The Barahoti saga: Failure of 'Nehru doctrine' and deceitful nature of Dragon

My article The Barahoti saga: Failure of 'Nehru doctrine' and deceitful nature of Dragon  appeared in Firstpost

Here is the link...

Hardly two months after the Panchsheel Agreement was signed, India discovered that all problems had not been solved. The first Chinese incursion took place in Barahoti in June 1954. This was followed by a series of intrusions numbering in the hundreds 

The Hindu recently reported that new posts of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had sprung up some six-seven kilometres north of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Middle Sector on the Indo-Tibet boundary, “while the frequency of patrolling has also significantly increased in certain areas,” it noted.
Citing sources in the Government, the newspaper asserted that China was actively expanding its network of ‘Xiaokang’ model villages (‘Xiaokang’ meaning ‘moderately prosperous villages’), along the Middle Sector of the LAC. These villages are said to be constructed with the main objective of ‘poverty alleviation’, but one could ask: is there a need for hundreds of such villages precisely on India’s northern borders …if there was no other purpose?
Obviously, these villages have a ‘dual use’; further, the fact both that Tibetans and Hans are settled there will quickly change the demography of the border areas, moreover providing bases or garrisons for the PLA when required.
The report also mentioned that the Chinese are “building villages at a rapid pace, sometimes as many as 300-400 houses in multi-storey blocks within 90-100 days. …Construction of a likely border settlement village was observed northwest of Tholing area [north of Chamoli district Uttarakhand] and a military complex is also under construction close by. Superstructures of buildings in both the locations are complete.”
China apparently uses prefabricated parts extensively to construct the houses at a quick pace.

Historical Background
The history of how Barahoti became a disputed area is interesting.
Let us remember that for centuries the Indo-Tibet frontier had been peaceful; however the Indian diplomats who negotiated the Panchsheel Agreement foolishly ‘avoided’ confirming India’s northern frontiers during the talks and in the final accord signed in April 1954. India still pays dearly for this monumental lapse.
The signature of the Panchsheel Agreement with China, through which India surrendered all its rights and responsibilities in Tibet while getting nothing in return, was a complete surrender to China; Delhi did not wait long to see the consequences of The ‘Nehru doctrine’ (to be friendly at any cost with China).

A Historical Background by the Intelligence Bureau
Let us go into the history of the so-called dispute; in July 1952, in a note ‘Border Disputes and Collection of Taxes by Tibetans in Garhwal District’, the Intelligence Bureau (IB) described the topography of the area (today’s Chamoli district of Uttarakhand): “The Garhwal-Tibet border can only be crossed through the Mana and Niti Valleys where there are open places and habitation, while the rest of the border area consists of snow-covered mountains studded with glaciers…”
The IB report continued its descriptions of the area: “There are four passes between Niti Valley and Tibet, namely: Gothing Pass, Damjin [Tunjun] Pass, Hoti Pass and Ghirti Pass. Niti, the Northern most village in the Indian territory, is situated 11 miles from Gothing Pass and Damjin Pass. There are few plains situated near these passes in the Indian territory.”
These passes marked the watershed line: north was Tibet (China after 1951), south was India.
The Intelligence note admitted that once in the 19th century, there was a short boundary dispute about Hoti Plain. Giving the background, it says: “About the end of the last [19th] century, the Tibetans had established a Customs Post at Hoti Plain. To stop this practice, the British Govt. had to send out a detachment of Gurkhas along with Shri Dharma Nand Joshi, Deputy Collector in 1890.”
The Tibetan official (called a Sarji, an emissary of the Tibetan Dzongpon or District Commissioner) usually crossed the border at Tunjun-la pass to announce the beginning of the trading season.
Though the access to the place was difficult, making it hard to keep a tab on the area, the British were quick to understand the plot and stop the Tibetan official to cross the pass.
Soon after the Chinese occupied Western Tibet in the early 1950s, they started claiming Barahoti as theirs. The IB recommended to the Government of India that it was essential that Delhi “should make it clear to the Govt. of Tibet and its Dzongpon that the Hoti Plain is Indian territory and the Tibetans have no right to establish any customs post there; nor can they exercise any authority in the area.”
But the Tibetan Government was fast losing its independence.

The Ink was Hardly Dry
Hardly two months after the Panchsheel Agreement was signed, India discovered that all problems had not been solved, as just announced in Parliament by the Prime Minister. The first Chinese incursion took place in Barahoti in June 1954. This was followed by a series of intrusions numbering into hundreds and culminating in the attack on India in October 1962.
The irony of the story of the first intrusion is that it was China which complained about the incursion of Indian troops… on India’s territory!
Though Barahoti was well inside India’s frontiers (clearly south of Tunjun-la, the watershed), arguments about the new ‘dispute’ continued with the exchange of hundreds of notes during the following months ...and years.
TN Kaul who had negotiated the Panchsheel Agreement, (before being sent back to Delhi for having an affair with a Chinese woman), philosophically explained later: “Territorial disputes have existed between near and distant neighbours through the ages. The question is whether they can and should be resolved by war, threat, use of force or through the more civilized and peaceful method of negotiation... Both sides still profess their faith in the Five Principles, and therein lies perhaps some hope for the future.”
The Five Principles had put Kaul and his colleagues to sleep.

1850 Map of Hoti

Where is Wuje?
In the meantime, the Chinese started calling Barahoti by the name of ‘Wuje’ creating more confusion in the minds of the Indian diplomats (the same tactic of changing the names of places is today used in Arunachal Pradesh).
During the following months, the Chinese would insist on sending a joint investigating team to this spot, something Delhi always refused. The main reason for Beijing to insist on a joint investigation team was that Beijing did not know that Barahoti was located south of Tunjun-la and therefore in India.

A New Note
Over the years, as the situation continued to deteriorate, a note was prepared by Jagat Mehta, Director (China) in the Ministry of External Affairs in 1961. It provides the background of Barahoti saga during the preceding years. Mehta writes: “The Chinese claim to the Barahoti became known to us in 1954, when the Indian and Chinese army faced each other in the small pasture ground. The suggestion for refraining from sending the troops was first made in 1955 and was reiterated in 1956; it was agreed that no troops should be sent by either party in 1957, and a conference to discuss the dispute regarding Bara Hoti was held in April – June 1958.”
At the end of the conference, it was agreed that “neither side should send forces in exercise of its supposed right during the talks and until the question was settled.”
At the same time, the Chinese reiterated again their desire for a joint investigation, while “persistently refused to specify the actual area of Wuje. When pressed, in a vague manner they said that Wuje covered 15 kms north to south and 10 kms, east to west, but no coordinates were given even with reference to this area.”
Mehta explained that India made it clear that Barahoti was a small pasture ground south of Tunjun-la: “during the talks we specified the relevant coordinates and pointed out that the area involved was 2 miles in length and ¾ of a mile in breadth. The Chinese did not agree to our suggestion for the complete neutralization of this area and hinted that they would continue to send civil officials, where upon we also informed them that we were reserving the right to send our own revenue officials to this area.”
The agreement was that the patrols should be unarmed; while India always kept its promise, already in 1958, China sent an armed detachment to the area after the Indian civil party withdrew in September.
Two points should be made to conclude: though it was not necessary for India to participate in a conference for Barahoti in 1958 as the area was clearly south of the watershed and therefore in India, Delhi agreed out of goodwill and for the sake of the ‘friendship’ with China. It did not help to find a solution for the issue.
The second point is that even after agreeing not to send armed patrols to the remote plain, Beijing did not keep its word. It was the beginning of a series of un-kept promises, which continues till today in Eastern Ladakh or Arunachal Pradesh.

Nilang Valley reopened

Home minister Rajnath Singh celebrated the New Year with Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) troops in Nelong (or Nilang) valley.
PTI commented: “This visit comes days after Chinese military said India should 'strictly control' its troops.”
It was Singh’s second visit to the Sino-Indian border area in Uttarakhand; in September, he had a 4-day tour of the region.
Nelong Border Outpost (BoP), manned by the ITBP personnel, is located at the height of 11,700 feet. The home minister visited the ITBP’s 12th battalion headquarters in picturesque Matli, located at 3400 feet on the banks of Bhagirathi river.
Later he was scheduled to visit Pulam Sumdha (altitude 14,200 feet), Kopang (8,700 feet) and Bhairon Ghati (9,150 feet). Accompanied by ITBP director general (DG) R K Pachnanda, Singh interacted with jawans and officers of the ITBP.
The 90,000-personnel strong ITBP is guarding the 3,488 km long Sino-India border stretching from Jammu and Kashmir (1,597 km), Himachal Pradesh (200 km), Uttarakhand (345 km), Sikkim (220 km) to Arunachal Pradesh (1,126 km).
A few years ago, I wrote about the history of the area.
The introduction of my paper is posted below.
The area is disputed by the Chinese because Beijing refuses to adhere to the universally-accepted principle of 'watershed' used to demarcate a border.
In 2017, the incident at the trijunction Tibet-Sikkim-Bhutan was triggered by the same wrong views from Beijing.
The watershed in the area is located at Tsangchok-la.

