China: more and more dams in Tibet

A few weeks ago, I questioned the real objective of the newly launched Sichuan-Tibet electricity grid.
Was the purpose to bring electricity from the mainland to Tibet or vice-versa?
At that time, the Chinese press said that the purpose was the former.
Now China Tibet Online speaks of a "Breakthrough in outward power transmission from Tibet".
What does it mean?
It signifies more and more dams will be required in the future ...to feed the outward power transmission and some of these dams will be built on the Yarlung Tsangpo-Brahmaputra.
Chinanews.com announced: "Tibet Autonomous Region is expected to see a breakthrough in outward electric power transmission this summer."
It quotes the Tibet Electric Power Company Limited, to say: "when the three power stations in Dzam [Zangmu?], Dondup [Pangduo?] and Guoduo [located on the upper reaches of the Mekong River in Tserwe Township] are put into operation，Tibet will begin transmitting electricity to other provinces for the first time. This will be achieved with the help of Sichuan-Tibet Power Grid and Qinghai-Tibet DC Networking Project."
It is not what China was saying a few weeks ago:

Xinhua reported that the opening of the 1.08 billion U.S. dollar project linking Chamdo in the TAR and the Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture of Garze in Sichuan Province, aims at "putting an end to the electricity shortages of the 500,000 residents of the Chamdo region and ease power strain in Tibet as a whole".

Now, the Chinese website admits: "The two lines will increase Tibet’s outward power transmission capacities to 350,000 and 20,000 kilowatts, or 1 billion and 600 million kilowatt hours a year respectively."
Beijing has invested a lot of money in the project: the Sichuan-Tibet Power Grid and Qinghai-Tibet DC Networking Project cost 4.6 billion US dollars. It was part of the 12th Five-year Plan Period (2011-2015).
China Tibet Online affirms: "Together with the Central Tibet Power Grid and Chamdo Power Grid, the two lines will certainly ease local power shortages and boost economic development in eastern Tibet. It is believed that the power grids in Tibet will cover 58 counties and benefit 2.18 million local residents by the end of the year."
Now comes the most telling part:

The foundation work for outward power transmission will be advanced steadily in 2015 by accelerating hydroelectric development in the middle section of the Yarlung Zangbo River [Brahmaputra], said Losang Jamcan [Lobsang Gyatsen], chairman of Tibet's regional government during the Third Session of the Tenth Tibet People's Congress.
Investment in power grid construction in Tibet is predicted to hit a record 60 billion yuan (9.7 billion US dollars) in the 13th Five-year Plan Period. By 2020 Tibet can bid farewell to the history of its power shortage and realize large-scale outward power transmission. The capacities in 2020, 2025 and 2035 will reach 20 million, 40 million and 110 million kilowatts respectively, industry analysts said.

In 2015, China will be "accelerating hydroelectric development in the middle section of the Yarlung Zangbo River."
The conclusion of the website was "Tibet is abundant in water power resources and will serve as an important energy base for the west-east electricity transmission project."
In other words, more and more dams will be built in Tibet ...to feed electricity to China. It will have serious consequences for India and Bangladesh.

Is the Zangmu dam 'clean'?

The Zangmu hydropower plant

This is in continuation to my previous post on the new electricity grid recently launched between Chamdo and Sichuan.
I raised the question: once the dams on the Brahmaputra are complete, will this (grid) investment be used to send electricity from Tibet to Sichuan or vice-versa.
We shall know soon, as the first run-of-river hydropower plant at Zangmu on the Yarlung Tsangpo, (which becomes the Siang and later on the Brahmaputra), is now operational.
Xinhua announced yesterday: "Tibet's largest hydropower station became partly operational, harnessing the rich water resources of the Yarlung Zangbo [Tsangpo] River to develop the electricity-strapped region."
It is the first generating unit of the  Zangmu Hydropower Station (costing 1.5 billion U.S. dollars). The project is located at 3,300 meters above sea level.
Xinhua says that "five other generating units are due for completion no later than next year", adding "the huge project, which straddles the middle reaches of the roaring Yarlung Tsangpo River, will have a total installed capacity of 510,000 kilowatts [510 Mws] upon completion. It is designed to generate 2.5 billion kilowatt hours of electricity annually."
According to Chinese official statistics, Tibet's per capita electricity consumption in 2013 was slightly over 1,000 kilowatt hours, less than one third of the national average.
Will the entire production of electricity of the 5 'officially' planned dams on the Tsangpo be used on the Tibetan plateau or will it be sent to the mainland?
The official news agency is obviously mum on the subject, though Liu Xiaoming, an official of the State Grid's Tibet Electric Power Co affirms: "The hydropower station will solve Tibet's power shortage, especially in the winter."
Tibet's Development and Reform Commission (local Planning Commission) asserts that "the region's installed power generating capacity was 1.48 million kilowatts.Tibet has annual water resources totaling 448.2 billion cubic meters, with potential water power resources reaching 201.36 million kilowatts. It holds nearly 30 percent of the nation's total water power resources."
It is a boon or a curse for the Roof of the World?
And what about the environment?
Though Lobsang Gyaltsen, the head of the Tibetan government declared: "The region has strived to protect the environment throughout construction. The hydroplant is a good example of clean energy development," run-of-river plants are not today considered 'clean' anymore.
There is no doubt that the life of the river between the 'intake' of the diversion and the power station downstream will be badly affected. 
One has recently seen the negative consequences of the 'run-of-river' plants in Uttarakhand (see my post, Dam is money, dam is destruction too).

Sketch showing the principle of
a run-of-river hydropower plant.
What happens to the life of the river
between the intake and the power house?

The Xinhua communique affirms: "A total of 320 million yuan has been invested in the Zangmu hydroplant project to build environmental friendly facilities such as sewage treatment plants, garbage recycling stations and fish protection stations."
Will China let environmentalists visit the site and study the state of the river before the diversion and after the power station?
I doubt.
According to Bo Lunzhang, an official of the regional environmental protection bureau. "The Yarlung Tsangpo River requires much higher protection standard than any other rivers in China, and the experience of Zangmu station may be learnt by other hydropower projects in Tibet."
China may learn from the Zangmu experience, but run-of-river plants elsewhere in India and the world have been very damaging for the environment (the aquatic life of the river for example).
Will the waters entering Upper Siang district of Arunachal Pradesh be different now?
India should carefully and scientifically monitor, not only the flow of the Siang, but also the quality of the water.
Article 12 of the 'Implementation Plan' signed in June 2014 between Indian and China for providing 'Hydrological Information of the Yarlung Zangbu/ Brahmaputra River in Flood Season by China to India' says: "In order to ensure normal provision of hydrological information, if necessary, after mutual consultation through diplomatic channel, the parties may dispatch hydrological experts to each other’s country to conduct study tour according to the principle of reciprocity."
Why can't Delhi ask Beijing's permission to send a team of hydrological experts to visit the dam and get some clarity on what is going on?

