Patel-Nehru rift over Tibet & China was deep

My article Patel-Nehru rift over Tibet & China was deep appeared in the Deccan Chronicle

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The most serious cause of discord was the invasion of Tibet by the Chinese “Liberation Army” in October 1950.

On October 31, the world’s tallest statue, the Statue of Unity dedicated to Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, was unveiled by Prime Minister Narendra Modi.The work on the 182-metre tall statue has been completed after round the clock work by 3,400 labourers and 250 engineers at Sadhu Bet island on Narmada river in Gujarat. Sadhu Bet, located some 3.5 km away from the Narmada Dam, is linked by a 250-metre-long long bridge.
Unfortunately, for several reasons, scarce scholarly research has been done on the internal history of the Congress; the main cause is probably that a section of the party would prefer to keep history under wraps. Take the acute differences of opinion between Sardar Patel, the deputy prime minister, and “Panditji”, as Nehru was then called by Congressmen. In the last weeks of Patel’s life (he passed away on December 15, 1950), there was a deep split between the two leaders, leading to unilateral decisions for the PM, for which India had to pay the heaviest price.
The most serious cause of discord was the invasion of Tibet by the Chinese “Liberation Army” in October 1950. In the course of recent researches in Indian archives, I discovered several new facts. Not only did several senior Congress leaders, led by Patel, violently oppose Nehru’s suicidal policy, but many senior bureaucrats too did not agree with the Prime Minister’s decisions and objected to his policy of appeasement with China, which led India to lose a peaceful border.
On November 11, 1950, the deputy prime minister of India addressed a meeting organised by the Central Aryan Association to commemorate the 67th death anniversary of Swami Dayanand Saraswati. It was to be his last speech. What did he say? The Sardar spoke of the potential dangers arising from what was happening in Tibet and Nepal, and he exhorted his countrymen: “It was incumbent on the people to rise above party squabbles and unitedly defend their newly-won freedom.” He cited the example of Gandhi and Swami Dayanand.
Sardar Patel then criticised the Chinese intervention in Tibet; he asserted that to use the “sword” against the traditionally peace-loving Tibetan people was unjustified: “No other country in the world was as peace-loving as Tibet. India did not believe, therefore, that the Chinese government would actually use force in settling the Tibetan question.” He observed that the Chinese government did not listen to India’s advice to settle the Tibetan issue peacefully: “They marched their armies into Tibet and explained this action by talking of foreign interests intriguing in Tibet against China.” The deputy prime minster added that this fear was unfounded; no outsider was interested in Tibet. The Sardar continued by saying that “nobody could say what the outcome of Chinese action would be. But the use of force ultimately created more fear and tension. It was possible that when a country got drunk with its own military strength and power, it did not think calmly over all issues.” He strongly asserted that the use of arms was wrong: “In the present state of the world, such events might easily touch off a new world war, which would mean disaster for mankind.”
Did he know that it was his last message? “Do not let cowardice cripple you. Do not run away from danger. The three year-old freedom of the country has to be fully protected. India today is surrounded by all sorts of dangers and it is for the people today to remember the teachings of the two great saints and face fearlessly all dangers.”
The deputy prime minister concluded: “In this kalyug we shall return ahimsa for ahimsa. But if anybody resorted to force against us we shall meet it with force.” He ended his speech citing Swami Dayananda: “People should also remember that Swamiji did not get a foreign education. He was the product of Indian culture. Although it was true that they in India had to borrow whatever was good and useful from other countries, it was right and proper that Indian culture was accorded its due place.” Who is ready to listen to this, even today?
Days earlier, Patel had written a “prophetic” letter to Nehru, detailing the implications for India of Tibet’s invasion. In fact, Patel used a draft done by Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, the secretary-general of the ministry of external affairs and Commonwealth relations. However, Nehru decided to ignore Patel’s letter.
Witnessing the nefarious influence of K.M. Panikkar, the Indian ambassador to China, who ceaselessly defended China’s interests, Bajpai, the most seasoned Indian diplomat, had lost his cool. On October 31, in an internal note, he detailed the sequence of events which followed Tibet’s invasion and the role of Panikkar, whose attitude was compared to Sir Neville Chamberlain’s towards Hitler.
Bajpai’s anger demonstrates the frustration of many senior officers; the account starts on July 15, when the governor of Assam informed Delhi that, according to the information received by the local intelligence bureau, Chinese troops, “in unknown strength, had been moving towards Tibet from three directions.” Not only was Panikkar unable to get any confirmation, but he virtually justified Beijing’s military action by writing: “In view of frustration in regard to Formosa, the Tibetan move was not unlikely.” During the next three months, the Indian ambassador would systematically take the Chinese side.
After receiving Bajpai’s note, Patel wrote back: “I need hardly say that I have read it with a great deal of interest and profit to myself and it has resulted in a much better understanding of the points at issue and general, though serious, nature of the problem. The Chinese advance into Tibet upsets all our security calculations. … I entirely agree with you that a reconsideration of our military position and a redisposition of our forces are inescapable.”
Some more details of the seriousness of the situation filters through Inside Story of Sardar Patel: The Diary of Maniben Patel, the daughter of the Sardar. In an entry on November 2, 1950, Maniben wrote: “Rajaji and Jawaharlal had a heated altercation about the Tibet policy. Rajaji does not at all appreciate this policy. Rajaji very unhappy — Bapu (Patel) did not speak at all.”
Later in the afternoon, “Munshi complained about Tibet policy. The question concerns the whole nation — said he had written a personal letter to Panditji on Tibet.”
Later, Patel told K.M. Munshi: “Rajaji, you (Munshi), I (Patel), Baldev Singh, (C.D.) Deshmukh, Jagjivan Ram and even Sri Prakash are on one side, while Gopalaswamy, Rafi, Maulana (Azad) are on his side.” There was a vertical split in the Cabinet; and it was not only about Tibet. The situation would deteriorate further during the following weeks.
On December 12, Patel was divested on his portfolios. Nehru wrote: “In view of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel’s ill-health it is absolutely necessary that he should have complete rest and freedom from worry, so as to be able to recuperate as rapidly as possible. …no work should be sent to him and no references made to him in regard to the work of these ministries.”
Gopalaswami Ayyangar, from the “other side”, was allotted the ministry of states and Nehru kept the ministry of home. The Sardar was only informed after the changes were made. He was a dejected man. Three days later he passed away.

