Just when we thought the gods had won...

My article, about Robert Ford, the British radio operator in Tibet entitled,  Just when we thought the gods had won... appeared today in today's Edit Page of The Pioneer.

Click here to read...

A Clarification

In an article published in Phayul.com and entitled Ngabo, a Traitor or a Patriot (The Ngaboization of Tibetan Society and its dangers), Vijay Kranti mentioned my name.
I would like to clarify my position on L’Affaire Ngapo (or Ngabo).
First of all, I believe that it is up for the Tibetans to decide whether to bestow a designation like ‘traitor’ or ‘patriot’ to one of their countrymen. Being a foreigner, I don’t consider it proper for me to comment on the decision of the Kashag, the elected body of the Tibetans.
However, as a student of Tibetan history, I have my own opinion on the subject.
On my blog, I have cited a few historical incidents which influenced this opinion.
Here is the link to my postings on the subject

The only point which makes me sad is that it seems that there is no distinction today between someone who is ready to fight for his country (or for his deepest convictions) and someone who is afraid to displease the masters of the day. I believe that it is important for a society to make this distinction clear; otherwise the martyr will remain on the same level as an ordinary person.
When I speak of defending one’s country, I am not speaking of a ‘nation’ in the parochial sense, but more in terms of the universal values which the Buddha Dharma and Tibet represent, which are, in my opinion, worth fighting for (and in some extreme cases, dying for).
Ngabo would have been great, if he had dared to speak out for these values. He never did. It is HIS tragedy.

The two sides of Ngapoi

My article The two sides of Ngapoi appeared in The New India Express today. Click here it read.

Ashamed of his Tibetanness

Last posting about Ngapo.
A few years back, I had written a long paper about the 17-Point Agreement.  Here is an extract which shows that Ngapo was ashamed of his tibetanness.  
When he arrived in Beijing, he refused to used a khata and cut his hair . Ironically, Beijing has  last week organized a function for people to offer khatas to the picture of Ngapo.


The Delegation to Beijing
At the end of the discussions in Yatung [where the Dalai Lama had taken refuge near the Indian border] , it was decided to send a delegation to Beijing to discuss the status of Tibet with the Communist leaders. A ten-point proposal was prepared as the basis on which the delegates were to negotiate.
A cable from Henderson [the US Ambassador] explains the state of mind of certain Tibetan officials: “…because Tibet had received no response from the United Nations and some of its member states with respect to its appeal regarding Communist China’s invasion of Tibet in October 1950, the Tibetan authorities had fallen into a dejected and fatalistic frame of mind and appeared to be convinced that they would have to accede to the demands of Communist China regarding Tibet.”
However, the Dalai Lama did not give his representatives any plenipotentiary powers. They were asked to refer any important decision back to the Kashag in the Chumbi Valley and were also requested to establish a wireless link between Yatung and Beijing to keep a daily contact. Unfortunately this was not to happen.
In late March, the different parts of the team began to proceed to Beijing. From Yatung, Kheme Dzaza [who had led the Congratulation Mission to India in 1946]  and Lhautara, a monk official sailed from Calcutta to Beijing soon after Surkhang’s return  from Delhi.
Two delegates left Lhasa for China via Chamdo to pick up Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, who had just been released after a short period of indoctrination. He was now Vice-Chairman of the ‘Chamdo Liberation Committee’. While prisoner in Chamdo, he is supposed to have told the Chinese: “We have been defeated and we are now your prisoners. Whether you keep me under arrest or not, my hope was that we could have a good negotiation and a peaceful settlement. That’s all I can say.”
At the same the Chinese troops began their propaganda: “With serious concern for the people of Tibet, who have suffered long years of oppression under American and British imperialists and Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary Government, Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Central People's Government and Commander in Chief Chu Te of the People's Liberation Army ordered the People's Liberation Army troops to enter Tibet for the purpose of assisting the Tibetan people to free themselves from oppression forever.
All the Tibetan people, including all lamas, should now create a solid unity to give the People's Liberation Army adequate assistance in ridding Tibet of imperialist influence and in establishing a regional self government for the Tibetan people.”
The fact that Ngabo had been in the hands of the Chinese for the past five months should have disqualified him automatically to be part of the team. It has not been explained why the Tibetan Kashag selected Ngabo to lead such tricky negotiations knowing that he had been under indoctrination by the Chinese.
At the end of April, Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Prime Minister went himself to receive Ngabo and the Lhasa delegates at the Beijing station.
Ngabo did not follow the Tibetan tradition of presenting scarves to the Chinese leaders, he most probably felt ashamed of this old custom. He had cut his long hair to show the Chinese revolutionaries that he was a modern leader. This must have immensely pleased the Communist Government to see that at least one of the [Tibetan] delegates had rejected the ‘olds’ [Old Customs, Old Culture, Old Habits, and Old Ideas].

