Reopening the Old Borders

Indus river in the vicinity of Dumchele

We are often hearing questions about what could be suggested as possible Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) between India and China.
I give here a few suggestions for the border in East Ladakh.
One could add joint patrolling in 'semi' disputed areas; by 'semi' disputed, I mean areas where both parties agree on the area disputed (which is often not the case).  

Reopening Demchok
A way forward could be to do what was not done in 1954 during the negotiations for the so-called Panchsheel Agreement: open the Demchok route for the pilgrims visiting Kailash-Manasarovar.
Of course, that would be a first step; the next one being to reopen the border for trade; it could also be done the other way round (first trade, then yatra), if both countries find it more acceptable.
Remember the skirmishes in Sikkim at the end of the 1960s !
When the Nathu-la pass was officially reopened to trade in July 2006, it had the effect of ‘fixing’ the border, drastically reducing the tensions in the area.
Considering the ‘Nathu-la’ effect; reopening Demchok route could be an excellent CBM between India and China in Ladakh.
For years, the people of Ladakh have asked for the reopening of the ancient route.
Why is Beijing, constantly speaking of Old Silk Roads, so reluctant to let people and goods flow again over the Himalaya? 
Why can’t China allow trade and the devotees keen to go to Kailash-Manasarovar to use the easiest route via Demchok?

An alternative to Demchok
If China refuses to open Demchok, for whatever reasons, an alternative would be Dumchele.
Very few in India have heard of Dumchele, a place located east of the Indus river, on the Chinese side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China; it used to be marked as a ‘grazing ground’ on old maps of the British Raj.
A couple of months after the 1962 border war, Dumchele appeared for the first time in the correspondence between India and China. On January 4, 1963, Delhi complained that China had an “intemperate and blatantly aggressive attitude”.
One of the examples given was that on October 22, 1962, the Chinese forces had attacked Indian posts at Chang-la, Jera-la and Demchok and occupied “fresh Indian territory upto Dumchele, east of Fukche.” Fukche was then an advanced Landing Ground (ALG) then used by India, West of the Indus.
Since then, the situation has stabilized and the Indus river has become a more or less agreed LAC till Demchok, located some 50 km South of Dumchele.
Though Dumchele is one of the 12 places where India and China have a difference of perception on the location of the LAC, this is not an insurmountable difficulty; The Hindustan Times recently mentioned the opening of a trading post which “could open as soon as the end of the year”.

From Smuggling to Trading
If the political leadership decides so, Dumchele could also become a new Border Personnel Meeting (BPM); presently the meeting points between the Indian and Chinese armies in Ladakh are located at Chushul and Daulat Beg Oldi (known as DBO).
Though Demchok, the historical landport would temporarily be set aside in favour of Dumchele which was the main smuggling center between India and China in Ladakh till 2016, when it was stopped for security reason.
The opening of Demchok or Dumchele would boost the local economy (both sides) and satisfy the local Indian sarpanches …and one day, one can dream of a new route (without crossing a single pass) to Mt Kailash. It would then become the fastest and easiest access to the holy mountain.
It could be an important step on the path of peace and would show China’s sincerity to open its frontiers with its neighbours.
Practically, it would mean, building a bridge over the Indus and build a tar road from Dungti to Dumchele. Technically, it is not a very difficult proposition.

Another possibility
Another feasible alternative would be to give Indian pilgrims access to Gunsa Ngari (Ali) airport.
Recently a two-day meeting between the representatives of the aeronautical authorities of Nepal and China was held to discuss issues pertaining to bilateral air transportation under an Air Services Agreement signed by the two countries.
According The Global Times: “As per the MoU signed between the two sides today, the Chinese side has agreed to designate eight more destinations in China for flights operated by Nepali Airlines, in addition to the existing seven destinations viz., Beijing, Shanghai, Lhasa, Guangzhou, Kunming, Chengdu and Xi’an.”
But more interesting for our purpose, the Chinese tabloid notes: “The two sides also reached a common understanding that after the development of adequate technical facilities at Gunsa Airport in Tibet, flights of Nepalese airlines would be allowed to land at that airport while circumnavigating Mt. Kailash as part of mountain flight.”
Then only a few hours will be necessary for the yatris to reach the base camp of the pilgrimage (via the beautiful G219 highway).
Opening Gunsa airport to Indian flights could be a serious alternative for the Kailash-Manasarowar yatris (especially old ones); the Indian pilgrims could fly from Dehra Dun (Uttarakhand) or Leh (Ladakh) airports after proper acclimatization in the lines of the ones, organized by the Government of India in Pittoragarh district for the Lipulekh-la route or near Gangtok for the Nathu-la one.
This would give a boost to the economy on both sides of the frontier, and show China’s goodwill.

Silk Roads without people

My article Silk Roads without people appeared last week in the Edit Page of The Pioneer

Xi Jinping’s likely visit to India must not be wasted. It can be a good occasion for New Delhi to question him about the new corridors and remind him about Demchok
China is very fond of Silk Roads. In 2013, a year after Xi Jinping was anointed Emperor of the Middle Kingdom, he initiated a Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Since then, the Chinese diplomacy has been tirelessly promoting the mega project to link the country to its neighbours as well as to Central Asia, Africa and Europe. Beijing’s latest promotional move has been to confer the Silk Road Super Ambassador Awards to the Ambassadors of Pakistan, the Maldives, Sri Lanka, Malta and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Pakistani Ambassador to China, Masood Khalid, told The Global Times: “Our cooperation is very broad and is expanding, so we are happy. We are confident that as we move forward, we will see more tangible progress in our cooperation.”
One may think that the BRI has opened new avenues between the people of China and Pakistan and that the route between Gilgit and Xinjiang is wide opened to Pakistanis to trade with China. But it is not the case — the BRI seems to be just a state-to-state affair, without any concern for the ‘people’ from both sides. To give an example, a few weeks ago, Reuters reported: “Pakistani businessmen, whose wives and children are trapped in China’s restive Xinjiang, are travelling to Beijing to lobby with their Embassy, with hopes that the south Asian nation’s new Government will pressure its ally for their release.”
Deutsche Welle of Germany explained: “Due to Xinjiang’s proximity to Gilgit-Baltistan, the residents of the two areas have shared long historical, cultural and family ties. Many Uighurs are married to the Gilgit-Baltistan locals and vice versa.” The pretext for closing down the border is China’s suspicion about the alleged association of Uighurs with Islamist extremists. China’s Silk Roads are clearly not for the common man, though Nepal, too, is speaking of Xi’s project in laudatory terms.
On January 9, Jameson Lamudhali Layi, the Nepali Consul General in Lhasa (Tibet), told the website China Tibet Online: “I’m really looking forward that the Qinghai-Tibet Railway would reach the city of Kyirong on the China-Nepalese border, which will connect Kathmandu, the capital of Nepal, with many cities in China, including Lhasa. …This will be very beneficial and very important to our country.”
The Chinese official website continued: “As the ongoing friendship and collaborations between China and Nepal continue to develop, the extension of the Lhasa-Shigatse Railway is also a project people of both countries are looking forward to.”
Everybody does see it this way; Uddhab P Pyakurel, an Assistant Professor in the School of Arts in Kathmandu, wrote a well-researched paper pointing to the historical and proximate relationship between Nepal and Tibet before China came into the picture. The scholar analyses how this relationship has changed from a striving one to “a stage that is only formal and rhetoric.” He said that the opening of the Rasuwagadi (Kyirong) border has been welcomed by Kathmandu “as if China has shown a great sympathy for Nepalis.” Pyakurel then asserted: “But evidences show that the Chinese proposal to strengthen activities through Kyirong border was just to avoid negative impressions about China in Nepal.” Another landport where local trade was taking place has recently been closed, though “it is reported that the Chinese officials keep promising to open it but do not confirm when they would open the customs points.”
The scholar accused China of progressively eliminating “both the local trade carried on by the inhabitants of the Nepal-Tibet border and the traditional transportation trans-border pasturage-usage system under which pastures on both sides of the boundary were used at different times of the year by Nepali and Tibetan herdsmen.”
Pyakurel gave a detailed account of the successive treaties since 1956, which made it more and more difficult for local traders to deal with Tibet …while the state-to-state business bloomed. This comes at a time when China is opening another port with Nepal: The new corridor lies dangerously close to the strategic State of Sikkim.
Kimathanka is one of the smallest and  remotest hamlets in the North-eastern district of Sankhuwasabha of eastern Nepal; the village is strategically located as it lies at the border with Tibet (China). The Kathmandu Post affirmed that it is “a crucial strategic location for Nepal as the country strives to increase its connectivity with the northern neighbour.”
In April 2018, Nepal’s Foreign Minister, Pradeep Gyawali, visited Beijing, where he met Vice President of China, Wang Qishan, and his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi. He spoke of “expediting past agreements, developing trans-Himalayan multi-dimensional transport networks and building a China-Nepal-India economic corridor.” Gyawali said that China is Nepal’s genuine friend and a trusted ally: “We should build on the excellent roots of civilisational, geographical and cultural affinities to further connect our countries and societies in order to achieve common prosperity in the trans-Himalayan region.”
Once the new corridor is opened, it will have serious strategic implications for India as it will open via Biratnagar, a new strategic and unwanted gate to India through Kishanganj and Siliguri. Here, too, no people-to-people exchange.
As the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to India is announced for February or March, it could be an occasion for the Government to question him about the new corridor and remind him about Demchok, the last Ladakhi village on the road to western Tibet.
For centuries, Demchok witnessed caravans from Kashmir, Ladakh or Central Asia bringing goods (delicious apricots among others) to the Roof of the World. Ironically, ‘The Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India’, remembered as the Panchsheel Agreement, signed on April 28, 1954, literally killed the age-old border trade.
Suddenly, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which had taken control over the plateau, stopped Ladakhi traders from selling their goods in Tibet; it marked the end of one of the most flourishing Silk Roads. There was a reason for it, China was building a road across the Aksai Chin, an Indian territory, and the PLA did not want witnesses to the construction.
If Beijing is serious about trans-boundary trade, it has no option but to re-open the old traditional routes, be it the Khunjerab Pass with Pakistan, the passes between Nepal and Tibet or the old routes like the Demchok caravan road. But is China ready to do this? Let us hope that Mr Modi will at least ask President Xi Jinping.

