incidents that followed (Shastri’s) mysterious death, such as killing of his personal doctor and assistant in two separate ‘accidents’, disappearance of records of the Rajya Sabha committee’s probe, and various significant points raised by journalists…and Shastri’s wife Lalitha Shastri and other family members, the Union Government has a duty to explain to the nation why and how Lal Bahadur Shastri died in Tashkent”.
The same ‘right to know’ should apply to all papers more than 25-years-old. It is not that India has no law; the Public Records Act exists, but laws seem to have been made more for the ‘common man’, than for Government offices. In the Shastri case, the Government was ordered “to place all the so-called ‘classified papers’ before the Prime Minister and the Home Minister and recommended that they “consider the fundamental right to know and demand of the people, (and) to declassify (them), either through an expert committee or by any other process, to get the mystery probed and resolved”.
Probably nothing will happen, like in the case of the Sikkim Papers, where the entire record of the Political Officer in Sikkim between 1895 and 1975 had ‘disappeared’. While India has reached a great maturity in many fields, the fact that the Government continues to confiscate the history of modern India not only demonstrates immaturity but also shows lack of self-confidence. I personally believe that the study of history of the subcontinent could be one of the keys to disentangle difficult problems such as the Kashmir issue and the border row with China. Unfortunately, it is practically impossible to access genuine historical records.
Without rewriting history, it is important to learn from past successes, victories, as well as defeats. In fact, there is certainly more to learn from blunders than success. A case worth citing is Lt Gen SPP Thorat’s report about the ‘Chinese threat’ on India’s borders. On October 8, 1959, Thorat, then responsible for the Eastern Command, sent a paper on the defence of the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) to the Army Chief who forwarded it to the Minister. Thorat’s findings were outrightly rejected by Menon, and worse, Thorat was accused of being an ‘alarmist and a warmonger’. Maj Gen VK Singh, who wrote Thorat’s biography, noted that the latter had provided a time-table showing “how the defences would fall day by day in case the Chinese attacked”. He had also advocated the use of the Air Force to counter China.
Sometimes, one is lucky. I recently came across a file of the visit of Kushok Bakula Rinpoche to Tibet in 1956; his secretary DD Khosla brought to the notice of the Government, the existence of the Aksai Chin road: “The Chinese Government have secretly circulated a new map of Tibet among their official organisations and the pro-Chinese Institutions — in which they have shown the whole of Aksai Chin (Soda Plains) hump as a part of Tibet.” The information was dismissed by the Indian Embassy in Beijing, but the point is that it was known to the Nehru Government that China had built road on the Indian territory several years before the issue came to Parliament.
Why is the present Government protecting the Congress for blunders committed more than 60 years ago? This, I am unable to understand. The only solution would be to create under the PMO, an office of the historian, which would make sure that the Indian laws pertaining to records are scrupulously respected. Just a Dream!

Conspiracy of Silence

My article Conspiracy of Silence appeared in The Mail Today/DailyO


One of the biggest failures of the present government has been to ignore post-independence history. To give an example, South Block still does not declassify historical documents and transfer them to the National Archives of India, as legally mandated.
Another disappointment is that the VK Krishna Menon Papers held at the Nehru Memorial Museum & Library, are still kept under wraps and not accessible to researchers and scholars.
Menon humiliated competent Armed Forces’ officers, in some cases with the backing of the Prime Minister; why should this be kept secret?
 
Keeping the Secret
Further, without rewriting history, it is important to learn from past successes, victories, as well as defeats. In fact there is certainly more to learn from blunders, than sucess
The case of Lt Gen SPP Thorat’s report about the ‘Chinese Threat’ on India’s borders is worth citing. On October 8, 1959, Thorat, then responsible for the Eastern Command, sent a paper on the defence of NEFA to the Army Chief who forwarded it to the Minister. Thorat’s findings were outright rejected by Menon and worse, Thorat was accused of being an ‘alarmist and a warmonger’.
The report began thus: “Previously, the only real threat against India which merited consideration was from Pakistan. To this now has been added the threat from China. …This is primarily due to the claim made by China upon large territories which are clearly ours. … (China) has also refused to recognise the McMahon Line as the international boundary and has made deliberate incursions into our territory in Ladakh, Uttar Pradesh and NEFA (North- East Frontier Agency.”
Soon after Menon took over the Defence Ministry, Thorat, like General Thimayya, the Army Chief, had fallen out of Menon’s favours.
Maj Gen VK Singh, who wrote one of the Army Commander’s biographies noted that Thorat “clearly brought out that with the troops, weapons and equipment available at that time, a Chinese attack could not be contained or defeated, and the 'forward policy', being advocated by Menon was not practicable.” Thorat also provided a time table showing “how the defences would fall day by day in case the Chinese attacked.” He advocated the use of the Air Force to counter China.
VK Singh further noted: “When Thimayya retired in May 1961, it was expected that Thorat would succeed him as the Army Chief. He was highly decorated, had combat experience, and was held in high regard in the Service. Most important, he was GOC-in-C Eastern Command, and was familiar with the situation on the borders with China.” Unfortunately for India, Gen PN Thapar got the top job; though technically senior, he had little field experience but was pliable and close to the minister.
An exchange between Gen Thapar and Lt Gen Thorat shows the pettiness of the then leaders; it occurred as Thorat was in the process of retiring.
At 8 am on June 24, 1961, Lt Gen Thorat received a letter from the Army Chief who had been ‘asked’ by the Prime Minister for his comments “on the following allegations against you [Thorat] which have come to his notice.” By the evening Thorat had answered all the points.

