USI Monograph - India Tibet Relations (1947-1962)

This monograph is a short summary of a study undertaken under the Field Marshal KM Cariappa Chair of Excellence of the United Service Institution of India, New Delhi.
The study is divided in four parts, each covered in a volume.
The four volumes respectively cover the periods 1947-1951, 1951-1954, 1954-1957 and 1957-1962.


Introduction
The end of the 1940s saw momentous events which, in one way, redesigned the world.
Two years after the end of WWII, India got her Independence from the British; in October 1949, the sleeping Dragon, Communist China rose  when its Great Helmsman announced the creation of the People’s Republic of China from the rostrum on Tiananmen Square.
Mao Zedong was very quick to move: by the end of December 1949, with the blessings of Stalin, he had annexed Eastern Turkestan (today Xinjiang) and reached the gates of India, north of the State of Jammu & Kashmir.
In January 1950, Beijing announced its next step on the Asian chessboard: it would ‘liberate’ Tibet, Formosa (today Taiwan) and the island of Hainan.
While the Communists advanced their pawns towards India’s borders, some leaders in India continued to imagine a perfect world and soon their main strategic objective became to avoid at any cost a world conflict.
It is with this background that the study of Tibet-India relations between 1947 and 1962, conducted under the Field Marshal KM Cariappa Chair of Excellence of the United Service Institution of India, witnessed the rise of the two Asian giants, with two different purposes, one could say, two opposite visions of the world: one wanted to dominate Asia with its foreign ideology, while the other dreamt of world peace.
Unfortunately in the process, India lost a century-old buffer zone between its Northern plains and the Middle Kingdom.
By the beginning of 1951, Tibet and Xinjiang were militarily absorbed into the new People’s Republic of China.
Many Indian political leaders soon realized that the Hindi-Chini-Bhai-Bhai honeymoon between Delhi and Beijing as envisaged by the Indian Prime Minister could only translate into the loss of a peaceful frontier for India.
Unfortunately, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, the Deputy Prime Minister and prime opponent of this policy, who presciently foresaw the implications for his country, passed away on December 15, 1950, leaving Jawaharlal Nehru to freely continue his policy of ‘friendship’ at any cost, with consequences very much present more than 70 years later.
Paradoxically, the Indian officials posted on the Roof of the World quickly discovered the true objectives of the Communists. But tragically, after Patel’s death, nobody in Delhi or the Indian Embassy in Beijing was ready to listen to the intrepid officers.
This study goes in depth into the slow break-down of the age-old Indo-Tibet relations, gradually being replaced by a cruder relation with the new occupiers of Tibet.  
India’s friendly relationship with its Buddhist neighbour was progressively terminated by the presence of the PLA on the plateau. During these fifteen years, not many Tibetans had the courage to fight the ineluctable; most of them, whether from the aristocracy or the clergy, collaborated with the occupying forces, particularly in the first years after the invasion.
The fifteen years under study witnessed a series of momentous events: starting with the annexation of Xinjiang and the closure of the Indian Consulate in Kashgar (end of 1949/1950), the invasion of Tibet (end of 1950), the signature of a 17-Point Agreement (May 1951) between China and Tibet and the arrival of the Chinese troops in Lhasa (September 1951).