The watershed principle helps demarcate the Indo-Tibet border

In 2015, I had also mentioned the opening of the area to tourism.

Yesterday, The Hindustan Times (HT) carried an article on Nilang (spelt Nelong) in Uttarakhand.
It says: “The spectacular Nelong Valley - a cold desert like area - tucked in the Uttarakhand Himalayas, close to the Indo-China border, was opened to tourists earlier this year after 53 years of remaining out of bounds post the 1962 War. While the state government opened it with much enthusiasm in May, it failed to promote the destination as a result less than 200 tourists visited the valley in the last six months. The valley, which has a similar landscape as that of Ladakh, is not only rich in natural beauty but also houses remnants of the treacherous Indo-China trade route - like a hand-built wooden bridge - that was used for centuries by the locals prior to the war.”
It is not exactly true that the landscapes look like Ladakh, but the beauty of the place is indisputable.
Further, Nilang has an interesting historical background, probably not known to the reporter who describes the area thus: “The valley, situated at an altitude of around 11,000 feet above the sea level, falls under the Gangotri National Park in Uttarkashi district, is around 315 km from Dehradun. It is also only 23 kms away from Bhaironghati, a place just eight kms ahead of the famous Gangotri shrine.”
Not only did the entry to this ‘restricted area’ remain closed for civilians after the 1962 War, but the local Bhotiya population was shifted to Bagori and Dunda villages in Uttarkashi district.

This year, the area has been opened to some privileged tourists.
The Hindustan Times explains: “The government has put a cap on the number of vehicles entering the valley per day, which is maximum six with only four occupants in each. A permit letter from the sub-divisional magistrate is required to visit the area while entry of foreigners is banned. Though the government had opened the destination with high hopes, only 184 tourists visited the valley in six months.”
According to the HT, the reopening of Nilang valley has made the local population happy, as tourism could be a good source of income: “Prior to the war, trade with Tibet was the economic mainstay of the villagers in the valley. Few remnants of the trade route - the most prominent one being a narrow wooden bridge along the gorge - still remains intact. This valley could thus be highlighted as a heritage site,” a native of Nilang told the daily.
The Government of Uttarakhand believes that the valley has a great potential; it can be developed into a special tourism destination, like Valley of Flowers in Chamoli district which attracts thousands of tourists and nature lovers every year.

A retired senior bureaucrat, SS Pangtey told the HT that the area is “an untapped asset of natural splendor that could turn into a major attraction for domestic tourists if publicized properly. It is a remote, virgin area which has a huge potential to become an adventure tourism hotspot if only the state is able to publicise it amply”
Soon after the 1962 War, locals Bhotiyas, living in Nilang during the summer and who for generations had been trading with Tibet, were resettled in Bagori and Dunda villages: “Prior to the war, trade with Tibet was the economic mainstay of the villagers in the valley. Few remnants of the trade route - the most prominent one being a narrow wooden bridge along the gorge - still remains intact. This valley could thus be highlighted as a heritage site,” said Jot Singh, a native of Nilang valley, now living in a nearby village.

History of Nilang-Jadhang Valleys
A few years ago, I researched the history of the area, which, in the early 1930s had been disputed by Tibet (later on, it was claimed by China).
In fact, it is this dispute which forced the Government of India to reallocate the local population after 1962.
I post here the introduction to my paper, as well as some extracts of the Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the Peoples’ Republic of China on the Boundary Question, published by the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India in 1961.
There were a few such places claimed by Tibet, with any historical or geographical basis; later they became part of the Sino-Indian border dispute.
It is a positive sign that the Government of Uttarakhand has not agreed to reopen this area.
Hopefully, it will become a destination for eco-tourism only.

Here is the introduction to my paper

History of the dispute between Tehri State and Tibet: A Himalayan Case

One of main historic upshots of the relation between Tibet and the Himalayan region has been the Sino-Indian border dispute along the 4,000 km mountainous range.
In many cases, the present ‘dispute’ with China has its origin in disagreement between the Lhasa government and the administration of Himalayan princely states (and by extension British India). This is true for NEFA too.
Our case study relates to Nilang/Jadhang area in today’s Uttarakhand.
It is particularly interesting due to the large amount of correspondence between Tibet (the Kashag in Lhasa and the Dzongpen in Tsaparang) and the princely states of Tehri-Garhwal, Bashahr as well as the provincial governments of the United Provinces and the Punjab and of course, the Foreign and Political Department of British India in Delhi.
The ‘negotiations’ lasted some 12 years, at the end of which no mutually acceptable solution could be found.
The entire story is extracted from a couple of files today in the British Archives. A few years ago, I had the good fortune to come across them and I thought it would be interesting to share this unknown aspect of the Himalayan relations.

Location and Description
The area disputed by Tibet and Tehri-Garhwal State lies between longitude 78.53 and 79.25 East and latitude 31 and 31.26 North.
For the sake of the different Commissions which went into the dispute between 1926 and 1935, different colours have been assigned to the respective claims on a map prepared by the British surveyors:

• The boundary between the Tehri-Garhwal state and Garhwal district of the United Provinces is shown in green.
• The boundary claimed by the Tehri-Garhwal State is shown in red. It is the watershed between the western sources of the Bhagirathi river and the valley of the Sutlej river, known in Tibet as Langchen Khabab.
• The boundary claimed by Tibet is shown in yellow; their frontier claim is unclear at several places as the Tibetan representatives often claimed ‘a single point as the boundary’, that is the junction of the Gumgum nala with the Bhagirathi (one mile West of Jangla Forest Bungalow).

The Brief History of the Dispute
The dispute seems to have arisen when the Dzongpen of Tsaparang, the nearby Tibetan district, visited the Gumgum nala in 1914. He publically announced his decision of setting up a boundary pillar near the bridge. When the local villagers objected, the Dzongpen left without any further action.
In 1918, the Tehri State decided to erect 3 pillars on the top of the Tsang Chok-la (31.30 North and 79.16 East). Some versions claimed that the pillars had already been there in the past and were only ‘repaired’.
Two years later, the Tehri State surveyed the area and, for the first time, prepared cultivation maps of the Nilang region (31.7 North and 79.4 East). The Jadhang valley (31.11 North and 79.6 East) was also included in the maps.
In 1921, the Tsaparang Dzongpen visited Nilang again. This time, he sent a letter to the Raja of Tehri requesting him to send an official to sort out the boundary issue; at that time, it was not yet considered a ‘dispute’; it was more a ‘difference of perceptions’ between neighbours. The Raja answered that the issue had to be raised through the Government of India as it involved a problem with two foreign governments.
During the next warm season, the Dzongpen visited Nilang again and collected a tax of Rs.1 from the local people of Nilang and Jadhang. He thus collected a total of Rs 300.
In 1924, it was finally proposed by British India to appoint a boundary Commission, but due to the poor communications and the fact that these areas could only be visited in summer, the Commission could meet only in the summer of 1926.

Report of the Officials
The Nilang-Jadhang area
Regarding Nilang-Jadhang, the Indian side produced a large amount of evidence to establish conclusively that this area had always been a part of India. The boundary alignment between India and Tibet in this sector had always been along the watershed range.
…The Chinese side then referred to the discussions regarding the boundary in this sector between India and Tibet during the years 1921 to 1928. This, however, could in no way substantiate the Chinese claim. During these discussions the Tehri state had produced a variety of records going back to the 17th century to prove its ownership of the area; and the Tibetan side could produce only one book in which the trade dues paid by the villages of Nilang and Jadhang to the Dzongpon of Tsaparang, when they visited the Tibetan trade marts of Poling and Toling, were entered as taxes. Again, while the Tehri representative gave a precise definition of the Tehri-Tibet boundary, the Tibetan representatives referred to only on point — Gum Gum or Gungoong bridge — on the alignment claimed by them and could not say how the line would run east and west of this point The compromise proposed at the time by colonel Bailey, and referred to by the Chinese side was offered not because Tehri's claim was weak but because the Government of India were anxious to settle a minor dispute lest it impair the prevailing friendly relations between India and Tibet.
It was not, therefore, true to say that the then Indian Government coerced the local inhabitants in order to alter the existing boundary.
Rather, it was the other way round. The people of Nilang and Jadhang, who during winter moved deeper south, in the summer, went to Tibet to trade. While in Tibet they were subjected to various vexatious dues and intimidated into declaring that they were subjects of Tibet and that the trade dues paid by them were land taxes. It was significant that the only documentary evidence brought forward by the Chinese side for this area were two 'avowals' alleged to have been made by the inhabitants in 1921 and 1927-i.e. after the commencement of the boundary dispute. It was such repeated coercion by the Tibetan authorities of the traders of Nilang and Jadhang that forced these villagers to cease going into Tibet for trade.