China War
The first allegation was about a speech given by Thorat in Ranikhet where the Army Commander would have said: “Indian Officers were seeking promotions through political influence which was disrupting our army, or words to that effect.”
Thorat replied that he had only said that “officers must give their loyalty to their superior Commanders and through them, to the COAS [Army Chief] whoever he may be. Any tendency to look in other directions for early advancement was likely to ruin the discipline of the Army.”
The habit of finding other ways of ‘advancement’ had already sneaked into the Army, mainly due to Menon’s ways of working.
The second allegation was that Thorat would have told a senior IAF Officer that he was “allergic to the Defence Minister whom [he] could not stand and who was disrupting the army.” There is no doubt that many in the Army thought that way. Had Thorat said it openly?
Thorat answered to the Chief: “I recollect that some IAF officer possibly at Jorhrat or Tezpur asked why I had not been appointed COAS. To the best of my memory, I remember having replied that you were senior to me and also that the Hon'ble Defence Minister and I were not very fond of each other.” He admitted that it was not proper to make such a statement.
 
Right Prediction
This exchange however shows the small-mindedness of those who asked these questions just before Thorat’s retirement.
The next query was worse: “your Headquarters spent large sums of money on the farewell parties, functions and parades for General KS Thimayya in Lucknow during his visit earlier this month. How much money was spent, and how many vehicles were employed under the items mentioned above?”
The Army Commander listed ‘his’ expenses during the farewell functions: (a) At Home: Apr 26 Nil; (b) Guest Night: Apr 29, Nil; (c) Parade: May 1, Rs 450. He went on to provide the details for the Rs 450.
Thorat’s conclusions were: “Should [the PM] not be satisfied with my explanation, I request that I may be given an opportunity to clear myself in person, in the presence of those who have made these allegations.”
Thapar had nastily written to Thorat, “these are serious allegations and cannot be ignored.”
It is said that after the war Nehru realized how right Thorat had been in his assessments and predictions. It was too late.
One can only hope that the VK Krishna Menon Papers will soon be available to the Indian public; then we may realize all the blunders committed by the arrogant Minister, and learn from them.

Defence Minister India should not have had

My article Defence Minister India should not have had appeared in the Edit Page of The Pioneer

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The Himalayan blunders of Krishna Menon are many. He humiliated competent Armed Forces’ officers and backed his cronies, though they were less capable. One of the results was India’s humiliation in the 1962 war

