70 Years ago: War and 'Liberation' - The Battle of Chamdo

Robert Ford, the British Radio Operator captured by the PLA

On the occasion of the 70 years of the Battle of Chamdo (October 7, 1950), I republished this article War and Liberation which originally appeared in the USI Journal (April 2016 - June 2016 issue).

See the original article for proper references: here is the link...

A Liberation?
During the first weeks of October 1950, as Tibet was invaded by the People’s Liberation Army, Communist China stated that it was ‘liberating’ Tibet. It is not the place here to enter into this debate, but one can see that several decades later, the Tibetans, particularly the first ‘liberated’ in Eastern Tibet, still disagree with this interpretation.
The Battle of Chamdo, the first and only encounter between the Tibetan and Chinese forces, is however interesting to look at for several reasons.
Tibet, a Buddhist nation was not military and tactically ready to oppose the seasoned troops of Mao (and some of China’s brilliant commanders). From the start, The Land of Snows stood no chance, especially without outside support.
Many in Tibet still believed that increasing the number of japa (recitation) or parikramas (circumambulations) around the monasteries and stupas of Kham, would be sufficient to make the Truth Prevail. As Robert Ford, the British radio operator posted in Chamdo, remarked ‘The gods are on our side’ was the mantra most oft-repeated in the town, “but it seemed to me that something more Churchilian was needed.”
For the Chinese, it was a well-prepared operation (a ‘police operation’ would have said Marshal Peng Dehuai) in 2 stages: the fall of Chamdo, the capital town of Kham province during the Fall of 1950 and then the advance to Lhasa during the next season .
India was fooled into believing that Communist China wanted a ‘negotiated’ settlement with the Tibetans: it was never the case. Marshal Liu Bosheng in a message in August 1950 made it clear that he was going to ‘liberate’ Tibet.
Opposite the Chinese strategists was Ngabo Shape , the Tibetan Commissioner for the Kham province, a weak leader, ready to surrender; he was obviously not the military chef de guerre that Tibet need at this point in time to coordinate the defence of the different border posts.
It has to be noticed that Mao Zedong entered the Korean campaign on the same day (October 7) as the PLA crossed the Yangtze and started its Tibet operations. It shows the confidence the Communist leadership had in the local PLA commanders.
Finally, the PLA summary of the battle and recommendations distributed by the PLA after the Battle of Chamdo tends to show that it was a good preparation for the Chinese troops for another battle 12 years later on the Himalayan slopes. Against India this time.

Marshal Liu Bocheng Communique
On the first day of August, a message from Marshal Liu Bocheng, the Chairman of Southwest Military and Political Committee, was widely distributed by Xinhua: “[The] People Liberation Army will soon march towards Tibet with object of driving out the British and American aggressive forces so as to make Tibetans return to the Great Family of the Peoples Republic of China.”
The general lines of the ‘liberation’ were given: “As soon as the Liberation army enters into Tibet they will carry out the Programme of National Regional Autonomy, religious freedom, protection of Lama church and will respect the religious belief and customs of the Tibetans, develop their languages and characters as well as their educational and their agricultural, pastural, industrial and commercial enterprises and work for betterment of the Peoples living standard.”
Did the CCP’s Central Committee have the intention to seriously implement these policies? It is difficult to say.
Lui’s message continues: “The military and political systems prevailing in Tibet now will remain as they are and will NOT be changed.” However the present Tibetan Army will become a part of the National Defence Force of the Peoples Republic of China. It was ominous for the Tibetans.
Liu generously added: “All expenditure of the Peoples Liberation Army when they enter into Tibet [will be borne] by this Central Peoples Government so as to reduce the burden of the Tibetans.”
The dice was cast.

