Himalayan earthquakes

Hardcore Tibetan Communist Raidi with Chinese Panchen Lama

Once upon a time, Raidi was a powerful Tibetan Communist cadre. He was the leader of the Nagchu clique, ruling over the Tibetan plateau.
Now, he is honorifically titled, vice chairman of the 10th Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress, but he is very old.
Nonetheless, he recently sent a letter to the Tibet Autonomous Region’s government to “express his sympathies for the victims of the recent earthquake, offer his condolences to the relatives of those injured or killed, and pay his respects to the relief workers.”
Raidi explains to his comrades in the Communist administration that Tibet being located in “an alpine area, the mountains are high, valleys are deep, and the geology is complex”.
Relief work is therefore very difficult: “In such a serious disaster, it is really not easy to have achieved such results in the phased earthquake relief efforts."
Nothing wrong. Raidi then speaks of the massive 8.6-magnitude earthquake on August 15, 1950, whose epicenter was located in Metok County (Dzong) and Zayul Dzong.
Raidi recalled that he was 12 years old at that time: “At the quake’s epicenter, there were landslides from the mountains and the ground opened up, and the Yarlung Tsangpo (Siang/Brahmaputra) was divided into four parts. Some villages were thrown on the opposite of the river and houses collapsed. Even places that were far from the epicenter, like Lhasa, Chamdo, and Nagchu, were also greatly affected. According to incomplete statistics from the time, more than 2,000 people were killed, countless people went missing, and the disaster area was covered in ruins.”
Now comes the ideological part of the letter: “Tibet was still ruled by the old Tibetan government. Led by the 14th Dalai Lama, not only did the government not care about the lives of common people, but they also increased several taxes.”
Raidi’s conclusion is: "There is a sharp contrast between the earthquake relief in Old Tibet and in New China. …this shows that only under the leadership of the CPC, in a socialist society can the Tibetan people have the confidence, courage, and ability to overcome any disaster and rebuild their homeland. Thus Tibet, especially those areas affected by the recent earthquake, will achieve leapfrog development and long-term stability.”
There is no doubt that the infrastructure is very different today from what it was in 1950. In Nepal too, it is far easier to bring food, supplies, warm cloths to those affected by the tragedy. In 1950, Lhasa, without speaking of Metok or Zayul, located north of the McMahon Line, had never an ‘iron birds’, helicopters or planes.
But to compare the rescue operations during the recent tragedy and the ones, 65 years ago is unbecoming of a former senior Communist cadre. Mr. Raidi should have kept quiet. He probably does not realize that the progress in infrastructure, roads, airfields, transportation have been planetary and due to the Communist Party only.
By the way, the Chinese Panchen Lama (also a Nagchu native) has personally donated 200,000 yuan（32,300 US dollars), for the quake-affected areas, “to show his sympathy for the needy people.”
I am wondering how, under a Communist dispensation, Lamas can become rich, like their predecessors in Old Tibet.
How do they get richly-endowed labrangs (estates) like in the past?
Buddha too must be wondering: is what I thought my monks.

The 1950 Earthquake
To give an idea of the devastating 1950 Earthquake, known in India as the ‘Assam Earthquake’, I post the report of the famous British botanist Kingdon-Ward.

THE EARTHQUAKE 
(AUGUST 15, 1950) 

By F. KINGDON-WARD

A vividly-written account of an unforgettable experience.
The Author is a well-known Himalayan explorer, and describes how, while camping near the Tibetan frontier, he and his wife narrowly escaped with their lives from the havoc wrought by one of the most violent earthquakes on record.

Finishing an entry in my diary, I shut it and lay back in the deck chair near the entrance to our tent. On the camp table beside me the hurricane-lamp burnt dimly; my wife was already in her cot, half asleep. I told myself I must soon put out the light and turn in; we were due to start off again early the following morning, and a good night’s rest was essential. First of all, however, I wanted to lie back and relax for ten minutes, enjoying the comparatively cool night air. The date was August 15th, 1950, the time about 8 p.m. and the place the wilds of Upper Assam.
Everything seemed very quiet. Now and then a dog barked in the village of Rima, away behind us, and I could just detect the muffled echo of the river as it entered a narrow part of the deep gorge. Occasionally an owl shrieked somewhere close by.
Suddenly, as I reclined there in a semi-doze, the chair on which I sat, the table, and finally the tent itself began to shiver. Aroused, my wife sat up in her cot. A split second later the whole valley appeared to be convulsed, and the air was filled with a loud roaring. Involuntarily I sprang to my feet.
“What on earth’s that?” I asked, startled, and thrust my head out between the tent-flaps.
The high mountains were silhouetted against a riband of clear, star-flecked sky, but their outlines, instead of being sharp and hard, were strangely fuzzy. Meanwhile noise continued, becoming louder even as I stared about me in bewilderment. Then the dread truth dawned on both of us but it was my wife who put it into words.
An earthquake the cried, now thoroughly awake and forth with leaped from her bed. “Outside –quick!”
I seized the lantern, with some vague idea of a fire risk, and together we rushed out into the most awful pandemonium. The turmoil was terrifying. Mingled with the dreadful sound of the tearing and shearing of the earth’s crust came the roar of mountains that were apparently tumbling downing every direction. It appeared as though the very arch of heaven was falling.
Directly we left the tent a violent tremor threw us to the ground, and we felt the earth beneath us bucking and heaving madly. Every moment I expected it to split open and precipitate us into some yawning figure. Great rocks were crashing from the mountainsides; dust rose like the smoke of some vast conflagration, blotting out the stars. Meanwhile a rain of gigantic hammer-blows thundered on the ground below; it seemed that it must soon be pulverized into fragments.
Too frightened to move, we lay where we had fallen, with the familiar world around us breaking up bodily. For quite five minutes—minutes as long as years—mountains and valleys shook, shivered, and trembled to the accompaniment of ear-splitting sounds of destruction. It is impossible to convey an adequate idea of our sensations or the impression of overmastering terror and utter helplessness in the face of stupendous disaster.
At last, however, the earth-tremors began to die away. Then, quite suddenly, there came a series of five explosions high in the sky; they followed one another, loud and distinct, at equal intervals of a few seconds. The detonations reminded me of anti-aircraft shells bursting round enemy planes, but their effect was very different. Abruptly the shaking of the ground ceased, the last boulders rumbled down the mountains, the splintering trees stood firm. Even the river—which had roared like a wild beast in pain throughout the cataclysm—became quieter. There could be no doubt the earthquake was over.
What caused that extraordinary “gunfire” is a complete mystery. The explosions were heard on the plains of Assam, two hundred miles away, where the soft earth “wobbled like a jelly” during the worst phases of the quake.
We rose slowly to our feet, thanked to be alive and unhurt, but not yet quite sure that we were. Had we passed through some terrible nightmare, or had it all really happened? It seemed hard to believe it was an actual experience—but there was the dust which filled the air and now began to settle, silently and impalpably. It was in our eyes, our ears, our mouths; already it was lining our lungs and forming a grey film on our faces. For days thereafter we were eating dust as well as breathing it!
The quake was mercifully over, but its dread aftermath was only just beginning. From the village came no sound of barking dogs, no shouting of men. Had all those poor souls been killed? Fortunately, this was not the case, for presently there strolled into our camp the familiar figure of a villager of our acquaintance—and he had a broad grin on his face! I envied his stolidity, in the midst of this tremendous calamity he still contrived to remain cheerful! The sight of that simple Hillman put new life and confidence into us, and especially into our two Sherpa boys, who had been badly frightened.
Our friend told us that the village had been badly damaged, despite the fact that the houses—massively built of logs resting on solid stone foundations—were only one storey high. By great good luck, however, nobody had been killed.
“Let’s have some tea,” suggested my wife; there was no thought of going back to bed again after such an awakening. The wood fire was still burning, and we re-lit the lanterns. The stream from which we drew our water was only a dozen yards from the cook-house and boys’ tent, and one of the Sherpas took the kettle and went off. Next moment he gave a shout of dismay, and we all rushed towards him to see what had happened. The brook, which two hours previously had flowed swiftly along its bed, was now nothing but a trickle. Even as we watched it grew smaller and smaller.
    “Quick!” I shouted. “Bring buckets, saucepans—anything!”
We filled a couple of kettles and a pail, but only with difficulty, for the trickle soon died away to a mere thread and, finally, intermittent drops. Our water supply had vanished, and there was nothing we could do about it!
    We sat around sipping tea and talking for an hour. We still felt slightly dazed; it seemed incredible that these mighty mountains, rising ten or twelve thousand feet above our heads—the village in the gorge was itself 5000 feet above sea-level—should have been in the grip of a force which shook them as a terrier shakes a rat. The previous day they had looked as solid and immovable as the Rock of Gibraltar; now they were riven and shattered, their rocky slopes disintegrating like sand-dunes in a breeze.
Inside our tent, curiously enough, everything appeared exactly as it had done before the quake. Nothing was broken, nothing disarranged, even the aluminium tent-poles had not Shifted! The knoll on which our little camp was pitched had withstood the terrific shaking and battering unharmed, moreover-very fortunately for us—it had not been in the line of descent of the falling rocks. Thousands of huge boulders, dislodged from the mountainsides by the violent tremors, had leaped, bounced, and rolled down the steep slopes, snapping off stout trees like match-sticks. Any one of these flying masses could have demolished our tents and swept them away, leaving nothing but rags and shattered corpses to mark the site. Yet we had emerged scatheless!
Though the disturbance was over, there was as yet no reassuring restfulness about our surroundings. Those adjustments of the earth’s crust which inevitably follow a severe earthquake-especially in regions so notoriously unstable as the mountains on the Assam frontier—had still to come. We were blissfully unaware of the fact at the moment, but these minor movements were destined to continue for months! In our state of nervous tension, in the dust and darkness of that night of terror, it was enough for us that, practically every half-hour, the tortured ground gave a convulsive shudder. Each of these tremors—some of hall a minute’s duration—was accompanied by a roaring sound, like a great wind, and by fresh rock-falls close at hand, either on the opposite side of the big Lohit River or on our own bank, close to the village and camp.
Not knowing the ways of major earthquakes—indeed, we were ignorant as yet that it was a major earthquake—we feared a repetition of the major shock, and before venturing to lie down on our beds again we made careful preparations for a rapid get-out if necessary. There was no sleep for any of us during the remainder of the night, although I believe I dozed off once or twice for half an hour.
Meanwhile, in England, California, South Africa, and almost every modern city in the world, seismographs had been registering the greatest upheaval of the earth’s crust since these delicate instruments were invented. As a matter of fact, seismographs thousands of miles distant had been thrown off balance; they either ceased to record or the tremendous oscillations extended beyond the limits of the graph paper. Within a few hours scientists were hard at work trying to decide in what part of the globe this terrific cataclysm had occurred, and later the newspapers announced that there had been an earthquake of great intensity somewhere in north-east India. Not for several days was the real magnitude of the disaster realized.
Its “epicenter,” according to American physicists, was in the south-eastern corner of Tibet, about twenty-five miles from the frontier with Assam. The ‘quake shook the whole of Upper Assam, two hundred miles away, and must also have done the same with a large area in Tibet, but as this region is almost uninhabited no record of what happened there has come to hand.
Dawn arrived at last, and we got up and looked outside once more. Things appeared more or less normal. A bird was singing sweetly; in a nearby field a small boy was shouting to scare birds off the ripening crops. Presently, from the village, there emerged a file of old women and young girls plodding out to work, as they had done every morning for months. We felt very thankful; evidently the world was nor completely topsy-turvy!
Nevertheless, the sun rose on a scene very different from that on which it had set the previous evening. The flanks of the mountains were mutilated and torn asunder, the wounds gleaming white as snow against the prevailing green of summer. The broad terraces that led step by step down to the river—many of them cultivated—were now corrugated and fissured with deep cracks, sometimes raised, sometimes downwards. The high river-bank itself had slipped in a hundred places, piling up mounds of gravel. The village, in its bower of trees, appeared to be in ruins. It was true that the stout main timbers of the twelve or fifteen log houses still held firm, but every roof had gone, and flimsier erections lay flat. Many of the hapless cattle and pigs, shut up in pens that had collapsed, lay dead or dying—a sad loss to their owners. The monastery building lay on its side, hurried clean off its foundations, and a bottle-shaped chorten (religious memorial) had been stripped to its core.
The most amazing sight of all, perhaps, was the Lohit River, now a wildly-tossing sea of liquid mud which had suddenly risen several feet. On its turbulent bosom it carried innumerable great tree-trunks, plunging and tossing amidst huge waves, dancing madly in the swirling eddies, and rushing headlong through the gorge. Literally millions of big trees must have been uprooted or smashed; they passed in endless procession. The stench of the mud was horrible.
No less wonderful, though on a smaller scale was the spectacle presented by the minor tributary which swept swiftly down from the Burma border to join the Lohit at Rima. The previous afternoon it had been crystal-clear; carefully choosing the right place, one could easily have waded across it. Now, like the Lohit, it was just liquid mud—the colour of coffee—laced with froth, and considerably deeper. Three mills housed to timber cabins along its bank in ruins the primitive cantilever bridge that spanned it was in grave danger of collapse and shaking like a leaf. I shouldn’t have cared to essay a crossing.
We learned later that on the plains of Assam, two or three hundred miles from where we were, the earth had swayed sickeningly and sagged in many places. Over a wide area several buildings had fallen, railway lines had snapped, bridges had been shattered, and roads had sunk. On the whole, however, direct damage had been comparatively slight. But the damage had been comparatively slight. But the floods resulting from the damming of rivers far away back in the mountains, long after the earthquake was over, eventually caused the death of hundreds of people by drowning.
So much for external matters; I will now return to our own position. Once it was fully light we were able to get a better idea of the havoc the ‘quake had wrought, but we still had no idea of its extent and intensity. As the sun rose over the mountain ridge the air began to heat up, and the usual daily wind swept through the river gorge. Loosened rocks started to fall again, and soon the shaken mountains were disgorging avalanches of gravel and boulders, which swept down their slopes to the accompaniment to rise from these rock slides, spread far and wide by the wind until the sun was veiled and the mountains across the river, only a mile away, appeared dimly outlined through the choking fog.
Meanwhile, every hour or so, there was a terrifying subterranean rumble, after which the ground shook for several seconds. These earth-tremors felt—and sounded—exactly as though an enourmous train were rushing through a tunnel just beneath our feet.
You will already have gathered that when all this happened my wife and I were far away from anything representing civilization. It was three weeks before we were able to cross the flooded river and start our difficult homeward journey. This was because the rope bridge across the impassable Lohit had been destroyed and—with the stream in gigantic flood—it proved impossible to replace it. Even then it was nearly three months, after a series of adventures, before we succeeded in getting out of the mountains and safely back to the plains. Here we discovered that our friends had been exceedingly anxious as to our fate; even the Home newspapers had indulged in speculation as to what had happened to us. We learned also, for the first time, that we had been at the very heart of one of the greatest earthquakes on record—and, luckily, survived uninjured to tell our story!
From the strictly scientific point of view, however, all that occurred was the sudden collapse of a relatively small block of the earth’s crust a few miles down. Possibly the fracture was several miles long, and one half of it slipped downwards, thus creating a geological “fault.” On the other hand, the roof of some vast subterranean cavern may have given way, thereby jarring the upper crust. Nobody knows for certain; it is just a matter of theory. At all events, whatever its cause, the displacement produced the awe-inspiring phenomenon I have endeavoured to describe, and which my wife and I will never forget.

