Wang in Tibet: Sinicization of the religions in China

Tibet is an extraordinarily popular destination these days, not only for the 26 million Chinese tourists visiting the Roof of the World, but also for the members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee.
In just one month, two almighty members visited Tibet (Number 2 and 4 in the hierarchy).
I mentioned the visit of Premier Li Keqian just before Beidaihe 'summer holidays' and now it is the turn of Wang Yang, chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) to spend three days on the plateau (apparently in Chamdo and Lhasa).
Xinhua reported that Wang visited a Tibetan family in Chamdo, during his three-day 'inspection tour' on the plateau from August 24 to 26.
The news agency commented: “Top political advisor stresses poverty relief, religious work in Tibet.”
His visit was to urge the Tibetans (and the local cadres), to do more “to advance targeted poverty relief and accelerate the paces of building a moderately prosperous society in all respects” and also to take care of the “religious work to ensure prosperity, development and lasting stability in Tibet Autonomous Region.”
“Winning the tough battle of eliminating poverty in Tibet is of great significance to people's well-being and ethnic solidarity,” Wang said.
Apparently he came for the same objective than the Premier at the end of August.
Strange!
Is there so much poverty on the plateau more than 60 years after the so-called Liberation?
Wang advised the cadres: “Priority should be given to improving the quality of poverty relief, with a reasonable sequence of work and no hastening to meet deadlines.”
He spoke of the long-term effects of relief (of poverty) work: “The current standard of poverty relief must be strictly implemented,” he added.
Wang also stressed ecological protection, “ecological relocation work in high-altitude mountainous areas should proceed steadily and in an orderly manner. The national ecological security shield must be strengthened.”
What does ‘relocation work’ mean? It is not clear, probably to relocate the nomads in ‘new cities’, often looking like ghettos.

Sinicization of the religions in China
Wang also visited Sera monastery near Lhasa, where he asked the monks to work  for “improved and innovative temple management and advancing anti-separatism efforts.”
Are the monasteries still the hot-beds of ‘separatism’?
It looks like.
Wang was accompanied by Drukhang Rinpoche Thubten Khedrup, the President of the Tibet branch of the China Buddhist Association.
The CPPCC Chairman chairman spoke of “social stability and prosperity of Tibet in the long term, urging preparedness and precautions for danger in times of safety.”
What danger? From Dharamsala? From India?
While visiting the monastery, he mentioned the new of theme of Xi Jinping’s religious campaign, “Sinicization of the religions in China”.
More efforts should be made to integrate Tibetan Buddhism into China’s socialist society, he explained, asking the monks “to firmly uphold the leadership of the CPC, inherit and promote patriotism, and be courageous to battle all separatist elements, in order to further protect the national reunification, ethnic unity and social stability.”
Why was the Panchen Lama, who has been camping in Lhoka prefecture in the past few days, not accompanying Wang is a mystery?
In terms of seniority, he is certainly ‘senior’ to Thubten Khedrup.
Why was he not around is rather strange, though some more pictures may emerge in a few days, showing an encounter.
While in Sera, Wang instructed the monasteries to better cultivate “talents in religious work within the religious circle, to preserve the good image of Buddhism, and push forward the healthy development of Tibetan Buddhism.”
With Chinese Communist characteristics of course…
Was there a meeting with the PLA officers and soldiers posted on the platea?
Nothing has appeared so far.Wang was accompanied by Zhang Yijiong, who since 2012 serves as executive deputy director of the United Front Work Department and as such is responsible for the Tibetan affairs in Beijing.
Incidentally, Zhang succeeded Hu Chunhua as Deputy Secretary of the TAR.
Today Hu is a member of the Politburo (at one time, he was the heir-designate of the Emperor).
All this does not explain why two visits by members of the Politburo’s Standing Committee were necessary.
To enter in the Guinness Book of Records?
We will have to wait to know.
As mentioned earlier, it was Wang Yang who should have visited Tibet in the first place.

In Sera Monastery

In Chamdo

In Chamdo

Cashless 'modern' Tibet

While Indians are struggling with the demonetization scheme introduced by the Narendra Modi Government on November 8, Cashless Tibet is blooming, at least according to Xinhua.
On January 4, the official news agency reported: “While Tibet evokes images of ancient traditions for many tourists, people are discovering they don't have to give up modern conveniences when they travel in the far western region.”
The article cites a tourist from Fujian Province who was able to pay through Alipay at a fast food chain in downtown Lhasa. Xinhua adds: “The restaurant opened in March, and within a month, customers no longer had to pay in cash.”
Alipay.com is a third-party online payment platform launched in 2004 by Alibaba Group and its founder Jack Ma.
A store manager explains: “Mobile payments have not only improved efficiency, but also save tourists a lot of time withdrawing money from the ATM."
For Xinhua, “Going cashless has become the new normal for Tibetans,” adding “restaurants, souvenir shops, and movie theaters all provide online payment services.”
The number of Internet users in Tibet would have reached 1.639 million in March 2016.
According to Alipay, 83.3 percent of payments in Tibet were conducted via mobile phones in 2015, topping the country for four years in a row.
Norbu, a Tibetan who works at the Lhasa branch of the People's Bank of China is quoted as saying: “This year's online transactions rose significantly compared to previous years. Partly because more stores accept online payments, but more importantly, it shows a change in consumption and payment habits among the public in Tibet."
In another article, Xinhua quotes Alibaba's financial branch Ant Financial saying that the company's 2016 annual report shows that 90 percent of online payments in Tibet were made on mobile devices.
It is far higher than in the more developed coastal provinces of China.
China now boasts that due to communication signal coverage, farmers and herdsmen, even the remotest villages in Tibet can use cell phones to purchase daily necessities online.
It is probably an exaggeration.
Xinhua also said that over 80 percent of mobile payment users were born in the 1980s and 1990s. Shigatse Township ranked first in online shopping in Tibet, with consumption per person exceeding 10,000 yuan (1,430 U.S. dollars) for the year. QR codes are used for payment are common in restaurants and shops.

