Tibet: The Last Months of a Free Nation — India Tibet Relations (1947-1951)

My book Tibet: The Last Months of a Free Nation India Tibet Relations (1947-1951) published by Vij Publishers for the United Service Institution of India (USI) was released  by Ambassador Shiv Shankar Menon (former National Security Advisor and Foreign Secretary) on September 7 at the USI.

This is the first of a series of four books on the India-Tibet Relations between 1947 and 1962.
The four volumes will cover the following periods:
•    Volume 1 (1947-1951) ending by 17-Point Agreement
•    Volume 2 (1951-1954) ending by Panchsheel Agreement & foods in Gyantse
•    Volume 3 (1954-1957) ending by Dalai Lama’s visit to India
Volume 4 (1957-1962) closure of the Consulate General in Lhasa

The book is based on Indian archival materials only.

It is available on Amazon.com.

I am posting here the concluding remarks of the first volume.

A few concluding remarks
At the end of this first volume on “The Relations between Tibet and India between 1947 and 1962”, it is important to draw some lessons from the tragic happenings of the Year 1950 which led to the signature of the 17-Point Agreement in May 1951. The end result was that Tibet lost her independence and India lost a frontier.

Strategic thinkers vs ‘visionaries’
A first observation: India had some of the best strategic thinkers, but the government did not use their competence.
Though their conclusions were not accepted by the Prime Minister Nehru, I have tried to pay homage to some of these foresighted Indian thinkers. One should not forget that India is still suffering from some of the decisions taken in 1950-51.
The hundreds of letters, cables, telegrams, notes that I could access show that two factions emerged during the tumultuous last six months of 1950: one led by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and K.M. Panikkar, his ambassador in Beijing, both obsessed by an imaginary friendship with New China and fixated on the ‘larger implications for World Peace’; the other, which immediately saw the strategic implications for India, would Delhi let Tibet down, was led by Sardar Patel, the Deputy Prime Minster with Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, the Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations as his main adviser. They were fed by reports ‘from the ground’ by Harishwar Dayal, the Political Officer in Sikkim and Sumul Sinha, the Head of the Indian Mission in Lhasa. At that time, India had a full-fledged Mission in Tibet as well as three Trade Agencies in Gyantse, Yatung and Gartok.
The ‘Chinese’ Ambassador Panikkar had opposite views. In one of his lengthy reports, Panikkar explains to Nehru: “Tibet is now in the process of being ‘liberated’. The word ‘liberation’ (Chieh fang), it may be made clear, does not in Chinese signify a military conquest. It means the introduction of new life and the elimination of misery, moral degradation, inequality of sexes, etc. - in fact liberation from the oppression of tradition. The ‘liberation’ of Tibet is, therefore, being attempted mainly through education and propaganda.”
Sixty five years later, the Tibetans have still not understood from what they needed to be ‘liberated’. China, however gained not only a huge landmass, the access to the ‘water tower of Asia’, large mineral resources and a strategic position dominating the subcontinent.

Who were the ‘visionaries’?
Unfortunately, Sardar Patel, who articulated so presciently the dangers of the Chinese invasion for India’s frontiers, passed away on December 15, 1950, barely two months after the entry of the People’s Liberation Army in Eastern Tibet. Thereafter, Nehru’s line prevailed, with the disastrous consequences which still can be seen today on the Indian borders, whether in Ladakh, Uttarakhand or Arunachal Pradesh.
In the text, I have quoted a personal letter written by Dayal to Maj S.M. Krishnatry, then posted as Trade Agent (ITA) in Gyantse. While discussing the Chinese advance towards the McMahon Line, the PO informed the ITA of Sardar Patel’s death, “It is a heavy blow. He was the one person in this Government who had strong realistic view of things, including on foreign relations. Now, we are left at the mercy of the visionaries.”
In hindsight, Patel, Bajpai, Dayal or Sinha were the real ‘visionaries’.

Tibet: a temporary setback for India’s ‘peace’ policy
An important factor in our story was the role that India wanted to play in the Korean conflict. It greatly influenced Delhi’s Tibet policy. By January 1951, the Ministry of External Affairs and the Indian Embassy in Beijing had started to spend most of their time and energy on ‘peace-making’; in the process: Tibet was abandoned.
In fact by the beginning of 1951, the ‘Tibetan incident’ was over for the Indian Ambassador in China. India could start dreaming of an eternal friendship with China. In the Annual Report of the Indian Embassy for 1950, Panikkar wrote: “The exchange of Notes on Tibet, following the Chinese attack on Chamdo gave a temporary setback to our relations, but the reaction of the Chinese Government to the Indian protests was restrained and neither country permitted this incident to have more than a temporary effect. India consistently supported Chinese claims in the United Nations and her sustained efforts to settle the Korean issue have been fully appreciated in China. There is every reason to hope that the next year will see even better relations established between the two countries.”
But India had lost a peaceful border and a friendly neighbour.