New Problems of Internal Security Caused by the Chinese Occupation of Tibet

In a few days, the world's tallest statue, the Statue of Unity dedicated to Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel will be unveiled by Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
The work of 182-meter tall statue has been completed after round the clock work by 3,400 labourers and 250 engineers at Sadhu Bet island on Narmada River in Gujarat.
Sadhu Bet, located some 3.5km away from the Narmada dam, is linked by a 250-meter long bridge.
Flowers will be grown on the hillocks adjoining the statue to make the 230-hectare area look like a Valley of Flowers.

Scarce Scholarly Research
For several reasons, scarce scholarly research has been done on the internal history of the Congress; the main cause is probably that a section of the party would prefer to keep the history under wrap.
Take the acute difference of opinion between Sardar Patel, the Deputy Prime Minister and ‘Panditji’, as Nehru was known.
In the last weeks of Patel’s life (he passed away on December 15, 1950) there was a deep split between the two leaders, leading to unilateral decisions, for which India still has to pay the heaviest price.
The most serious apple of discord was Tibet’s invasion by the Chinese ‘Liberation Army’ in October of 1950.
In the course of recent researches in the Indian archives, I discovered several new facts. Not only several senior Congress leaders, led by Patel, (other leaders were C. Rajagopalachari, President Rajendra Prasad, KM Munshi, etc) violently opposed Nehru suicidal policy, but many senior bureaucrats too, did not agree with the Prime Minister’s decisions and objected to his policy of appeasement, which lead India to lose a peaceful border. 

