Time to change the narrative on 1962 India-China war

My article Time to change the narrative on 1962 India-China war appeared in The Daily Guardian

The history of 1962 needs to be rewritten, and India should not be ashamed of its Army during those fateful months. On the contrary, it is time to build more memorials and museums and let the general public—and China—know about the outstanding valour of the Indian soldiers.

The event which has most marked the Indian psyche since Independence is undoubtedly the Sino-Indian conflict of October/November 1962.

The best proof is that even a non-Congress government at the Centre has been unable to declassify the Henderson-Brooks-Bhagat Report prepared by the Indian Army a few months after the ‘debacle’.

But was it really a defeat?

Retrospectively, I do not think so, even though the government has kept the totality of the report under wraps … perhaps to save the reputation of a few ‘guilty men’.

If not such a disaster, even though for those who fought, for their families, the Indian Army and the nation at large, the 1962 conflict with China was certainly an extremely harrowing experience?

Communist China still uses the narrative of the ‘defeat’ of the Indian Army for its own propaganda and the Communist leadership keeps threatening India to ‘redo it’.

An example, soon after the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) started an uncalled for confrontation in East Ladakh in May 2020, Beijing tried again to propagate the narrative of India’s crushing defeat in 1962; Beijing argued that it was the Indian Army who had attacked China on the slopes of Thagla ridge and in Ladakh in 1962 and that India had been punished for its temerity.

Already at the end of October 2017, as an offshoot of the Doklam episode, Sina.com published an album of photos “to commemorate the 55th Anniversary of the Outbreak of the Self-Defense Counterattack.” It showed ill-equipped and unprepared Indian troops who ‘dared’ to provoke the Chinese troops, giving Chairman Mao no option but to ‘counterattack’; killing hundreds of Indian jawans and officers in the process.

President Xi Jinping was probably dreaming of another 1962, when he undertook to change the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh in May 2020, not realizing that today’s India was not Nehru’s romantic and peace-loving India.

Would China decide to ‘teach another lesson’ to India, there will be many Rezang-las or Walongs, and this time, India would use its Air Force, without speaking of severe economic and political retaliations (Beijing could forget about its dear ‘One China Policy’)— Tibet and Taiwan could immediately be recognized by India.

If Xi Jinping had thought that the Ladakhi adventure would be a quick and easy one to digest, he probably has not read Sun Tzu’s Art of War properly.

The battle of Walong of 1962 is one of the well-known episodes which illustrates how well the Indian Army fought; unfortunately, it does not get enough coverage in India.

The website Bharat Rakshak explained: “But for most of the war, the fighting qualities of the Indian jawan and the young officers remained unchanged. Without a mention of the heroic resistance offered at Walong, no story of the 1962 war will be complete. Walong is a small hamlet located near the tri-junction of Tibet, Burma, and India. Situated on an ancient trade route, it was manned by an Assam Rifles post with a small airfield capable of only handling Indian Air Force Otters and Caribous.”

The Print recently recounted some episodes of the battle: “On the morning of 16 November [1962], the final day of the battle, the Chinese launched another massive attack to capture Walong. The few tired and ill-equipped Indian troops left continued to fight. A helicopter tried to evacuate the casualties, but could not land because of poor weather conditions and an absence of suitable landing ground free from enemy fire,” quoting Col NN Bhatia, author of Kumaoni Nostalgia.

The retired colonel continued: “But the fate of Walong and 6 Kumaon was sealed as they were surrounded by two brigade strength of the Chinese. With no fresh troops to reinforce, it was impossible to hold on any longer. The remaining troops were ordered to withdraw.” But they had fought well.

It is said that during the battle for Walong and Kibithoo, the 6 Kumaon had 391 casualties, including 115 killed, 109 wounded, and 167 taken prisoners of war; the Chinese suffered 752 casualties, including 198 killed and 554 wounded.

Lt Gen Panag, a former Army Commander noted: “At Walong, 4 Sikh, 6 Kumaon, 3/3 Gorkha Rifles and 4 Dogra under 11 Infantry Brigade fought the most heroic brigade-level action of the 1962 War. The battle was waged continuously from October 18 to November 16, 1962.”

In the Western sector, the battle of Rezang-la will remain in the annals of the Indian Army.

The tale of Major Shaitan Singh, Param Vir Chakra, and his 13 Kumaon is too well known to be recounted; they fought to their last bullet to defend their position at Rezang-la.