Power from the mainland to Roof of the World

Xinhua has just announced that the Tibet-Sichuan grid is now functional.
The launching ceremony was chaired by Yu Zhengsheng, Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), who declared operational the power lines linking the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) to Sichuan Province.
The function was held  in Beijing.
Xinhua reported that the opening of the 1.08 billion U.S. dollar project linking Chamdo in the TAR and the Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture of Garze in Sichuan Province, aims at "putting an end to the electricity shortages of the 500,000 residents of the Chamdo region and ease power strain in Tibet as a whole".
The news agency further explained: "The complex interconnection circuits stretch 1,521 kilometers across the plateau at an average altitude of 3,850 meters and its construction involved more than 20,000 staff over eight months, according to the State Grid Corporation of China."
Before the official launch, Yu inspected the power 'dispatching center' at the State Grid's headquarters where he met workers and engineers involved in a grid construction.
He was accompanied by Chen Quanglo, the TAR's Party Secretary.
The billion-yuan question is: will this investment still be used to send electricity from Tibet to Sichuan or vice-versa, once the dams on the Brahmaputra are complete.

According to China Environment Forum of the Wilson Centre in the US:

The West - East Electricity Transfer Project, initiated in the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2000-2005), was designed to bring investment and development to China’s lagging west while satisfying the growing electricity needs of the country’s eastern provinces. The project’s first phase has been and is continuing to expand the western provinces’ electricity-generating capacity, primarily through the construction of new coal bases and hydroelectric dams.The project’s second, ongoing component is the construction of three electricity-transmission corridors, which are essentially three vast networks of electrical transmission lines that connect newly built generation capacity in the North, Central and South to China’s electricity-hungry coast (see arrows on map). Each of the corridors is expected to exceed 40 gigawatts (GW) in capacity by 2020—a combined capacity equivalent to 60 Hoover Dams. The seven recipient provinces — Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Guangdong — together consume nearly 40 percent of China’s electricity.

A few pictures of the grid and the function.

 

The Mad Mega Diversion Plan

Giving a new life to the Yellow River?

As already mentioned on this blog, on February 17, 2013, an article appeared on the website of the Yellow River Conservancy Commission of the  Chinese Ministry of Water Resources. 
It described in detail two phaoronic projects known as the Great Western Water Diversion and the Yellow River Waterway Corridor.
It mentioned a preliminary feasibility study prepared by officials of the Ministry of Water Resources. The idea of the Chinese engineers is to divert 150 billion cubic meters of water and pomp these waters in the drying Yellow River to irrigate northern China. A giant reservoir near the Yellow River 'Maqu' Great Bend would regulate the flow of the river.
I am publishing here Section 3 to 6 of the article on the 'crazy' mega project.
Of interest to us in India are Section 4 and  6 on the diversion of the Yarlung Tsanpo (Yaluzangbu Jiang) or Brahmaputra (Siang in Arunachal).
Interestingly, Xinhua has just announced the construction of the Sichuan-Tibet grid: "Construction of power lines between Tibet and Southwest China's Sichuan province got underway."
The news agency reported: "The project will cost over 6.6 billion yuan ($1.08 billion), and should be complete in the first half of 2015, solving the power shortage and transmission problems in parts of Tibet. More than 1,521 kilometers of lines will connect Qamdo [Chamdo] prefecture in Tibet and the Tibetan autonomous prefecture of Garze in Sichuan, with four substations."
It further elaborated: "The project covers some very harsh terrain and work conditions are difficult with an average altitude of 3,850 meters. Shu Yinbiao, general manager of the State Grid, said that environmental protection and safe working conditions are vital to the project's success. Medical services for construction workers include 26 health centers and four hyperbaric oxygen chambers."
This could be linked to a future mega-project.
Here is the translation of Sections 3 to 6 of the article posted on the website of the Yellow River Conservancy Commission of the  Chinese Ministry of Water Resources.

Section 3
Overall Situation of Yellow River Navigation
The Yellow River shipping waterway, with the assistance of the "western line" water diversion project, will use the existing Yellow River riverway, and will open up navigation from the Bohai Bay to Lanzhou. The riverbed of the Yellow River will be excavated and dredged, to permit passage of 50,000-ton class vessels from the mouth of the Yellow River to Lanzhou, and with that, it will become the greatest "golden" waterway of the world. The main (note: or "trunk") shipping route of the Yellow River will be 3300 kilometers in length, from Dongying (note: a city in Shandong) at the mouth of the Yellow River into Bohai Bay, all the way to the upstream area of Lanzhou. It will pass through Shandong, Henan, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, and Gansu, a total of 7 provinces, providing access for 50,000-ton class ships. The shipping route along the Weihe, a tributary of the Yellow River, will extend for 388 kilometers, from Tongguan at the mouth of the Weihe, to the midstream area of Xianyang, for passage of 50,000-ton class ships. The shipping route along the Yiluohe, another tributary, will extend 50 kilometers, from the mouth of the Yiluohe to Luoyang, for passage of 50,000-ton class ships. The shipping route along the Fenhe, yet another tributary, will extend 600 kilometers, from Hejin at the mouth of the Fenhe, to the upstream area of Taiyuan, for passage of 50,000-ton class ships. The Datong shipping route, from the Qingshui River, to Datong, and on to Tongzhou, will extend for 1000 kilometers, from the upper reaches of the Qingshui River, in the middle of the Yellow River, along the Sanggan River, through the Guanting water reservoir, to Tongzhou District in Beijing. It will pass through Datong, and connect to the northern stretch of the Beijing-Hangzhou Grand Canal in Tongzhou, allowing passage of 1000-ton class vessels. On the lower reaches of the Yellow River, the Weihe and Majiahe secondary shipping routes on the North bank, as well as the Jialuhe and Huijihe secondary shipping routes on the South bank, will all connect to the Beijing-Hangzhou Grand Canal, for passage of 1000-ton class vessels. The Beijing-Hangzhou Canal is 1700 kilometers in length, and can carry 10,000-ton class vessels. At its Northern reaches, it permits passage through Tianjin and into the Bohai Bay, whereas at its Southern end, it reaches Hangzhou, and permits passage out into the East Sea. As such, the entire marine shipping network will on one hand reach up to the Bohai, on the other down to the East Sea, and going inwards, all the way to the heart of the West, forming a super-network which will encompass half the country.

***

Section 4
Overall Situation of Water Diversion Project
The ‘western line’ water diversion project, will draw 150 billion cubic meters of water from 6 rivers: the Yaluzangbu Jiang, the Nu Jiang, the Lancang Jiang, the Jinsha Jiang, the Yalong Jiang, and the Dadu He. The water will be sent to the Maqu Daguaiwan super-reservoir on the upper stretches of the Yellow River. Out of that water, 50 billion cubic meters will pass through man-made canals, sending 10 billion cubic meters to Qaidam Basin in Qinghai Province, 30 billion cubic meters to the Taklimakan Desert in Tarim Basin in Xinjiang Province, and 10 billion cubic meters to Lop Nur. The remaining 100 billion cubic meters will flow out along with the existing waterflow of the Yellow River, allowing many hydropower stations serving Lanzhou to operate at full capacity, as well as providing 50 billion cubic meters for diversion along the river branch at Qilihe District of Lanzhou. Those 50 billion will be carried by man-made canals, through the Hexi Corridor, sending 10 billion cubic meters to the Turpan Basin in Xinjiang, another 10 billion to the Junggar Basin, and 30 billion to boost the laggard waterflow of the Shiyang He, Hei He, and other rivers. The balance of 50 billion cubic meters will flow through the Yellow River to the ocean, boosting the river's water level to permit navigation.

***

Section 5
Construction Plan for the Shipping Waterway

5.1
The construction can be divided into 2 phases: phase 1 will include tributary river projects, discharge waterway projects, tributary shipping waterway projects, shipping canal projects, and water-supply canal projects; phase 2 will include the main/trunk shipping waterway project, water locks, reservoir, widening of the Beijing-Hangzhou canal, and water-supply canals into the Northwest.