Patel's letter to Nehru on Tibet 
It is usually assumed that on November 7, Sardar Patel wrote a ‘prophetic’ letter to Nehru, detailing the implications for India of Tibet’s invasion. In fact, Patel used a draft given by Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, the Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth.
A month after the entry of the People’s Liberation Army in Tibet, Patel sent Bajpai’s note under his own signature, to Nehru, who decided to ignore the Deputy Prime Minister’s letter.
Bajpai, the most seasoned Indian diplomat, lost his legendary cool after witnessing the nefarious influence of KM Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador to China, who ceaselessly defended the Chinese interests.
On October 31, in an internal note, Bajpai detailed the sequence of events which followed Tibet’s invasion and the role of Panikkar, whose attitude was compared to the one of Sir Neville Hendersons toward Hitler.
What decided Patel to send his letter to Nehru was a note from the Intelligence Bureau (IB).
We are reproducing below the IB note which is probably dated from the end of October 1950.
The IB Note was sent by Sardar Patel along with his letter to the Prime Minister.

Draft of Patel's letter kept in the National Archives of India

New Problems of Internal Security Caused by the Chinese Occupation of Tibet
(a Note from the Intelligence Bureau)

India occupies a very important position in the general pattern of world communism and next only to Russia and China. As early as 1923 Lenin after posing the question “Can we save ourselves from the impending conflict with these Imperialist countries”, gave the answer in the following words” “In the last analysis the upshot of the struggle will be determined by the fact that Russia, India and China account for the overwhelming majority of the population of the globe and it is precisely this majority that during the past few years has been drawn into the struggle for emancipation with extraordinary rapidity so that in this respect there cannot be the slightest shadow of doubt what the final outcome of the world’s struggle will be. In this sense the complete victory of socialism is fully and absolutely assured”. Lenin also said that the shortest way to Paris was through Peking and Delhi. In 1924 Moscow declared that India most stand at the head of free Eastern Republics. This view has been reiterated by Soviet leaders since 1923 on numerous occasions and even as late as 1949 Malenkov, the Communist leader next only to Stalin in Soviet Russia, stressed this aspect of the revolution. In fact, India is considered to be the pivotal point round which the south East Asia and the Middle East Asia must revolve not only because of her strategic position but also on account of her vast resources, non-power and moral influence. In articles published in 1949 in the “Problems of Economics” in Moscow, it was stated that during the period between the first and second world wars China was in the vanguard of the revolutionary movement of the peoples of the colonies and semi colonies and now during the period between the second and the third world wars it was India’s turn to take its place. Consistent with these steadfastly held ideas, the USSR and International Communists can never give up their ambition of converting India into a communist State and in fact they can never feel secure in their socialism me long as India does not accept and practise the same creed. Just as India’s struggle for freedom culminated not only in the achievement of independence for India but also for many neighbouring countries, and it is India’s example which is inspiring freedom struggles in other colonial countries in Asia, similarly there is no doubt that India’s conversion to the Communist faith will also envelop all the neighbouring countries in communism. So long as India holds out these countries can also held out, but if India goes they cannot resist. The International Communism therefore must do everything possible to convert India to communism. There is no question of their deviating from this idea by any amount of negotiation or diplomatic pressure. In all Cominform and Russian authoritative publications and even in the publications of the satellite countries, India has been described to be a colonial state, groaning under the heels of the Anglo-American Imperialists and the ‘Nehru’ Government as their lackeys. The Indian Communists have been repeatedly told to unite all progressive classes against the ‘Nehru’ Government, create agrarian troubles and initiate armed struggles which have been held to be the only way in which national liberation can be achieved. All groups in the Communist Party in India have accepted this directive and are trying to pool all their strength to follow it by creating new Telanganas everywhere and put the countryside progressively on the rails of armed struggle. As has been seen repeatedly in the past, Russia and her satellites are quite willing to negotiate on their own terms but they have always achieved their aims by the application of force only.