The military plans for the ‘liberation’
On August 23, Mao Zedong sent a telegram to the Southwest Bureau of the Central Committee; it is entitled: “Strive to Occupy Chamdo This Year and Advance to Lhasa Next Year”. This cable, repeated to the Northwest Bureau in Qinghai , lays down the Communists’ military plans for the year 1950 and 1951.
Answering a note that he had received 3 days earlier  Mao writes: “The plan to push for occupying Chamdo this year and to leave three thousand men to consolidate Chamdo is good. You can actively make preparations according to this plan, and when it is ascertained by the end of this month or the beginning of next month that the road has reached Ganzi  without obstruction, the advance can go ahead. It is expected that Chamdo will be occupied in October. That would be advantageous for pushing for political changes in Tibet, and marching into Lhasa the next year.”
A few days earlier, KM Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador in China had met Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Foreign Minister. The Ambassador reported to Delhi: “I am satisfied that the representations we have made have had two important results; the Chinese will NOT now proceed to attack Tibet unless all efforts at peaceful settlement have been exhausted. …Short of giving Tibet its privileged position, China, I am convinced, would do everything to satisfy Tibetans, at least for the time, and will NOT proceed to military action.”
Such a foolish assessment!
On August 22, the Ambassador had handed over an aide-mémoire to the Chinese Government in which he stated that the Government of India “have no political or territorial ambitions in Tibet and no desire to seek any novel privileged position for themselves or their nationals in Tibet.”
The next day, the Great Helmsman could affirm: “Now India has issued a statement recognizing Tibet as China’s territory, only expressing hope that the issue can be settled peacefully, not by force. …If our army can occupy Chamdo in October, there is the possibility of pushing the Tibetan delegation to Beijing for negotiation, begging for a peaceful solution… Right now we are using the strategy of urging the Tibetan delegation to come to Beijing and reducing Nehru’s fear.”
The strategy was clear. The PLA had to occupy Chamdo before the winter; stop the advance for a while; get time to force ‘an agreement’ with the Tibetans and then complete the ‘liberation’ by advancing to Lhasa in 1951.
In his telegram to Chengdu, Mao explains: “When Tibetan representatives arrive in Beijing , we plan to use the Ten Points already decided as the basis for negotiation, urge the Tibetan representatives to sign it, and make the Ten Points an agreement accepted by both sides. If this can be done, it will make things easier for advancing into Tibet next year.”
In other words, it would be a ‘peaceful liberation’.
It is what happened in May 1951 when the Tibetan ‘negotiators’ were forced ‘under duress’ to sign the 17-Point Agreement; the road to Lhasa was open.
In August 1950, Mao’s rationalizes further: “Your plan to leave 3,000 men in Chamdo for the winter after occupying it, not to advance into Lhasa this year, and withdraw the main force back to Ganzi may be seen by the Tibetans as a gesture of good will. The matter of 30 airplanes is in process, but it takes time. You should not count on them in the short term. All the provisions for the 16,000 men marching from Ganzi to Chamdo have to be carried by manpower and yaks, and 3,000 men among them will need provisions for winter. …Part of the grain and meat (needed by troops) may be purchased in Chamdo etc., and have you prepared some gold, silver and goods that Tibetans need, such as silk, to take with you?”
That was it. The military operations could start.

 

The Battle of Chamdo
For the description of the Battle of Chamdo, our source is a Chinese text called Detailed Report on Battle of Chamdo by the 52nd Division of the 18th Army of the People’s Liberation Army.
It is part of a Chinese report, The Liberation of Chamdo, which was translated by two independent researchers, Jianglin Li and Matthew Akester.
While reflecting the views of Mao Zedong and the Communist Party of China, it shows that the Battle of Chamdo was a military operation conducted in a professional manner by the 18th Army of the Second Field Army, with the possibility to receive support from the North (Qinghai), the South (Yunnan) and even a few troops from Xinjiang.
While Nehru was banking on 'talks' to peacefully solve the issue, there was no question of ‘peace’ or ‘negotiations’ for Mao, and Chamdo was merely the first stage before an advance towards Lhasa during the next season.
What is surprising is the elaborate planning of this military operation. Comparatively, the leaderless Tibetans were novices and stood no chance in front of the calculated tactical moves of the PLA. We shall see that the Chinese learned a lot during the Chamdo operations; this is apparent in their ‘Summary’.
While Panikkar in Beijing was talking peace and dialogue, the PLA’s slogan in Eastern Tibet as: “Surround more, annihilate more; surround less, annihilate less” or “Cutting into the heart of the enemy position, penetrating, separating, surrounding and annihilating the enemy.”
It did not mean that some of the Tibetan troops did not fight well, particularly the Gadang regiment under Dapon Muja.
It is a tragedy that nobody in India thought of studying the Battle of Chamdo, it would have perhaps avoided a lot of suffering and the crushing defeat of 12 years later.