It is impossible to rewind history.
What happened has happened.
It is however always possible to learn from past successes, victories, as well as defeats. In fact there is certainly more to learn from blunders.
One, called by one of the main actors, ‘The Himalayan Blunder’ relates to the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict.
It is difficult to imagine that 54 years after Lt Gen Henderson Brooks submitted his report of the 1962 War, the document is still ‘classified’. Prepared for the government in 1963 the report went into the reasons for India’s defeat in the 1962 border war with China.
One could also learn from the report written by Lt Gen SPP Thorat, then Army Commander, Eastern Command, about the ‘Chinese Threat’ on India’s borders.
On 8 October 1959, Thorat sent his paper on the defence of NEFA to the Army Chief who forwarded it to Krishna Menon. Thorat’s findings were rejected: Thorat was accused of being an “alarmist and a warmonger”.
The report began thus: “Previously, the only real threat against India which merited consideration was from Pakistan. To this now has been added the threat from China.  …This is primarily due to the claim made by China upon large territories which are clearly ours. … (China) has also refused to recognise the McMahon Line as the international boundary and has made deliberate incursions into our territory in Ladakh, Uttar Pradesh and NEFA (North- East Frontier Agency)”.
In May 1957, General Thimayya took over as Chief of Army Staff and around the same time, VK Krishna Menon became the Defence Minister. But differences soon cropped up between Menon and Thimayya, forcing the latter to send in his resignation, (which he unfortunately withdrew later). Thorat too fell out Menon’s favours; in particular, the Defence Minister did not agree on Thorat’s suggestions on the way to reorganize the defence of the Sino-Indian border.
Maj Gen VK Singh, who wrote Thorat’s biography noted that the Army Commander: “clearly brought out that with the troops, weapons and equipment available at that time, a Chinese attack could not be contained or defeated, and the 'forward policy', being advocated by Menon was not practicable.”
Thorat also provided a time table showing “how the defences would fall day by day in case the Chinese attacked.”
VK Singh writes: “When Thimayya retired in May 1961, it was expected that Thorat would succeed him as the Army Chief. He was highly decorated, had combat experience, and was held in high regard in the Service. Most important, he was GOC-in-C Eastern Command, and was familiar with the situation on the borders with China.” Unfortunately (for India) Gen PN Thapar got the top job; though senior, he had little field experience. We know what happened next.
An exchange between Gen Thapar and Lt Gen Thorat which has recently come to light, shows the pettiness of the then leaders; it occurred as Thorat was in the process of retiring.
At 8 am on June 24, 1961, Lt Gen Thorat received a letter from the Army Chief and by the evening he had replied to all the points.
Thapar had been ‘asked’ by the Prime Minister “to request you [Thorat] for your comments on the following allegations against you which have come to his notice.”
The first allegation was about a speech given by Thorat in Ranikhet where the Army Commander would have said that “Indian Officers were seeking promotions through political influence which was disrupting our army — or words to that effect.”
Thorat replied that he had only said that “officers must give their loyalty to their superior Commanders and through them, to the COAS whoever he may be. Any tendency to look in other directions for early advancement was likely to ruin the discipline of the Army.”
But the habit of finding other ways of ‘advancement’ had already sneaked into the Army, mainly due to the Defence Minister’s ways of working.
The second allegation was that Thorat would have told a senior IAF Officer that he was “allergic to the Defence Minister whom [he] could not stand and who was disrupting the army.” There is no doubt that many in the Army thought that way. Had Thorat said it openly? And if he did, who denounced him to Menon and Nehru?
Thorat answered to Chief: “I recollect that some IAF officer possibly at Jorhrat or Tezpur asked why I had not been appointed COAS. To the best of my memory, I remember having replied that you were senior to me and also that the Hon'ble Defence Minister and I were not very fond of each other. I realise now that it was not proper for me to make a statement of this nature and am sorry for it.”
This exchange however shows the small-mindedness of those who asked these questions, a few days before Thorat’s retirement,.
The next query was worse: “your Headquarters spent large sums of money on the farewell parties, functions and parades for General KS Thimayya in Lucknow during his visit earlier this month. How much money was spent, and how many vehicles were employed under the items mentioned above?”
The Army Commander listed ‘his’ expenses during the farewell functions:
(a) At Home - 26 Apr Nil
(b) Guest Night - 29 Apr Nil (About Rs.450 may be spent from the Mess Entertainment Fund)
(c) Parade - 1 May Rs.450
He went on to provide the details for the Rs 450.
He was then accused to have said in Korea in 1954 that “India would not have survived after independence but for the many sided assistance she received from the Americans.”
Thorat just said he denied the allegation “which I am supposed to have made seven years ago.” In a professional manner, he went through the press clippings of that time which proved that he never made any such statement.
Thorta’s conclusions were: “Should [the PM] not be satisfied with my explanation, I request that I may be given an opportunity to clear myself in person, in the presence of those who have made these allegations.”
Thapar had nastily told him: “these are serious allegations and cannot be ignored.”
After the 1962 War, the Prime Minister realized that Thorat had written a detailed report of the Chinese threat. “Why was it not shown to me?” Nehru asked.
According to Maj Gen VK Singh: When Thorat suggested to the Prime Minister that the Defence Minister could perhaps answer the question, Nehru exploded, "Menon, Menon! Why have you got your knife into him? You people do not realise what an intellectual giant he is."
It was too late for India.
One can only hope that the VK Krishna Menon Papers will one day be available to the Indian public; then we may be realize all the blunders committed by the arrogant Minister.


Here is the correspondance:

From P.N. Thapar to S.P.P. Thorat: Allegations
PERSONAL AND TOP SECRET
Lt Gen PN Thapar
DO No PNT/1
CHIEF OF THE ARMY STAFF, ARMY HEADQUARTERS
NEW DELHI
23 APR 61

To
Lt Gen SPP THORAT, DSO
GOC-in-C Eastern Command
LUCKNOW

Subject: ALLEGATIONS

I am directed by the Prime Minister to request you for your comments on the following allegations against you which have come to his notice.

