My interview on Bhutan with Aadi (DEF Talks)
Indias Challenge in Bhutan and the danger to India's Chicken Neck. China and Bhutan border Dispute. Are the Chinese claim valid in Bhutan and what should India do?
DEF Talks is a space for clear cut discussions on important subjects of current affairs of the world with a prime focus to the Indian Subcontinent. I cover issues related to conflicts, Geopolitics, Military Strategy and Foreign Affairs.
Showing posts with label Bhutan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bhutan. Show all posts
Monday, May 1, 2023
China Challenges India in Bhutan
Sunday, August 26, 2018
One year after Doklam standoff: Will Bhutan increase deployment to check activities of Chinese military?
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| 1959 Chinese map of the border |
China has always been jealous of India's special relation with Bhutan, which it claims as its 'vassal state'.
The Standing Committee on external affairs, headed by Shashi Tharoor, former minister of state, was recently in the news. After several hearings on the Doklam episode, some of its conclusions were leaked to the media. Of course, one could ask: Are the MPs not under oath when they get confidential briefings? But it is perhaps too much to expect from some of the people’s representatives. Remember, on June 16 last year, Indian and Chinese troops faced each other for 73 days after India decided to stop the construction of a road on Bhutanese territory, near the tri-junction between India, China and Bhutan.
Chinese military
According to PTI, though the Committee report “did not clarify whether the committee was favouring increasing the deployment of Indian troops in the region,” Delhi should encourage Thimphu to ensure a larger deployment of its soldiers in the Northern Doklam area “to check the activities of Chinese military in the sensitive region.”
The above recommendation raises the crucial issue of the relation of Bhutan and China.
In this context, it is interesting to look into the past.
In June 1955, RK Nehru was foreign secretary, when he decided to pay an official visit to Bhutan. At that time, to go to Bhutan, the easiest way was to cross through the Chumbi Valley (north of Doklam) in Tibet, before proceeding to Paro. After a stay of a few days in Yatung, the main village of the Chumbi Valley where India had an important Trade Agency, Nehru left for Bhutan on June 14; he returned on June 26 and again stayed a couple of days in Yatung.
In his report, the foreign secretary wrote: “My visit to Bhutan via Yatung had been notified to the Chinese. We were given to understand that I would receive all facilities and courtesies. I received all the facilities needed, but no special courtesies were shown.”
Why? China was simply jealous of India’s special relation with Bhutan.
Nehru mentioned that South Block had notified Beijing about his visit: “but we were aware that they claim Bhutan as their vassal state. This claim was last made in 1910, but it has never been given up.”
The question may be different today, but the fact remains that the leadership in Beijing has always thought that it was natural for Bhutan to have ‘special’ relations with China. The then foreign secretary continued: “As recently as 1948, the claim was repeated. …The Chinese position in the past has been that we [India] cannot have special relations with Bhutan without their concurrence. I presume this is still their position, though it is not being asserted openly.”
Nehru admitted: “For all these reasons, they could have refused to give transit visas, but this would have led to a conflict. The alternative was to give visas, but to take no special notice of the visit. This is what they actually did.”
It was not the first time that China was trying to play the ‘Bhutan Card’.
First meeting
In August 1950, the Indian Mission in Lhasa reported an encounter between Bhutan’s commercial agent in Lhasa and General Zhang Jingwu, Mao’s representative in Tibet, who had just arrived in Lhasa; it was the first meeting between the Chinese general and a foreign ‘diplomat’ posted in Tibet.
It was quite farcical.
The agent had to state his name, age and functions; then he was required to explain why restrictions were imposed on Tibetan traders entering Bhutan.
The agent had to explain to the tough general that his government had stationed five or six men along her frontier merely to prevent Tibetans from stealing mules from villages in Bhutan.
Let us remember that at that time, India was responsible for Bhutan’s foreign relations; China was deeply unhappy about this.
On October 1, 1950, on the first anniversary of the People’s Republic, the Chinese gave a party in Lhasa.
Zhang gave special considerations to Bhutan: “of foreign representatives Bhutan Agent received much attention and encouragement verging on patronage,” wrote Sinha, the head of the Indian Mission.
The PLA general constantly praised the Bhutanese Agent, even “styled Envoy of the Independent Asian State of Bhutan.” Sinha informed Delhi “through [the] questions put to the Agent, [it was as if] Bhutan had nothing in common with India. Bhutan was ‘coolly told’ that it would be invited to send a Mission to Peking next year.”
Diplomatic relations
The Chinese were very much aware that the Dragon Kingdom’s diplomatic relations were taken care by Delhi, but it was clearly a calculated move to put Bhutan and India on the same diplomatic level.
Even the Tibetans were quite surprised about the “new status of Bhutan Agent and the fuss made of him.” Today like yesterday, though not ‘openly asserted’, the Chinese mindset remains the same; this partially explains why Beijing decided to start building a road near the tri-junction, without informing Thimphu or Delhi.
Beijing could not think that a ‘foreign’ country (India) would intervene and stop the work.
A few weeks ago, though Thimphu does not have formal diplomatic relations with its northern neighbour, Chinese vice foreign minister Kong Xuanyou spent three days in the Dragon Kingdom. It was the first high-level visit post-Doklam.
Kong, accompanied by the Chinese ambassador to India, met Bhutan’s King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck, Prime Minister Tshering Tobgay and foreign minister Damcho Dorji; they discussed ‘matters of mutual interest’, acknowledged Bhutan. Though Bhutan kept India ‘in the loop’ about Kong’s visit, there is no doubt that the Chinese pressure on Bhutan will increase in the coming months, especially as the parliamentary elections are coming soon in Bhutan.
In these circumstances, it is unsure Bhutan will agree to increase its deployment in the Doklam area.
Sunday, May 13, 2018
A Dinner with the Third King of Bhutan
On this occasion, I post a note written by Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Minister of India on January 20, 1954 after a dinner with the King of Bhutan.
Jigme Dorji Wangchuck (2 May 1929 – 21 July 1972) was the Third Druk Gyalpo. He is credited with opening Bhutan (or Druk, the Land of the Dragon) to the outside world, to have started the modernization process and have taken the first steps toward the democratization of his country.
In September 1958, Nehru would visit him in Paro, crossing over the Chumbi Valley.
See my post of the subject.
The Dinner
At one point during the dinner in 1954, Nehru said that India was “friendly with China and there was no reason to think that between India and China there would be any conflict.”
This was of course a serious misjudgment.
Nehru however rightly pointed out that the foreign affairs of Bhutan “was a vital matter for India.”
Though Bhutan is now a fully independent nation, what is happening in Bhutan remains ‘vital’ to India.
Later in the evening, Nehru spoke of a survey of the Manas river for a hydro-power project; the Gyalpo was not fully convinced. Nehru added: “As for a survey, he [the Gyapo] said that permission had been given within a limited area. I [Nehru] said that this was not good enough and that the survey should have to take into consideration broad areas. He said he would consider this matter further.”
This would eventually lead to the survey of the trijunction between Tibet, Bhutan and Sikkim (Batang-la area) two years later by TS Murty, an officer of the Indian Frontier Administrative Service (with a team of the Survey of India).
It would then be realized that the trijunction was Batang-la, not Gyemochen (or Gipmochi).
A large collections of documents on the relations between Bhutan and India are available on my website.
Here is the link...
Here is Nehru’s Note dated January 30, 1954:
I had a long talk with the Maharaja of Bhutan after dinner to-night. The Maharani was asked to join us after some time at the instance of the Maharaja. According to him this was desirable as he did not always understand what I said and the Maharani's knowledge of English would help.
