The Tulung-la Killing

On the way to Tulung la

Prime Minister Narendra Modi will visit China for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit to be held in Tianjin n August 31 and September 1. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Guo Jiakun asserted that the Tianjin Summit will be the largest in scale since the establishment of the SCO.

Beijing already stated that it will seek closer ties with New Delhi, especially after global concerns over the tariffs imposed by US President Donald Trump.
While there is no harm to meet, a question remains: can Delhi fully trust Beijing? The past tends to show that it is difficult.
A recent visit to the remote Mago sector of Tawang district showed me that India should remain cautious.
This area has only recently been linked by a proper tar road to the rest of the district, which saw the brunt of the first military operations with China in October and November 1962. 
The villages of Thingbu and Mago are now easily reachable by road and are integrating fast into the country’s mainstream partly due to the Vibrant Village Program of the Central Government. The close collaboration between the Indian Army and the Central and State governments has also greatly helped.

The Tulung-la Pass
Driving further north on a track, one reaches the McMahon Line marking the border between India and Tibet (Arunachal Pradesh Chief Minister, Pema Khandu rightly insists that his State has a border with Tibet only, not China).
The Tulung-la, the pass between the Tsona Dzong (County) in Tibet and Tawang district is located close to the Gorichen peak, on a watershed between the Tsona Chu (river) in Tibet and the Tawang Chu; the ridge clearly demarcates the border between the two countries.
During the 1914 Simla Convention conference, the British Indian Foreign Secretary Henry McMahon and the Tibetan Prime Minister Lonchen Shatra negotiated a mutual agreeable boundary, mainly based on the watershed principle. McMahon explained: “the boundary line ...follows the crest of the mountain range which runs from peak 21431 through Tulung-la ...To the north of it are people of Tibetan descent, to the south the inhabitants are of Bhutanese and Aka extraction. It is unquestionably the correct boundary.”
In fact, before 1975, the boundary was never disputed, though it was one of the routes used by the Chinese Army to bring reinforcements to Bomdila during the second phase of the Sino-Indian War (November 18-20, 1962).

The 1975 Incident
In 1975, a serious and uncalled-for incident took place forcing the official spokesman of the Ministry of External Affairs to make a statement: “On the October 20, 1975, an Indian patrol party consisting of one NCO and four men, while on a routine patrol along India’s northern border, were ambushed by a Chinese party of about 40 persons. The ambush was well within Indian territory and in an area which has been regularly patrolled by us for many years and where no previous incident had taken place. Following this incident, four men were missing and it was subsequently learnt through diplomatic channels that they had been killed. Their bodies have since been returned.”
While visiting the spot, we were told that the bodies of the four soldiers, all of Nepali origin and all called Chhetri, were repatriated a few days later, after the Chinese side informed the Indian post of the incident. The story also says that the fifth member of the patrol had gone around the corner when the killing took place and fate saved him.
The MEA statement continues: “The Government of India have taken a very serious view of this incident and have lodged a strong protest with the Chinese Government against the unprovoked and unjustified firing on the Indian personnel who were on routine duties within the Indian side of the border and against the deliberate killing of Indian personnel performing their routine duty.”
The question is, why did China deliberately kill these Assam Rifles jawans in this remote undisputed area?
I shall answer this later.

A CIA account
It is interesting to go through a CIA note on the incident; the note is entitled: “Peking restrained in denying Chinese crossed Indian border”. 
The US agency observes: “On 3 November PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement used relatively restrained language in denying charges made in a 1 November statement by the Indian Foreign Ministry spokesman.”
Beijing obviously did not want the matter to be scrutinised further; it was satisfied with the mild protest from Delhi, despite the fact that the incident had clearly taken place on the Indian side of the boundary.
The CIA gives its own explanation: “The Chinese statement avoided the harsh invective against the Indian government and its China policy that have characterized Chinese statements on the border since the 1962 Sino-Indian war. China did not comment on the border incident until after the Indian statement made it public.”
It appears that Beijing waited to see Delhi’s reaction; the note just says: “Indian soldiers crossed into Chinese territory on 20 October despite repeated warnings from ‘Chinese civilian checkpost personnel’ and opened fire on the Chinese side, causing the latter to ‘fire back in self-defense.”
It was obviously a lie. 
A further untruth from Beijing is that the Tulung Pass is located on the eastern Sino-Indian border near Bhutan (which is factually incorrect) and that the Indian troops crossed "the line of actual control of November 7, 1959 ".
There is NO 1959 Line. Moreover, the CIA report notes that it is “a phrase used by Peking in the past to refer to the so-called McMahon line which delineates the eastern part of the Sino-Indian frontier,” the Chinese assertion is absolutely incorrect since till date China has never exchanged maps or given its perceptions of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Eastern Sector of the boundary.
According to the US spy agency: “Peking's statement noted that a Chinese protest on the incident had been delivered to the Indian Embassy in Peking on 22 October, that the Indian Embassy had agreed on the 25th to accept China's offer of the 22nd to collect the bodies of the four dead soldiers, and that an Indian representative at Tulung had accepted the bodies and captured Indian weapons and ammunition from the Chinese side on the 28th and had signed a receipt." This chronology might be correct. 
The issue remains, why this sudden unprovoked on Indian territory?
The order to ‘kill’ the Indian soldiers probably came from a local commander in Tibet who wanted to remind the Indian Army (and government) of the 1962 border conflict. The incident took place on October 20, the exact day the war had started on the Namkha chu river 13 years earlier. Any China watcher knows that there are no coincidences with China.
While visiting the Chhetri Memorial built on the site of the incident, I realised that this was the objective of the PLA’s uncalled for shooting, a strong reminder to India that Beijing could strike anywhere, at any time. 
The CIA reports does not make the connection between 1962 and 1975, but notes:“Though accusing the Indian side of spreading ‘slander’ about the clash, the Chinese statement was far milder than China's last official protest over an armed border clash, in 1967. At that time a series of Chinese Foreign Ministry statements in September and October had scathingly labeled the Indian ‘aggressors’, denounced the ‘reactionary Indian government’ for its alleged hypocrisy in calling for a peaceful border settlement and normalization of relations with China, and accused New Delhi of working closely with the United States and the USSR to foster anti-China opinion in the world.”
It was clearly to show India that the Chinese Army were the masters of the Himalaya and that the 1967 clash in Sikkim would be avenged.
For the CIA: “this current statement concluded by giving unusual emphasis to Peking's repeated measures to maintain the border status quo, avoid armed conflict, and ‘preserve peace’ pending a final settlement of the frontier issue.”
Prime Minister Modi will hear similar arguments in Shanghai at the end of the month.
Interestingly, on November 1, 1975, TASS news agency reposted the reports of the Indian protest. Two days later, TASS carried Indian a press comment condemning the Chinese action as an affront to India's expressed desire for normal Sino-Chinese relations; it remarked that it was the latest evidence of "the great power, hegemonistic policy of the Chinese leaders in South Asia”. 
The same day, Moscow Radio spoke of China’s “interference in the Kashmir and Sikkim issue and support for subversion and insurrection in northeastern India.” Interesting in today’s context.
The fact that the Indian Army has built a memorial for the four Assam Rifle soldiers who lost their lives at 17,000 ft is praiseworthy. One can only hope that in the near future, more Indians will visit the spot.
It remains that the Indian negotiators in Shanghai or elsewhere should not be taken in by China.