Nilang Valley reopened

Home minister Rajnath Singh celebrated the New Year with Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) troops in Nelong (or Nilang) valley.
PTI commented: “This visit comes days after Chinese military said India should 'strictly control' its troops.”
It was Singh’s second visit to the Sino-Indian border area in Uttarakhand; in September, he had a 4-day tour of the region.
Nelong Border Outpost (BoP), manned by the ITBP personnel, is located at the height of 11,700 feet. The home minister visited the ITBP’s 12th battalion headquarters in picturesque Matli, located at 3400 feet on the banks of Bhagirathi river.
Later he was scheduled to visit Pulam Sumdha (altitude 14,200 feet), Kopang (8,700 feet) and Bhairon Ghati (9,150 feet). Accompanied by ITBP director general (DG) R K Pachnanda, Singh interacted with jawans and officers of the ITBP.
The 90,000-personnel strong ITBP is guarding the 3,488 km long Sino-India border stretching from Jammu and Kashmir (1,597 km), Himachal Pradesh (200 km), Uttarakhand (345 km), Sikkim (220 km) to Arunachal Pradesh (1,126 km).
A few years ago, I wrote about the history of the area.
The introduction of my paper is posted below.
The area is disputed by the Chinese because Beijing refuses to adhere to the universally-accepted principle of 'watershed' used to demarcate a border.
In 2017, the incident at the trijunction Tibet-Sikkim-Bhutan was triggered by the same wrong views from Beijing.
The watershed in the area is located at Tsangchok-la.

The watershed principle helps demarcate the Indo-Tibet border

In 2015, I had also mentioned the opening of the area to tourism.

Yesterday, The Hindustan Times (HT) carried an article on Nilang (spelt Nelong) in Uttarakhand.
It says: “The spectacular Nelong Valley - a cold desert like area - tucked in the Uttarakhand Himalayas, close to the Indo-China border, was opened to tourists earlier this year after 53 years of remaining out of bounds post the 1962 War. While the state government opened it with much enthusiasm in May, it failed to promote the destination as a result less than 200 tourists visited the valley in the last six months. The valley, which has a similar landscape as that of Ladakh, is not only rich in natural beauty but also houses remnants of the treacherous Indo-China trade route - like a hand-built wooden bridge - that was used for centuries by the locals prior to the war.”
It is not exactly true that the landscapes look like Ladakh, but the beauty of the place is indisputable.
Further, Nilang has an interesting historical background, probably not known to the reporter who describes the area thus: “The valley, situated at an altitude of around 11,000 feet above the sea level, falls under the Gangotri National Park in Uttarkashi district, is around 315 km from Dehradun. It is also only 23 kms away from Bhaironghati, a place just eight kms ahead of the famous Gangotri shrine.”
Not only did the entry to this ‘restricted area’ remain closed for civilians after the 1962 War, but the local Bhotiya population was shifted to Bagori and Dunda villages in Uttarkashi district.

This year, the area has been opened to some privileged tourists.
The Hindustan Times explains: “The government has put a cap on the number of vehicles entering the valley per day, which is maximum six with only four occupants in each. A permit letter from the sub-divisional magistrate is required to visit the area while entry of foreigners is banned. Though the government had opened the destination with high hopes, only 184 tourists visited the valley in six months.”
According to the HT, the reopening of Nilang valley has made the local population happy, as tourism could be a good source of income: “Prior to the war, trade with Tibet was the economic mainstay of the villagers in the valley. Few remnants of the trade route - the most prominent one being a narrow wooden bridge along the gorge - still remains intact. This valley could thus be highlighted as a heritage site,” a native of Nilang told the daily.
The Government of Uttarakhand believes that the valley has a great potential; it can be developed into a special tourism destination, like Valley of Flowers in Chamoli district which attracts thousands of tourists and nature lovers every year.

A retired senior bureaucrat, SS Pangtey told the HT that the area is “an untapped asset of natural splendor that could turn into a major attraction for domestic tourists if publicized properly. It is a remote, virgin area which has a huge potential to become an adventure tourism hotspot if only the state is able to publicise it amply”
Soon after the 1962 War, locals Bhotiyas, living in Nilang during the summer and who for generations had been trading with Tibet, were resettled in Bagori and Dunda villages: “Prior to the war, trade with Tibet was the economic mainstay of the villagers in the valley. Few remnants of the trade route - the most prominent one being a narrow wooden bridge along the gorge - still remains intact. This valley could thus be highlighted as a heritage site,” said Jot Singh, a native of Nilang valley, now living in a nearby village.

History of Nilang-Jadhang Valleys
A few years ago, I researched the history of the area, which, in the early 1930s had been disputed by Tibet (later on, it was claimed by China).
In fact, it is this dispute which forced the Government of India to reallocate the local population after 1962.
I post here the introduction to my paper, as well as some extracts of the Report of the Officials of the Governments of India and the Peoples’ Republic of China on the Boundary Question, published by the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India in 1961.
There were a few such places claimed by Tibet, with any historical or geographical basis; later they became part of the Sino-Indian border dispute.
It is a positive sign that the Government of Uttarakhand has not agreed to reopen this area.
Hopefully, it will become a destination for eco-tourism only.

Here is the introduction to my paper

History of the dispute between Tehri State and Tibet: A Himalayan Case

One of main historic upshots of the relation between Tibet and the Himalayan region has been the Sino-Indian border dispute along the 4,000 km mountainous range.
In many cases, the present ‘dispute’ with China has its origin in disagreement between the Lhasa government and the administration of Himalayan princely states (and by extension British India). This is true for NEFA too.
Our case study relates to Nilang/Jadhang area in today’s Uttarakhand.
It is particularly interesting due to the large amount of correspondence between Tibet (the Kashag in Lhasa and the Dzongpen in Tsaparang) and the princely states of Tehri-Garhwal, Bashahr as well as the provincial governments of the United Provinces and the Punjab and of course, the Foreign and Political Department of British India in Delhi.
The ‘negotiations’ lasted some 12 years, at the end of which no mutually acceptable solution could be found.
The entire story is extracted from a couple of files today in the British Archives. A few years ago, I had the good fortune to come across them and I thought it would be interesting to share this unknown aspect of the Himalayan relations.