2. I expressed my pleasure at their visit to India which had enabled us to know each other better and also given them an opportunity of seeing a bit of India. I was sure that this would lead to greater understanding and fuller co-operation.
3. The Maharaja entirely agreed and thanked me for all the friendliness shown to him here. He said that Bhutan's relations had been friendly with India even in British times, and now they were friendlier.
4. I then mentioned very briefly the difficulties and tensions of the world and the possibility of even distant countries being affected by them. Bhutan had kept an isolated existence in the past and, for my part, I thought that this was a wise policy then, otherwise the British Government would have interfered a great deal. But conditions were very different now because of various happenings. The world was a much tighter place to live in, and the Tibet-Bhutan-India frontier was much more important now. We had, therefore, to take a broader view of the present as well as the future and it would become progressively more difficult for Bhutan to remain isolated. We had no desire to interfere in the internal government of Bhutan, though we were, of course, interested in Bhutan's progress and the well-being of her people. But, we were very greatly concerned with anything affecting foreign affairs and defence of Bhutan. It was for this reason that in our last Treaty [of 1949] it had been mentioned that the foreign affairs of Bhutan should be conducted with the guidance of India. Foreign affairs were intimately connected with defence. A wrong step by Bhutan in either of these matters might land us in difficulties. Therefore, there has to be the fullest co-ordination between Bhutan and India in regard to foreign affairs and defence.
5. In so far as Bhutan was concerned, the only two countries that affected her were India and China (or Tibet). We were friendly with China and there was no reason to think that between India and China there would be any conflict. Nevertheless, one must not leave things to chance and it was in the interest of India and Bhutan both to co-ordinate their defence and foreign policy. I mentioned that, even in the case of Nepal, this was our understanding. Indeed, India's real defence lay in the Himalayas. Any intruder coming into Nepal or Bhutan would weaken that defence and we could not tolerate it.
6. I developed this point rather fully. The Maharaja said that they quite understood that in regard to foreign policy India should be interested and they would give every consideration to what India said in this matter. I again pointed out that this was a vital matter for India.
7. I referred to our previous suggestion about having an Agent in Bhutan and said that this would help greatly in furthering our co-operation. It would be helpful to Bhutan in many ways and, in any event, we would be in direct contact which was so necessary. The Maharaja referred to past history and said that his National Assembly had not viewed this with favour but he was prepared to consult them again. He said that he was in constant touch with Mr. [BK] Kapur [the Political Officer in Sikkim]. I said that this was right, but, it would be advantageous to have an Indian Agent in Bhutan. I had no desire to press this against the will of the Maharaja and the Bhutan Government. But I did not understand why the Maharaja or his Government should be apprehensive in this matter. That showed a certain lack of confidence in us. We should proceed on a basis of accepting each other's bona fides and having confidence in each other. I left it at that.
8. I discussed internal conditions in Bhutan, the land system, the Nepalese there etc. The Maharaja said that there were no big zamindars there and land was owned by peasant proprietors who were happy and prosperous. There was no trouble with them. There was also no trouble with the resident Nepalese in the valleys, though two or three outsiders had come and tried to create some trouble.
9. I referred to the survey of the Manas river. He said that this matter had been raised in his father's time who thought that if a dam was constructed, the backwash of it would be injurious to Bhutan. I pointed out that the first step was a survey. Nobody could say now whether this survey would lead to the construction of a dam, and, in any event, no such decision could be taken without the consent of the Bhutan Government. As for a survey, he said that permission had been given within a limited area. I said that this was not good enough and that the survey should have to take into consideration broad areas. He said he would consider this matter further.
10. I then referred to the foreign exchange question and said that we had to be very careful about this so as not to waste it. Generally speaking, Bhutan should be able to get her requirements from India. Where this was not possible and something was specially wanted from abroad, there would be no difficulty in our arranging for foreign exchange. I suggested that we might have a minimum figure (I did not mention the figure) for foreign exchange. Any addition to this, if necessity arose, we would consider favourably.
11. The Maharaja referred to the necessity for free trade between Bhutan and India. He said that this had been more or less agreed to by Mr Harishwar Dayal [previous Political officer] at the time last Treaty was framed [1949]. It was then said that this might be left out of the Treaty but would nevertheless hold good. As a matter of fact, there were tell gates right near the frontier with West Bengal, and each truck was charged at the rate of Rs. 5 for round trip. This affected contractors on the Bhutan side. I told him that I knew nothing about this and no mention of this had been made previously. This question had better be discussed with our officers.
12. This was the substance of my conversation. Towards the end, the Maharaja again expressed his happiness at having come here and established personal contacts.
Copies were sent to the Secretary General of the MEA, the Foreign Secretary and the Joint Secretary.
Sunday, February 4, 2018
So, who has a Cold War mindset?
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| Chinese map of Sikkim showing the trijunction at Batang La It is what the joint Survey of 1956 had confirmed |
Here is the link...
It is ironical that while it is the Middle Kingdom which is getting ready for another stand-off, it loudly objects to New Delhi protecting its side of the border
China has difficulties to digest the Doklam episode for which Beijing (or at least the People's Liberation Army) was fully responsible. Senior Colonel Wu Qian, spokesperson of the Ministry of Nation Defense (MND), in his regular monthly Press conference spoke in a derogatory manner: “I have noticed many China-related remarks made by this Indian general lately.” ‘This general’ is the Chief of Army Staff, General Bipin Rawat, who had just said India needed to shift its focus to the northern border. A logical and normal statement after last year’s confrontation at the tri-junction between Sikkim, Tibet and Bhutan?
Col Wu continued: “I would like to stress that Donglang [Doklam] is China’s territory and the remarks from the Indian side also shows that illegal border crossing of the Indian troops is a clear fact. We hope that the Indian side will draw lessons from the incident.”He also spoke of India’s ‘Cold War mentality’.
A look at the facts: In 2012, the Governments of India and China had reached an agreement that the location of the tri-junction would be finalised in consultation with the concerned countries. On June 30, 2017, the Ministry of External Affairs issued a statement: “Any attempt, therefore, to unilaterally determine tri-junction points is in violation of this understanding.” The finalisation of the boundary was to take place during the Special Representatives’ talks.
In June-July 1956, a tour of the Sikkim-Bhutan-Tibet frontier from the tri-junction area was conducted by the Ministry of External Affairs, the Survey of India, along with Bhutanese officials. The location of the boundary was reconfirmed on the watershed principle, but also on the basis of the reports of the local inhabitants: “The Bhutan-Tibet frontier starts in the vicinity of Batang La and runs along the La Hen Chum ridge via Sinchu La and then along the Amo Chu upto Chilim Chon.” The description continues till the Chomo Lhari, in North-West Bhutan.
Interestingly, the factors which weighed in favour of the confirmation of this boundary were, firstly, “[in] the west of Amo Chu, the published Chinese maps themselves appeared to include the Doklam pastures (south of Batang La and Sinchu La line) in Bhutan; and secondly, the east of Amo Chu, the Bhutanese had strong claims over the pastures of the Langmarpo valley (south of Tendji ridge).”
Why did China need to suddenly change the status quo and start building a road on the Bhutanese territory?
It was apparently the initiative of a Chinese General, with the knowledge of President Xi Jinping (who was probably not briefed on the details of the operation and its implications).
In an informed piece, The Indian Express recently questioned: “Who in the Chinese hierarchy ordered the extension of the track in Dolam from the point it had been constructed up to in 2003, to the Jampheri ridge?”
According to the newspaper, the road construction was ordered by General Zhao Zongqi, commander of the Western Theatre Command facing India; Zhao had, for two decades, served in Tibet.