Mago Village

Mago chu (river)

Cave

Thingbu Village in Mago Circle

On the way to Tulung la

War Memorial & the pass behind

Dragon and the art of selective amnesia

My article Dragon and the art of selective amnesia appeared a few days back in The Daily Guardian

Here is the link...

Before making outrageous claims, Chinese officials should do their homework and know their country’s history. China has not always claimed Arunachal Pradesh.

Zhao Lijian, the ‘wolfwarrior’ and spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, did it again. On 7 September, during a press briefing, when asked to provide details about five missing Indian nationals from Arunachal Pradesh (who are said to have been captured by the People’s Liberation Army), the arrogant Zhao asserted: “China’s position with regard to the eastern sector of China-India boundary i.e., South Tibet region, is consistent and clear. We have never recognised the socalled ‘Arunachal Pradesh’ illegally established on the Chinese territory.” About the missing Indians, he added: “I am not aware of it now.”
Obviously, Zhao has poor knowledge of history and even geography. Already in February 2019, when the Prime Minister visited the Northeastern Indian state, Hua Chunying, Zhao’s boss, had affirmed: “The Chinese Government has never recognised the so-called Arunachal Pradesh and is firmly opposed to the Indian leader’s visit to the East Section of the China-India boundary.”
South Block issued its usual weak rebuttal. Why can’t New Delhi speak of the ‘so-called Tibetan Autonomous Region’ or Eastern Turkestan? Will Indian diplomats do this one day? In 2019, Hua’s sharp tongue expressed hopes that “India will cherish the momentum of warming bilateral ties and not take any provocative action.” Today, the bilateral ties are not that warm anymore, but the fact remains that Hua, like Zhao, seems unaware that China’s refusal to acknowledge the McMahon Line is a new phenomenon.
Let us go back to 1956. As India prepared to celebrate the 2,500th anniversary of the birth of Buddha, communist China was extremely nervous; eastern Tibet was on fire with the Khampa rebellion, while central Tibet was slowly getting contaminated by the revolt. After months of prevarication, Beijing finally allowed the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama to visit India for the celebrations. But Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai was really febrile, he was aware that many Tibetans wanted the Dalai Lama to stay on in India; as a result, he visited Delhi thrice in a period of two months.
During one of his numerous encounters with Zhou, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru asked him: “But I do not quite understand what you meant when you said that Tibet in the past had not become a province of China?” The Premier answered: “That Tibet is part of China is a fact but it has never [been] an administrative province of China and has kept an autonomous character.” For the Communists, the autonomous character would remain on paper only. Zhou even admitted that India knew more about Tibet’s past history than China: “For example, I knew nothing about McMahon Line until recently when we came to study the border problem after the liberation of China.”
Zhao Lijian would be surprised to learn that China’s Premier did not know about the line delineating the border between India and Tibet till the early 1950s. Nehru unnecessarily asserted that historical knowledge was not important: “History is gone,” he said, adding: “My impression was that whatever it may be in theory, for all practical purposes, Tibet has all along been autonomous.”
The clever Zhou repeated that though people like him never knew about the McMahon Line till recently, the Kuomintang regime knew about it. Referring to the McMahon Line, he spoke of a ‘secret’ pact between British India and Tibet at the time of the Simla conference.
The Chinese do not like to remember that the Tibetans sat on an equal footing with them and British India during the Simla conference between October 1913 and July 1914. To give an example, the proceedings of the third meeting of the Tibet conference held on 12 January 1914 mentioned the presence of Sir Henry McMahon, British Plenipotentiary and staff, Monsieur Ivan Chen, Chinese Plenipotentiary and staff, and Kusho Lonchen Shatra, Tibetan Plenipotentiary and staff. They officially sat together for nine months, but China suffers from selective amnesia today.
To come back to the Nehru-Zhou meeting, the Premier continued on the McMahon Line: “And now that it is an accomplished fact, we should accept it. But we have not consulted Tibet so far. In the last agreement, which we signed about Tibet [in 1954], the Tibetans wanted us to reject this Line but we told them that the question should be temporarily put aside,” the Chinese Premier bluffed and added: “But now we think that we should try to persuade and convince Tibetans to accept it.” Then, Nehru went on his favourite argument: “The border is a high mountain and sparsely populated.” He further asserted: “Apart from the major question, there are also small queries about two miles here and two miles there. But if we agree on some principle, namely, the principle of previous normal practice or the principle of watershed, we can also settle these other small points.” It is Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government which first made the communists realise the extent of the Tibetan territory in the area. Long before the beginning of the Japanese war, Ren Naiqiang, an influential scholar during the Republican era, had started wandering through eastern Tibet. In 1926, he went a step further and included part of the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA, today Arunachal Pradesh) into Chinese territory.
In 1939, as the Nationalist Government formally established the new province Xikang (corresponding to Kham province of Tibet), Ren Naiqiang was encouraged by Liu Wenhui, the Governor of Xikang, to produce a map of the area. Though the Chinese had never set foot in the area, the new map included NEFA in the new Chinese province. It is how “Arunachal has always been Chinese territory”.
At the end of 1949, Ren Naiqiang met Marshal He Long, one of the senior-most generals of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and explained why his map was dependable; the Marshal was convinced and ordered the distribution of copies. On 10 January 1950, He Long sent a report to Mao Zedong strongly recommending that Ren’s map should be accepted and circulated amongst the PLA. It is after this encounter that Beijing started claiming NEFA as Chinese.
Before making outrageous claims, Hua and her colleagues should do their homework and know their country’s history. China has not always claimed NEFA.

China Prepares for War

On January 8, the Chinese State-owned Global Times reported that some units of the People's Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF) stationed in Tibet have been equipped with a new vehicle-mounted howitzer to boost China's combat capability and improve border security.
The mouthpiece of the Communist Party referred to the new system as ‘PLC-181’, claiming that it had already been deployed by an artillery brigade in Tibet during a 73-day-long stand-off in 2017 between the PLAGF and the Indian Army at the Doklam tri-junction between Sikkim, Tibet, and Bhutan.
Though this information was not confirmed, The Global Times posted a PLAGF photograph (see above) with units of the new howitzer system in a mountainous area. According to Jane's Intelligence Review, “the platforms are similar in appearance to the Norinco SH-15 155 mm self-propelled artillery system.”