Three phases towards a so-called liberation
If one analyses the events, the period covered in this first volume could be divided in the three phases.
•    Phase 1: August 1947- September 1949
•    Phase 2: October 1949- August 1950
•    Phase 3: September 1950 – May 1951
During the first two phases, the policy of the Government of India towards Tibet remained as it had been during the British period.
Through Phase 1, life on the Roof of the World continued as in the past several decades.
The Dalai Lama was growing into a bright adolescent and nobody bothered much about the revolutions happening in the world …and the decolonization.
Nehru’s government had reappointed two Britishers to their jobs: Arthur Hopkinson, who had served as the last British Political Officer in Sikkim (Hopkinson continued to officiate till mid 1948) and Hugh Richardson, as the head of the Mission in Lhasa. Both played an important supporting role with their great clarity of mind; they understood the importance to maintain relations with Tibet ‘on the old basis’, and more particularly for India, they realized the implications of an eventual Chinese ‘adventure’ on the plateau.
It must be noted that Dayal and Sinha would be treated very differently by the Indian Prime Minister than Hopkinson and Richardson. Had Richardson received from Nehru one of the reprimands that Sinha received a few months later, he would have immediately returned to his native Scotland. But Sinha had no island to leave for; after his tenure in Lhasa, he was a broken man.
July 1949 saw the preemptive expulsion of all Chinese living in the Tibetan capital. But all was to change on October 1, 1949 when the Communists took over the Middle Kingdom.
Independent India primarily sought to maintain a kind of status quo, i.e. Tibet continuing to be a buffer between China and India, while trade and religious exchanges through the Indian borders flourished. By June 1948, Lhasa had accepted the past treaties and conventions between British India and Tibet, but there were no efforts to delineate, demarcate and secure the northern boundary as Buddhist Tibet was a friendly neighbor.
All was well.
The second phase (from October 1, 1949 till August 1950) was marked by the emergence of an irredentist New China. The relations between India and Tibet however remained unchanged even when the Communist propaganda started announcing the ‘liberation’ of Tibet. Very few in Delhi took it seriously. What was the Indian Intelligence doing? Did they ever read the speeches or declaration of the Chinese leaders? It is a question which needs to be answered.
India clearly failed to evolve a strategy to deal with Communist China, or at least a pragmatic policy; further, leaders like Panikkar or V.K. Krishna Menon thought that the arrival of Mao on the stage was the best thing which could have happened to China …and Tibet.
The third phase starts with the beginning of the military operations in Tibet. It was officially announced by a letter of Marshal Liu Bocheng which was dismissed by the ‘visionaries’; around the same time (August 1950), Panikkar changed ‘suzerainty’ into ‘sovereignty’, giving a green card to Communist China to invade (or ‘liberate’ in Red jargon) Tibet.
Indian policy during this period was marked by accommodation and shameless appeasement towards China.
The strategic interests of India were sacrificed on the altar of ‘wider world views’ such as the ‘World Peace’ or the fear of jeopardising the chances of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) gaining entry into the United Nations Security Council. From the Western powers’ point of view, the main concern was “let us not rock the boat”, as in any case, “it is India’s business”.

Military as an Instrument of State Policy
Another dimension of India’s Tibet policy is the fact that the Prime Minister often disregarded the military as an instrument of State policy. Of course, this was in strong contrast with what was happening in China.
In the Chinese account of the so-called Liberation published as an annexure, during a meeting in Chengdu in August 1950, Deng Xiaoping, the Political Commissar of the Southwestern Bureau mentioned the importance of both the military and civilian factors to liberate the Roof of the World.
Some strategic notes of Lt Gen Nathu Singh, GOC-in-Chief, Eastern Command are quoted in the last chapter; they were regularly discarded by the Indian civilian leadership.
Even the attempt by the Indian Military Intelligence to send an officer to Tibet was thwarted; instead, Maj (later Lt Gen) Z.C. Bakshi was sent to Tibet on behalf of the Ministry of External Affairs. He nevertheless gave interesting suggestions, which were never implemented.
As I completed this first volume, these words of Sri Aurobindo came to mind: “There are moments when the Spirit moves among men and the breath of the Lord is abroad upon the waters of our being; there are others when it retires and men are left to act in the strength or the weakness of their own egoism. The first are periods when even a little effort produces great results and changes destiny; the second are spaces of time when much labour goes to the making of a little result. It is true that the latter may prepare the former, may be the little smoke of sacrifice going up to heaven which calls down the rain of God's bounty. Unhappy is the man or the nation which, when the divine moment arrives, is found sleeping or unprepared to use it, because the lamp has not been kept trimmed for the welcome and the ears are sealed to the call. But thrice woe to them who are strong and ready, yet waste the force or misuse the moment; for them is irreparable loss or a great destruction.”
An occasion was definitively missed for Tibet and India too.
Some call this Karma.

Why China needs a history lesson on the 1890 Convention

No Historical Division in South Block

My article Why China needs a history lesson on the 1890 Convention appeared in Mail Today/Daily Mail (UK).

Here is the link...

India has won a battle on the ridge in western Bhutan by not allowing China to change the status quo and build a strategic road near the trijunction between Sikkim, Tibet and Bhutan.
But Delhi has lost other battles.
In 2003, China's Central Military Commission approved the concept of 'Three Warfares': one, the coordinated use of strategic psychological operations; two, overt and covert media manipulation; and three, legal warfare designed to manipulate strategies, defence policies, and perceptions of target audiences abroad.

Standoff
While some in India are satisfied with preventing the construction of the road, the other aspects of the standoff should be looked into (and indeed India does have strong legal and historical arguments).
For example, Delhi has been unable to explain to the Indian public the background about the Chinese 'trick' regarding the 1890 Convention repeatedly quoted by the Chinese authorities.
The spokesperson of the Chinese ministry of foreign affairs in Beijing vociferously managed to convince many that it was a valid treaty.
However, the fact that the main stakeholders, Tibet and Sikkim (and Bhutan for the trijunction), were not even consulted, made it an 'Imperial Treaty' with no validity (in any case, the survey of the trijunction was done several decades after the agreement was signed; so China can't justify 'fixing' the trijunction by quoting this treaty).
In Tibet: a Political History, Tibetan politician and historian Tsepon WD Shakabpa explained: 'In 1890 a convention was drawn up in Calcutta… without consulting the government of Tibet.
'The first article of the convention agreement defined the (northern) boundary between Tibet and Sikkim, and the second article recognised a British protectorate over Sikkim.'
Three years later, the trade regulations about increasing the trade facilities across the Sikkim-Tibet frontier were discussed: 'Again, the provisions of that agreement could not be enforced because Tibet had not been a party to the negotiations,' says Shakabpa.
The Convention of 1890 and the Trade Regulations of 1893 proved to be of no use to the British as Tibet never recognised them; this eventually led London to directly 'deal' with Lhasa and send the Younghusband expedition to Lhasa in 1904 and open the doors to organise the Tripartite Simla Convention in 1914, with British India, Tibet and China sitting on equal footing.
Today, Beijing speaks of 'renegotiating' the 1890 Convention; it would imply that the treaties signed with the Tibetans, particularly the Simla Convention and the border agreement (defining the McMahon Line) in 1914, would be scrapped and India would have no defined border with Tibet in the Northeast.
The Chinese have tried similar tricks earlier. One factor which has led to losing the battle of information is the lack of a Historical Division in the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA).
In the early years after Independence, the Nehru government established a historical division with S Gopal (President Radhakrishan's son) as its first head.