Airlines booming
In the meantime, Chinese statistics, for what they are worth, say that in 2016, the Tibet civil aviation set a new record with more than 4 million passengers flying to Tibet. According to the Tibetan Autonomous Region’s Bureau of Civil Aviation Administration, the number of passengers had crossed 3 millions in December 2014.
The same statistics say the airports have grown from one to five, airline companies increased from one to nine, airline routes from one to 71, cities connections from one to 41 and staff from 16 to more than 2,300.
Wang Zhaojun, head of the TAR's Planning and Statistics Department stated that Tibet has now gained a valuable experience of operation on the plateau. 
During the 13th Five Year Plan Period (2016-2020), the airports of Lhasa Gongkar, Nyingtri Mainling and Chamdo Bangda will be ‘reconstructed and expanded’.
I mentioned earlier on this blog, the design of Terminal 3 of Lhasa Gongkar Airport is ready. By 2025, the capacity of the new terminal will be 9 million passenger and 80,000 tons of cargo.
SF Airline should officially launch all-cargo flights from Chengdu to Lhasa in March 2017 “to meet the consumer demand for air cargo transport as the online shopping has become a part of Tibetan people’s lives.”
There is no doubt that Tibet is changing.
Is it for the good? It is another question.

New highway, Lhasa-Nyingtri  and Gongkar-Lhasa.

China: Perfecting Tibet railway network

New line in blue. Note that China appropriates Arunachal in its maps

Grim news for India: according to Xinhua, the preliminary work on the Yunnan-Tibet Railway is being carried out.
On September 20, the Chinese news agency announced the beginning of the work on the Yunnan-Tibet Railway which will run through Shangri-La and Dechen County of Yunnan Province and Markam and Dzogang Counties in the Chamdo Prefecture of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR).
In Bamda, a small township of Nyingchi Prefecture, the line will connect with the Sichuan-Tibet railway presently under construction.
The railway line will have a total length of 415 kilometers, with 265-kilometer railway in Tibet Autonomous Region, the rest in Yunnan.
The total investment is evaluated to be 43.6 billion yuan (some 7 billion US dollars), out of which the Tibet section's comes to 27.8 billion yuan.
The preliminary work which includes surveys and line alignment, has started.
Xinhua says that the Tibet's railway department “will accelerate relative work and strive to start its construction work during the 14th Five-Year Plan period [2020-2025].”
According to China Tibet Online: “The Tibet's railway network is gradually approaching perfect [sic] along with the operation of Qinghai-Tibet Railway and Lhasa-Shigatse Railway as well as the construction of Lhasa-Nyingchi Railway.”
The website adds: “Since the Qinghai-Tibet Railway is put into operation, Tibet's freight transportation has increased rapidly and it has become the main freight channel.”

Though it is not mentioned, China probably plans to extend the Lhasa-Shigatse-Kyirong line towards Western Tibet and one day (not too far) to Xinjiang (by following the route of the Highway 219 through the Aksai Chin).
About the Yunnan-Tibet railway, China Tibet Online notes: “Compared to highway's season limit and airplane's climate limit, the construction of Yunnan-Tibet Railway will bring more convenient transportation conditions for the passenger and cargo circulation between Tibet Autonomous Region and Yunnan Province. The rapid development of traffic can reduce transportation cost and then promote the economic development of manufacturing industry.”
As mentioned earlier on this blog, all infrastructure development in China needs to follow a dual use (civilian and military) norms. It is probably at what the website hints when it says: “In addition, Yunnan-Tibet Railway is a critical part of China Western Development, which is meaningful for the leapfrog development and long-term peace and order of Tibet.”
‘Peace on the border’ means reinforcement of the infrastructure opposite Eastern Arunachal Pradesh.
In the meantime, India is not fully asleep.
According to The Business Standard:  “The Indian Air Force is ready to fully operationalise seven Advanced Landing Grounds (ALGs) in Arunachal Pradesh. After over two years of repair and reconstruction work, the ALGs will be brought into use and are intended to give a major boost to the country's operational capability. The rupees 700-crore project got an impetus in 2009.”
The Tawang ALG, far from being completed, will allow one day the landing of C-130J Super Hercules, the latest IAF’s transport aircraft.

When Nehru was taken for a ride by Mao

Crossing the Upper Yangtze on October 7, 1950 (http://historicaldocs.blogspot.in)

One often-asked question is: why did India not take a stronger stand on the Tibet issue in October/November 1950, when Eastern Tibet was invaded by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army?
One of the reasons is the nefarious influence that K.M. Panikkar, the Ambassador in Communist China, played on the Indian Prime Minister and the fact that Nehru chose to follow his advice against those of senior diplomats like G.S. Bajpai or politicians like Sardar Patel of Rajaji.

Some historical facts
On August 3, 1950 General Liu Bocheng, the head of the Southwest Military Command had been ‘assigned to liberate Tibet’. In a proclamation, the great strategist affirmed:”The People’s Liberation Army will soon march towards Tibet with the object of driving out the British and American aggressive forces so as to make Tibetans return to the Great Family of the Peoples Republic of China.”
The fact that there was no American and only a couple of British nationals live on the Tibetan plateau, did not bother Panikkar and Nehru.
On August 21, the Indian ambassador met Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Foreign Minister; the latter assured him that:

it was China’s earnest desire to settle the problems by negotiations and peace, and that he [Zhou] had instructed the Chinese Ambassador to India to enter into preliminary contacts with the Tibetan Delegation in Delhi and to make arrangements for their journey to Peking.

Zhou Enlai said that he greatly appreciated the view taken by India and would do everything possible to come to a peaceful settlement “on the understanding that Tibet was an integral part of China, entitled to local autonomy and to its own institutions”.
During this meeting, Panikkar, on his own, promised that India would not move in case Tibet is forcefully liberated.
On 26 August 1950, in an aide memoire submitted to the Chinese Government, K.M. Panikkar went a step further, he changed India's policy vis-à-vis Tibet. This would trigger the most dramatic consequences for India.
In his note, Panikkar described Tibet’s status as ‘autonomy within framework or Chinese sovereignty’, and not anymore ‘suzerainty’ as it had been done during the previous decades. The two words had a very different legal meaning and Panikkar knew it.
During the following months, South Block tried to revert to ‘suzerainty’, but it was too late, the damage was done.
Three days after presenting his aide-memoire, Panikkar send a Top Secret cable to Nehru to inform him that he had met the Director of Asian Section of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who had called on him on behalf of Zhou Enlai to discuss India’s (more correctly Panikkar’s) aide-memoire on Tibet.
The Chinese officials were delighted; they conveyed the gratitude of their Government

for reaffirmation that India had NO political or territorial ambition in Tibet and stated that it is earnest desire of Chinese Government to settle Sino Tibetan matters amicably and by peaceful means.