5.2
Tributary projects: These projects will start from the highest class of tributary rivers. First, simple, temporary dams will be built to shut off the entrances of the level-3 tributaries and their large and small gullies (note: or "ditches"), and they will be drained of water. Then, the riverbed will be dredged, and the slopes on either side of the river will be leveled (note: or "graded"?). Since gentle slopes are advantageous for preventing soil erosion, a 15-degree slope is best. Then, simple, temporary dams will be constructed on the level-2 tributaries and their large and small gullies, and the same procedure as above will be followed. Last will be the level-1 tributaries and their large and small gullies, with the same procedure again. As these projects progress to the lower-class tributaries, the amount of water to be drained will be larger and larger, so if it proves necessary, low-lying land can be found for excavation of temporary drainage reservoirs, or the water can be discharged through canals into other rivers.

5.3
Discharge Waterway projects: The Weihe and Majiahe, on the North bank of the lower reaches of the Yellow River, will be blocked off with temporary dams. Then the base of the trapezoidal cross-section of their entire riverbeds will be widened to a minimum of 100 meters, with a minimum depth of 9 meters, a normal water level of 6 meters, 15-degree slopes on each side, and an average downhill slope of 0.04% or less. The Jialuhe, Huijihe, and other similar tributaries on the South Bank will be dealt with in exactly the same way.

5.4
The discharge channels on the north bank will be situated at the mouth of the Fenhe, and will flow through man-made channels to the Weihe, Majiahe, etc. The discharge channels on the south bank will be situated at the mouth of the Qinhe, and will flow into the Jialuhe, Huijihe, etc. The trapezoidal cross-section of the discharge channels will be 150 meters wide at the base, at least 9 meters in depth, with a normal water level of 6 meters, a 15-20 degree slope on either side, and an average downhill slope of 0.04% or less.

5.5
The discharge channel for the Weihe (NOTE: this is *different* from the Weihe mentioned in the previous paragraph. The 2 names are written with different characters.) can make use of the existing Luohe; man-made channels will conduct water from the mouth of the Weihe to the middle reaches of the Luohe, and further down, other man-made channels will connect the Luohe to the discharge channels on the south bank. The trapezoidal cross-section of these channels will be 20 meters wide at the base, at least 9 meters in depth, with a normal water level of 6 meters, and a 40 degree slope on either side. There is no need to pay special attention to the downhill slope.

5.6
The discharge channel in the upriver area of Lanzhou will conduct water through Lanzhou, along the West side of the Yellow River, through Jingtai County, and into the Hexi Corridor. At Wuwei it will flow into the Shiyanghe. This channel will help in transporting water through the Hexi Corridor to Xinjiang.

5.7
Shipping Canal projects: Upstream from the temporary dams at the mouths of the Wei and Yiluo rivers, a large dam with water locks will be constructed, whereas upstream from Xianyang and Luoyang, "bottom-stretching" (or "bottom-reaching"? The name seems to indicate either that the dams extend up from the riverbed, which seems trivially true of any dam, or they extend deeper down into the riverbed.) water control dams will be constructed. The trapezoidal cross-section of the river bottom will be at least 400 meters at the base, with a depth of no less than 18 meters, a normal water level of 15 meters, and a slope of 20-25 degrees at the sides, as well as an average downhill slope of 0.04% or less. The trapezoidal cross-sections of other tributary rivers will be decided based on whether, whether they will be opened for shipping, and if so, what the class of ships sailing on them will be.

5.8
Canal projects: The canal from the Qingshui river, through Datong, and on to Tongzhou will have a dam with water locks at the entrance of the Qingshui. Another dam with water locks will be located at the exit of the Guanting water reservoir. The trapezoidal cross-section and slope will be the same as the discharge channels on the North and South sides of the lower stretches of the Yellow River.

5.9
Water-use Channel projects: (note: perhaps this refers to channels used for transporting water for irrigation? The name seems to indicate the water is for human use, not simply for shipping.) The discharge channel upstream from Lanzhou, also known as the Northwest Channel. It will have a branch which will be a water-use channel, stretching from Jingtai, along the Yellow River on its Northwest side, to Hohhot.

5.10
After the phase 1 projects are completed, the temporary dams for the Weihe, Majiahe, Jialuhe, and Huijihe, as well as other discharge channels, will be dismantled. All the temporary dams constructed at the mouths of level-1 tributaries will remain. The discharge channel on the upstream side of Lanzhou will be opened up. At the exit of the Northwest Channel, near Lanzhou, a temporary dam will be built on the side toward the downstream side of the Yellow River. The portion of the channel cut off by the dam will be drained. The water can be used locally, or if it is too much, it can be diverted into the desert and used for irrigation.

5.11
Dry-river projects: At the mouth of the Yellow River, going out into the sea, a temporary dam will be built. On the downstream side of the temporary dam at Lanzhou, a "bottom-stretching" water control dam will be built. The trapezoidal cross-section of the dry river bed will be at least 500 meters at the base, with a maximum depth of no less than 18 meters, normal water level of 15 meters, sides with slope of 20-25 degrees, and downhill slope same as the shipping channels. In the canyons of the upper and middle stretches of the Yellow River, the natural features of the terrain and its green cover can be maintained, but the depth and width of the channel must be enough to permit navigation.

5.12
The entrance of the Weihe water-supply channel is directly across (note: or "facing") the exit of the Lanzhou Northwest Channel.

5.13
Water-locks projects: Three "bottom-stretching" dams with water locks will be constructed on the dry riverbed at Heishanxia (Black Mountain Gorge), Tuoketuo, and Yumenkou. They will divide the drained riverbed into 4 sections, from Lanzhou-Heishanxia, Heishanxia-Tuoketuo, Tuoketuo-Yumenkou, and Yumenkou-Dongying. All three dams will have multiple locks, including one pair for 50,000-ton class ships, one pair for 20,000-ton class ships, one pair for 10,000-ton class ships, two pairs for 5000-ton class ships, and two pairs for 1000-ton class ships. The chamber inside the 50,000-ton class locks will have effective measurements of 300 by 50 by 12 (note: meters?). The width of the water-lock dams will be about 800 meters, with a depth of about 1500 meters.

5.14
Water reservoir projects: At the Maqu Great River Turn area, there will be a water reservoir with a capacity of 150 billion cubic meters. On the inner side of the Great River Turn area dikes will be built, and will connect with the mountains surrounding the area to form a vast reservoir 30 kilometers wide, 90 kilometers long, and 60 meters deep. The cofferdam dikes built around the reservoir will be trapezoidal in cross-section, with a 45 degree incline on the inner side, and a 30 degree incline on the outer side, running for a total length of 240 kilometers, at least 184 meters thick at the base, 60 meters tall, and at least 20 meters thick at the peak. The reservoir outlet will be on the downstream side of the Maqu Great River Turn area. The dikes will be constructed using gabions, with geo-membrane on the inner side, and filled with earth dug up on site.