The Indian Express said: “Even before the face-off in Doklam, Chinese border troops had been telling Indian soldiers in daily interactions at multiple points on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) that General Zhao had walked each of these tracks with military patrols over 20 years, and had been rarely confronted by the Indians. As the Indian deployment has increased over the past decade, General Zhao is unwilling to accept the challenge to Chinese claims. Not only in Doklam, but also at other places on the LAC.”
It might partly be speculation, but there is no doubt today about the involvement of General Zhao, who probably had forgotten to read the agreement arrived at by the Indian and Chinese diplomats in 2012 about the status quo at the tri-junction. Amongst other things, it shows that China does not always speak with one voice.
While the PLA talks of a Cold War mindset, pointing a finger at India, China is not ready to restart the usual Border Personnel Meetings (BPM) along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Only two BPMs took place on the occasion of the Republic Day, both in Ladakh region (in DBO and Chushul area). Why was no BPM held in Bumla, Kibithu in Arunachal and Nathu-la in Sikkim?
Why has the Indian drone, which accidentally fell in the Chumbi Valley, not yet been returned? Why has information on the flow of the Sutlej and Pareechu rivers in Himachal and the Yarlung Tsangpo/Brahmaputra still not been shared with India?
The Central Water Commission recently raised serious concerns over the Pareechu and even sought the Ministry of External Affair’s help: “We wrote to the Ministry. China stopped sharing information about the tributary’s flow last year. They said that the water monitoring site across the border is damaged,” AK Gupta, the Commission’s regional director told The Hindustan Times.
On New Year’s Eve, President Xi Jinping delivered an 11-minute televised speech to extend his greetings to all Chinese and… friends all over the world. Xi said that Beijing is dedicated to safeguarding peace. “China will act as a builder of world peace, a contributor to global development and an upholder of the international order.”
Will this translate in peace on the border in 2018? Probably not! Soon after, the PLA intruded in Tuting sector of the Siang Valley of Arunachal Pradesh. The irony is that while China itself is getting ready for another standoff, Beijing loudly objects to Delhi protecting its side of the border.
The China Daily recently reported: “Investment in infrastructure in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) is helping to lift 628 villages along the border out of poverty.” The Chinese newspaper further asserted: “After getting access to electricity and the construction of new roads, tea farmers and herdsmen in a village some 200 kilometres southwest of Lhasa in Tsona county founded a cooperative that provides skill training and job opportunities for villagers.”
Lepo, the first Tibetan village north on the McMahon Line in the Tawang sector, is said to have received several thousands of visitors last year and to have adequate lodging facilities.
China also admitted: “Starting last year, more than 100 million yuan (Rs 99.4 crore) has been invested in infrastructure in villages of less than 100 families as a part of a broader construction project to build model villages in the border area.”
There are many such examples on the Tibetan side of the McMahon Line.
In the meantime, it is refreshing that the new Indian Ambassador in China, Gautam Bambawale told The Global Times: Our interaction must be based on equality and mutual benefit. Also, in the India-China border areas, especially at some sensitive points, it is important not to change the status quo. We need to be clear about this.”
It is indeed China which did not respect its engagements. Year 2018 may not be serene despite the peaceful vows of President Xi.
Saturday, August 5, 2017
The Great Game over Bhutan - a few articles
After independence, India chose to be represented in Lhasa by a British ICS officer, Hugh Richardson; the Scot was Indian Mission-in-Charge from 1947 to 1950. On June 15, 1949, in a communication addressed to the Ministry of External Affairs in Delhi, he suggested that India might consider occupying Chumbi Valley up to Phari ‘in an extreme emergency.’ The Chumbi Valley is the highly strategic ‘finger’ sandwiched between Bhutan and Sikkim.
Sixteen months later, Chinese troops invaded Eastern Tibet and Harishwar Dayal, who had replaced another Britisher as the Political Officer in Sikkim, made again the same suggestion: “[Richardon’s] suggestion was NOT favoured by Government of India at the time. It was however proposed as a purely defensive measure and with NO aggressive intention. An attack on Sikkim or Bhutan would call for defensive military operations by the Government of India,” he wrote to Nehru.
Read on…
The present standoff at the trijunction between Sikkim, Tibet and Bhutan, on the southern tip of the Chumbi, is a worrying development. While recently addressing the foreign diplomats in Delhi, Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar rightly stated that China has been ‘unusually aggressive and articulate’.
Beijing seems to have only one argument, i.e. the 1890 Convention between the British and the Manchus, conveniently forgetting several other agreements, particularly the 1893 Trade Regulations (1890 twin accord) which allowed India to open a trade mart in Yatung in the Chumbi Valley.
Read on...
The Truth from the Dragon's Mouth
Recently a book Spying Against India (Chinese Military Intelligence from 1962 to 2012) Volume 1, written by one Ben Keiler (probably a nom de plume) was published by Amazon Kindle.
It is difficult to verify the veracity of the content.
However it complements the above map that I posted a few weeks ago on this blog (China ties to alter the status quo in Bhutan).
One Chapter of the book is entitled: The Western Territories of Bhutan
It explains that the above map is a copy of Top Secret Chinese Intelligence map.
(it copy was probably published to hide the embarrassing information about the Indian and Bhutanese camps inside the area today claimed by China)
The book publishes the originals along the translation of the accompanying texts and provides its own comments.
Read on...
I have often mentioned on this blog, The Three Warfares, more particularly the Propaganda/Information Warfare.
Today China believes that it has mastered the Art and that it has demonstrated it in brainwashing many Indian journalists in the wake of the Doka La confrontation, near the trijunction between Tibet, Bhutan and Sikkim.
This may have been true during the first weeks in view of the of the paucity of information (and knowledge) from the Indian side.
Propaganda (or disinformation) has always taken an important place for the survival of a totalitarian regime. It continues today, whether it is with North Korea or China.
Read on…
Very few in India have heard of Taksing.
It is the last village on the Tibet (China)-Arunachal Pradesh border, and the first village likely to be invaded if Beijing retaliates.
Scarily, it takes jawans THREE days of walking to reach Taksing.
In all the noise surrounding the Doklam confrontation, Claude Arpi focuses on a crucial issue that has hardly been covered -- the construction of roads for the armed forces and the local population to reach the most remote border posts.
Very few incidents have triggered so many comments as the confrontation at the trijunction between Tibet, Bhutan and Sikkim.
On June 16, 2017, Chinese troops entered a stretch of land at the southern tip of the Chumbi Valley to build a road …on Bhutanese territory.
They were stopped by the Indian Army.
Read on...
The spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been vociferously trying to convince the Indian correspondents in Beijing about the 1890 Convention (known as Convention of March 17, 1890 between Great Britain and China relating to Sikkim and Tibet).
However, Beijing forgot to mention about the two main stakeholders, Tibet and Sikkim, who were not even consulted by the 'Great Imperial Powers'.
It is interesting to have the views of Tsepon WD Shakabpa, the Tibetan politician and famous historian.
In his Tibet: a Political History, he explained : « In 1890 a convention was drawn up in Calcutta by Lord Lansdowne, the Governor-General of India and Sheng-t'ai, the Manchu Amban from Lhasa, without consulting the government of Tibet. The first article of the convention agreement defined the boundary between Tibet and Sikkim, and the second article recognized a British protectorate over Sikkim, which gave them exclusive control over the internal administration and the foreign relations of that country.
Read on...