During the first years of occupation, the reports of the Indian Trade Agent in Yatung, Gyantse and Gartok, as well as of the Indian representatives in Lhasa, vividly described the changing trends in the power balance on the plateau. The Indian officials, who for decades dealt directly with the Tibetan authorities, had now to pass through the Chinese PLA officers.
Then China started to build strategic roads, most of them towards the Indian borders or worse, through Indian territory in the Aksai Chin in Ladakh.
As the situation continued to deteriorate on the plateau, India and China decided to engage in the ‘Tibet Talks’ in Beijing (which started on December 31, 1953); the negotiations, which culminated with the signature of the Panchsheel Agreement in April 1954, saw India losing all the rights it had in Tibet since the beginning of the 20th century.
This bi-lateral accord between Delhi and Beijing redefined India’s age-old trade relations with Tibet; but the Tibetans themselves were excluded from the negotiations and the benefits of the Agreement.
In many ways, it marked the tail end of the events set into motion by the entry of Younghusband in Tibet in 1904. While the British expedition indicated recognition of Tibet as a separate entity (for the Western power), the signing of the Agreement put an end to Tibet as an independent nation. The circle was closed, with incalculable consequences for the Himalayan region and India in general.
It took a few more years and many persistent Chinese intrusions on Indian soil to sensitize the Indian government and public to the gravity of the new state of affairs.
The third and fourth parts of our study go further into the deteriorating situation on the Roof of the World, with Communist China tightening their grip on the administration, trade and religion. Despite a visit to India of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama in 1956/57 for the 2500th Buddha Jayanti celebrations, the down-sliding could not be stopped.
This tense situation culminated in the events of March 1959, which saw an uprising of the Tibetan population in Lhasa and the flight of the Dalai Lama who took refuge in India.
Soon after, the border intrusions turned into armed clash on the frontier (Longju, Spangur Gap, etc.); this marked the beginning of the ‘dispute’ with China over the Northern boundaries of India.
The three following years saw the Chinese ‘preparations’ for the onslaught on the Indian borders. Our narrative finishes with the border war between the two Asian giants in October 1962; it shattered the Indian Prime Minister’s dream of an eternal friendship with Communist China.
The Indian presence in Tibet ended with the lapse of the Panchsheel Agreement in April 1962 (it was not renewed) and the closure of the Consulate General of India in Lhasa in December 1962. This marked the end of an era.
The study has recorded in great detail these events which continue to have implications 60 years after the armed conflict in NEFA and Ladakh; the consequences can still be seen today in Eastern Ladakh and other sectors of the Tibet-India boundary, which has unfortunately become the Sino-Indian border.
Today, the Chinese propaganda would like us to believe that Tibet has always been part of China, but historical records show that it is not a fact and that the relations between Tibet and India are as ancient as the Himalaya ranges. Fifteen years have been documented through more than 2,000 pages.
To put these facts on record was the main purpose of our study under the Field Marshal KM Cariappa Chair of Excellence.