Chinese narrative of the Battle of Chamdo
The Chinese report tells us that after crossing the Jinsha river  from October 6 to 9, the troops reached “the vast plateau of a thousand li  in length and width and in coordination with brother troops, units of this division were divided into three wings, left, middle and right, forming the assault on Chamdo, a powerful pincer attack targetting the 1500-li-long position of the Tibetan army commanded by Chamdo Governor Lhalu. ”
It has to be noted that before the operations started, Governor Lhalu had been transferred to Lhasa. Robert Ford was not happy with Ngabo who ‘seemed too cool and confident’.
It was one could say, ‘a British understatement’.
The report continues: “During the fourteen days of rapid advance and fighting, all units were moving across the unfamiliar plateau without accurate maps. Soldiers carried loads of 60 or 70 jin , climbed more than 50 high mountains and crossed rivers over 60 times. On average, foot soldiers cover 72 li,  cavalry 80 li  a day, those who had to march day and night moved up to 34 hours continuously without enough food. However, all units answered the call by party committees of both the army and the division and endured extreme hardship, annihilated all the defending enemies in Chamdo on schedule, and successfully completed the capture of Chamdo.”
How such a quick success?
It is explained in detail: “[the PLA] annihilated five Dapons , the main force of the Tibetan army, and over 2,000 militia, liberated the region north to Qinghai , south to Yunnan , east to Jinsha river, west to Luolong  and Leiwuqi , a vast area more than one thousand square li. The success further strengthened our unity with Tibetans west of the Jinsha river, laid the foundation for advancing next year (1951), struck blows directly and indirectly at the British and American imperialist invaders, inspired people in the near east and repaid the people of the whole country who had warmly supported us.”
Of course, apart from the poor Robert Ford, who soon would be captured and kept five years in a Chinese gaol, there were no imperialist around.
But the Tibetans had to be ‘liberated’ from something or somebody. It was an easy alibi for the world at large, and particularly for the gullible Indian Ambassador in Beijing.
The military operation to ‘liberate’ Tibet also demonstrates how Mao’s concept of a ‘Liberation War’ was applied on the ground.
The Report says: “…Tibetans have warmly supported us (taking in and escorting individual stragglers, delivering information, guiding the way, providing transportation, building bridges, preparing firewood and fodder, etc.), all of this shows that we had good influence by carrying out the policies conscientiously before the attack and shows the tangible benefits brought to Tibetans during our westward march. This is a small accomplishment we achieved in the past, and it is also a major pointer for the future in the liberation and construction of Tibet.”
The ‘political’ instructions to the ground forces were: ‘Three Keep-in-Mind’  and ‘Eight Things-to-do’.  
The Political Department of Tibet Military Area Command in Chengdu later prepared “A Brief Report on Battle of Chamdo by Southwest Military Area Command”. One gets an idea of the role of the ‘liberated populations’  in the military operations: “Before the battle, troops had gone through comprehensive education on minority policy and conducted work aimed at uniting with the minority people in a planned way. This work contributed greatly to accomplishing the battle smoothly,” notes the Report.
Of course, the situation rapidly changed and by mid-1950s, the Khampa guerrilla started resisting the ‘liberation’.
To come back to the Report of the Battle, it notes: “In this battle, troops advanced rapidly for 15 days with heavy loads across the high plateau a thousand kilometers in length and width, wrapping up…entire enemy position 1500 li  in length and accomplished the task on schedule, completely annihilated the third (two Dapons), the seventh, the eighth, the fifth and the tenth Dapon, altogether five Dapons (averaging small regiments) under Tibetan Frontier Envoy Commissioner General , captured …over 3,000 men. This victory is fundamentally due to correct leadership by leading officers of the Military Area Command and the Army Party Committee, strong support from the people of the whole country, coordination from brother troops (particularly engineer corps), …and the eight-month long preparation.”
In some places, the Tibetans fought quite well. As noted by Melvyn Goldstein, already in August, the Tibetans fought a pitch battle in Denkok: “The battle of Dengo [Denkok] was technically a victory for the Tibetans, in that they had pushed the Chinese back and demonstrated they could contend with the People's Liberation Army. The battle boosted the morale of the Tibetan forces in Kham, but it did not alter the basic military situation of the Tibetans, who were woefully undermanned and under- armed.”
But at the time, Mao and his generals had not completed the preparations for the Battle of Chamdo.

Analysing the Tibetan opposition
We shall not go into the details of the operations, but it is worth stopping for a moment at the Chinese analysis of their opponents, the Tibetan troops:

• The enemy had no focus, no depth and attached no importance to flanks.
• Enemy lacks systematic strategic planning and command, they fought wherever they were attacked and were easily misled by us. After we crossed the river from Dengke , it was quite possible that the enemy might mistakenly believe, based on historical experience, that the Chinese could be stopped.
• The enemy had never experienced large scale battle
• The Tibetans had no knowledge of modern military science and were equipped with few heavy weapons.
• Their combat capability was not strong.
• The Chinese estimated that there were 3 possibilities:
• The Tibetans would retreat without fighting and escape without hesitation (“if this happened, it would definitely make it more difficult for us to annihilate them”)
• The Tibetans would scatter at the first contact, everywhere in the mountains and wilderness to entangle us also existed (“this would make it more difficult for us to annihilate them”).
• The Tibetans would concentrate forces and put up strong resistance in strategic locations (“this was exactly what we were hoping for, for we were absolutely sure that we would annihilate them thoroughly, straightforwardly and completely”).

After a first encounter in Denkok in August, the Chinese report comments: “we did not seize the moment of strength to strike the enemy a fatal blow. The enemy might mistakenly have thought that our combat capability was not strong”.
But this was not the real Battle of Chamdo. Mao wanted to complete the logistic preparations before the fatal blow to the Tibetans.