Nehru and the ‘pending’ case of Tibet in United Nations

My article Nehru and the ‘pending’ case of Tibet in United Nations appeared in The Firstpost.

Here is the link...

A Canadian scholar, Claudia Johnston, went through the old UN files and found out that following India’s assurance that it would ‘sort out the Tibet issue peacefully with China’, the case was still pending in the UN
 

On September 30, Russia held four referenda with the objective of annexing Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia regions of Ukraine recently occupied by Moscow; it immediately draw strong condemnation from Kyiv as well as Western nations who called the votes a sham.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said: "These are not just crimes against international law and Ukrainian law, these are crimes against specific people, against a nation."
The G7 foreign ministers released a strong statement saying that Putin’s actions “constitute a new low point in Russia’s blatant flouting of international law. …[The G7 countries] will never recognize these purported annexations, nor the sham ‘referenda’ conducted at gunpoint."
While the UK and the US announced fresh sanctions against Russia, the European Union strongly condemned the annexation.
At the UN, a resolution, tabled declaring the annexations illegal and demanding an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Russia’s military forces from Ukraine, was vetoed by Russia (while China, India, Brazil and Gabon abstained).
Without going into the merits and demerits of the present imbroglio, it is interesting to look at what happened to Tibet in 1950 in the same UN forum, soon after the invasion of the Land of Snows by Communist China.

The Case of Tibet
Early October 1950, Eastern Tibet was occupied by Mao’s troops. The world kept quiet, nobody wanted to know about it, while the Tibetan government was not even queen to inform the world about what had happened to their country …not to make it worse.
By the end of October 1950, things finally began moving in Lhasa, the Cabinet of Ministers (Kashag) decided to appeal to the General Assembly of the UN against the act of this blatant act of aggression.
The Tibetan Government was quite confident in the Nehru’s government who had constantly taken the side of the oppressed people against the imperialist and colonialist powers.
To the Tibetan surprise, Delhi’s reply was that they certainly would support an appeal from Tibet, but it was not ready to sponsor the case.
On November 1, Nehru sent a cable to BN Rau, the Indian Representative in the UN: “Chinese military operations against Tibet have undoubtedly affected our friendly relations with China. But these developments do not affect our general policy or even our policy regarding admission of new China in United Nations.” At that time, Delhi supported the Communists’ admission in the UN (with a seat in the Security Council for Mao!).
Finally, a well-drafted appeal was cabled by the Government of Tibet to the UN on November 7, 1950; it stated that "the Tibetans were racially, culturally and geographically far apart from the Chinese. …The problem is not of Tibet’s own making but is largely the outcome of unthwarted Chinese ambitions to bring weaker nations on her periphery within her active domination.”
The appeal continued: “This unwarranted act of aggression has not only disturbed the peace of Tibet, but is in complete disregard of the solemn assurance given by the Chinese to the Government of India. …the problem is simple. The Chinese claim Tibet as part of China.”
It concluded that Lhasa hoped that “the conscience of the world would not allow the disruption of our State by methods reminiscent of the jungle.”
The appeal eventually was dispatched from Kalimpong, where lived the Tibetan representative in India. This would be objected by the UN bureaucracy, as an appeal is supposed to emanate from the territory of the aggrieved country.
On November 14, The Hindu commented: “India’s support, it is understood, will mainly be based on the ground that the issue could be solved peacefully and without resort to arms and the extent to which there were military operations, world peace was endangered.”
Finally on November 15, it is the tiny State of El Salvador which requested the Secretary General to list the Tibetan appeal on the Agenda of the General Assembly.
During the following days, the procedural battle went on at Lake Success.

India abandons Tibet
On November 20, in a cable to BN Rau, Nehru affirmed: “Draft resolution of El Salvador completely ignores realities of situation and overlooks fact that only result of passing such a resolution will be to precipitate conquest of Tibet and destruction of Tibetan independence and perhaps even autonomy.”
In the meantime, the United Kingdom was in a dilemma; the British had always managed to keep the status of Tibet nebulous, as the vagueness had worked well for years and decades; however, the times were changing; a State could claim to be under the suzerainty of another State and at the same time fully autonomous.
For the British government, it was a real issue.
The place and status of the Land of Snow on the Asian chessboard and its appeal to the General Assembly depended on this issue as according to the UN rules, only from a ‘State’ could make an appeal to the General Assembly.
Was Tibet a State for the British Government?
Surprisingly, after consulting legal experts, His Majesty’s Government accepted the fact that Tibet was a separate State. One of the points of White Hall was that the British Government had concluded a Convention between China, Tibet and herself in 1914 in Simla (and agreed to the McMahon Line with India). The other point was that the Chinese had been expelled from Tibet in 1911 and Tibet had declared her independence two years later. The fact that Tibet had from 1911 to 1950, kept the control of her internal as well as external affairs was certainly qualifying Tibet under Article 35 (2) of the UN Charter as a separate state.
But then India’s position began vacillating, though the Prime Minister admitted to his Representative in New York: “Chinese Government has repeatedly expressed themselves In favour of Tibetan autonomy, but of course we do not know what their idea of autonomy is.”
A few days later, Vijayalaksmi Pandit, Nehru’s sister was quoted as saying: “India’s view that communist China should be given a seat in the UN, …[she thought that], if this had been done earlier, some of the present troubles in Korea might have been avoided” And what about Tibet?
Incredibly political logic!

Another Argument
Suddenly an unbelievable argument cropped up, if the opinion of the legal cell of the Foreign Office (stating that Tibet was a separate State) was not changed, the logical conclusion would be that a firm stand (and action) would have to be taken. As a consequence the UN would have to accept that an aggression had been committed and as a result pressures would be exerted by the community of nations to take an action in favour of Tibet. But nobody wanted to take an action!
The British Representative to the UN concluded: “I greatly hope therefore that I shall be instructed when and if the Indians raise this matter in the Security Council, to argue to the general effect that the legal situation is extremely obscure and that in any case Tibet cannot be considered as a fully independent country.”
The British government then asked for another legal opinion from its Attorney General.