2. Soviet Russia now feels that India will be more swayed by the influence of China than of Russia and Mao Tse Tung will make a better leader for the Indian masses than even Stalin can. It is with this object that the Peking Liaison Bureau was established last year, that Mao Tse Tung has been given a dominating voice in the affairs of India and Far east and that the Indian Communists have been told by numerous Communist publications, as well as by the Cominform, in clear unambiguous words, to follow the China way to victory. If therefore the occupation of Tibet by the Communist forces gives to the world Communism any strategical and tactical advantages of furthering the cause of communism in India, all such advantages will be exploited legally and illegally to the fullest extent without any consideration for international conventions and even though the Chinese Government may continue to remain superficially in the friend list terms with the Indian Government. And the occupation of Tibet by the Chinese Communists does open up vast possibilities for creating internal disorders and disruptions within India.

3. Up till now India’s northern frontier from Ladakh in the west to the Sadiya Hill Tracts in the east has been free from any dangers of external invasion or from even any subversive movements fostered by external forces. With Tibet as a weak and autonomous country, giving many facilities to India which no other independent country would give, India could rightly feel absolutely secure about its northern frontier and this sense of security was reflected in is best in all the policies followed with respect to this northern frontier and actions taken for its security in these areas and on the understanding that no danger would come to India from the north very little security measures have been taken which in the altered circumstances will be found to be completely inadequate.

4. Within our borders in all these frontier areas live races and tribes who have been practically semi independent and who by religious, linguistic, cultural and ethnical ties are bound more with Tibet than with India. In fact, the hill tribes of the Sadiya Hill Tracts, the Bhutanis, the Sikkimis or the Ladakhis have little affinity with the Aryans of the Gangetic and the Brahmaputra Valleys. The tribes living in the Sadiya Hill Tracts have never been properly subordinated and India exercises only nominal authority over them leaving them free to live their own lives. If given a choice to affiliate either with India or with Tibet, under existing circumstances they are almost sure to vote for Tibet and not for India. Bhutan’s foreign affairs are controlled by India, but this has been possible only because Bhutan’s other neighbor, Tibet, was weak. With a new and aggressive Tibet under China’s guidance there is every likelihood that Bhutan will change her attitude towards India and by all standards the Bhutanese are more akin to the Tibetans than to the Indians and given the freedom of choice there is no doubt in which direction her choice will lie. Sikkim is inhabited by a large number of Tibetans and members of the ruling family have all their marriage ties with the Tibetans. There is little to distinguish between the Sikkimese and the Tibetans. Kalimpong and Darjeeling were originally parts of Sikkim and a fair proportion of the population in these areas also consists of the Sikkimese and the Tibetans. Nepal, which forms the frontier with Bihar and U.P., has got a regime which in extremely unpopular and where the ruling family is sitting on the top of a volcano which may burst out at any moment. Similarly, Ladakh is more a part of Tibet than of India.