Six weeks before the invasion, the fate of Tibet was sealed.
But Nehru and his Ambassador continued to foolishly think that the future of Tibet would depend on ‘negotiations’ in Delhi or Beijing.
It was absolutely wrong. A telegram sent by Mao on August 23, 1950, (2 days after Panikkar had met Zhou) is telling.

General He Long inspecting the preparations
(http://historicaldocs.blogspot.in/)

It is addressed the Southwest Bureau, repeated to the Northwest Bureau in Qinghai Province and entitled, ‘Strive to Occupy Chamdo This Year and Advance to Lhasa Next Year’.
Mao first refers to a communication received three days earlier from the Southwest Bureau suggesting the order of the battle (to ‘liberate’ Tibet). Mao writes:

The plan to push for occupying Chamdo this year and to leave three thousand men to consolidate Chamdo is good. You can actively make preparations according to this plan, and when it is ascertained by the end of this month or the beginning of next month that the road has reached Ganzi [also known as Kandze in today’s Sichuan province] without obstruction, the advance can go ahead.

It demonstrates that the east of the Upper Yangtze River, the Communists were not expecting (and they did not encounter later) any ‘obstruction’. Lhasa had then no control over these Tibetan-inhabited areas.
Mao continues:

It is expected that Chamdo will be occupied in October. That would be advantageous for pushing for political changes in Tibet, and marching into Lhasa the next year.

While Nehru believed that everything depended on ‘talks’ between the Dalai Lama’s government and the Communists, the reality was different. On the opposite, Mao asserts in his telegram: “Now India has issued a statement recognizing Tibet as China’s territory, only expressing hope that (the issue) can be settled peacefully, not by force.”
The Great Helmsman refers to the meeting between Panikkar and Zhou and admits that the earlier stalemate about visas for the Tibetan delegation had been sorted out: “Great Britain didn’t allow the Tibetan delegation to go to Beijing before, but now they have agreed.”
Though Mao knew that the hurdles for the ‘talks’ had been cleared, he was not interested in ‘negotiations’.
In order to understand Nehru’s mindset, let us look at a letter addressed by the Indian Prime Minister to C. Rajagopalachari, a Minister without Portfolio in his Cabinet on November 1. The Chinese had entered into Tibet 3 weeks earlier.
Rajaji had sent a note to Nehru complaining that the ‘Chinese are deceiving us’. Nehru answers: “Legally our position seems to be a weak one in regard to Tibet,” and adds that morally he finds it difficult to say that the Chinese Government has deliberately deceived India (i.e. Nehru) at any stage.
The Prime Minister explains: “We may have deceived ourselves, and they may have done wrong in the action they took, as I think they did.”
For him, the Chinese did ‘not deceive’ India:

For the last year they have been talking about ‘liberating’ Tibet as a part of the Chinese fatherland. From the 15th of July of this year there has been a great deal of talk on this, and even some Chinese troops’ movements were reported to us on the Tibetan border of China. Early in August the Chinese Government issued a text of a proclamation by the Head of their Southern Command [General Liu Bocheng], who was ‘assigned to liberate Tibet’.

The above lines show that the Government of India was well-informed about the decision of Communist China to forcefully enter in Tibet. Nehru writes to his colleague:

This proclamation stated that the Peoples Liberation Army will soon march towards Tibet etc. We sent a telegram to our Ambassador asking him to point out that any such move will be most unfortunate and that this should be settled by peaceful means. In this way telegrams have been exchanged repeatedly.

Nehru was regularly in touch with Panikkar (and Sumul Sinha in Lhasa) about the happenings in Tibet, in China and on the front; that is why Nehru could write, “at no stage did the Chinese Government say to us that they would not take any military steps.”
The Indian position was mainly the result of the foolishness of the Indian Ambassador who repeatedly informed Delhi that the Chinese would not use force.
The Communists were the worthy children of Sun Tzu and were adept of the Art of War, the ‘negotiations’ trick was just a dilatory tactic to gain time for the Chinese troops to be ready for the battle of Chamdo.
Nehru tells Rajaji:

They did say that they were always prepared for peaceful negotiations and that they had waited for a long time, but the Tibetan Delegation did not come. According to them, the Tibetan Delegation could not come because of imperialist manoeuvres.

None of the Chinese declassified telegrams/reports shows that the PLA was waiting for the outcome of the negotiations. In fact, it was absolutely clear for Mao and his colleagues that the 18th Army had to advance on Chamdo in 1950 itself so that Lhasa and Central Tibet could be ‘liberated’ in 1951.
Nehru admits: “When we informed them that the Tibetan Delegation was actually going to start, Chinese troops’ movement had already taken place some days before.”
This should have opened the Prime Minister’s (and his ambassador’s) mind to the true intentions and tactics of the Communists. It did not and very unfortunately, the Tibetan issue would get worse when, less than 2 months later, Patel will be gone forever.
The Indian Prime Minister was aware that the Chinese Government has decided to use force, “but I do not see how they can be accused of deception. They have been perfectly clear from the beginning.”
While understanding the rapidly-evolving situation, Nehru decided to remain passive, with tragic consequences for India.
In his letter to Rajaji, the Prime Minister tries to find excuses for the Communists:

We have to remember also that the Chinese Government and people are living in constant fear of attack by the U.S.A. That fear may not be justified but it is not wholly groundless. Prominent men in the U.S. have repeatedly state that this attack should be made.
…If we can put ourselves in China and see Chiang-Kai-shek with a powerful Army sitting nearby to attack China, supported by the U.S., and war coming over nearer and their own territories being bombed, then we can perhaps appreciate the temper and apprehension of the Chinese Government and people.

The argument has nothing to do the Chinese troops entering in Tibet, massacring hundreds of Tibetan soldiers and invading a peaceful nation. It is rather flabbergasting that the Prime Minister gives such a long justification on an unrelated topic. 
On his August telegram, Mao had stated that the Government of India has not objected to the Chinese entering into Tibet. But once again, Nehru tries to justify the Chinese actions (or his own?):

Of course, all this does not justify military operations against Tibet, but it does explain many things. Tibet for many years has been under British influence and the British Agent there was violently anti-Chinese. He tried his best to incite Tibetans against China. Previous Chinese Governments have protested against this, and indeed I have myself been told by their representatives. Tibet was thus looked upon as a place which was under British influence. That influence is now gone, but only six months ago the same British Agent was there representing us.

