Conspiracy of Silence

My article Conspiracy of Silence appeared in The Mail Today/DailyO


One of the biggest failures of the present government has been to ignore post-independence history. To give an example, South Block still does not declassify historical documents and transfer them to the National Archives of India, as legally mandated.
Another disappointment is that the VK Krishna Menon Papers held at the Nehru Memorial Museum & Library, are still kept under wraps and not accessible to researchers and scholars.
Menon humiliated competent Armed Forces’ officers, in some cases with the backing of the Prime Minister; why should this be kept secret?
 
Keeping the Secret
Further, without rewriting history, it is important to learn from past successes, victories, as well as defeats. In fact there is certainly more to learn from blunders, than sucess
The case of Lt Gen SPP Thorat’s report about the ‘Chinese Threat’ on India’s borders is worth citing. On October 8, 1959, Thorat, then responsible for the Eastern Command, sent a paper on the defence of NEFA to the Army Chief who forwarded it to the Minister. Thorat’s findings were outright rejected by Menon and worse, Thorat was accused of being an ‘alarmist and a warmonger’.
The report began thus: “Previously, the only real threat against India which merited consideration was from Pakistan. To this now has been added the threat from China. …This is primarily due to the claim made by China upon large territories which are clearly ours. … (China) has also refused to recognise the McMahon Line as the international boundary and has made deliberate incursions into our territory in Ladakh, Uttar Pradesh and NEFA (North- East Frontier Agency.”
Soon after Menon took over the Defence Ministry, Thorat, like General Thimayya, the Army Chief, had fallen out of Menon’s favours.
Maj Gen VK Singh, who wrote one of the Army Commander’s biographies noted that Thorat “clearly brought out that with the troops, weapons and equipment available at that time, a Chinese attack could not be contained or defeated, and the 'forward policy', being advocated by Menon was not practicable.” Thorat also provided a time table showing “how the defences would fall day by day in case the Chinese attacked.” He advocated the use of the Air Force to counter China.
VK Singh further noted: “When Thimayya retired in May 1961, it was expected that Thorat would succeed him as the Army Chief. He was highly decorated, had combat experience, and was held in high regard in the Service. Most important, he was GOC-in-C Eastern Command, and was familiar with the situation on the borders with China.” Unfortunately for India, Gen PN Thapar got the top job; though technically senior, he had little field experience but was pliable and close to the minister.
An exchange between Gen Thapar and Lt Gen Thorat shows the pettiness of the then leaders; it occurred as Thorat was in the process of retiring.
At 8 am on June 24, 1961, Lt Gen Thorat received a letter from the Army Chief who had been ‘asked’ by the Prime Minister for his comments “on the following allegations against you [Thorat] which have come to his notice.” By the evening Thorat had answered all the points.

China War
The first allegation was about a speech given by Thorat in Ranikhet where the Army Commander would have said: “Indian Officers were seeking promotions through political influence which was disrupting our army, or words to that effect.”
Thorat replied that he had only said that “officers must give their loyalty to their superior Commanders and through them, to the COAS [Army Chief] whoever he may be. Any tendency to look in other directions for early advancement was likely to ruin the discipline of the Army.”
The habit of finding other ways of ‘advancement’ had already sneaked into the Army, mainly due to Menon’s ways of working.
The second allegation was that Thorat would have told a senior IAF Officer that he was “allergic to the Defence Minister whom [he] could not stand and who was disrupting the army.” There is no doubt that many in the Army thought that way. Had Thorat said it openly?
Thorat answered to the Chief: “I recollect that some IAF officer possibly at Jorhrat or Tezpur asked why I had not been appointed COAS. To the best of my memory, I remember having replied that you were senior to me and also that the Hon'ble Defence Minister and I were not very fond of each other.” He admitted that it was not proper to make such a statement.
 
Right Prediction
This exchange however shows the small-mindedness of those who asked these questions just before Thorat’s retirement.
The next query was worse: “your Headquarters spent large sums of money on the farewell parties, functions and parades for General KS Thimayya in Lucknow during his visit earlier this month. How much money was spent, and how many vehicles were employed under the items mentioned above?”
The Army Commander listed ‘his’ expenses during the farewell functions: (a) At Home: Apr 26 Nil; (b) Guest Night: Apr 29, Nil; (c) Parade: May 1, Rs 450. He went on to provide the details for the Rs 450.
Thorat’s conclusions were: “Should [the PM] not be satisfied with my explanation, I request that I may be given an opportunity to clear myself in person, in the presence of those who have made these allegations.”
Thapar had nastily written to Thorat, “these are serious allegations and cannot be ignored.”
It is said that after the war Nehru realized how right Thorat had been in his assessments and predictions. It was too late.
One can only hope that the VK Krishna Menon Papers will soon be available to the Indian public; then we may realize all the blunders committed by the arrogant Minister, and learn from them.