5.15
Widening of the Beijing-Hangzhou Canal project: When the elevated riverbed of the Yellow River comes down to ground level (note: due to many years of silting, the last ~800km of the Yellow River is elevated above ground level and is kept on its course and prevented from overflowing by dikes), and connects with the Beijing-Hangzhou canal, the original capacity of the canal to carry vessels up to 1000 tons will make for a severe mismatch with the 50,000 ton vessel capacity of the Yellow River. Therefore, the capacity of the canal can be increased to carry 10,000 ton vessels, and the elevated portion of the canal in Shandong can be lowered to the same elevation as the connections with the Yellow and Yangze rivers. As the entire course is made flat and level, it will also be deepened and widened. The trapezoidal cross-section of the canal will be at least 300 meters at the base, at least 15 meters deep, with a normal water level of 12 meters, and a 20-25 degree slope on the sides. The average downhill slope of the canal will be decided by the relative elevation of the Yellow River and Yangze River riverbeds. If the slope is excessive, then the construction of water locks must be considered.

5.16
At the point where the Yellow River (primary shipping channel) exits to the sea at Dongying, the bottom will be dredged to a depth of at least 25 meters. In the gulf port at the mouth of the Yellow River, the depth to which the mooring berths will be dredged will be decided according to the depth which the ships require.

5.17
After the phase 2 projects complete, all the tributary and dry riverbed temporary dams will be dismantled. The water-use channels and bypass channels running along the Weihe and Yiluohe will be taken out of commission, but can be left in place in case they are useful in the future. The discharge channels on the North and South sides of the lower reaches of the Yellow River will be kept and will serve as secondary river channels. The primary river channel on the lower end of the Yellow River will become its primary shipping channel, and the secondary river channels will become secondary shipping channels. The primary and secondary Yellow River shipping channels, along with the Qingshui-Datong-Tongzhou canal and the Beijing-Hangzhou canals will all connect for passage of shipping traffic, and will form the main framework (note: literally "skeleton"; perhaps translate as "backbone"?) of the new marine shipping network.

5.18
The discharge channels chosen for use during the Yellow River shipping channel project, are all preexisting riverways, which will greatly reduce the work to be done and the amount of movement required. The discharge channels used on the upper stretches of the Yellow River, however, do include some man-made channels for diversion of water to the Hexi Corridor. These discharge channels will not require too much work, will not occupy too much space, and will not require many people to be relocated.

5.19
Since the average downhill slope of the Yellow River riverbed is as high as 0.46%, the limited water volume available cannot maintain the required depth when descending such a steep slope. If we were to limit the average slope to no more than 0.06%, the height of each big dam with water-locks would have to be extended as high as 400 meters, or more. If that was the case, the work required to build each dam, and the technical difficulty involved, as well as the work involved in building dikes on either side of the riverway, would be greatly increased. The enormous dams and dikes, protruding hundreds of meters from the ground, would form huge barriers, as well as being a safety hazard. While our plan does involve a certain degree of height to the dams, we solve the problem primarily by making the base of the dams extend down below ground level, thus increasing the difference between water level behind and in front of the dam, and making it possible to flatten out the slope of the riverbed. The height of those huge 400-meter dams will mostly be *below* ground level, greatly mitigating the safety hazard, and reducing the technical difficulty of construction. This way, the above-ground height of both dams and dikes can be kept within reasonable limits.

***

Section 6
Plan for the Water Diversion Project

6.1
150 billion cubic meters of water are to be drawn from the Yaluzangbu Jiang, the Nu Jiang, the Lancang Jiang, the Jinsha Jiang, the Yalong Jiang, and the Dadu Jiang, and be diverted to the upper Yellow River. Of that amount, 50 billion cubic meters will be taken from the Yaluzangbu Jiang, approximately 30% of its yearly flow of 165.4 billion cubic meters; the Nu Jiang will contribute 24 billion cubic meters, roughly 35% of its yearly flow of 74 billion cubic meters; from the Lancang Jiang, 26 billion cubic meters, roughly 35% of its yearly flow of 74 billion cubic meters; from the Jinsha Jiang, 28 billion cubic meters, roughly 20% of its yearly flow of 143 billion cubic meters; from the Yalong Jiang, 12 billion cubic meters, roughly 20% of its yearly flow of 60.4 billion cubic meters; and from the Dadu Jiang, 10 billion cubic meters, roughly 20% of its yearly flow of 50 billion cubic meters.

6.2
The water outlet on the Yaluzangbu will be the point where the level-2 tributaries Palongzangbu and Yigongzangbu flow into the (level-1 tributary) Layue He. The diverted water will flow east along the Sichuan-Tibet Highway, from Mibo to Bashe, and will join the channel for water diverted from the Nu Jiang. The merged channel will contain flowing along the Sichuan-Tibet Highway, from Xiaya to Changdu, and will merge with the channel carrying diverted water from the Lancang Jiang. The channel, now carrying water from 3 rivers, will continue along the highway, from Jiangda to Dege, and will then merge with the channel carrying water from the Jinsha Jiang. The merged channel will will continue along the highway, past Que'er Mountain, through Manigange to Ganmu, and will then merge with the channel carrying water from the Yalong Jiang. Now carrying water from 5 rivers, the merged channel will continue along the same highway, through Huhuo, to Lianghekou, on the Dajin Chuan, a tributary of the Dadu He. There, it will merge with the water diverted from the Dadu He, and will turn North, flowing along the Aba Highway, through Rangtang and Aba. It will continue flowing to the upper Yellow River, and will cross over the Yellow River and flow into the Maqu Daguaiwan reservoir.

6.3
Previous proposals for the Western Line water diversion project, have generally recommended using natural (downhill) water flow to transport the water, so as to reduce the operating costs of water diversion. However, this would make the technical difficulty of the project very great. It would mean building highly elevated reservoirs, and excavating long, deep tunnels for the water to flow through. If we take a different perspective, and abandon the idea of natural water flow, instead using external electric power to pump the water, that extreme technical difficulty can be avoided, though the operating costs will of course be much greater. If we can bear those operating costs, then the plan described above is feasible. The difference between the Great Tongdao water project and most other water projects, is that the economic and social benefits to be reaped are far better. Most water projects take a long time to recoup the construction costs, or even never recoup them at all. In contrast, the Great Tongdao project has enormous meaning; in effect, it can turn Henan province, Shanxi province, Shaanxi province, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia province, Gansu province, and Anhui province into "coastal" provinces. At the same time, it will make Qinghai, Xinjiang, and Tibet take a giant step towards parity with central China, as if the "golden coastline" of Southeast China was extended all the way into the belly of the deep West. So the Datongdao project can pay back all the capital expenses of the entire project, it can compensate for all the damages caused, and it can pay for the high operating expenses of electric pumping. Therefore, there is no reason why this project cannot proceed by use of electric pumping for water transport, thus easily avoiding the difficulty of building elevated reservoirs and deep, long-distance tunnels. Besides, the enormous power generation capacity which the Yaluzangbu Daguaiwan power station will provide, will do much to relieve the strain on the existing power network.