This is an absolutely an unfair statement against Hugh Richardson who brilliantly served the Indian interests in Tibet for 3 years (August 1947-1950). Richardson was not only a sharp-minded ICS officer, but also a great lover of Tibet and an outstanding scholar of ancient Tibetan history.
Sumul Sinha, Richardson’s successor, was himself one of the finest young Chinese-speaking diplomats; he tried to serve India as well as he could in the difficult circumstances. His services will never be appreciated by Nehru (‘Sinha does not understand our policies’). This is one of the saddest tragedies of modern India.
Nehru ends up his letter to Rajaji by saying that he just wish to point out to:

certain considerations which have to be borne in mind to understand why the Chinese Government may have developed a state of mind bordering on fear of what is going to happen, and fear leads to wrong action. I am quite sure that the Chinese Government did not intend to deceive us or to insult us deliberately.

It is necessary to come back for a moment on Mao’s cable to the Southern Bureau; Chairman Mao says: “If our army can occupy Chamdo in October, there is the possibility of pushing the Tibetan delegation to Beijing for negotiation, begging for a peaceful solution (of course there are other possibilities too). Right now we are using the strategy of urging the Tibetan delegation to come to Beijing and reducing Nehru’s fear.”
It is ironical that Nehru spoke of the Chinese fear, while Mao tries to ‘cool down Nehru’s fears’.
The second stage of the Chinese plans are explained by Mao

Map of the PLA operations
planned by Mao

When Tibetan representatives arrive in Beijing, we plan to use the Ten Points already decided as the basis for negotiation, urge the Tibetan representatives to sign it, and make the Ten Points an agreement accepted by both sides.

The Ten-Point eventually became the Seventeen-Point Agreement signed ‘under duress’ by Tibetan delegates in Beijing on May 23, 1951.
Mao concludes:

If this can be done, it will make things easier for advancing into Tibet next year. Your plan (the Southwest Bureau’s) to leave 3,000 men in Chamdo for the winter after occupying it, not to advance into Lhasa this year, and withdraw the main force back to Ganzi may be seen by the Tibetans as a gesture of good will.

This was the beginning of the Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai policy.
In the process, India lost of ‘buffer zone’ with Communist China and a friendly and peaceful neighbour.
The duo Nehru-Panikkar had been taken for a ride by Mao and Zhou.

(The translation of Mao's telegram is available on http://historicaldocs.blogspot.in/)

Occupy Chumbi Valley: a cable from Harishwar Dayal

Should the Chumbi Valley be occupied?

On November 21, 1950, hardly a month after the People's Liberation Army had invaded Tibet and occupied the town of Chamdo, the Political Officer in Sikkim, Harishwar Dayal send a Top Secret cable to his bosses in the Ministry of External Affairs in New Delhi.
It could be said that some parts of Dayal's assessment were prophetic.
But who was ready to listen to him in Delhi?
Dayal analyzed: "Occupation by China of the whole of Tibet or of portions of Tibetan territory bordering India, Nepal and Bhutan, or establishment of a Chinese-inspired regime at Lhasa, will create a variety of problems which are doubt engaging Government of India's attention."
It is very unfortunate that Nehru's government did not pay attention to this basic fact.
The cable contains an interesting suggestion from the strategic point of view: India should occupy Chumbi Valley. Dayal writes: "it was suggested that we might consider occupation of the Chumbi Valley up to Phari in an extreme emergency. This suggestion was NOT favoured by Government of India at the time. It was however proposed as a purely defensive measure and with NO aggressive intention. An attack on Sikkim or Bhutan would call for defensive military operations by the Government of India. In such a situation occupation of the Chumbi Valley might be a vital factor in defence."
It was obviously not favoured by the Government of India.
Another interesting point is that soon after India's independence, Lhasa claimed large portions of the Indian territory in the Himalaya.
Such a foolishness!

Telegram from: Political, Sikkim to Foreign, New Delhi
November 21, 1950
No. 456 P. TOP SECRET

2. As Government of India are aware, Tibetans have in the recent past asserted a claim to Ladakh, Darjeeling, Sikkim, Bhutan and portions of Assam Tribal Areas; large sections of the India-Tibet border in the western Himalaya are undefined and there have been border disputes between the Tibetans and Kashmir and Tehri Garhwal. The Chinese have a claim to suzerainty over Nepal and disputes with Burma over the northern frontier of Burma. India's own frontier with Burma in this area is in part undemarcated and in part undefined. We must therefore be prepared for the aggressive assertion of a variety of claims, either directly by the Chinese or through Chinese-sponsored Governments in Tibet and elsewhere. Indeed it was already rumoured, at a time when it seemed doubtful whether Tibet could expect any assistance from India in the preservation of her autonomy, that some Tibetans felt that their country's best course would be to come to a settlement with the Chinese and then with Chinese assistance make various territorial demands on India. Border disputes and intrigue necessitated negotiation of Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 and fixation of McMohan [McMahon] line as northern boundary of Assam Tribal Areas in 1914. When they occupied Lhasa in 1910 Chinese simultaneously exerted pressure on Bhutan; this move was defeated by the staunchness of the Maharaja of Bhutan and by negotiation of the 1910 Treaty between Great Britain and Bhutan which virtually gave Government of India control over Bhutan's external relations.

3. The position is further complicated by the present disturbed conditions in Nepal.

4. Government of India are reported already to have warned the Chinese against violation of Indian frontiers in operations against Tibet. They are also understood to have accepted the view that any threat to border territories namely Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan must be resisted if necessary with force. In view of the manifest dangers of the situation and of the lessons of history it will probably soon be necessary to warn the Chinese against interference in these territories as well.