What does it mean for India?
It has to be seen in the larger context of the PLA’s preparedness for War.
On January 4, President Xi Jinping ordered the Chinese armed forces to enhance their combat readiness “from a new starting point and open new ground for developing a strong military.”
He gave this instruction during a meeting of the Central Military Commission (CMC); Xi added that the armed forces had resolutely safeguarded national sovereignty, security and development interests and withstood complex situations and severe struggles: “The world is facing a period of major changes never seen in a century, and China is still in an important period of strategic opportunity for development," he asserted while speaking of the various risks and challenges facing China.
The Chinese Armed Forces are expected to speed up their preparation in view of a series of landmark anniversaries in 2019, particularly the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic.
Xinhua recently ported that some 2 million personnel had been involved in more than 18,000, mostly small-scale exercises in 2018. The report did not offer a comparison for 2017, but state media reported earlier that the PLA conducted roughly 100 larger-scale exercises in 2016.
Apart from that China has been active for months in boosting its border defence with India; one can cite a few examples:

• Construction of Xiaogang (‘moderately well-off) model villages in Tibet on the Indian border
• Rapid development of infrastructure on the plateau (in particular three new airports in Lhuntse, Purang and Tingri)
• New drones to boost border control.
• In November, The Global Times quoted a professor at the National Defense University who revealed details of China's new armed reconnaissance drone, which had been seen at the Airshow China 2018 in Zhuhai: “The GJ-2 is believed to enhance China's border patrol and counter-terrorism efforts,” said the professor. The military-industrial conglomerate Aviation Industry Corporation of China had unveiled a new reconnaissance drone series. Reportedly, the GJ-2 prototype flew over the 8,848-meter Mount Everest during one trial flight. The drone has six weapon bays under its wings, capable of carrying more ordnance than its predecessors, including up to 12 air-to-surface missiles.
• The new-generation Type 15 lightweight battle tank, which is much swifter and has better mobility than other armoured vehicles, could easily be deployed in Tibet in the event of a conflict with India. It was also recently handed over to the PLA; last month, the Chinese Defence Ministry’s spokesman confirmed that the tank has been put into service. According to The South China Morning Post, the tank will enhance PLA’S combat readiness and it could be quickly deployed in sensitive regions such as Tibet and the plateau border area …if a dispute broke out.
• Already in August 2018, The Global Times, published photos of China's in-development Z-20 utility helicopter trend on Chinese online military forums. It is meant to replace the imported UH-60 Blackhawk to be deployed in Tibet. The Z-20 is a newly developed 10-ton medium-lift utility helicopter, which will fill the gap between light and heavy helicopters.

Many more such examples could be cited.
All this shows that China is working hard to be ready to any contingency.
The deployment of vehicle-mounted howitzer should be seen in this perspective.
India needs not to be worried, but should closely follow the developments on the plateau and take necessary counter-measures to boost the preparedness of the Indian Army and the Air Force on the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

On the Indian side
It is however true that the pace of development on the Indian side of the border is painfully slow.
The Minister of State for Home Affairs, Kiren Rijiju stated in written reply to a question in the Lok Sabha that 73 roads had been identified as strategic Indo-China Border roads (ICBRs) with a total length 3812 km, out of which 61 ICBRs have been entrusted to Border Roads Organisation (BRO) with a length of 3417.50 km. Out of the 61 ICBRs, 28 roads of length 981.17 km have been completed.
The quasi monopoly of the BRO is a serious problem.
Can the government bold enough to tackle it? Doubtful.
In Arunachal Pradesh alone 11 roads for a length of 1110 km has been identified. Though it is said that connectivity has been achieved in 27 roads out of these 33 roads, in practical terms many are not motorable as yet.
The main reasons given by the Minister are: “delay in obtaining Forest/Wildlife clearances, hard rock stretches, limited working season, difficulties in availability of construction materials, delay in land acquisition, natural calamities i.e. earthquakes, flashfloods etc. and strategic security consideration.”
China does not seem to be facing so many problems on the other side of the line.
One explanation is probably that the Middle Kingdom is ruled by a totalitarian regime.
Though Rijiju assured the Parliament that “all measures are being taken to ensure timely and smooth supply of essential commodities and ammunition to the troops in remote locations by appropriate means of transport,” the progress are agonizingly slow.
Developing the border infrastructure (roads, advanced landing grounds, communications) is one of the actions India should take immediately on fast track to counter China, at least far more vigorously than presently.
The acquisition of the Rafale aircrafts will also be a game changer …if the Opposition let it happened.
China does not have these problems ...and Beijing greatly enjoy watching some debates in the Parliament.

A Road to the Border in Arunachal

It is regrettable that the national media hardly reported an event has the most crucial strategic implications for India.
On April 6, the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) opened a new road to one of India's most remote villages, near the frontier with China (Tibet).
The Army’s engineers have managed to connect Tame Chung Chung, a remote tiny village in Upper Subanisiri district of Arunachal Pradesh to the rest of the country.
A few weeks ago, on this blog, I mentioned the Tsari pilgrimage.
The new road follows the old pilgrimage route.
The inhabitants of Tame Chung Chung village, locally known as the ‘Land of Snakes’, had dreamed of this road for decades, but like for many other ‘normal’ things, for the border populations it remained a Dream.
The BRO explains: “The area is located in an extremely remote area with rugged terrains, thick vegetation and inhospitable weather. The place has remained inaccessible since 2009.”
In fact, the road was to be opened in 2009, but ….India is not China.
The same report says: “The persistent efforts of BRO engineers have finally changed the scenario.”
The road comes under Project Arunank, run by the Army in five districts of Arunachal Pradesh: Upper Subansiri, Lower Subansiri, Kurung Kumey, Kra Daadi and Papum Pare.
The most difficult route (because of the rough terrain and hard rocks) and strategically important (because the Chinese presence nearby) was the Nacho-Tame Chung Chung section in Upper Subansiri district.
The BRO statement mentions that the village is located at the confluence of Taksing and Maja valleys: “[it] acts as a gateway to both the valleys and its connectivity was essential for further development of the area.”
The BRO admitted that a large number of personnel suffered severe injuries during the construction work and equipment worth crores of rupees was lost in landslides.

Congratulations to the 128 Road Construction Company of the 23 Border Roads Task Force (Project Arunank) for accomplishing this herculean task, …even if a bit late.

Incidentally, two years ago, I mentioned the Chinese incursions which had occurred in the remote circle of Taksing in Upper Subansiri district.
The Deccan Chronicle then reported: "After the recent Ladakh incursions, frequent intrusions by China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in Arunachal Pradesh’s Taksing region have come to the notice of the security agencies. The villagers of Taksing circle in Upper Subansiri district took photographs of the PLA crossing over the Asa-Pila-Maya Army camps, which were Indian territory till 1962, but now under Chinese occupation."
The new road will hopefully help curbing the intrusions.

A 1957 report of the area
It is worth quoting a “Report on an Exploratory Tour Undertaken in the Upper Subansiri Area and the Tsari Chu Valley”.
The author is Capt L.R. Sailo of the Indian Frontier Administrative Service (IFAS).
Capt Sailo was Assistant Political Officer in Taliha of Subansiri Frontier Division (NEFA) when he undertook this tour (from January 21 to March 29 1957).
That is long ago, and all these years, the local Tagin population have been dreaming of a road, … and China was dreaming that the road will never come to be. 

Here are some excerpts from Capt Sailo, the intrepid IFAS officer’s tour.
(Note that two years later, the first clash occurred in Longju near Migyitun).