China promotes ...the Indian tribes: a dangerous move (The Pioneer)The fact that China is promoting ‘Indian culture’ is dangerous. The Union Government has been ignorant about the issue. But for how long? India could lose a crucial battle on its borders… without a shot being fired
Watching Chairman Xi Jinping officiating during the mega parade at the Zhurihe Combined Tactics Training Base in Inner Mongolia on the occasion of the 90th anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), this writer was struck by the Chinese martial air of the Chinese President driving in an open jeep, dressed in combat fatigue.
He later ordered the PLA to be prepared for the battle and to defeat ‘all enemies that dare offend’ his country. Was India, who had dared to challenge the mighty PLA when Beijing tried to change the status quo at the tri-junction between Tibet, Bhutan and Sikkim, targeted? It’s difficult to say.
It was indeed a huge display of military power; Chinese state agencies reported that some 40 per cent of the weapons on show had never before been seen by the public. Xi, who is also the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, by far the most powerful organisation in the Middle Kingdom, inspected 12,000 combat troops.
Read on...
When China refuses to talk about Bhutan and Sikkim boundaries.
Yesterday, the Chinese Foreign Ministry's spokesperson Geng Shuang stated that the border in Sikkim was well demarcated, according to the 1890 Convention between Great Britain and China and Doka La, the area of contention ‘belongs to China’.
He added that Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru endorsed the 1890 Sino-British Treaty on Sikkim in a letter to Zhou Enlai in 1959.
Geng also said that successive Indian governments have also endorsed this.
This far from the truth.
Read on...
China has recently tried to change the status quo in the Doklam area of the Bhutan-Tibet border.
On June 29, the Royal Government of Bhutan, which had held 24 rounds of talks with China so far, had to officially clarify :
On 16th June 2017, the Chinese Army started constructing a motorable road from Dokola in the Doklam area towards the Bhutan Army camp at Zompelri. Boundary talks are ongoing between Bhutan and China and we have written agreements of 1988 and 1998 stating that the two sides agree to maintain peace and tranquility in their border areas pending a final settlement on the boundary question, and to maintain status quo on the boundary as before March 1959. The agreements also state that the two sides will refrain from taking unilateral action, or use of force, to change the status quo of the boundary.
Read on...
As I mentioned in my last post, ‘differences of perceptions’ on the Tibet-Sikkim-Bhutan and the Sikkim-Tibet borders are not new.
China used fully these differences during the Indo-Pakistan conflict of 1965, threatening to interfere in the War and opening a new front in Sikkim.
This has been well-documented in the Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged between the Government of India and China (known as White Papers on China) published by the Ministry of External Affairs in Delhi.
Today, I post an extract of White Paper No. XII (pertaining to January 1965 to February 1966). The Note relates to an incident which took place in Delhi on September 24, 1965.
An Indian politician (and later Prime Minister of India) took a herd of 800 goats to the Chinese Embassy in Delhi to send a message to Beijing: is it worth starting a war over some pastures in the Himalaya or because some herds had crossed an unmarked line?
Read on....
Thursday, August 3, 2017
The Truth from the Dragon's Mouth
It is difficult to verify the veracity of the content.
However it complements the above map that I posted a few weeks ago on this blog (China ties to alter the status quo in Bhutan).
One Chapter of the book is entitled: The Western Territories of Bhutan(it copy was probably published to hide the embarrassing information about the Indian and Bhutanese camps inside the area today claimed by China)
The book publishes the originals along the translation of the accompanying texts and provides its own comments.
For example, this Chinese Intelligence map provides an overview of the disputed areas in Western Bhutan with detailed textual explanations.
The map is said to have been compiled by Chinese intelligence some 30 years ago.
The original maps with the positions of the Bhutanese and Indian Armies were obviously not published in China, as they contradict China's version of the historical background of the present standoff with India near the trijunction.
The present standoff between the Chinese and Indian Army is taking place in the Southern part of the map.
The top text shows what the Chinese consider the international border.The fact that this area is shown in a separate colour (green), as well as the captions clearly demonstrates that the area was already disputed 30 years ago.
The second text is what India and Bhutan consider as the location of the border.
The third is the “illegal” McMahon Line (in Eastern Bhutan - not shown on this particular map)
Today, China pretends that the area has always been Chinese territory!
Not a single post occupied by the Chinese Army is marked.
The PLA was nowhere to be seen.
Here is the legend for the above map :
Blue circle: Permanent base of the Royal Bhutan ArmyHere is the translation of text on the Chinese text accompanying the Intelligence map (as well as it 'edited' reproduction; see map on the top of this post - top most text).
Blue triangle outlined: Observation post of the Royal Bhutan Army
Blue triangle: Checkpoint of the Royal Bhutan Army
Light brown circle: Indian army base.
Luling (also called Ru-ling) area is located on southeast of the Rinchengang town, in the lower part of the Dro-mo [Lower Chumbi Valley].These facts contradict the Chinese propaganda: Beijing never maintained any army base, customs office or other government function in that area until 1983.
The area includes some of the small rivers in the east of Dromo Machu, Charthang river and Luling river.
The size of the area is around 340 sq. km and there are more than 40 grasslands (pastures). The source [of income] comes from the products of the forest; it is pretty marvelous.
According to some historical documents, before 1843 China put border stone pillars on the hill of Ha-la, which is the source of the Luling River. [Nobody has ever heard of these 'pillars'; my comment].
The western part of the Ha-la Mountain’s range was in the past the pastoral area of the nomads of the Dro-mo [Chumbi].
In the year of 1954, the Bhutanese army permanently settled at Charthang for whole year. There were around 100 troops occupying the area.
In 1960, the Bhutanese soldiers came again and set up an Observation Post at Ha-rar with more than 20 soldiers. There were sent from the pasture ground of Charthang.
In 1973, the people of the Dro-mo [Chumbi] restored their control over the border area and managed to send their animals grazing like before in the upland region of Lang-ma.
Moreover, in 1975, we [China] established a forest park in the Langma’s upland.
In 1983, we [China] a set up a civil administration.
Now the soldiers and nomads of Bhutan do not enter the lower part of Lang-ma’s upland grassland by crossing the Phu-tren pass as before.
Further, according to the book Spying Against India:"If we go to the map [marked] as Doc 67 [above], we see the 1987 reality as reported by Chinese military intelligence: there are four bases by the Bhutanese army and one by the Indian army in that area alone. Those bases are located along the border and there is not one single Chinese base."
The author of the book further comments:
First no Tibetan from Yatung [in Chumbi Valley] or any other Chinese lived there or even went there. After some 20 years after the arrival of the Chinese army in Yatung, they start to send local Tibetans as ‘nomads’ with their cattle into that area to stake a claim. If those Tibetans are not expelled for some ten years, they open a small civil administration post which could be only an unmarked tent operated during summer. Again if that civil administration station is not demolished they start to make propaganda to claim this area has been Chinese territory since ancient times.Perhaps more interesting is the Chinese description of the place where the conflict is presently going on. Here is the translation of the text:
Tunglang (Doklang) area is located in the south, moreover the valley of Tunglang river is an area of more than 100 sq. km.The author of the book rightly notes: "The names and areas of those disputed territories are not identical in China and Bhutan. Therefore if the Chinese talk about Tonglang it’s not identical in size and geographical location to what the Bhutanese and Indians called Doklam."
Northern parts of that area are plain with lots of lakes and there are more than 30 small and big grassland.
Southeast are mostly forest with steep mountains and deep valley.
According to the historical documents, Tunglang grassland is the summer pastoral area of the people of Lower Dro-mo [Lower Chumbi] region and the army of India and Bhutan both are not entering into the Tung lang area. They just observed to the nomads and people from a big stone.