2. In a speech in the Kumaon Regimental Centre Mess at RANIKHET, in the presence of several foreigners, including Major General JILANI of the Pakistan Army, Colonel M Iqbal, Pakistan's Military Attache, Brigadier Newton Dunn, UK Military Adviser, and Mr BOWES of the British Chamber of Commerce, you stated that Indian Officers were seeking promotions through political influence which was disrupting our army — or words to that effect. You may like to say why you thought it necessary to make such a statement in the presence of foreigners.
3. Some months ago, somewhere in ASSAM, you stated in the presence of a senior IAF Officer that you were allergic to the Defence Minister whom you could not stand and who was disrupting the army.

4. It is stated that your Headquarters spent large sums of money on the farewell parties, functions and parades of General KS THIMAYYA in LUCKNOW during his visit earlier this month. How much money and POL was spent, and how many vehicles were employed under the items mentioned above?

5. In KOREA in 1954, in the presence of many Americans and South Koreans, whilst addressing them, after a lunch engagement, you said, within the hearing of many Indians, that INDIA would not have survived after independence but for the many sided assistance she received from the Americans (or words to that effect). What was the need of such a statement in the presence of so many foreigners, including South Koreans, who were so hostile to us at the time.

6. You will appreciate that these are serious allegations and cannot be ignored. The Prime Minister is, however, anxious that every opportunity should be given to you to clear up your position in the matter before Government decided what further action should be taken.

7. This letter is being sent to you through the safe hands of Major PK SIBAL, who has instructions to bring back your reply as soon as possible.


Sd/- P.N. Thapar
OFFG CHIEF OF THE ARMY STAFF

***

From S.P.P. Thorat to P.N. Thapar: Reply to Allegations 

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
No 750113/AC
Headquarters Eastern Command, Lucknow
24 Apr 61

To
Lt Gen P N Thapar
Offg: Chief of the Army Staff
Army Headquarters
DHQ PO New Delhi - 11

Subject: Allegations

Reference your DO No. PNT/1, dated 23 Apr 1961.

1. I am very grateful to the Prime Minister for giving me an opportunity to clear my position in regard to the matters reported to him.

2. My explanation is as under:

Your para 2 I have been incorrectly quoted.
3. In the speech at RANIKHET, what I said was that officers must give their loyalty to their superior Commanders and through them, to the COAS whoever he may be. Any tendency to look in other directions for early advancement was likely to ruin the discipline of the Army. (As this speech was not reported in the press I am unable to quote the precise words). However, I have repeated similar statements elsewhere also. I have been able to get some of the PRO's press releases and quote the relevant extracts below. The originals are available for inspection if desired –

MOKOKCHUNG dated 11 Feb 1961
"... Lt Gen THORAT said that the entire structure of every army was based on discipline—the two ingredients of which were implicit loyalty and unquestioning obedience of legal orders. He deprecated the tendency of questioning and arguing about decisions, about orders and urged officers to trust in their superiors, have confidence in their fairness and above all, to give unswerving loyalty to the Chief of the Army Staff. ... "
TEZPUR dated 14 Feb 1961

"... He urged officers and men alike to maintain the glorious traditions of the Indian Army by remaining disciplined soldiers, by having complete faith in their superior officers and giving them loyal obedience...."

Your para 3
4. I do not know where in ASSAM I am supposed to have made this statement. However, I recollect that some IAF officer possibly at JORHAT or TEZPUR asked why I had not been appointed COAS. To the best of my memory, I remember having replied that you were senior to me and also that the Hon'ble Defence Minister and I were not very fond of each other. I realise now that it was not proper for me to make a statement of this nature and am sorry for it. However, I most emphatically deny having said that I was "allergic to the Defence Minister whom I cannot stand and who was disrupting the Army". In this context, before your appointment was made public, whenever anyone asked me about the future Chief, my invariable reply was that you were senior and should, therefore, be appointed to that post. You will recollect that a statement of this nature made by me at WELLINGTON was reported to you.

Your para 4
5. Please see Appendix ‘A' attached.

6. HQ Eastern Command have arranged the following farewell functions for me.-
Likely Expenditure
(a) At Home - 26 Apr Nil
(b) Guest Night - 29 Apr Nil
(About Rs.450/- may be spent from the Mess Entertainment Fund)
(c) Parade - 1 May Rs.450/- (excluding transport for tps)
I shall be grateful if you could indicate whether these functions should be held or not.

Your para 5
7. I emphatically deny this allegation concerning  a statement which I am supposed to have made seven years ago. I cannot now remember which party it was, but looking through my file of press cuttings, I see that at one of the parties given just before the Custodian Force left for INDIA, I paid a tribute to the British. The relevant para as reported by Hindustan Times dated 7 Feb 1954 states -

"In reply General Thorat said that the Indian Army owes a tremendous debt of gratitude to the British Army. We were taught by you to be soldiers, to fight and to behave. If you are giving us 'a pat on the back' today, then we believe that you equally deserve a 'pat on the back' ".