ACHIEVEMENT OF THE TASKS (OF THE 1957 TOUR)
The exploratory tour has successfully achieved its given tasks as noted below:-

1. The location of LIMEKING vis a vis the international border has been determined.
2. The exploration of the SUBANSIRI westwards of LIMEKING upto the international border beyond Lower NA settlements has been completed and the confluence of the SUBANSIRI and the YUME CHU has also been ascertained to locate at Mo 4691 and not at MO 6593 as shown on the existing quarter inch map.
3. Having determined the precise location of the confluence of the SUBANSIRI and the TSARI CHU which locates at MO 6892 and not at MP 1097, the TSARI CHU valley has been explored upto the international border with MIGYITUN settlements.
4. A sketch map of the area has been prepared with estimate of the locations of villages or settlements, the courses of rivers, mountains, and important routes. Names of various villages with population figures have also been established as far as possible.
5. The exploratory tour has been carried out with the policy friendly border relations with the people across the border and friendly relationship has been developed with the people of Lower NA and MIGYITUN settlements.
6. Reliable and confirmed informations regarding the Chinese activities across the border have been obtained during the course of the exploratory tour.
7. The exploration of the upper SUBANSIRI and the TSARI CHU Valleys up to the international borders has enabled proper assessment of the administrative setup required for the Tagin area and checkpost for the integrity of our international border on the SUBANSIRI sector.
8. After completing the exploration of the upper SUBANSIRI region, the village lying in the area between the KODUK and the SEBAR rivers on the left bank of the SUBANSIRI which have so far been unexpected have been visited on the return journey to TALIHA. 

[Description of the inexistent road network in 1957]

Road communication and other Engineering problems:

The urgency and importance of constructing roads from DAPORIJO to the border settlements of Lower NA and MIGYTUN cannot be over-emphasised. In view of the more favorable nature of the country, it will be easier and more economical to open our main line of communication along the right bank of the SUBANSIRI starting from DAPORIJO right up to Lower NA settlements which is roughly 150 miles and another road on the left bank connecting TALIHA to NACHO about 48 miles.

To start with, we may aim at mule track between DAPORIJO and TALIHA and the rest porter tracks. Between DAPORIJO and LIMEKING, it will be possible to construct roads and bridges by using local man power but tools, implements and other necessary stores will have to be arranged.
For want of human habitation beyond LIMEKING on the routes to Lower NA and MIGYITUN settlements, labours will be a problem and the lower Tagins, at present will be most unwilling to operate in the higher region due to its cold climate and the difficult nature of the country. The solution may lie in posting one platoon of Assam Rifles pioneers at LIMEKING to work up to GELENSHINIAK and two sections of Agency Service Corps each at TAKSING and LONGJU to work downward to GELENSHINIAK as supply dropping can be easily done at TAKSING and LONGJU. If emergency dropping can be done at a place known as GADUBO, about 5 miles from GELENSHINIAK on the way to Lower Na, it will be very convenient and save lot of troubles in portering rations and other equipments. GADUBO locates approximately at MO 6589 and it seems to be suitable for temporary camping ground.
About 4 miles from GADUBO, there is a place known as RICHIDEN which has a route on the left bank of the SUBANSIRI connecting LANGIN on the TSARI CHU Valley, approximately 4½ miles from GELENSHINIAK. The route is followed during the DOLO pilgrimage and it might be better to align MIGYITUN trace from RICHIDEN and avoid the difficult portions between GELENSHINIAK and LANGIN.
At present we have no proper staging huts even between DAPORIJO and LIMEKING and great inconvenience is being experienced for movements in the SUBANSIRI Valley. It is essential that staging huts are provided at least on the route between DAPORIJO and LIMEKING. Along with the construction of staging camps, the question of providing camp Chowkidars should also be taken up. The following are suggested places for construction of staging huts.

SIPI    -         10 miles
RADING    -    8 miles
TALIHA    -     12 miles
DOYOM    -    10 miles
ATE    -         11 miles
AENGMORI-   10 miles
NACHO    -    11 miles
DOGINALO-   7½ miles
NABA    -      10 miles
LIMEKING-    10 ½ miles

LIMEKING, being only about 70 miles which can be conveniently covered in 7 marches, should now be reduced to 7 stages and the existing porterage payment of Rs. 26/- (for 13 stages) be cut down accordingly to Rs. 14/- at the rate of Rs. 2/- per load per stage.
The question of constructing staging huts on the left bank route may also be examined when we establish administrative centre on the left bank.
Apart from several rivers to be bridged along the routes, construction of reliable suspension bridges over the SUBANSIRI will be required for easy contact with the left bank at the points near DAPORIJO, TALIHA, AENGMORI, NACHO, GELENSHINIAK and LOWER NA.

India should follow China's cues on infrastructure

My article India should follow China's cues on infrastructure appeared in The Mail Today

Here is the link...

One may think India is sleeping, but that is not the case. India is busy with civilisational issues.
Whether it is a mega-cultural event on the banks of Yamuna or the ‘tolerance’ debate in the Indian universities, the buzzword is ‘civilisational’, a word cherished by Indian ‘thinkers’.
It reminds me of the lengthy ‘civilisational’ dispatches from KM Panikkar, the then Indian Ambassador in Beijing, to his prime minister during the fall of 1950. Jawaharlal Nehru always promptly replied with grand philosophical cables about ‘peace in the world’.

Ideological
At exactly the same time, Mao Zedong sent short, to-the-point orders to the People’s Liberation Army to advance towards India’s northern borders, invading Tibet in passing.

The road to Metok near the Indian border (Upper Siang district)

Tourism has become a major force in supporting the economy of China’s border areas - and proper infrastructure is crucial to attracting visitors
Tourism has become a major force in supporting the economy of China’s border areas - and proper infrastructure is crucial to attracting visitors
The Great Headsman went straight to the logistics required: providing the Chinese invading force with the day-to-day practical instructions.
“The philosophers have so far only interpreted the world, the point is to change it,” Mao had written earlier.
To juxtapose the two is an eye-opener. Has the situation changed in the past 65 years? Not much. The focus of the Indian nation remains on philosophical or ideological issues (does tolerance need to be discussed again and again, when it is a fact of life in India?), while China still believes that it does not matter if a cat is black or white as long as it catches mice.

Just look at the massive development in Nyingchi Prefecture (called Nyingtri by the Tibetans), north of the Indian border of Arunachal Pradesh. Though the happenings in the area have critical implications for India, this does seem to bother anybody in the country. It is true that the North-East is so far from Delhi!
The Yarlung Tsangpo, known as Siang in Arunachal Pradesh and Brahmaputra in Assam, flows through the Tibetan prefecture, which will set up an international ecotourism zone during the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020). It will receive six million tourists by 2020… and get a hefty $1.2 billion revenue from the mainland visitors.
According to China Tibet Online, during the next five years, Nyingchi will build 10 rural tourism demo villages, adding some 70,000 jobs; the per capita income for the local population will increase by about 10,000 yuan ($1620).
Tourism has become a major force in supporting the economy of China’s border areas, and Beijing’s Five-Year Plan says that it is ‘crucial’ to improve the income of the Tibetans and develop infrastructure for the region.
For the first time in 2015, Nyingchi Prefecture’s GDP has crossed 10 billion yuan to reach 10.4 billion yuan ($1.67 billion); its growth rate of 11.2 per cent is the highest among cities on the plateau.
Can you imagine something similar in Upper Siang, Anjaw or other border districts of Arunachal? In Nyingchi, 25 per cent of the prefecture’s revenue comes from tourism. “There were 3.2 million tourists in Nyingchi in 2015, a 20 per cent increase from 2014. (Today) over 5,000 local residents work in tourism, running 219 family inns,” proclaim the local officials.