A first step well-accomplished
The Report gives insight on the strategy; the Battle of Chamdo was the first step towards Lhasa: “Liberating Chamdo, annihilating the main force of the Tibetan army in the area east of Upper Mekong, Enda  and Riwoche lays the foundation for advance into Lhasa next year 1951 and liberate the entire Tibet.”
The report describes the battle: “We decided to deploy a powerful right-flank encircling force composed of infantry and cavalry, providing strong points to offset each other’s weaknesses, making a detour via Batang and Nangchen and pushing forward vigorously and precipitately. Troops should not be blocked by small numbers of enemy, doing everything possible to clear away obstacles and circle bravely…the entire field, cutting off the enemy’s retreats from Enda to Gyamda Dzong in Kongpo  and from Riwoche to Nagchu, the two main escape routes, making it impossible for enemies to escape even if they intended to slip away without fighting.
Performance of troops in this wing is the key to success or failure in annihilating more than three Dapons of the enemy force. The middle wing cut into the heart of the enemy position by way of …cutting into the heart of the enemy position, penetrating, separating, surrounding and annihilating the enemy within the entire enemy position and advancing straight to Chamdo.”
If the enemy did not rest, we wouldn’t rest; when the enemy took rest, we annihilate them. The left wing force crossed the river at Kamtok, marching slowly by way of Dongpu, Jomda and Jueyong to draw in the enemy. They seized the Damala Pass  and controlled Sichuan bridge.
The Chinese also wrote down the lessons of the battle and analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of the Tibetan Army. It makes interesting reading:

• All Tibetan troops were organized in a comparatively primitive way. Troops have neither commanding offices (headquarters?) nor maps.
• Everything was handled by one single officer-in-charge.
• Special reconnaissance troops and communication tools were very outdated.
• They did not fight aggressively and lacked counter attack ability. In several battles we did not find the enemy launching strong counter attacks.
• Lack of systematic strategic thinking
• No attention paid to protect flank and rear while deploying the forces. No knowledge of using the terrain to block our advance.
• No night combat experience.
• No guards posted at encampments.
• Enemies were slow in climbing mountains: the 156th regiment’s speed was nearly one third faster than the speed of the enemy.
• In terms of tactics: the Tibetans were good at riding horses, highly skillful at shooting and utilizing terrain and landforms, but not good at operation. There is certainly some exaggeration in this account, but the lack of larger strategic thinking cannot be discounted.
  One should also not forget that the Tibetan troops were less than 5,000 (perhaps 7,000 if one includes the local militia) and the PLA numbered around 20,000.

 
The tactics used against Tibetan army are also mentioned in the Report:

• To deal with the weak Tibetan army with our current equipment, the key is to encircle the enemy
• No need to worry about breaking through Tibetan army’s positions, the only worry is not being able to encircle them.
• Once the supply line is cut, enemy will retreat in disorder without fighting.
• Based on special conditions of the plateau cavalry is the key to annihilate the enemy, and the guarantee of success.

A good coordination between the Infantry and Artillery is required: “Due to weather conditions on the plateau and our equipment, vigorous activities and rapid charge are not favourable to the troops. Therefore, during combat firepower must be well organized so as to coordinate with foot soldiers continuously and effectively.”
About the reconnaissance, as no accurate map was available and rivers, forests and mountain ranges are serious obstacles: “knowledge of enemy situation and terrain through reconnaissance prior to battle is highly important. The method is to inquire from Tibetans familiar with the area …as long as we are nice to him, he would give us such information honestly.”
About the Artillery, to combat on the plateau, distance should be well measured: “Observation is not easy since too many objects block the view, and as a result, distances are often misjudged as closer.”
Perhaps more interesting for India are the suggestions on the PLA structure and equipment required for future operations.

The Summary recommends:

• A division should have a cavalry regiment to fulfill the task of circling and surrounding the enemy.
• A regiment should have a mounted reconnaissance company to facilitate communication and reconnaissance.
• Mounted reconnaissance company can perform tasks of circling and surrounding in small actions.
• One engineers platoon should be allocated for building bridges, handling boats, and clearing away obstacles to increase advancing speed.
• Reduce mountain artillery, increase recoilless guns, high-angle guns, dynamite, detonator, fuse and explosive.
• Quality and style of current field tools needs to be improved.
• The current style of uniform must be changed and quality must be improved, otherwise it will not be able to last the season
• It is better to make the uniform with strong and durable cloth, shoulders, backsides and knees should be reinforced.
• Weight of coat should be reduced. Comforter should be changed into soft, warm, damp-resistant, lightweight, larger size wool blanket which can be used as mattress pad as well as comforter.
• Raincoat and damp-resistant canvas should be combined into one, based on current raincoat size and shape, adding more rubber to make it thicker so it can be used to wear and to spread as bedding. Quality of shoes should be improved, soles should be softer and the upper should be higher, water-proof and damp-resistant.
• Headgear should better be helmet with goggles fixed on.
• Regiment and above level should be equipped with larger radio of 50 watt or more.
• All food should be high quality, low quantity, long-lasting and easy to carry, otherwise it increases soldiers’ burden, reduces their physical strength, slows down marching speed and has negative impact on accomplishing tasks.