8. At this or on some other occasion, I also remember having paid a tribute to the Americans for the administrative help which they had given us and for having stood by us whenever the then President of South Korea threatened the Custodian Force.

9. It is evident from your Para 1 that certain allegations have been made against me to the Prime Minister by some persons. Should he not be satisfied with my explanation, I request that I may be given an opportunity to clear myself in person, in the presence of those who have made these allegations.

10. I have already written to MS requesting your permission to be allowed finally to leave LUCKNOW on the 1st of May. I would, therefore, be very grateful if I may know the Prime Minister's verdict before then so that I can proceed on pension with an easy mind after 35 years' service.

[Signature]
GENERAL OFFICER COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF

 
Appendix "A" to HQ Eastern Command
letter No 750113/AC dated Apr 61
Reference your Para 4

The money spent on farewell functions for the retiring COAS by this Headquarters is as under:

1. Reception by Citizens of LUCKNOW Cantt Paid for by the citizens and members of the Cantonment Board.     …    Nil
   
2. At Home
   Every one except the guests paid for his/her own Tea. The amount spent by this Headquarters (Army Commanders Fund) is Rs.158.96.  
3. Guest Night
   Every one except the guests paid for his/her own dinner and drinks. The guests’ expenses were met from the Mess Entertainment Fund which is maintained for this purpose. In addition, Rs.448.18 are being shared by 183 officers on a sliding scale. Thus Headquarters, therefore, has incurred no expenditure on the Guest Night.    Nil
4. Token presentation
   A token present (HQ Eastern Command Crest mounted on a wooden base) was presented to retiring COAS. Rs. 50.00 (approx)
   
   Note – It was intended to present a small silver On advice from Army HQ, this was not presented to the COAS and has been retained in the Mess as Mess property.    …   
5. Expenses for the stay of the Chief’s party at the MES Inspection Bungalow (Army Commanders Fund).    Rs. 146.82
6. Parade
   This amount includes hire of furniture, printing of invitation cards etc. and is being paid out of army Commander’s Fund. The total expenditure incurred by HQ Eastern Command on the farewell visit of the COAS amounts to       Rs. 503.08
   
   Total  Rs. 858.86

I hope you will agree that this is not an unduly large expenditure to be spent on the farewell visit of the retiring Chief, from the Army Commander's Fund which is not a Public Fund.

The details of transport are as under:

(a) Vehicles used for conveyance of the COAS from the AMAUSI Air Field to LUCKNOW, in LUCKNOW and for the Parade etc. is as under:-

• Staff Cars    2-mileage for both =185 mls
• 3 Tonners for the carriage of Troops
  and equipment for the Parade 42  mileage = 886 mls
• 15 cwt    7  =  363 mls
• Jeeps     2   =  84 mls

Owing to the urgency of replying your letter today, I have not had the time to check the accuracy of the figures given to me. It is possible therefore that there may be some minor inaccuracies in these figures.

Note:- The transport used by the Chief of the Naval Staff, Chief of the Air Staff and other guests who had come to attend the AMC Corps Day is not included in the above.

'So it was all for nothing': The Aksai Chin road

Here is another article posted 5 years ago on the Aksai Chin.