Essays
Shivshankar Menon, the former foreign secretary and national security advisor, in a book review of Gopal's Collected Essays recollects: 'For reasons I find incredible and incomprehensible the Historical Division was wound up by MEA in the nineties… Some of our present difficulties may indeed be due to a lack of memory.'
Menon mentions the decision of the government of the doubling of MEA posts approved by the Cabinet in 2008 and says that he hopes that '(it) will be used to revive the ministry's memory and Historical Division.'
The former top Indian diplomat adds: 'As head of MEA's historical division from 1954 to 1966, Gopal led the Division's work not just on diplomatic history but on the intersection of policy and history, making significant contributions to both.' An interesting case in point is the 1960 negotiation of the 'officials'.
In April 1960, Nehru and Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier, had several meetings: 'The talks, however, did not resolve the differences that had arisen and the two Prime Ministers decided that officials of the two governments should examine the factual materials in the possession of the two governments in support of their stands,' said a joint communiqué.

Meetings
Subsequently five rounds of talks were held between officials of India and China; the Indian side was headed by JS Mehta, director, China Division, and Gopal, the then Director of MEA's Historical Division.
The historian was assisted by knowledgeable colleagues such as TS Murty, G Narayana Rao and K Gopalachari.
The first two meetings were held in Peking, in late June and late July 1960; the next two in New Delhi, in late August and late September 1960, and the last in Rangoon in early December 1960.
The outcome is the Report of the Officials, still today a reference for any study on the Tibet-Indian border. The border issue could probably have been sorted out at that time.
Ironically, the Indian point of view was so well documented (by the historical division) that the MPs were in no mood to agree to a compromise solution; India and China probably lost a chance to solve the dispute.
Many examples of the usefulness of the Historical Division could be cited. Incidentally in 1960, the Chinese refused to discuss Tibet's border with Sikkim and Bhutan; Beijing had probably no clue where the trijunction was.
The point remains that a strong Historical Division in the MEA is a crying need today, like it was in the past.
When the time comes to draw lessons from the present confrontation, let us hope that the ministry realises that it is a worthwhile investment, even if it has to be 'outsourced' outside the service.

In Bhutan too, Chinese grab land

Chinese Claims (according to yesheydorji.blogspot.in)

On August 9, Kuensel, a Bhutanese publication, reported that the Indian National Security Advisor (NSA) Shivshankar Menon arrived in Thimbu to ‘congratulate the new Prime Minister Tshering Tobgay on assuming the office’.
Menon wanted also to commend Tobgay for Bhutan’s successful transition to democracy.
During their meeting which followed, the Bhutanese Prime Minister thanked Menon for visiting Bhutan at this critical time; he expressed his gratitude to Dr. Manmohan Singh, who had assured Bhutan of India’s continued assistance in the implementation of its 11th Plan and its Economic Stimulus Plan.
Tobgay explained to the NSA that the 11th plan was inadequate to address the country’s current economic situation; therefore the newly elected government had to prepare a ‘stimulus plan’ to increase liquidity schemes in banks which would allow loan provisions for private sectors and enhance youth employment.
According to Kuensel: “Lyonchhoen [Prime Minister] said these issues required immediate attention and the present government called for Indian Government’s assistance and support to ensure these issues were carefully and effectively addressed.”
“We’ll do everything we can to support and provide assistance to Bhutan. We really look forward to working together and achieving positive outcomes,” answered Shivshankar Menon, who was accompanied, oh surprise, by the new Indian Foreign Secretary, Ms Sujatha Singh.
Why this ‘double’ visit?
The NSA does not usually travel with the Foreign Secretary.
There was certainly more than the 11th Plan to be discussed.
Though the Indian Foreign Secretary could have traveled alone to Bhutan, she took along her senior colleague and former foreign Secretary, Shivshankar Menon. It soon become clear that the NSA’s main purpose was to advise the Bhutanese government on how to handle the border talks with China.
The 21st round of boundary talks between Bhutan’s foreign minister Rinzim Dorje and the Chinese vice-minister in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were to be held on August 22.
The New India Express speaks of “a shift in emphasis from the disputed north-western, close to Siliguri corridor, to the central parts of Bhutan,” this made Delhi nervous.
These border talks have indeed serious strategic implications for India’s security and Delhi’s own negotiations with China probably needed to be ‘synchronized' with Thimpu.
The New Indian Express asserted: “According to sources, NSA spoke to his interlocutors about the current status of the India-China border talks. But, with the political leadership in Bhutan being brand-new, Menon took the opportunity of the Foreign Secretary’s visit to share Indian ‘experience’ and knowledge of Chinese negotiation tactics to advice Thimpu on the way forward.”
Menon’s visit had also nothing to do with the fuel subsidy cut imposed by India during the last days of legislative election campaign; New Delhi had already said that it as a bureaucratic lapse.
Delhi was just nervous since Thimbu apparently had decided during a previous round of talks with China to have a joint technical field survey in one of the disputed areas, Pasamlung in central sector.