Why China needs a history lesson on the 1890 Convention

No Historical Division in South Block

My article Why China needs a history lesson on the 1890 Convention appeared in Mail Today/Daily Mail (UK).

Here is the link...

India has won a battle on the ridge in western Bhutan by not allowing China to change the status quo and build a strategic road near the trijunction between Sikkim, Tibet and Bhutan.
But Delhi has lost other battles.
In 2003, China's Central Military Commission approved the concept of 'Three Warfares': one, the coordinated use of strategic psychological operations; two, overt and covert media manipulation; and three, legal warfare designed to manipulate strategies, defence policies, and perceptions of target audiences abroad.

Standoff
While some in India are satisfied with preventing the construction of the road, the other aspects of the standoff should be looked into (and indeed India does have strong legal and historical arguments).
For example, Delhi has been unable to explain to the Indian public the background about the Chinese 'trick' regarding the 1890 Convention repeatedly quoted by the Chinese authorities.
The spokesperson of the Chinese ministry of foreign affairs in Beijing vociferously managed to convince many that it was a valid treaty.
However, the fact that the main stakeholders, Tibet and Sikkim (and Bhutan for the trijunction), were not even consulted, made it an 'Imperial Treaty' with no validity (in any case, the survey of the trijunction was done several decades after the agreement was signed; so China can't justify 'fixing' the trijunction by quoting this treaty).
In Tibet: a Political History, Tibetan politician and historian Tsepon WD Shakabpa explained: 'In 1890 a convention was drawn up in Calcutta… without consulting the government of Tibet.
'The first article of the convention agreement defined the (northern) boundary between Tibet and Sikkim, and the second article recognised a British protectorate over Sikkim.'
Three years later, the trade regulations about increasing the trade facilities across the Sikkim-Tibet frontier were discussed: 'Again, the provisions of that agreement could not be enforced because Tibet had not been a party to the negotiations,' says Shakabpa.
The Convention of 1890 and the Trade Regulations of 1893 proved to be of no use to the British as Tibet never recognised them; this eventually led London to directly 'deal' with Lhasa and send the Younghusband expedition to Lhasa in 1904 and open the doors to organise the Tripartite Simla Convention in 1914, with British India, Tibet and China sitting on equal footing.
Today, Beijing speaks of 'renegotiating' the 1890 Convention; it would imply that the treaties signed with the Tibetans, particularly the Simla Convention and the border agreement (defining the McMahon Line) in 1914, would be scrapped and India would have no defined border with Tibet in the Northeast.
The Chinese have tried similar tricks earlier. One factor which has led to losing the battle of information is the lack of a Historical Division in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA).
In the early years after Independence, the Nehru government established a historical division with S Gopal (President Radhakrishan's son) as its first head.

Essays
Shivshankar Menon, the former foreign secretary and national security advisor, in a book review of Gopal's Collected Essays recollects: 'For reasons I find incredible and incomprehensible the Historical Division was wound up by MEA in the nineties… Some of our present difficulties may indeed be due to a lack of memory.'
Menon mentions the decision of the government of the doubling of MEA posts approved by the Cabinet in 2008 and says that he hopes that '(it) will be used to revive the ministry's memory and Historical Division.'
The former top Indian diplomat adds: 'As head of MEA's historical division from 1954 to 1966, Gopal led the Division's work not just on diplomatic history but on the intersection of policy and history, making significant contributions to both.' An interesting case in point is the 1960 negotiation of the 'officials'.
In April 1960, Nehru and Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier, had several meetings: 'The talks, however, did not resolve the differences that had arisen and the two Prime Ministers decided that officials of the two governments should examine the factual materials in the possession of the two governments in support of their stands,' said a joint communiqué.