5. At the same time a state of military preparedness is also evidently desirable. Military authorities are NO doubt considering measures for strengthening border establishments both for maintenance of internal security where this is likely to be threatened and for security against external dangers. In so doing they must take account of problems of communication and transport. On this border National Highway No.31-A, which has been heavily damaged by natural calamities this year, is of vital importance and it is essential that it should be maintained in motorable condition throughout its length. Improvement and maintenance of important internal roads in Sikkim is also of great importance. National Highway ends in Gangtok and the frontiers as well as important areas inside Sikkim can be reached only by pack transport. Strategic roads in Northern Sikkim are at present in poor condition because fund s have NOT been forthcoming for the extensive repairs required to keep them open for pack transport in all seasons. It is necessary that these roads be put in order without delay. Work on them should begin at once because it can only be carried out in the dry months of the winter season.

6. I understand that NO Animal Transport Companies are located in this region and unless transport arrangements are made in advance movement might be seriously hampered in an emergency. Local and Tibetan animals are most suitable for local conditions. Best course would be for military authorities to establish without delay an 'irregular', transport corps by requisitioning pack animals through local agencies. Animals could be kept under supervision, in the care of the muleteers themselves who could be paid for their maintenance and assisted when necessary in procurement of feeding-stuffs. This arrangement would be cheaper than immediate purchase of a large number of animals.

7. In Lhasa express letter No.3 (3)-L/49 dated 15th June 1949 it was suggested that we might consider occupation of the Chumbi Valley up to Phari in an extreme emergency. This suggestion was NOT favoured by Government of India at the time. It was however proposed as a purely defensive measure and with NO aggressive intention. An attack on Sikkim or Bhutan would call for defensive military operations by the Government of India. In such a situation occupation of the Chumbi Valley might be a vital factor in defence. In former times it formed part of the territories of the rulers of Sikkim from whom it was wrested by the Tibetans by force. It is now a thin wedge between Sikkim and Bhutan and through it lie important routes to both these territories. Control of this region means control of both Jelep La and Nathu La routes between Sikkim and Tibet as well as of the easiest routes into Western Bhutan both from our side and from Tibetan side. It is a trough with high mountains to both east and west and thus offers good defensive possibilities. I would therefore suggest that possibility of occupying the Chumbi Valley be included in any defensive military plans though this step would NOT of course be taken unless we became involved in military operations in defence of our borders.

The Tibetan Army ...in 1949

In the summer of 1949, the Indian Chief of Army Staff sent a young bright officer to survey the eventual routes that could be used to bring troops and ammunition in the event of a ‘political’ decision to defend Tibet.
He had also to report on the strength of the Tibetan Army.
As one can see from his report, it was not very promising in case of Chinese attack.
However, the fact that this covert mission took place, and this with the knowledge of K.P.S. Menon, the Foreign Secretary, is proof that in the summer of 1949, the Government of India was still keeping all its options open.
In the 1990s, I interviewed the Indian officer (Lt. Gen. Z.C. 'Zoru' Bakshi, who later became one of the most decorated Generals of the Indian army). He then remembered:

My mission was very simple. It was to see the routes in these areas. In the army, we always prepared for eventualities. The Army does not decide to go anywhere, but should we be asked to go anywhere, we must know where the routes are. In fact the army does not make any recommendation at all [that we should go for war or not]. Nothing like we should go to Tibet. 

He made his recommendations, nothing was impossible, after all Younghusband had done it 45 years earlier, under much more compelling conditions, but it had to be a ‘political’ choice.
A few months later, the American Chargé d’Affaires in Delhi was told by Sanjeevi, a senior Indian intelligence official that at an "interdepartmental meeting held to discuss Tibet it was decided [that the] most GOI could do was send moderate supply [of] small arms plus a few officers to instruct Tibetans how to use them. India was not ready to become involved in any military adventures in Tibet.”
It was in conformity with the logic of Nehru’s philosophy of non-violence.
Tibet was sacrificed in the process.
Here is the report on the Tibetan Army by (then) Maj. Zoru Bakshi:

SECRET

THE TIBETAN ARMY

1. Strength, composition and location
The Tibetan army is about 8,000 strong. There are approximately 10 Battalions in it. Names of some of these Battalions are:

KUSUNG (The Body Guard)
TRAPCHI
MAGYO

There is no fixed strength of any of these battalions. Normally battalions are now approximately 900 strong. Neither is there any fixed scale of weapons and equipment for these battalions. They are armed with rifles, brens and sten guns. It is believed that they have also got a few 2 in. mortars.
The Tibetan army has got 12 to 15 2.75 guns which are believed to be locked up in LHASA. Some men and officers have been trained to fire these guns by I.A. [Indian Army] instructors. Most of the troops are stationed at CHAMDO, the most important place in Eastern Tibet. At present there are 5,000 troops there.
Next to CHAMDO in importance is NAGCHUKA in Northern Tibet. There are only one hundred troops there. In addition there are 800 militia men who are armed with old [one line of the report is missing] … men are in LHASA. 500 men of TRAPCHI Regiment in YATUNG.

2. Method of recruitment
Method of recruitment is feudal. Each landlord provides a certain number of men for the army. These men are always from the poorest classes. As no pay is given to the soldier, not even the poorest men show any inclination to join the army. However those who do not have enough money to please their landlord, are forced to join. This has a direct bearing on the efficiency of the soldier.

3. State of training and discipline
I have had a few opportunities of seeing the men of KUSUNG and TRAPCHI Regiments on parade in LHASA. The standard of drill, with and without arms, is very poor. I have no hesitation in saying that an I.A. [Indian Army] recruit, after two weeks training, is much smarter than the soldiers of the Tibetan Body Guard Regiment.
The Tibetan soldier shows no pride in being a soldier. The standard of turn out and discipline is shocking. The soldier does not seem to wash himself and his clothes. A great freedom of choice is given especially to senior officers, in the selection of their uniforms. As the soldier is not given any pay, he has to resort to objectionable methods to earn enough money to support himself and his family. He has no hesitation in looting the civilians in the villages through which he happens to pass. Rape is common and obviously allowed by the officers. There are no training units or schools. The new soldier is expected to pick up professional knowledge from the older men in his Regiment. N.C.O.s [Non-Commissioned Officers] who have been trained by I.A. instructors at Gyantse have proved quite useful in training other men of their Regiment. But their knowledge now seems to be quite rusty as no refresher courses have been run for these men. The I.A. instructors found these men quite keen and enthusiastic students. Due to the shortage of ammunition and a desire of the Tibetan Government to build up an ammunition reserve, the soldier was seldom given an opportunity to fire his weapons in the past. The little ammunition which was received from India was locked up in the ammunition dump in LHASA. Recently fire practices were held in LHASA and were considered quite useful by the army officers.