Another claim by China, the Doklam plateau is adjacent to the hyper-strategic Chumbi valley. That is the real nightmare for India.
On the opposite side, China never liked the India’s monopoly over Bhutan’s foreign affairs. Liu Zengyi, a research fellow at Shanghai Institutes for International Studies wrote in The Global Times, "New Delhi sees Bhutan as little more than potential protectorate".
Referring to China's attempts to establish diplomatic relations with Bhutan, the scholar explained: “India won't allow Bhutan to freely engage in diplomacy with China and solve the border issue, …Besides, India will continue its stance on the Sino-Indian border dispute and strengthen its strategic posture”.
The article alleged that Indian ambassador to Bhutan VP Haran followed a ‘carrot-and-stick’ policy and ‘played a big role’ in the victory of the opposition Peace and Democratic Party (PDP) over the Druk Phuensum Tshogpa (DPT): “Critics stated that the timing of India's subsidy withdrawal suggested it wanted to influence Bhutan's election results. Why did India, which is proud of being the largest democratic country in the world, venture to interfere in Bhutan's elections?”
The Global Times’ article acknowledges that for India, China’s advances in the Doklam area is a strategic threat to the Siliguri corridor: “As a country located between China and India, Bhutan serves as a buffer and is of critical strategic importance to the Siliguri corridor, a narrow stretch of land (known as chicken's neck) that connects India's northeastern states to the rest of India. …The corridor is considered a vulnerable bottleneck for India's national security. Delhi worries that China will send troops to the corridor if a China-Indian military clash breaks out.”
It is indeed a serious issue for India.
Though India’s influence over Bhutan is acknowledged by China, New Delhi is keen to keep an eye on the Sino-Bhutanese negotiations, which would definitively have repercussions on the Sino-Indian talks. Though China and Bhutan do not have direct diplomatic relations, last year Jigme Thinley, the then Bhutanese PM met on the sidelines of a United Nations summit in Rio with Chinese premier Wen Jiabao.
A note of the Library of Congress give a background of the Sino-Bhutanese relations: “Tension was renewed during the 1962 Sino-Indian border war when the Chinese army outflanked Indian troops, who, with permission of Bhutanese authorities, retreated through southeastern Bhutan. More fearful of China than confident of India's ability to defend it, Bhutan formally maintained a policy of neutrality while quietly expanding its relations with India. Cross-border incursions by Chinese soldiers and Tibetan herders occurred in 1966, but tensions generally lessened thereafter and during the 1970s.”
In 1979, after Thimphu and New Delhi protested against regular intrusions by Tibetan herders into Bhutan, Beijing ignored the Indian protest, responding to the Bhutanese complain only.
In 1998, China signed a peace agreement with Bhutan to “maintain peace and tranquility on the Bhutan-China border areas.” The Bhutanese were happy because Beijing admitted: “China fully respects the territorial integrity and independence of Bhutan”.
In 1996, China has already offered a package deal to Bhutan: Beijing was ready to renounce its claim over the 495 sq. kms of disputed land in the Pasamlung and Jakarlung valleys in exchange for a smaller track of disputed land measuring a total of 269 sq. kms, the Doklam Plateau located in the Northwestern part of Haa District. This is, by the way, the new Bhutanese PM Tshering Tobgay’s constituency.
The problem is that the Doklam Plateau is close to India’s ‘chicken neck’ area (The Chumbi Valley) and the Siliguri corridor connecting the Northeast to the rest of the country.
A Bhutanese blogger wrote: “Any talk of ceding the Doklam Plateau to China causes feverish nightmares to India. That is why, when India learnt that China was sending a delegation to Bhutan for the 21st round of border talks, India promptly rushed their National Security Advisor Mr. Shivshangkar Menon to ‘brief’ the ‘brand-new’ Bhutanese government and to ‘share Indian experience and knowledge of Chinese negotiation tactics to advice Thimphu on the way forward’.
Another issue is Bhutanese susceptibilities. The blogger adds: “That is a whole lot of hogwash. India knows that the border talks will not be conducted or influenced by the new government team but by a select group of Bhutanese negotiators who have knowledge of the issues involved and who were part of past negotiations. Mr. Menon should not have bothered - he could have simply called up our government from the comfort of his office in New Delhi and categorically stated the Indian security concerns - Bhutan would have been happy - as in the past three decades - to do their bidding.”
Many in Bhutan believe that “This is clearly a case of being caught between a rock and a hard place.”
The same Bhutanese writes: “the possibility that Bhutan may be considering ceding the Doklam Plateau to China - drives India completely berserk!”
Just a look at a map makes it clear why.

It is clear that the claim on the Doklam Plateau is a second thought for China. In a ‘Note given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China to the Embassy of India in China’ on December 26, 1959, the Chinese Ministry affirmed: “With regard to Bhutan and Sikkim, some explanation may be given in passing. China has no other intentions than that of living with them in friendship without committing aggression against each other. Concerning the boundary between China and Bhutan, there is only a certain discrepancy between the delineation on the maps of the two sides in the sector south of the so-called McMahon Line.”

In 1959, there was no discrepancy between the Chinese and Bhutanese maps (except for eastern Bhutan where Beijing did not recognize the McMahon Line).
The 1959 note adds: “But it has always been tranquil along the border between the two countries. The boundary between China and Sikkim has long been formally delimited and there is neither any discrepancy between the maps nor any disputes in practice. All allegations that China wants to encroach on Bhutan and Sikkim, just like the allegations that China wants to commit aggression against India and other southwestern neighbouring countries, are sheer nonsense. The basic stand of the Chinese Government towards its neighbours has long been defined time and again and there should have been no need to deal with it at length. It is, however, unfortunate that recently, particularly since the putting down of the rebellion of the reactionary serf-owners in the Tibet region of China, India has in various ways distorted and attacked the Chinese attitude. In the interest of friendship of the two countries, the Chinese Government does not wish to answer attack with attack, but would rather assume that the Indian Government really has some misunderstandings about China's intentions. …'The strength of a horse is known by the distance travelled, and the heart of a man is seen with the passage of time.' China's peaceful and friendly attitude toward India will stand the test of time. The Chinese Government is convinced that, though the truth of a matter may be hidden for a while, it is impossible to hide it up for long.”
Well, the ‘passage of time’ has shown that China was an unreliable horse, not only the PLA has intruded in several areas during the recent years, but has also built important infrastructure, such as the road from Yatung to Phari in the Chumbi Valley which cuts across the Doklam Plateau.
The Chinese engineers have also built traversal roads and set up a communication network within the disputed area.
How to dislodge the Chinese is not an easy issue.
In the meantime, it is a fact the security of the Siliguri corridor has been and is one of India's most vital objectives since independence.
By grabbing the Doklam Plateau, Beijing considerably enlarged the Chumbi valley and its access to Sikkim and Siliguri.

