Know your history

My article Know your history appeared in the Edit Page of The Pioneer


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If we want to win the battle of information or perception like China, then we need to restore the Historical Division in the MEA or let MOD set up a comparative cell

With the country approaching the General Elections, one rarely comes across good news. However, the “transformative” reforms, soon to be undertaken by the Ministry of Defence, are an encouraging sign that a few things in India are changing. According to PTI, the idea is “to make the 1.3 million-strong force leaner and meaner as well as  enhance its combat capabilities.”
Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman has approved the first batch of reforms, which include relocation of 229 officers from the Army headquarters to operational postings, reorganisation of the Army Headquarters and the setting up of new wings for vigilance and human rights issues. Particularly interesting is the creation of a post of Deputy Chief of the Army Staff (Strategy) or DCOAS, which will deal with military operations, military intelligence and operational logistics. Then there will be a new information warfare wing “in keeping with the needs of the future battlefield, hybrid warfare and social media reality.”
The Modi sarkar finally realised that the war of tomorrow will be “hybrid”— “unrestricted warfare” in Chinese terminology — and primarily needs a change of mindset. The Chinese understood this long back. In 2003, China’s Central Military Commission approved the concept of “Three Warfares” — one, the coordinated use of strategic psychological operations; two, overt and covert media manipulation; and three, legal warfare designed to manipulate strategies, defence policies and perceptions of the target audience abroad.
Further, on November 23, 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced a new plan to completely change the face of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Apart from the three traditional Services (Ground Forces, Air Force and Navy), a Rocket Force and more importantly a Strategic Support Force were set up.
Remember the Doklam incident of 2017, where India won a battle on the ridge in western Bhutan by not allowing China to change the status quo and build a strategic road near the trijunction between Sikkim, Tibet and Bhutan? But Delhi lost another battle. That of the legitimacy of its claim. While everyone in India applauded the forces, which prevented the construction of the road, Delhi was unable to articulate the background of the standoff although it had strong legal and historical arguments. At the same time, the Chinese repeatedly quoted a 1890 Convention between Great Britain and the Manchus. The spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing vociferously managed to convince the Indian media posted in Beijing that it was a valid basis for the Chinese action at the trijunction.
The fact that in 1890, the main stakeholders, Tibet and Sikkim and Bhutan, were not even consulted, made it an “unequal” treaty without validity (in any case, the survey of the trijunction was done only several decades after the agreement was signed).
The Convention of 1890 proved to be of no use to the British as Tibet never recognised it; this eventually led London to directly “deal” with Lhasa, send the Younghusband expedition there in 1904 and open the doors to the tripartite Simla Convention between British India, Tibet and China sitting on an equal footing in 1914. Since India did not object to the argument behind the 1890 Convention, it meant that the subsequent treaties signed with the Tibetans, particularly the Simla Convention and the border agreement (defining the McMahon Line) in 1914 would have no validity; as a result India would lose its defined border in the Northeast.
The main factor which has led to losing the battle of information is the lack of a Historical Division in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). While the Ministry of Defence gets ready to undertake bold reforms, the MEA seems lethargic (at least for an external eye). It is difficult indeed to imagine today the MEA looking at its failure and taking initiative to reform its functioning; it seems beyond the capacity of the mandarins of South Block.
In May 2016, a parliamentary committee on foreign affairs had suggested expanding the manpower in the Indian Foreign Service (IFS), providing lateral entry into the IFS and organising a separate exam for the service. All this is fine, but what about reviving the defunct Historical Division?
How can a modern State,  which wants to be a “Great Power,” function without a Historical Division to which these types of issues (such as the historical background of the trijunction) can be referred for clarifications and advice, is beyond comprehension.
In the early years after Independence, the Nehru government established a Historical Division with S. Gopal (President Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan’s son) as its first head. Shivshankar Menon, a former foreign secretary and national security advisor, in a book review of Gopal’s Collected Essays explained: “For reasons I find incredible and incomprehensible, the Historical Division was wound up by the MEA in the nineties … some of our present difficulties may indeed be due to a lack of memory.” Today, the MEA has just a Boundary Cell headed by a Lieutenant Colonel, while it should be looked by a Joint Secretary-rank officer (or may be a Major General with intimate ground knowledge of the boundary).
Why was the Historical Division closed in the first place? It seems that in the 1990s, an all-knowing diplomat believed that it was not necessary. Is there a resource base  today with the will and the capacity to tackle such a thorny issue today?
For the Ministry of Defence, the best would be to forget about the MEA and reorganise itself to bring together all historical records in a well-organised manner (a place where documents would be available when required for operations, public information or other purposes), while keeping a strict classification process.
To keep these records, the Ministry would have to employ a team of professional historians, recruited through lateral entry and who would be given the necessary security clearance (with the punishment it entails if the rules are bent …for illicit photocopies for journalists “seeking the truth”). This move would allow a centralisation of all the historical records kept in different MOD departments. The Directorate of History and Records (or whatever name the Office is given) would make historical documents or notes available to the DCOAS (Strategy) or any other officer requiring them.
It would have an added advantage, the MEA may be able to wake up and decide to recreate its Historical Division.  This “reform” could greatly enhance the capacity of the defence forces to fight the hybrid war of tomorrow.