5. With an aggressive Chinese Communist Government in Tibet, intent on furthering the creed of International Communism in India and holding the belief that World Communism and so Communism in China can never be safe unless India becomes a Communist country and following the basic Communist creed that the International proletariat (which in other words means the Soviet and the Chinese Governments) must assist the peoples of all Colonial countries (which include India) in their fight for national liberation (which in India means the overthrow of the ‘Nehru’ Government), every method will be adopted to disrupt the integrity of India and what will be more opportune and easy than to foster trouble in these frontier areas where India’s administrative control is not strong and where her cultural influence is less.
All these tribes living the frontier regions will be directly encouraged to agitate for independence so that they can later be drawn into the Communist fold. Russia’s method of solving the problem of small nationalities has been extremely successful and it appeals to all under-civilized tribes and races. Communist China has successfully prosecuted the same policy within its own frontiers and India must be prepared to meet this challenge. There are large numbers of Gurkhas who are residents of Tibet and just as the Chinese formed a Tibetan Liberation Army, similarly they after the occupation of Tibet will form a Nepalese Liberation Army and attempt to liberate Nepal where the present rulers can show very little resistance. There is reliable information that the Nepalese Communists are trying to go into Tibet to contact the Tibetan and Chinese Communists. Even on the eastern frontier of Assam, China claims the northern triangle of Burma, which is inhabited by the Kachins, as part of her own territory and there are reports that some Kachin leaders have already gone to Yunnan and are receiving training under the Communists, probably to form a Kaohin Liberation Army. Burmese Government will be able to offer little resistance to it. If Kachin goes under the Communists, the tribals living in the Naga Hills, Manipur and the Lushai Hills will start trouble because even now the Lushais, the Kukis and the China living on this frontier areas are trying for accession of their territories to Burma. They certainly have more ethnical and cultural ties with the population on the other side of the frontier than with the Aryans of India. Even the Ahoms have agitated for linking up with the Kachins to form an independent State. For the sake of her security, India must firmly retain her hold or influence in these areas because once India loses her control her entire belly will be opened up to direct attacks. Militarily also these areas can be held with comparatively smaller forces but once the Communists establish their hold in there areas the defence of the plains will become extremely difficult and will require large manpower. Communists will no doubt arm these tribals and make them the spearheads of their attacks on and frays into India. There areas will then be just as difficult to protect as the N.W.F.P. has been in the past.

6. With China on India’s long unguarded frontier, the Indian Communists will be in a good position to get help by the way of supply of arms, by the infiltration of trained agents and by direct contact with the Chinese Communists. The Indian Communists have been badly mauled during the last 2 ½ years and they are passing through a difficult period and there is definite information that they are wanting direct guidance from the foreign Communists. So far attempts to make such contacts have to a great extent been countered by Governmental action but with China strongly entrenched in Tibet it will be extremely difficult to stop this contact. With the commencement of trouble in the frontier areas where India’s Armed forces will have to be moved, more Telengana struggles will be launched in India itself so as to dissipate India’s Armed forces by wide dispersal.
Communications and industries will be sabotaged to make the movement of troops difficult and to disrupt India’s economy thereby creating wide dissatisfaction amongst  the masses. These are not more speculations because it is known that these firm instructions have been issued by Soviet Russia to the Indian Communists and the circulars issued by the C.P.I. show that the Indian Communists are preparing to carry out these directives. Therefore the occupation of Tibet by Communist China not only raises problems of security from external danger across India’s long and practically unguarded frontiers and problems of security in the border tribal regions now under India’s control but also very serious problems of internal security in the Sub-continent itself. Suggestions that follow for taking measures against this three-fold danger cover many aspects of the problem, many of which are not the concern of the Intelligence Bureau but they are being made to provide material for the M.H.A. to make final proposals to the Government.

7. Administrative Measures
Sadiya Hill Tracks
Modern administrative measures should be introduced immediately. The area held by each tribe should be formed into a district and a District officer with all necessary staff should be posted. Police Stations should be opened and instead of continuing the old tribal system of maintaining law and order, modern Police methods of administration should be introduced. District officers should make a detailed survey of the economic needs of the areas under them and see that these needs are met by supplies from Indian so that economically these areas are tied to India and not to Tibet. Schools should be opened in which the languages to be taught will be both Hindi or Assamese and the tribal so that the inhabitants may gradually forge cultural links with the plains people. Hospitals and dispensaries should be opened and philanthropic missions, such as the Rama Krishna Mission, may be encouraged by payment of subsidies to open centres in these areas. The strength of the Assam Rifle battalions in these areas should be increased and each district should have the minimum equivalent of one battalion with reserves kept at strategic centres. In the Assam Rifles, the recruitment of northern Indians should be encouraged because in any conflict with the tribes the tribal element in these units may not be found to be very loyal, as has been experienced with the Tripura Rifles recently. These regions should continue to remain directly under the Central Government.