These lessons were certainly useful for a far more difficult campaign; i.e. against India in 1962. The battle of Chamdo can hence also be considered, logistically at least, as a rehearsal of the 1962 ‘Indian’ War.

The Word's Double Standards

The tragedy which took place in Paris two days ago, when Notre Dame de Paris, the emblematic Cathedral in the heart of the French Capital, was engulfed in a fire, has created a lot of emotions all over the world, including in China.
All those who visited the Cathedral understand why?
Notre Dame was/is the symbol of the genius of the country.
The Chinese bloggers have been very active to express their deep sorrow.
One published picture said: "Notre Dame de Paris Cathedral  yesterday and today. The fire is still raging. A tragedy for the history of humanity, The French President has jst announced that it will be rebuilt."
Thousands of such messages could be read on the Chinese Internet.
It is good. It is touching.
But I wonder why  the Chinese press ...and the World Press, practically kept rather quiet when the same tragedy befell on Jokhang Cathedral in Central Lhasa, (which was built several centuries before Notre Dame). The information was announced and dropped immediately.
I wonder why there is always double standards when it comes to Tibet.
It is sad...
I  repost an article that I had written last year on the fire in Jokhang...


February 2018 article
Last night, Xinhua reported that "a fire broke out at 6:40 pm in part of Jokhang Temple in Lhasa."
According to the official Tibet Daily, the fire was eventually put off in the evening,
The News Agency said: "Located at the center of old Lhasa, Jokhang Temple is a renowned temple for Tibetan Buddhism. It has a history of more than 1,300 years and houses many cultural treasures, including a life-sized statue of Sakyamuni when he was 12 years old."
This inauspiciously occurred on the second day of the Losar, the Tibetan New Year (Earth Dog Year).

The Statue of Jowo Rinpoche
The Jokhang temple, the Central Cathedral in the Tibetan capital, houses Jowo Shakyamuni or Jowo Rinpoche, the most sacred statue in Tibet.
The Jowo Rinpoche statue is said to have been personally blessed by the Buddha.
It came to be owned by the king of Magadha, who gave it to a Tang emperor of China.
One of the emperor's clansman's daughter, Princess Wenchen Kongjo took it to Lhasa in a wooden cart when she married the Great King of Tibet, Songtsen Gampo.
During King Mangsong Mangtsen's reign (649-676), due to a threat that the Tang Chinese might invade, Princess Wencheng is said to have hidden the statue of Jowo Rinpoche in a secret chamber in the Jokhang.
Another Chinese Princess Jincheng, sometime after 710 CE, placed in the central chapel.
The statue was badly damaged by the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution.

Signs sent by the Gods
The Tibetans believe that the Gods are from time to time sending signs to the humans.
It can be forewarning messages for the bad (and good) times to come.
I post here extracts of my book The Fate of Tibet.
It was August 15, 1950 (coincidentally (?) India's Independence Day).
The signs were strong.
On that day, the Gods spoke.
Three months later, Tibet was invaded by the 'Liberation Army' of China.
The epicentre of the earthquake was also symbolic; it occurred in Rima, north of the McMahon Line (Kibithu/Walong sector), which saw heavy fighting in October/November 1962.
It was one of the most powerful earthquakes of the 20th century (8.6 on the Richter scale).
In India, it became known as the 'Assam Earthquake' due to the extensive damages in the State.
The course of the rivers changed in several places.

Here are the extracts of The Fate of Tibet:

The Dalai Lama who was 15-year old, was in Lhasa, a few hundred kilometers away.
He later wrote about the ominous earthquake which shook Tibet on August 15, 1950

It was like an artillery barrage – which is what we assumed to be the cause of both the tremors and the noise: a test of some sorts being carried out by the Tibetan army…Some people reported seeing a strange red glow in the skies in the direction from which the noise came….

For centuries, Tibet had remained isolated. The nation’s energies and time was consecrated to achieve spiritual goals, her defence was neglected and until the beginning of the twentieth century, nobody (except the Thirteenth Dalai Lama) had too much been bothered by the international happenings.
Formal recognition or boundary delimitation [with India] had been in a way forced on the Tibetans by Younghusband’s invasion and later by Sir Henry McMahon at the Simla Convention.
At the end of the forties, Tibet had begun to wake up at the sight of the black clouds gathering around the Land of Snow: the atheist 'east wind' was threatening to blow over the sacred Shangri-La. 
The first signs that mythical Tibet was soon to forever disappear were appearing.
The 'Rima' earthquake was the most striking one.

...In the evening of August 15, a terrible earthquake shook Tibet. "This was no ordinary earthquake; it felt like the end of the world,

writes Robert Ford, the British Radio operator working in Chamdo (Kham);

 For hours afterwards, the sky over the south-eastern Tibet glowed with an infernal red light, diffused with the pungent scent of sulphur.