India changes its mind
At that time, Britain and the USA had made their position known: they would support the stand of the Government of India, but at the last moment, Nehru backed out of the understanding India had given to Tibet.
He requested Washington to refrain from publicity condemning China for its action in Tibet for fear that such condemnation might give credence to China's claims that Western powers had an interest in Tibet and that the American were exerting an influence over Indian policy.
Nehru wrote these appalling words: "We cannot save Tibet, as we should have liked to do so, and our very attempts to save it might bring greater trouble to it.” India then informed that UN that it would sort out the issue peacefully with China.
A couple of decade ago, a Canadian scholar, Claudia Johnston went through the old UN files and found out that following India’s assurance, the Tibet issue was still pending in the UN.
Obviously, the present case of annexation of parts of Ukraine is different, but the morale remains that it is often the bullies who prevail, at least today, many nations (often big bullies themselves) are ready to object.
The Prime Minister is absolutely right when he says that “this was not the era for war”, but what about Tibet? Will it be forever ‘pending’?

The Mistake of the Century

President Xi Jinping is a poor strategist.
Chinese are known followers of the Art of War, an ancient Chinese military treatise written by Sun Tzu, a Chinese general and military authority in the 5th century BC. The treatise teaches all aspects of warfare and particularly how to win a War without fighting it, but today, it is clear that President Xi Jinping has not read the book properly.
Xi got the first basic wrong, “don’t take too many enemies in one go, take them one by one.”
As a result, Xi may win a few battles, but ultimately, the Chairman of the all-powerful Central Military Commission is certain to lose the war; the world will not let the Middle Kingdom dominate the planet.
Xi Jinping and his advisors did not take into account that China’s ‘enemies’ would react so quickly to Beijing’s aggressive expansionism.
Take India, how could the nation (and the government) ignore Chinese intrusions in Ladakh and accept a change of the status quo without taking measures to make Beijing pay a price.
Banning Chinese applications or cancelling State contracts for Chinese mining companies, Delhi has started acting. As China digs in in Ladakh and prepares for the winter, retaliating actions are bound to increase and certain policies taken in the 1950s, will certainly be debated afresh, particularly the ‘One-China’ policy.
It is where President Xi and his advisors have miscalculated.
India and the world can well reopen ‘unfinished’ business.
One is the Tibetan issue at the UN.
On November 7, 1950, a well-drafted appeal sent from Kalimpong (as there were no postal facilities in Lhasa), pointed to the fact that “the Tibetans were racially, culturally and geographically far apart from the Chinese.” It also made a parallel with the situation in the Korean peninsula: “The attention of the world was then riveted on Korea where aggression was being resisted by an international force.
Similar happenings in Tibet were taking place with the world covering its eyes: … [The problem is] largely the outcome of unthwarted Chinese ambitions to bring weaker nations on her periphery within her active domination,” said the Appeal, which continued: “As a people devoted to the tenets of Buddhism, Tibetans had long eschewed the art of warfare, practised peace and tolerance and for the defence of their country, relied on its geographical configuration and on non-involvement in the affairs of other nations.”
It added that the Chinese, in their natural urge for expansion, “have wholly misconstrued the significance of the ties of friendship and interdependence that existed between China and Tibet.”
Some twenty years ago, Claudia Johnston, an independent researcher in International Law at the University of Victoria, Canada, wrote a fascinating paper “Tibet: The International Mistake of the Century”.
The outcome of her research was that the Tibetan Appeal was still a pending matter in the UN …waiting to be reopened: “The UN and individual Member States, have been conducting their decisions based on the false assumption that Tibet is not a ‘State’, but ‘an internal affair’ of China. UN official records show this to be a mistake.” Tibet was then a State.
As a result, “the issue of Tibetan Statehood remains unconsidered by the United Nations. United Nations mechanisms for ‘States’ to employ peaceful solutions to ‘Disputes’ have not been utilised.”
All this was done …at the instance of India.
It is true that from the start, Delhi was pessimistic about the outcome of the UN appeal: “We doubt whether a discussion of Tibetan problem in General Assembly or in Security Council will yield any useful result,” wrote Nehru.
The friendship with China was already too important to be sacrificed for the fate a weak and peaceful neighbour like Tibet.
The Prime Minister frankly admitted that though Beijing had repeatedly expressed itself in favour of Tibetan autonomy “but of course we do NOT know what their idea of autonomy is.”
Delhi thought: “We do NOT think that legal argument will be helpful or that Assembly should attempt more than appeal to two parties to come to a peaceful settlement. Condemnation of China will NOT help Tibet; and neither Security Council nor Assembly is in any position to render physical aid to Tibet.”
As a result China was not condemned and could complete its task of entering Lhasa without hindrance; in Sun Tzu’s jargon, ‘liberating Tibet without waging war’.
In the course of the discussions at the UN in New York, most of the representatives indicated that India was the nation most concerned and that they would follow India’s lead.
In a note, Nehru sadly asserted: “I think it may be taken for granted that China will take possession, in a political sense at least, of the whole of Tibet.”
He further admitted that for the Tibetan people the “autonomy can obviously not be anything like the autonomy, verging on independence, which Tibet has enjoyed during the last forty years or so.”
His final words were: “We cannot save Tibet, as we should have liked to do so, and our very attempts to save it might bring greater trouble to it. It would be unfair to Tibet for us to bring this trouble upon her without having the capacity to help her effectively.”
The strange argument was: if we do anything to help Tibet, it will upset the Chinese and the fate of Tibet would be worse.
The case was eventually ‘put in abeyance’ at India’s demand.
Let us remember that Sardar Patel was by then a dying man; nobody could stand up to Nehru.
But today, if China stubbornly continues to occupy Indian territory in Ladakh or if the Chinese Western Theatre Command generals manage to convince the new Helmsman that India should be taught more lessons, there are plenty of old issues for India to reopen. For sure, Chairman Xi has not played his cards well.

Tibet is a way for China to wipe its tears: Vajpayee

India has lost one of her greatest political leader, Atal Vihari Vajpayee.
I am posting is an article written for Swadesh, a Hindi journal published in Lucknow.
On October 26, 1950, just two weeks after the Chinese troops entered Eastern Tibet, Vajpayee wrote these words.
He was one of the very few Indian journalists who condemned the Chinese action; he was then responsible for several publications linked with the RSS.
I am also posting Vajpayee's intervention during is a debate in the Lok Sabha after the first Chinese attacks on the Indian border in 1959.

[Translated from Hindi]
The 'Shanti Path’ [the Path of Peace] of the 6th anniversary of the UN was not even finished when we heard of a new invasion.
The armies of Communist China were ordered to invade Tibet.
Although behind the iron curtain they [China] try to hide all news, the news of the invasion, even before being received officially from Peking, was sent by China News Agency [The Xinhua communiqué was dispatched through Hong Kong, not directly from Beijing] and it is why the world received the first news of the invasion of Tibet, not from Peking, but from London.
Some people did not believe in these news, though a few times in the past there had been rumours of invasion of this kind [in August 1950].
 So much so that the Tibetan representatives [Tsepon Shakabpa] who had arrived in India also said that they did not believe in the truth of these news.
One reason for this disbelief was that the [forthcoming] negotiations between China and Tibet.
The Indian government had arranged for the talks through the Ambassador to India of Communist China. But he declared that not Delhi but Beijing was the proper place for the talks.
The delegation of Tibetan representatives was today leaving to Peking via Calcutta.
On one side, peace talks, on the other side invasion, naturally nobody could believe it, but after the Peking government officially announced the invasion, all doubts were removed.
With the announcement of the invasion the communist government has thrown some light on its causes and its aims. Yet the causes and the language are the same as those of all invaders, that is to say, the aggressor is never attacking for egoist purposes, he attacks to liberate the people of the attacked region.
And they had to take this step to save the people from the evil conspiracy of imperialist forces.
The communist China invades also for this same reason -- to save the people of Tibet from the grip of imperialist forces, the communist armies marched in Tibet.
But the efforts it made till today for getting the membership of UN surely put on them some moral responsibility to respect the principles of UN.
China can reject it saying that it is an internal matter, but Tibet is a free country, even if at the time of imperialist China there were sovereignty in name of China over it.
Communist China which is so opposed to imperialism surely is not bound by this tradition, nor can it be a ground for declaring legal this invasion of the independent state of Tibet.
More than Tibet, Formosa is a part of China, but nobody included America would accept its invasion. If an invasion of Formosa is considered as contrary to the ideals of the UN, then how much more for Tibet?
Will the UN pay attention and help Tibet?
It is possible that the powers, trapped each one in its own interest, will not pay attention to Tibet.
The reason for the invasion of Tibet is not the discovery of uranium or the greed of the imperialist powers for it; it is an attempt to strengthen the moral of the Communist block.
The invasion of South Korea by North Korea and the initial victory over the army of UN had given a boost to the communists of all countries.
But the victory of UN has put cold water on their enthusiasm. The influence of Russia has diminished somewhat. When the question came on the UN armies crossing the 38° latitude, then China warned that if it happens then she will attack the UN armies.
But the UN did not worry and ordered its armies to get full victory.
Russia felt that with the cold war becoming hot they had to suffer defeat.  Seeing the state of North Korea, China did not have the courage to up its army against UN army. In consequence it was not possible for the Chinese armies to advance towards Formosa and Korea…
Invading Tibet is a way for China to wipe its tears.