From the year of 1975, China’s armies went around very carefully, almost once a every year.
Generally after we (Chinese) reached near to the Lhamasi through Shismo, we [China] returned back.
In 1983, the boundary line of our observation was expanded towards the south and later it was getting nearer to the Observation Post of the Bhutanese army in Dung-Tsona in South of Trae grassland.
He points out at the contradiction in the Chinese Intelligence documents: "a second and different Chinese story appears is in Doc 67 where Chinese intelligence marks one base of the Bhutanese army clearly inside that very area and two more at the border."
See the legend above.
The book Spying Against India says:
This was in 1987.In Doc 70, we can see the deployment of Bhutanese and Indian army units in western Bhutan in 1987. The first Battalion of the Bhutanese army defends the area close to the border with Sikkim.
In that location they make sure the Chinese army cannot take any shortcut through Bhutanese territory and cut-off and encircle the Indian border defense in the northern areas of Sikkim.
The 2nd, 3rd and 5th battalions were positioned to defend the area between Yatung and the capital Thimphu.
The 6th battalion serves as reserve force and can be deployed in any direction. The Indian troops are intermixed with the Royal Army of Bhutan to strengthen the defense but also to make sure the Chinese army cannot enter any area of Bhutan without fighting the Indian Army. This mix makes sure the Chinese cannot only target the Bhutanese army and grab more land without killing Indian soldiers.
All this shows that the situation is far more complicated than the one showed in the recent Chinese statement.
In other words, the PLA has blundered in entering Indian territory, a place that a few decades ago, China did claim as its own. Today, at best for Beijing, it is today 'disputed'.
It also shows the Chinese way of claiming new territories.
They first send grazers. If not objected, the grazers would visit every year.
Then a small patrol is sent.
The following year a tent (representing the Civil Administration) is planted.
After a few years, it becomes "Chinese territory administrated by China since immemorial times".
Thursday, July 13, 2017
China is on a sticky wicket in Bhutan
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| Most of the maps show Batang-la as the trijunction Sikkim-Tibet-Bhutan |
Here is the link...
Has China lost its gamble on a Himalayan ridge in Sikkim? It is too early to say, but some lessons can already be drawn from the scuffle between the Indian Army and the People's Liberation Army in Doka La, near the trijunction between Tibet (China), India and Bhutan.
The episode started when China began building a road on Bhutanese territory without informing Thimphu.
Beijing was certainly not expecting that India would come to the rescue and defend the small kingdom.
China, which dreams of becoming a 'Big Power', attempted to change the status quo south of the Doklam plateau on the Bhutan-Tibet border.
Statement
On June 29, the Royal Government of Bhutan, which had held 24 rounds of talks on the issue with China so far, explained the situation in a statement: 'On 16th June 2017, the Chinese Army started constructing a motorable road from Doka La in the Doklam area towards the Bhutan Army camp at Zompelri.
'Boundary talks are ongoing between Bhutan and China and we have written agreements of 1988 and 1998 stating that the two sides agree to maintain peace and tranquillity in their border areas pending a final settlement on the boundary question...
'The agreements also state that the two sides will refrain from taking unilateral action, or use of force, to change the status quo of the boundary.'
Bhutan conveyed to Beijing that the construction of the road inside Bhutanese territory was a direct violation of the agreements and that it would affect the ongoing demarcation process.
On June 30, 2017, the MEA too issued a press communiqué underlining that 'the two governments had in 2012 reached agreement that the trijunction boundary points between India, China and third countries will be finalised in consultation with the concerned countries.
'Any attempt, therefore, to unilaterally determine tri-junction points is in violation of this understanding.'
Beijing was well aware that the area has been under dispute for several decades; already some 50 years ago, nasty letters were exchanged between Delhi and Beijing on the issue.
The first lesson of the present episode is that India is eons behind China in terms of communication.
Though Beijing broke its pledge to Bhutan and India, the constant threatening statements by their spokesperson made it sound as if Beijing was the aggrieved party.
In 2003, China's Central Military Commission approved the concept of 'Three Warfares', namely: (1) the coordinated use of strategic psychological operations; (2) overt and covert media manipulation; and (3) legal warfare designed to manipulate strategies, defence policies, and perceptions of target audiences abroad.
The Chinese spokespersons efficiently demonstrated how, even when wrong, you can make it appear that it is the other parties, Bhutan and India in this case, who are the culprits.
History
Take the case of the 1890 Convention between Great Britain and China relating to Sikkim and Tibet.
The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs' spokesperson managed to convince most of the Indian and foreign media of the importance of the treaty.
Beijing, however, forgot to mention that the two main stakeholders, Tibet and Sikkim, had not even been consulted by the then 'Great Imperial Powers'.
Tsepon WD Shakabpa, the famous historian, in his Tibet: a Political History, explained that in 1890, a convention was drawn up without consulting the government of Tibet: '…six articles related to Tibet, and since (Tibet) was not represented at the Convention, those articles were not allowed to be put into practice by the Tibetans.'
Shakabpa added: 'The British were aware that China exercised no real power in Tibet at that time; but it suited their interests to deal with the Manchus, because of the advantages they gained from the Convention.'
An unequal treaty in Chinese parlance! The Manchus agreed to 'offer' Sikkim to the British as they were afraid that Tibet and Britain might enter into direct negotiations with London; therefore, they signed the treaty to forestall such a possibility.
In 1904, Capt Francis Younghusband anyway mounted a military expedition to Tibet to make the recalcitrant Tibetans sign their first agreement with the Crown.
Wedge
China has always been interested to create a wedge between India and Bhutan.
In 1966, in similar circumstances, for the same disputed place, the Dokham plateau, the Chinese government attempted to convince Delhi that Bhutan did not require India's support 'as it was an independent country'.
The Communists did not accept that Delhi could advise Bhutan; they crudely wrote: 'inheriting the mantle of British imperialism, the Indian Government has all along been pursuing an expansionist policy and bullying its neighbouring countries.'
Chinese President Xi Jinping (right) shakes hands with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the G20 Summit on September 4, 2016 in Hangzhou, China (stock photo)
Chinese President Xi Jinping (right) shakes hands with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the G20 Summit on September 4, 2016 in Hangzhou, China (stock photo)
As at present, the Bhutanese Government had issued a press statement on October 3, 1966: 'The Government of Bhutan have, for some time, been concerned with reports received from its patrols of a number of intrusions by Tibetan grazers and Chinese troops in the Doklam pastures which are adjacent to the southern part of the Chumbi Valley.'
It concluded that the area has been traditionally part of Bhutan, and China had never disputed 'the traditional frontier which runs along recognisable natural features.'
However, later, China started claiming large strategic chunks of Bhutan's territory.
Incidentally, Article 1 of the much quoted 1890 Convention placed the trijunction at Gipmochi: 'The line commences at Mount Gipmochi on the Bhutan frontier, and follows the above-mentioned water-parting to the point where it meets Nepal territory.'
According to Sikkimese records, Gipmochi is in Batang La, 5 km north of Doka La.
It means the territory south of Batang La is indeed Bhutanese, and therefore India did not 'trespass' into Tibet.
So, why all this fuss?
Friday, July 7, 2017
China believes the best form of defence is attack
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| PLA's Tanks exercising on the plateau |
'How can a State, which claims to be a responsible power, unilaterally grab a "disputed" area to build a road on it?' asks Claude Arpi.
Hee is the link...
After completing my first book on Tibet in the 1990s, I looked for a title which could resume the content of my research.