For the Tibetans, it was one more bad omen, following some recent prophecies of the State Oracle and the appearance of a bright horse-tailed comet similar to the one viewed before the Chinese invasion of 1910.

The time has come
Suddenly in Tibet, everyone understood that the time had come.
The Last Testament of the Thirteen  Dalai Lama [‘And Long and Dark Shall be the Night’] came back at the mind of all, but it was too late, the dies had been thrown long ago.
Now, Tibet would have to go through the ordeal and the only hope for the Tibetans was it would not be too painful and long.
In the meantime, the Indian Government was torn between two sentiments: on one side Tibet was a small (though large by size) independent nation with very rich and old cultural and religious bonds with India and on the other side Nehru and some of his colleagues had an immense admiration for the new People's Republic who like India, had to struggle against colonial powers to gain her freedom. For many in Delhi, China and India were the symbol of a ‘New Asia’ and the newly-found ‘eternal friendship’ with China was of supreme importance.
This one-way friendship was to be the fountainhead of Nehru’s Tibet policy till the fateful day of October 1962 when the troops of Marshal Lin Biao crossed the McMahon Line over the Tagla Ridge. That day Nehru knew that the so-called friendship was a one way traffic, but he was too late and he never physically and psychologically recovered.
As we will see in the debate in the Lok Sabha in December 1950, a few Indian political leaders understood about the security of the Indian borders and the defence implications of the ‘resurgence’ of the Chinese empire.
Among them, one man stands as a giant: Sardar Patel.
But fate took him away from the political scene at this most crucial time of Indian history.

Just when we thought the gods had won...

My article, about Robert Ford, the British radio operator in Tibet entitled,  Just when we thought the gods had won... appeared today in today's Edit Page of The Pioneer.

Click here to read...

Phodo Kusho no more

Robert Webster Ford (born on March 27, 1923 in Burton-on-Trent, England) is no more; he passed away on 20 September 2013 in London.
Ford served several years in Tibet as a radio operator in the late 1940s; till he was arrested by the advancing People Liberation Army in October 1950.
The Tibetans had a problem in pronouncing 'F', 'Ford' became 'Phodo'; in Kham, he became known as 'Phodo Kusho', 'Ford Sir'.
After being released by the Chinese in 1955, he entered the  British foreign service. He ended his career as British Consul General in Bordeaux.
Ford was the lone foreign witness of the Chinese invasion of Kham in 1950. That is probably why he was 'captured' and underwent much suffering and humiliation during his five-year as a prisoner of Mao.
'Phodo' was a radio technician of the Royal Air Force during World War II; he served in England and later in India. In 1945, he joined the British Mission in Lhasa as a radio officer. An audience with the 14-year-old Dalai Lama in Lhasa convinced him to continue to work in Tibet.
He was soon transferred to Gangtok, Sikkim, where he worked under the Political Officer, in-charge of the Tibet Affairs.

Ford in Sikkim
with first Tibetan allopathic doctor

When India became independent in 1947, Robert Ford returned to Lhasa and was officially appointed by the Government of Tibet. Later he became the first foreigner to be given a Tibetan official rank.
The following year, he was transferred to Chamdo, capital of eastern Tibet (Kham), to establish a radio station.
In 1949, the Tibetan-speaking Ford and three Kinnauri wireless operators left for Chamdo to help the Governor General Lhalu Tsewang Dorje, who wanted to improve the defence of Kham.
'Phodo' soon managed to establish a first direct link with Lhasa.
In the first months of 1950, Lhalu requested Ford to shorten the training of the Kinnauri wireless operators; the governor wanted the station to be fully operational, he could sense the forthcoming danger.
Unfortunately for Tibet, Lhalu was replaced as Governor General of Kham by Ngabo Ngawang Jigme who took lightly the Chinese threat.
'Phodo' was arrested (along with Ngabo) in October 1950 by the invading Chinese army.
The Chinese accused him of espionage, spreading anti-communist propaganda and causing the death of a monk, known as the Geda Lama. 'Phodo' spent nearly 5 years in jail, in constant fear of being executed; he was subjected to interrogation and 'thought reform'. Only in 1954 was he allowed to send a letter to his family. His trial was held at the end of 1954; he was sentenced to ten years jail. He was eventually released and expelled from China in 1955.
In 1957, he published a book Captured in Tibet about his harrowing experience.

With the Dalai Lama in England

In my book Tibet: the Lost Frontier, I quoted 'Phodo Sir'.
I remember hosting him for a few days some 25 years ago. He was a lovely human being. He used to say that his ordeal in the Chinese jails (and specially the interrogation methods) were very similar to ones the Indian officers captured by the Chinese in October 1962 had to go through; it was also comparable to experience of Sidney Wignall, captured in Western Tibet in 1955.
See my posting on Wignall, 'So it was all for nothing': The Aksai Chin road.
In his book, Ford mentioned that 'The gods are on our side' was the most often repeated mantra in the Chamdo in the Fall of 1950.