22 December 1959
Debate in the Lok Sabha
(Intervention of Atal Bihari Vajpayee translated from Hindi)

Mr Speaker, a new situation has arisen with the letter received from the Prime Minister of China.
Our Prime Minister in his letter of November 16 had placed some alternative proposals before China. According to these proposals, China had to vacate the Indian land in Ladakh [Aksai Chin] and at the same time, it was suggested that India would not send her men to that area.
Our Prime Minister had been criticised in this House for this proposal.
We had found it objectionable; we had said that it will encourage the Chinese aggression and it will give her the opportunity of strengthening her old claims and present new claims. The answer from the Prime Minister of China only confirms this.
Our Prime Minister had suggested that China abandons the Indian land, but they answered : why should this proposal apply only to the border of Ladakh, if we go out of the land defined by the maps of India, then the Indians should go out of the land defined by our maps, they should go out of NEFA.
Mr Speaker, we tried to respect China and as a result we are  being insulted.
Instead of understanding the Prime Minister's good will, China has increased her claims, China puts claims on Uttar Pradesh, on Punjab, on Himachal Pradesh, on places which are ours by geography, by history, by tradition, by treaty. She demands a price for withdrawing from Ladakh.
We should abandon our rights to other regions.
If this is the attitude of China, then what is the basis for the hope of making an agreement with China? There should be an agreement, nobody in the country wants a war, but if we trade with China sacrificing the interests of India, if we cannot defend the honour of India, this peace will not be worth getting, it will not be a stable peace.
The Prime Minister of China answered after one month.
I think that they want to prolong this correspondence, so that they can make roads and construct airports on the land they have taken, so that they can strengthen their attack.
Shri Karam Singh [who had been taken prisoner by China in Ladakh] said in his statement that at the place where he was arrested, motorable roads are being made. War preparations are being made on the soil of India. China needs time for that. It is why this long exchange of letters.
They took one month for replying and our Prime Minister hopes that on receiving his letter they will pack up and go to Rangoon. ... I am happy that our Prime Minister refused the suggestion to go to Rangoon.
It was not a proposal to go to Rangoon, it was an invitation for Munich, they want to re-enact Munich. I am happy that our Prime Minister has refused this proposal.
But he said this afternoon in the Rajya Sabha that in the letter of the Prime Minister of China, an eagerness to meet him was expressed and he welcomed it. Is really the Prime Minister of China wanting an agreement or is the desire to meet our Prime Minister propaganda?
He wants to show the world that China wants peace, while China invades India, and India does not want peace because we are not ready to meet him.
There is a great similitude between the proposal by China and the line adopted by the Communist Party of India. In Calcutta they have repeated that the two Prime Ministers should meet and the Prime Minister of China is also saying that we should meet.
Meet for what?
After all, what is the meeting ground between our two countries? what is the basis for talks? And if the two prime ministers meet, why meet in Rangoon? If they meet, why not in Delhi?
I object to this accusation by the Prime Minister of China that in India an atmosphere is being created against the Chinese friendship.
M Speaker, there is no atmosphere against the friendship, there is an atmosphere against invasion.
As long as this attack will last, this atmosphere will persist.
We are a living people, we have self-respect and if there is trespassing on our land our reaction is necessary, nobody can stop this.
But their Prime Minister wants to make propaganda, he wants to be the divine messenger of peace, he wants to place our Prime Minister in a false position.
Now the Communists will start saying that Mr Zhou Enlai wants a meeting, but Panditji [Nehru] does not want it. If Panditji does not want a meeting, he rightly does so.
After all, what is the basis for a meeting? When there is no agreement on the facts, when there is no agreement on the principles, what is the use of meeting?
And suppose  there is a meeting and it is a failure, the result will be even more frightening. It is why the point of view of the Government is correct. Before the two prime ministers can meet, the preliminary things should be decided, we should decide what will be the basis for agreement. But as far as the preliminary  things are concerned, there is no sign in the letter of China that they want an agreement, except that they have evoked Panchsheel, they have sung the refrain of peace.

Shri Jadhav:  And they are ready  to stab us.

Shri Vajpayee: They say that we are a backward country, that we have to develop economically, but they are not ready to leave the land of India they have grabbed. Our Prime Minster has already said that the northern border of India is fixed. It has not been drawn on the map and we can discus about some details, but the entire border cannot be made a subject of discussion. But  the Chinese Prime Minister is trying to make the entire border a subject of discussion. He wants to dictate his terms as maker of our border. It is clear that the Indian government and the people of India cannot accept this situation.
But today it is said: what can we do? the Prime Minister in the Rajya Sabha said: "what can we do? Should we make war?“
Nobody wants you to make war, but I want to know : if tomorrow China advances in Longju [in NEFA], or Ladakh, or further, what will you do?

An Hon'ble Member: Negotiations.

Shri Vajpayee: No compromise can be made with an invasion, and it is why we should prepare for war. We may not start the war from our side, but if the other side is intent on war, it cannot be  avoided. But there are other ways than war.  The trade what we had with Tibet is stopped. China put restrictions on Indian trade with Tibet. Yet we did not put restrictions. We have only deployed a guard  before the Chinese Trade Agency of Kalipong. There are other Chinese trade agencies in India whose activities can be stopped. The restrictions that have been put on the Indian embassy in Peking can be put on the Chinese embassy in New Delhi. The time has come to take this step.

An Hon'ble Member: There is democracy in India.

Shri Vajpayee: Because of the Chinese attack, today we face a danger and the friends of China by repeating this slogan ”There is democracy in India“ try to make us blind to this danger.
If we want, we can also break our diplomatic relations with China; there are other means we can adopt other than waging war, and where there is a will, there is a way.
I believe that, except the [Indian] Communist Party, all the country agrees that the Chinese challenge should be dealt with firmly. It is clear that war will have to be fought, but as long as we don't take steps on time, we cannot prepare an atmosphere to face this challenge.
I have to say something else, and it is that our Foreign Affairs Ministry does not work well.
In the Rajya Sabha our Prime Minister spoke of a place named Samado. It has been printed by mistake. This was part of China but we have put claims on it.
He apologised. This type of mistake should not happen. I feel that the Foreign Ministry should be careful. China takes hold of small things like this and tries to weaken our case. In this hour of danger, the Foreign Ministry should rise to the occasion, it has not done it so far. This is necessary. Thank you.

Is China Changing? Religious practices in Tibet

My article Is China Changing? Religious practices in Tibet has been published by the Asia Research Institute of the University of Nottingham


Here is the link...

In October 1950, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) entered Eastern Tibet with the objective of ‘liberating’ the region. The Tibetans, who for centuries had lived in beatific seclusion, could not really understand from what they needed to be ‘liberated’; a large percentage of the population lived as Buddhist monks and nuns in thousands of monasteries, seeking the Great Liberation. It soon turned out that the Communist ‘liberation’ was very different from the one advocated by Gautama Buddha in the plains of North India some 2500 years earlier. Mao and his colleagues wanted to ‘reform’ a so-called feudal society.
When the Communist leadership tried to force their ‘reforms’ on the Khampas, the inhabitants of Eastern Tibet, the latter immediately revolted. It resulted in tens of thousands of them being killed. Monasteries were bombed, ‘rebels’ machine-gunned: religion was a ‘poison’, as per Mao’s words, it had to be eradicated. One question is often asked, has China changed over the last 60 years or has it remained the same? China is indeed today a different nation; it has laws, rules and regulations, even for religious practices.

A new set of regulations
In November 2017, the Chinese State Administration for Religious Affairs published a set of updated regulations dealing with religious issues (they have come into force in February 2018). Some of the directives are aimed at monitoring the over-commercialization of Buddhism and Taoism. The South China Morning Post said that China had decided to ban commercialization of Buddhist and Taoist activities to tighten its grip on religion: “local cadres have been specifically barred from promoting and profiting from religious activities in the name of fostering economic development. Temples in scenic spots cannot overcharge tourists for entry, while they are banned from building any new large outdoor religious statues.” The stated objective of these regulations was to ‘protect citizens’ freedom of religious belief’.
But some religious leaders in China, such as Pastor Wang Yi of Early Rain Church in Sichuan saw a deeper scheme: “the government has no authority to direct or examine religious groups and religious activities in their doctrinal teaching and governing or to limit citizens religious activity to the time and location it decides,” he stated. Indeed, under the revised Regulations, religious affairs are controlled in minutest details by the State (read the Communist Party).

How does this translate in Tibet?
 In the recent months and years, there has been in a tightening of State control over religious institutions. Further, most of the monasteries have now become tourist attractions under the control of local administration. Monks are mostly in place as a showcase for the millions of Han tourists visiting the Roof of the World (26 million in 2017). Another dichotomy is reflected in the case of the Serthar Buddhist Institute in Larung Gar in Sichuan’s Kardzi prefecture. The Institute was founded by a charismatic Lama, Khenpo Jigme Phuntsok in 1980 to help revive Buddhist scholarship and meditation. In the early 2000s, it housed the largest concentration of monks and nuns in Tibetan areas …including nearly 1,000 Han Chinese students. In 2016, Radio Free Asia (RFA) reported that Beijing had decided to destroy large sections of a monastery: “Massive cuts are being planned for the number of monks and nuns allowed to live at a large Buddhist study centre.”
It had perhaps become too dangerous for the Communist Party that the monastery enjoyed a great popularity among Chinese; between 20,000 and 30,000 monks and nuns, (a large proportion from the mainland) had joined the institute over the years. The Diplomat described the situation: “In June 2016, the Chinese government in Beijing issued an order that stated the site had become overcrowded and its population had to be reduced to a maximum of 5,000 by October 2017. Within weeks, work teams descended on the peaceful community and began tearing down people’s homes, reducing cabins to nothing more than splintered wood and shattered glass. The owners were forced to sign documents agreeing not to return to the area again and to ‘uphold the unity of the nation’.”
China seems stuck between the ‘normality’, i.e. the rule of law on one side and the imposition of the Party’s diktats, on the other. Already in 2001, a similar process had occurred; The South China Morning Post then wrote: “Tibetan support groups and Chinese residents of a nearby town said the dismantling of homes at Serthar had started in June [2001] and many of the residents — once estimated at 6,000 to 7,000 — had been forced to leave.” But as a sphinx, Sethar had emerged again.

Examinations in Beijing
A sign that all is not well in the field of religion in the Middle Kingdom is the fact that China does not hold the examination for the highest degree in Buddhist philosophy, the Geshe Larampa, in Tibet itself. On May 19, You Quan, minister of the United Front Work Department, a high functionary in the Party, distributed the certificates to the new graduates. During the function, You Quan emphasized that the Tibetan Buddhist community, the Sangha, “should thoroughly study and understand the Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, unswervingly adhere to correct political positions; firmly uphold national unity; positively adapt to developing trends of the current times; vigorously promote interpretations of Buddhist doctrines and make new contributions to the future inheritance and development of the Tibetan Buddhist tradition.”
The function took in the premises of the High-level Tibetan Buddhism College …in Beijing. For hundreds of years, the examinations were held in the Great Monasteries of Ganden, Drepung and Sera in the outskirts of Lhasa, why should they take now place in the Chinese capital? Simply because Beijing is nervous about the rise of religion in Tibet …and the Middle Kingdom. Another sign that religious freedom is not blooming, political training is regularly held for religious leaders. The Global Times mentioned, “Extensive training for religious priests is being launched at the local and central levels on core socialist values, patriotism and religious signification.” According to the tabloid, training is being organized by the Central Institute of Socialism, the Party Schools for non-Party members. The Global Times admitted: “The sinification of religions was highlighted in China’s newly revised regulation on religious affairs, which took effect in February.” The Institute has been holding this type of course for all major ‘Chinese’ religions including Buddhism, Catholicism, Protestantism and Islam.
In the meantime, in Tibet, the Chinese authorities are closely monitoring the religious observances during the holy month of Saga Dawa, forbidding government workers and students from participating in traditional gatherings. Radio Free Asia reported: “The Chinese authorities in Lhasa are ordering Tibetan government employees, schoolchildren, and their parents to avoid group religious activities during the holy month.… Even government retirees are being targeted by this ban on religious worship,” RFA’s source said. China may have greatly changed in the recent decades, but the freedom to practice one’s own religion still exist on paper only.