Location and Description
The area disputed by Tibet and Tehri-Garhwal State lies between longitude 78.53 and 79.25 East and latitude 31 and 31.26 North.
For the sake of the different Commissions which went into the dispute between 1926 and 1935, different colours have been assigned to the respective claims on a map prepared by the British surveyors:

• The boundary between the Tehri-Garhwal state and Garhwal district of the United Provinces is shown in green.
• The boundary claimed by the Tehri-Garhwal State is shown in red. It is the watershed between the western sources of the Bhagirathi river and the valley of the Sutlej river, known in Tibet as Langchen Khabab.
• The boundary claimed by Tibet is shown in yellow; their frontier claim is unclear at several places as the Tibetan representatives often claimed ‘a single point as the boundary’, that is the junction of the Gumgum nala with the Bhagirathi (one mile West of Jangla Forest Bungalow).

The Brief History of the Dispute
The dispute seems to have arisen when the Dzongpen of Tsaparang, the nearby Tibetan district, visited the Gumgum nala in 1914. He publically announced his decision of setting up a boundary pillar near the bridge. When the local villagers objected, the Dzongpen left without any further action.
In 1918, the Tehri State decided to erect 3 pillars on the top of the Tsang Chok-la (31.30 North and 79.16 East). Some versions claimed that the pillars had already been there in the past and were only ‘repaired’.
Two years later, the Tehri State surveyed the area and, for the first time, prepared cultivation maps of the Nilang region (31.7 North and 79.4 East). The Jadhang valley (31.11 North and 79.6 East) was also included in the maps.
In 1921, the Tsaparang Dzongpen visited Nilang again. This time, he sent a letter to the Raja of Tehri requesting him to send an official to sort out the boundary issue; at that time, it was not yet considered a ‘dispute’; it was more a ‘difference of perceptions’ between neighbours. The Raja answered that the issue had to be raised through the Government of India as it involved a problem with two foreign governments.
During the next warm season, the Dzongpen visited Nilang again and collected a tax of Rs.1 from the local people of Nilang and Jadhang. He thus collected a total of Rs 300.
In 1924, it was finally proposed by British India to appoint a boundary Commission, but due to the poor communications and the fact that these areas could only be visited in summer, the Commission could meet only in the summer of 1926.

Report of the Officials
The Nilang-Jadhang area
Regarding Nilang-Jadhang, the Indian side produced a large amount of evidence to establish conclusively that this area had always been a part of India. The boundary alignment between India and Tibet in this sector had always been along the watershed range.
…The Chinese side then referred to the discussions regarding the boundary in this sector between India and Tibet during the years 1921 to 1928. This, however, could in no way substantiate the Chinese claim. During these discussions the Tehri state had produced a variety of records going back to the 17th century to prove its ownership of the area; and the Tibetan side could produce only one book in which the trade dues paid by the villages of Nilang and Jadhang to the Dzongpon of Tsaparang, when they visited the Tibetan trade marts of Poling and Toling, were entered as taxes. Again, while the Tehri representative gave a precise definition of the Tehri-Tibet boundary, the Tibetan representatives referred to only on point — Gum Gum or Gungoong bridge — on the alignment claimed by them and could not say how the line would run east and west of this point The compromise proposed at the time by colonel Bailey, and referred to by the Chinese side was offered not because Tehri's claim was weak but because the Government of India were anxious to settle a minor dispute lest it impair the prevailing friendly relations between India and Tibet.
It was not, therefore, true to say that the then Indian Government coerced the local inhabitants in order to alter the existing boundary.
Rather, it was the other way round. The people of Nilang and Jadhang, who during winter moved deeper south, in the summer, went to Tibet to trade. While in Tibet they were subjected to various vexatious dues and intimidated into declaring that they were subjects of Tibet and that the trade dues paid by them were land taxes. It was significant that the only documentary evidence brought forward by the Chinese side for this area were two 'avowals' alleged to have been made by the inhabitants in 1921 and 1927-i.e. after the commencement of the boundary dispute. It was such repeated coercion by the Tibetan authorities of the traders of Nilang and Jadhang that forced these villagers to cease going into Tibet for trade.

China’s border tactics unchanged

Indian patrol in the Barahoti Plain in the 1950s

My article China’s border tactics unchanged appeared in The Asian Age/Deccan Chronicle
 
Here is the link...

Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi’s visit to New Delhi on Saturday will not change anything in the mindset of the leadership in Beijing, and the intrusions (transgressions?) will continue. It is important, therefore, that the Indian public is aware about the history of our borders.

In July 1952, the Intelligence Bureau sent New Delhi a worrying report about the Garhwal-Tibet border; after explaining that the border in this area could “only be crossed through Mana and Niti Valleys, where there are open places and habitation, the rest of the border area consists of snow-covered mountains studded with glaciers,” it mentioned one area, Hoti, used by Indian traders going to Tibet during the warm season.
The report warned that at the end of the 19th century, the Tibetans had once established a customs post in Hoti Plain: “To stop this practice, the British government had to send out a detachment of Gurkhas along with Dharmanand Joshi, deputy collector, in 1890. This had a salutary effect and the Tibetans removed their post,” the IB report noted.
But once the Chinese appeared on the scene and occupied the plateau in 1950-51, the Tibetans became bolder: “It appears the Tibetans have again established a police-cum-customs post at Hoti during the trading season,” the 1952 IB report said. It added: “It’s quite possible that if the Tibetans aren’t stopped from establishing their post at Hoti Plain, they might eventually claim it to be their own territory. Since there is no habitation or cultivation in this area, the Garhwal authorities hardly ever visit the area or take action to denote that it lies within their jurisdiction.”
For centuries, the dzongpon (commissioner) of Daba in Tibet had sent serjis (messengers) to Hoti Plain in Indian territory to announce that the trading season had begun. As Indian traders went to Tibet, there were charged some “hospitality” taxes corresponding to the facilities they got from the Tibetan authorities (fodder for animals, etc).
In 1952, the Tibetans again shifted their “customs” camp to Barahoti. The IB then suggested sending a detachment of the Garhwal Rifles and local armed police to hoist the Indian tricolour in Barahoti “to stop the Tibetans from establishing their customs post”.
That is how the Barahoti “dispute” started. It took a nastier turn two years later, when China had established its presence in western Tibet.
It’s important to remember that the Indian and Chinese governments had signed the “historic” Panchsheel Agreement on trade and pilgrimage in Tibet in April 1954. India gave away all its rights in the Land of Snows (telegraph lines, post offices, dak bungalows, military escorts in Gyantse and Yatung), but got no assurances on the border demarcation from Beijing.