Ngapo: Collaborator No 1

Ngapo Ngawang Jigme died short of his 100th birthday. Very few in India have heard of Ngapo, the Tibetan who collaborated with the Chinese to make Tibet a Chinese colony in October 1950.
While the Chinese Government has only praise for Ngapo (spelled Ngapoi by the Chinese press), the Tibetan Administration in Dharamsala strangely paid also tribute to the old man. Why? It is difficult to understand, but probably to show that their position is not far from Beijing’s and that today, they do not seek separation from the ‘Motherland’.
Xinhua however is clear on Ngabo’s role: “He followed renowned scholars like Sherab Gyatso, who was strongly against an independent Tibet. In 1949, Ngapoi urged the Dalai Lama and the local Tibetan Government to accept the Central Government's invitation and send a delegation to Beijing to negotiate the peaceful liberation of Tibet. When he was designated governor of Qamdo [Chamdo], Ngapoi dismissed more than 8,000 militia soldiers who were deployed to fight the People's Liberation Army, paving the way for the peaceful liberation of Qamdo. In 1951, the Dalai Lama sent Ngapoi and four other delegates to Beijing for negotiations [by that time, he was a prisoner]. In Chongqing, Ngapoi met future Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping for the first time. In an article, he recalled that Deng dispelled his doubts about Tibet's future and that he regarded Deng as his first guide in the revolutionary cause. In 1951, the Central Government and local Tibetan authorities signed the 17-Article Agreement, heralding the region's peaceful liberation.”
That was the end of an independent Tibet. India did not react to this momentous event, being too busy trying to mediate in the Korean crisis and wanting to play a role amongst ‘decolonised’ nation.
Referring to the revolt of Eastern Tibet against of the Chinese, Xinhua added: “During the rebellions of the 1950s, which were instigated by some Tibetan nobles and high-ranking religious figures, Ngapoi stood firmly against the wave, and personally protected many who stood up to the rebels. “
In other words, he sided with the occupiers against the Tibetans. The ‘rebellion’ culminated with the Tibetan uprising in March 1959 during which the Dalai Lama had no choice but to take the road to India. One detail shows that Ngapo was already considered a collaborator: when the Dalai Lama decided to leave Tibet, he hid his plans from Ngabo, then the senior most Cabinet Minister. He knew that the latter would have immediately reported his intentions to the Chinese authorities in Lhasa who would have thwarted his escape.
When I heard that a debate was raging in Dharamsala between those who believe that Ngapo was ‘a honest patriot’ and those who considered him as a collaborator and a traitor, a not-too-well known incident came back to my mind. Several years ago I had interviewed a Tibetan 'Red Guard' who participated to the ghastly Cultural Revolution.
At that time, one of the ‘specialties’ of the Red Guard (in Tibet like in China) was ‘class struggle session’. Most of the Chinese and Tibetan leaders including senior leaders such as Lui Shaoqi, the Chinese President (who died as a result of the exercise), were ‘struggled’. They had to publicly admit their wrongs while been beaten and tortured by hordes of vociferous and wild Red Guards brandishing the famous Little Red Book. Wikipedia says that it caused “millions of Chinese to perish by public execution”
When I asked the former Tibetan Red Guard if Ngapo went through ‘struggle sessions’ like other leaders, I was surprised to hear that the only time Ngapo was ‘struggled’, it turned out a masquerade as he was under the PLA’s ‘protection’.
My informant recalled another incident: “One day we were called to the main Chinese headquarters to manage the crowd. Thousands of people were shouting: “Down with Ngapo Jigme, let him be killed”. When we went there, we saw Ngapo in his military uniform lead by some Chinese soldiers. He was brought on the stage and before making his confession, he took out the five stars out of his uniform and put them into his pocket and said: “For years and years my family had been exploiting the Tibetan people, and we will not able to get rid of this [sin] forever.” He just said that and he was quickly taken away.” He then put in the plane and flown to China. He was accompanied by his family members. Not a member of his family was left behind [in Tibet].”
By that time, other Tibetans who had supported the Chinese take-over, such as the Panchen Lama or Bapa Phuntsok Wangyal, the first Tibetan Communist had been arrested.
Both the Panchen Lama and Wangyal spent nearly two decades in Chinese jails and concentration camps. Ngapo remained one of the few leaders in China who managed to peacefully surf through the different purges and upheavals of Modern China. It shows how pliable he was.
During the following years, Ngapo would be given pompous titles by the Communist regime such as Vice chairman of the National People's Congress Standing Committee, Vice chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference or Chairman of the Tibet Autonomous Region (during the Cultural Revolution).
Ngapo will remain in history for his active participation to two events: first as the Governor of Eastern Tibet at the time of the invasion and then as a negotiator when an Agreement was signed between Tibet and China in May 1951.
Robert Ford, a Britisher employed by the Tibetan government as radio operator recalled the first event. On October 12, 1950, five days had already passed since the Chinese began their ‘liberation’ of Tibet. Ngapo had refused to spare a radio set for Riwoche, the border post to monitor the advance of the Chinese troops. Already in August 1950, Ford tried several times to convince Ngapo to send a wireless set to Riwoche, but the Governor was not interested. Ford keeping a strict etiquette, told the Governor: “Your Excellency, the spare portable radio is ready to go out at the shortest notice”, indirectly suggesting that a radio should be sent to the border. “Good, please keep the batteries charged,” replied Ngapo. “They are always fully charged. Either or both of the Indian operators are also in constant readiness to go out,” hinted again Ford. That day Ford did not want to leave the Residency without getting a clear answer about Riwoche: “Would you like me to send the radio to Riwoche now, Ford?” the Governor finally asked. “Yes, Your Excellency,” said Ford. “You are afraid we shall be cut off in Chamdo?” asked the Governor, adding: “Do not worry, Ford, the gods are on our side.”
A few days later, Ngapo was made prisoner and taken to Beijing where he suddenly became the Chief Negotiator to sign on behalf the Tibetan Government an Agreement with China. This was done on May 23, 1950. The Dalai Lama who had taken refuge near the Indian border was not even informed. The Tibetan seals were forged by the Chinese and affixed on the Agreement. Ngapo did not even protest.
The Dalai Lama eventually denounced the Agreement when he crossed the Indian border and took refuge in India in April 1959.