At the end of the 19th century, Tibet was a mere pawn in the Great Game between Imperial Powers. The 1890 Treaty on Sikkim, today quoted ad nauseam by the Chinese government, was one of the ‘unequal treaties’ imposed on a smaller nation. Big insects had little consideration for the weak.
The Thirteenth Dalai Lama could grasp the forces at play and was determined to make Tibet an independent state. It did not work. Charles Bell, the British frontier officer recalled the Lama’s great deception when China invaded the Land of Snows in 1910. After deciding to temporarily take refuge in India, the Tibetan leader cabled the British Agent in Gyantse, Tibet, asking him to inform London that “Large insects are eating and secretly injuring small insects.”
The story seems to continue today with China building a road on Bhutanese territory without informing Thimphu. But this time, what Beijing had not expected is that India would come to the rescue and defend the small Kingdom.
China, which dreams of becoming a ‘big insect’ (without the name!) tried to change the status quo in the Doklam area of the Bhutan-Tibet border.
On June 29, the Royal Government of Bhutan, which had held 24 rounds of talks on the issue with China so far, explained the situation: “On 16th June 2017, the Chinese Army started constructing a motorable road from Dokola in the Doklam area towards the Bhutan Army camp at Zompelri. Boundary talks are ongoing between Bhutan and China and we have written agreements of 1988 and 1998 stating that the two sides agree to maintain peace and tranquility in their border areas pending a final settlement on the boundary question. …The agreements also state that the two sides will refrain from taking unilateral action, or use of force, to change the status quo of the boundary.”
Bhutan conveyed to Beijing “both on the ground and through the diplomatic channel,” that the construction of the road inside Bhutanese territory was a direct violation of the agreements and that it would affect the ongoing process of demarcating the China-Bhutan boundary (Beijing and Thimbu have already had a Joint Survey of the area).
Beijing was well aware that the area has been under dispute for several decades; some 50 years ago already, letters were exchanged between Delhi and Beijing using the same language for a similar incident.
Despite the fact that China has no proof to contradict that the pastures in the Dokham area have for centuries been used by Bhutanese nomads (the Chinese were nowhere to be seen before the first years of the 1960s), the Chinese spokesperson has stridently been speaking of ‘Chinese’ nomads using these pastures since immemorial times.
But let us come back to the 1966-67 correspondence which appeared in the Volumes 13 and 14 of the MEA’s White Papers on China.
In January 1966, China was the first to open the hostilities, Beijing complained of Indian troops entering Tibet on September 30, 1965 “four Indian soldiers crossed Toka La [Doka-la] and intruded into Tunglang pasture in Dongnan [Dokham plateau] grassland, and with their weapons intimidated Chinese herdsmen who were grazing cattle there.”
On September 30, 1966, South Block sent a note to the Embassy of China in Delhi to counter the Chinese propaganda; it spoke of a series of intrusions “in the Doklan pasture area which lies south of the traditional boundary between Bhutan and the Tibet region of China in the southern Chumbi area.”
The note pointed out: “It is reported that on the 13th of April 1966, a patrol of the Royal Bhutanese Army observed that a Chinese patrol of 13 men had intruded about three miles south-west of Sinchel La. …The Tibetan grazers were informed by the Bhutanese patrol that they were in Bhutanese territory and asked to withdraw.”
The situation continued during the following months.
The problem was that the trijunction between Tibet (China), Bhutan and India had never been agreed upon. The situation has not changed today.
On October 27, 1966, Xinhua News Agency replied to the Indian note on behalf of the Chinese government: “the Indian Government concocted stories about ‘intrusions’ into Bhutanese territory by Chinese herdsmen and patrols and claiming to be acting on behalf of Bhutan, lodged a so-called protest with the Chinese Government. Following that, with much fanfare [the] Indian Government set its propaganda machine in motion raising a hue and cry about Chinese intrusions into Bhutan and the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi came out in person to conduct the campaign against China.”
It mentioned the ‘Doklam pasture’ where the Chinese intrusions took place, located in the vicinity of the trijunction of the boundaries of China, Bhutan and Sikkim.
At that time already, Beijing tried to create a wedge between India and Bhutan: “The King of Bhutan has long since solemnly declared that ‘Bhutan is an independent sovereign state and has the right to conduct her own foreign affairs’ …[but] inheriting the mantle of British imperialism, the Indian Government has all along been pursuing an expansionist policy and bullying its neighbouring countries.”
Like today, the Bhutanese Government had issued a press statement on October 3, 1966: “The Government of Bhutan have, for some time, been concerned with reports received from its patrols of a number of intrusions by Tibetan grazers and Chinese troops in the Doklam pastures which are adjacent to the southern part of the Chumbi Valley. This area is traditionally part of Bhutan and no assertion has been made by the Government of the People's Republic of China disputing the traditional frontier which runs along recognizeable natural features.”
Last week, the MEA issued a press communiqué underlining that “the two Governments had in 2012 reached agreement that the tri-junction boundary points between India, China and third countries will be finalized in consultation with the concerned countries. Any attempt, therefore, to unilaterally determine tri-junction points is in violation of this understanding.”
Despite the fact that Beijing loves to refer to the 1890 Treaty, which was an ‘unequal’ treaty signed by the Manchus and Great Britain (without the participation of Bhutan, Tibet and Sikkim, the stakeholders), China has clearly broken its promises given to Bhutan and India.
How can a State, which claims to be a responsible power, unilaterally grab a 'disputed' area to build a road on it, especially when it is aware that this road is so strategically located for a neighbour. Only Beijing can answer this question.
Some say that it is in Chinese DNA "to first change the status quo on the ground and then later to offer to 'talk".
Remember the South China Sea or the Aksai Chin.
India has to remain vigilant.
Tailpiece: As mentioned above, ‘differences of perceptions’ on the Tibet-Sikkim-Bhutan and the Sikkim-Tibet borders are not new. China used fully these differences during the Indo-Pakistan conflict of 1965, threatening to interfere in the War by opening a new front in Sikkim.
This has been well-documented in the Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged between the Government of India and China (or White Papers) published by the Ministry of External Affairs in Delhi.
An incident which took place in Delhi on September 24, 1965 is worth relating (it appears in White Paper No. XII).
A delegation led by some Indian politicians (one of them would later become Prime Minister of India), took a herd of 800 goats to the Chinese Embassy in Delhi to make a point: is it worth starting a war over some pastures or simply because herds had crossed an unmarked line?
On September 26, 1965 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodged a strong (not to say rude) complaint to the Indian Embassy in Beijing: “In the afternoon of September 24, 1965, a mob of Indian hooligans went to the gate of the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi to make provocation led by Indian officials and Congress leaders and driving a flock of sheep before them.”
The Chinese note continues: “They made a huge din, yelling that China had invented absurd pretexts for threatening and intimidating India, that China wants to start a world war over some sheep and a few yaks, and so on and so forth.”
The note directly accused Lal Bahadur Shastri’s Government: “This ugly farce was wholly instigated and staged by the Indian Government.”
It continues in the same tone: “The Indian Government will definitely not succeed in its attempt, by staging this ugly anti-Chinese farce, to cover up its crimes of aggression against China and the wretched picture of its troops fleeing in panic from the Chinese side of the China-Sikkim boundary. For a number of years you have flatly denied that Indian troops had intruded into Chinese territory across the China-Sikkim boundary and built military works for aggression there. Yet within a few days of our demand for the dismantling of the military works for aggression within a specified time-limit, the Indian troops who had intruded into the Chinese side of the China-Sikkim boundary could not but flee helter-skelter under the surveillance of Chinese troops, leaving behind numerous evidence of their crime, thus suddenly exploding the falsehood which you had so painstakingly concocted over these years. How can you succeed in hiding your shame?”