In the negotiations, Indian diplomats clearly showed that the traditional and customary boundary followed the watershed range; the passes of Mana, Niti, Tun Jun La, Balcha Dhura, Kungri Bingri, Darma and Lipulekh marked the border in the area. China agreed to name five of them in the agreement, but flatly refused to mention Tsang Chok La, Tun Jun La and Balcha Dhura.
Why? Simply because Tun Jun La is north of Barahoti in Garhwal and Balcha Dhura north of Sangchamalla and Lapthal in Almora district. Not naming these passes allowed China to later claim that these areas were located south of the watershed. The Indian negotiators were fooled... but then China, at that time, was a great friend!
The ink barely dried on the Panchsheel that China started making claims on the Indian territories. On August 13, 1954, a note from the Chinese embassy in New Delhi complained: “Over 30 Indian troops armed with rifles crossed the Niti Pass on June 29, 1954, and intruded into Wu-Je (Chinese name for Barahoti).” Beijing pretended to be shocked, saying “this not in conformity with the principles of non-aggression and friendly co-existence between China and India.” So while China had entered Indian territory, it was now blaming India!
Beijing later protested that on July 17, a 33-person unit had entered its territory... in Barahoti: “The unit was under the command of an officer called Nathauja (Chinese pronunciation), a deputy commander, the district magistrate of Walzanjapur district as well as a doctor, a radio operator and soldiers, all living in 17 tents.”
After investigations, India replied on August 27 that it was found “the allegation is entirely incorrect. A party of our Border Security Force is encamped in Hoti Plain, which is southeast of Niti Pass and in Indian territory. None of our troops or personnel have crossed north of Niti Pass.”
It is how the saga of incursions in the central sector of the Indo-Tibet (now Sino-Indian) border began.
A new terminology has been found by bureaucrats in New Delhi. It is called a “transgression”, but it doesn’t change the historical fact: Barahoti is south of the Himalayan watershed marking the border.
In 1958, New Delhi decided to try to negotiate a settlement with Beijing. Fu Hao, Chinese counsellor in New Delhi, met a MEA joint secretary several times. The Chinese suggested a joint local inquiry. Foreign secretary Subimal Dutt sent a note to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru: “Our case is that Barahoti is an area of about one and a half square miles. We have given the exact position with reference to its latitude and longitude. The Chinese have not defined which area they mean by Wu-Je... an area south of Tun Jun La.” Dutt then added: “If the Chinese claims are conceded, the international boundary would lie south in what is undoubtedly Indian territory.”
The foreign secretary said: “The Chinese are apparently keen on a local inquiry because they will thereby be in a position to define the exact borders of the area which they are claiming.” But Beijing didn’t know where Wu-Je or Barahoti was located.
Subimal Dutt then concluded: “We should emphatically refuse to take any oral evidence locally. Barahoti is more easily approachable from the Tibet side than from our side. The Chinese would be able to produce any number of Tibetans to say what they (want) these people to say.”
He went on: “The Chinese government is not prepared to accept our northern border as shown on our maps, as these maps are supposed to have been prepared by British colonialists surreptitiously. They are also not prepared to accept passes mentioned in the 1954 agreement as border passes... thereby indirectly repudiating the principle of watershed as marking the international boundary.”
All this shows that the Chinese still use the same tactics (whether in the South China Sea today or earlier in Aksai Chin or Barahoti); they occupy a territory that they deem important for their own interests and later emphatically declare it has always been “Chinese territory”, which is sacred and will be defended by force if necessary.
Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi’s visit to New Delhi on Saturday will not change anything in the mindset of the leadership in Beijing, and the intrusions (transgressions?) will continue. It is important, therefore, that the Indian public is aware about the history of our borders.

Mr Wang, Reopen Demchok

In my previous post, I mentioned the railway lines which will soon reach Purang/Taklakot, north of Pithoragarh district of Uttarakhand and Yatung in the Chumbi Valley, sandwiched between Sikkim and Bhutan.
In this connection, The China Daily published a couple of days ago, an intriguing article entitled Tibet envisioned as hub of Himalayas.
What does it mean?
Is China unilaterally planning to open/reopen the Himalayan passes which were closed in 1962, without informing India?
Today, only three passes have been reopened for trade: Shipki-la in Himachal Pradesh, Lipulekh-la in Uttarakhand, and Nathu-la in Sikkim.
According to The China Daily: “Tibet could become the cultural, economic and humanitarian hub of the Himalayas and so build a peaceful, cooperative relationship with its South Asian neighbors.”
It conveniently quotes some ‘experts’ who attended the Sixth International Forum on Tibetan Studies in Beijing.
Note that it has never been difficult for Beijing to find ‘experts’.
The article explains:

Sandwiched between the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, Tibet plays a significant role in connecting both initiatives, making it an ideal place for cultures to meet.

This surprising statement comes at a time when not only the Chinese ‘transgress’ into Indian territory in Chamoli district of Uttarakhand, but also adamantly refuse to reopen the main traditional route leading to the Kailash-Manasarovar, namely the Demchok-Tashigang route between Ladakh and Tibet.
Blissfully ignorant ‘experts’ like Lai Shanglong, chief economic commissioner of the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs affirms:

With its beautiful thangka (Buddhist-themed paintings on cloth) and unique clothing, Tibetan culture is very attractive in the Himalayan region. Its influence can radiate through mountains and connect with other South Asian countries.

The Buddhist culture did not wait for Mr Lai to radiate in the Indian side of the Himalaya.
Mr Lai should visit the Tawang monastery, village gompas in Ladakh, Spiti or Kinnaur? Or Sikkim and Bhutan. He will realize the Buddhist culture flourishes on the Southern slopes of the Himalaya too.
The China Daily article remarks that in June [2015], “China opened a new land route along Himalayan Nathu La Pass for Indian pilgrims to visit the holy sites of Mount Kailash and Lake Manasarovar in Tibet, considered sacred by Hindus and Buddhists. The initiative was universally hailed.”
It may have been universally hailed in China, but not in India: the Nathu-la route is several times longer than the traditional route in Ladakh (via Demchok).
Why are the Chinese so quiet about the demand from the people in Ladakh to reopen the old caravan road?
It is a mystery.
After all, for centuries it has been the main (and the easiest) route to the Holy Mountain.
One of the reasons could be the proximity of the National Highway 219, infamously known as the Aksai Chin road, cutting across the Indian territory in Northern Ladakh.
Mr Lai, with his poor knowledge of the region, amazingly argues:

if China expanded its humanitarian aid projects in Tibet to other South Asian countries - providing practical services such as teaching, repairing buildings and medical treatment - that initiative would also earn praise. …This would strengthen goodwill toward China in South Asian communities, improve China's image and increase support from neighboring countries.

He does not mention Demchok nor Shipki-la or Mana-la (Uttarakhand) routes?
Let us not forget that when the government of Himachal Pradesh appealed to Delhi to make Shipki-la one of the routes to the Kailash, it was immediately blocked by China.
Liu Zhifu, director of the South Asia Research Institute at Xizang Minzu University told the Beijing Forum that “trade routes have facilitated economic and cultural interaction for centuries”.
It is true, but just look at the map of the scheme One Belt One Road.
One notices that China is ready to open new routes or corridors, but only with its friends (Pakistan, i.e. the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and Nepal in Zham and Kyirong).
Liu Zhifu added that the Belt and Road Initiative “is breathing new life into Purang (trijunction Tibet-Nepal-India), Kyirong, Zham and other ports.”
This 'new life' will only help accelerate the process of the integration of Nepal in the Middle Kingdom.
Di Fangyao, executive deputy director of the Institute commented: “It's high time that Tibet increase its exports of locally produced goods”; he complained that the trade market in Yatung opens only for only six months “before the harsh winter sets in”.
It is perhaps true, but China is not sincere in its approach.
It should first reopen Demchok.
Let us hope that Ms Swaraj will ask her Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, when he visits Delhi Next week: why are you so adamant to let the people and goods flow again over the Himalaya. Let the devotees wanting to visit the abode of Lord Shiva use the easiest road: Demchok or Shipki-la.
Pilgrims and traders, instead of using a long and tortuous route, could take the Ladakh or Shipki-la routes as it was done for centuries.
Incidentally, China still claims Demchok as theirs.
It would be interesting to refer the case of Demchok to the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA).
What right does have Beijing to claim Demchok?
None!
For centuries it has been part of the kingdom of Ladakh and remains so after the Himalayan region was integrated  into the Dogra State during the 19th century.
China was nowhere to be seen.
Like in the South China Sea and other places at the periphery of the Middle Kingdom, it is an invented claim without historical basis.
Is it this that Beijing does not want to admit?
Otherwise, why this double speak?

Return to the Stilwell Road: Reopening a mythical trade route

My article Return to the Stilwell Road: Reopening a mythical trade route  appeared in Mail Today.

The Stilwell Road is a myth. Constructed by the Americans during World War II, it started from Ledo, the railhead in the plains of Assam, and wound its way to Kunming, in China’s Yunnan province, covering 1726 km of some of the treacherous terrain.
The road ran only 61km in India before it crossed into Burma via the Pangsau pass.
Lying at an altitude of 1,136m, in today’s Changlang district of Arunachal Pradesh, it was nicknamed the ‘Hell Pass’ during the WWII due to its fierce gradients, serpentine twists and constant mudslides.