Metok tunnel

Infrastructure
On the other side of the slope, India remains busy with ‘civilisational’ issues. As a result, the infrastructure south of the McMahon Line is coming up at a snail’s pace and still struggling under an antiquated Inner Line Permit system set up by the British.
In Southern Tibet, the infrastructure of the border areas grows faster every day (note that the same infrastructure is used by the People’s Liberation Army). Is this development a danger for the environment of these pristine areas and India downstream? Probably, though last week, during a panel discussion with the delegates from Qinghai province on the sidelines of the National People’s Congress, President Xi Jinping pledged to protect the fragile ecology of Tibet.
He said: “The ecological environment has irreplaceable value. We should treat it as our lifeline and protect it like the apple of our eye.”
He exhorted the delegates to treat environment ‘as our lifeline’. This is great news… if it is followed by acts.
In India, infrastructure development has not reached this point, though two Advanced Landing Grounds (ALG) in Ziro and Aalo have just ‘reopened’ in Arunachal Pradesh, slightly improving the Air Force’s operational capability; though it is a small step forward, the situation remains pathetic.

Tourism
A PTI report explained that “the runway surface at Ziro saw a steady deterioration over a period of time due to lack of maintenance and other issues. Encroachment due to absence of a security wall further added to the declining status of the airfield.”
One could ask, why not open the area to tourism on a large scale like China? After all, it is Indian territory.
The last Chinese Plan promises that “Nyingchi will strengthen the transportation networks via air, rail, highways, and waterways, as well as the building of starred hotels, economy hotels, motels, theme hotels, family inns, and recreational vehicle parks to diversify the type of accommodations.”
The China Tibet Online further reports: “The Lhasa-Nyingchi highway was put in use by the end of 2015, while the Lhasa-Nyingchi railway is also under construction. In addition, Mainling Airport could become an international airport with more flights and routes in the future.”
After opening a tunnel in 2013, the small county of Metok, north of the Geling Circle of Upper Siang district, which was earlier known as the last county without road access in China, received 70,000 visitors in 2015. Is it not an example worth studying at least?
One can only pray that Delhi will wake up and start building more roads and tunnels in the border districts of Arunachal Pradesh. For this, tourism has an important role to play - but can the mindsets change in Delhi?

Return to the Stilwell Road: Reopening a mythical trade route

My article Return to the Stilwell Road: Reopening a mythical trade route  appeared in Mail Today.

The Stilwell Road is a myth. Constructed by the Americans during World War II, it started from Ledo, the railhead in the plains of Assam, and wound its way to Kunming, in China’s Yunnan province, covering 1726 km of some of the treacherous terrain.
The road ran only 61km in India before it crossed into Burma via the Pangsau pass.
Lying at an altitude of 1,136m, in today’s Changlang district of Arunachal Pradesh, it was nicknamed the ‘Hell Pass’ during the WWII due to its fierce gradients, serpentine twists and constant mudslides.

Difficulties
During the War, the US had the choice between two ‘hells’. A large number of American planes had crashed in NEFA (today’s Arunachal Pradesh) while on supply missions to China. It is estimated that 416 US aircrew went missing in India, mostly in NEFA. The US troops desperately needed a way to bring supplies to the Chinese front, to fight the Japanese troops. Transport planes faced extraordinary difficulties with inclement weather, strong winds and a treacherous air route known as ‘The Hump’.
The US then decided to build a road, and on January 12, 1945, the first convoy of 113 vehicles left Ledo to finally reach Kunming on February 4. The construction is said to have cost 13,70,00,000 dollars.
Though originally known as the ‘Ledo Road’, it was later baptised after General Joseph Stilwell, alias ‘Vinegar Joe’, the Chief of Staff of Allied Forces in the China- Burma-India theatre.
Can you believe that the road was reopened on December 30, 2015? Very few, except in the North-East, noticed the event: but a myth was reborn, with probably incalculable future economic consequences for the region.
The Arunachal Times reported from Itanagar: “Exhibits from China arrived at the border trade point at Pangsau Pass in Changlang district of Arunachal Pradesh en route to the Assam International Agri-Horti Show 2016 at Guwahati.”
The Chinese truck, accompanied by 2 light motor vehicles, carried 82 parcels with electronic goods, organic tea, coffee, and toys to be displayed during the show scheduled for next month.
An official communiqué from the Arunachal government said: “Passing through the historic Stilwell Road, the exhibits arrived all the way from Baoshan in China’s Yunnan province.”
Representatives of the North East Federation on International Trade (NEFIT), as well as Arunachal’s Trade & Commerce Director Tokong Pertin were present to receive the  Chinese delegates. Pertin called the reopening of the Stilwell Road a ‘historic moment’.
He said that the newly reopened route could become “a conduit for trade and better understanding for the two Asian economic giants as well as among the countries of the Bangladesh-China-India- Myanmar Forum for Regional Cooperation (BCIM).”

Support
Pertin added that his government was ready to provide logistic support “with a hope that it will go a long way in developing future trade and business among BCIM countries and ASEAN.”
The route is said to have been used during the 13th century invasion of Assam by the Ahoms, and in the late 19th century, the British pondered a railway line to Myitkyina in north Burma through the Hukawng Valley, but the project never materialised.
A year ago, MoS for Home Kiren Rijiju mentioned the reopening of the Stillwell road: “After the Stillwell Road was closed in 1962, the movement of border trade was restricted. Re-opening this road would open up numerous options,” Rijiju asserted.
The reopening today is mainly symbolic, as many other considerations have to be taken into account to start trade on a large scale. One of them is that Delhi may presently like to go slow on the ‘BCIM’ corridor.
The issue was apparently raised by Chinese President Xi Jinping during his visit to India in September 2014, but only a passing reference was made about the BCIM Economic Corridor in the Joint Statement.
Perhaps one of the greatest tragedies of the 20th century has been the closing of the border trade through the Himalayan routes.
Soon after Tibet’s invasion in October 1950, the traditional border passes were progressively closed.
Though the Panchsheel Agreement in 1954 was meant to regulate the flow of people and goods over the Himalayas, it did not happen and as a result of the 1962 border war and the non-renewal of the Agreement, trade between ‘Tibet’s Region of China’ and India came to an end.
The same fate lay in store for the Stillwell Road.

Tragedies
It is only after prime minister Rajiv Gandhi’s trip to China in December 1988, that a ‘Protocol for Resumption of Border Trade’ was signed.
Following the Sino-Indian agreement of 1992, trade through Lipulekh Pass in Pithoragarh district became an annual feature. The pass also became the official pilgrimage route for the Kailash-Mansarovar yatra.
Shipki-la, in Kinnaur district of Himachal Pradesh was the second landport to open. However, the poor quality of the infrastructure and the limited list of permissible items has restricted the border trade which flourished for centuries.
After PM Vajpayee’s visit to China in June 2003, talks started on the resumption of border trade via Nathu-la in Sikkim. Finally, the pass opened for trade in July 2006.
Pangsau Pass has become the fourth Himalayan pass to open for trade. Though trade may remain small-scale for some time, it is an important step for normalising the relations between the concerned countries. And one day, it will hopefully bring some prosperity to the local populations of Arunachal and Assam.