6.4
If electric pumping is used all along the entire water diversion course, then when choosing the route to be taken, there is no need to worry about altitude and levelness, so a route which takes the pipes along a public highway will be simplest and most convenient for construction. The volume of the reservoirs and channels for diverted water will not be an issue for water delivery, so construction of reservoirs at the water inlets and outlets will not be required. In the high mountains and deep valleys of the Southwest, there will be no need to build dams or dig long, deep tunnels, and the need to build roads for transporting construction supplies into remote areas will be greatly alleviated. Basically, all the tricky technical parts of the Datongdao and Western Line projects will disappear. With no high-altitude reservoirs, no deep tunnels, and pipes and channels running along public highways, the quantity, difficulty, and expense of construction work will be slashed. The investment capital required to set up water pipes and channels, and the high operating expenses of pumping the water, can all be carried by the enormous economic and social dividends provided by marine shipping. The electric power generated will be seasonal, which is disadvantageous for any other use; but for water diversion, it's perfect. When the rivers are high, the hydroelectric power stations will produce at full capacity, just when the pumps for water diversion need the most power. When the rivers are at moderate level, the hydroelectric stations will generate a moderate amount of power, and the power consumption of the pumps will also be moderate. When the rivers are low, water will not be diverted. Any hydroelectric power generated during the low season, as well as any excess power during the high season, will be given to Tibet.

6.5
The great canyon of the Yaluzangbu Jiang forms a "U" shape toward the Northeast. The water reservoir which is to be built on the Yaluzangbu will be toward the end of one branch of the "U", at Paiqu town. That part of the canyon has yearly water flow of 68 billion cubic meters. The dam will be 50 meters high, and will pass 40 billion cubic meters through the generator turbines each year. The generator station itself will be located close to the other branch of the "U", will have a capacity of 35,000 megawatts, and will connect to the reservoir through a sloped tunnel 30 meters in diameter and several kilometers long. The top and bottom of the tunnel will have a 2.2 kilometer difference in elevation, and will pass enough water to generate 150 million megawatt-hours per year.

6.6
The power used for pumping the diverted water could be brought in from elsewhere, or could be transmitted from the Yaluzangbu power station. Ideally, the power generated from the diverted rivers would be used to cover the power needs of the whole diversion project, though this would increase the required investment and difficulty of construction. Even if it is deemed necessary to buy power from elsewhere, the economic benefits of the Datongdao project are still enough to pay for its operating expenses. Of course, if building the new power stations proves too difficult to do right away, the project could initially run on purchased electricity, and when the time is right, the Yabuzanglu power station could be built. Or, if China's level of engineering and construction expertise advances in the future, maybe converting the water diversion channels over to use natural water flow rather than pumps would become feasible.

Security: Learn from Tibet

According to The China Daily, a delegation from Xinjiang's capital Urumqi visited Lhasa to learn the tricks about 'security' and 'stability'.
The delegation was taken around by Tibet's Security Czar, Deng Xiaogang who is also the Party's Deputy Secretary of the Tibet Autonomous Region.
You can be sure that the delegation had not come for sight-seeing.
According to The China Daily, the Party cadres from Urumqi were very impressed by the "effective grid management system, which arranges every five or 10 households into a group. They concluded that the Urumqi government should put more effort into improving community facilities and service, enhancing the management of its floating population, and maintaining community stability."
Will an 'effective' grid system be able to stop cars ramming into tourists on the Tiananmen Square? Not sure!
Anyway, the leadership from Xinjiang believes that it can learn from Tibet.
In an earlier post, Tibet: nets in the sky and traps on the ground, I mentioned the Orwellian monitoring system put in place in Lhasa (probably by Deng Xiaogang).
One understands that other provinces are interested.
 

Deng Xiaogang

Urumqi delegation visits Lhasa
November 11, 2013
China Daily           
A delegation led by Zhu Hailun, Urumqi Party committee secretary, paid a first-time visit to the city of Lhasa in the Tibet autonomous region from Oct 26 to 27. The delegation discussed economic and livelihood development with local officials.
The delegation – including Zhang Huaguo, Yuan Baoxin, Qiu Shuhua and other directors from the Urumqi government – visited a number of sites, such as the Potala Palace, Lhasa Train Station, Lhasa City Planning Exhibition Hall and Lhasa Lugu community. They were accompanied by Deng Xiaogang, deputy secretary of the Tibet autonomous region Party committee, and Zhang Yanqing, mayor of Lhasa.
The delegation was impressed by Lugu community’s effective grid management system, which arranges every five or 10 households into a group. They concluded that the Urumqi government should put more effort into improving community facilities and service, enhancing the management of its floating population, and maintaining community stability.
Zhu Hailun also shared experiences regarding promoting cultural tourism and building city brands with local officials.
At the Lhasa Train Station, the staff explained the station’s architectural style, management system and eco-friendly technology to the delegation.
Lhasa Train Station, founded in 2006, is a main part of the Qinghai-Tibet Railway project. It lies in Liuwu New Area, 1 kilometer to the south of the main river and 5 kilometers southwest of the Potala Palace.
Lhasa is the administrative capital of Tibet. It is one of the highest cities in the world, located at an altitude of 3,490 meters. The city contains many culturally significant Tibetan Buddhist sites such as the Potala Palace, Jokhang temple and the Norbulingka palaces, many of which are located in Chengguan district.

The Boss has come: Yu's visit in Lhasa

Pema Thinley, Yu, Chen Quanguo and Zhang Yijiong

After visiting Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous  Prefecture (Kham) from January 6 to 8, 2013, Yu Zhengsheng, the Standing Committee member responsible for the Tibetan Affairs (as the Chairman of Central Working Coordination Small Group on Tibet) visited the former Amdo Province in early July this year.
In Gansu, Yu called "for lasting prosperity and stability in China's Tibetan regions by improving local livelihoods and fighting the 14th Dalai Lama clique."
Yu Zhengsheng has now visited the Tibetan Autonomous Region.
He apparently was around Lhasa (and Ngachu) from August 1 to 6; the most extraordinary news was that nothing appeared in the Chinese (or the local) press before Yu was back in Beijing on August 6 evening.
Outside China, it is difficult to believe that the official responsible for a region at the highest level of the government can stay for nearly one week in this region and the world would only know about it when he has left.
Xinhua informs us that for Yu Zhengsheng, development remains 'fundamental and key' to addressing all issues related to Tibet.
The Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference was keen "to promote efforts to rule Tibet by law and seek a regional development path with Chinese and local characteristics."
Like Xi Jinping when he addressed the Tibetan delegation in March in Beijing, he spoke of "achieving leapfrog economic and social development in Tibet and long-term stability".

Photo session with the 'masses',
Lobsang Gystsen and Chen Quanguo in attendance

Like in Gansu, he referred to (and rejected) the Dalai Lama's proposal for 'high-degree autonomy in Greater Tibet'.
Yu said that it "runs counter to China's Constitution, the law, and the fundamental interests of Tibetan Buddhism."
Yu asked the monks to "have a clear understanding of the secessionist nature of the Dalai Lama clique and resolutely safeguard national unification, ethnic unity and Tibet's harmony and stability, ...and comprehensively implement the ethnic and religious policies of the Communist Party of China and actively guide religions so they adapt to a socialist society."
Nothing really new.
But the 'secret' visit was unusually long (6 days) and seemed to have focused on the way "to scientifically develop ideas for the development of Tibet, strengthen infrastructure construction and cultivate industries."
It is interesting to have alook at the officials who accompanied Yu to understand the true objectives of this long visit.