Difficulties
During the War, the US had the choice between two ‘hells’. A large number of American planes had crashed in NEFA (today’s Arunachal Pradesh) while on supply missions to China. It is estimated that 416 US aircrew went missing in India, mostly in NEFA. The US troops desperately needed a way to bring supplies to the Chinese front, to fight the Japanese troops. Transport planes faced extraordinary difficulties with inclement weather, strong winds and a treacherous air route known as ‘The Hump’.
The US then decided to build a road, and on January 12, 1945, the first convoy of 113 vehicles left Ledo to finally reach Kunming on February 4. The construction is said to have cost 13,70,00,000 dollars.
Though originally known as the ‘Ledo Road’, it was later baptised after General Joseph Stilwell, alias ‘Vinegar Joe’, the Chief of Staff of Allied Forces in the China- Burma-India theatre.
Can you believe that the road was reopened on December 30, 2015? Very few, except in the North-East, noticed the event: but a myth was reborn, with probably incalculable future economic consequences for the region.
The Arunachal Times reported from Itanagar: “Exhibits from China arrived at the border trade point at Pangsau Pass in Changlang district of Arunachal Pradesh en route to the Assam International Agri-Horti Show 2016 at Guwahati.”
The Chinese truck, accompanied by 2 light motor vehicles, carried 82 parcels with electronic goods, organic tea, coffee, and toys to be displayed during the show scheduled for next month.
An official communiqué from the Arunachal government said: “Passing through the historic Stilwell Road, the exhibits arrived all the way from Baoshan in China’s Yunnan province.”
Representatives of the North East Federation on International Trade (NEFIT), as well as Arunachal’s Trade & Commerce Director Tokong Pertin were present to receive the  Chinese delegates. Pertin called the reopening of the Stilwell Road a ‘historic moment’.
He said that the newly reopened route could become “a conduit for trade and better understanding for the two Asian economic giants as well as among the countries of the Bangladesh-China-India- Myanmar Forum for Regional Cooperation (BCIM).”

Support
Pertin added that his government was ready to provide logistic support “with a hope that it will go a long way in developing future trade and business among BCIM countries and ASEAN.”
The route is said to have been used during the 13th century invasion of Assam by the Ahoms, and in the late 19th century, the British pondered a railway line to Myitkyina in north Burma through the Hukawng Valley, but the project never materialised.
A year ago, MoS for Home Kiren Rijiju mentioned the reopening of the Stillwell road: “After the Stillwell Road was closed in 1962, the movement of border trade was restricted. Re-opening this road would open up numerous options,” Rijiju asserted.
The reopening today is mainly symbolic, as many other considerations have to be taken into account to start trade on a large scale. One of them is that Delhi may presently like to go slow on the ‘BCIM’ corridor.
The issue was apparently raised by Chinese President Xi Jinping during his visit to India in September 2014, but only a passing reference was made about the BCIM Economic Corridor in the Joint Statement.
Perhaps one of the greatest tragedies of the 20th century has been the closing of the border trade through the Himalayan routes.
Soon after Tibet’s invasion in October 1950, the traditional border passes were progressively closed.
Though the Panchsheel Agreement in 1954 was meant to regulate the flow of people and goods over the Himalayas, it did not happen and as a result of the 1962 border war and the non-renewal of the Agreement, trade between ‘Tibet’s Region of China’ and India came to an end.
The same fate lay in store for the Stillwell Road.

Tragedies
It is only after prime minister Rajiv Gandhi’s trip to China in December 1988, that a ‘Protocol for Resumption of Border Trade’ was signed.
Following the Sino-Indian agreement of 1992, trade through Lipulekh Pass in Pithoragarh district became an annual feature. The pass also became the official pilgrimage route for the Kailash-Mansarovar yatra.
Shipki-la, in Kinnaur district of Himachal Pradesh was the second landport to open. However, the poor quality of the infrastructure and the limited list of permissible items has restricted the border trade which flourished for centuries.
After PM Vajpayee’s visit to China in June 2003, talks started on the resumption of border trade via Nathu-la in Sikkim. Finally, the pass opened for trade in July 2006.
Pangsau Pass has become the fourth Himalayan pass to open for trade. Though trade may remain small-scale for some time, it is an important step for normalising the relations between the concerned countries. And one day, it will hopefully bring some prosperity to the local populations of Arunachal and Assam.

The sorry state of India’s Borders

Kiren Rijiju trekking to the border

Sometimes, though it is rare, one reads some good news in the national press. One of these refreshing items, for me at least, was the visit of the Minister of State for Home Affairs, Kiren Rijiju, to the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) posts in Gunji and Kalapani of Pithoragarh District of Uttarakhand.

Another Rediff interview with Kiren Rijiju

According to Sushil Kumar, the District Magistrate, Rijiju went “to take stock of the defence infrastructure in these border areas.”
The young dynamic minister from Arunachal spent a night at Nabhidhang rest house, on the way to Lipulekh-la, no very far from the trijunction between India, Tibet and Nepal.
He is said to have walked the last eight kms from Kalapani to Nabhidhang to reach the last ITBP border post.
And guess what the minister discovered?
A ‘peculiar security concern’, said the local press.
Indian telecom services are not available in these remote areas; as a result, local villagers have to use Nepali SIM cards. Isn’t it shocking?
Rijiju said: “Villagers in this region walk for five days to reach a road. After Dharchula, only Nepal SIM cards work.”
He told The Indian Express: “It’s a shame that in 68 years of independence, we have not been able to provide over 20,000 villagers in this region with roads, electricity and telecommunication. People, including our jawans, use SIM cards bought from Nepal as Indian telecom signals do not reach here. There is no tower in the entire region.”
On his return to the capital, the minister wrote to his colleagues in the Department of Telecom and the Ministry of Defence asking them to immediately remedy this vital lacuna.
This raises several issues.
First, it is not a new phenomenon. Several years ago, I was told by a politician from Arunachal, who had earlier served as a minister, that when he went abroad and he received calls from Tawang, to his surprise, the identification number showed the Chinese ISD code: it meant that calls originating from Tawang were transiting via China. That was long ago, but the situation on the borders does not seem to have improved much.
Then, Rijiju was the first Union minister to visit these areas. Why? It is simply too far from Delhi’s comfort.
Further, Nabhidhang is not an ordinary border post: it is on the track followed by the MEA Yatra to Kasilash-Mansarovar and one of the 3 official landports (with Nathu-la and Shilpi-la) between India and China.
I would be curious to know how many times the Pithoragargh DM has visited this area. Usually, once in a tenure is enough; local officials prefer to dream of a posting in Dehradun.
A larger, but closely linked issue is the migration of populations from India’s frontiers.
A few weeks ago, The Times of India (TOI) reported from Dehradun: “As villages along the international border in Uttarakhand face out-migration on an unprecedented scale, uninhabited areas lie open to territorial claims by the Chinese.”
The journalist studied the case of Niti, the last Indian village, located 26 km south from the Niti pass, which demarcates the border between Tibet and India. For centuries, the village, situated at an altitude of 3,600 metres, saw traders, pilgrims and officials freely moving between the two countries and the area flourished. Unfortunately, all this stopped in 1962; today only 35 families remain in the village; a few decades ago, there were 250.
Trade with Tibet (today China) is dead and the area is virtually closed to outsiders; an Inner Line Permit is not easy to obtain from the local authorities.
Located 88 km from Joshimath, though the village could have been developed into an eco-tourism centre, it was not done. Even amongst the remaining 35 families, most of the young people have moved to the plains in search of a better life.
The Chinese have no qualms to develop their side of the Himalayan range and while Beijing has taken great leaps forward to built its border infrastructure, Delhi has worked at snail’s speed, struggling to create a semblance of infrastructure; migration is the direct outcome of this slow pace.
On the same subject, The Tribune quotes Dr Shamsher Singh Bisht, a social activist: “The rate of migration has increased after June 2013 as most of the people who lost their homes but received compensation preferred to relocate in safer plains.”
Dr Anil Joshi, a ‘gaon bachao’ advocate explains: “Over 3,000 villages in the hills have been abandoned due to policies of the respective state governments which kept neglecting villages when it came to development policies. …A silent migration from rural Uttarakhand is on.”