The fate of a visionary diplomat

Sumul Sinha, second from left

My article A fate of a visionary diplomat appeared in the Edit Page of The Pioneer.

Here is the link...

Had Nehru followed the advice of Sumul Sinha, the Indian official who had warned him about the intentions of communist China, the destiny of the nation could have been different

One does not often pay homage to unknown diplomats: hade their advice been followed, the destiny of the nation could perhaps have different. This is the case of Sumul Sinha, the official in charge of the Indian Mission in Lhasa between 1950 and 1952.
Five months after forcing a 17-Point Agreement on Tibetan delegates (and forging the seals of the Lhasa government), the Chinese ‘Liberation Army’ (PLA) entered the Tibetan capital in September 1951. During the first months the Red generals were pure honey. Sinha witnessed their changing bheviour and reported to his bosses in Delhi.
The young Mandarin-speaking diplomat noted that the Tibetans had started to ‘shed their fears’ and they have again ‘acquired confidence for the future’. Though eleven months earlier, the PLA had brutally smashed an ill-prepared and disorganized Tibetan Army in Eastern Tibet, perhaps the Chinese were not so bad after all, believed many Tibetans.
Sinha explained to Delhi: “Credit is due to the Chinese [general] who with patience and delicacy are handling the problem of leading Tibet into the fold. They had struck terror into the hearts of Tibetans, when the offensive began, and it was then essential to pulverize resistance and gain victory. …The struggle has begun for the mind and soul of Tibet in ways that are subtle and hardly perceptible.” The Chinese largesse at that time was phenomenal.
This type of language deeply irritated the Indian Prime Minister; according to Nehru, Sinha could not grasp that the Chinese had come to help the Tibetans to abandon their medieval mindset and in any case, the destiny of India and China were forever bound together for the good of humanity.
“Mr Sinha needs to be enlightened”, he once wrote; poor Sinha was only trying to report, as faithfully as possible, the situation on the ground.
On October 7, 1950, the Chinese had walked into Eastern Tibet. While the population in Lhasa had started panicking, the Tibetan government reacted ‘cautiously’ to the invasion at the beginning; they did not want to ‘upset’ the Chinese.
India’s Tibet policy had recently been taken a radical change under the guidance of KM Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador in Beijing, who was suddenly promoted as Nehru’s chief advisor for Tibet affairs. Conflict with China had to be avoided at any cost, world peace was the only objective were the new mottos …and Tibet could be sacrificed in the process.
The situation rapidly soured between the Indian Representative in Tibet and the Prime Minister. On November 23, Nehru wrote to Sinha: “Government of India have noticed that certain communications from Lhasa and Sikkim regarding Tibet are dogmatic, disputatious and admonitory. We want of course our representatives to give us full information …[But] once a decision has been taken by Government [read to abandon Tibet to its fate], it should be accepted gracefully and followed faithfully; any insinuation that Government have been acting wrongly or improperly is objectionable.”
Sinha saw another angle to the dramatically-unfolding Tibetan issue; India was suddenly acquiring a new neighbour; the Indian borders could soon be endangered. But Sinha’s reports did not fit into Nehru’s ‘larger’ vision of the world. Further, for Delhi, Sinha expressed too much sympathy for the Tibetan people at a time when their nation was being erased from the world map.
Sincere and competent officers often suffered because of Nehru’s admonishing tendencies; the Prime Minister was particularly harsh on those who tried to warn him of the consequences of his ‘friendship at any cost’ policy with China.
The reaction to Sinha’s cable has to be understood against backdrop of the letter on Tibet sent on November 7 by the Deputy Prime Minister, Sardar Patel to Nehru.
In the same cable, the Prime Minister said that diplomats should: “avoid as far as possible strong language and condemnation …of nations which only increases international tension.” In other words, don’t call a spade, a spade, even in internal ‘top secret’ correspondence.
The cable continued eulogizing China’s revolution: “This may be factor for stability and peace of the world or danger to us and to world peace. For this reason we tried to cultivate friendly relations with China and we believe that this became a stabilizing factor when Korean war started.”
On November 27, 1950, Sinha cabled the Foreign Secretary (a young officer could not answer directly to the Prime Minister, though copies were marked for the PMO): “My short-coming is inexperience. I know however that I have striven to carry out Government of India’s policy to the letter. In my telegrams which had to be TERSE I tried to reflect faithfully the reactions of Tibetan Government to situation facing them in the belief Government of India would like to know.”
In the following years, Sinha would be blasted again and again for warning Nehru of the true intentions of Communist China. Sadly, he finished a dejected man.
Just before the end of his tenure in Lhasa in Summer 1952, Sinha did it again; he upset the Prime Minister. Sinha had the unfortunate idea to ask for a loan of Rs. 2 lakhs to help the forces fighting for Tibetan independence.
Nehru was furious. In a cable sent to the Mission in Lhasa, the Prime Minister told off Sinha; it would be “improper and unwise for our representative to get involved in Tibetan domestic affairs or intrigues.”
He added that India was naturally friendly towards Tibetans, but this should not give anyone the impression of possible interference or help. He concluded by telling his Representative: “We have to judge these matters from larger world point of view which probably our Tibetan friends have no means of appreciating.”
On March 5, 1953, Nehru again got irritated by a memo prepared by Sinha, who was now posted as Officer on Special Duty (OSD) in the Ministry. Retrospectively, Sinha’ note was prophetic; it was titled “Chinese designs on the North-East Frontier of India.”
But one can imagine that the title was not to the Prime Minister’s liking.
The Prime Minister again criticized the approach of the former Indian Representative in Tibet. He noted: “I find Mr. Sinha’s approach to be coloured very much by certain ideas and conceptions which prevent him from taking an objective view of the situation. The note starts by reference to the lust for conquest of the Chinese and is throughout based on this.”
Nehru asserted that Sinha: “looks back with a certain nostalgia to the past when the British exercised a good deal of control over Tibet and he would have liked very much for India to take the place of the British of those days.”
Six years later, when the Chinese intruded in NEFA and Ladakh, the Prime Minister probably realized that Sinha had been was right, but it was too late.
Ever since, every summer, the Chinese cross the line and ‘transgress’ into Indian territory.

The abiding mystery of Kashgar

Indian (and Pakistani) Consulate in Kashgar: today a restaurant

My article The abiding mystery of Kashgar appeared in the Edit Page of The Pioneer

Here is the link...

After years of silence over the sudden closure of the Indian Consulate in Kashgar, China, keen to have India as part of OBOR, is ready to reopen the consulate

Post-Independence, one of the most mysterious events which occurred in the early 1950s (and perhaps earlier), is still shrouded in veils; it is the closure of the Indian Consulate in Kashgar.
In a speech in the Parliament in December 1953, Nehru said, "Some major changes have taken place there [Kashgar]. …But when these changes, revolutionary changes took place there [we had to close our Consulate]."
At that time, nobody questioned these changes.
Though the Karakoram Pass was still witnessing a large number of caravans carrying on trade between Kashmir and Central Asia, Delhi accepted the closure of its Kashgar consulate as a fait accompli, just because a 'revolution' had taken place.
It is not that there was no opportunity to clarify why the Kashgar Consulate was closed, but strangely the issue was never raised, though a Top Secret note prepared for the Panchsheel Agreement negotiations in November 1953, says, "We could ask the Chinese Government to restore the normal traditional trade between Sinkiang and Kashmir, which has been completely stopped now. In fact, we had to close down our Consulate General in Kashgar and all our Indian traders have returned."
However, the Indian negotiators kept mum as Delhi was not keen to offer 'a bargaining counter for China to open more Consulates in India'.
Some documents recently declassified by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) bring some light on the 'revolutionary' events in Xinjiang in the early 1950s, particularly a summary of the happenings between 1950 and 1953. A section entitled 'Treatment of Foreigners' says: "The consulates general of Pakistan and India were closed in November 1949. Shortly after the Chinese Communist Army arrived in later December 1949 and in January 1950, restrictions were placed on the movements of people."
Why before the Chinese arrived? Again a mystery!

The Communists arrive in Urumqi

Though 'closed', the Indian Consulate continued to function normally during several months, but in the Fall of 1950, the Indian Consul General, Capt Ram Sathe (later Indian Ambassador in China) had to leave Kashgar …by the most treacherous land route, via the Karakoram pass.
Col PN Kaul, who later served in Lhasa as Consul General, mentions in his memoirs: "Our consul general in Kashgar, RD Sathe of the Indian Foreign Service and an ex-Army officer, and his wife also arrived in Leh during the winter of 1950, after their long and difficult journey from Kashgar. From distant Urumchi (Tiwah), the capital of Sinkiang, came the American consul general, Paxton, and his young wife. They had to stay with us before they could be airlifted. They had an exciting story to tell of their flight from Sinkiang. …Another person who dropped in over the passes later was the British vice-consul from Kashgar." All the foreign diplomats (except the Soviets) had no choice but to escape the Communist 'revolution'.
A few other reports from the CIA give a clearer picture of the happenings in Xinjiang. On March 21, 1951, the CIA notes: "the Chinese troops stationed in Sinkiang use systematic, disciplined violence for political reasons, …[while] rations, ammunition and military stores are received from the USSR."
The entire trade with Soviet Union and Central Asia was suddenly nationalised "and it is planned to nationalise the land. Sinkiang supplies wool, cotton and leather to the USSR, and in return receives kerosene, gasoline and old fish-plates from the USSR"
As a result, hundreds of Indian traders had to flee Kashgar; they travelled in appalling conditions before reaching Leh and Srinagar.
The CIA report continues: "almost all food in Sinkiang is being sent via Kashgar to the USSR by Russian trucks. Even the farmers have little food, and there is acute distress in the cities." At the time, there is not yet any active rebellion: "Russians are working in each Sinkiang government department."
Worse for the 'foreigners': "The Communists in Sinkiang spread anti-Pakistan, anti-British and anti-American propaganda, but because of the dislike of the Turki [Uyghur] population for the Communist Government, the propaganda has little effect."
Two years later, another report remarks: "the authorities were engaged in liquidating large numbers of people accused of having participated in the 1944 revolt against Chinese rule. [Sinkiang was then made an autonomous province supported by the USSR]."
Restrictions have greatly increased, notes the CIA: "it is necessary to obtain police permission before inviting guests to one's home. Further, the traditional fortification walls surrounding the two cities of Kashgar were torn down by forced labor: "All women in both cities were compelled to work at removing the debris resulting from the destruction. The men of Kashgar were being forced to work on the construction of roads and buildings."
During the last months of 1952 "the Government was vigorously pursuing its program for the redistribution of land. Every man agreeing to work in the fields was given 10 mows [a mow equals 0.1647 acres] of land which had been confiscated from wealthy landowners."
The report adds: "By the end of 1952 all profitable business, including the silk industry in Khotan, was under Government control. Private business was discouraged, and almost all shops had been turned into Government owned cooperative stores. The salaries paid to shopkeepers were barely enough to cover their living expenses. …any person found with gold or silver in his possession was suspected of engaging in black-market traffic in these metals, a crime, and was subjected to official interrogation concerning the manner in which he obtained it." These were the 'revolutionary' changes mentioned by Nehru.
What is striking is the omnipresence of the Soviets who, "posing as engineers, were in almost every town in southwestern Sinkiang."
Meanwhile, propaganda goes on full swing: "In every administrative unit youth organizations had been established to carry on propaganda work aimed at reactionary elements in the population. Pictures of Mao and Stalin were displayed in almost every home."
The officials in the Government of Sinkiang Province assured the people that "the Chinese in the administrative structure were there simply to teach the natives of Sinkiang the art of governing, and that soon the full Governmental administrative responsibility would be turned over to the people of Sinkiang." It is ironic that more than sixty years later, the Han cadres still control the restive province.
Reading these detailed CIA reports makes one understand the chaotic atmosphere in Xinjiang and particularly in Kashgar.
In October 1953, a short sentence at the end of a monthly report sent to Delhi by the Indian Ambassador to China, reads: "Indian Consulate General at Kashgar was closed by us during the month and Indian members of our staff started on their return journey home by the overland route."
No comment, no detail was given.
Returning to 2017, China is today keen that India should join the One Belt One Road initiative, in this case, the Indian Consulate in Kashgar should be reopened. It would be one proof of China's sincerity.