India, China and the US Pivot?

Shivshankar Menon, the Indian National Security Adviser has left for China to say bye to the old guard in Beijing and particularly to his counterpart Dai Bingguo with whom he had several rounds of 'talks' on the border issue.
In the article of The Hindu posted below, Hu Shisheng, a scholar from the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations says that a progress on the border could be the acceptation and the respect "of each other’s LAC [Line of Actual Control] claim”, but he forgets to raise the question: where is the Chinese LAC? 
That seems to be one of the main hurdles in these fruitless talks, China is not ready to put on paper 'its' perception of the LAC, except that for general declaration that Arunachal is Chinese territory. This has nothing to do with a LAC, which is a precise demarcated Line.
Presuming that Beijing is not interested to immediately 'settle' the border issue, an indication of its 'perceptions' would be useful.
Regarding the 'Tibet policy', Ananth Krishnan says that it is "under the charge of Ling Jihua, a protégé of Hu Jintao". 
It is not exactly correct because, even though Ling may run the day-to-day Tibet's affairs as the head of the United Front Work Department, in fact it is the Central Working Coordination Small Group on Tibet which gives the directions. As mentioned a few days back in this blog, it has not been reconstituted as yet.
Regarding the 'American Pivot', many in India believe that in case of a conflict, Washington will side with India. 
Is this presumption correct?
Historically, the United States have never helped India against China.
I have earlier written about the 1962 conflict and the role of India's so-called friends.
In this context, an interesting to reproduce a discussion between Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai (Chou) and Henry Kissinger, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
Though now declassified, it was marked  TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY.
The encounter took place in Beijing  on July 10, 1971.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Dr. Kissinger: With respect to the incidents in Sinkiang [Sino-Russian clashes] , though, I can say the following.
When I assumed my present position I thought that the Chinese were always the aggressors. (Chou laughs.) Then I looked at the map of that part Sinkiang where the incidents took place --this was in the summer of 1969 and saw that it was three miles from the Soviet railhead and 200 miles from a Chinese railhead. It then occurred to me that the Chinese military loaders would not have picked such a spot to attack, Since then I have looked at the problem with a different perspective.

PM Chou: It is also possible to misunderstand the origins of the Sino-Indian conflict.

Dr. Kissinger: That's possible.

Chou: The Indians said that we created the Ladakh incident. It occurred on a peak of the Karakorums on the Aksai-chin Plateau of Sinkiang. At this point a ridge of the Karakorums falls off very sharply downward on the Kashmir side. The elevation is very high and even the Soviet helicopters used by the Indians could only gradually work their way up the steep slope. Our people were on top of this ridge and could see down on the Soviet helicopters gradually coming up. The Aksai-chin Plateau is the route along which we have to travel when crossing from Sinkiang to the Ali district of Tibet. The height of the plateau is 5000 meters. We started to build this highway in 1951

Dr. Kissinger: The Indians call this region Ladakh.

PM Chou: Actually, Ladakh is farther below, but the Indians call all of this region Ladakh. Even the British colonial maps do not show this as a part of India, and Nehru was only able to provide a claim on the basis of a map drawn by a British traveller. Even three years after the road was built, Nehru didn't know about it. It runs all the way from Western Sinkiang to the Ali district of Tibet.
In my discussions with Nehru on the Sino-Indian boundary in 1956 he suddenly raised the issue of the road. I said, "you didn't even know we were building a road the last three years, and now you suddenly say that it is your territory.." I remarked upon how strange this was. Although the so-called McMahon Line was a line that no Chinese government ever recognized, at least it was a line drawn by a Britisher, even though in drawing it he included more than 90, 000 square kilometers of our territory in India. However, in the western sector there was no such line.
was no agreement with us either in 1956 or 1957. And so in 1959 the Indians sent small patrols crawling up the steep slopes to attack our post. Our guards were at the passes. This was in December and the weather was extremely cold --40 degrees below zero. Our post was in the form of a fort and we could see them climbing up. So when the Indians attacked they suffered more heavy losses than we. However, we did have some wounded, and we raised a protest with the Indian Government. TASS said of this incident that the Chinese committed aggression against India. Khrushchev, without inquiring, took the same position on the grounds that the Indians had suffered such heavy casualties. This was the first such anti-China statement from the USSR.
Khrushchev wanted to go to David. Just before, in June 1959, he tore up the Soviet agreement on atomic cooperation with China, and he brought these two things (the Soviet support for India and the tearing up of the nuclear cooperation agreement with China) as gifts to Camp David.

Dr. Kissinger: No, we didn't know about this until much later.

PM Chou: Were you there?

Dr. Kissinger: I wasn't in the government then, but because I had been a time advisor to several governments I knew a number of our senior officials. They didn't believe that there was a split between Moscow and Peking until well into the 1960's. But whatever the Soviets do to you, they do for their reasons, not for our reasons.

PM Chou: I'm aware of that, but I wanted you to know what had taken place.

Dr. Kissinger: I wasn't present at Camp David, so I cannot tell what was happening.