Book Release - Will Tibet ever find her soul again?

My book Will Tibet ever find her soul again? - India Tibet Relations 1947-1962 (Part 2) was released at the United Service Institution of India by Ambassador KS Bajpai, former ambassador to Pakistan, China and the US on September 6.
Interesting discussions on the meaning of the title followed the release.
 
Here are a few concluding remarks which form the postcript of this volume

As at the end of Volume I of The Relations between Tibet and India between 1947 and 1962, it is important to draw some lessons from the happenings of the years 1951-54 leading to the signature of the “Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India”. The accord was signed on April 29, 1954 in Beijing by the Indian Ambassador N. Raghavan and Zhang Hanfu, the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister. It is often referred to as the Panchsheel Agreement.

Period 1951-1954
This period was marked by a general deterioration of the situation in Central Tibet and the slow take-over of the institutions by the People’s Liberation Army and the representatives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of India. It seemed ineluctable after the signature of the 17-Point Agreement between China and Tibet in May 1951 and Delhi’s surrender of India’s interests in Tibet for the sake of a mythic ‘eternal’ friendship with China.
Soon after the arrival of the Chinese troops in Lhasa, the Head of the Indian Mission realized that Tibet would never been the same. Sumul Sinha’s encounter with General Zhang Jingwu, the Central Committee’s representative, was instructive in this regard.
Also edifying was the case of the Indian PoWs; it would take months of negotiations for Phuntso and his colleagues to be freed. These youngsters from the Himalayan region were accused of trying to obstruct the ‘Liberation of Tibet’; they had been employed by Robert Ford, a British working as a radio operator for the Tibetan Government. Retrospectively, their illegal detention of the young assistants is shocking.
‘Will Tibet ever find her soul again?’ once asked SM Krishnatry in one of his reports from Gyantse, where he served as Indian Trade Agent.
The Tibetans were at a loss, should they collaborate with the Communists or revolt against the Chinese occupation? Interestingly, it was the poorer sections of the society which would start to rebel, while the high clergy and the aristocracy were not unhappy with the Chinese largesse.
In Lhasa, Gyantse or Shigatse, many Tibetans happily collaborated with Chinese; they could not grasp the implications of their ‘liberation’ for the future of the Tibetan nation.
The tide continued to turn against the Tibetans during the following years; the Indian representatives in Tibet could do little to change this course of events; this was the time when Delhi was more and more enamoured with Communist China.
One of the strangest episodes of the period under study is the ‘feeding of the PLA’ by the Indian government, who allowed large quantities of rice to transit via its territory for more than two years.
What lessons could be learnt from the episode?
It is better not to feed the army of a potential enemy, especially when this army is busy constructing road to your borders. The cost of strengthening the PLA’s presence on the plateau would soon be obvious.
While the Chinese were pushing their administration in Western and Southern Tibet, the Indian government was slowly advancing towards the McMahon line; the administration of Tawang was in good hands, thanks to Maj Bob Khathing, though the difficulties were immense.
In the early 1950s, two most tragic events took place: the closure by force of the Indian Consulate General in Kashgar, which was followed by the downgrading of the Lhasa Mission into a Consulate General. This would have long-term implications which can be seen even today, seventy years later. India no longer has a representation in Tibet and Xinjiang, two places which have traded with Northern India for centuries. In the present days, the reopening of any Silk Road has no meaning if these regions are unable to have contacts with India. India may have to take a stand on the issue one day, if it wants in participate of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) sponsored by Chinese. Without these traditional outposts, how could India play a meaningful role in the region?
While these momentous events were taking place on India’s borders, the military consolidation on the Tibetan plateau continued at a fast pace.
What is most surprising is the fact that India was very much aware of the details, but the political leadership read China’s intention totally wrong.