President Hu presenting his condolence to Ngapo's fami

While the present government in Beijing declared: “Ngapo ushered in major milestones in Tibet, such as the democratic reforms”, Dharamsala mourned his death saying that he was a honest and patriotic Tibetan.
Unfortunately, this policy of appeasement may not have the desired result on the hard-core leadership in Beijing.

Ngapo and the Cultural Revolution

That day, he removed his stars

While the Tibetan Diaspora is debating whether Ngapo Ngawang Jigme was a patriot or not, I found in my archives the transcript of an interview with a former Tibetan 'Red Guard' who clearly remembered the only time Ngapo was 'struggled'. 
In fact it was staged managed by the Chinese; Ngapo never suffered like all other senior Tibetan (and Chinese) leaders.
I find it strange when some Tibetans compared the case of Ngapo to the one of the Late Panchen Lama or of Bapa Phuntsok Wangyal. 
Let us not forget that the Panchen Lama (and Phunwnag) spent 17/18 years in Chinese jails or concentration camps. Ngapo is one of the few leader in China who has never suffered and managed to peacefully surf through the different purges and upheavals of Modern China. It shows how pliable he was. He may be a Chinese patriot, but certainly not a Tibetan patriot.

The Panchen Lama during a 'struggle' session

The Panchen Lama had the courage to send his 70,000-characters petition to Zhou Enlai ('a Poisonous Arrow', according to Mao), he suffered dearly for it (and lost his hearing). It has not been the case of Ngapo. 
Phunwang also nearly became insane in solitary confinement. I respect them, Ngapo was just  a collaborator.


Interview with a former Tibetan Red Guard
Question: What happened to Ngapo [Ngawang Jigme] during [the Cultural Revolution]? Did he get through a ‘struggle session’ (tamzhing)?

TW [former Red Guard]: Ngapo was ‘struggled’ only one time and during this session, he was heavily protected by the PLA.
At the time he was supposed to be ‘struggled’, the [Red] students [conducting the ‘struggle’] were sent to the Office of the TAR which was covered with Big Character Posters [praising the Cultural Revolution].
The Chinese [students] did not speak Tibetan and they wanted to know what was written on the posters; we were told to say what the posters said, what were the slogans in Tibetan. They took notes of the Tibetan Big Character Posters, but as they did not know Tibetan, they just copied them (after we had explained the meaning).
Another day we were called to the main headquarters of the TAR to manage the crowd. Thousands of people were shouting: “Down with Ngapo Jigme, let him be killed”. When we went there, we saw Ngapo in his military uniform; he was lead by some Chinese soldiers. He was brought on the stage and before making his confession, he took out the five stars out of his uniform and put them into his pocket and said: “For years and years my family had been exploiting the Tibetan people, and we will not able to get rid of this [sin] forever.” He just said that and he was quickly taken away by the PLA soldiers.
He then put in the plane and flown to China. He was accompanied by his family members. Not a member of his family was left behind [in Tibet].
The reason why Tibetans were so angry with Ngapo, (though they could not say it openly) was because in 1951, he had signed the 17-Point Agreement with the Chinese government. But also because the Chinese [Army] gave him a full protection.

Mourning Ngapo: why?

Ngapo and Mao in 1951


As Dharamsala mourns the death of Ngapo Ngawang Jigme, one could ask, what is the need?
He has always been on the wrong side of History. We mentioned the signature of the 17-Point Agreement (without referring to the Dalai Lama or the Lhasa government) in an earlier posting, here is an extracts of my book Tibet: the Lost Frontier showing his attitude during the Chinese 'liberation' campaign of October 1950 which was ambiguous, to say the least. 