LAC not ripe for settlement

My article LAC not ripe for settlement appeared in Asian Age/Deccan Chronicle

Here is the link...


A solution probably favoured by Beijing would be to ‘exchange’ Aksai Chin against recognition of Arunachal as being a part of India... If India does agree, would the border issue be resolved? No!

Invariably, when an Indian Prime Minister goes to China or a senior Chinese leader visits India, the Indian media goes berserk speculating, “this time” the border dispute between the two Asian giants will be resolved.
Unfortunately, it is not an easy proposition.
We have recently seen that it takes time and patience to solve differences, even for a relatively minor dispute, like the one between Bangladesh and India. The Sino-Indian divergences are major.
The Chinese are not completely wrong when they say that the border imbroglio has been “inherited from history”. But, while Beijing cites British imperialism, the facts are different: there was no “border issue” between India and Tibet before 1951 simply because the Roof of the World was a peaceful independent state. Unfortunately for India, the then Prime Minister was a romantic.
In the early 1950s, having swiftly taken control of Tibet, the People’s Liberation Army progressively stopped the age-old trade and exchanges between India and the Dalai Lama’s land. China even built a road on Indian territory (without Nehru’s government noticing it); the stakes brutally changed and the border gradually became “disputed”.
By the end of the decade, despite the Panchsheel Agreement (“on trade and intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India”) signed in April 1954, the traditional “soft” border between India and Tibet (now China) became real, concrete, tangible, sensitive and eventually the object of a “border war” in 1962.
It had not always been like this. For centuries, a constant flow of Tibetan lamas had visited the great Indian viharas of Nalanda, Odantapuri and Vikramasila, while trade across the Himalayan belt prospered. After Tibet had opted for the non-violent doctrine, Buddhism, in the 7th century, it is fascinating to look at the changes in the people of Tibet who were among the most belligerent on earth.
Their powerful empire, which had spread far and wide, suddenly turned pacifist, and another kind of conquest started — the conquest of self. Tibetan Buddhism spread its “soft” influence over Central Asia and Mongolia. The Himalaya, a most formidable natural barrier, which separates the Indian subcontinent from the Tibetan plateau, remained vibrantly porous till the arrival of the Chinese troops on the Roof of the World.
On November 7, 1959, in a letter addressed to Jawaharlal Nehru, Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai used for the first time a new terminology. He wrote that the Line of Actual Control (LAC) consisted of “the so-called McMahon Line in the East and the line up to which each side exercises actual control in the West.” The term “LAC” became a legal concept in the Sino-Indian agreements signed in 1993 and 1996, 2012 and 2013. The 1996 agreement states, “No activities of either side shall overstep the line of actual control.”
But that is not all. To complicate the issue further, another term has recently appeared in the diplomats’ jargon: “a perceptional border” because India and China have different perceptions of where their LAC lies. Moreover, China refuses to share with India the maps of its perception.
Today, the more than 4,000 km-long LAC, is divided in three sectors: the western sector (Ladakh in Jammu & Kashmir), the middle sector (Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh) and the eastern sector (Sikkim and Arunachal). All have large or small disputed areas. A solution probably favoured by Beijing would be to “exchange” the Aksai Chin area in Ladakh, vital for China, as it links Tibet and Xinjiang, against Arunachal Pradesh that is claimed by Beijing.
A few years ago, Lorenz Lüthi of McGill University in Montreal wrote a well-researched paper (Sino-Indian Relations, 1954-1962) based on archival documents. He said: “In the spring of 1960 China was ready to find a compromise settlement… the PRC usually was willing to settle border disputes with neighbors through a compromise when it was internationally isolated and internally weak.”
Lüthi wrote that when Mao’s regime was in the midst of the great famine, which followed the Great Leap Forward, “internal documentation suggests that the PRC wanted to insist on its claim to Aksai Chin for strategic reasons, but Beijing probably was willing to let the territory of NEFA (today Arunachal) go”.
China is not weak anymore; it will not make any compromise. During the several rounds of detailed talks on the border issue which followed Zhou Enlai’s visit in Delhi in April 1960, no matter what evidence India produced, it was clear that the Chinese would never relinquish the Aksai Chin artery.
If India does agree and receive from Beijing in return for such a “gift” the recognition of Arunachal Pradesh as being a part of India, would the border issue be resolved? No!
Supposing that with a magic wand, Prime Minister Narendra Modi convinces President Xi Jinping to agree to “settle” the border dispute, will the Himalayan passes return to the situation ante 1951, when trade and cultural exchanges flourished between Tibet and India? Again the answer is no.
Will China accept to reopen the Himalayan routes which were closed in 1962, namely Demchok (Ladakh), Shipka-la (Himachal Pradesh), Mana and Niti pass (Uttarakhand), Jelep-la (West Bengal), and others routes in Arunachal Pradesh such as Kibithu (Anjaw district), Bumla (Tawang district) Menchuka, Manigong (West Siang district) and Gelling-Tuting (Upper Siang district)? Again, no.
Will China agree to reopen an Indian consulate general in Lhasa and trade agencies in Gyantse, Yatung and Gartok (Ngari), all of which were functional till 1962? No!
Will the cultural and religious exchange between the Buddhist monasteries in Tibet and those in Ladakh, Himachal Pradesh, Sikkim or Arunachal Pradesh be allowed, as was the case in the past? No.
Will Beijing accept to have a frank discussion on the Tibet issue and the fate of the Tibetan refugees in India? Absolutely not.
Before a holistic settlement is found, the border agreements of January 2012 and October 2013 are probably good enough to keep the status quo and peace on the LAC (or LACs).
Why should India compromise her position for a solution that will not bring the Himalayas back as a dynamic passage between the Tibetan world and the subcontinent? Zhou Enlai cleverly said in the early 1950s, “the border issue is not ripe for settlement”. Mr Modi should say the same when he visits China later this week.

High on rhetoric, but ill-prepared on ground

My article High on rhetoric, but ill-prepared on ground appeared today in the Edit page of The Pioneer.

Here is the link...