The lesson is that an ideological stand can hamper a proper geostrategic vision of a situation, and ultimately have disastrous consequences for the nation. Accurate information was there, it was just that the leadership decided to close their eyes.
While the Indian administration continued to advance in the NEFA, India had also a presence in Western Tibet with Minsar, the Indian Village traditionally part of the J&K State, next to Mount Kailash.
This would soon be forgotten in view of the nascent friendship with the Communist regime, but the legal facts remain the same, even 65 years later, Minsar is part of the Indian territory, even though it is difficult to enforce the possession of the village today (or in the 1950s).
One of the most fascinating and lesser known aspects of the relations between Tibet and India were the age-old contacts with Western Tibet and the role of the Indian Trade Agency in Gartok. The diary of Lakshman Singh Jangpangi, who for years represented the Indian government in these desolate areas, makes fascinating reading. As a result of the rapid decrease of the trade in Western Tibet, the Himalayan regions slowly lost their main sources of revenue, which translates even today in the quick migration out of the border villages.
Over these first years of occupation of the plateau, one can see the situation slowly changing with the Chinese getting bolder and establishing themselves by force, imposing their law on the local Tibetan officials as well as the Indian representatives. The pilgrims to Mt Kailash and the traders from the Himalayan region and Ladakh started to face more and more harassment.
Delhi seemed to close their eyes on the tragedy happening in the high Himalaya, as more important ‘world’ issues had probably to be tackled.
A bunch of notes from the CIA on the infrastructure development in Tibet, as well as the Indian views on the Chinese military deployment, give frightening insight on the Chinese intentions in Tibet and Xinjiang. It was the time when the Aksai Chin road linking the two ‘liberated’ provinces started being built.
In Delhi, very few officers had the courage to call a spade, a spade. Sumul Sinha, who had previously been posted as the Head of the Indian Mission in Lhasa, was one of them. Now serving in the North-East Division of the Ministry of External Affairs, he dare to mention in a note, ‘the Chinese threats on the NEFA’. He would be blasted by a Prime Minister, who still relied on KM Panikkar, now Indian Ambassador in Cairo, to advise him about India’s China policy. Volume I has amply covered this subject.
While the situation in Lhasa and elsewhere in Tibet continued to deteriorate, the strengthening the Indian borders was imperative. For the purpose, an Indian Frontier Administrative Service was created and several ex-Army officers were recruited. This is one of the positive outcomes of the exacerbated tensions on the borders. These remarkable officers performed miracles on the frontiers.
Finally, at the end of 1953, negotiations started for a new Agreement with Tibet. The consequences of China’s occupation of Tibet, were to be settled in a couple of weeks; it would take four months to arrive at a settlement …but forgetting the border in the process (Zhou Enlai had said on the first day that only issues ‘ripe for settlement’ would be solved, but nobody understood what he meant). Slowly over the weeks and months, India would give away all its rights in Tibet, getting nothing in return.
The main lesson of this volume is perhaps the narrative of the negotiations themselves, which should become a text book: how negotiations should not be conducted with China.
Further, the fact that the Prime Minister wanted ‘quick results’ did not help. The Chinese negotiators extracted concessions one after another; in many cases, it was plain surrender from the Indian diplomats.
At the end of the ‘talks’, Delhi discovered that the main Indian official dealing with the Chinese, a married man, wanted to marry his Chinese girl friend; he would have to be replaced by the Indian ambassador.
It was a tragic moment of the Indian diplomacy, which has never been acknowledged by the Indian side.
The Volume ends by the terrible floods in Gyantse, which washed away the Indian Trade Agency and killed the Trade Agent and the new Officer Commanding the military Escort. It was a sign that the days of the Indian presence in Tibet were counted.
China would never allow the Agency to be rebuilt despite the Agreement.
The main lesson remains the unnecessary surrender of Indian rights in Tibet.