Sydney Wignall is dead. He died on April 4 in London.
But who is Sydney Wignall? Very few have ever heard of him in India!
His obituary in The Telegraph (London) says: "Sydney Wignall, who has died aged 89, was an adventurer who, in 1955, led the first Welsh Himalayan Expedition with the intention of climbing Gurla Mandhata, at 25,355ft the highest peak in Chinese-occupied Tibet; in his book Spy on the Roof of the World, he recounted how he was captured by the Red Army and held in jail accused of being a CIA spy."
He was not a CIA agent; though he worked for the Indian Military Intelligence.
The Economist also remembers him: "Few things annoyed Sydney Wignall more than the thought that the world’s least accessible places were divided up among the great powers. To go where he wanted among the wilds and snows—to cross that pass undetected, to find lakes unmarked on charts, to see what lay on the other side of the hill—was a fever in him.”
Though he died unknown in India, Wignall has done something great for India.
In 1955, Wignall led a Welsh Himalayan expedition to climb the Gurla Mandhata, a peak dominating the Manasarovar and Rakshastal lakes, not far from Mount Kailash, near the tri-junction between Tibet, Nepal and India.
The expedition was officially sponsored by the Liverpool Daily Post and Life magazine.
 Unknown to the public, Wingnall had agreed to collect information on the strategic road bordering India’s northern borders.
Already during the mid-fifties, the Indian army strongly suspected the Chinese of wanting to construct a road linking their new acquired provinces of Tibet and Xinjiang. Was the road crossing Indian territory?
It is in London that Wignall was first contacted by Lt.-Col. H. W. Tobin, the Vice-president of the Himalayan Club and editor of the Himalayan Journal. Tobin asked Wignall if he would “do some friends a favour”. He was later introduced to an Intelligence officer, code-named ‘Singh’ from the Indian High Commission in London.
Wignall was briefed by ‘Singh’ about the Chinese presence in Western Tibet and the possibility of the existence of a military road.
Different incidents occurred in the early fifties which should have woken the Government of India out of its soporific Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai dream-world.
First, the harassment of the Indian Trade Agent in Gartok which was without doubt linked with the work which had started on the Tibet-Xinjiang highway; in 1953, the Chinese even forced Nehru to close the Indian Agency as the presence of an Indian official was embarrassing for the PLA.
Then Brig S.S. Mallik, the Indian Military Attaché in Beijing made some references to the Chinese road-building activities in a report to the Government around that time; a year later, the Military Attaché would confirm the construction of the strategic highway through Indian territory in Aksai Chin.
The mission given to Wignall by the soon to-be Indian Army Chief, General K.S. Thimayya to Wignall, was to check this information. It was thought that the Chinese would not suspect an innocuous group of foreign mountaineers.
Let us remember that at that time, there was no NTRO with sophisticated satellites able to follow the movement of vehicles in these remote areas; ‘human intelligence’ was still the prime source of information. Wignall was therefore asked to get proof of the existence of the road.
Unfortunately, Wignall and his companions were captured soon after they crossed the border town of Taglakot (known as Purang in Tibetan).
They however had the opportunity to witness the Chinese road-building activities.
Although the Official Report of 1962 War prepared by the Ministry of Defence mentions the famous road, it does not give any detail about Nehru's biggest blunder: ignoring for several years that a road being built on Indian territory.
The Official Report states: “China started constructing motorable road in summer 1955. …On 6 October 1957, the Sinkiang-Tibet road was formally opened with a ceremony in Gartok and twelve trucks on a trial run from Yarkand reached Gartok.”
It was Wignall who had informed the Government of India about the Chinese scheme.
Wignall was eventually caught by the Chinese Army, interrogated and kept prisoner for several weeks.
He was later released in the midst of winter in a high altitude pass. The Chinese thought he would never survive the blizzard or find his way back to India. After an incredible journey, he managed to reach India and was able to report to Lt-Col ‘Baij’ Mehta, his contact in the Military Intelligence.
The army authorities in turn, informed the Prime Minister and V. K. Krishna Menon, the arrogant Defense Minister.
Wignall was later told by his army contact: "Our illustrious Prime Minister Nehru, who is so busy on the world stage telling the rest of mankind how to live, has too little time to attend to the security of his own country. Your material was shown to Nehru by one of our senior officers, who plugged hard. He was criticised by Krishna Menon in Nehru's presence for ‘lapping up American CIA agent-provocateur propaganda.’ Menon has completely suppressed your information.”
'So it was all for nothing?' I [Wignall] asked.
'Perhaps not,' Singh, Wignall's contact, responded. 'We will keep working away at Nehru. Some day he must see the light, and realise the threat communist Chinese occupation of Tibet poses for India.
Nehru saw the Light on October 20, 1962. Unfortunately, it was way too late.
General Thimayya, who became Army Chief in 1957, was forced to retire in 1961. He said in his valedictory address to the Indian Army Officer Corps: “I hope that I am not leaving you as cannon fodder for the Chinese communists.”
The Government of India did not acknowledge that already in 1955, it had information about the Aksai Chin road. The issue was discussed for the first time in the Lok Sabha in August 1959 only.
Wignall later wrote that he was interrogated by General Zhang Guohua, the Commander of the Tibet Military District who later took an active part in the 1962 war with India.
Wignall and his companions were beaten up; they were told: “You intended disguising your illegal armed invasion of China.” Wignall was asked to: “sign the confession that you are a Western Fascist Lackey Imperialist Running Dog of the American CIA and we will be very good to you. Otherwise you will be severely punished.”
It is from General Zhang that Wignall heard that Beijing claimed the Aksai Chin, the NEFA, as well as parts of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan.
Several years ago, I had the occasion to correspond with Wignall about his master coup, I realized that the Chinese interrogation techniques remained the same. Other prisoners, like Robert Ford, the British radio operator in Chamdo, Eastern Tibet who spent 5 years in Communist jails, reported the same way of interrogating prisoners, the same psychological tactics to break the morale of the ‘imperialist spies’.
Some Indian PoWs’ account, after 1962 Chinese attack are also similar.
One of the most distressing parts of this story is that when Wignall offered his manuscript to Indian publishers, he was politely told they could not publish 'this stuff' in India. He had no other choice but to publish his book in the UK.
The only reward he received was “profuse thanks” from his Indian Army contact and some cricket bats and balls for the children of a Nepalese village school that the expedition team visited before entering Tibet.
That is not much for helping India.