4. Leadership
The Magchies (Cs-in-C) and Depons (Battalion Commanders) are mere figure heads who are usually despised by their men. Any civil official may be picked up and made Magchi or Depon. These officers after being trained to salute with their swords are considered quite fit for their respective commands. The real leaders are the Rupons (Majors who have rise from the ranks) and the N.C.Os. These are the persons who train and lead their men in action. Although junior in rank, they command respect of their men.

5. Pay and rations
The following are the yearly rates of pay:

Mago (Sepoy)          18 sangs (Rs. 3/-)
Depon(Bn.Comd)      900 sangs (Rs. 180/-)
Magchi (C-in-C.)       1800 sangs (Rs. 360/-)

[The equivalence in Indian rupees corresponds to the rate in 1949]

    Free rations are provided to the soldier by the Government. Uniform is provided by the landlord who enlists the man.

6. Medical organizations
Apart from a few civilian vaccinators who are sent round with vaccine in the event of a break out of smallpox in the army, there is no medical organization. Neither are there any civil hospitals. The Indian Government runs hospitals at Lhasa, Gyantse and Yatung.
The most common disease in the army as well as the civil population is V.D. [venereal disease]. Majority of the patients who come for treatment to our hospitals suffers from this deadly disease. The common habit of the soldiers to rape any woman he can get hold of, the easy ways of the Tibetan women and the prevalence of polyandry in the country, contribute largely to the widespread V.D.. Even nuns and monks from the monasteries have come to these hospitals for treatment of V.D.. Other common diseases are bad teeth, goiter and colds. The soldier is strong and very tough.

7. Morale
Because of the meager pay, complete absence of amenities and a lack of interest of officers in his welfare, it is not surprising that the moral of the Tibetan soldier is low. Another factor which I am sure contributes to this, is lack of confidence in his weapons which is due to inadequate training.

8. Inter-Communication
There is no scientific system of intercommunication used in the army. Some Helios and flags are used to transmit only a set number of messages. No other messages can be transmitted by this means. The international signal code is not used by the Tibetan army. Intercommunication is by means of runners who may be mounted if the distance is long and horses are available in the nearby villages.
The Tibetan Government has got wireless stations at CHAMDO and NAGCHUKA linked to LHASA. The sets used are American which were given as a gift by the American Government. Mr. Fox, an ex-wireless operator of the Indian Mission in LHASA, is the wireless export of the Tibetan Government. He is now training 12 Tibetan boys to operate these sets. So far he has found these boys dull and slow. It is doubtful whether they will ever learn this trade. There is a telegram line up to LHASA. Upto GYANTSE, it is worked by Indian P&T [Post & Telecommunications] Deptt. From GYANTSE to LHASA, the Tibet Government work it.

9. CHAMDO Wireless station
This wireless station which was opened recently is in a good working condition. Speech is possible between LHASA and CHAMDO. Mr. [Robert] Ford an ex-R.A.F. wireless operator is in charge of this station.

10. Landing grounds
There are no landing grounds anywhere in Tibet. Suitable sites are available at TOONA [Tuna, north of the Chumbi Valley and the Sikkim border], GYANTSE and LHASA. Also strong wind storm blow over TOONA daily in the afternoons. The ground is fairly level at all the three places and I think landing grounds can be made with very little work.

11. Foreign officers and arms
Not a single foreign officer is employed in the Tibetan Army. Except for a few weapons given by CHIANG-KAI SHEK, all other weapons have been obtained from India.

12. Communists
There are absolutely no communists in Tibet.

13.Militia
The Militia merely consists of men who are earmarked by landlords for the army in case of emergency. No training is given to these men. Neither are they issued with any uniforms or weapons. The exact number of men in the Militia is not known.
The Tibetan Government is now considering to raise a special Militia of 2500 men from well-to-do families in LHASA.
Young monks can also be called up in emergency. 1/3rd of the total male population are monks. These monks are believed to be due to the fact that they have no worldly attachments. The monks of SERA monastery have fought well against the Chinese in the past. 

Power from the mainland to Roof of the World

Xinhua has just announced that the Tibet-Sichuan grid is now functional.
The launching ceremony was chaired by Yu Zhengsheng, Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), who declared operational the power lines linking the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) to Sichuan Province.
The function was held  in Beijing.
Xinhua reported that the opening of the 1.08 billion U.S. dollar project linking Chamdo in the TAR and the Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture of Garze in Sichuan Province, aims at "putting an end to the electricity shortages of the 500,000 residents of the Chamdo region and ease power strain in Tibet as a whole".
The news agency further explained: "The complex interconnection circuits stretch 1,521 kilometers across the plateau at an average altitude of 3,850 meters and its construction involved more than 20,000 staff over eight months, according to the State Grid Corporation of China."
Before the official launch, Yu inspected the power 'dispatching center' at the State Grid's headquarters where he met workers and engineers involved in a grid construction.
He was accompanied by Chen Quanglo, the TAR's Party Secretary.
The billion-yuan question is: will this investment still be used to send electricity from Tibet to Sichuan or vice-versa, once the dams on the Brahmaputra are complete.

According to China Environment Forum of the Wilson Centre in the US:

The West - East Electricity Transfer Project, initiated in the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2000-2005), was designed to bring investment and development to China’s lagging west while satisfying the growing electricity needs of the country’s eastern provinces. The project’s first phase has been and is continuing to expand the western provinces’ electricity-generating capacity, primarily through the construction of new coal bases and hydroelectric dams.The project’s second, ongoing component is the construction of three electricity-transmission corridors, which are essentially three vast networks of electrical transmission lines that connect newly built generation capacity in the North, Central and South to China’s electricity-hungry coast (see arrows on map). Each of the corridors is expected to exceed 40 gigawatts (GW) in capacity by 2020—a combined capacity equivalent to 60 Hoover Dams. The seven recipient provinces — Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Guangdong — together consume nearly 40 percent of China’s electricity.

A few pictures of the grid and the function.

 

Just when we thought the gods had won...

My article, about Robert Ford, the British radio operator in Tibet entitled,  Just when we thought the gods had won... appeared today in today's Edit Page of The Pioneer.

Click here to read...