China Invades Tibet: ‘The Gods are on Our Side!’
...On October 11 at 11 p.m., [Robert] Ford [radio operator working for the Tibetan government] had just finished speaking to his mother in England on the radio and was preparing to go to bed, when he heard a faint tinkle of bells coming from the east. “As bells grew louder I heard another sound, the clip-clop of horse’s hoofs.” Ford added, “…it passed my house on the way into the town. I saw the rider’s fur hat and the silhouette of the barrel of his riffle sticking up above his shoulder.” Ford immediately recognized an Army messenger riding towards the Residency where Ngapo Ngawang Jigme, the new Governor of Kham was staying.
The next morning Ford was awakened by his servant who announced: “Phodo Kusho, the Chinese are coming! They’ve crossed the river at Gangto Druga and killed all the troops.”
Gangto Druga was on the main trade route between Kangting and Chamdo. A Tibetan garrison was posted there.
Five days had already passed since the Chinese began the ‘liberation’, but for reasons known only to himself, Ngapo Shape [Ngapo as Governor of Kham had a Cabinet Minister rank and was referred as Ngapo Shape] had refused to spare a radio set for the border post to monitor the advance of the Chinese troops.
Ford tried many times to convince Ngapo to send a wireless set to Riwoche in August-September, but the Governor was not interested in listening to Ford, a very junior official in the Tibetan Government. From Ford’s side, he had to keep the etiquette in addressing the Governor and present his suggestions as politely as possible:
“Your Excellency, the spare portable radio is ready to go out at the shortest notice”, Ford told Ngapo, indirectly suggesting that a radio should be sent to the border.
”Good, Please keep the batteries charged,” replied Ngapo.
“They are always fully charged. Either or both of the Indian operators are also in constant readiness to go out,” hinted again Ford.
“Very good, we may need to send the station at any time,” answered Ngapo.
That day Ford did not want to leave the Residency without getting a clear answer about Riwoche: “Would you like me to send the radio to Riwoche now, Phodo?“ the Governor finally asked. “Yes, Your Excellency,” said Ford.
“You are afraid we shall be cut off in Chamdo?” asked the Governor. But Ngapo thought the army reinforcements had made the defence of Riwoche very strong. “Do not worry, Phodo, the gods are on our side.”
This discussion summarized the Tibetan world view. Unfortunately for them, the world had changed and the consequences would soon be tragic for old Tibet. Ngapo was not a military strategist and he could not have known about the conversation between Stalin and Mao. But at the time of this conversation, the Chinese Liberation Army had already attacked on many fronts.
The main border post at Gamto Druga had been overrun by the Chinese who used the same strategy as in Korea. Wave after wave of soldiers soon overpowered the Tibetan defenders, who fought well but were finally massacred.
In the meantime another Chinese regiment crossed the Yangtse above Dengo and advanced rapidly towards Dartsedo (Jyekundo), marching day and night.
In the South, the 157th PLA Regiment crossed the Yangtse and attacked the Tibetan troops near Markhan. When they reached Markhan, the local Tibetan Commander, Derge Se, surrounded by the Chinese troops, surrendered his force of 400 men.
Poor Ford! He had planned to use the southern route to escape. Now this route was also cut off. The net was slowly closing on Ford and on Tibet.
The northern front lost ground day by day and the headquarters of the central zone was soon lost to the waves of young Chinese soldiers. They caught the fleeing Tibetans at night in a place called Kyuhung where the Tibetans were decimated. The road to Chamdo was open.
Lhasa was finally informed on October 12 that the Yangtse had been crossed and that the Chinese had began to ‘fulfil’ their promise to ‘liberate’ the Roof of the World.
At the same time, the opera season was in full swing in Lhasa. The aristocracy and the Government were busy. For the Tibetan officials opera and picnic were sacred!