Trespass on Barahoti: We had it coming

My article Trespass on Barahoti: We had it coming appeared in The Asian Age/Deccan Chronicle.

Here is the link...

An improved infrastructure should be provided to the Indian Army and the paramilitary forces to man the area.

According to PTI, on June 3, two helicopters of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) hovered over the Barahoti bowl in Chamoli district in Uttarakhand.
The news agency repotted that the choppers, which returned to the Chinese side after about five minutes, “could have carried out aerial photography of Indian ground troops during what was possibly a reconnaissance mission.”
The choppers were identified as the Zhiba (WZ-9) attack helicopters.
Incidentally, on the same day, Lt Gen He Lei, vice president of the PLA’s Academy of Military Science addressed the plenary session of the 16th Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore.
Representing China, Gen He affirmed in front of his colleagues from Asia and the West: “China has always worked to maintain, build and contribute to international and regional peace and has firmly followed the path of peaceful development although it is faced with multiple security challenges.”
Whether it is in the South China Sea (SCS) or Barahoti, the Chinese break the rules that they pretend to uphold; intruding areas, occupying them and later telling the other stakeholders: “let us discuss”. Opponents, placed in front of a fait accompli, are most of the time unable to give a fitting answer (this is even the case of Donald Trump in the SCS).
In the present situation, Chamoli’s Superintendent of Police, Tripti Bhatt told The Hindustan Times that the helicopter(s) entered the Indian airspace from Tibetan side; however, she refused to confirm that it was a Chinese helicopter. This raises several questions.
First, for such sensitive issues, there should be only ONE spokesperson, whether from the Defence Ministry or the Indo-Tibet Border Police (ITBP) who gives factual infor
mation to the press.
Then, photos or videos should be provided to the media, which hopefully can help the Indian public to better understand what China does.
Then an improved infrastructure should be provided for the Indian Army and the paramilitary forces to man the area. This is the result of the neglect of the Himalayan frontier with China for the past 60 years.
Finally, there are no ‘minor’ issues when the Indian borders are concerned. Barahoti, which witnessed the first Chinese intrusions on Indian soil in 1954 is indeed a telling case.
Every summer, the Indian media cries foul: “The Chinese have come again”. “The Chinese Dragon struck again”, scream reports originating from this ‘inaccessible’ part of Uttarakhand.
Last year, The Times of India reported: “It all began on July 22, when an Indian team of 19 civilians led by a Sub Divisional Magistrate first entered into the area in Barahoti. …Three days later for the first time, China sent a helicopter to the area.”
The Government of India, as usual, played down the incident. As a result, this year, two choppers have come …in June and next year more will come.
Last year another serious issue cropped up, as per an agreed protocol signed in 2005 and reiterated in 2013 with China, the ITBP personnel were not carrying firearms, while Chinese were carrying arms and wearing uniforms.
But how did the story start?
In July 1952, in a secret note, the Intelligence Bureau described the topography of the Himalaya in this area: “The Garhwal-Tibet border can only be crossed through the Mana and Niti Valleys where there are open places and habitation, while the rest of the border area consists of snow-covered mountains studded with glaciers. …There are four passes between Niti Valley and Tibet”. One of them was Tunjun-la, north of Barahoti.
A couple of years earlier, some Tibetans officials had entered the tiny bowl of Barahoti. The IB explained the background of the so-called dispute: “About the end of last century the Tibetans had established a Customs Post at Hoti Plain. To stop this practice, the British Government had to send out a detachment of Gurkhas along with the Deputy Collector in 1890. This had a salutary effect and the Tibetans removed their post. It appears that for some time past the Tibetans have again been establishing a Police-cum-Customs post at Hoti during the trading season.”
As in most areas in the Himalaya, the access is far easier from the Tibetan side than from the Indian. Over the years, this greatly facilitated the Chinese intrusions.
The 1952 IB note continued: “It is quite possible that if the Tibetans are not stopped from establishing their post at Hoti Plain, they might eventually claim it to be their own territory.” The IB then recommended: “It is, therefore, essential that the Govt. of India should make it clear to the Govt. of Tibet and its Dzongpon [District Commissioner] that the Hoti Plain is Indian territory and the Tibetans have no right to establish any Customs post there.”
At that time, the Uttar Pradesh Government asserted that no case of “encroachment has so far been reported though at one or two places tax collectors from Tibet did come in but were persuaded to go back.”
The above incident was enough for China to claim the area as ‘hers’. It happened as soon as the negotiations for the Panchsheel Agreement, (which only deals with trade and pilgrimage between Tibet and India) were completed in April 1954. It was soon obvious that the Indian diplomats had goofed up, they had ‘forgotten’ to discuss the Indo-Tibet border.
Though the ‘smart’ Indian negotiators in Beijing had been sent a complete list of the Himalayan passes, they believed that by naming six passes only, they had delineated a border.
As a result of India not insisting on all the passes, China started claiming several areas south of the watershed, in particular the area south of the Tunjun-la pass, where Barahoti is located.
It is only much later that South Block understood the meaning of Premier Zhou En-lai’s opening remarks, at the time of signature: “there are bound to be some problems between two great countries like India and China with a long common border… but we are prepared to settle all such problems as are ripe for settlement now”.

China did not know that Barahoti was south of Tunjun-la in 1958

Less than two months after the signature, India discovered that all problems had not been solved: the first Chinese incursion in the Barahoti area of Uttar Pradesh occurred in June 1954. This was the first of a series of incursions numbering in the hundreds which culminated in the attack of October 1962
Correspondence went on for four years and in 1958 a conference was held to sort out the issue. China refused to admit that the watershed marked the frontier and that Tunjun-la pass had for centuries been the traditional border.
After the failure of the 1958 talks, the Foreign Secretary Subimal Dutt wrote: “Each side has put forward its arguments in favour of its case. The Chinese are contesting our arguments and we are, of course, contesting theirs. The only positive suggestion made by the Chinese is that there should be a joint local enquiry.”
But India refused when it discovered that was just a pretext for China to find out the exact location of the place. They thought that Barahoti (they call it Wuje) was north of Tunjun-la. It seems a joke; unfortunately, the Chinese intrusions still continue today.
More than 60 years later, the case of Barahoti shows that for the Chinese, there is no big or small issue, every inch is a victory, and the second lesson is that there is no short cut to building a proper infrastructure.
And India should not hesitate to send drones to the area if and when required.

Will the 'paharis' look after the Himalayan borders?

My article entitled (sic) Smell the coffee along the China border appeared in the Edit Page of The Pioneer.
 
Here is the Link...

While Beijing has been pressing with remarkable speed in developing infrastructure along its borders with India, the latter has shown equally remarkable laxity over the same. Hopefully, things will now change