Let us build roads to the borders: sixty-four years later

Border Road Organisation ...in 2011

Everyday, one reads in the Indian press about the poor infrastructure in the border regions, particularly in areas facing China in the Himalayas.
Last week, I already wrote on this blog about the 'Neglected Borders of India'.
Today, I am posting a note by the Indian Prime Minister addressed to V.K. Krishna Menon, the  Defence Minister on January 20, 1960.
Please read it carefully, you will see that nothing much has changed during the last sixty-four years! 
Nehru suggested the creation of the Border Road Organisation, which has, for different reasons, become the stumbling block in road development in border areas.
It is rather strange that the Prime Minister is thinking of using 'old machinery' for building roads in most difficult terrains. He should have suggested the use of the latest technologies.
Will the Modi Sarkar be able to change this trend?
Certainly not with the present structure.

Note from Jawaharlal Nehru to Krishna Menon
January 20, 1960
[From the Selected Work of Jawaharlal Nehru, Series II, Volume 56, page 378-79, published by Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund]

You will remember that the question of our border areas came up before the Cabinet sometime ago. There were two aspects of it: One was the building of
roads and the other was the development of those areas in other ways. So far as the development is concerned, certain tentative proposals have been made for a reorganisation of the administrative apparatus there so that some good and experienced officers may be put in charge of smaller areas than at present and should be given a good deal of authority and latitude to proceed with the development. Naturally, funds for this development will largely come from the Centre. This matter will come up before the Cabinet soon.

2. The Cabinet Secretary was put in charge of a committee to deal with these border areas and report to the Cabinet. He is reporting soon about the development of the border areas. When I asked him about the roads and communications, he said that the paper had been sent to the Defence Ministry about two weeks ago and it was still there. Will you please look into this matter and have it expedited so that Cabinet might consider any proposals that are being made?

3. To name the roads required in some order of priority can of course be done without much difficulty. The question, however, is how we can expedite the building of these roads. The normal PWD methods are very slow and we cannot afford to wait for several years before these roads are completed. I had a talk with you about this matter sometime ago. You had then suggested that it would be desirable, in order to expedite the building of these roads, to divide them up into three categories: (1) the Central PWD; (2) State PWD; and (3) some other agency [The Border Roads Organisation was started in July 1960] to be created for the purpose. I am not taking into consideration here those roads which might be called operational and which inevitably will be under the charge of the army engineers.

4. About the third category, i.e. some other agency, to build these roads, it is for us to consider what kind of an agency we can create. Probably it will not be wholly desirable to put them regularly under the army engineers, although army engineers may well be used for the purpose. Possibly, a separate labour corps might be recruited, and some army engineers attached to it. This method would probably be cheaper. Also, some of our old machinery for building or levelling etc. which we have with us at present might be used after some reconditioning.

5. This will have to be considered by the Cabinet. I should like your Ministry to give thought to this and prepare a paper on the subject as soon as possible.

Myth that must be busted at earliest

My article Myth that must be busted at earliest appeared in the Edit Page of The Pioneer today.

Here is the link...

Neville Maxwell, who recently ‘released’ the Henderson-Brooks-Bhagat Report on the 1962 conflict, claims that Nehru forced the war on Mao. This is a dangerously inaccurate interpretation of history and must be debunked