Manipur, Lushai and Naga Hills
The existing administration in Manipur and Lushai Hills should be further strengthened and Police Stations should be opened in the Lushai Hills area. The economic needs of these areas should be studied and met from Indian sources. Indian language should be popularized through schools and other welfare measures should be undertaken. The Naga Hills area, which is at present unadministered, must be brought to the same level of administrations as has been proposed for the Sadiya Hill Tracts. These areas should be under the direct control of the Central Government.

Bhutan
It is necessary to strengthen Bhutan’s ties with India by changing the treaty, if possible, and placing more advisers in the Bhutan administration. More outlet for Bhutan’s trade with India may be created at Government’s initiative instead of leaving it to private enterprisers. Education and medical missions may open schools in Bhutan just as Christian Missions may open schools in Bhutan just as Christian Missions may open schools in Bhutan just as Christian Missions have been educating the tribals, aborigines and backward people in India and China for over a century. The new treaty should have a clause to enable India to post troops in Bhutan for protecting her from external dangers if such a provision does not already exist.

Sikkim
India’s control in this territory may be further tightened and the Sikkim Congress group, which owes allegiance to the Indian National Congress, may be encouraged. Here also, under Indian Government’s efforts educational and medical missions may be established to forge more closely Sikkim’s ties with India. Administration may be brought to the level of an Indian district. A strong contingent of troops should be posted in Sikkim as the highway from Tibet to India traverses Sikkim before entering Darjeeling district.

Nepal
India’s present treaty with Nepal allows for consultations in case of external danger. The present Nepal Government certainly does not welcome communism in its territory but is hardly in a position to resit Communist aggression. Therefore the Nepal Government will probably be only too willing to accept India’s assistance in warding off this external danger. For improving internal resistance, a more democratic set-up is necessary. The consultations may give India facility to ask Nepal to allow her army to be trained by Indian officers in the same way as the Russians are training the Czech and the Polish armies. India should provide equipment to the Nepalese army.

Kumaon Hills Garhwal Hills and Himachal Pradesh
The administration in these areas should be tightened by posting executive officers where there are none and opening up more Police Stations. The economic needs of these areas should also be studied and properly met and educational and medical facilities should be extended/

Ladakh
The administration here should also be brought to the same level as in rest of India and police stations should be opened in this Valley. Economic, educational and medical measures may be taken as in the other areas.

8. Defence
The Defence Department must be considering problems from its own angle but what needs to be emphasized is that the communist world understands force and nothing else. They will be willing to negotiate but will follow Bismark’s policy of always keeping a million bayonets behind to support their discussions and agreements can be reached only on their own terms. The defence needs of Assam, Bhutan and Sikkim, as sell as Nepal, have to be closely studied. The presence of strong units ready to strike back will not only discourage any aggressive acts from across the border but will also keep the hostile elements within our own frontiers under subjugation.

9. Intelligence
For both defence and internal security purposes, India should be in a position to collect reliable intelligence of Communist activities in China, Tibet, Burma, Nepal and all the frontier regions and their possible repercussions in India proper. For this purpose the following measures are suggested:

(i)    Inside Tibet
It is presumed that China will allow an Indian Consulate to work either at Lhasa or at Gyantse. There should be posted to this Consulate an Intelligence Officer of the experience of an Assistant Director of the Bureau. As Tibet cannot be immediately drawn behind an impenetrable iron curtain, the possibilities of collecting intelligence in that country will be great. This post should be linked with the Intelligence post at Kalimpong. Details of developing this intelligence and communication will be worked out in detail and are beyond the scope of this note.

(ii)    Inside China
There should be an Intelligence Officer of the rank and experience of assistant Director in our Embassy in Peking with assistants in Shanghai, Hongkong and other places where we have Consulates or other offices. It will be impossible for the Embassy officials without an Intelligence Officer to get full intelligence of intentions or contemplated actions which may be contrary to India’s interest. In the present case of the invasion of Tibet the shortcomings of system of collecting intelligence by the Indian Embassy in Peking has been only too evident. In China also the possibilities of setting up a good intelligence system are good.