A few days before the arrival of the Chinese, the greatest excitement in town was the divination that Shiwala Rinpoche, the head lama of the local monastery, had just performed. It was on all tongues, the great news had spread like wildfire: “Shiwala Rinpoche says that the Chinese will not come.” Everywhere there was a sigh of relief. The Gods had finally won!

The Britisher in Ford commented that Shiwala Rinpoche’s statement was perhaps good for morale “but it seemed to me that something more Churchilian was needed.” 

Indeed!

Here is a chapter of my book:

China Invades Kham
The rumours of an impending attack on Tibet had started trickling in from August.
Panikkar [the Indian Ambassador to China] knew it, he knew that the Chinese had already entered in the Chinese-controlled areas of Kham (Sikang). In a communication to the Chinese Foreign Office on 2 October he informed the Chinese that the Tibetan Delegation would be leaving India shortly to Peking and had expressed the hope that further military action would, therefore, not be necessary. "It will help the peaceful settlement of the Tibetan question if the Chinese troops which might have entered territory under the jurisdiction of the Lhasa authorities could restrict themselves to western Sikang."
In Chamdo, Robert Ford, the British radio operator employed by Lhasa had arrived in December 1949. Ford, ‘Phodo Kusho’ as the Tibetans called him, had brought with him brand new radio sets that he found nicely packed in crates when he first arrived in Lhasa. From Chamdo, Ford soon established a daily link with Lhasa. He was also able to monitor the world news from Beijing and Delhi.
On new year’s day of 1950, Ford heard an ominous communiqué broadcast by the People’s Republic of China: “The task for the People’s Liberation Army for 1950 is to liberate Taiwan, Hainan and Tibet.”
One of Ford’s first tasks was the training of some young Indians of Tibetan stock (Lahauli, Kinnauri) who would be able to operate the radio sets. The idea was to send them to the Sino-Tibetan border to monitor the movements of the Chinese troops. This border which had been ‘shifting’ during the past decades and even centuries, was now situated some one hundred miles east of Chamdo and followed the course of the Upper Yangtse.
It is difficult to ascertain the true number of Tibetan troops stationed on the 200 mile long border along the banks of the Yangtse, Goldstein speaks of about 3,500 soldiers, but Ford estimated their strength to be much less. On the other side of the great river more than 40,000 much better equipped troops waited to ‘liberate’ Tibet.
One of the major problems faced by the Tibetans was the lack of unity between the local chieftains and the Lhasa government. It was not a new problem but a heavy toll would be paid for the antagonism between Lhasa and the Khampas at this crucial point in the history of Tibet.
On October 11 at 11 p.m., Ford had just finished speaking to his mother in England on the radio and was preparing to go to bed, when he heard a faint tinkle of bells coming from the east. “As bells grew louder I heard another sound, the clip-clop of horse’s hoofs.” Ford immediately recognized an Army messenger riding towards the Residency where Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, the new Governor of Kham was staying. He was bringing the ominous message: the PLA had crossed the Yangtse.
The main border post at Gamto Druga had been overrun by the Chinese who used the same strategy as in Korea (and later in NEFA). Wave after wave of soldiers overpowered the Tibetan defenders, who fought well but were finally massacred.
In the meantime another Chinese regiment crossed the Yangtse above Dengo and advanced rapidly towards Dartsedo, marching day and night.
In the South, the 157th PLA Regiment attacked the Tibetan troops near Markhan. When they reached Markhan, the local Tibetan Commander, Derge Se, surrounded by the Chinese troops, surrendered his force of 400 men.
Poor Ford! He had planned to use the southern route to escape. Now this route was also cut off. The net was slowly closing on Ford and on Tibet.
The northern front lost ground day by day and the headquarters of the central zone was soon lost to the waves of young Chinese soldiers.
Lhasa was finally informed on October 12 that the Yangtse had been crossed. At the same time, the opera season was in full swing in Lhasa. The aristocracy and the Government were busy. For the Tibetan officials opera and picnic were sacred!
In Chamdo no one panicked, though the number of prayers was increased. More and more lay people joined the monks and began circumambulating around the monastery, the incense smoke went higher and higher in the sky, the gods had to be propitiated. Ford said that the monks believed that “only the gods could give Tibet victory - which was unanswerable - and they were doing their bit by praying. They would pray twice as hard, or rather twice as often, and that would be of more use than taking up arms.”
“The gods are on our side,” was the most often repeated mantra in the town.
The Dalai Lama recalled:

The omen [The Earthquake of August 15, 1950.], if that is what it was, began to fulfil itself. Towards evening, during one of the performances, I caught sight of a messenger running in my direction. On reaching my enclosure, he was immediately shown in to Tathag Rinpoche, the Regent…I realized at once that something was wrong. Under normal circumstances government matters would have to wait until the following week. Naturally, I was almost beside myself with curiosity. What could this mean? Something dreadful must have happened.