The 2011 census says that 1,065 villages of the state have been deserted.
Why should a farmer or a pastoralist, living in a remote village of Uttarakhand or near the LAC in Ladakh, remain in his native village when he can earn a decent living by running a small hotel in Dehradun or driving a taxi in Leh.
In one of his monthly radio programs, Maan ki Baat, Prime Minister Modi had announced that he was “deputing Central Government officials to find solutions to problems being faced by the region”. The Ministry of Development of the North-Eastern Region was to send officials to hold week-long camps. The outcome has never been made public.
Remember Verrier Elwin’s A Philosophy for NEFA, so dear to Nehru! Based on French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s theory: “Nothing is so gentle as man in his primitive state, when placed by nature at an equal distance from the stupidity of brutes and the fatal enlightenment of civil man,” the romantic view of the tribal folks ultimately amounted to the segregation of a large chunk of the Indian population and a total lack of development of these strategically important regions.
One of the decisions taken by Modi Sarkar has been to modify the guidelines of the Border Area Development Programme (BADP) drafted some 10 years ago. The BADP is a 100 per cent centrally funded scheme covering in priority all Indian villages located within 10 km of the International Border.
The sucess is doubtful, because despite good intentions, how will the project be implemented on the ground, and crucially how soon?
Another issue is the stagnating petty trade between India and Tibet. Though border trade could have been a way to stop migration, the local babus are not really motivated, while China is not interested to reopen the traditional passes.

Milam village in Pithoragargh district

The serious strategic implication of the depopulation of the entire Himalayan belt is that it has opened wide the door to Chinese incursions.
Take the Barahoti grazing ground in Chamoli district; it was the first area claimed by China as ‘theirs’ in 1954. If there are no Indian grazers to go up with their herds at the beginning of the summer season, the Chinese are quick to send their own to ‘mark’ China’s presence. Recently, Indian district officials had to be sent for a few weeks to ‘stamp India’s presence’ as hardly any grazer from Niti is interested anymore.
Who in Delhi realizes that in case of a conflict, the ‘local’ population will play a crucial role?
Though Mr Modi’s initiative to send officers to the spot is certainly a great improvement in the right direction; a special ‘border’ cadre could also help reverse the tide.
Will Rijiju’s trip be followed by the visit of his colleagues of Defence (who obviously prefers the beaches of Goa for his weekends), Telecom or Road Transport ministries to India’s frontiers?
This would be a boon for the borders of India, but it may not happen.

Guess what? The Chinese are coming...

Construction work on the new road Lhasa-Nyingtri

An article, which appeared yesterday in the Chinese ‘Tibetan’ press, put the release of the White Paper (WP) on Tibet into perspective.
I have been wondering about the WP's timing which was obviously ‘synchronized’ with the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR), but it was also clear that there was more behind the strong attack against the Dalai Lama (and his Group, as Beijing calls the Dharamsala Administration).
An article in China Tibet Online gives a hint of what is up Beijing’s sleeves.
The piece is titled: “Guess what? 6th Tibet Work Conference may be convened this year, netizens say.”
For China, it is new that netizens are aware of ‘State Secrets’ such as holding crucial meetings …and their timings!
But when one watches China, the first rule is not to be surprised by anything.
The announcement of the holding of a Sixth Conference (or Forum) on Tibet Work by ‘netizens’ is clearly a propaganda gimmick.
The previous Forum was held in Beijing in January 2010. Before that, five Tibet Work Conferences were organized in 1980, 1984, 1994, 2001 and 2010: “it has played a significant role in advancing the economic and social development in Tibet”, says the official media.
What is a Work Forum on Tibet?
It is the place where a new Tibet policy is decided.
It is attended by several hundreds of officials, including all the members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo.
The Chinese website says: “Now people are eagerly anticipating the Sixth Tibet Work Conference.”
Who are the ‘people’ eagerly expecting a new direction in Tibet Policy?
The ‘netizens’ (there were called the ‘masses’ under Mao), says the official media which gives a background: “This year marks the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the Tibet Autonomous Region. On March 5, during the Third Session of the 12th National People’s Congress, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang highlighted that celebrations should be organized for the 50th anniversary in the government work report.”
To prepare the ground for the TAR celebrations (and the new Forum), the State media explains that from November 2014 to March 2015, “many in the central leadership as well as various government departments went to Tibet and Tibetan-inhabited areas in Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan provinces to conduct research and make inspections, including: Yu Zhengsheng, Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, Du Qinglin, Vice Chairman of the CPPCC National Committee, and Sun Chunlan, minister of the United Front Work Department of CPC Central Committee as well as leaders of the Ministry of Education, the State Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Environmental Protection, Ministry of Water Conservancy and Ministry of Agriculture.”
I have reported these visits from time to time on this blog.
China Tibet Online and other ‘Tibetan’ official websites quote a Communist ‘saying’: “the central leadership and relevant departments must conduct in-depth research and inspections before an important meeting is convened and important documents issued.”
Now the ‘masses’ (oops sorry, the ‘netizens’) are guessing: “the central authorities [read Beijing] may initiate a big move to aid Tibet.”
Netizen ‘Costa’ says: "After much research, I think the next conference will be held sometime between August 28 and September 1, 2015"; while Netizen ‘i3broadaxe’ believes that "the reasonable time frame (for the conference) is from June to July".
Of course, adds the Communist mouth piece, “these statements are not necessarily credible,” but, but, but...: “It might be a good news if the Sixth Tibet Work Conference could be held this year. This would comply with Chinese President Xi Jinping’s important strategic ideology.”
What does Xi says about Tibet?
The Chinese President believes that "to govern the country well, we must govern the border areas first, and to govern the border areas well, we must stabilize Tibet first".
Who is on the other side of the border? India, of course!
How does this translate on the ground?
In Tibet, the masses will have to follow Xi’s Four Comprehensives, in other words: “upholding the rule of law in governing Tibet, maintaining a long-term development of Tibet, seeking for public consent, and laying a solid foundation.”
[Officially, Xi’s theory refers to ‘comprehensively’ building a moderately prosperous society, deepening reform, governing the country according to rule by law, and enforcing strict party discipline.]

More Chinese tourists in perspective

But business being business, the national strategy of ‘One Belt, One Road’ should be kept in mind while 'developing' the Roof of the World.
For Tibet, it means: “the promotion of development and stability in Tibet and Tibetan-inhabited areas in other four provinces. Furthermore, it will help achieve the goal of achieving a comprehensive moderately prosperous society, comprehensively deepening the reform, and promoting the rule of law.”
‘The promotion of development and stability in Tibet and Tibetan-inhabited areas in other four provinces’ partially answers the Dalai Lama’s demand for a common policy for the 3 traditional regions of Tibet (U-Tsang, Amdo and Kham), now administrated by Yunnan, Sichuan, Gansu and Qinghai provinces, (apart from the Tibetan Autonomous Region).
By bringing prosperity and exchanges (with Nepal through Kyirong port, for example), Beijing believes that it can solve the Tibetan issue.
The Sixth Work Forum on Tibet will probably decide to transform the Land of Snows into an important economic (and touristic) hub for the New Silk Road project.
One of the decisions could be to immediately start the Tibet-Xinjiang railway through the disputed Askai Chin area. To complete it at the earliest (see my previous post), could be a major policy decision of the Forum.

"To govern the country well,
we must govern the border areas first", Xi Jinping

Where is India in all that?
Of course, Delhi's permission will not be taken to run the railway through what India considers her own territory.
In any case, India will be nowhere because all Himalayan landports are today closed (except on a very small restricted scale for Nathu-la in Sikkim, Shipki-la in Himachal and Lipulekh-la in Uttarakhand).
If China is truly serious about the New Silk Road, (and wants India’s participation), it should reopen the traditional Himalayan border passes/routes, such as the Karakoram pass and Demchok in Ladakh, Niti, Mana, Darma passes in Uttarakhand, Jelep-la between West Bengal and Tibet, Bumla, Kibitoo in Arunachal.
One should not forget that for millennia, the Himalaya has been a place of passage and exchanges between the Tibetan world and the subcontinent.
It is only because of the irresponsible ‘Panchsheel’ policy of Jawaharlal Nehru policy effectively closed the passes in 1954.
When the former Prime Minister realized his blunder, it was too late, the PLA soldiers were already rolling down the slopes of the Thagla ridge and marching into the high plateau of Ladakh.
For the Tibetans, a Sixth Work Forum does not augur well; it probably means the final integration (Beijing used to speak about ‘Liberation’) under millions and millions of Han tourists and traders.

China’s inroads in Nepal

Wang Yi with Nepali Prime Minister

My article China’s inroads in Nepal appeared today in NitiCentral.

Here is the link...