The note concluded: “In staging a few forlorn and unseemly anti-Chinese demonstrations you have your undivulgeable motive - to seek reward from the imperialist and modern revisionists. But the Chinese Government must remind the Indian Government that there is a limit to everything, and that the exceeding of such a limit will not be tolerated.”
A few days later, Delhi simply replied that India is a democracy and demonstrations are allowed. It denied the Government’s involvement.
Let us hope that the Chinese missives are less rude now than 50 years ago, but then like now, Beijing believes that the best form of defense is attack.
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| Practicing |
Tuesday, July 4, 2017
When China refuses to talk about Bhutan and Sikkim boundaries.
He added that Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru endorsed the 1890 Sino-British Treaty on Sikkim in a letter to Zhou Enlai in 1959.
Geng also said that successive Indian governments have also endorsed this.
This far from the truth.
In the Notes, Memoranda and letters Exchanged and Agreements signed between The Governments of India and China (White Paper IV for the period between September 1959 - March 1960), published by the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Nehru’s letter to Zhou Enlai is reproduced (Letter from the Prime Minister of India to the Prime Minister of China, 26 September 1959)The issue of the 1890 Agreement is mentioned in para 17 of the letter.
The Indian Prime Minister makes 2 points:
One, Sikkim and Bhutan borders need to be included in any talk on the boundary; two, India stands by the 1890 agreement as far as Northern Sikkim is concerned.
Nehru writes:
It is not clear to us what exactly is the implication of your statement that the boundaries of Sikkim and Bhutan do not fall within the scope of the present discussion. In fact, Chinese maps show sizeable areas of Bhutan as part of Tibet. Under treaty relationships with Bhutan the Government of India are the only competent authority to take up with other Governments matters concerning Bhutan's external relations, and in fact we have taken up with your Government a number of matters on behalf of the Bhutan Government.The Indian Prime Minister remarks that
The rectification of errors in Chinese maps regarding the boundary of Bhutan with Tibet is therefore a matter which has to be discussed along with the boundary of India with the Tibet region of China in the same sector.It is exactly what is the problem today.
The para concludes:
As regards Sikkim, the Chinese Government recognised as far back as 1890 that the Government of India 'has direct and exclusive control over the internal administration and foreign relations of that State'.This clearly refers to northern Sikkim and not to the trijunction which needed to be discussed with Bhutan and Sikkim and which is today the contentious area.
This Convention of 1890 also defined the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet; and the boundary was later, in 1895, demarcated. There is thus no dispute regarding the boundary of Sikkim with the Tibet region.
And once more, let us not forget that the 1890 Treaty was an unequal treaty as Tibet, Sikkim and Bhutan were not involved.
The 1960 Negotiations
In the Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the Peoples’ Republic of China on the Boundary Question, India mentioned time and again that Sikkim and Bhutan (and therefore the trijunction) should be included in the agenda of the talks.
In a Statement Leading to The Adoption of The Agenda (summarized by the Indian side), the Indian Officials stated in Para 2:
The Chinese side in commenting on the Indian suggestion showed that they had a radically different conception of the procedure to be adopted for the meetings of the officials. For one thing, the Chinese side did not consider it necessary to exchange maps and descriptions for the fulfillment of the assignment given to the officials.This was not acceptable to India, as to reach a comprehensive solution for the dispute all the aspects/parts of the boundary had to be included.
Further, the Chinese side stated that the question of the boundaries of Bhutan and Sikkim fell outside the purview of these meetings. According to them, the task envisaged in the Joint Communique could best be taken up by both sides making preliminary general statements of their viewpoints on the Sino-Indian boundary question and from the text of these statements a list of questions could, be drawn up and such a list could serve as the Agenda for the meetings.
In Para 17, the Indian side further also pointed out
that since the terms of reference for the meetings of the officials were to examine factual material on the differences which had arisen between the Indian and the Chinese Governments regarding the border areas, it was not justified to exclude from consideration the boundaries of Bhutan and Sikkim.China stubbornly refused to discuss the issue. As a result, Beijing can today pretend that the boundary was fixed in 1890.
Indeed, references to these boundaries had already been made in the correspondence between the two Governments. For example, the Chinese Government's note of the 26th December, 1959, in reply to the Indian Prime Minister's letter of the 26th September, had dealt with the question of Bhutan and Sikkim. By the terms of the Treaties between these States and India, the latter clearly had responsibility for the external relations of Bhutan and Sikkim and at Bhutan's request the Government of India had already represented to the Chinese Government on matters pertaining to her interests in Tibet.
The question was important because there existed a discrepancy between the correct delineation of the boundaries of Bhutan and that shown on Chinese maps. Moreover, the relevance of these questions to the present dispute had been clearly affirmed by the Prime Minister of India in his talks with Premier Chou En-lai.
The Special Representatives take over
More recently, the issue has been taken on by the Special Representatives (SRs) and as mentioned in the June 30’s Statement of the Ministry of External Affairs,
the Indian side has underlined that the two Governments had in 2012 reached agreement that the tri-junction boundary points between India, China and third countries will be finalized in consultation with the concerned countries. Any attempt, therefore, to unilaterally determine tri-junction points is in violation of this understanding.It also asserted:
Where the boundary in the Sikkim sector is concerned, India and China had reached an understanding also in 2012 reconfirming their mutual agreement on the 'basis of the alignment'. Further discussions regarding finalization of the boundary have been taking place under the Special Representatives framework.During the 2012's talks between the SRs, the two Governments had reached an agreement that the tri-junction boundary points between India, China and a third countries would be finalized in consultation with the concerned countries. It was agreed that any attempt to unilaterally determine tri-junction points would be a violation of this understanding.
As far as the boundary in the Sikkim sector was concerned, India and China had reached reconfirmed their mutual agreement on the 'basis of the alignment' and that further discussions regarding finalization of the boundary would take place under the Special Representatives framework.
It was also pointed out that it was essential that all parties concerned display utmost restraint and abide by their respective bilateral understandings not to change the status quo unilaterally. The consensus reached between India and China through the Special Representatives process was to be scrupulously respected by both sides.
A few weeks ago, China unilaterally started building a road in the contentious area; they have therefore broken the 2012 agreement.
The 1890 treaty is clearly a diversion from the historical facts.
It is however regrettable that the MEA is unable to explain better these facts.
Monday, July 3, 2017
A World War over some sheeps and a few yaks?
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| Yaks by Wang Yiguang, a famous modern Chinese painter |
China used fully these differences during the Indo-Pakistan conflict of 1965, threatening to interfere in the War and opening a new front in Sikkim.
This has been well-documented in the Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged between the Government of India and China (known as White Papers on China) published by the Ministry of External Affairs in Delhi.
Today, I post an extract of White Paper No. XII (pertaining to January 1965 to February 1966). The Note relates to an incident which took place in Delhi on September 24, 1965.
Atal Bihari Vajpayee, then a Member of Parliament took a herd of 800 goats to the Chinese Embassy in Delhi to send a message to Beijing: is it worth starting a war over some pastures in the Himalaya or because some herds had crossed an unmarked line?
Here is the Note given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing to the Embassy of India in China on September 26, 1965.
Let us hope that the Chinese missives are less rude today.
I wish I could find a cartoon (by Shankar for example) of the ‘incident’.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China presents its compliments to the Indian Embassy in China and has the honour to state as follows:
In the afternoon of September 24, 1965, a mob of Indian hooligans went to the gate of the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi to make provocation led by Indian officials and Congress leaders and driving a flock of sheep before them.