Meetings
Subsequently five rounds of talks were held between officials of India and China; the Indian side was headed by JS Mehta, director, China Division, and Gopal, the then Director of MEA's Historical Division.
The historian was assisted by knowledgeable colleagues such as TS Murty, G Narayana Rao and K Gopalachari.
The first two meetings were held in Peking, in late June and late July 1960; the next two in New Delhi, in late August and late September 1960, and the last in Rangoon in early December 1960.
The outcome is the Report of the Officials, still today a reference for any study on the Tibet-Indian border. The border issue could probably have been sorted out at that time.
Ironically, the Indian point of view was so well documented (by the historical division) that the MPs were in no mood to agree to a compromise solution; India and China probably lost a chance to solve the dispute.
Many examples of the usefulness of the Historical Division could be cited. Incidentally in 1960, the Chinese refused to discuss Tibet's border with Sikkim and Bhutan; Beijing had probably no clue where the trijunction was.
The point remains that a strong Historical Division in the MEA is a crying need today, like it was in the past.
When the time comes to draw lessons from the present confrontation, let us hope that the ministry realises that it is a worthwhile investment, even if it has to be 'outsourced' outside the service.

Can South Block’s babudom change?

It appeared as great news from the most powerful babudom’s fief in the Government of India. On June 29, 2015, the Administration Division of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) issued a notification inviting applications for filling up of posts of consultants: “The selected consultants will be required to work as International Relations Expert in the Policy Planning and Research Division of the Ministry. Their duties will entail regular monitoring of specific geographical or thematic areas relevant to foreign policy formulation, and providing knowledge-based inputs for the same. They will be required to summarize and analyse published material in the areas assigned to them.” Revolutionary changes in offing in the MEA?
With the prospect of jaunting aspect around, it could certainly enthuse many bored scholars in Indian Universities and think-tanks: “They will also be required to attend important seminars and conferences relevant to the work of the Policy Planning Division, and submit reports on them.”
The idea that academicians and experts get a ‘lateral entry’ into the MEA is not new and recently suggestions were made by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs, which discussed the possibility to expand the recruitment of the IFS cadre.
Nobody can deny that the Indian Foreign Service has too few officials to cope with the new imperatives of Delhi’s foreign policy.
Shashi Tharoor, the Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee, a regular tweeter, announced: “Foreign Secretary informed us that Government was finally implementing one of our recommendations for lateral entry into MEA.”
A second tweet followed: “Good2let new thinking into MEA.”
The former Minister of State in the MEA spoke of filling up the gaps and bringing ‘different expertise’; a move which could later be emulated by other ministries, he said.
One of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s objectives has been to make of India a major world power. Behind his numerous foreign trips, this thread has always been present. But does India have today the means to assume this new status?
Is the present Foreign Service an effective tool for a ‘major power’? It depends, of course, on how a ‘major power’ is defined.
Is it a moral power (like Nehru wanted India to be in the 1950’s); a scientific/innovator power (like Finland and the Noika experience); a soft cultural power (like Buddhist India during Ashoka’s times); a military power (like the US or China) or an economic power (like several emerging nations)?
In today’s world, it is not really enough to be ‘soft’ or ‘moral’; a truly powerful nation needs to be all the above simultaneously.