PM Chou: You were not in the government at that time. When Khrushchev returned from Camp David he came to Peking the Tenth Anniversary of the People's Republic of China. Here, in the same banquet hall which you saw this afternoon, he made a speech in which he openly declared that there were "roosters who to fight."

Dr. Kissinger: Who were the roosters?

PM Chou: By this he meant the Chinese. We understood well what he but he put it in abstract terms.
The next day we asked him why he said what he did in such an open forum.
We also asked him first of all why it was that on the eve of his departure for the U.S. he had declared we had committed aggression against India --without even asking us about it. He said that he did not need any other information, and the mere fact that India had lost more men proved that we were the aggressors. This was strange logic, totally illogical.
On the border question, at the beginning he didn't understand it, but afterwards he understood very well what the actual situation was. This is a thing of the past.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: Weren't you aware of the fact that in 1960 he withdrew all Soviet experts from China and tore up all Soviet contracts?

Dr. Kissinger: I personally became aware of this only in 1962.

Kissinger happily bites at Zhou Enlai's arguments on the Aksai Chin, though the Chinese Premier seems to have poor knowledge of the geography of the Aksai Chin plateau and he mixes up the clashes in Longju (NEFA), when the TASS agency took a seemingly pro-India stand and some other incidents in Ladakh.
Though the US Department of State has officially stated that the McMahon Line is the border between India and China in the Northeast, Washington has never taken a proactive stand in the border issue.
It is true that in a Memorandum from the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President Kennedy dated October 26, 1962, it is mentioned: "...We are now prepared to do the following things if you approve: ...b. Make a public statement through Galbraith that we recognize the McMahon line as the traditional border between India and China".
It was eventually approved and Galbraith was "authorized to state that the United States recognized the McMahon Line as the traditional and generally accepted international border and fully supported India's position in that regard" (telegram 1663, October 26, 1962), however India has never received active support from the US later.
My conclusion is that Delhi should not base its China's policy on a eventual US support, but look at its own interests and after assessing its own strengths and weaknesses, decide what is good for India.

What China’s transition means for India
Ananth Krishnan
The Hindu
 December 3, 2012
The new leadership in Beijing is likely to look for stability in relations with New Delhi as it addresses more urgent issues with its neighbours in the Asia Pacific and the U.S.
“Continuity” is a word that National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon is likely to hear often from his Chinese interlocutors during his visit to Beijing, which begins today. Mr. Menon, who is also the Special Representative on the boundary question, will meet State Councillor Dai Bingguo, his counterpart on the border talks, for what officials have described as “informal talks” on the border and strategic issues of common concern. He is expected to hold talks with one of the seven members of the newly-selected Politburo Standing Committee — likely to be second-ranked Li Keqiang, the anointed Premier, subject to his availability — marking India’s first real engagement with the fifth generation of the Chinese leadership following the November 15 transition.
The once-in-ten-year leadership change in China is likely to usher in a new chapter on how the country conducts its foreign policy, officials and strategic scholars in Beijing say. Over the next four months, both the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the government that it leads will complete a sweeping change across all levels of its leadership. At the recently concluded Party Congress, the CPC selected a new 25-member Politburo and 371-member Central Committee, which will guide policy-making in all spheres for the next five years. The Parliament session of the National People’s Congress in March will be of more relevance to China’s diplomacy. The expected retirement of Dai Bingguo — one of five State Councillors who function under the four Vice Premiers of the Cabinet, or the State Council — in March has received much attention in India, as he has served as the Special Representative (SR) on the boundary talks since the current format was initiated a decade ago.

Border talks
Chinese officials and strategic scholars who focus on China-India relations say Mr. Dai’s retirement will not have much impact on the boundary talks. Mr. Dai himself, as the SR, was only tasked with the mandate of following strictly the guidelines put in place by the Politburo and Central Committee for the talks. That role will be continued by his successor as the SR — the current Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi and Vice Foreign Ministers Fu Ying and Zhang Zhijun, who were all selected as members of the new Central Committee, have been mentioned as likely candidates. Among Chinese strategic scholars, there is little expectation that the boundary talks, of which 15 rounds have been held, will yield any major concrete outcomes in the near future. Since 2005, when the two countries completed the first of three stages of negotiations by signing an agreement on political parameters and guiding principles, perceptions in Beijing are that the crucial second stage of framework negotiations has been deadlocked.
“After 2005, there is nearly no significant progress on the boundary talks,” said Hu Shisheng, a South Asia scholar at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR). “If there [will] be any progress in the future,” he said, “it could be [because of] accepting and respecting each other’s LAC [Line of Actual Control] claim.” Based upon this, he said, both sides could “put aside the sovereignty issue” and leave the boundary question for next generations to solve. Mr. Hu’s sentiment was echoed in a rare commentary on the boundary talks published last month in the Liberation Daily, a newspaper with ties to the CPC in Shanghai, which suggested that both sides put aside the dispute. The commentary said even the status quo — that is, accepting the Line of Actual Control — would not be acceptable to both countries, rendering a solution unlikely in the near future.
Lack of progress on the border notwithstanding, relations with India “will be much more stable” under the new leadership because of China’s current domestic and external priorities, according to Mr. Hu. As the Work Report of the Party Congress — the policy blueprint for the next five years — stressed, the internal focus will be on development. As for the external focus, “addressing China’s relations with West Pacific neighbours and China’s relations with the U.S.” would be the likely priority, Mr. Hu said. He agreed that India fared far below issues such as relations with the United States, current territorial disputes with Japan and the situation in the South China Sea in terms of China’s pressing priorities. “In urgency, it is true that China-India relations are secondary to those more urgent issues,” he said. “[But] in China’s present foreign policy, India is regarded as one country that China has confidence in. India-China relations are not a disturbance. The Chinese government has to keep this kind of momentum. But as for issues such as … the regional order in the Asia-Pacific region in particular, climate change and trade regime talks, China’s strong partner is still India.” “So, in whatever way,” he concluded, “China needs more stable Indo-China relations.”