• First, Zhang Yijiong, the Executive Vice Minister of the United Front Department. It is logical since he stepped into the shoes of Zhu Weiqun.
• Then Du Ying, a Deputy Director of the State Development and Reform Commission. 
• Sithar, a German-speaking Tibetan posted in the United Front Department.
• Weng Mengyong, a Vice Minister from the Transportation Ministry. By the way, his boss in the Ministry is Yang Chuantang, who used to be vice-chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Regional Government.
•  Shuai Junqing, Vice-President of the State Grid Corporation of China

In the next few days, I will try to provide more information on these officials and their connection with Tibet, if any.
Let us start by Weng Mengyong

Weng Mengyong, Vice Minister of Transport
In January 2011, I mentioned on this blog the opening of the last section of a tunnel leading to Metok County in Southern Tibet, on December 15, 2010 (the day Wen Jiabao arrived in India)
At that time, Weng Mengyong, already Vice Minister of Transport told Xinhua that this ended an era of isolation for the region: “The 3,310-meter-long Galongla Tunnel, built at an altitude of 3,750 meters, is a crucial part of the Metok Highway”; he further said that the extremely complex geological and meteorological conditions made highway construction work arduous and difficult.
The Chinese press did not mention the proximity of the Indian border; it was however admitted that the area was a natural 'paradise': "Metok State Nature Reserve, located in canyons at an average altitude of 750-4,800 meters, is home to numerous waterfalls and rivers as well as rich flora from tropical to cold-weather plants. As one 10th of China's plant species can be found in Metok, it has been dubbed the 'Natural Museum of Tibet' or 'Tibetan Botanical Garden'. Plants from both frigid and subtropical zones are compatible and coexist on this small isolated island."
But what will happen to the 'paradise' when lakhs of tourists and PLA's soldiers will pour into the county?

Shorter and safer
Metok, with a population of 11, 000 people was China's last county with no highway link. Bad weather, frequent heavy snow and rain made the narrow paths to the county impassable for nine months of the year; it took more than 10 hours to get out of the county on foot.
The Galongla Tunnel was the key sector of the road project. The new 117-km highway, linking Metok and Bome counties shortened by 24 km the old rugged mountain road.
No doubt it benefits the transportation of goods and local people. Fang Hong, a Metok-born member of the Menba (Monpa) ethnic group who works in another nearby county told a Chinese publication:"I can finally join my family during Spring Festival holidays."
Poor infrastructure has hindered economic development in Tibet in the past, affirmed Padma Choling, [then] Chairman of Tibet Autonomous Region. The central and local Tibetan governments have been sparing no effort to build a highway network of 58,000 km, which has boosted economic development and enhanced social stability in the region, he said.
The Metok-Bome Highway project was approved by the State Council in October 2008 with an investment of 950 million yuan ($ 144 million). It entirely financed by the Central Government (probably because of the proximity of the Indian border). The project includes 29 bridges and 227 culverts and took 36 months to complete.

Metok Tunnel

China Tibet Online pointed out that Tibet had tried to build modern roads to link Metok and other parts of the county as early as 1965. In the following decades the effort to build roads to link the county never ceased, but the best results were fragments of simply constructed paths, which only allowed hikers and horse caravans. Seven years before the country finally settled on the project to build the modern highway to Metok, prospecting teams were dispatched to survey geological conditions of the area where the highway has been laid.
What new project(s) had Meng come to supervise?
Probably an even better road connectivity which can be used for tourism and defence!

Shuai Junqing, Executive vice president of the State Grid Corporation of China
In China, many provinces regularly hit by severe power shortages during the summer period. Some factories have been forced to stop production on certain days of the week, despite local authorities' efforts to cope with the situation.
In 2011, Xinhua reported: “Financially crippled coal plants are shutting down their generators, even though the country is facing one of its most severe power shortages ever, which could hamper the 12th Five- Year Plan starting this year.”
The same year, Shuai Junqing told the Chinese press agency: “Some 26 provincial regions would suffer combined power shortages of at least 30 gigawatts this year. The deficiency could reach 40 million kilowatts when power consumption reaches its annual peak during the summer.”
Shuai added that the situation could become worse in 2012 and 2013.
On another occasion, Shuai Junqing said, "In order to address the power shortage, we will enhance transmission capacity across different regions, especially between the northwest and the northeast. The Three Gorges Dam is also stepping up efforts to produce more electricity."
At the end of 2011, China Tibet Online had reported the completion of the Qinghai-Tibet AC/DC Power Networking Project. This power grid interconnection project is one of China's 23 key projects of the western development strategy, which started in 2010.
According to Wen Weibing, deputy director-general of this power project, three sections are being constructed: 750 KV electricity transmission and conversion station along the Xining-Mt. Riyue-Wulan-Golmud line; 400KV. D.C. electricity transmission from Golmud of Qinghai to Lhasa of Tibet and 220 KV. electricity ring network in Lhasa.
A Chinese website explained: “Due to the complex highland natural conditions in Tibet, the power networking project requires sophisticated technology and take prudent measures to battle the high altitude, large frozen soil area, fragile biological environment and harsh working conditions.”
The Chinese media reported that 16.2 billion yuan and 60,000 workers have been involved in accomplishing this project. According to press reports, by December 2010, it had already witnessed remarkable progress.
It was later announced that “The Qinghai-Tibet AC/DC Power Networking Project ended the history of single power grid operation, and tremendously improve the power supply in Tibet.”
It sounded as if Beijing was planning to send electricity from the mainland to Tibet, which is the region of the world with the highest hydropower potential. Is it not strange?

Grid map

More than 2 billion dollars for supplying electricity to the Tibetan plateau which will soon produce gigawattas of electricity!
But the same equipment can probably use 'in reverse' and power will then be sent from Tibet to the mainland.
Last month, Xinhua announced: “Another ‘Heavenly Road of Electricity’ has been built on the snow-covered plateau, which is bound to bring light to the people. On June 6, 2013, the 330kV Interconnection Project between Yushu grid and the state grid was put into trial operation, which took one year to construct. The project puts an end to the isolated operation of Yushu grid and solves the power shortage problem in that area once and for all.”
Let us not forget that Yushu was hit by a serious in April 2010.
Apparently, the inaugural ceremony took place at the main site of Qinghai Electric Power Company while sub-venues were at Tangnaihe Substation, Maduo Switching Station, and Yushu Substation.
Qinghai Provincial Party Secretary and Chairman of Standing Committee of Provincial CPC Luo Huining, Deputy Party Secretary of Qinghai and the Governor Hao Peng [formerly Deputy Secretary of the TAR] attended the event. Standing Committee Member and Deputy Governor of Qinghai Luo Yulin and SGCC Executive VP Shuai Junqing were also present.
This was part of a larger grid project of SGCC for the plateau after the Qinghai-Tibet ADC/C Interconnection Project. The project is said to start from Huangzhong County, Xining City in the north, and ends at Gyêgu Township of Yushu Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, passing through Xining, Hainan, Golog and Yushu. It the world’s highest 330kV transmission project, with an attitude of 3,200m to 5,000m. The project, with a total investment of 2.47 billion yuan, comprises of Tangnaihe 330kV Substation, Maduo 330kV Switching Station, Yushu 330kV Substation and the Riyue Mountain-Tangnaihe-Maduo-Yushu line. The total length is 803km.
The Yushu Interconnection Project is presented as “a civic project to ensure the post-quake reconstruction and the power supply for the socio-economic development in that area, promote national unity, and build a harmonious society”.
The Chinese propaganda adds that: “It is also a green project to promote the exploitation of hydropower resources and optimize resource allocation in a broader scope. The voltage of Yushu grid was upgraded to 330kV for the first time so the interconnection to other grids in Qinghai could be realized. It is certainly another milestone for the electric power development in Qinghai.”
During the inaugural function Shuai Junqing stated that “the project was an important measure of SGCC to implement the deployment of the CPC Central Committee and State Council and to promote the socio-economic development in Qinghai. The construction was quite difficult due to geological complexity, widespread permafrost, severe cold, and lack of oxygen.”
He concluded that “the mission [of building the transmission line] was an honor [for the SGCC]. During the construction, SGCC gave full play to the conglomerate operation and intensive management, standardized the construction, and combined specialized project management with localized project construction. All construction workers have ensured hardships and difficulties to complete a safe, reliable, quality, efficient, and green project with high standard, high efficiency and high level within a year.”
What are the new projects of Mr. Shuai?
Probably a series of dams producing electricity for the mainland.
In this case, number of 'grid' issues will have to be sorted out.
A day after Yi left Tibet, it was announced that a ceremony was held in Lhasa for 148 signed development projects: “City government officials and entrepreneurs intended to invest in Tibet attended the ceremony.”
China Daily says that agreements for 148 projects, with an investment totaling 104 billion yuan ($17 billion), were signed. Of them, 45 projects, with an investment of 10.9 billion yuan, have already been launched: “Tibet is relatively economically underdeveloped. There are about 58,000 impoverished people in Lhasa, accounting for 19.7 percent of the nomad and farmer population," said Qi Zhala [Choedrak], Party chief of Lhasa.
More electricity will be needed, in another words more dams and more tourists in view!