In the early 1990s, out of the straitjacket of Soviet-type planned economy, India started blooming. The nation soon emerged as a power to reckon with. Another turning point was Pokharan II.
By that time, Western nations had begun then to dissociate India and Pakistan; earlier, the equation had been purposefully kept alive to serve ‘powerful’ nations, such as the United States to create a ‘balance’ in the subcontinent.
Nobody can deny today that India is a great power.
A few years ago, an interesting research was published by Daniel Markey, a Senior Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington DC. Markey pointed out some of the issues which prevent India’s diplomacy to grow:
•    expand, reform, pay, and train the Indian Foreign Service to attract and retain high-caliber officers.
•    encourage the growth of world-class social science research and teaching schools in India through partnerships with private organizations.
•    invest in Indian think-tanks and exchange programs that build capacity for foreign policy research.
•    bring non-career officers into the Indian Ministry of External Affairs and other parts of the foreign policy establishment as term-limited fellows to improve outside understanding of the policy process.
Apparently, the new Mandarins under the Prime Minister’s active direction have started working on these issues and the recent notification is hopefully a first step in this direction.
A few years ago, Shashi Tharoor, already wrote an interesting report on the subject; he noted: “India is served by the smallest diplomatic corps of any major country, not just far smaller than the big powers but by comparison with most of the larger emerging countries. At just about 900 IFS officers to staff India’s 120 missions and 49 consulates abroad, India has the fewest Foreign Service officers among the BRICS countries. …It is ironic that India — not just the world’s most populous democracy but one of the world’s largest bureaucracies — has a diplomatic corps roughly equal to tiny Singapore’s 867.” No further comment is required.
The lack of ‘vision’ or ‘plan’ for the next 20 or 30 years has been a serious difficulty which has hindered the advent of a powerful diplomacy. South Block today does not have a 5-year or 10-year ‘diplomatic vision’.
India needs a consistent and clear foreign policy, with India’s national interests clearly defined; short term opportunism gets neither respect nor lasting friends.
In 2008, Shivshankar Menon, then Foreign Secretary, prepared a note for the Cabinet in which he proposed doubling the Foreign Service strength. It was agreed that the cadre would be increased by 320 officers in the IFS category and 200 in the support staff. The move was however blocked by some serving officers, too jealous of their privileges.
The main problem is the mindset of the babu who ‘knows everything’. This has to change; it is the only way for India to become a truly ‘major’ power.
An interesting point in the MEA notification is the following sentence: “From time to time, the [consultants] may also be asked to undertake historical research on specific foreign policy related issues.”
One of the greatest tragedies of modern India is that history has been kept under wraps by the successive governments. Will the Modi Sarkar be better than its predecessor?
Markey had written that steps should be taken to “support the efforts of Indian researchers to maximize public access to material related to the history of India’s foreign policy.” There is no move in this direction.
Can you imagine that there is no Historical Division today in MEA today? It means that the Mandarins in the ministry have no reference point to check on a historical event or prepare a note on it. Can a ‘major power’ like India be dispensed of knowing its history?
I thought that the issue was on the way to be solved when, a few years ago, a group of 15/20 retired ambassadors started going through lakhs of old files. After reading them, they were to decide if the files could be destroyed (after being digitalized), remain classified or sent to the National Archives of India (as required by the Indian laws).
Unfortunately, the experiment was stopped. Why? I don’t know. Probably the babus have as usual prevailed.
Is it the sign of a mature democracy, a ‘major power’?