Maj K.C. Preval in Indian Army After Independence noted that on November 18, 1962, in a freezing morning, the Chinese began with a ‘silent’ attack on Rezang-la, advancing wave after wave: “Rezang-la was held by C Company of the battalion and had no artillery support. At about 04:00 am, a patrol spotted a large body of the Chinese scrambling up the gullies and gave the alarm. Within minutes; every man in the company was at his fire position. Under Shaitan Singh, the company at Rezang La had been brought to a state of absolute readiness. The gullies had been ranged in and all of Singh’s light machine guns and mortars were now trained on them.”

Then the Kumaonis let the Chinese ‘have it’.

Let us also not forget that due to the ‘madness’ of the then political leadership, the Indian Air Force was not used.

Wing Commander Jag Mohan (‘Jaggi’) Nath, the first officer to have twice been decorated with the Maha Vir Chakra (MVC), India’s second-highest war-time military decoration, went on regular missions over Tibet for more than two years from 1960 to reconnoiter the Chinese military build-up on the Tibetan plateau. Unfortunately, the political leadership refused to believe the hard evidence gathered during his sorties or use the information gathered. Jaggi Nath concluded that China had no Air Force on the Tibetan plateau in 1962.

Had the IAF been used, one can imagine that the casualties would have been less on the Indian side and more on the Chinese; the Line of Actual Control would have remained where it was in September 1959, and the border dispute with China would not be so acute today; the Shaksgam Valley would have not been offered to China by Pakistan in 1963; Mao Zedong would have lost his job. As a result, China would have been completely different today.

The history of 1962 needs to be rewritten, and India should not be ashamed of its Army during those fateful months, on the contrary, it is time to do more research into those battles, build more memorials and museums and let the general public (and China) know about the outstanding valour of the Indian soldiers.

Preparing for China’s information warfare

Is China prospecting gold in this river?

My article Preparing for China’s information warfare appeared in the Edit Page of The Pioneer

Here is the link...

As Beijing intensifies the implementation of military/civilian doctrine, particularly media manipulation, India must stand prepared. Information will be an important part of any battle of tomorrow

In 2003, China’s Central Military Commission approved the concept of ‘Three Warfares’, namely: (1) the coordinated use of strategic psychological operations; (2) overt and covert media manipulation; and (3) legal warfare designed to manipulate perceptions of target audiences abroad.
In recent months, Beijing has been intensifying the implementation of this military/civilian doctrine, particularly ‘media manipulation’.
Take the example of an article published last week in The South China Morning Post. It speaks of “large-scale mining operations on the Chinese side of the border with India where a huge trove of gold, silver and other precious minerals has been found.” It argues that it “may create a new military flashpoint with India.”
Though no large-scale mining has yet been spotted in Lhuntse County, north of Arunachal Pradesh, the writer connects it with the Chinese claims in the area: “People familiar with the project say the mines are part of an ambitious plan by Beijing to reclaim South Tibet [the Chinese name for Arunachal], a sizeable chunk of disputed territory currently under Indian control.”
The article mixes the Longju border incident in 1959, the 1962 war with India, the Chinese claims and the supposedly huge deposit of rare earths. The sad part of the story is that the article was immediately copied and pasted by PTI and the next morning, the entire Indian media reported about the issue and linked the happenings on the Tibetan plateau with the Chinese advances in the South China Sea.
Ironically, a day later, the ultra-nationalist Chinese tabloid, The Global Times, called the article “a dodgy report disturbing the Sino-Indian ties.” It said that the article had lit a firestorm but remarked that after Indian Prime Minister’s visit to Wuhan, the two countries have achieved major progress in strengthening mutual trust, further it said China “has no intention of provoking border disputes”.
The Global Times added that though: “the report severely lacked factual evidence and was coarse,” the Indian media “was extremely excited to see such a topic,” adding: “to many Chinese people, their first impression is that the report is not credible, given the vague facts, the geopolitical point quoted by a geologist and the denial by the expert.”
Whether it is an orchestrated move by Beijing to first plant a ‘dodgy’ piece, knowing fairly well that some Indian correspondents in Beijing are experts at copy-paste reporting, and later to throw water on the fire, is difficult to know.
It is not the first time that The South China Morning Post has done it. On October 29, 2017, Jack Ma’s newspaper reported that “Chinese engineers are testing techniques that could be used to build a 1,000km tunnel — the world’s longest — to carry water from Tibet to Xinjiang;” again the Indian media jumped to the bait. There is no doubt that India needs to be prepared for Information Warfare in the coming months.