The young Dalai Lama said that he managed to peep into the Regent’s lodge and spy on him. “I could see his face quite clearly as he read the letter. He became very grave. After a few minutes, he went out and I heard him give orders for the Kashag to be summoned.”

Captured in Chamdo

The Dalai Lama discovered later that the letter was Ngabo’s telegram informing the Regent that the first outposts near the Yangtse had fallen.
But Deng Xiaoping, Liu Bocheng and their men were used to hardship and bitterness. It was without doubt easier for the People’s Liberation Army to fight ill-equipped Tibetans than the sophisticated weapons of McArthur’s troops in Korea on the eastern front.
In the meantime, Ford was trying to catch the latest world news on his wireless, but there was nothing about Tibet. One of the greatest dramas of the twentieth century was unfolding without anyone knowing it. When the world heard of it, it was already too late.
Over, the next few days, many Tibetan officials came to Ford’s radio station to try to hear the reaction of Lhasa, thinking that the Kashag would immediately appeal to the world community for help. They expected Lhasa to respond quickly before it was too late. But nothing!
Nobody could understand what was going on!
“Radio Lhasa had no more to say the next day, or the day after that,” said Ford.
Finally about 10 days after the Chinese had crossed the Upper Yangtse, Ford heard an announcement from Delhi: Thubten Gyalpo, Shakabpa and the Tibetan delegation were denying any attack on Tibet.
They were simply not living in this world. But their world was disappearing, without them or the world of the world realizing it.
On 26 October, a news report from Calcutta stated:

The leaders of seven-man delegation to Peking told PTI today that this delegation was proceeding to Peking irrespective of the reported Chinese Communists invasion of Tibet. He had received final instructions from Lhasa to conduct negotiations in Peking on future Sino-Tibetans relations only last Sunday, he said.

The Delegation had not discussed the future of Tibet with the Chinese Ambassador in New Delhi during their stay there. They had only informal talks. A member of the delegation said that they were more interested in religion than in foreign affairs. He thought Tibet was of no significant strategic importance for military point of view.
To send a delegation more interested in religion than in foreign affairs to discuss with Mao the future of their nation!
On 27 October, The Hindu in Madras published the following piece:

The Tibetan Delegation which left New Delhi this morning en route to Peking remained unperturbed over the reported entry of the Chinese troops into Eastern Tibet and the leader of the delegation pointed out that the area in question was always disputed territory, both China and Tibet claiming it as part of their territory. New Delhi is generally inclined to believe the reported movement of troops may be related to some border incidents but not to any general invasion by Chinese troops. “

Nineteen days after the Chinese invaded Tibet, its negotiating delegation was not informed (or pretended to be not informed) of the development and they were innocently proceeding to Beijing. The previous day the Indian Prime Minister had given one of the speeches he loved to deliver that could electrify the masses: it was reported by The Hindu:

Pandit Nehru said that while vast millions of people all over the world were ‘hankering and hindering after peace’ feverish preparations for war were also going on in many parts of the world and this is a serious contradiction which had to be solved. ‘the only way to bring peace’, the Prime Minister thought was ‘for the people of the world and the different countries to cast away fear from their hearts and minds and think and do the right thing’.

Poor Tibetans, they thought they were doing the right thing in calling upon the gods for help and in completing the Opera Festival. One thing is for sure — there was no fear in Lhasa and Chamdo.
Strangely enough Lhasa was keeping quiet. In the words of Robert Ford:
I decided to take my news summary personally to Ngabo.
"Radio Lhasa has not mentioned the invasion," I said pointedly.
"The Government only heard of it this morning," said Ngabo.
"It cannot be announced until it has been decided what we shall say. I will tell you confidentially, Phodo [Ford]," he added, "that the National Assembly is meeting in Lhasa now."
“The National Assembly was evidently having a long session”, added Ford.
The analysis of Ford may be correct when he said:

I could only think it was a matter of habit. The Lhasa Government was so used to the policy of saying nothing that might offend or provoke the Chinese that it kept it on after provocation had become irrelevant. It was still trying to avert a war that had already broken out.

On October 19, Robert Ford was arrested and charged with having killed the Gethak Lama and spying for the imperialists. He spent five years in Chinese jails.
It was only on October 25 that the Chinese themselves announced to the world that Tibet was ‘liberated.’ A brief communiqué of the New China News Agency (Xinhua) said: “People’s army units have been ordered to advance into Tibet to free three million Tibetans.”
On November 10, Xinhua News Agency said that Mao and Zhu De were “deeply concerned about the prolonged oppression of the Tibetan people by the British and American imperialism.” Accordingly, they had decided to “move into Tibet to help the Tibetan people to shake off the oppression forever.”