Maps now and then

Recently published Chinese Map
Large tracks of Indian territory are shown as Chinese

My article Map Now and Then appeared today in The Statesman.

Here is the link...
 
Why is Delhi so quiet? Probably because ‘China and India are friends’! Friends like in 1954? It is very ominous.  It is perhaps time for Delhi to distribute the maps of India's borders. It will be useful for the general public, the press and for the Indian officials 

Last week, Beijing published its first official vertical national map of China, incorporating vast areas of the South China Sea. The South China Morning Post (SMCP) commented that the new map gave “equal weight to both land and sea, in [Beijing’s] latest move emphasising its claims of sovereignty over the disputed waters.”
Earlier maps showed the islands in the South China Sea on a smaller scale, in a separate box-out in a bottom corner of the map. Mainly due to the prominence given to the South China Sea on the new map, during several days, most commentators concentrated on the South China Sea; finally, the MEA decide to take note of the new map.
Why? Probably because the Indian media had discovered that the new map showed Arunachal Pradesh as part of China. South Block could not keep quiet anymore, especially at a time the Indian Vice-President was visiting China …to celebrate 60 years of “peaceful co-existence”.
The MEA was, however, quick to dismiss the new map by saying that “cartographic depiction did not change the reality that Arunachal was part of India.” The MEA spokesman further elaborated: “The fact that Arunachal Pradesh is an integral and inalienable part of India has been conveyed to the Chinese authority on several occasions including at the very highest level.”
What is more shocking is the fact that the spokesperson forgot to mention the central sector (Uttarakhand and Himachal) where large chunks of Indian territory (such as Barahoti and Nilang) appear on the Chinese map also …and similarly not a word for the Aksai Chin and areas around the Pangong Tso in Ladakh!
Why has the MEA nothing to say about these vast areas of India’s territory? It is all the more difficult to understand after the Indian press had reported: “On June 24, four Chinese high-speed interceptor boats were spotted moving from Srijap I posts around 8.25 am to Srijap VIII, VI and V detachments on the northern banks of the [Pangong] lake. Twenty minutes later, Indian troops on the four American-made boats moved from Thukang base and intercepted Chinese vessels. The two sides first were locked in a face-off and then conducted a so-called banner drill to remind the other side of the Line.”
According to South Block sources, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) boats came 5.5 kilometres into the Indian side of the Pangong Lake (Tso) on 24 June. The incursion lasted over two hours, involving four high-speed Chinese interceptor boats that were pushed back by Indian troops, on their US-built interceptor vessels.
The Hindustan Times quoted government sources to affirm that the lake has seen 12 face-offs between Indian and Chinese troops this year alone: “In 2013, there were no less than 18 face-offs between Indian and Chinese troops in Pangong Tso due to serious difference in perception on the LAC and also due to massive Chinese infrastructure build-up close to the line.”
The non-reaction of the MEA is particularly surprising when one looks at the new Chinese map which shows large parts of Ladakh as belonging to China. China is a regular offender. A few months after the signature of the infamous Panchsheel Agreement, Nehru visited China. On his return, he wrote a note entitled ‘Implications of China Visit’; it was an internal note intended for the MEA officials. He described in detail his visit to Beijing (in October 1954): “During my visit to China, I had a number of talks with the Chinese leaders. I had long talks with Premier Zhou Enlai separately. I also had joint talks with Chairman Mao Zedong and his principal colleagues, Vice Chairman Zhu De, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Peoples’ Congress Liu Shaoqi; Premier Zhou Enlai...”
The Prime Minister was accompanied by the Secretary General of the MEA, NR Pillai, and India’s Ambassador in Peking, N. Raghavan.
In other words, it was a Sino-Indian Summit.
The maps of China were discussed. Like today, they showed several parts of India’s territory as belonging to China. Nehru writes: “I referred to Chinese maps which still showed portions of Burma and even of India as if they were within Chinese territory. So far as India was concerned, I added, we were not much concerned about this matter because our boundaries were quite clear and were not a matter for argument. But many people took advantage of these old maps and argued that China had an aggressive intent, or else why continue to use these maps. In Burma also this caused apprehension.”
Zhou Enlai cleverly replied that “these maps were old ones and China had not done any surveying to draw new maps. Their boundaries even with Mongolia and the Soviet Union were still not clearly demarcated and there were discrepancies. I [Nehru] pointed out that this might be so. So far as India was concerned, I repeated, there was no doubt about our boundaries and I was not worried about them. But I wondered how China would feel if a part of Tibet had been shown as part of India in our maps.”
Amazing (and sad), while Beijing still speaks about the Five Principles, 60 years later, the situation on the ground is repeating itself. Let us not forget that China’s Survey and Mapping Administration has approved the controversial map published by Hunan Map Press, which in its announcement said the map was of “great significance in safeguarding the nation’s water sovereignty and territorial integrity”.
Why is Delhi so quiet? Probably because ‘China and India are friends’! Friends like in 1954? It is very ominous.
Another similarity with 1954:  60 years ago too, Beijing had ‘no problem’ with India; China’s problem was with the American imperialists.
During the Panchsheel commemoration, President Xi Jinping vowed that no violations of territorial integrity would be tolerated, adding though that no nation (read the US) should be allowed to monopolise global affairs. Xi however made it clear: “Sovereignty is the reliable safeguard and fundamental element of national interest. Sovereignty and territorial integrity should not be infringed upon. This is the hard principle that should not be cast aside at any time”.
And then, he started indirectly bashing the US: “All nations should be given equal footing in the global security framework, and share equal rights.”
Su Hao, a professor with China Foreign Affairs University, told SCMP: “The message is that China is not the source of the problem, and it is some external force violating principles of international relations and making chaos in the region.”
One more ‘detail’, but which is vital for India; on the new Chinese map, the size of the Chumbi Valley, located between Sikkim and Bhutan, is really bloated. Does China plan to grab more territory from Bhutan?
A few months before his 1954 visit to Beijing, Nehru had taken up the issue of Indian maps with the MEA Secretary-General. At that time, India was foolishly showing most of the Ladakh border as ‘undefined’. Nehru wrote: “All our old maps dealing with this frontier should be carefully examined and, where necessary, withdrawn. New maps should be printed showing our Northern and North-Eastern frontier without any reference to any ‘line’. These new maps should also not state that there is any un-demarcated territory. The new maps should be sent to our embassies abroad and should be introduced to the public generally and be used in our schools, colleges etc.”
It is perhaps time for Delhi to distribute the maps of India’s borders. It will be useful for the general public, the press and for the Indian officials.