They made a huge din, yelling that China had ‘invented absurd pretexts for threatening and intimidating India’ that ‘China wants to start a world war over some sheep and a few yaks’, and so on and so forth.
This ugly farce was wholly instigated and staged by the Indian Government. The Chinese Government hereby lodges a strong protest with the Indian Government.
The Indian Government will definitely not succeed in its attempt, by staging this ugly anti-Chinese farce, to cover up its crimes of aggression against China and the wretched picture of its troops fleeing in panic from the Chinese side of the China-Sikkim boundary.
For a number of years you have flatly denied that Indian troops had intruded into Chinese territory across the China-Sikkim boundary and built military works for aggression there.
Yet within a few days of our demand for the dismantling of the military works for aggression within a specified time-limit, the Indian troops who had intruded into the Chinese side of the China-Sikkim boundary could not but flee helter-skelter under the surveillance of Chinese troops, leaving behind numerous evidence of their crime, thus suddenly exploding the falsehood which you had so painstakingly concocted over these years.
How can you succeed in hiding your shame?
It was clearly because you knew yourselves to be in the wrong that you could not but hastily withdraw all your troops who had intruded to the Chinese side of the China-Sikkim boundary and demolish some of your aggressive military works there.
But then you felt it to be too great a loss of face, so you cast aspersions on China alleging that China wanted to start a war merely for some sheep and a few yaks. Actually, you knew full well that this was a deliberate lie. Otherwise, why did you withdraw all your intruding troops before the time-limit set by us was up?
You must return every single one of the border inhabitants and livestock you kidnapped and seized from Chinese territory across the China-Sikkim border.
But the issue between China and India is absolutely not limited to a matter of some sheep and yaks. Are your subversive activities in Tibet only a matter of some sheep and yaks?
Is your occupation of 92,000 and more square kms of Chinese territory [mainly NEFA, today’s Arunachal Pradesh] along the three sectors of the Sino-Indian border a matter of some sheep and yaks?
No. All Indian intrusions, harassments and armed provocations against China are major questions involving China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and these accounts will have to be settled.
The distinction between aggression and anti-aggression can never be blotted out. The whole world now sees that it was India which launched a war of aggression against Pakistan, thus endangering peace in Asia and the world, and that it was China and other justice-upholding countries which by their firm anti-aggressive stand punctured your aggressive arrogance. It is understandable that you are feeling very much ill at ease.
But you will never succeed in your attempt to coerce China into abandoning her just stand by concocting the lie about China wanting to start a world war. The Indian Government should know that it cannot do what it likes to its neighbouring countries even with the backing of the U.S. imperialists and the modern revisionists. In staging a few forlorn and unseemly anti-Chinese demonstrations you have your undivulgeable motive - to seek reward from the imperialist and modern revisionists. But the Chinese Government must remind the Indian Government that there is a limit to everything, and that the exceeding of such a limit will not be tolerated.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Indian Embassy the assurances of its highest consideration.
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| Yaks by Wang Yiguang |
On October 1, the Indian Government answered the allegations by sending Note to the Embassy of China in India.
It is a reply to two Chinese communications; one dated September 24 about Tibetans taking refuge with their yaks in India and the above.
It also mentions China's 'ultimatum' to India.
The ministry says:
In the two notes under reply the Chinese Government has again belaboured the trumped-up and farcical allegations which have formed the terms of its impertinent ultimatum to India. The Government of India have already repudiated each and every one of these allegations. As regards the so-called military structures, which the Chinese had made into a casus belli, the Government of India and the entire world are amused by the Chinese Government's statement that these have since been demolished by Indian troops while ‘withdrawing’ within the time-limit set by the Chinese Government. The fact was that there were no Indian troops in Tibetan territory to be withdrawn and that there were no Indian military structures in Tibet to be destroyed. The Chinese Government had, indeed, admitted this indirectly by its refusal to allow an independent observer to go to the border and also by rejecting its own proposal for joint inspection when the Government of India accepted it.The Note continues:
Both the 'construction' and the 'demolition' of military structures by Indian troops were a Chinese myth-a myth which has now exploded in the face of its own authors.
About the four Tibetan inhabitants allegedly kidnapped by Indian troops, an adequate reply has been given in the Indian notes of September 17 and 21. Like other Tibetan refugees these four people had come into India on their own volition and without our permission and taken refuge in India. They are free to go back to Tibet at any time if they desire to do so. A propos the 800 sheep and 59 yaks the Government of India have already given a reply in the clearest terms possible. We know nothing of the yaks and as regards the sheep it is up to the two herdsmen concerned to take them to Tibet if and when they choose to go back to their homeland.
Then it comes to the incident in front of the Chinese Embassy in Delhi.
The Indian Note remarks:
In its note of September 26, China has protested against the peaceful demonstration which was held near the Chinese Embassy in New Delhi on September 24 when some of the citizens of Delhi took in procession about 800 sheeps. The Government of India had nothing to do with this demonstration. It was a spontaneous, peaceful and good-humoured expression of the resentment of the citizens of Delhi against the Chinese ultimatum and the threat of war against India on trumped-up and trivial issues. In India, as the Chinese Government is, no doubt, aware, citizens have the right of peaceful assembly and of peaceful demonstration. There is no reason for the Government of China to protest against this. The demonstration was not only peaceful but the demonstrators kept themselves more than 50 yards away from the gate of the Embassy building.It further adds that full security protection was provided to the Chinese Embassy:
This peaceful demonstration by a number of private citizens of Delhi was entirely in conformity with the laws of India and with the rights and freedoms enjoyed by Indian citizens under the Constitution. The Chinese Government has absolutely no right to interfere in the internal affairs of India. The protest is, therefore, rejected as completely unwarranted.The rest of the Note deals with the inflow of Tibetan refugees in India, a topic very sensitive for Beijing in the 1960s … and today too.
South Block says:
The Chinese Government appears to have been embarrassed by the statement in the Indian note that there are not four but thousands of Tibetans who have left their homeland and taken refuge in India. But that is a fact, though not a creditable one for the Chinese regime in Tibet. The Chinese note has stated that these thousands of Tibetan refugees are a debt which India owes to China. On the contrary, it is a debt which China owes to the people of Tibet for making it impossible for them to live in freedom and dignity in their own motherland. It is interesting that a mention has been made in the Chinese note to His Holiness the Dalai Lama.These remarks were bound to upset China further.
However, Delhi continues to give its views on the matter:
In March, 1959, when the Dalai Lama fled from Lhasa, following the Chinese invasion of Tibet, and took asylum in India, the Chinese Government had stated that His Holiness was ‘abducted to India by Tibetan rebels’ and kept under duress by the Indian authorities.At that time, India still speaks about an ‘invasion’, a term which is not used anymore today.
The Note recounts the sequence of events:
However, on December 17, 1964, the State Council of China, while dismissing the Dalai Lama from his posts as the Chairman and member of the Preparatory Committee for the autonomous region of Tibet, described His Holiness as having ‘staged a traitorous armed counter revolutionary rebellion against the country in 1959’ and to have fled abroad. Now the Chinese Government has changed its tune once again and has alleged that the Dalai Lama and others were enticed or coerced to go to India.Using strong words, Delhi points out: “The falsehoods propagated by the Chinese Government do not even possess the virtue of consistency. The Chinese Government ought to be aware that rebellions do not take place under enticement or coercion.”
And says: “Where there is oppression, there is rebellion. It is futile to blame India for the troubles in Tibet and for large number of Tibetans being forced to leave their hearths and homes for refuge in other countries.”
The entire White Paper is available on my website.
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