Tibet: The Last Months of a Free Nation — India Tibet Relations (1947-1951)

My book Tibet: The Last Months of a Free Nation India Tibet Relations (1947-1951) published by Vij Publishers for the United Service Institution of India (USI) was released  by Ambassador Shiv Shankar Menon (former National Security Advisor and Foreign Secretary) on September 7 at the USI.

This is the first of a series of four books on the India-Tibet Relations between 1947 and 1962.
The four volumes will cover the following periods:
•    Volume 1 (1947-1951) ending by 17-Point Agreement
•    Volume 2 (1951-1954) ending by Panchsheel Agreement & foods in Gyantse
•    Volume 3 (1954-1957) ending by Dalai Lama’s visit to India
Volume 4 (1957-1962) closure of the Consulate General in Lhasa

The book is based on Indian archival materials only.

It is available on Amazon.com.

I am posting here the concluding remarks of the first volume.

A few concluding remarks
At the end of this first volume on “The Relations between Tibet and India between 1947 and 1962”, it is important to draw some lessons from the tragic happenings of the Year 1950 which led to the signature of the 17-Point Agreement in May 1951. The end result was that Tibet lost her independence and India lost a frontier.

Strategic thinkers vs ‘visionaries’
A first observation: India had some of the best strategic thinkers, but the government did not use their competence.
Though their conclusions were not accepted by the Prime Minister Nehru, I have tried to pay homage to some of these foresighted Indian thinkers. One should not forget that India is still suffering from some of the decisions taken in 1950-51.
The hundreds of letters, cables, telegrams, notes that I could access show that two factions emerged during the tumultuous last six months of 1950: one led by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and K.M. Panikkar, his ambassador in Beijing, both obsessed by an imaginary friendship with New China and fixated on the ‘larger implications for World Peace’; the other, which immediately saw the strategic implications for India, would Delhi let Tibet down, was led by Sardar Patel, the Deputy Prime Minster with Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, the Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations as his main adviser. They were fed by reports ‘from the ground’ by Harishwar Dayal, the Political Officer in Sikkim and Sumul Sinha, the Head of the Indian Mission in Lhasa. At that time, India had a full-fledged Mission in Tibet as well as three Trade Agencies in Gyantse, Yatung and Gartok.
The ‘Chinese’ Ambassador Panikkar had opposite views. In one of his lengthy reports, Panikkar explains to Nehru: “Tibet is now in the process of being ‘liberated’. The word ‘liberation’ (Chieh fang), it may be made clear, does not in Chinese signify a military conquest. It means the introduction of new life and the elimination of misery, moral degradation, inequality of sexes, etc. - in fact liberation from the oppression of tradition. The ‘liberation’ of Tibet is, therefore, being attempted mainly through education and propaganda.”
Sixty five years later, the Tibetans have still not understood from what they needed to be ‘liberated’. China, however gained not only a huge landmass, the access to the ‘water tower of Asia’, large mineral resources and a strategic position dominating the subcontinent.

Who were the ‘visionaries’?
Unfortunately, Sardar Patel, who articulated so presciently the dangers of the Chinese invasion for India’s frontiers, passed away on December 15, 1950, barely two months after the entry of the People’s Liberation Army in Eastern Tibet. Thereafter, Nehru’s line prevailed, with the disastrous consequences which still can be seen today on the Indian borders, whether in Ladakh, Uttarakhand or Arunachal Pradesh.
In the text, I have quoted a personal letter written by Dayal to Maj S.M. Krishnatry, then posted as Trade Agent (ITA) in Gyantse. While discussing the Chinese advance towards the McMahon Line, the PO informed the ITA of Sardar Patel’s death, “It is a heavy blow. He was the one person in this Government who had strong realistic view of things, including on foreign relations. Now, we are left at the mercy of the visionaries.”
In hindsight, Patel, Bajpai, Dayal or Sinha were the real ‘visionaries’.

Tibet: a temporary setback for India’s ‘peace’ policy
An important factor in our story was the role that India wanted to play in the Korean conflict. It greatly influenced Delhi’s Tibet policy. By January 1951, the Ministry of External Affairs and the Indian Embassy in Beijing had started to spend most of their time and energy on ‘peace-making’; in the process: Tibet was abandoned.
In fact by the beginning of 1951, the ‘Tibetan incident’ was over for the Indian Ambassador in China. India could start dreaming of an eternal friendship with China. In the Annual Report of the Indian Embassy for 1950, Panikkar wrote: “The exchange of Notes on Tibet, following the Chinese attack on Chamdo gave a temporary setback to our relations, but the reaction of the Chinese Government to the Indian protests was restrained and neither country permitted this incident to have more than a temporary effect. India consistently supported Chinese claims in the United Nations and her sustained efforts to settle the Korean issue have been fully appreciated in China. There is every reason to hope that the next year will see even better relations established between the two countries.”
But India had lost a peaceful border and a friendly neighbour.