If we are to be prepared to counter Chinese designs along the Line of Actual Control and China’s claim over States like Arunachal Pradesh, we need to dramatically ramp up road infrastructure at the borders

President Barack Obama has come and gone. The dust is slowly settling over the Indian capital. Even if very few concrete projects have materialised during the three-day visit, it was a great diplomatic success for Mr Narendra Modi. The bonhomie displayed by the two heads of Government is certainly a good omen for the future. At last India has come out of the dreadful ‘non- alignment’ syndrome.
But one serious concern comes from Mr Modi’s own camp: Several Ministers are not able to think before speaking. The latest is Tourism Minister Mahesh Sharma who stated, “If there was a religious centre in Aksai Chin, China would not have dared [enter] and there would have been no need for border security.” Religion and spirituality were Tibet’s way of life, but the Chinese invaded and destroyed 6,000 monasteries.
But that is not all for Mr Modi. Take Arunachal, for example. Despite the good intentions and the publicised resolutions to transform the State, changes take more time than expected. Irredentist China still asserts that the State belongs to it. During his recent visit to Delhi, Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida was fired by Beijing because he stated that Arunachal Pradesh was under India’s control. Beijing immediately lodged a strong protest: “We hope Japan fully understands the sensitivity of the China-India boundary question”, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said.
At the time of the incident, the website, China Tibet Online explained its stance: “The areas located between the illegal ‘McMahon Line’and the traditional customary boundary between China and India [down to Assam], have always been Chinese territory.” Though this does not make any historical sense, Beijing continues with its claims. At the same time, China develops the areas north of the McMahon on a war footing.
For centuries, one of most sacred places in Tibet was a remote area known as Pemakoe. Dominated by Mt Namcha Barwa, at an altitude of 7,782 metres, it is located in Metok county, north of Upper Siang district of Arunachal Pradesh. For the Tibetans, this pristine region was one of their ‘hidden valleys’, said to be the home of Goddess Dorjee Pagmo, Tibet’s Protecting Deity.
As Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao landed in Delhi in December 2010, Xinhua dropped a bombshell: “The tunnel of highway linking Tibet’s Metok completed”, it informed. Though unnoticed by the Indian media, it heralded a significant strategic change for the defence of India’s borders. On October 31, 2013, China Tibet Online reported that the 117-km Metok Highway had been opened to traffic: Pemakoe was not ‘hidden’ anymore. Xinhua announced that the journey by cars or buses to the nearby Bomi county would take hardly eight hours.
Last week, Xinhua announced that the same Metok county “celebrated a tourist boom last year thanks to a new highway”. Tashi, Party chief of the county declared that Metok “received 96,000 tourists last year, almost doubling that in 2013, …[it] expects to welcome 110,000 visitors this year”, bringing revenue of nearly one billion US dollars to the area.
On the Indian side, Prime Minister Modi has to deal with unbelievable difficulties. One is the terrain itself, while others have been the creation of the previous Congress Government. Take the Border Roads Organisation, which has clearly been unable to deliver the goods. There was an irrational dual command between the Ministry of Surface Transport looking after ‘administration’ and the Ministry of Defence taking care of ‘operations’. Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar admitted that “with two masters, you don’t get work output”.
It may take years to set things right, but the Modi regime  seems determined. It has been decided to transfer the BRO under the MoD. The organisation will entirely be “defence-controlled and defence-financed”, according to the Defence Minister, quoted by Business Standard. Mr Parrikar added that the Modi Government was “considering transferring of 6,000-7,000 km of roads, which are not in sensitive areas, to the National Highways Authority of India”.
This is good, but today, nobody in Arunachal Pradesh believes that the BRO will be able to keep its promises (amongst them, to complete by 2016 the strategic Balukpong-Tawang road). Another small step in the right direction is the exemption by the Union Ministry of Environment and Forest of necessary clearance for the “construction/widening of roads entrusted to the BRO in the area falling within 100 kilometers aerial distance from the Line of Actual Control”.
Press Trust of India reported that the BRO’s Director General , Lt Gen RM Mittal, accompanied by the organisation’s top brass, paid a five-day visit to Arunachal Pradesh early this month. The Director General must have heard of the pathetic case of the 221-km Daporijo-Taksing road in Upper Subansiri district. In November and December, the BRO’s local Chief Engineer, Brigadier HK Pokhariya had to tour the project on foot. This time, the officials flew to the LAC, “for ascertaining the progress of work and to suggest steps to speed up the work”, said a communique.
All essential goods have still to be carried to Taksing circle, which often witnesses Chinese intrusions. The BRO has not enough camps, and, in some cases, according to local sources, it takes three to four  hours for the workforce to reach their workplace. After working a couple of hours, the time comes for the workers to return to their base. When will this be sorted out? The situation on the ground shows that Mr Modi’s dream to stop the migration from the border areas will continue to face huge hurdles.
Another example was that the Protected Area Permit for foreigners, was made more complicated: Tourists from abroad had to go through a tour operator who was charging several times the $50  fixed by the authorities. It appears that the issue has now been solved; a proposal has been approved for relaxation of the permit to promote tourism.
Yet another issue that the Modi Government has not yet been able to solve is the Chinese intrusions. This is going to take more time. It is a pity that the Government remains hesitant and still insists on the antiquated Inner Line Permit (and PAP) for Arunachal Pradesh. This timid attitude seems to encourage Beijing to persist with its wild claims on the region.
Delhi should assert once and for all that the entire Arunachal Pradesh is Indian territory and, therefore, it must treat it on par with any other Indian State. Every Indian national should be allowed to freely visit the State, while, of course, keeping in mind the security issues. Similarly, in every field of governance, the progresses are slow. Still, as long the Modi Government keeps trying to bring about change, there is hope.

Chinese Wild Claims in Arunachal

McMahon Line signed by Lochen Shatra and Sir Henry McMahon

The Chinese are not happy at all. Why?
Because the Japanese foreign minister Fumio Kishida dared to speak about what Beijing calls "a Chinese territorial area adjacent to India as Indian territory."
According to The China Daily, the Japanese diplomat was referring to Arunachal Pradesh.
Beijing immediately lodged a strong protest: "We hope Japan fully understands the sensitivity of the China-India boundary question," said Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei.
He added that in a speech in New Delhi, "Kishida attracted media attention after referring to a southern area of China's Tibet Autonomous Region as Indian territory. ...Beijing has taken notice of the report, expressed serious concerns, demanded Japan make a clarification and immediately manage damage control."
Unfortunately for Beijing, the bullying tactics do not work with Japan.
Hong however affirmed that Tokyo had earlier stated its position of "no taking sides in regard to the areas disputed by China and India" and promised Beijing that it will not get involved in the issue.
Beijing requested Tokyo to "pay due respect to efforts made by China and India in resolving disputes through negotiations and be cautious with words and actions when it comes to the issue," as the two countries (China and India) are "seeking a fair, reasonable solution that will be acceptable to both sides."
The website China Tibet Online explains: "Arunachal Pradesh, which includes three areas in Tibet Autonomous Region -- Monyul, Loyul and Lower Tsayul, is currently under Indian illegal occupation. The Chinese government's stance on these areas, located between the illegal 'Mcmahon Line' and the traditional customary boundary between China and India, is that they have always been Chinese territory."
Historical facts say differently.
First of all the McMahon Line is very much legal: it was signed by the Prime Minister of Tibet (Lochen Shatra) and India's Foreign Secretary (Sir Henry McMahon) in March 1914 (see map above).
As importantly, during the last two millennia, the Chinese have never set a foot in what is today Arunachal Pradesh (former NEFA), except for one short visit in one particular location in 1910.
To quote from my book, 1962: the McMahon Line Saga:

Soon after their occupation of Lhasa [in 1910], Zhao Erfeng’s [Chinese warlord] troops undertook the subjugation of Poyul, the region located north of the territory inhabited by the Abors in the Yarlung Tsangpo/Brahmaputra Valley. Zhao Erfeng invited Chinese settlers to come and settle in Zayul, near Rima on the Tibetan side of the Lohit valley.
The British knew what was going on.
In the decades to come, the entire North-East policy would be based on the Chinese threat [in this area].
During the summer of 1910, some Chinese troops were posted near Rima. They went as far south as Walong where they planted boundary flags, in a place where the Lohit joins the Yepuk river.
This incident rang the bells in Delhi and London. Something had to be done.