In Chamdo no one panicked, though the number of prayers was increased. More and more lay people joined the monks and began circumambulating around the monastery, the incense smoke went higher and higher in the sky, the gods had to be propitiated. Ford said that the monks believed that “only the gods could give Tibet victory - which was unanswerable - and they were doing their bit by praying. They would pray twice as hard, or rather twice as often, and that would be of more use than taking up arms.”
“The gods are on our side,” was the most often repeated mantra in the town.
The greatest excitement in Chamdo was the latest divination that Shiwala Rinpoche, the head lama of the local monastery, had just performed. It was on all tongues, the great news had spread like wildfire: “Shiwala Rinpoche says that the Chinese will not come.” Everywhere there was a sigh of relief. The Gods had won!
The Britisher in Ford commented that Shiwala Rinpoche’s statement was perhaps good for morale “but it seemed to me that something more Churchilian was needed.”
The Dalai Lama recalled: “The omen, if that is what it was, began to fulfil itself. Towards evening, during one of the performances, I caught sight of a messenger running in my direction. On reaching my enclosure, he was immediately shown in to Tathag Rinpoche, the Regent…I realized at once that something was wrong. Under normal circumstances government matters would have to wait until the following week. Naturally, I was almost besides myself with curiosity. What could this mean? Something dreadful must have happened.”
The young Dalai Lama said that he managed to peep into the Regent’s lodge and spy on him. “I could see his face quite clearly as he read the letter. He became very grave. After a few minutes, he went out and I heard him give orders for the Kashag to be summoned.”
The Dalai Lama discovered later that the letter was Ngapo’s telegram informing the Regent that the first outposts near the Yangtse had fallen.
“So, the axe has fallen,” the Dalai Lama later wrote. “And soon, Lhasa must fall.”
One of the problems as seen by the political leader of Tibet was that Tibetans were peace-loving people, non-violent by choice and to join the army was “considered the lowest form of life: soldiers were being held like butchers.”
In the circumstances and keeping in mind the deep division between the Tibetans from Lhasa and the Khampas, what could have been done?
Perhaps as the Tibetans themselves explain, the Karma of Tibet had ‘ripened’ and nothing or nobody could stop it.
Nevertheless, the Chinese lost thousands of men in fierce battles; the Dalai Lama remembers that “they suffered greatly from difficulties of supply on the one hand and the harsh climate on the other. Many died of starvation; others must have certainly have succumbed of altitude sickness.”
But Deng Xiaoping, Liu Bocheng and their men were used to hardship and bitterness. They had gone through worse when the Nationalists were trying to catch up with them during the Long March.  It was without doubt easier for the People’s Liberation Army to fight ill-equipped Tibetans than the sophisticated weapons of McArthur’s troops in Korea on the eastern front.
In the meantime, Ford was trying to catch the latest world news on his wireless, but there was nothing about Tibet. One of the greatest dramas of the twentieth century was unfolding without anyone knowing it. When the world heard of it, it was already too late.
The Englishman was not happy with Ngapo who “seemed too cool and confident.”
Lhalu, the previous Governor of Kham had already left and though still in radio contact with Chamdo, was now out of reach for the Chinese.
Over, the next few days, many Tibetan officials came to Ford’s radio station to try to hear the reaction of Lhasa, thinking that the Kashag would immediately appeal to the world community for help. They expected Lhasa to respond quickly before it was too late. But nothing!
Nobody could understand what was going on!
One day Ford went to Ngapo to show him the news summary and he was reassured by the Governor not to worry. The Tsongdu and the Kashag were deliberating and once a decision was taken, it would be announced.
“Radio Lhasa had no more to say the next day, or the day after that.”
Finally about 10 days after the Chinese had crossed the Upper Yangtse, Ford heard an announcement from Delhi: Shakabpa and the Tibetan delegation were denying any attack on Tibet.