The Army Commanders’ Conference was recently held at the Indian Military Academy at Dehradun. Led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and Minister for Defence Manohar Parrikar, dignitaries were given an extensive briefing by the three Services chiefs, particularly on  infrastructure development along the China and Pakistan borders.
At a time when China is investing billions of yuans to develop its ‘Indian’ frontiers, it was a timely review. On January 23, the website, China Tibet Online, announced that a road leading to the last two townships without road access in Tibet, would soon be completed. Both roads in Metok County of Nyingchi town, started in 2015, are expected to be soon operational. The Metok County is situated north of the Tuting Circle of Upper Siang of Arunachal Pradesh, where the Yarlung Tsangpo enters India to become the Siang (and later the Brahmaputra).
The Chinese article says: “The geological conditions are complex with high mountains and deep valleys, leading to high road construction costs and long construction periods.” In 2017 alone, a total of 52 billion yuan (nearly six billion dollars) will be invested in infrastructure assets on the plateau, and “355km of high-grade highway [will be added], leading to a total highway mileage of more
than 90,000 km.”
The Chinese website adds that these roads could not be built earlier “due to the high mountains and deep valleys”. It was only in October 2013 that Metok Highway was officially opened to the public: “Metok waved goodbye to China’s last County without road access”, said China Tibet Online.
On the other side of the range, the situation is different. A recent article in The Arunachal Times describes the sad state of affairs. Journalist Tongam Rina recounts her ‘memorable trip’ to Tuting; she had joined an all-women team from the Arunachal Institute of Tribal Studies of Rajiv Gandhi University in Itanagar. Rina writes: “After a few kilometres of good roads, we hit the typical Arunachal road; forever under-construction, chopping off hills that inevitably result in landslides during the monsoon, at the same time destroying whatever is left of an existing road.”
She continues her narration after a first night on the way: “…The next morning, the caretaker of the guesthouse prompted us to eat, “Tuting ka rasta bahut dur hai, khana jaldi nehi milega… After a few kilometres out of town, we were on bumpy, narrow road again. The only saving grace was the mighty beautiful Siang, flowing majestically below.”
The description is vivid: “And a bad jerk forced me to look at the road again. The road is so bad that one can’t drive more than 15 kilometres per hour. One bad move from the driver because of the bad road could literally end the journey.”
On the other side, China is planning to build a Gangdise International Tourism Cooperation Zone in Ngari Prefecture, adjoining Himachal Pradesh and Ladakh, ‘to serve as an opening window to South Asia’(sic). Gangdise or Trans-Himalaya is a term coined by Swedish explorer Sven Hedin in the 19th century. It is the space on both sides of the main Himalayan range, following the Indian border.
KangbaTV, a Chinese site about Tibet, explains that the zone will cover areas around the Himalaya, mainly in Ngari area, but it will also include Shigatse, Lhoka (southeast of Lhasa), Purang (near Mt Kailash), Zham (landport with Nepal), Yatung (in Chumbi Valley), Kyirong (border between Nepal and Tibet) and Tsona (north of Tawang). But the main development will focus on western Tibet. The website adds: “Scenic spots in Ngari area are all featured. With the drive of the main scenic spots, travelling routes of other tourist spots have been gradually developed, which will make Ngari tourism a growth-pole of Tibet’s tourism.”
China is planning to transform the Trans-Himalayan region into a mega tourist spot. For the purpose, Beijing announced that two new highways will soon be constructed leading to the Indian border and that Highway G219, the main artery connecting Tibet to Xinjiang (also known as the Aksai Chin road) will be upgraded. All this will be done during China’s 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020).
The first new highway, known as G564, will branch off from the G219, near Mount Kailash (Tharchen) and head south, passing between Mansarovar and Rakshas lakes before reaching Purang, near the tri-junction Nepal-India-Tibet. The length of the road will be 107 km; it is designed for a speed of 80 km/h. The construction should be completed by August 2019. The second highway, the G365, will connect the G219 to Tholing and Tsaparang. The ancient monastic complexes are presently being restored to bring a large number of Chinese tourists to the famous ruins of the Guge Kingdom.
Another important development is the construction a second highway between Tibet and Xinjiang, via Minfeng. The road will be 558 km long. The deeply-worrying aspect of the project is that it crosses the highly eco-sensitive Changthang National Nature Reserve. It will run for 110 km in the main reserve, about 270 km in the buffer zone and some 100 km in the ‘experimental area’. More than one billion American dollars is invested in the project. The road should be put into operation by early 2021.
All this comes at a time when Beijing has announced the creation of a new Central Commission for Integrated Military and Civilian Development. It was launched on January 22, and according to The People’s Daily, experts have declared it vital for China’s national defence “The commission will decide and coordinate affairs on civil-military integration”. It will function directly under the Politburo’s Standing Committee with President Xi Jinping as the Chairman.
In the meantime, Delhi still lives in the Middle Ages, with an antediluvian Inner Line Permit and hardly any cooperation between the Armed Forces and the civil administration (at least in Ladakh).
But India has perhaps a chance. For the first time, the National Security Advisor, the Army chief and the Director of the Research & Analysis Wing are all natives of Pauri Garwhal in Uttarakhand. One can hope that the paharis will understand better the issue of mountain development.
The Indian Expressrecently noted: “Pauri Garhwal district has the distinction of sending three men to topmost positions in the current security establishment. At the same time, it suffers high migration out of the hills, thanks to near-zero irrigation, declining farming, zero employment, poor education and health facilities.”
And no highways of course! Let us hope that this will be remedied soon. It’s of vital interest to the country’s security and stability.

China’s border tactics unchanged

Indian patrol in the Barahoti Plain in the 1950s

My article China’s border tactics unchanged appeared in The Asian Age/Deccan Chronicle
 
Here is the link...

Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi’s visit to New Delhi on Saturday will not change anything in the mindset of the leadership in Beijing, and the intrusions (transgressions?) will continue. It is important, therefore, that the Indian public is aware about the history of our borders.

In July 1952, the Intelligence Bureau sent New Delhi a worrying report about the Garhwal-Tibet border; after explaining that the border in this area could “only be crossed through Mana and Niti Valleys, where there are open places and habitation, the rest of the border area consists of snow-covered mountains studded with glaciers,” it mentioned one area, Hoti, used by Indian traders going to Tibet during the warm season.
The report warned that at the end of the 19th century, the Tibetans had once established a customs post in Hoti Plain: “To stop this practice, the British government had to send out a detachment of Gurkhas along with Dharmanand Joshi, deputy collector, in 1890. This had a salutary effect and the Tibetans removed their post,” the IB report noted.
But once the Chinese appeared on the scene and occupied the plateau in 1950-51, the Tibetans became bolder: “It appears the Tibetans have again established a police-cum-customs post at Hoti during the trading season,” the 1952 IB report said. It added: “It’s quite possible that if the Tibetans aren’t stopped from establishing their post at Hoti Plain, they might eventually claim it to be their own territory. Since there is no habitation or cultivation in this area, the Garhwal authorities hardly ever visit the area or take action to denote that it lies within their jurisdiction.”
For centuries, the dzongpon (commissioner) of Daba in Tibet had sent serjis (messengers) to Hoti Plain in Indian territory to announce that the trading season had begun. As Indian traders went to Tibet, there were charged some “hospitality” taxes corresponding to the facilities they got from the Tibetan authorities (fodder for animals, etc).
In 1952, the Tibetans again shifted their “customs” camp to Barahoti. The IB then suggested sending a detachment of the Garhwal Rifles and local armed police to hoist the Indian tricolour in Barahoti “to stop the Tibetans from establishing their customs post”.
That is how the Barahoti “dispute” started. It took a nastier turn two years later, when China had established its presence in western Tibet.
It’s important to remember that the Indian and Chinese governments had signed the “historic” Panchsheel Agreement on trade and pilgrimage in Tibet in April 1954. India gave away all its rights in the Land of Snows (telegraph lines, post offices, dak bungalows, military escorts in Gyantse and Yatung), but got no assurances on the border demarcation from Beijing.

In the negotiations, Indian diplomats clearly showed that the traditional and customary boundary followed the watershed range; the passes of Mana, Niti, Tun Jun La, Balcha Dhura, Kungri Bingri, Darma and Lipulekh marked the border in the area. China agreed to name five of them in the agreement, but flatly refused to mention Tsang Chok La, Tun Jun La and Balcha Dhura.
Why? Simply because Tun Jun La is north of Barahoti in Garhwal and Balcha Dhura north of Sangchamalla and Lapthal in Almora district. Not naming these passes allowed China to later claim that these areas were located south of the watershed. The Indian negotiators were fooled... but then China, at that time, was a great friend!
The ink barely dried on the Panchsheel that China started making claims on the Indian territories. On August 13, 1954, a note from the Chinese embassy in New Delhi complained: “Over 30 Indian troops armed with rifles crossed the Niti Pass on June 29, 1954, and intruded into Wu-Je (Chinese name for Barahoti).” Beijing pretended to be shocked, saying “this not in conformity with the principles of non-aggression and friendly co-existence between China and India.” So while China had entered Indian territory, it was now blaming India!
Beijing later protested that on July 17, a 33-person unit had entered its territory... in Barahoti: “The unit was under the command of an officer called Nathauja (Chinese pronunciation), a deputy commander, the district magistrate of Walzanjapur district as well as a doctor, a radio operator and soldiers, all living in 17 tents.”
After investigations, India replied on August 27 that it was found “the allegation is entirely incorrect. A party of our Border Security Force is encamped in Hoti Plain, which is southeast of Niti Pass and in Indian territory. None of our troops or personnel have crossed north of Niti Pass.”
It is how the saga of incursions in the central sector of the Indo-Tibet (now Sino-Indian) border began.
A new terminology has been found by bureaucrats in New Delhi. It is called a “transgression”, but it doesn’t change the historical fact: Barahoti is south of the Himalayan watershed marking the border.
In 1958, New Delhi decided to try to negotiate a settlement with Beijing. Fu Hao, Chinese counsellor in New Delhi, met a MEA joint secretary several times. The Chinese suggested a joint local inquiry. Foreign secretary Subimal Dutt sent a note to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru: “Our case is that Barahoti is an area of about one and a half square miles. We have given the exact position with reference to its latitude and longitude. The Chinese have not defined which area they mean by Wu-Je... an area south of Tun Jun La.” Dutt then added: “If the Chinese claims are conceded, the international boundary would lie south in what is undoubtedly Indian territory.”
The foreign secretary said: “The Chinese are apparently keen on a local inquiry because they will thereby be in a position to define the exact borders of the area which they are claiming.” But Beijing didn’t know where Wu-Je or Barahoti was located.
Subimal Dutt then concluded: “We should emphatically refuse to take any oral evidence locally. Barahoti is more easily approachable from the Tibet side than from our side. The Chinese would be able to produce any number of Tibetans to say what they (want) these people to say.”
He went on: “The Chinese government is not prepared to accept our northern border as shown on our maps, as these maps are supposed to have been prepared by British colonialists surreptitiously. They are also not prepared to accept passes mentioned in the 1954 agreement as border passes... thereby indirectly repudiating the principle of watershed as marking the international boundary.”
All this shows that the Chinese still use the same tactics (whether in the South China Sea today or earlier in Aksai Chin or Barahoti); they occupy a territory that they deem important for their own interests and later emphatically declare it has always been “Chinese territory”, which is sacred and will be defended by force if necessary.
Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi’s visit to New Delhi on Saturday will not change anything in the mindset of the leadership in Beijing, and the intrusions (transgressions?) will continue. It is important, therefore, that the Indian public is aware about the history of our borders.