1962 War with India
Another favorite topic of the Chinese media propaganda has been the 1962 War with India. Beijing is keen to rewrite the narrative and sell it to lakhs of its citizens visiting South Tibet; its idea is to prove that India attacked China in October 1962.
At the end of October 2017, as an offshoot of the Doklam episode, Sina.com published an album of photos “to commemorate the 55th Anniversary of the Outbreak of the Self-Defense Counterattack.” Note that for Beijing, it is the ill-equipped and unprepared Indian troops who attacked the Chinese, giving China no option but to ‘counterattack’, killing hundreds of Indian jawans and officers in the process.
One of the photos, showing the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) parading in front of the Potala in January 1963, in Lhasa linked the 1962 War with the 2017 standoff in Bhutan: “The leader of the Chinese Communist Party, Mao Zedong, once estimated that India’s ‘embarrassment’ [of the 1962 War] could usher in 10 years of border security and peace. History has proved that the period of peacetime has been longer than estimated. Today, 55 years later, India once again provoked China.” The message was clear. At the time of the 1962 War, disinformation already existed.
In his Monthly Report for April 1963, the Political Officer in Sikkim informed New Delhi: “Early in the month it was announced by the Chinese authorities that the Chinese frontier guards in Tibet would be releasing 3,213 Indian prisoners which included amongst others one Brigadier [John Dalvi], 26 Field Grade Officers and 29 Company Grade Officers.”
The PO added: “The propaganda machine of the Chinese made out that the Indian prisoners were living in Tibet in a state of idyllic bliss. The detention camp was described as having been established in picturesque surroundings where the prisoners spent their time playing games or fishing and otherwise enjoying themselves. The food was supposed to have been so good that the prisoners had according to the Chinese statement on an average gained 1.35 Kgs per head. The nursing care received by the sick is supposed to have so overwhelmed the recipients as to have induced them to say that even their parents had not bestowed more loving care on them.”
The Indian PoWs reported the opposite; they ate only radish and immensely suffered during their months of captivity on the cold Tibetan plateau. Today, the Chinese propaganda is using the 1962 conflict to its benefit.
Che Dalha (alias Qizhala), the Governor of the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) recently visited Zhayul, north of the McMahon line in the Lohit Valley. Some 50 km south in the same valley, the famous Battle of Walong took place in November 1962; here Indian troops and particularly the six Kumaon regiment of the Indian Army managed to stop the Chinese advances and paid a high price for it; the Chinese too suffered heavy casualties.
China has built a Hero Memorial Park to honour its deaths in Zhayul. During his visit, Che told the villagers that the masses should always cherish the memory of the revolutionary martyrs; he laid a wreath for 447 Revolutionary Martyrs at the War Memorial.
The story will now be told to thousands and thousands Chinese visitors, how ‘the Indians attacked our troops’. Incidentally, Che took the opportunity to urge the villagers to watch for strangers or suspicious persons (Indian?); he asked them to cross-examine them and send a report to the PLA manning the Indian border.
Another memorial stands north of the Thagla ridge in Tsona County. The Forward Command Post of General Zhang Guohua, who commanded the PLA operations in 1962, has been reconstituted and opened to tourists. It is located in Marmang village, the first hamlet north of the McMahon Line.
This gazetted national-level historical site also mentions the ‘Sino-India Self Defense Counter Attack Battles’, hotels are already mushrooming to receive the visitors.      ‘Information’ will certainly be an important part of any battle of tomorrow. Has India grasped this? Not sure. In the meantime, Indian journalists should scrupulously verify the facts when they write.

Chinese Wild Claims in Arunachal

McMahon Line signed by Lochen Shatra and Sir Henry McMahon

The Chinese are not happy at all. Why?
Because the Japanese foreign minister Fumio Kishida dared to speak about what Beijing calls "a Chinese territorial area adjacent to India as Indian territory."
According to The China Daily, the Japanese diplomat was referring to Arunachal Pradesh.
Beijing immediately lodged a strong protest: "We hope Japan fully understands the sensitivity of the China-India boundary question," said Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei.
He added that in a speech in New Delhi, "Kishida attracted media attention after referring to a southern area of China's Tibet Autonomous Region as Indian territory. ...Beijing has taken notice of the report, expressed serious concerns, demanded Japan make a clarification and immediately manage damage control."
Unfortunately for Beijing, the bullying tactics do not work with Japan.
Hong however affirmed that Tokyo had earlier stated its position of "no taking sides in regard to the areas disputed by China and India" and promised Beijing that it will not get involved in the issue.
Beijing requested Tokyo to "pay due respect to efforts made by China and India in resolving disputes through negotiations and be cautious with words and actions when it comes to the issue," as the two countries (China and India) are "seeking a fair, reasonable solution that will be acceptable to both sides."
The website China Tibet Online explains: "Arunachal Pradesh, which includes three areas in Tibet Autonomous Region -- Monyul, Loyul and Lower Tsayul, is currently under Indian illegal occupation. The Chinese government's stance on these areas, located between the illegal 'Mcmahon Line' and the traditional customary boundary between China and India, is that they have always been Chinese territory."
Historical facts say differently.
First of all the McMahon Line is very much legal: it was signed by the Prime Minister of Tibet (Lochen Shatra) and India's Foreign Secretary (Sir Henry McMahon) in March 1914 (see map above).
As importantly, during the last two millennia, the Chinese have never set a foot in what is today Arunachal Pradesh (former NEFA), except for one short visit in one particular location in 1910.
To quote from my book, 1962: the McMahon Line Saga:

Soon after their occupation of Lhasa [in 1910], Zhao Erfeng’s [Chinese warlord] troops undertook the subjugation of Poyul, the region located north of the territory inhabited by the Abors in the Yarlung Tsangpo/Brahmaputra Valley. Zhao Erfeng invited Chinese settlers to come and settle in Zayul, near Rima on the Tibetan side of the Lohit valley.
The British knew what was going on.
In the decades to come, the entire North-East policy would be based on the Chinese threat [in this area].
During the summer of 1910, some Chinese troops were posted near Rima. They went as far south as Walong where they planted boundary flags, in a place where the Lohit joins the Yepuk river.
This incident rang the bells in Delhi and London. Something had to be done.

A brief intrusion in the Lohit valley does not means that the entire NEFA has always belonged to China, but it is what Beijing pretends today.
In any case, the  so-called boundary markers were soon removed by the British.
I again quote from the McMahon Saga (note that the British called their small expedition a 'promenade'):

The Walong Promenade and the Chinese Cairns
On November 19, 1913, the Secretary of State sanctioned a new ‘promenade’. T. P. M. O'Callaghan, the Assistant Political Officer, Sadiya was in charge. He was accompanied by an escort of the 1/8th Gurkha Rifles led by Major C. Stansfeld and Lt. H. R. Haringlon.
The British officers visited Rima at the invitation of the Tibetan authorities, and apparently cordial relations were established.
On May 6, 1914, Sir Archdale Earle, the Chief Commissioner of Assam writes: "Mr. O'Callaghan's report confirms the information in the possession of the Chief Commissioner that there are at present no Chinese troops anywhere in the neighbourhood of Rima. It urges nevertheless the importance of carrying the Lohit Valley road to our frontier, and of establishing a post as near the frontier as is practicable at the earliest possible date. This view is shared by the Chief Commissioner, but he realises that, for reasons which will presently be stalled, it will probably be found advisable to move slowly in the coming cold weather. He thinks, however, and he trusts that the Government of India will agree in this view, that the impossibility of recognising a Chinese boundary in the neighbourhood of Menilkrai has been finally established, and he regards Mr O'Callaghan's action in removing the boundary posts as thoroughly justified."
The APO had found Chinese markers at a place called Menilkrai, just below Walong. One set dated from 1910 and new markers had been placed in 1912 by the Chinese troops. O'Callaghan removed the markers, repositioned them upstream, near Kahao just south of the McMahon Line.
O'Callaghan confirms that a post needs to be established at Walong: "I am more than ever convinced of the necessity of the finishing of the road to our frontier and the opening of a post as near our frontier as soon as possible. From Walong to Rima, there is no difficulty in road making and the Lohit Valley road already constructed and open up to Mankum only required continuation to Manglor flat, a distance of less than 30 miles, to make the opening and rationing of the post a practicable scheme."

Even before the McMahon Line was formerly delineated, there were no Chinese presence in NEFA.
It is however true that there were areas where the Tibetans had some influence (it represented some 10% of the NEFA's territory); it was mainly in Tawang area, in today's West Siang [Pachaksiri], Upper Siang [Tuting, Geling], and Lohit/Anjaw, where tribes affiliated with the Tibetans (Monpas, Mempas, etc...) lived.
This again does not make Arunachal 'Chinese' as the Chinese never even visited these areas.
It is however true that the shyness of the Government of India which still insists on an Inner Line Permit (or Protected Area Permit for foreigners) encourages the Chinese government to continue with its wild claims.
Delhi should assert once and for all that the entire Arunachal is Indian and therefore treat at par with the other Indian States and every Indian national should be allowed to freely visit the State (while, of course, keeping in mind security issues at the proximity of the border with China).