The Doka La Confrontation

My article on the Doka La Confrontation appeared in Hindi on the BBC website

Here is the link...

After independence, India chose to be represented in Lhasa by a British ICS officer, Hugh Richardson; the Scot was Indian Mission-in-Charge from 1947 to 1950. On June 15, 1949, in a communication addressed to the Ministry of External Affairs in Delhi, he suggested that India might consider occupying Chumbi Valley up to Phari ‘in an extreme emergency.’ The Chumbi Valley is the highly strategic ‘finger’ sandwiched between Bhutan and Sikkim.
Sixteen months later, Chinese troops invaded Eastern Tibet and Harishwar Dayal, who had replaced another Britisher as the Political Officer in Sikkim, made again the same suggestion: “[Richardon’s] suggestion was NOT favoured by Government of India at the time. It was however proposed as a purely defensive measure and with NO aggressive intention. An attack on Sikkim or Bhutan would call for defensive military operations by the Government of India,” he wrote to Nehru.
The proposal was again rejected by the Indian Government, though many in India thought that Delhi should be more proactive to support the Dalai Lama.
On June 16, 2017, when the Chinese troops entered a disputed stretch at the southern tip of the same Chumbi Valley, India did what it had not done in 1950, it came to the rescue of a friendly neighbor; this time it was Bhutan.
Beijing’s sharp response, via its spokesperson and State media, is probably due to the surprise; China did not expect Delhi to militarily defend Thimphu. It is also true that the trijunction is a strategic hotspot for Delhi, and by occupying it, the Chinese would have a ‘view’ not only on the Chumbi Valley but also on the Siliguri corridor, which is India’s main strategic weakness in case of a military conflict.
Beijing bases its action on the 1890 Convention between the British and the Manchus, which was never recognized by the Tibetans, as they (and the Bhutanese) had not been consulted by the 'Great Imperial Powers'. Tsepon WD Shakabpa, the Tibetan historian explained: “The British were aware that China exercised no real power in Tibet at that time.”
The need to bring the Tibetans onboard eventually resulted in the Younghusband’s military expedition in 1904 and ten years later, the Tripartite Simla Conference.
Further, the 1890 Convention mainly dealt with Northern Sikkim, where two years earlier, an armed conflict had taken between the British and the Tibetans. Though Article 1 mentions “The line commences at Mount Gipmochi on the Bhutan frontier,” the area had never been surveyed. The first survey of northern Sikkim dates 1895; some maps published more than a decade later did not show a defined border.
On June 30, 2017, the Ministry of External Affairs in Delhi clarified that, in 2012, it had been decided with China that the status quo would be maintained: “The two Governments had in 2012 reached an agreement that the tri-junction boundary points between India, China and third countries will be finalised in consultation with the concerned countries.”
Probably getting upset with the delay in finding a solution, Beijing decided to take the matter in its own hand, as it had done earlier in the South China Sea. Beijing has a tendency to believe in the principle that it is better to first be ‘in possession’ and then start talking.
While recently addressing the foreign diplomats in Delhi, Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar stated that China has been ‘unusually aggressive and articulate’.
He told Indian MPs that India’s position has been clearly outlined on the border, though the Chinese have a differing position.
An interesting (and reassuring) feature of the present standoff is that both the Indian and Chinese troops, facing each other in the 7 km gap between the different ‘perceptions’ of the trijunction, are unarmed. Braving the high altitude, two chains of soldiers stand opposite each other preventing a move of the opponent.
As long as no weapon is used, there is still hope to find a diplomatic solution, though the Chinese have gone rather far in their propaganda campaign; this has made a win-win solution, without ‘loss of face’, more difficult to find.
In a recent interview, Former National Security Advisor Shyam Saran said there was no need of acrimonious exchanges: “I don’t think we should look for tit-for-tat kind of exchanges. This is serious business. Would welcome the fact that the Indian side has rather been restrained and mature in its reaction.” It should remain so.
One can only hope that reason will prevail, but a solution is bound to take time, certainly not before the Chinese leadership change during the Communist Party’s 19th Congress at the end of the year.
Before this, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will celebrate its 90th Anniversary on August 1. In April, President Xi Jinping, who has introduced in-depth reforms of the PLA, asked all military units to prepare themselves for combat and give priority to building ‘new-type’ fighting capabilities in electronic, information and space warfare. He was probably not expecting that India would jump so quickly to Bhutan’s defence.
All these factors make it more difficult to find a quick solution, which lies in the return of the status quo and eventually the creation of a demilitarized zone.

Tibet's Invasion: the Last Warning

Harishwar Dayal (left) with Lovell Thomas, the American journalist in front of the Residence in Gangtok

An interesting exchange between the Indian Prime Minister (Jawaharlal Nehru), the  Political Officer in Sikkim (Harishwar Dayal) and the Head of the Indian Mission in Tibet (Sumul Sinha) took place at the time Communist China started to mass troops at the border of Tibet in August 1950.
The full-fledged invasion will take place 2 months later on October 7, when the PLA crossed the Upper Yangtze.
In August, Dayal asks/tells his Government:

• To urgently decide a line to be taken "on Tibetan question and how and when India will act."
• That India has promised to provide diplomatic support when the Tibetan question is raised
• Friendly representations have so far been ineffective 
• India is not doing charitably in assisting Tibet
• The domination of Tibet would cause nervousness and unrest among border peoples  in NEFA and from Ladakh to Assam
• The policing of the northern frontier has so far required negligible military effort. It would assume immediate practical importance. 
• India should not condone the Chinese aggression on Tibet 
• There is no Anglo-American activity in Tibet as the Chinese propaganda pretends.
• Dayal gives the example of Eastern Europe which makes it clear that the autonomy offered by the Communists is meaningless. 
• He suggests that friendly, but positive representation might avert aggression while maintenance of an attitude of indifference would certainly encourage it.
  The latter option would eventually be chosen by Delhi.

Here is the exchange:

From the Political Officer in Sikkim, Gangtok.
To Foreign (Ministry of External Affairs), New Delhi.
Repeated to the (Indian) Mission (in) Lhasa.
TOP SECRET telegram dated August 17, 1950

Lhasa telegram [from Sumul Sinha] of 14th August and 16th August [1950] make it urgent for Government of India to decide definitely what line they are going to take on Tibetan question and how and when they will act. Message conveyed in your [previous] telegram assured Tibet of diplomatic support when Tibetan question was raised. It is evident that satisfactory solution must largely depend on existence of friendship between India and China. But it is equally evident that friendly representations made after invasion has begun must be ineffective (repeat ineffective).

2. Question is not (repeat not) simply one of charitably assisting Tibet. Communist domination of Tibet would cause nervousness and unrest among border peoples along whole of India’s Northern frontier from Ladakh to Assam and policing of that frontier which has hither - to required negligible military effort and expenditure would assume immediate practical importance. Moreover in Korea Government of India have opposed aggression even though the party attacked is a reactionary regime dominating one part of a country whose people wish for UNIFICATION. They could not (repeat not) in the circumstances condone aggression on Tibet from Chinese side of the De FACTO border.

3. Recent statements by Chinese spokesmen that their forces will enter Tibet only to free her from Anglo-American influences and that Tibetan way of life and autonomy will be left undisturbed are clearly insincere. There is now no (repeat no) Anglo-American activity in Tibet and Chinese have already attacked the established religious and political Order by CHAMPIONING the PANCHEN LAMA candidate. The example of Eastern Europe makes it quite clear that establishment of Communist autonomy meaningless.

4. In these circumstances it appears necessary that Chinese Government should immediately be informed of Government of India’s views on Tibet and of their concern at reports of military concentrations on Tibetan border. They could be told that India is keenly interested in maintenance of full Tibetan autonomy and integrity for reasons of her own security. Any military activity against Tibet would worsen the already present International situation besides causing alarm in India.

5. Friendly but positive representation on these lines might possibly avert aggression while maintenance of an attitude of indifference would certainly encourage it. Communist countries have evidently accepted India’s stand on Korea with understanding. If Chinese Government are genuinely anxious to cultivate India’s friendship they should be ready to appreciate India’s concern for her own security.

6. I did NOT hear All India Radio announcement of statement said to have been made by Indian High Commissioner in London. Grateful for details.

A day later, Nehru replied that the pressure tactics suggested by Dayal are unlikely "to succeed because, ultimately, we have no effective sanctions."
One could ask, in which case "why to intervene in the Korean crisis"?
Just for the glory?


Here is Nehru's reaction to Dayal's telegram. Dayal and Sinha were rightly getting nervous!