The situation is not gloomy, the borders are safe

Dr Sampuranand was a freedom-fighter and educationist.
Born on 1 January 1891 at Benaras, he participated in the Non-cooperation Movement and edited Maryada, a Hindi monthly with Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya.
In 1922, he was elected to the All-India Congress Committee, and later became provincial Minister for Education in the Uttar Pradesh cabinet and then Minister in the Union Government from 1951 to 1954.
He held several portfolios such as education, finance, and home labour; from April 1962 to April 1967, he was Governor of Rajasthan.
On October 28, 1951, hardly a month after the first Chinese troops entered Lhasa, the Tibetan capital, Dr Sampuranand sent a letter to the Prime Minister from Lucknow. It was marked ‘Secret’.
Reading this letter, one realizes that several prominent politicians were aware of the Chinese threat on the Northern borders of India.
What the Government  has done for the last 65 years on such warnings is another matter.
Here is the letter from Dr Sampuranand.

My dear Jawaharlalji,
I am writing this personal letter to you because this seems to me to be the only way to unburden myself of what has recently become one of my principal worries. Of course, you know all about the events on our Indo-Tibetan border, but my study of what is happening in that region makes me feel that the question has not received that serious attention which it deserves. I do not mean to suggest that anyone across the border is intending to engage in aggressive activities against India in the near future, but history shows that negligence shown in the matter of what appears to be trifling at the moment may lead to disastrous consequences in times of trouble.
I am basing my observations on the reports received from time to time from the local authorities and on the verbal report of the Inspector General of Police who has been on an extensive tour in that region. The Chinese have reduced prices considerably, so much so that rice in that comparatively inaccessible area is selling at a cheaper rate than obtains in the rice- producing areas in the plains. The prices of sugar and other necessaries have also been brought down. We have no roads leading upto the border. The State P.W.D. has prepared an estimate for 2.5 crores, which is taking its leisurely course among the files of some department of the Government of India. On the other hand, the Tibetan side of the border line has evidently fairly good roads and good barracks have been provided for the Chinese troops and the Tibetans whom they are training in modern methods of war. They are also apparently raising some kind of a local militia. Here the Government of India have not thought it necessary to post a single soldier and, in any case, there are no buildings where soldiers could stay if they were posted there. Among other reasons, the utter absence of barracks has prevented the U.P. Government from posting any unit of the P.A.C. which, as you know, can efficiently do part of the work which might otherwise have to be entrusted to the Army. My own feeling is that, in such cases, barracks should be built first and an estimate prepared later. The check-posts, we are maintaining, will have to be broken up very soon because there is no arrangement for shelter or for regular supply of food, fuel and other necessities in that area during the ensuing cold weather. At the most, the men can be kept there for about a fortnight. The local Bhotias also move inland in this season and there will be nothing to prevent the infiltration or Tibetans and Chinese into our territory. I am asking the Inspector-General to see if he can recruit some local men for the police but it is difficult to be quite sure of the loyalty of these men. Racial, linguistic and religious ties will probably make them lean towards the men on the other side; their loyalty to India cannot but be of a most tenuous nature. I might also point out that we are short or wireless sets; the Chinese, on the other hand, seem to be very well equipped in this respect. The Government of India have not yet agreed to our request for wireless sets. Probably, this question is also under consideration by somebody somewhere.
Some Tibetans, it is said under the inspiration of their Chinese mentors, are believed to say that Tibetan suzerainty extends over that part of the U.P. which reaches upto Moradabad. The claim is, of course, fantastic and is not being put forward from any responsible quarter. But we have to remember that such fantastic claims have elsewhere led to international wars in recent years. Anything can provide the spring-board for people who are spoiling for a fight. There is also the curious convention which allows Tibetan officials to collect certain taxes within Indian territory. The amount involved is very small, but the principle involved is very dangerous. Even if the practice is put an end to now, its memory may be revived some day as a proof of the shadowy sovereignty exercised by the Tibetan over certain territory in the U.P.
It may be that I am exaggerating the importance of these little things, but it seems to me that it will do us no harm to take all necessary precautions; a strategic road, good winter barracks for soldiers, a small military outpost and a few well equipped police check-posts will amply repay the expenditure involved.
Yours sincerely,
Sampurnanand.

On October 31, 1951, the Prime Minister replied  that it was no “need take a too gloomy a view of the situation.”
The first ‘official’ Chinese incursions occurred in Barahoti in June 1954.
India was not ready; nothing had been done to correct the issues raised by Dr Sampuranand.
This will continue during the following years/decades.
Here is Nehru's answer:

My dear Sampurnanand,
Thank you for your letter of October 28th.
We have not been entirely negligent about our Tibetan border. Full enquiries have been made by air and on land and we are considering reports of these enquiries. Some steps have already been taken on the lines of the recommendations made.
While I agree with you that all necessary steps, within our resources, should be taken as soon as possible, I do not think that we need take a too gloomy view of the situation.
I am a little surprised to learn that prices of rice and sugar etc., have been brought down considerably. Could you send me some further information on this subject?
Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

Nearly 8 years later, on September 8, 1959, Dr Sampuranand wrote again to the Prime Minister from Lucknow.

My dear Jawaharlalji,
There is a very important matter about which I wanted to speak to you, but as we were very busy, it was not possible for me to do so. People in the State, particularly those living near the Indo-Tibetan border, are greatly disturbed by news of Chinese infiltration in Indian territory. The matter has been raised in the Legislature also.
Today's papers carry the news of the Chinese having entered a part of Punjab somewhere on the Lahaul side. This may or may not be correct; even if it is a rumour, it is enough to add to the already existing alarm. It is felt that the strength of our police on the border is not sufficient and that, in any case, there is nothing to prevent infiltration during the winter months when the police retires from its forward positions. You might remember that some time ago, you had yourself suggested that all-the-year-round police arrangements should be made in that area and we had been asked to prepare a scheme for that purpose. We did so and received the assurance that it would be sanctioned in its entirety. I do not know what has happened to it as I have not heard anything about it for the last several months.
The idea was roughly this: It may not be possible for the police to remain in the winter season in places which it occupies in other parts of the year as the area is swept by snow and blizzards and remains completely cut off for weeks together, but a little further back a line of check-posts can be maintained. This area also is not particularly attractive from the point of view of the weather - there are heavy snow-falls-but with proper arrangements it can be held. Expenditure will have to be incurred, however, on putting up buildings and making such arrangements as will ensure a steady flow of supplies during the worst weather. That scheme was to cost about 50 lakhs. We had prepared it on the assumption that, if it was sanctioned, it would come into operation next year. But if it is felt that, in the conditions obtaining at present, this area has to be policed at all costs to prevent possible infiltration, it might be possible to do something in the few weeks remaining till winter actually sets in. It requires your immediate attention. I do not know which department of the Government, External Affairs, Defence, Home or Finance is studying the matter. But I thought the best thing would be to write to you personally.
I cannot say, of course, what the Chinese intend to do, but if their idea is to infiltrate and gain footholds in those parts of our territory which they claim to be their own, it seems to me that the winter months would provide the most suitable opportunity, because that is the time when our frontiers remain completely unguarded.
Yours sincerely,
Sampurnanand

On September 9, 1959, Nehru replied to Dr Sampuranand: “I do not think it does anyone any good to be alarmist.”
By that time, the Chinese had already entered in Longju in Subansiri Frontier Division as well as in Ladakh.
Here is Nehru’s response.