At the end of November, Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Nepal and held important talks with his Nepali counterpart Sushil Koirala. Not only did they discuss strategic issues, but India and Nepal signed 10 bilateral agreements.
Further, India offered a line of credit (LoC) of US$ 1 Billion to be utilized for hydropower, irrigation and infrastructural development projects. After the meeting, Narendra Modi commented: “When we trust each other, we can move forward very quickly.”
Though that sounded very positive, these developments may not have been appreciated on the other side of the Himalayas. According to Reuters, “China will increase official aid to Nepal by more than five times from fiscal 2015-16.” China wants “to develop infrastructure in the landlocked nation where regional rival India has long wielded political influence,” says Reuters which further reported: “The jump in assistance was announced after talks between visiting Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and his Nepali counterpart Mahendra Bahadur Pandey, part of a deepening engagement which is expected to lead to a visit by President Xi Jinping next year.”
China has two main stakes. One, Beijing wants to control the Tibetan refugees living in Nepal and make sure that their ranks do not increase in the coming years. Two, the Communist leadership wants to render Kathmandu economically dependent on the trade with Tibet (read China).
According to Xinhua: “Wang expressed his gratitude toward Nepal for its firm and precious support in China's core interests, including the issue of Tibet, …China and Nepal should not only be friends of mutual trust and mutual support, but also should be good partners of common development and common prosperity.”
On the first issue, Tibet, China has already acted. During his visit to the former kingdom, Wang Yi laid the foundations of a ‘police academy’ to train officers of Nepal’s Armed Police Force to guard the districts bordering Tibet. The new police academy is a ‘gift’ to Nepal, on top of the annual aid of US $128 million. The Chinese Foreign Minister told reporters: “As neighbors China and Nepal have common security needs ... we need to work together to crack down on illegal border crossings and transnational crimes.”
The Nepali leaders are not concerned as to why so many Tibetans try to escape Tibet. In the past, tens of thousands of Tibetans crossed over the Himalayan passes; once they reached Kathmandu, the United Nations’ High Commissioner for Refugees would use issue them passes for their onward journey to Dharamsala in Himachal Pradesh where the Dalai Lama lives.
Beijing calls these refugees, ‘illegal migrants’ and has decided to ‘help’ Kathmandu (with ‘gifts’ such as the Police Academy) to stop the hemorrhage of Tibetan through the Himalayan passes; as a result, the number of Tibetans ‘migrants’ has fallen from about 2,500 six years ago to about 200 last year.
On the second issue, China wants to increase manifold the trade between Tibet (China) and Nepal. Wang proposed to “widen pragmatic cooperation in nine sectors, namely trade, investment, agriculture, infrastructure, science and technology, interconnection and intercommunication, tourism, cultural and educational exchanges, security and law enforcement.”
The Foreign Minister stated that the two nations should fully implement the ‘three supports’, namely funds, talent and geography.
About geography, new facilities at the China (Kyirong) Nepal (Rasuwa) Bilateral Port have been opened on December 1. The China Daily says that it will “to boost business between China and Nepal and benefit nearby residents.”
The Kyirong port is an old gateway between Tibet and Nepal; the present border post was opened in 1962, when the traditional trade between India and Tibet stopped due to the Sino-Indian conflict.
The China Daily admits that the trade through Kyirong “began to drop off in the mid-1980s and continued to decline through 2006,” but in the recent years, exchanges between China and Nepal have increased so much that the Zhangmu Port, Tibet's largest land port, could no longer cope with the demand.
Penpa, director of the Tibet Autonomous Region's Department of Commerce explained: “Since 2008, preparatory projects to expand the [Kyirong] port have been launched, including equipping the port with inspection and support services."
Wang Long, the director of the new Kyirong Customs said that the extension of the Qinghai-Lhasa Railway line to Shigatse (opened in August) will be a bridgehead towards South Asia; he added: “There will be an increase in the categories of products and the quantity of exported electronic products, and there will be a rise in trading volume as well."
Does it mean that China is planning to flood India with consumer goods through the porous Indo-Nepal border in the Terai? This could be a very serious issue for India.
Su Yuanming, director of Tibet’s Port Administrative Office also told The China Daily: “Operation of the port means a solid foundation for China to build the South Asia trading area, and it will help to promote trade between China and South Asian countries in the near future."
It is time for India to wake up to this new threat.
From January through November 2014, trade volume through Kyirong Port reached 1,600 metric tons for a value of US $ 4.5 million, double the value of the past three years combined. With the formal opening of the new facilities, these figures are bound to increase manifold in 2015.
The China Daily emphasizes that it will greatly improve the lives of the local population on both sides. It quotes Lhakpa, a Tibetan from Kyirong Township, who worked as a driver since the age of 15, and now, at the age of 34, owns a small transport company: “I have long been waiting for this day, and I believe it will boost my business." Lhakpa explains: "With improved traffic conditions and a better electricity network, our villagers have begun to enjoy the advantages brought about by the government."
It is true that the residents of Kyirong have been trading with Nepal since ancient times, though the quantity of products has always been limited. Following the opening of the new port, it may not the case anymore.
In November 1950, a few days after China invaded Tibet, the young Editor of Mother India, (published in Mumbai) asked Sri Aurobindo, the great Indian freedom fighter and yogi about these ominous happenings in the Himalayas. The sage gave his views; in his next editorial, K.D. Sethna, the journalist wrote: “Let us not blink to the fact that Tibet is useful to China principally as a gate of entry to India. Nepal …appears to be the most likely objective;” Sethna further explained: “An extension of Mao’s rule to Nepal will lay India open to easy attack by him [Mao]”.
It is what is happening 64 years later.
The new port and the arrival of the train in Shigatse (and later in Kyirong) will also have strategic and security implications on India, especially if the military exchanges between Beijing and Kathmandu keep increasing.

Gateway to Nepal via the roof of the world

Kyirong welcoming China

My article Gateway to Nepal via the roof of the world appeared today in the Edit Page of The Pioneer.

Here is the link...

Chinese plans to improve connectivity between Tibet and the Himalayan nation, by extending the railway network and building a new land-port at Kyirong, should be of concern in Kathmandu and New Delhi

Next week, Prime Minister Narendra Modi will travel to Nepal. Can you believe that he will be the first Indian Prime Minister to pay an official bilateral visit to Kathmandu in 17 years? Press reports say that Mr Modi may also travel to Lumbini, the birthplace of Lord Buddha, and Janakpur, where legend has it, Lord Ram wed Sita.
This is good: India needs to re-establish her cultural, historical, economic and strategic links with Nepal as the Chinese are descending fast on the former Himalayan Kingdom. In September 2013, according to the Nepali publication The Republica, Mr Lobsang Gyaltsen, Chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Region, told some Nepali officials visiting Tibet that China would extend a rail service to Nepal once the train reaches the southern city of Shigatse. At that time, the Nepali delegation seemed more interested in a Chinese-built railway line from Kathmandu to Lumbini.
Mr Hari Basyal, the Nepalese Consul General in Lhasa, said that Mr Gyaltsen, though non-committal about Lumbini, announced: “Feasibility study is underway for expanding rail service between Nepal and Tibet.” Mr Gyaltsen also expressed China’s commitment “to extend a meaningful support to Nepal for achieving the common goal of socio-economic development.” This is ominous for India. This month, The Global Times made the train story official: “Sky rail to run from Lhasa to south Tibet; further railway expansion to connect Nepal, Bhutan, India by 2020.”
The rail line, linking Lhasa and Shigatse (poetically termed by China as the ‘closest stretch of railway to the sky’), will be open in August. The construction of the extension of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway, which started in September 2010, will be 254km long and have 13 stations. Trains will run at a speed of 120kmph and it will take only two hours from Lhasa to Shigatse, the TAR’s second largest city.