‘Pivot concerns’
China’s concerns on the United States “pivot” or “rebalancing”, which has emerged as Beijing’s primary foreign policy focus in recent months, is likely to cast a shadow on ties with India. “Obama’s “pivot” offers a lens through which many Chinese analysts see India’s strategic intention toward China,” said Han Hua, a leading South Asia scholar at Peking University. “The two have to talk to each other on “core interests” and how to avoid challenging those interests,” she said. “Small frictions will be still there, but in general, stable relations are the main theme in China’s India policy.”
Ms Han was of the view that China under new General Secretary Xi Jinping “will attach more importance on its relations with its neighbours than before.” Chinese officials and scholars say the new leadership is acutely aware that the past year has been a difficult one for China’s diplomacy. There is renewed concern in the region — particularly among China’s neighbours — about increasing Chinese assertiveness, in the wake of recent territorial disputes with Japan over the East China Sea islands and in the South China Sea.
There is also a perception in Beijing that its diplomacy has lacked creativity and nimbleness. To elevate the level of diplomatic decision-making, the CPC is considering appointing one of its 25 Politburo members as a new foreign policy “czar” who would also hold the title of Vice Premier — a rank higher than the position held by the current top Chinese diplomat, Mr. Dai.
Wang Huning, who joined the Politburo in November, has been mentioned as a candidate for the post. As an official working in the Secretariat of the Politburo, Mr. Wang regularly accompanied President Hu Jintao on almost all of his international trips, including to India for the BRICS Summit earlier this year. He speaks French fluently, and earlier worked as the Dean of the International Politics Department at Shanghai’s Fudan University.
Two other areas where a new approach by the Chinese leadership is likely to be of relevance to India are with regard to Tibet and trade.
The CPC has appointed a new head of the United Front Work Department, the leading organisation in charge of Tibet policy and talks with the Dalai Lama, which have been stalled after the Tibetan spiritual leader’s representatives resigned citing a hardening Chinese position. The around 90 self-immolation protests by Tibetans have brought fresh accusations aimed at Dharamsala of a “separatist plot”.
The Tibet policy will be under the charge of Ling Jihua, a protégé of Hu Jintao. Under Mr. Hu, China followed an approach to Tibet that emphasised stability and security, and stepped up pressure on the Dalai Lama internationally.
On the trade front, the past year has seen a more than 13 per cent decline in trade with India, as of October. Bilateral trade has been driven by Indian exports of iron ore and imports of Chinese power and telecom equipment. Iron ore exports are unlikely to recover as a result of a prolonged slowdown in China’s steel sector in the short-term and the government’s long-term target of rebalancing the economy. China has suggested boosting mutual investments as a way to bridge the imbalance, but its officials have voiced concern — most recently at the November 26 Strategic Economic Dialogue in New Delhi — at the investment climate in India after duties on the import of power equipment and restrictions in the telecom sector were imposed. The CPC’s Work Report highlighted health care reform and Information Technology as strategic priorities for the next five years, which may open up new possibilities for Indian pharmaceutical and IT companies. In both sectors, India is pushing for greater market access. But Chinese officials say Indian companies will, for their part, have to invest far more in the domestic market — in terms of boosting both their expertise and commitment — if they want to expand their presence in China as the country’s new leadership takes charge.

Tawang is not part of China!

The Dalai Lama took refuge in India on March 31, 1959. 
He crossed the Indian border at Khenzimane at the bottom of the famous Thagla ridge in West Kameng Frontier Division of the North-East Frontier Agency (today, Tawang District of Arunachal Pradesh).
Jawaharlal Nehru sent a senior officer of the Ministry of External Affairs, (PN Menon, father of the present National Security Adviser, Shivshankar Menon) to receive him. 
Menon delivered to the Tibetan leader a message from the Prime Minister: "My colleagues and I welcome you and send greetings on your safe arrival in India. We shall be happy to afford the necessary facilities to you, your family and entourage to reside in India. The people of India, who hold you in great veneration, will no doubt accord their traditional respect to your personage. Kind regards to you." 
Since then, the Dalai Lama has been a 'honoured guest' in India.
In his autobiography Freedom in Exile, the Dalai Lama remembered: 

“…After bidding these people [his Khampa bodyguards] a tearful farewell, I was helped on to the broad back of a dzomo [hybrid of a yak and domestic cattle], for I was still too ill to ride a horse. And it was on this humble form of transport that I left my native land.

…We must have been a pitiful sight to the handful of Indian guards that met us at the border - eighty travellers, physically exhausted and mentally wretched from our ordeal. I was delighted, however, that an official I knew from my visit two years earlier was there to rendezvous with us. He explained that his orders were to escort me to Bomdila, a large town that lay a further week's travel away, for rest.”

It is interesting to note that, at that time (1959), the Chinese never said that the Dalai Lama and his entourage were in 'Southern Tibet' (the term used today by Beijing to define Tawang). They knew perfectly well that the Tibetan leader had taken refuge on Indian territory. 

Strangely, Beijing is now insisting that Tawang district is part of the People's Republic of China. It is clearly an after-thought. 
Special Representative and State Councillor  Dai Bingguo told his Indian counterpart, Shivshankar Menon during the 15th Meeting of the Special Representatives that India should first discuss the Eastern Sector of the boundary. Dai further asked Menon how much territory New Delhi would be ready to part with.
Apart from the fact that historically this does not make sense  (and I will come back to this issue in future postings), why did the Chinese not follow the Dalai Lama and his entourage  into this area in 1959, if they really believed that it was a part of  Chinese territory?
The answer is clear, it was not Chinese territory and Mao knew it. 
So, why claim the area 53 years later?
Further, under the 2005 Guidelines (Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question), it was agreed that "In reaching a boundary settlement, the two sides shall safeguard due interests of their settled populations in the border areas." 
The demand of Dai Bingguo is all the more ironic as it comes at a time when China is using ferocious repressive policies against the Tibetans on the other side of the McMahon Line.
It was reported that China "has effectively sealed off a vast Tibetan area of Sichuan province, sending in troops and cutting off communications to towns where protesters have been killed by security forces in the past week."
Presuming that the new Chinese stand on the border had a historical justification (and it does not), would the local Mompa population desire to become Chinese nationals and lose their democratic rights and freedom?
The answer is 'NEVER!'
Read my previous posting on the subject.