PRIME MINISTER’S SECRETARIAT
To the Secretary General, MEA (G.S. Bajpai)
and Foreign Secretary (K.P.S. Menon)
Date: August 18, 1950

Our Representative at Gangtok in Sikkim is evidently getting very nervous about the situation in Tibet. His telegram displays this nervousness and advise us to go on bringing pressure on the Chinese Government to refrain from invading Tibet. Our Representative in Lhasa also feels that way. I do not think any such attempt at pressure tactics is likely to succeed because, ultimately, we have no effective sanctions. We are reminded that we promised diplomatic support to Tibet. We have been giving such diplomatic support in so far as it is feasible. We can do little more.
I am however sending you a draft telegram which I wish to send personally to our Ambassador in Peking.
(J. Nehru)
[Prime Minister] 

From Foreign (Ministry of External Affairs), New Delhi.
To the Political Officer in Sikkim, Gangtok
Repeated to the Indian Mission in Lhasa.

Reference your telegram. Threatened invasion of Tibet by China.
On July 16th, we instructed our Ambassador at Peking to emphasise to Chinese Government the desirability of settling Sino-Tibetan affairs by friendly negotiations. On receiving the text of General Liu Po-Cheng’s [Liu Bosheng] proclamation to Tibetans from our Embassy at Peking [General Liu had announced that Tibet would soon be 'liberated'], we instructed him in our telegram dated 5th August to make a representation to the Chinese Government that Sino-Tibetan relations should be settled by means of negotiations and that the projected military march should be stayed. The Ambassador made the representation on 13th August to the Vice Minister who promised to refer it to the Foreign Minister, Chou En Lai who was ill. The reply of the Chinese Government is still awaited. In a telegram sent by us on the 17th August we instructed our ambassador to repeat our earnest hope that the problem of Tibet will be peacefully settled by friendly negotiations.

2. We regret that by oversight this information was not conveyed to you earlier.

3. Press report of Krishna Menon’s statement will be sent to you by bag [V.K. Krishna Menon, the Indian High Commissioner in London had defended Communist China].

The Indian ambassador, K.M. Panikkar's appeal was so weak that the Chinese took it as a green light to go ahead. It will be mentioned two months later in a telegram from Mao to the Southwestern Bureau in Chengdu, responsible for the military operations.
Panikkar believed that in any case Tibet has always belonged to China.
Such a tragedy for Tibet and for India.
Retrospectively, Dayal's warnings were absolutely accurate.

War and Peace: the Invasion of Tibet, an unequal combat

As Tibetans prepare to elect a new Prime Minister (Sikyong), it is necessary to look back at a time when Tibet was still a free country, not yet ‘liberated’ by China.
But, let us be honest, during the first weeks of October 1950, Tibet was invaded by China, not ‘liberated’ of anything.

Nehru and Tibet
As the PLA makes lightning advances in Kham province, the Indian Prime Minister talks of Peace.
On November 19, 1950, Nehru writes a note to the Foreign Secretary; he is deeply upset with the notes/cables received from Harishwar Day, the Political Officer in Sikkim and Sumul Sinha, the head of the Indian Mission in Lhasa.
Why?
Nehru explains: “I am a little tired of reading the telegrams that come to us from our Mission in Lhasa and our Representative in Sikkim.”
While a drama unfolds on India’s borders, the Prime Minister (who is also Foreign Minister) is ‘tired’ of these two remarkable diplomats: “They are full of their advice to us as to what we should do and criticism of us for what we may have done. I think that it is about time that we reminded these representatives of ours what their functions are and what they are supposed, and what not, to do," remarks Nehru.
The note, addressed to K.P.S. Menon, the then Foreign Secretary, continues: “We want from them full information and appraisals of the situation. We want also their own recommendations. But, it seems to me that their messages go beyond this and indicate a lack of confidence in the Government of India and an apprehension that we might do the wrong thing unless they stop us from doing it. They live in remote parts, cut off from the rest of the world, and judge all world events from their own immediate environments. They appear to have hardly any conception of broad policies in terms of what is happening in the world.”
Dayal and Sinha are probably unable to 'understand' the implications of what is happening in the Korean peninsula and the ‘mediator’ role that Nehru wants to play in the crisis, but these two officers are witnessing of one of the greatest tragedies of the 20th century, a peaceful independent nation is engulfed by a bully neighbour in the name of ‘liberation’.
Nehru further observes that the last paragraph in a telegram from Lhasa (from Sinha) is ‘extraordinary’: “Our representative in Lhasa says that he would be grateful if the Government of India do not adopt a certain policy. Exactly whom does he represent there and on whose behalf is he going to be grateful? This is not a personal concern of his.”
The Prime Minister finally requests the Foreign Secretary to send some message to both Lhasa and Sikkim, “pointing out the functions of our representatives there.”

A Note from Harishwar Dayal
Two days later, on November 21, not knowing that the Prime Minister is ‘tired’ of his comments, Harishwar Dayal sends a long legal note to the Ministry of External Affairs on the importance of Tibet for India.
His points are deeply relevant to the situation on India's borders.
In the last paragraph of his communication, Dayal ‘dares’ to quote the letter from Hugh Richardson sent on June 15, 1949 addressed to South Block.
The British-born first ‘Indian’ representative in Lhasa (he will be replaced by Sinha in August 1950) had suggested that India might consider occupying Chumbi Valley up to Phari ‘in an extreme emergency.’

Take the control of the Chumbi Valley
More than a year later, Dayal brings again the same suggestion: “This suggestion was NOT favoured by Government of India at the time. It was however proposed as a purely defensive measure and with NO aggressive intention. An attack on Sikkim or Bhutan would call for defensive military operations by the Government of India,” he writes.
It is what China’s PLA theorists today call ‘active defence’.
Dayal explains his reasoning: “In such a situation occupation of the Chumbi Valley might be a vital factor in defence. In former times it formed part of the territories of the rulers of Sikkim from whom it was wrested by the Tibetans by force. It is now a thin wedge between Sikkim and Bhutan and through it lie important routes to both these territories. Control of this region means control of both Jelep La and Nathu La routes between Sikkim and Tibet as well as of the easiest routes into Western Bhutan both from our side and from Tibetan side. It is a trough with high mountains to both east and west and thus offers good defensive possibilities. I would therefore suggest that possibility of occupying the Chumbi Valley be included in any defensive military plans though this step would NOT of course be taken unless we became involved in military operations in defence of our borders.”

The Political Officer probably does not realize that China is a ‘friend’!

And he has not yet been informed that the Prime Minister was tired of his comments!

What may have prompted Dayal to write this letter is probably a meeting with members of the Himmatsinghji Committee, who are preparing a contingency plan to defend India’s borders. They may have asked him to put his views in writing in order to put some pressure on the pacifists in South Block which could only see the ‘wider perspectives’.

Retrospectively, only a solution such as the one suggested by Harishwar Dayal, could have stopped the advance of the Chinese troops.

But India's official political thinking was elsewhere. A few days earlier, Nehru explained to K.M. Panikkar, his ambassador in Beiing: “Our present policy is primarily based on avoidance of world war; and secondly on maintenance of honourable and peaceful relations with China.”

Well, China had other objectives.

The Battle of Chamdo
I am posting below the Detailed Report on Battle of Chamdo by the 52nd Division of the 18th Army of the People’s Liberation Army.
The source of this text in Chinese is The Liberation of Chamdo, compiled by Office of Editing and Research, Political Department, Chengdu Military Area Command and Tibet Military Area Command (Chengdu, 1991).
It has been translated by two independent researchers Jianglin Li and Matthew Akester and the entire text in English is available on their blog.
Of course, it reflects the views of Mao Zedong and the Communist Party of China, but it shows that the Battle of Chamdo was a military operation conducted in a professional manner by the 18th Army, as well as other supporting forces coming from the North (Qinghai, then Amdo province of Tibet).
There was no question of ‘peace’ or ‘negotiations’ for Mao (Nehru was banking on 'talks' to peacefully solve the issue)).
Further, it is clear for the Great Helmsman that it is only the first stage before an advance towards Lhasa during the next season.
What is surprising is the elaborate planning of this military operation. Comparatively, the leaderless Tibetans are novices and stand no chance in front of the calculated tactical moves of the PLA.
It should also be noted that the Chinese learned a lot during the Chamdo operations; this is apparent in the Summary.
Did they learn for another operation, 12 years later, on the other side of the Himalayan slopes?
Probably. Look at their slogans:

Surround more, annihilate more; surround less, annihilate less

Cutting into the heart of the enemy position, penetrating, separating, surrounding and annihilating the enemy

India learned nothing during these 12 years. This is another tragedy.
India is still suffering of the crushing defeat of 1962. Stigmas of the rout are still visible in the Indian psyche.

Here is the Chinese narrative of The Battle of Chamdo.
(November, 1950)

After crossing the Jinsha river [Tib: Drichu or Upper Yantze] from October 6th to 9th, troops reached the vast plateau of a thousand li [1000 li, c. 500 km] in length and width and in coordination with brother troops, units of this division were divided into three wings, left, middle and right, forming the assault on Chamdo, a powerful pincer attack targetting the 1500-li-long position of the Tibetan army commanded by Chamdo Governor Lhalu.
During the fourteen days of rapid advance and fighting, all units were moving across the unfamiliar plateau without accurate maps.
Soldiers carried loads of 60 or 70 jin,[ c. 30 to 35 kg] climbed more than 50 high mountains and crossed rivers over 60 times.
On average, foot soldiers cover 72 li , [36 km] cavalry 80 li [40 km] a day, those who had to march day and night moved up to 34 hours continuously without enough food. However, (all units) answered the call by party committees of both the army and the division and endured extreme hardship, annihilated all the defending enemies in Chamdo on schedule, and successfully completed the capture of Chamdo.
The success of this battle, …annihilated five Dapons [commander of a regiment], the main force of the Tibetan army, and over 2000 militia, liberated the region north to Qinghai, south to Yunnan, east to Jinsha river, west to Luolong [Lhorong Dzong] and Leiwuqi [Riwoche], a vast area more than one thousand square li. The success further strengthened our unity with Tibetans west of the Jinsha river, laid the foundation for advancing next year (1951), struck blows directly and indirectly at the British and American imperialist invaders, inspired people in the near east and repaid the people of the whole country who had warmly supported us.
…Tibetans have warmly supported us (taking in and escorting individual stragglers, delivering information, guiding the way, providing transportation, building bridges, preparing firewood and fodder, etc.), all of this shows that we had good influence by carrying out the policies conscientiously before the attack and shows the tangible benefits brought to Tibetans during our westward march. This is a small accomplishment we achieved in the past, and it is also a major pointer for the future in the liberation and construction of Tibet.
In this battle, troops advanced rapidly for 15 days with heavy loads across the high plateau a thousand kilometers in length and width, wrapping up…entire (enemy?) position 1500 li [750 km] in length and accomplished the task on schedule, completely annihilated the third (two Dapons), the seventh, the eighth, the fifth and the tenth Dapon, altogether five Dapons (averaging small regiments) under Tibetan Frontier Envoy Commissioner General,[The Chamdo governor was the ‘Domey Chikyap’ or ‘Eastern Governor’] captured…over 3000 men. This victory is fundamentally due to correct leadership by leading officers of the Military Area Command and the Army Party Committee, strong support from the people of the whole country, coordination from brother troops (particularly engineer corps), favourable influence created by advanced detachment through their hard work and carrying out policies conscientiously, and the eight-month long preparation. All of these contributed to the successful conclusion of this battle.
Review of the battle process is as follows:

Surround more, annihilate more; surround less, annihilate less

I. Process

(I) Judgement of enemy situation:

1. Based on information obtained by the advanced detachment and by our own battle experience, in terms of the arrangement of their position, the enemy had no focus, no depth and attached no importance to flanks.
2. Enemy lacks systematic strategic planning and command, they fought wherever they were attacked and were easily misled by us. After we crossed the river from Dengke [Dengo or Denkok on the Yangtze river], it was quite possible that the enemy might mistakenly believe, based on historical experience, that we were going to take Lhasa by way of Yushu [today’s Yushu prefecture, Qinghai] and Heihe [Nagchu].
3. The enemy had never experienced large scale battle, had no knowledge of modern military science and was equipped with few heavy weapons. Their combat capability was not strong. After our powerful military forces crossed the Jinsha river, it was estimated that the following three changes may appear:

• Retreat without fighting and escape without hesitation. If this happened, it would definitely make it more difficult for us to annihilate the enemy.
• Scatter at the first contact, and the possibility of scattering everywhere in the mountains and wilderness to entangle us also existed. This would make it even more difficult for us to annihilate the enemy.
• Concentrate forces and put up strong resistance in strategic locations. This was exactly what we were hoping for, for we were absolutely sure that we would annihilate them thoroughly, straightforwardly and completely.
• In the Dengke battle, (we) did not seize the moment of strength to strike the enemy a fatal blow. The enemy might mistakenly have thought that our combat capability was not strong, getting arrogant and inattentive enough to confront us.

(II) Determination and Deployment

Liberating Chamdo, annihilating the main force of the Tibetan army in the area east of Lanchang river [Upper Mekong], Enda and Leiwuqi [Riwochey] lays the foundation for advance into Lhasa next year (1951) and liberate the entire Tibet. (We) decided to deploy a powerful right-flank encircling force composed of infantry and cavalry, providing strong points to offset each other’s weaknesses, making a detour via Batang and Nanqian [Nangchen] and pushing forward vigorously and precipitately. Troops should not be blocked by small numbers of enemy, doing everything possible to clear away obstacles and circle bravely…the entire field, cutting off the enemy’s retreats from Enda to Taizhao [Gyamda Dzong in Kongpo] and from Leiwuqi to Heihe, the two main escape routes, making it impossible for enemies to escape even if they intended to slip away without fighting.
Performance of troops in this wing is the key to success or failure in annihilating more than three Dapons of the enemy force. The middle wing cut into the heart of the enemy position by way of Shengda [Jomda county in today’s Chamdo prefecture], Yayaosongduo [Yayu Sumdo], Yiquka, Dongdong Zhuka, Duozhiduo, etc, cutting into the heart of the enemy position, penetrating, separating, surrounding and annihilating the enemy within the entire enemy position and advancing straight to Chamdo.
If the enemy did not rest, we wouldn’t rest; when the enemy took rest, we annihilate them. The left wing force crossed the river at Gangtuo [Kamtok], marching slowly by way of Tongpu, Jiangda [Jomda] and Jueyong to draw in the enemy. They seized the Damala Pass and controlled Sichuan bridge. Our slogans were “not to worry about breaking up Tibetan army’s positions, but to worry whether we can surround them. Surround more, annihilate more; surround less, annihilate less.”

II. Review of the Battle [not available]

III. A few experiences from the battle

(I) Experiences of fighting the Tibetan army

1. All Tibetan troops were organized in a comparatively primitive way. Troops have neither (commanding) offices nor maps. Everything was handled by one single officer-in-charge. Special reconnaissance troops and communication tools were very outdated. Everything relied on wula,  and as a result the upper and lower could not communicate during the battle. For example, during the battle when Gaqionba, the third Dapon, retreated in defeat from Jiangda to Chamdo, he was surprised to meet Moxia [Mucha] Dapon, and only at that time did he come to know that the Liberation Army had passed Dengke [Dengo] and that Moxia [Mucha] had been defeated too.
2. They did not fight aggressively and lacked counter attack ability. In several battles we did not find the enemy launching strong counter attacks.
3. Lack of systematic strategic thinking, as expressed by:

• No attention paid to protect flank and rear while deploying the forces. As seen from the deployment of this battle, three Dapons positioned in the front had fallen into our horseshoe-shape encirclement, 200 men were still deployed in the Leiwuqi flank.
• No knowledge of using the terrain to block our advance. While chasing and attacking the enemy, none of the bridges and passes in the route were destroyed, particularly the Sichuan bridge (this bridge is like the gateway to Chamdo). The 156th regiment was half a day’s distance from the enemy, when they advanced and seized the bridge, it was left intact.
• No night combat experience. Falling into disorder as soon as fighting began, each man escaping on his own. This was how the enemy behaved in the battle of Jueyong.
• No guards posted at encampments. In Jueyong one squad of our reconnaissance battalion sneaked into the enemy’s tents at night, and only then did they find out and began screaming and running about in disorder.

1. Enemies were slow in climbing mountains: the 156th regiment was one day’s distance away, the reconnaissance battalion was two days’ distance away from the enemy, but they both caught up the enemy within 100 to 200 li. Their speed was nearly one third faster than the speed of the enemy.
2. In terms of tactics: (enemy) was good at riding horses, highly skillful at shooting and utilizing terrain and landforms, but not good at operation. For example: in the battle of Shengda [Sipda in today’s Jomda county], the 155th regiment confronted the enemy across the river for more than ten hours, and over ten men were wounded. The distance in between was about 300 meters, but hardly any enemy could be seen (they were all hiding behind rocks and in dense forest). According to our observations in the battle field, beside Jazhangka and Shengda where a few fortifications were made, the other places had no fortifications. The fortifications were very poorly built, mostly piled up stones in the shape of a pigsty, which could be pushed over by hand.
   (II) Tactics to be used against Tibetan army

1. To deal with the weak Tibetan army with our current equipment, the key is to encircle the enemy (that is, the more encircled, the more will be annihilated; less encircled, less will be annihilated). No need to worry about breaking through Tibetan army’s positions, the only worry is not being able to encircle them. Since supplies are scarce in Kham-Zang Plateau, once the supply line is cut, enemy will retreat in disorder without fighting.
2. Based on special conditions of the plateau cavalry is the key to annihilate the enemy, and the guarantee of success. Because the loads foot soldiers have to carry are too heavy, they don’t have enough physical strength to walk long distances to encircle the enemy. As is shown in this battle, the cavalry detachment was able to complete its task on time (to block the enemy), based on the distance, it was impossible for the infantry to complete it.

III. Coordination of Infantry and Artillery

Due to weather conditions on the plateau and our equipment, vigorous activities and rapid charge are not favourable to the troops. Therefore, during combat firepower must be well organized so as to coordinate with foot soldiers continuously and effectively. In arranging firepower, the focal points should be the flank and rear, for enemy fears our artillery attack more than anything.

IV. Reconnaissance

Since there are no accurate maps available and no accountable mileage for roads, plus there are lots of rivers, forests and mountain ranges in Kang-Zang area, knowledge of enemy situation and terrain through reconnaissance prior to battle is highly important. The method is to inquire from Tibetans familiar with (the area) in various ways, and estimate how far it is based on how many days he covers certain distance. As long as we are nice to him, he would give us such information honestly.   

V. Artillery

How to use artillery in plateau combat should be well studied, particularly how to measure distance. Observation is not easy since too many objects block the view, and as a result, distances are often misjudged as closer (than they actually are). Because the air is thin, the speed of the shells is faster.

VI. Suggestions on army structure and equipment

1. Branches of army: a division should have a cavalry regiment to fulfill the task of circling and surrounding (the enemy). A regiment should have a mounted reconnaissance company to facilitate communication and reconnaissance. When the regiment engages in individual combat, (mounted reconnaissance company) can perform tasks of circling and surrounding in small actions. In addition, one engineers platoon should be allocated (can be attached to guard company) to take on tasks such as building bridges, handling boats, and clearing away obstacles so as to reduce the trouble of crossing rivers and increase advancing speed.
2. Weaponry: reduce mountain artillery, increase recoilless guns, high-angle guns, dynamite, detonator, fuse and explosive.
3. Tools: Quality and style of current field tools needs to be improved. Both the shovels and picks the troops are currently equipped with are not practical in combat. Besides being pointed at one end, the other end of the pick should be changed to something that can be used mainly in hacking. Shovel should be changed into American style with removable head, and can be used to dig, scratch and shovel off grass. Besides, since the plateau weather is cold, canteen should be changed into thermal canteen, and more cowhide boats, and bridge-building tools such as saws, hatchets, ropes, etc.
4. Uniform: There are thorns and gravel everywhere on the plateau and clothes are easily torn, the current style of uniform must be changed and quality must be improved, otherwise it will not be able to last the season (until the next uniform issue).
   It is better to make the uniform with strong and durable cloth, shoulders, backsides and knees should be reinforced. It is better that the cuffs are tightened and trousseaus in the style of jodhpurs. Weight of coat should be reduced. Comforter should be changed into soft, warm, damp-resistant, lightweight, larger size wool blanket which can be used as mattress pad as well as comforter. Raincoat and damp-resistant canvas should be combined into one, based on current raincoat size and shape, adding more rubber to make it thicker so it can be used to wear and to spread as bedding. Quality of shoes should be improved, soles should be softer and the upper should be higher, water-proof and damp-resistant. Headgear should better be helmet (the type used by pilots) with goggles fixed on. Goggle lenses should be made of plastic (at the moment two thirds of the goggles the troops were equipped with have been damaged).
5. Communication tools: Office at regiment and above level should be equipped with larger radio of 50 watt or more. Current radios cannot function at 11. p.m. because signals are too weak.
6. Supply: Since the current transportation condition is rather difficult, all food should be high quality, low quantity, long-lasting and easy to carry, otherwise it increases soldiers’ burden, reduces their physical strength, slows down marching speed and has negative impact on accomplishing tasks. For example, the powdered food distributed this time was heavy and the quality was poor. Grain powder was not well cooked, ration was not enough to eat, and hard to digest, causing stomach pain, abdominal bloating and diarrhea. As a result, medical patients sharply increased, and a considerable number of soldiers lagged behind. According to initial statistics, of all the stragglers in the whole division, 80% were because of the food powder.