Nets in the sky and traps on the ground

My article Nets in the sky and traps on the ground is posted on Rediff.com.

Click here to read...

Tibet: nets in the sky and traps on the ground

Party Chief Chen Quanguo visits
a 'convenience police-post'

It was to happen on a redwood bench at the luxurious desert estate known as Sunnylands in southern California.
President Xi Jinping of China had agreed to meet US President Barack Obama for a ‘relaxed’ week-end but a righteous Obama had planned to blast his Chinese counterpart on a hot topic in Washington, Chinese hackers visiting the Pentagon’s and other US government Internet servers and taking away American military secrets. This was deeply irritating for the Obama Administration and the President had decided to corner Xi on the subject.
In his opening remarks, Xi denied any wrong doing from China’s side and said that the cybersecurity issue needed to be resolved in a ‘pragmatic way’.
He probably had a smile, because the night before the tide had changed.
The Guardian had reported that the US National Security Agency (NSA) had obtained direct access to the systems of Google, Facebook, Apple and other US Internet giants. The British newspaper quoted from a top secret document showing that the NSA had been using a previously undisclosed programme called PRISM, allowing US officials to collect personal information including search history, content of emails, file transfers and live chats.
Suddenly, it was the pot calling the kettle black.
Not really. China is still far 'in advance' in surveillance, take the example of Tibet.
The Human Right Watch (HRW) reported in March on a new system had been put in place in Tibet to watch the 'masses'. HRW's report, titled: "China: Alarming New Surveillance, Security in Tibet - Restrictions Tightened on Tibetans Despite Lack of Threat" described a 'grid' system to catch the flies and the tigers (these are not in the HRW report, but Xi Jinping used them while talking about corruption).
Sophie Richardson, China Director of the HRW explained: "Chinese authorities should dismantle this Orwellian ‘grid’ system, which has been imposed while the government continues to avoid addressing popular grievances. Its purpose appears to be surveillance and control, and it encroaches on Tibetans’ rights to freedom of expression, belief, and association."
The human rights organization goes into detail about the infamous 'grid':

Official documents describe the new system, known as 'grid' (Tib.: drwa ba, Ch.: wangge) management, as designed to improve public access to basic services. But the system also significantly increases surveillance and monitoring, particularly of 'special groups' in the region – former prisoners and those who have returned from the exile community in India, among others. Expansion of the grid system, alongside the construction across Tibet of over 600 convenience police-posts' with high-tech equipment to monitor daily life, and increasingly active volunteer security groups known as 'Red Armband Patrols' (Tib.: dpung rtag dmar po) in 2012, means that surveillance is now a pervasive part of life across the region.

Are these 'Red Armband Patrols' not reminiscent of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and its millions of victims.
What greatly surprises me is the return of the Cultural Revolution's methods under Xi Jinping who suffered the most of Mao's follies.
You can read the report on the HRW website.
This was in March.
Since then further 'progresses' have been made in the repressive system.
President Obama may be right when he termed the US surveillance a ‘modest encroachment on privacy’. Indeed, 'modest' compared to the Chinese 'grid' surveillance on the Roof of the World.
Yesterday, Xinhua reported that all Internet, fixed line and mobile phone users "in southwest China's Tibet Autonomous Region" have provided service operators with their real names, "as required by a 2011 local regulation".
The Chinese official news agency says: "By the end of 2012, 2.76 million fixed line and mobile phone users and 1.47 million web users in Tibet had registered for services under their real identities, according to data from the regional communications administration."
Xinhua defends the drastic measures (which means that thereafter all the Tibetans' phone conversations or email exchanges will be monitored): "The real-name registration is conducive to protecting citizens' personal information and curbing the spread of detrimental information, said Nyima Doje, deputy director of the administration."
The Communist propaganda has started justifying the new move: "Thanks to the rules, I feel less bothered by disturbing messages and calls," said one man called Zhang who lives in the regional capital of Lhasa.
Dai Jianguo, a member of the commission of legal affairs under Tibet People's Congress explained: "The growing popularity of the Internet and mobile phones has brought about social problems, including the rampant circulation of online rumors, pornography and spam messages."
Apparently, the regional legislators passed the regulation on real-name registration, a year before the country's top legislature approved similar rules.
It was in November 2011.
But monitoring Lhasa and the large cities was not enough, sometime in 2011, Beijing decided to also target the countryside.
More than a year ago, I had mentioned the deep cause for resentment of the Tibetan masses against the Communist Party. I then wrote:

Today, the hardcore leftists are still at the helm, trying to impose policies reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution.
For example, during the 5th Tibet Work Forum in January 2010 (Tibet Work Forums are large meetings called every 5 or 10 years to discuss the CCP’s Tibet policies. They are attended by all the members of the powerful Politburo's Standing Committee, senior PLA generals, United Front Work Department officials, regional leaders, etc.), it was apparently decided to send 21,000 Han and Tibetan Party officials in teams of four to each of the TAR’s 5,453 administrative villages; they had to remain there for a period of 4 years. Each team member could rotate to a new location after 12 months only; they were assigned to a particular village for at least 25 days in a month.

A new report of the Human Rights Watch give more details about the scheme which has been 'working' for the past 18 months.
The title of HRW report is 'benefiting the masses'.
Like the phone tapping, the 'grid' surveillance, the countryside monitoring will ultimately be for the benefit of the masses, says Beijing.
Once the 5th Tibet Work Forum had decided (in January 2010) the general lines how best to 'benefit the masses' and perhaps more importantly, how to avoid the recurrence of the 2008 unrest, it was the job of the Central Working Coordination Small Group on Tibet or Small Group on Tibet to implement the policies.
Apparently, the secretive Group had a meeting on October 18, 2012 under the Chairmanship of Jia Qinglin, the CPPCC's Chairman. It was attended amongst others by Ma Kai, Meng Jianzhu, Ling Jihua, and Du Qinglin and 'local' officials (like Chen Quanguo) .  At that time, Ma, Meng and Du were the Vice Chairmen of the Small Group.
After the 18th Party Congress' leadership change, all these leaders have secured good jobs. Ma Kai and Meng Jianzhu are part of the Politburo, (Meng will take the mantle of Zhang Yongkang as the boss of the Security apparatus). Du Qinglin shifts from the United Front Work Department to the Party Central Secretariat while Ling Jihua takes Du's seat in the United Front.
It is said that the reconstituted Small Group under the chairmanship of You Zhengsheng had a meeting last month.
Interestingly, as mentioned earlier, the Nagchu incident occurred when Chen Quanguo, the TAR Party Chief was returning from Beijing where he had attended the meeting.
Indeed, Mr. Obama's surveillance is mild compared to Mr. Xi's grids.
But should not the United States give the good example to their Chinese friends?