A brief intrusion in the Lohit valley does not means that the entire NEFA has always belonged to China, but it is what Beijing pretends today.
In any case, the  so-called boundary markers were soon removed by the British.
I again quote from the McMahon Saga (note that the British called their small expedition a 'promenade'):

The Walong Promenade and the Chinese Cairns
On November 19, 1913, the Secretary of State sanctioned a new ‘promenade’. T. P. M. O'Callaghan, the Assistant Political Officer, Sadiya was in charge. He was accompanied by an escort of the 1/8th Gurkha Rifles led by Major C. Stansfeld and Lt. H. R. Haringlon.
The British officers visited Rima at the invitation of the Tibetan authorities, and apparently cordial relations were established.
On May 6, 1914, Sir Archdale Earle, the Chief Commissioner of Assam writes: "Mr. O'Callaghan's report confirms the information in the possession of the Chief Commissioner that there are at present no Chinese troops anywhere in the neighbourhood of Rima. It urges nevertheless the importance of carrying the Lohit Valley road to our frontier, and of establishing a post as near the frontier as is practicable at the earliest possible date. This view is shared by the Chief Commissioner, but he realises that, for reasons which will presently be stalled, it will probably be found advisable to move slowly in the coming cold weather. He thinks, however, and he trusts that the Government of India will agree in this view, that the impossibility of recognising a Chinese boundary in the neighbourhood of Menilkrai has been finally established, and he regards Mr O'Callaghan's action in removing the boundary posts as thoroughly justified."
The APO had found Chinese markers at a place called Menilkrai, just below Walong. One set dated from 1910 and new markers had been placed in 1912 by the Chinese troops. O'Callaghan removed the markers, repositioned them upstream, near Kahao just south of the McMahon Line.
O'Callaghan confirms that a post needs to be established at Walong: "I am more than ever convinced of the necessity of the finishing of the road to our frontier and the opening of a post as near our frontier as soon as possible. From Walong to Rima, there is no difficulty in road making and the Lohit Valley road already constructed and open up to Mankum only required continuation to Manglor flat, a distance of less than 30 miles, to make the opening and rationing of the post a practicable scheme."

Even before the McMahon Line was formerly delineated, there were no Chinese presence in NEFA.
It is however true that there were areas where the Tibetans had some influence (it represented some 10% of the NEFA's territory); it was mainly in Tawang area, in today's West Siang [Pachaksiri], Upper Siang [Tuting, Geling], and Lohit/Anjaw, where tribes affiliated with the Tibetans (Monpas, Mempas, etc...) lived.
This again does not make Arunachal 'Chinese' as the Chinese never even visited these areas.
It is however true that the shyness of the Government of India which still insists on an Inner Line Permit (or Protected Area Permit for foreigners) encourages the Chinese government to continue with its wild claims.
Delhi should assert once and for all that the entire Arunachal is Indian and therefore treat at par with the other Indian States and every Indian national should be allowed to freely visit the State (while, of course, keeping in mind security issues at the proximity of the border with China).

Is the Zangmu dam 'clean'?

The Zangmu hydropower plant

This is in continuation to my previous post on the new electricity grid recently launched between Chamdo and Sichuan.
I raised the question: once the dams on the Brahmaputra are complete, will this (grid) investment be used to send electricity from Tibet to Sichuan or vice-versa.
We shall know soon, as the first run-of-river hydropower plant at Zangmu on the Yarlung Tsangpo, (which becomes the Siang and later on the Brahmaputra), is now operational.
Xinhua announced yesterday: "Tibet's largest hydropower station became partly operational, harnessing the rich water resources of the Yarlung Zangbo [Tsangpo] River to develop the electricity-strapped region."
It is the first generating unit of the  Zangmu Hydropower Station (costing 1.5 billion U.S. dollars). The project is located at 3,300 meters above sea level.
Xinhua says that "five other generating units are due for completion no later than next year", adding "the huge project, which straddles the middle reaches of the roaring Yarlung Tsangpo River, will have a total installed capacity of 510,000 kilowatts [510 Mws] upon completion. It is designed to generate 2.5 billion kilowatt hours of electricity annually."
According to Chinese official statistics, Tibet's per capita electricity consumption in 2013 was slightly over 1,000 kilowatt hours, less than one third of the national average.
Will the entire production of electricity of the 5 'officially' planned dams on the Tsangpo be used on the Tibetan plateau or will it be sent to the mainland?
The official news agency is obviously mum on the subject, though Liu Xiaoming, an official of the State Grid's Tibet Electric Power Co affirms: "The hydropower station will solve Tibet's power shortage, especially in the winter."
Tibet's Development and Reform Commission (local Planning Commission) asserts that "the region's installed power generating capacity was 1.48 million kilowatts.Tibet has annual water resources totaling 448.2 billion cubic meters, with potential water power resources reaching 201.36 million kilowatts. It holds nearly 30 percent of the nation's total water power resources."
It is a boon or a curse for the Roof of the World?
And what about the environment?
Though Lobsang Gyaltsen, the head of the Tibetan government declared: "The region has strived to protect the environment throughout construction. The hydroplant is a good example of clean energy development," run-of-river plants are not today considered 'clean' anymore.
There is no doubt that the life of the river between the 'intake' of the diversion and the power station downstream will be badly affected. 
One has recently seen the negative consequences of the 'run-of-river' plants in Uttarakhand (see my post, Dam is money, dam is destruction too).

Sketch showing the principle of
a run-of-river hydropower plant.
What happens to the life of the river
between the intake and the power house?

The Xinhua communique affirms: "A total of 320 million yuan has been invested in the Zangmu hydroplant project to build environmental friendly facilities such as sewage treatment plants, garbage recycling stations and fish protection stations."
Will China let environmentalists visit the site and study the state of the river before the diversion and after the power station?
I doubt.
According to Bo Lunzhang, an official of the regional environmental protection bureau. "The Yarlung Tsangpo River requires much higher protection standard than any other rivers in China, and the experience of Zangmu station may be learnt by other hydropower projects in Tibet."
China may learn from the Zangmu experience, but run-of-river plants elsewhere in India and the world have been very damaging for the environment (the aquatic life of the river for example).
Will the waters entering Upper Siang district of Arunachal Pradesh be different now?
India should carefully and scientifically monitor, not only the flow of the Siang, but also the quality of the water.
Article 12 of the 'Implementation Plan' signed in June 2014 between Indian and China for providing 'Hydrological Information of the Yarlung Zangbu/ Brahmaputra River in Flood Season by China to India' says: "In order to ensure normal provision of hydrological information, if necessary, after mutual consultation through diplomatic channel, the parties may dispatch hydrological experts to each other’s country to conduct study tour according to the principle of reciprocity."
Why can't Delhi ask Beijing's permission to send a team of hydrological experts to visit the dam and get some clarity on what is going on?