Three phases towards a so-called liberation
If one analyses the events, the period covered in this first volume could be divided in the three phases.
•    Phase 1: August 1947- September 1949
•    Phase 2: October 1949- August 1950
•    Phase 3: September 1950 – May 1951
During the first two phases, the policy of the Government of India towards Tibet remained as it had been during the British period.
Through Phase 1, life on the Roof of the World continued as in the past several decades.
The Dalai Lama was growing into a bright adolescent and nobody bothered much about the revolutions happening in the world …and the decolonization.
Nehru’s government had reappointed two Britishers to their jobs: Arthur Hopkinson, who had served as the last British Political Officer in Sikkim (Hopkinson continued to officiate till mid 1948) and Hugh Richardson, as the head of the Mission in Lhasa. Both played an important supporting role with their great clarity of mind; they understood the importance to maintain relations with Tibet ‘on the old basis’, and more particularly for India, they realized the implications of an eventual Chinese ‘adventure’ on the plateau.
It must be noted that Dayal and Sinha would be treated very differently by the Indian Prime Minister than Hopkinson and Richardson. Had Richardson received from Nehru one of the reprimands that Sinha received a few months later, he would have immediately returned to his native Scotland. But Sinha had no island to leave for; after his tenure in Lhasa, he was a broken man.
July 1949 saw the preemptive expulsion of all Chinese living in the Tibetan capital. But all was to change on October 1, 1949 when the Communists took over the Middle Kingdom.
Independent India primarily sought to maintain a kind of status quo, i.e. Tibet continuing to be a buffer between China and India, while trade and religious exchanges through the Indian borders flourished. By June 1948, Lhasa had accepted the past treaties and conventions between British India and Tibet, but there were no efforts to delineate, demarcate and secure the northern boundary as Buddhist Tibet was a friendly neighbor.
All was well.
The second phase (from October 1, 1949 till August 1950) was marked by the emergence of an irredentist New China. The relations between India and Tibet however remained unchanged even when the Communist propaganda started announcing the ‘liberation’ of Tibet. Very few in Delhi took it seriously. What was the Indian Intelligence doing? Did they ever read the speeches or declaration of the Chinese leaders? It is a question which needs to be answered.
India clearly failed to evolve a strategy to deal with Communist China, or at least a pragmatic policy; further, leaders like Panikkar or V.K. Krishna Menon thought that the arrival of Mao on the stage was the best thing which could have happened to China …and Tibet.
The third phase starts with the beginning of the military operations in Tibet. It was officially announced by a letter of Marshal Liu Bocheng which was dismissed by the ‘visionaries’; around the same time (August 1950), Panikkar changed ‘suzerainty’ into ‘sovereignty’, giving a green card to Communist China to invade (or ‘liberate’ in Red jargon) Tibet.
Indian policy during this period was marked by accommodation and shameless appeasement towards China.
The strategic interests of India were sacrificed on the altar of ‘wider world views’ such as the ‘World Peace’ or the fear of jeopardising the chances of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) gaining entry into the United Nations Security Council. From the Western powers’ point of view, the main concern was “let us not rock the boat”, as in any case, “it is India’s business”.

Military as an Instrument of State Policy
Another dimension of India’s Tibet policy is the fact that the Prime Minister often disregarded the military as an instrument of State policy. Of course, this was in strong contrast with what was happening in China.
In the Chinese account of the so-called Liberation published as an annexure, during a meeting in Chengdu in August 1950, Deng Xiaoping, the Political Commissar of the Southwestern Bureau mentioned the importance of both the military and civilian factors to liberate the Roof of the World.
Some strategic notes of Lt Gen Nathu Singh, GOC-in-Chief, Eastern Command are quoted in the last chapter; they were regularly discarded by the Indian civilian leadership.
Even the attempt by the Indian Military Intelligence to send an officer to Tibet was thwarted; instead, Maj (later Lt Gen) Z.C. Bakshi was sent to Tibet on behalf of the Ministry of External Affairs. He nevertheless gave interesting suggestions, which were never implemented.
As I completed this first volume, these words of Sri Aurobindo came to mind: “There are moments when the Spirit moves among men and the breath of the Lord is abroad upon the waters of our being; there are others when it retires and men are left to act in the strength or the weakness of their own egoism. The first are periods when even a little effort produces great results and changes destiny; the second are spaces of time when much labour goes to the making of a little result. It is true that the latter may prepare the former, may be the little smoke of sacrifice going up to heaven which calls down the rain of God's bounty. Unhappy is the man or the nation which, when the divine moment arrives, is found sleeping or unprepared to use it, because the lamp has not been kept trimmed for the welcome and the ears are sealed to the call. But thrice woe to them who are strong and ready, yet waste the force or misuse the moment; for them is irreparable loss or a great destruction.”
An occasion was definitively missed for Tibet and India too.
Some call this Karma.