China: ‘Benefit the Masses’ Campaign Surveilling Tibetans
Cadre Teams in Villages Collecting Political Information, Monitoring Opinions
June 19, 2013
Human Rights Watch
It’s hard to see the ‘benefit’ to Tibetans of thousands of political education sessions, partisan quasi-police force operations, and scrutiny of their political views. In a region where people are already subjected to extraordinary monitoring, this village-level drive, alongside similar efforts directed at towns and monasteries, effectively means that Tibetans cannot avoid state surveillance.
Sophie Richardson, China director
(New York) – The Chinese government, under the rationale of a campaign to improve rural living standards, has sent more than 20,000 officials and communist party cadres to Tibetan villages to undertake intrusive surveillance of people, carry out widespread political re-education, and establish partisan security units, said Human Rights Watch today. These tactics discriminate against those perceived as potentially disloyal, and restrict their freedom of religion and opinion.
Over 5,000 teams of officials and communist party cadres have been stationed in Tibetan villages under a government campaign called “Solidify the Foundations, Benefit the Masses” (qianji huimin). The campaign, launched by the party leadership in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) on October 10, 2011, is now halfway through its planned three-year duration. It is described in state media reports as improving living conditions and prosperity for people living in rural areas of the TAR, but research by Human Rights Watch shows that the teams are also categorizing Tibetans according to their religious and political thinking, and establishing institutions to monitor their behavior and opinions.
“It’s hard to see the ‘benefit’ to Tibetans of  thousands of political education sessions, partisan quasi-police force operations, and scrutiny of their political views,” said Sophie Richardson, China director. “In a region where people are already subjected to extraordinary monitoring, this village-level drive, alongside similar efforts directed at towns and monasteries, effectively means that Tibetans cannot avoid state surveillance.”
The campaign is one of three major new systems of social organization and control introduced in the TAR since 2011. An urban administrative network that includes significantly increased surveillance and monitoring known as the grid system was introduced in the TAR in 2012, and a new system of information gathering known as the “Six Ones” was introduced to monitor monks and nuns in Tibetan monasteries in November 2011.
The three systems are officially described as measures to promote “stability maintenance,” a drive which was described by the TAR party secretary in March 2013 as “the number one priority exceeding all else” in the TAR. The “Benefit the Masses” campaign aims to achieve “the three non-occurrences,” meaning no protests or expression of dissent.
In Tibetan areas, particularly since a wave of unrest in spring 2008, dissent is viewed by the Chinese authorities as the result of “splittist sabotage by hostile forces and the Dalai Clique.” In a major policy speech on February 14, 2013, Yu Zhengsheng, China’s top official in charge of minority and religious affairs, called for forces supporting the Dalai Lama to be “resolutely ground into dust.” As a result, hundreds of arrests, sentences, and punitive measures have been carried out in Tibetan areas since 2008 involving Tibetans suspected of support for the Dalai Lama.
“Beijing’s obsession with so-called ‘stability maintenance’ is a recipe for abuses,” Richardson said. “It is intended to suppress Tibetan citizens’ basic rights to free expression and to instill fear.”
While facilities have been upgraded by the cadre teams in some villages, “benefiting the masses” is only the last of the five objectives of the drive. The instructions given to the teams state that their first priority is to expand the role and size of the party in Tibetan villages, while the second is to “maintain stability” by “carrying out activities against the Dalai clique.”Implementation of these measures, which are also reported to be taking place in some Tibetan areas outside the TAR, have led to curbs on freedom of expression and religious practice.
For example, according to a villager interviewed by Human Rights Watch, a resident village work cadre team (zhucun gongzuodui) in Taktse (Dazi) county in Lhasa prefecture questioned all the inhabitants of his village, including young children, and classified them into three categories: those who want wealth and support the current system, those who secretly pray to and support the Dalai Lama but do not protest openly, and those who “do not accept re-education and do not have faith in motherland and party.” The classification led to about 135 people from the third category being “taken to the county seat and kept there for 45 days to be given re-education” in March 2013, according to the interviewee, who also claimed that up to 500 villagers from Nagchu (Naqu) prefecture had been detained for re-education during the same period. Another interviewee reported that 73 villagers had been sent from Meldro Gungkar (Mozhugongka) county for re-education at the same time.
An official report on the operations of a cadre team in a village in Chamdo (Changdu), one of the seven prefectures in the TAR, confirmed claims by interviewees that teams are tasked with identifying the social network of each villager. The team was also required to register “key personnel” in the village and maintain “close vigilance over them.” The term “key personnel” typically refers to people considered likely to cause political unrest.
Official documents about the campaign state that its first objective is to build the strength and numbers of the communist party in rural areas of the TAR. Each cadre team has been required to turn each village into “a fortress” in the struggle against separatism by setting up a new party committee in each village and by persuading “those who are good at getting rich” to become party members and village leaders.
The second objective of the drive, according to official reports, has three elements: to increase “social stability maintenance;” to “deepen the struggle” against followers of the Dalai Lama; and to “strengthen the management and education of monks and nuns.” Interviews conducted by Human Rights Watch show that these directives have led to a sharp increase in information gathering by cadre teams about support for the Dalai Lama among rural families, and a setting up of security operations and surveillance mechanisms aimed at eradicating support for the Dalai Lama.
On February 28, 2013, the official in charge of stability maintenance in the TAR, Hao Peng, told paramilitary forces that that they must “thoroughly ensure no shadows, no gaps, no cracks, not giving hostile forces even the slightest opportunity” and must “strengthen surveillance and secret intelligence.”
The campaign is unprecedented in its scope, size, and cost. Some 21,000 cadres – the largest proportion of a provincial-level cadre force to have been sent to the countryside since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, according to an official report – have been stationed in groups of four or more in each of the 5,451 villages in the TAR as part of the three-year drive. The campaign costs 1.48 billion yuan (approximately US$227 million) a year, more than 25% of the regional government’s budget, with an additional 10 billion yuan (approximately US$1.5 billion) allocated for infrastructure construction in the villages.
Cadre teams in the villages are also tasked with “solving difficulties” and promoting economic development, and media reports have described the teams helping villagers with snow clearance, access to water, road building, solar energy supplies, literacy classes, and the purchase of entertainment or communications systems, besides other forms of practical and economic support. Each team has been allocated at least 100,000 yuan (approximately US$16,000) per year to spend on their village.
“If the government and the party are serious about improving everyday life of Tibetans, they must begin with addressing ongoing human rights violations, including restrictions on religious freedom, freedom of expression, and access to information,” said Richardson.  “That’s likely to be a far more successful approach to ‘solidifying foundations.’”
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