Kyirong (Chinese Gyirong) landport

According to Mr Yang Yulin, Deputy Director of the TAR’s railway office, it is the largest infrastructure project in Tibet during the 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015), with an investment of more than $1.7 billion. The train to Shigatse has three basic purposes: One, to bring more tourists, the TAR’s main source of revenue (15 million will visit the region in 2014); two, to take away minerals to the mainland to feed the Chinese economic machine and three, to ‘strengthen’ the borders with India by allowing quick movement of troops and armament.
But Mr Yang also announced that during the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020) period, construction will start on railway line connecting Shigatse with Kyirong in northern Nepal and with Yatung, in the Chumbi Valley located between Sikkim and Bhutan. Xinhua also affirmed that Beijing will soon upgrade the road network in Tibet “to make travels on The Roof of the World much easier”. The Chinese Ministry of Transport said that it will expand its road network to 1,10,000km by 2020 in TAR alone. Should India not be worried? The MOT acknowledged that the development of transport in Tibet was “crucial to China’s national security… and the lasting prosperity in the autonomous region.” ‘National security’ here means the strengthening of the borders with India.
In the meantime, Nepal’s vital economic relations with its giant northern neighbour will receive a tremendous boost when the new Kyirong land-port opens later this year. On April 11, the official China Tibet Online reported: “The Kyirong Port in southwest China’s Tibet bordered with Nepal will be formally opened in October this year.” The opening of the Kyirong Port has been listed as a key element of the Plan for national ports for 2014. A cross-border China-Nepal Kyirong Port Economic Cooperation Zone will soon be established; further, the Kyirong Port will be promoted as a tourist destination for mainland Chinese.

Kyirong

Zham is currently the main land-port between the TAR and Nepal, though historically Kyirong has been important; Xinhua explains: “The Kyirong Port enjoys a long history of being the largest land trading port between Tibet and Nepal. Many shop owners have expressed the hope that the opening of the port can help them get more involved in the border trade.”
Very few remember that during the 1792 Tibet-Nepal War, the Manchu troops called by the Tibetan Government to defeat the Gorkhas used the Kyirong route to invade Nepal. Will the opening of Kyirong mean another ‘invasion’ of Nepal with lakhs of Chinese tourists (and cheap goods!) arriving in Kathmandu?
Economically, the new border infrastructure will undoubtedly benefit both sides of the border. On April 11, Mr Dong Mingjun, a Vice Chairman of the TAR’s Government told the media, “By the end of July this year, construction of roads, [provision for] energy and medical facilities will be completed at the port.” The Kyirong Port will also be equipped with special facilities for monitoring eventual smuggling. Mr Dong also affirmed that, “the Kyirong Port will serve as a link between China and the South Asian countries.” Geographically, it does not make sense for Kyirong to be the link between China and South Asia, but a railway line to Yatung could be this potential link.
It would explain the announcement that the train is being planned for Yatung too. Today the border trade between India and Tibet is minimal, despite the great hopes generated in 2006, when Nathu-la was opened between Yatung and Gangtok. Since then, border trade has stagnated (partly due to the restricted list of items allowed to be traded). Does the new announcement mean that China will like to open the Yatung-Nathula-Gangtok route in a big way? Has Beijing consulted New Delhi on this or is it a unilateral decision?
A Chinese official asserted: “The opening of the Kyirong Port will become a key trading port next to Zham Port, and an important destination for international trekking, folk activities and visitors’ driving tours.” Till now, the transactions in Kyirong represented only a small percentage of it; this will change with the opening of the new land port. The opening of Kyirong will certainly boost border trade between Nepal and Tibet (China).
Chinese tourists and goods will be poured into Nepal through the Lhasa-Shigatse railway line and then the highway between Shigatse and Kyirong (a branch of the highly-strategic G219 highway linking Tibet to Xinjiang, known in India as the Aksai Chin Road) and in a few years, the train will be available.
This will also have serious strategic and security implications for India, as military exchanges are bound to increase between Beijing and Kathmandu. During his visit, Mr Modi will have a hard time balancing the Chinese presence in Nepal, but the fact that he has chosen Kathmandu as his second bilateral destination, shows that he is determined to start on a new footing.

Chinese incursion will affect the already dwindling border trade

My article Chinese incursion will affect the already dwindling border trade
appeared yesterday in DNA.
 
Although for centuries, the Himalayas were a natural barrier between the Tibetan plateau and the Indian subcontinent, it was also a space of exchange. It witnessed a constant flow of knowledge, traditions and goods transiting up and down from far-away places in Central Asia, China or Mongolia to the entire subcontinent.
In October 1950, China invaded Tibet and soon after the Liberation Army began occupying the high plateau; exchanges gradually stopped.

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Reopening of the Himalayas

During a seminar on "Tibet's Relation with the Himalayas" organized by the Foundation for Non-Violent Alternatives and the Sikkim University in Gangtok, a debate took place: should the natural barrier between the Tibetan plateau and the Indian subcontinent be called ‘Himalayas’ or ‘Himalaya’.
The debate can continue amongst scholars and academicians, but the fact is that for centuries (or millennia) this formidable mountain range has not been a ‘barrier’, but a space of exchange; this is no longer the case today.
The Dalai Lama always surprises when he says that there is no such thing as ‘Tibetan Buddhism’, even less ‘Lamaism’. The so-called ‘Tibetan Buddhism’, was entirely borrowed from India, he says; more precisely from Nalanda. How?
Because, by a twist of fate, Tibetan monks and lamas, as well as abbots and pundits from the Indian viharas, criss-crossed the high mountain passes and transferred India’s knowledge to the Roof of the World.
Santarakshita, the Abbot of Nalanda, not only introduced the Buddha dharma to the Land of Snows, but also ordained the first monks.
For more than a thousand of years, the Himalayas witnessed a constant flow of knowledge, experiences, traditions and goods transiting up and down from far-away places in Central Asia, China or Mongolia to the entire subcontinent.
Then, China invaded Tibet and as the ‘Liberation Army’ began to occupy the high plateau, the passes were gradually closed.
Already in 1954, the infamous Panchsheel Agreement, which for the first time denied the existence of Tibet as a separate identity, designated only 6 passes (in Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh) as the sole Himalayan land ports; myriad other routes were hastily closed. The last stroke was the short border war between India and China in 1962. All bridges were then cut between the plateau and the Indian plains; the passes have been blocked ever since.
As I attended the seminar, a question came to me: how to soften the traditional borders again? Can the age-old relation between the Tibetan plateau and India be revived? The process has started, though it is extremely slow.
In 1991, a Memorandum on Resumption of Border Trade was signed by India and China; in a first phase, an overland trade route was reopened between the Tibet Autonomous Region and Lipukekh pass in the Pithoragarh district of (today’s) Uttarakhand; since then, a mart is annually permitted for a few months. In 1994, the same facilities were extended to Shipki pass in Kinnaur district in Himachal Pradesh and later to Nathu-la (‘la’ means pass in Tibetan) in Sikkim. A series of trade agreements between India and China allowed residents of Tibet and Indians from the border districts to export goods from a selected list of 29 items such as blankets, textiles, coffee, tea, vegetable oil or gur while raw silk, yak tails, goats or readymade garments, etc could be imported from China.
In 2006, India and China decided to resume the border trade through the historic Nathu-la, located 4,545 metres above sea level and 54 kilometers from Gantok; it had been closed for the past 44 years. With Jelep-la (via Kalimpong), the pass was traditionally the most important trade passage between Tibet, China and India.
The bilateral move had also a strategic implication as analysts believed that it signaled Beijing’s implicit recognition of Sikkim as part of India. This is debatable.
Incidentally, when I applied to visit the pass, I was told that I could not go due to my ‘foreign’ origin. This is typically foolish babu-thinking: to allow visitors from India or abroad to have a quick darshan of Chumbi valley on the Tibetan side, would be the best proof that the place is a part the Indian territory, under New Delhi’s control. Security checks should of course go alongside the permission. Babus are often unable to think in India’s interests.
In 2006, it was hoped that the border trade route would give a major boost to local economies and smoothen the bilateral relations between India and China. This has not really been the case for different reasons. The border trade remains rather small in volume, though smuggling of commodity goods is flourishing.
It is perhaps time to think to reopen the Himalayan passes without restrictions. Common men can only benefit from it.
After President Xi Jinping met the Indian Prime Minister on the occasion of the BRICS meet in Durban, the Chinese leader stated that he regarded “ties with India as one of the most important bilateral relationships”. According to him, an important issue was “enhancing people-to-people exchanges and cooperation, and broadening youth exchanges.”
Why can’t both governments agree to remove the restrictions on border trade and later open the Himalayan passes to tourism?
Foremost in my mind is the Demchok route in Ladakh which would allow Indian pilgrims to reach the Kailash-Mansarovar area in a relatively short time and in fairly comfortable conditions. Is it not worth it?