My dear Sampuranand,
I have your letter of the 8th September.
Our relations with China are strained and are likely to remain so for some considerable time. You must have seen the White Paper we issued and you would probably see further correspondence in the press soon.
While this is so, and we have to be vigilant, I do not think it does anyone any good to be alarmist. The news appearing in the press is often based on rumour and without foundation. I do not think any Chinese have entered any part of the Punjab, in Lahaul or elsewhere. Nor do I think there is much chance of the Chinese rolling across the U .P. border with Tibet. It may well be, however, that when your police detachment is withdrawn from Hoti, the Chinese will come and sit there as they did once previously.
The scheme to which you refer, that is putting up buildings at a cost of Rs. 50 lakhs, obviously cannot be given effect to, quickly. What is more important, I should imagine, is a good road to these places.
Anyhow I am having this matter looked into.
Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

What is the moral of the story?
It is good to be optimist, but one should always be ready for the worst.

A Modern Tragedy

Deserted Milam village in Phitoragarh district of Uttarakhand

My article A Modern Tragedy appeared yesterday in The Asian Age and The Deccan Chronicle

Here is the link...

The migration of populations from the frontiers, particularly the borders with China in Ladakh, Uttarakhand or Arunachal Pradesh, is a modern tragedy.
It is rarely mentioned in the Indian press, though a few weeks ago, The Times of India (TOI) reported from Dehra Dun: “As villages along the international border in Uttarakhand face out-migration on an unprecedented scale, uninhabited areas lie open to territorial claims by the Chinese.”
The journalist studied the case of Niti, the last Indian village, located 26 km south from the Niti pass, which demarcates the border between Tibet and India. For centuries, the village, situated at an altitude of 3,600 metres, saw traders, pilgrims and officials freely moving between the two countries and the area was flourishing. Unfortunately, all this stopped in 1962; today only 35 families remain in the village; a few decades ago, there were 250.
Trade with Tibet (today China) is dead and the area is virtually closed to outsiders; an Inner Line Permit is not easy to obtain from the local authorities.
Located 88 km from Joshimath, though the village could have been developed into an eco-tourism centre, it was not done, probably due to the ‘sensitivities’ of the Chinese authorities on the other side of the pass.
Even amongst the remaining 35 families, most of the young people have moved to the plains in search of a better life.
The Chinese have no qualms to develop their side of the Himalayan range and while Beijing has taken great leaps forward to built its border infrastructure, Delhi has worked at snail’s speed, struggling to create a semblance of infrastructure; migration is the direct outcome of this slow pace.
Soon after he took over as the Union Minister of State for Home Affairs, this writer had interviewed Kiren Rijiju, a native of Kameng district of Arunachal Pradesh; he had then said, “My immediate concern is to concentrate on the India-China border.” The young and dynamic Minister added, “It means development of infrastructure, roads, communication, other basic amenities; facilities for local people living in the border area. They should be provided with electricity, water, food.”
But it is not a glamourous process; indeed perseverance and an unshakable will are required to change the tide. Migration is today one of the major issues facing the populations along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh or the McMahon line in Arunachal Pradesh.
Why should a farmer or a pastoralist, living near the LAC in Ladakh, remain in his native village with the risk of being harassed by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, when he can earn a decent living as a taxi driver or by running a small hotel in Leh?
Defence analyst, Nitin Gokhale, who visited most of these borders areas, wrote about the sad situation in Ladakh: “Chushul, an important village very close to the border did not have a single landline telephone and the lone mobile tower in the vicinity was more a showpiece than a functional facility. The anger among the villagers at the lack of what is now a basic necessity was palpable.”
It is not an easy challenge. In one of his monthly radio programs, Maan ki Baat, Prime Minister Modi had announced that he was “deputing Central Government officials to find solutions to problems being faced by the region”. The Ministry of Development of the North-Eastern Region was to send officials to hold week-long camps. The outcome has never been made public.
Remember Verrier Elwin’s A Philosophy for NEFA, so dear to Nehru! Based on French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s theory: “Nothing is so gentle as man in his primitive state, when placed by nature at an equal distance from the stupidity of brutes and the fatal enlightenment of civil man,” the romantic view of the tribal folks ultimately amounted to the segregation of a large chunk of the Indian population and a total lack of development of these strategically important regions …and today, irreversible migration.
One of the decisions taken by Modi Sarkar has been to modify the guidelines of the Border Area Development Programme (BADP) drafted some 10 years ago. According to the new notification, “The main objective of the BADP is to meet the special developmental needs and well being of the people living in remote and inaccessible areas situated near the international border.”
The BADP is a 100 per cent centrally funded scheme covering in priority all Indian villages located within 10 km of the International Border. Within the 10 km, some villages are identified by the Border Guarding Forces for most immediate help.
This is one way to counter the Chinese claims, which regularly translates into deep incursions into Indian territory; depopulation plays into the Chinese hands. Will the BADP scheme reduce the migration from the borders? It is doubtful, because despite good intentions, how will the project be implemented on the ground, and crucially how soon?
Another issue is the stagnating petty trade between India and Tibet. While Nathu La is better organised, the traders at Shipki La (Himachal) and Lipulekh La (Uttarakand) face many bureaucratic hurdles. Though border trade could have been a way to stop migration, the local babus are not really motivated, while China is not interested to reopen the traditional passes.
Whether in Uttarakhand, Ladakh or Arunachal, life is hard on the borders.
The serious strategic implication of the depopulation of the entire Himalayan belt is that it has opened wide the door to Chinese incursions.
Take the Barahoti grazing ground in Chamoli district; it is the first area claimed by China as ‘theirs’ in 1954. If there are no Indian grazers to go up with their herds at the beginning of the summer season, the Chinese are quick to send their own to ‘mark’ China’s presence. Recently, Indian district officials had to be sent for a few weeks to ‘stamp India’s presence’ as hardly any grazer from Niti is interested anymore. The TOI admitted: “Barahoti had begun emptying out around eight years ago. Ever since, district officials have been marking the territory at regular intervals.”
And in Delhi, very few ‘strategists’ perceive that in case of a conflict, the ‘local’ population play a crucial role to play.
One possible solution would be to replace the present IAS cadre in these areas by dedicated officers, like it was done in the 1950s and 1960s with the Political Officers (POs) of the defunct Indian Frontier Administrative Service.
Every year, the POs would tour these remote border areas, meet the ‘locals’, get to know their problems and dutifully report in long notes to the ‘durbar’.
One can’t expect young IAS officers, dreaming only of a Delhi posting, to be of the caliber of the old Pos.
Though Mr Modi’s initiative to send officers to the spot is certainly a great improvement in the right direction, a special ‘border’ cadre could help revert the tide. It may soon be too late.

Maps now and then

Recently published Chinese Map
Large tracks of Indian territory are shown as Chinese

My article Map Now and Then appeared today in The Statesman.

Here is the link...
 
Why is Delhi so quiet? Probably because ‘China and India are friends’! Friends like in 1954? It is very ominous.  It is perhaps time for Delhi to distribute the maps of India's borders. It will be useful for the general public, the press and for the Indian officials 