China plays the bully on Arunachal: Beijing tells Delhi to work out Eastern sector formula
By Saurabh Shukla
Daily Mail
28th January 2012
There were speeches, smiles and the usual chants of Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai after the 15th round of Sino- Indian special representative talks in the Capital in mid-January.
What actually transpired amid this show of bonhomie was that the boundary dialogue ended in a deadlock after Beijing declared it would settle for nothing less than 'its share' of Arunachal Pradesh.
Highly placed sources privy to discussions between the two special interlocutors - National Security Adviser Shiv Shankar Menon and his Chinese counterpart, state councillor  Dai Bingguoa - said things went off track following some hard bargaining by China.
Beijing had insisted during the meeting that India should first discuss the eastern boundary in Arunachal Pradesh.
The hosts were surprised when Dai, couching his query in diplomatic niceties, asked Menon how much territory New Delhi would part with.
The intransigent stand adopted by the Chinese was a response to India's proposals for a framework for boundary negotiations that the two countries shared during the border talks.
Menon, a former envoy to Beijing and an old China hand in India's national security set-up, argued that under article 3 of the guiding principles of the Sino-Indian boundary discussions, all sectors (eastern, western and middle) needed to be discussed and a package solution required to be thrashed out. India argued that the western sector in Jammu and Kashmir, which includes the Aksai Chin area, should be discussed along with the eastern portion of the boundary.
Under a previously agreed principle, the two sides had concurred in 2005 that settled population would not be disturbed. New Delhi articulated this, too, at the meeting.
But Beijing simply stuck to its guns and told India to first put on the table its proposal for the division of Arunachal Pradesh, specifying the proportion of territory swap.
The hotspot
'The meeting was held in a productive, fruitful and friendly manner,' Menon had said after the two-day session that began on January 16.

Speaking at a banquet subsequent to the talks, Dai also struck an optimistic note, saying Sino-Indian ties had made 'substantial progress' and they (the two countries) could 'work miracles' together.

POINTS OF AGREEMENT

ARTICLE I
The differences on the boundary question should not be allowed to
affect the overall development
of bilateral relations... Neither side shall use or threaten to use force against the other by any means.

ARTICLE II
The two sides should, in accordance with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, seek a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution to the boundary question through consultations on an equal footing.

ARTICLE III
Both sides should, in the spirit of mutual respect and mutual understanding, make meaningful
and mutually acceptable adjustments to their respective positions on the boundary question, so as to arrive at a package settlement to the boundary question.

ARTICLE IV
The two sides will give due
consideration to each other’s strategic and reasonable interests, and the principle of mutual and
equal security.

ARTICLE V
The two sides will take into account, inter alia, historical evidence,
national sentiments, practical difficulties and reasonable concerns and sensitivities of both sides, and the actual state of
border areas.

ARTICLE VI
The boundary should be along well-defined and easily identifiable natural geographical features to
be mutually agreed upon between the two sides.

ARTICLE IX
Pending an ultimate settlement of the boundary question, the two sides should strictly respect and observe the line of actual control and work together to maintain
peace and tranquillity in the border areas.

The special interlocutor added that he hoped the two nations would never go to war again.
'In the China-India boundary negotiations, although we have not yet arrived at the summit - that is, we have not reached full agreement on the framework of settlement of the border question - yet we have scaled substantial heights and made much progress,' he declared.
The Indian delegation also included foreign secretary Ranjan Mathai, the country's envoy to China, S. Jaishankar as well as the representatives of the ministries of external affairs and defence.
The only forward movement during the interaction was that Dai and Menon agreed to put in place a mechanism for border management to discuss intrusions on the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
The mechanism was mooted by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao during his visit to India in 2010.
The present arrangements under the peace and tranquillity agreement between the two countries include communication channels between local-level commanders along the LAC.
The joint border mechanism will focus specifically on how it will function on a routine basis, particularly for taking spot decisions. It would, however, not replace existing border interactions.
This mechanism may create a plan beyond just the maintenance of peace along the LAC that was enunciated by the 1993 and 1996 agreements.
In 1993, India and China signed an accord to reduce tension along their border and respect the LAC. The boundary settlement process was originally envisaged as a three-step process.
The first was to establish guiding principles, the second included evolving a consensus on a framework for the boundary and the last step comprised carrying out its delineation and demarcation.
The SR-level dialogue was initially scheduled for November 28-29 last year. It had to be postponed after India and China disagreed over the Dalai Lama's participation in the Global Buddhist Congregation in Delhi on those very dates.
This was the 15th round of boundary negotiations which commenced in 2003 and have remained inconclusive. It came just ahead of a report accessed by Headlines Today that said that over 500 Chinese intrusions had taken place in the last two years on all the three sectors of the boundary.
In fact, allegations of contravention by Chinese troops were common in 2009 and 2010.
In 2005, the two sides agreed on political parameters and guiding principles for a boundary settlement, which would form the basis of the final settlement. Insiders say the Chinese gameplan was to put pressure on India to reassert claims over territory.
At the centre of the Sino- Indian boundary dispute is the McMahon Line which the Chinese refuse to recognise. While China claims over 90,000 sq km of territory, the Indian claim extends over 3,68,846 sq km.
Read more: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-2092841/China-plays-bully-Arunachal-Beijing-tells-Delhi-work-Eastern-sector-formula.html#ixzz1ktj8r2v5