Why China needs a history lesson on the 1890 Convention

No Historical Division in South Block

My article Why China needs a history lesson on the 1890 Convention appeared in Mail Today/Daily Mail (UK).

Here is the link...

India has won a battle on the ridge in western Bhutan by not allowing China to change the status quo and build a strategic road near the trijunction between Sikkim, Tibet and Bhutan.
But Delhi has lost other battles.
In 2003, China's Central Military Commission approved the concept of 'Three Warfares': one, the coordinated use of strategic psychological operations; two, overt and covert media manipulation; and three, legal warfare designed to manipulate strategies, defence policies, and perceptions of target audiences abroad.

Standoff
While some in India are satisfied with preventing the construction of the road, the other aspects of the standoff should be looked into (and indeed India does have strong legal and historical arguments).
For example, Delhi has been unable to explain to the Indian public the background about the Chinese 'trick' regarding the 1890 Convention repeatedly quoted by the Chinese authorities.
The spokesperson of the Chinese ministry of foreign affairs in Beijing vociferously managed to convince many that it was a valid treaty.
However, the fact that the main stakeholders, Tibet and Sikkim (and Bhutan for the trijunction), were not even consulted, made it an 'Imperial Treaty' with no validity (in any case, the survey of the trijunction was done several decades after the agreement was signed; so China can't justify 'fixing' the trijunction by quoting this treaty).
In Tibet: a Political History, Tibetan politician and historian Tsepon WD Shakabpa explained: 'In 1890 a convention was drawn up in Calcutta… without consulting the government of Tibet.
'The first article of the convention agreement defined the (northern) boundary between Tibet and Sikkim, and the second article recognised a British protectorate over Sikkim.'
Three years later, the trade regulations about increasing the trade facilities across the Sikkim-Tibet frontier were discussed: 'Again, the provisions of that agreement could not be enforced because Tibet had not been a party to the negotiations,' says Shakabpa.
The Convention of 1890 and the Trade Regulations of 1893 proved to be of no use to the British as Tibet never recognised them; this eventually led London to directly 'deal' with Lhasa and send the Younghusband expedition to Lhasa in 1904 and open the doors to organise the Tripartite Simla Convention in 1914, with British India, Tibet and China sitting on equal footing.
Today, Beijing speaks of 'renegotiating' the 1890 Convention; it would imply that the treaties signed with the Tibetans, particularly the Simla Convention and the border agreement (defining the McMahon Line) in 1914, would be scrapped and India would have no defined border with Tibet in the Northeast.
The Chinese have tried similar tricks earlier. One factor which has led to losing the battle of information is the lack of a Historical Division in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA).
In the early years after Independence, the Nehru government established a historical division with S Gopal (President Radhakrishan's son) as its first head.

Essays
Shivshankar Menon, the former foreign secretary and national security advisor, in a book review of Gopal's Collected Essays recollects: 'For reasons I find incredible and incomprehensible the Historical Division was wound up by MEA in the nineties… Some of our present difficulties may indeed be due to a lack of memory.'
Menon mentions the decision of the government of the doubling of MEA posts approved by the Cabinet in 2008 and says that he hopes that '(it) will be used to revive the ministry's memory and Historical Division.'
The former top Indian diplomat adds: 'As head of MEA's historical division from 1954 to 1966, Gopal led the Division's work not just on diplomatic history but on the intersection of policy and history, making significant contributions to both.' An interesting case in point is the 1960 negotiation of the 'officials'.
In April 1960, Nehru and Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier, had several meetings: 'The talks, however, did not resolve the differences that had arisen and the two Prime Ministers decided that officials of the two governments should examine the factual materials in the possession of the two governments in support of their stands,' said a joint communiqué.

Meetings
Subsequently five rounds of talks were held between officials of India and China; the Indian side was headed by JS Mehta, director, China Division, and Gopal, the then Director of MEA's Historical Division.
The historian was assisted by knowledgeable colleagues such as TS Murty, G Narayana Rao and K Gopalachari.
The first two meetings were held in Peking, in late June and late July 1960; the next two in New Delhi, in late August and late September 1960, and the last in Rangoon in early December 1960.
The outcome is the Report of the Officials, still today a reference for any study on the Tibet-Indian border. The border issue could probably have been sorted out at that time.
Ironically, the Indian point of view was so well documented (by the historical division) that the MPs were in no mood to agree to a compromise solution; India and China probably lost a chance to solve the dispute.
Many examples of the usefulness of the Historical Division could be cited. Incidentally in 1960, the Chinese refused to discuss Tibet's border with Sikkim and Bhutan; Beijing had probably no clue where the trijunction was.
The point remains that a strong Historical Division in the MEA is a crying need today, like it was in the past.
When the time comes to draw lessons from the present confrontation, let us hope that the ministry realises that it is a worthwhile investment, even if it has to be 'outsourced' outside the service.