Death of a Collaborator

Ngapo Ngawang Jigme (right) at the Indian Mission in Lhasa in the 1950's



Ngapo has passed away in Beijing. He was the main Tibetan collaborator. Without his full support, the Chinese would have found difficult to 'peacefully liberate' the Roof of the World in the fifties. He was the signatory of the 17-Point-Agreement (in May 1951). Ngapo even agreed to have seals forged to affix at the bottom of the text. During the following decades he faithfully served his masters.
The Chinese are obviously proud of him.



Vitae of Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme  
www.chinaview.cn  2009-12-24
BEIJING, Dec. 24 -- Ngapoi once served as vice chairman of the National People's Congress (NPC) Standing Committee from 1964 to 1993 and vice chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) for many years.
He was also president of the China Association for Preservation and Development of Tibetan Culture, established in 2004.
He was one of the founders of the Tibet Autonomous Region and the first chairman of the Regional Government.
He followed renowned scholars like Sherab Gyatso, who was strongly against an independent Tibet.
In 1949, Ngapoi urged the Dalai Lama and the local Tibetan Government to accept the Central Government's invitation and send a delegation to Beijing to negotiate the peaceful liberation of Tibet.
When he was designated governor of Qamdo, Ngapoi dismissed more than 8,000 militia soldiers who were deployed to fight the People's Liberation Army, paving the way for the peaceful liberation of Qamdo.
In 1951, the Dalai Lama sent Ngapoi and four other delegates to Beijing for negotiations. In Chongqing, Ngapoi met future Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping for the first time. In an article, he recalled that Deng dispelled his doubts about Tibet's future and that he regarded Deng as his first guide in the revolutionary cause.
In 1951, the Central Government and local Tibetan authorities signed the 17-Article Agreement, heralding the region's peaceful liberation.
During the rebellions of the 1950s, which were instigated by some Tibetan nobles and high-ranking religious figures, Ngapoi stood firmly against the wave, and personally protected many who stood up to the rebels.
Ngapoi ushered in major milestones in Tibet, such as the democratic reforms and the founding of the Tibet Autonomous Regional Government.
(Source: China Daily/Xinhua)