Last week, Beijing published its first official vertical national map of China, incorporating vast areas of the South China Sea. The South China Morning Post (SMCP) commented that the new map gave “equal weight to both land and sea, in [Beijing’s] latest move emphasising its claims of sovereignty over the disputed waters.”
Earlier maps showed the islands in the South China Sea on a smaller scale, in a separate box-out in a bottom corner of the map. Mainly due to the prominence given to the South China Sea on the new map, during several days, most commentators concentrated on the South China Sea; finally, the MEA decide to take note of the new map.
Why? Probably because the Indian media had discovered that the new map showed Arunachal Pradesh as part of China. South Block could not keep quiet anymore, especially at a time the Indian Vice-President was visiting China …to celebrate 60 years of “peaceful co-existence”.
The MEA was, however, quick to dismiss the new map by saying that “cartographic depiction did not change the reality that Arunachal was part of India.” The MEA spokesman further elaborated: “The fact that Arunachal Pradesh is an integral and inalienable part of India has been conveyed to the Chinese authority on several occasions including at the very highest level.”
What is more shocking is the fact that the spokesperson forgot to mention the central sector (Uttarakhand and Himachal) where large chunks of Indian territory (such as Barahoti and Nilang) appear on the Chinese map also …and similarly not a word for the Aksai Chin and areas around the Pangong Tso in Ladakh!
Why has the MEA nothing to say about these vast areas of India’s territory? It is all the more difficult to understand after the Indian press had reported: “On June 24, four Chinese high-speed interceptor boats were spotted moving from Srijap I posts around 8.25 am to Srijap VIII, VI and V detachments on the northern banks of the [Pangong] lake. Twenty minutes later, Indian troops on the four American-made boats moved from Thukang base and intercepted Chinese vessels. The two sides first were locked in a face-off and then conducted a so-called banner drill to remind the other side of the Line.”
According to South Block sources, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) boats came 5.5 kilometres into the Indian side of the Pangong Lake (Tso) on 24 June. The incursion lasted over two hours, involving four high-speed Chinese interceptor boats that were pushed back by Indian troops, on their US-built interceptor vessels.
The Hindustan Times quoted government sources to affirm that the lake has seen 12 face-offs between Indian and Chinese troops this year alone: “In 2013, there were no less than 18 face-offs between Indian and Chinese troops in Pangong Tso due to serious difference in perception on the LAC and also due to massive Chinese infrastructure build-up close to the line.”
The non-reaction of the MEA is particularly surprising when one looks at the new Chinese map which shows large parts of Ladakh as belonging to China. China is a regular offender. A few months after the signature of the infamous Panchsheel Agreement, Nehru visited China. On his return, he wrote a note entitled ‘Implications of China Visit’; it was an internal note intended for the MEA officials. He described in detail his visit to Beijing (in October 1954): “During my visit to China, I had a number of talks with the Chinese leaders. I had long talks with Premier Zhou Enlai separately. I also had joint talks with Chairman Mao Zedong and his principal colleagues, Vice Chairman Zhu De, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Peoples’ Congress Liu Shaoqi; Premier Zhou Enlai...”
The Prime Minister was accompanied by the Secretary General of the MEA, NR Pillai, and India’s Ambassador in Peking, N. Raghavan.
In other words, it was a Sino-Indian Summit.
The maps of China were discussed. Like today, they showed several parts of India’s territory as belonging to China. Nehru writes: “I referred to Chinese maps which still showed portions of Burma and even of India as if they were within Chinese territory. So far as India was concerned, I added, we were not much concerned about this matter because our boundaries were quite clear and were not a matter for argument. But many people took advantage of these old maps and argued that China had an aggressive intent, or else why continue to use these maps. In Burma also this caused apprehension.”
Zhou Enlai cleverly replied that “these maps were old ones and China had not done any surveying to draw new maps. Their boundaries even with Mongolia and the Soviet Union were still not clearly demarcated and there were discrepancies. I [Nehru] pointed out that this might be so. So far as India was concerned, I repeated, there was no doubt about our boundaries and I was not worried about them. But I wondered how China would feel if a part of Tibet had been shown as part of India in our maps.”
Amazing (and sad), while Beijing still speaks about the Five Principles, 60 years later, the situation on the ground is repeating itself. Let us not forget that China’s Survey and Mapping Administration has approved the controversial map published by Hunan Map Press, which in its announcement said the map was of “great significance in safeguarding the nation’s water sovereignty and territorial integrity”.
Why is Delhi so quiet? Probably because ‘China and India are friends’! Friends like in 1954? It is very ominous.
Another similarity with 1954:  60 years ago too, Beijing had ‘no problem’ with India; China’s problem was with the American imperialists.
During the Panchsheel commemoration, President Xi Jinping vowed that no violations of territorial integrity would be tolerated, adding though that no nation (read the US) should be allowed to monopolise global affairs. Xi however made it clear: “Sovereignty is the reliable safeguard and fundamental element of national interest. Sovereignty and territorial integrity should not be infringed upon. This is the hard principle that should not be cast aside at any time”.
And then, he started indirectly bashing the US: “All nations should be given equal footing in the global security framework, and share equal rights.”
Su Hao, a professor with China Foreign Affairs University, told SCMP: “The message is that China is not the source of the problem, and it is some external force violating principles of international relations and making chaos in the region.”
One more ‘detail’, but which is vital for India; on the new Chinese map, the size of the Chumbi Valley, located between Sikkim and Bhutan, is really bloated. Does China plan to grab more territory from Bhutan?
A few months before his 1954 visit to Beijing, Nehru had taken up the issue of Indian maps with the MEA Secretary-General. At that time, India was foolishly showing most of the Ladakh border as ‘undefined’. Nehru wrote: “All our old maps dealing with this frontier should be carefully examined and, where necessary, withdrawn. New maps should be printed showing our Northern and North-Eastern frontier without any reference to any ‘line’. These new maps should also not state that there is any un-demarcated territory. The new maps should be sent to our embassies abroad and should be introduced to the public generally and be used in our schools, colleges etc.”
It is perhaps time for Delhi to distribute the maps of India’s borders. It will be useful for the general public, the press and for the Indian officials.

Asia’s challenge

Srinagar (Garhwal) HEP

My article Asia’s challenge appeared in The Statesman today.

Here is the link...

There is no doubt that the most serious issue that Asia will have to face during the coming decades is the climatic change  and  the health  of the Tibetan glaciers and rivers which feed nearly 2 billion human beings says Claude Arpi

During a visit to Srinagar, Garhwal, in March this year, I was told that a total of 95 hydropower projects were being built or planned on different rivers converging in the Alaknanda and Bhagirathi basin of Uttarakhand.  Why so many dams, I asked? If the Centre does not go for dams and generate power, then Rs 10,000-15,000 crore would have to be annually released by Delhi as Central assistance, I was told. The Centre wants power and the State, hard cash; dams bring a win-win situation, they say. Projects currently underway were supposed to increase the hydropower capacity of the State to 12,235 MW.
Nobody really cared if environmentalists like former IIT professor, Dr GD Agrawal or before him Sunderlal Bahuguna were opposing the wild contagion of concrete infrastructures; they were just labeled as being anti-development by the authorities; ‘development’ being the new God worshiped in the Himalayas.
But the gods are neither crazy nor helpless. They showed it on June 16 and the following days, when torrential rains poured from the sky; the result: several thousands of humans left dead or missing, hundreds of roads cut, villages erased, hydropower plants destroyed, a State totally ruined.
It was predictable and had even been predicted. In 2009, after studying the hydro-electric projects (HEP) in Uttarakhand, a state audit of the Comptroller and Auditor-General admitted that, though most of the projects faced problems associated with land acquisition, forest clearances and enhancement in project capacities “...more grave is the total neglect of environmental concerns, the cumulative impact of which may prove devastating for the natural resources of the State.”
The auditors also remarked: “Negligence of environmental concerns was obvious as the muck generated from excavation and construction activities, was being openly dumped into the rivers contributing to increase in the turbidity of water.”
One visible consequence was seen in Vishnuprayag where the deluge coming down from the upper reaches of Alaknanda completely buried the 400 MWs hydropower plant.
Tragically, the same situation is bound to happen, probably on a larger scale, in Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh.
What depressed me the most is that many swamis or ‘holy men’ were quite happy with the ‘development’ of their Himalayan environment; their ashrams were getting wealthier and they were getting more followers (they probably thought that it was a win-win situation!)
I was in this frame of mind when I came across a refreshing book written by the 17th Karmapa, Ogyen Trinley Dorje, entitled The Heart Is Noble: Changing the World from the Inside Out. It is obvious that the Karmapa has studied our modern world ‘inside out’. The background of the book is a month-long dialogue between the Lama (called by everyone ‘His Holiness’) and a group of American university students who visited him in May 2011 at the Gyuto Ramoche Monastery in Sidhbari near Dharamsala. It is there that the 29-year old Lama has found a ‘temporary’ refuge, surrounded by the majestic Dhauladhar range as a backdrop.
Though the Karmapa often tells the students (his ‘friends’) that he does not give them a ‘religious’ teaching, the Buddhist themes of ‘temporariness’, ‘interdependence’ or ‘compassion’ pervade the book.
The 12 chapters deal with subjects like ‘Our Shared Ground’; ‘A Meaningful Life: Anything Is Possible’, ‘Healthy Relationships: Orienting Ourselves toward Others’; ‘Gender Identities: It’s All in the Mind’ or ‘Consumerism or Greed: Contentment Is the Best Wealth’. One chapter elaborates on Karmapa’s favorite topic, “Environmental Protection: Cultivating New Feelings for the Earth”.
The young Lama often describes himself as an environmental activist. Born to a nomad family in Kham province of Eastern Tibet, he says that during his youth he experienced a rustic lifestyle which is unfortunately fast disappearing.
The Karmapa asks his visitors to try to realize their intimate dependence with the whole planet. He also sees a close affinity between the concept of ecology and the Buddhist views of interdependence.
His young US friends are warned not to confuse economic success with personal happiness: “Just because we have a market economy, does not mean we need to have a market society.”
In his book, he explains: “In recent years, we have gained a great deal of information about the impact of our actions on the environment. We human beings have tremendous intelligence, but it is clear that there remains a big gap between the brain and the heart. We seem to find it easy to process new information and generate new ideas, yet much harder to produce new feelings. …What we now need to go along with all our powerful new ideas about the environment are powerful new feelings.”
According to him, it is here that our noble heart should intervene. The message of the Karmapa is simple and ‘secular’ -
Page after page, one finds a mature and deep thinker; it is rather rare these days. There is a great lightness in his thought-process, which he is able to share with his young interlocutors.
Karmapa would certain support the Bhutanese ‘Gross National Happiness’ which seems now to have been rejected by the new government in Thimphu. Let us hope that the Land of the Dragon will not take Uttarakhand’s path. It would be such a pity!