It is necessary to come back to the Henderson-Brooks-Bhagat Report (HBBR) and the role played by Neville Maxwell. The Australian journalist, who recently ‘released’ the famous report by posting it on his website, has been propagating a wrong interpretation of history, namely that India attacked China in 1962.
Even presuming that Indian troops may have crossed what the Chinese perceived as the international border, many other factors have to be taken into consideration.
At age 87, why Maxwell remains a great advocate of China’s theory that India was the aggressor, is a mystery to me.
It is not that I have any doubt that Nehru committed blunder after blunder, but Maxwell’s version is truly a biased over-simplification of the facts.
In an interview in The South China Morning Post, when asked by the Hong Kong newspaper: "What do you hope to achieve with this disclosure?" Maxwell answered: "What I have been trying to do for nearly 50 years! To rid Indian opinion of the induced delusion that in 1962 India was the victim of an unprovoked surprise Chinese aggression, to make people in India see that the truth was that it was mistakes by the Indian government, specifically Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, that forced the war on China."
Reading the HBBR does not show that India forced a war on China, it just proves that India was not prepared to successfully defend some new forward positions ordered by Krishna Menon (and Nehru) in NEFA and Ladakh.
It is undoubtedly a Himalayan Blunder in itself; it demonstrates the foolishness of the Prime Minister (and his arrogant Defence Minister), but it was certainly not the root-cause of the War.
The ‘forward policy’ was however the ideal pretext for Mao to show that India could not go unpunished for insulting China (by giving refuge to the Dalai Lama and his followers).
An interesting conversation which took place in February 1972 in Beijing, (during the historic Nixon visit) demonstrates the high esteem the Chinese have for Maxwell.
The Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai told Nixon, Nehru never implemented the famous the Panchsheel (five principles). In an earlier encounter, Zhou had already mentioned “a book by Neville Maxwell (India’s China War) about the Indian war against us, which proves this.”
Zhou repeatedly quoted Maxwell: “Neville Maxwell mentioned in the book that in 1962 the Indian Government believed what the Russians told them that we, China, would not retaliate against them. Of course we won’t send our troops outside our borders to fight against other people. We didn’t even try to expel Indian troops from the area south of the McMahon line, which China doesn’t recognize, by force. But if [Indian] troops come up north of the McMahon line, and come even further into Chinese territory, how is it possible for us to refrain from retaliating?”
He concluded: “You know all the other events in the book, so I won’t describe them, but India was encouraged by the Soviet Union to attack.”
The question of how India could attack without arms, ammunitions, clothing, food or basic supplies, etc. is not explained (The HBBR even says that some Indian troops starved for days).
One should grant China ideological consistency in its interpretation of the conflict. I remembered interviewing Indian PoWs who were taken shivering to Tibet in their light parkhas, they were repeatedly told by their jailors, “why did you attack us, we are a peaceful nation.” China has been propagating this theory ever since and Maxwell’s over-simplistic interpretation has been extremely useful to them.
However, many other factors came into play, but first and foremost the flight of the Dalai Lama in March/April 1959 and his subsequent asylum in India, changed the rapport between India and China. It is an aspect that Maxwell has totally ignored: China has been aggressive from the day it entered Tibet in October 1950. Let us not forget that China had NO BORDER with India till that time.
When Nehru acquiesced to the annexation of Tibet, it was a far more serious blunder than the so-called Forward Policy.
Another blunder of Nehru was to have ‘discovered’ the Aksai Chin road, linking Tibet to Xinjiang, only in 1958, (while it was officially opened to traffic in 1957 and the construction had started several years earlier). That was Blunder No 2.
Further, Maxwell conveniently forgets is that at the end of the 1950s and the early 1960s, Tibet was on the boil (particularly Eastern Tibet, north of the McMahon Line).
The 70,000 character petition from the Panchen Lama to Zhou Enlai on the internal situation in Tibet demonstrates the atrocious suffering of the Tibetan people during the period.
A few weeks back, while working in the National Archives of India, I came across interesting reports from the Indian Trade Agent in Yatung (Tibet). The Chinese authorities kept harassing the local Tibetans. For example, they were told: “[They] should offer scarves to the photograph of Mao Tse-tung which will be displayed in the bazaar. It is no use to worship images in the monasteries which are of no use. Some images from the local monastery were thrown in the latrine or trampled down under their feet in the presence of the gathering.” They were also ordered: “From now onwards, nobody should utter any Hindi word and they should not speak of [to] India Office [Trade Agency] in any matter. They should address Indian merchants here as ‘dogs’.”
The ITA says: “The effect of the above announcement in the meeting is having adverse effect on the general local population and they are making every effort to escape into India.”
By attacking India, China could effectively and ruthlessly seal the Tibet border and stop the Tibetans taking refuge in India.
Another factor forgotten in Maxwell's simplistic approach is the internal power struggle in China; the War was a plank for Chairman Mao to return to power. In Volume III of his Origins of the Cultural Revolution, the US scholar Roderick MacFarquhar said “It is not difficult to understand why Mao launched this sudden [internal] counter-attack [during the 10th Plenum in September 1962]. He was faced with what he saw as fundamental and unacceptable changes in key areas of policy: a rolling back of collectivization in the countryside which would have undermined his whole vision for a socially transformed China; and a détente with the Soviet Union.”
But here too, Maxwell only sees the Chinese side of the coin; it explains why he was so lavishly praised by Zhou Enlai.
Retrospectively, the babus who confiscated the HBBR made a huge disservice to India, they allowed Maxell’s one-sided interpretation to flourish.
Let us hope more hidden aspects of India’s modern history will soon be made public; it can only help India to become a mature nation.