Phodo Kusho no more

Robert Webster Ford (born on March 27, 1923 in Burton-on-Trent, England) is no more; he passed away on 20 September 2013 in London.
Ford served several years in Tibet as a radio operator in the late 1940s; till he was arrested by the advancing People Liberation Army in October 1950.
The Tibetans had a problem in pronouncing 'F', 'Ford' became 'Phodo'; in Kham, he became known as 'Phodo Kusho', 'Ford Sir'.
After being released by the Chinese in 1955, he entered the  British foreign service. He ended his career as British Consul General in Bordeaux.
Ford was the lone foreign witness of the Chinese invasion of Kham in 1950. That is probably why he was 'captured' and underwent much suffering and humiliation during his five-year as a prisoner of Mao.
'Phodo' was a radio technician of the Royal Air Force during World War II; he served in England and later in India. In 1945, he joined the British Mission in Lhasa as a radio officer. An audience with the 14-year-old Dalai Lama in Lhasa convinced him to continue to work in Tibet.
He was soon transferred to Gangtok, Sikkim, where he worked under the Political Officer, in-charge of the Tibet Affairs.

Ford in Sikkim
with first Tibetan allopathic doctor

When India became independent in 1947, Robert Ford returned to Lhasa and was officially appointed by the Government of Tibet. Later he became the first foreigner to be given a Tibetan official rank.
The following year, he was transferred to Chamdo, capital of eastern Tibet (Kham), to establish a radio station.
In 1949, the Tibetan-speaking Ford and three Kinnauri wireless operators left for Chamdo to help the Governor General Lhalu Tsewang Dorje, who wanted to improve the defence of Kham.
'Phodo' soon managed to establish a first direct link with Lhasa.
In the first months of 1950, Lhalu requested Ford to shorten the training of the Kinnauri wireless operators; the governor wanted the station to be fully operational, he could sense the forthcoming danger.
Unfortunately for Tibet, Lhalu was replaced as Governor General of Kham by Ngabo Ngawang Jigme who took lightly the Chinese threat.
'Phodo' was arrested (along with Ngabo) in October 1950 by the invading Chinese army.
The Chinese accused him of espionage, spreading anti-communist propaganda and causing the death of a monk, known as the Geda Lama. 'Phodo' spent nearly 5 years in jail, in constant fear of being executed; he was subjected to interrogation and 'thought reform'. Only in 1954 was he allowed to send a letter to his family. His trial was held at the end of 1954; he was sentenced to ten years jail. He was eventually released and expelled from China in 1955.
In 1957, he published a book Captured in Tibet about his harrowing experience.

With the Dalai Lama in England

In my book Tibet: the Lost Frontier, I quoted 'Phodo Sir'.
I remember hosting him for a few days some 25 years ago. He was a lovely human being. He used to say that his ordeal in the Chinese jails (and specially the interrogation methods) were very similar to ones the Indian officers captured by the Chinese in October 1962 had to go through; it was also comparable to experience of Sidney Wignall, captured in Western Tibet in 1955.
See my posting on Wignall, 'So it was all for nothing': The Aksai Chin road.
In his book, Ford mentioned that 'The gods are on our side' was the most often repeated mantra in the Chamdo in the Fall of 1950.

A few days before the arrival of the Chinese, the greatest excitement in town was the divination that Shiwala Rinpoche, the head lama of the local monastery, had just performed. It was on all tongues, the great news had spread like wildfire: “Shiwala Rinpoche says that the Chinese will not come.” Everywhere there was a sigh of relief. The Gods had finally won!

The Britisher in Ford commented that Shiwala Rinpoche’s statement was perhaps good for morale “but it seemed to me that something more Churchilian was needed.” 

Indeed!

Here is a chapter of my book:

China Invades Kham
The rumours of an impending attack on Tibet had started trickling in from August.
Panikkar [the Indian Ambassador to China] knew it, he knew that the Chinese had already entered in the Chinese-controlled areas of Kham (Sikang). In a communication to the Chinese Foreign Office on 2 October he informed the Chinese that the Tibetan Delegation would be leaving India shortly to Peking and had expressed the hope that further military action would, therefore, not be necessary. "It will help the peaceful settlement of the Tibetan question if the Chinese troops which might have entered territory under the jurisdiction of the Lhasa authorities could restrict themselves to western Sikang."
In Chamdo, Robert Ford, the British radio operator employed by Lhasa had arrived in December 1949. Ford, ‘Phodo Kusho’ as the Tibetans called him, had brought with him brand new radio sets that he found nicely packed in crates when he first arrived in Lhasa. From Chamdo, Ford soon established a daily link with Lhasa. He was also able to monitor the world news from Beijing and Delhi.
On new year’s day of 1950, Ford heard an ominous communiqué broadcast by the People’s Republic of China: “The task for the People’s Liberation Army for 1950 is to liberate Taiwan, Hainan and Tibet.”
One of Ford’s first tasks was the training of some young Indians of Tibetan stock (Lahauli, Kinnauri) who would be able to operate the radio sets. The idea was to send them to the Sino-Tibetan border to monitor the movements of the Chinese troops. This border which had been ‘shifting’ during the past decades and even centuries, was now situated some one hundred miles east of Chamdo and followed the course of the Upper Yangtse.
It is difficult to ascertain the true number of Tibetan troops stationed on the 200 mile long border along the banks of the Yangtse, Goldstein speaks of about 3,500 soldiers, but Ford estimated their strength to be much less. On the other side of the great river more than 40,000 much better equipped troops waited to ‘liberate’ Tibet.
One of the major problems faced by the Tibetans was the lack of unity between the local chieftains and the Lhasa government. It was not a new problem but a heavy toll would be paid for the antagonism between Lhasa and the Khampas at this crucial point in the history of Tibet.
On October 11 at 11 p.m., Ford had just finished speaking to his mother in England on the radio and was preparing to go to bed, when he heard a faint tinkle of bells coming from the east. “As bells grew louder I heard another sound, the clip-clop of horse’s hoofs.” Ford immediately recognized an Army messenger riding towards the Residency where Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, the new Governor of Kham was staying. He was bringing the ominous message: the PLA had crossed the Yangtse.
The main border post at Gamto Druga had been overrun by the Chinese who used the same strategy as in Korea (and later in NEFA). Wave after wave of soldiers overpowered the Tibetan defenders, who fought well but were finally massacred.
In the meantime another Chinese regiment crossed the Yangtse above Dengo and advanced rapidly towards Dartsedo, marching day and night.
In the South, the 157th PLA Regiment attacked the Tibetan troops near Markhan. When they reached Markhan, the local Tibetan Commander, Derge Se, surrounded by the Chinese troops, surrendered his force of 400 men.
Poor Ford! He had planned to use the southern route to escape. Now this route was also cut off. The net was slowly closing on Ford and on Tibet.
The northern front lost ground day by day and the headquarters of the central zone was soon lost to the waves of young Chinese soldiers.
Lhasa was finally informed on October 12 that the Yangtse had been crossed. At the same time, the opera season was in full swing in Lhasa. The aristocracy and the Government were busy. For the Tibetan officials opera and picnic were sacred!
In Chamdo no one panicked, though the number of prayers was increased. More and more lay people joined the monks and began circumambulating around the monastery, the incense smoke went higher and higher in the sky, the gods had to be propitiated. Ford said that the monks believed that “only the gods could give Tibet victory - which was unanswerable - and they were doing their bit by praying. They would pray twice as hard, or rather twice as often, and that would be of more use than taking up arms.”
“The gods are on our side,” was the most often repeated mantra in the town.
The Dalai Lama recalled:

The omen [The Earthquake of August 15, 1950.], if that is what it was, began to fulfil itself. Towards evening, during one of the performances, I caught sight of a messenger running in my direction. On reaching my enclosure, he was immediately shown in to Tathag Rinpoche, the Regent…I realized at once that something was wrong. Under normal circumstances government matters would have to wait until the following week. Naturally, I was almost beside myself with curiosity. What could this mean? Something dreadful must have happened.

The young Dalai Lama said that he managed to peep into the Regent’s lodge and spy on him. “I could see his face quite clearly as he read the letter. He became very grave. After a few minutes, he went out and I heard him give orders for the Kashag to be summoned.”

Captured in Chamdo

The Dalai Lama discovered later that the letter was Ngabo’s telegram informing the Regent that the first outposts near the Yangtse had fallen.
But Deng Xiaoping, Liu Bocheng and their men were used to hardship and bitterness. It was without doubt easier for the People’s Liberation Army to fight ill-equipped Tibetans than the sophisticated weapons of McArthur’s troops in Korea on the eastern front.
In the meantime, Ford was trying to catch the latest world news on his wireless, but there was nothing about Tibet. One of the greatest dramas of the twentieth century was unfolding without anyone knowing it. When the world heard of it, it was already too late.
Over, the next few days, many Tibetan officials came to Ford’s radio station to try to hear the reaction of Lhasa, thinking that the Kashag would immediately appeal to the world community for help. They expected Lhasa to respond quickly before it was too late. But nothing!
Nobody could understand what was going on!
“Radio Lhasa had no more to say the next day, or the day after that,” said Ford.
Finally about 10 days after the Chinese had crossed the Upper Yangtse, Ford heard an announcement from Delhi: Thubten Gyalpo, Shakabpa and the Tibetan delegation were denying any attack on Tibet.
They were simply not living in this world. But their world was disappearing, without them or the world of the world realizing it.
On 26 October, a news report from Calcutta stated:

The leaders of seven-man delegation to Peking told PTI today that this delegation was proceeding to Peking irrespective of the reported Chinese Communists invasion of Tibet. He had received final instructions from Lhasa to conduct negotiations in Peking on future Sino-Tibetans relations only last Sunday, he said.

The Delegation had not discussed the future of Tibet with the Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi during their stay there. They had only informal talks. A member of the delegation said that they were more interested in religion than in foreign affairs. He thought Tibet was of no significant strategic importance for military point of view.
To send a delegation more interested in religion than in foreign affairs to discuss with Mao the future of their nation!
On 27 October, The Hindu in Madras published the following piece:

The Tibetan Delegation which left New Delhi this morning en route to Peking remained unperturbed over the reported entry of the Chinese troops into Eastern Tibet and the leader of the delegation pointed out that the area in question was always disputed territory, both China and Tibet claiming it as part of their territory. New Delhi is generally inclined to believe the reported movement of troops may be related to some border incidents but not to any general invasion by Chinese troops. “

Nineteen days after the Chinese invaded Tibet, its negotiating delegation was not informed (or pretended to be not informed) of the development and they were innocently proceeding to Beijing. The previous day the Indian Prime Minister had given one of the speeches he loved to deliver that could electrify the masses: it was reported by The Hindu:

Pandit Nehru said that while vast millions of people all over the world were ‘hankering and hindering after peace’ feverish preparations for war were also going on in many parts of the world and this is a serious contradiction which had to be solved. ‘the only way to bring peace’, the Prime Minister thought was ‘for the people of the world and the different countries to cast away fear from their hearts and minds and think and do the right thing’.

Poor Tibetans, they thought they were doing the right thing in calling upon the gods for help and in completing the Opera Festival. One thing is for sure — there was no fear in Lhasa and Chamdo.
Strangely enough Lhasa was keeping quiet. In the words of Robert Ford:
I decided to take my news summary personally to Ngabo.
"Radio Lhasa has not mentioned the invasion," I said pointedly.
"The Government only heard of it this morning," said Ngabo.
"It cannot be announced until it has been decided what we shall say. I will tell you confidentially, Phodo [Ford]," he added, "that the National Assembly is meeting in Lhasa now."
“The National Assembly was evidently having a long session”, added Ford.
The analysis of Ford may be correct when he said:

I could only think it was a matter of habit. The Lhasa Government was so used to the policy of saying nothing that might offend or provoke the Chinese that it kept it on after provocation had become irrelevant. It was still trying to avert a war that had already broken out.

On October 19, Robert Ford was arrested and charged with having killed the Gethak Lama and spying for the imperialists. He spent five years in Chinese jails.
It was only on October 25 that the Chinese themselves announced to the world that Tibet was ‘liberated.’ A brief communiqué of the New China News Agency (Xinhua) said: “People’s army units have been ordered to advance into Tibet to free three million Tibetans.”
On November 10, Xinhua News Agency said that Mao and Zhu De were “deeply concerned about the prolonged oppression of the Tibetan people by the British and American imperialism.” Accordingly, they had decided to “move into Tibet to help the Tibetan people to shake off the oppression forever.”