The Karmapa likes to say: “If I have the opportunity, I would most like to restore the natural environment in the Himalayas and Tibet, and to especially protect the forests, the water and wildlife of this region.” His language always remains simple. He encourages his interlocutors by telling them that we, humans are far more powerful than we usually believe: “We individuals can become part of the solution, when we recognize this power and start to use it, together.”
For him, the starting point is ‘inter-dependence with others and the planet’; he believes that if each human being can increase his or her own love and compassion towards others, the planet will face much less conflicts.
In conclusion, he outlines what he calls ‘a kind of humanist spirituality’.
Interestingly, he was the first leader to issue a statement after Bodh Gaya’s recent tragic events. Though he was deeply saddened by the senseless violence perpetrated at the Mahabodhi temple, he appealed for compassion and understanding: “I am convinced that, as Buddhists, in responding to this situation, the best homage we can pay to Lord Buddha is to uphold his teachings on love and ahimsa (non-violence).”
There is no doubt that the most serious issue that Asia will  have  to  face  during  the  coming  decades  is  the  climatic change and the health of the Tibetan glaciers and rivers  which  feed  nearly  2  billion  human  beings.  Asia definitely needs more young, dedicated, intelligent, modern and  open-minded  leaders  like  Karmapa,  if it  wants  to avoid a doomed future.

inside each of us there is a noble heart. He tells the youth: “This heart is the source of our finest aspirations for ourselves and for the world. It fills us with the courage to act on our aspirations. Our nobility may be obscured at times, covered over with small thoughts or blocked by confused and confusing emotions. But a noble heart lies intact within each of us nonetheless, ready to open and be offered to the world.  …When we clear away all that blocks it, this heart can change the world.”

An intelligent leader: the Karmapa

During a visit to Srinagar, Garhwal, in March this year, I was told that a total of 95 hydropower projects were being built or planned on different rivers converging in the Alaknanda and Bhagirathi basin of Uttarakhand.
Why so many dams, I asked?
If the Centre does not go for dams and generate power, then Rs. 10,000-15,000 crore would have to be annually released by Delhi as Central assistance, I was told.
The Center wants power and the State, hard cash; dams bring a win-win situation, they say. Projects currently underway were supposed to increase the hydropower capacity of the State to 12,235 MW.
Nobody really cared if environmentalists like former IIT professor, Dr. G.D. Agrawal or before him Sunderlal Bahuguna were opposing the wild contagion of concrete infrastructures; they were just labeled as being anti-development by the authorities; ‘development’ being the new God worshiped in the Himalayas.
But the gods are neither crazy nor helpless. They showed it on June 16 and the following days, when torrential rains poured from the sky; the result: several thousands of humans left dead or missing, hundreds of roads cut, villages erased, hydropower plants destroyed, a State totally ruined.
It was predictable and had even been predicted.
In 2009, after studying the hydro-electric projects (HEP) in Uttarakhand, a State Audit of the Controller General of Accounts (CAG) admitted that, though most of the projects faced problems associated with land acquisition, forest clearances and enhancement in project capacities: “...more grave is the total neglect of environmental concerns, the cumulative impact of which may prove devastating for the natural resources of the State.”
The Auditors also remarked: “Negligence of environmental concerns was obvious as the muck generated from excavation and construction activities, was being openly dumped into the rivers contributing to increase in the turbidity of water.”
One visible consequence was seen in Vishnuprayag where the deluge coming down from the upper reaches of Alaknanda completely buried the 400 MWs hydropower plant.
Tragically, the same situation is bound to happen, probably on a larger scale, in Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh.
What depressed me the most is that many swamis or ‘holy men’ were quite happy with the ‘development’ of their Himalayan environment; their ashrams were getting wealthier and they were getting more followers (they probably thought that it was a win-win situation!)
I was in this frame of mind when I came across a refreshing book written the 17th Karmapa, Ogyen Trinley Dorje, entitled The Heart Is Noble: Changing the World from the Inside Out.
It is obvious that the Karmapa has studied our modern world ‘inside out’.
The background of the book is a month-long dialogue between the Lama (called by everyone ‘His Holiness’) and a group of American university students who visited him in May 2011 at the Gyuto Ramoche Monastery in Sidhbari near Dharamsala. It is there that the 29-year old Lama has found a ‘temporary’ refuge, surrounded by the majestic Dhauladhar range as a backdrop.
Though the Karmapa often tells the students (his ‘friends’) that he does not give them a ‘religious’ teaching, the Buddhist themes of ‘temporariness’, ‘interdependence’ or ‘compassion’ pervade the book.
The 12 chapters deal with subjects like ‘Our Shared Ground’; ‘A Meaningful Life: Anything Is Possible’, ‘Healthy Relationships: Orienting Ourselves toward Others’; ‘Gender Identities: It’s All in the Mind’ or ‘Consumerism or Greed: Contentment Is the Best Wealth’.
One chapter elaborates on Karmapa’s favorite topic, “Environmental Protection: Cultivating New Feelings for the Earth”.
The young Lama often describes himself as an environmental activist. Born to a nomad family in Kham province of Eastern Tibet, he says that during his youth he experienced a rustic lifestyle which is unfortunately fast disappearing.
The Karmapa asks his visitors to try to realize their intimate dependence with the whole planet. He also sees a close affinity between the concept of ecology and the Buddhist views of interdependence.
His young US friends are warned not to confuse economic success with personal happiness: “Just because we have a market economy, does not mean we need to have a market society.”
In his book, he explains: “In recent years, we have gained a great deal of information about the impact of our actions on the environment. We human beings have tremendous intelligence, but it is clear that there remains a big gap between the brain and the heart. We seem to find it easy to process new information and generate new ideas, yet much harder to produce new feelings. …What we now need to go along with all our powerful new ideas about the environment are powerful new feelings.”
According to him, it is here that our noble heart should intervene.
The message of the Karmapa is simple and ‘secular’: inside each of us there is a noble heart. He tells the youth: “This heart is the source of our finest aspirations for ourselves and for the world. It fills us with the courage to act on our aspirations. Our nobility may be obscured at times, covered over with small thoughts or blocked by confused and confusing emotions. But a noble heart lies intact within each of us nonetheless, ready to open and be offered to the world.  …When we clear away all that blocks it, this heart can change the world.”
Page after page, one finds a mature and deep thinker; it is rather rare these days. There is a great lightness in his thought-process, which he is able to share with his young interlocutors.
Karmapa would certain support the Bhutanese ‘Gross National Happiness’ which seems to now have been rejected by the new government in Thimbu. Let us hope that the Land of the Dragon will not take the Uttarakhand’s path. It would be such a pity!
The Karmapa likes to say: "If I have the opportunity, I would most like to restore the natural environment in the Himalayas and Tibet, and to especially protect the forests, the water and wildlife of this region.”
His language always remains simple. He encourages his interlocutors by telling them that we, humans are far more powerful than we usually believe: "We individuals can become part of the solution, when we recognize this power and start to use it, together.”
For him, the starting point is ‘interdependence with others and the planet’; he believes that if each human being can increase his or her own love and compassion towards others, the planet will face much less conflicts.
In conclusion, he outlines what he called ‘a kind of humanist spirituality’.
Interestingly, he was the first leader to issue a statement after Bodh Gaya’s recent tragic events. Though he was deeply saddened by the senseless violence perpetrated at the Mahabodhi temple, he appealed for compassion and understanding: “I am convinced that, as Buddhists, in responding to this situation, the best homage we can pay to Lord Buddha is to uphold his teachings on love and ahimsa (nonviolence).”
There is no doubt that the most serious issue that Asia will have to face during the coming decades is the climatic change and the health of the Tibetan glaciers and rivers which feed nearly 2 billion human beings.
Asia definitely needs more young, dedicated, intelligent, modern and open-minded leaders like Karmapa, if it wants to avoid a doomed future.