(iii)    Inside Burma
In the Indian Embassy in Rangoon should be posted an Intelligence Officer of the rank and experience of an Assistant Director, with the large Indian population practically all over Burma, a good intelligence system can easily be established. A branch will have to be opened in Kachin area. Links will be with the S.I.Bs. at Calcutta and Shillong. Details will be worked out separately. (The British have their intelligence organisation both in China and Burma).

(iv)    Inside Bhutan
An Intelligence Officer of the rank of a D.C.I.O. should be posted here and may be attached to any mission which India may establish at Punakha. This post will be linked with the post at Kalimpong. Border watch posts will have to be established in the north to prevent infiltration.

(v)    Inside Nepal
An Assistant Director from the Bureau has already been posted at Khatmandu. In the consultations which Nepal Government will have with India, it may be decided that this officer should have full assistance of the Nepal authorities and would liaise fully with them. As the danger from Communists is same both to India and Nepal, therefore co-operation on this aspect should not at all be difficult. Our Embassy at Khatmandu is already in radio-telephonic communication with Patna and this post will be linked with our post at Patna. Nepal will have to be persuaded to open border watch posts in the northern frontier.

(vi)    Within Indian Frontier
A scheme for establishing frontier watch posts was prepared in the Bureau and approved by both the M.H.A. and M.E.A. The implementation of this scheme was however kept in abeyance due to financial reasons and also because it was believed that China would not take any immediate aggressive action against Tibet. As however the situation has radically changed, this scheme should be sanctioned immediately. It visualizes the opening of watch posts all along the Indo-Tibetan border to guard all the passes.

(vii)    Within India.
The intelligence set-up inside India is good and is well posted with the activities of the Indian communists. Improvements are constantly being made. No special step is therefore necessary. All Branches will be alerted to be more vigilant about Communist activities. All attempts to establish Telangans must be frustrated by resolute and timely action. Gun-running must be stopped because without arms liberation armies cannot be set up. Every action should be taken to prevent contacts between the Indian and the Chinese Communists. (Dange has been found to be in contact with the Chinese Ambassador in Delhi). China’s invasion of Tibet should be exploited to prove the aggressive intentions of Communist China.

(viii)    Registration of Tibetans & Chinese.
The Chinese are already being registered and the registration of Tibetans, who will become Chinese nationals after China occupies Tibet, should also be under-taken immediately. Restrictions should be placed on their movements in and out of India and it will be necessary to exercise strict vigilance over the large Chinese population in India and make them conform to all the restrictions which the Act imposes. This may look to be too drastic but proper discretion can be utilized in making the movements of innocuous Chinese as easy as possible whilst exercising real surveillance over the suspects.

9.A. Communications
In the frontier regions, except near Kalimpong and Gangtok (Sikkim) road communication is extremely difficult and consists mostly of foot or mule tracks and there is no telephone or telegraphic communication. For developing proper security measures it is necessary to open up roads in all these areas and also have a net-work of telephone and telegraph lines and wireless stations. The utility of well-developed communications in subordinating hostile tribes was well demonstracted by the policy which the British Army followed in the N.W.F.P. Acutually on many occasions in the past the need for improving communications in these inaccessible areas was recognized by the Government but as there was no immediate danger to India’s security from across these frontiers any expenditure incurred on this work was probably considered to be uneconomic. However, these communications are very necessary for security purposes in the changed circumstances and therefore the development of both road and tele-communication should be undertaken without delay.

10. Other Measures
With the Chinese army in Tibet, which is used to fighting in mountainous territories, probably certain regrouping of India’s Armed Forces will be necessary. As these are however limited, unless new units are raised, which will mean incurring large expenditure, withdrawals have to take place from Commands where no external danger of aggression is present; but these areas, like Telengana, may be important from internal security point of view. But for internal security work and even for operations against armed Communists and operations on the frontier tribal areas, regular army is not necessary, nor is it advisable to dissipate the Army’s strength in this way. Military Police Units of the type, which have been raised in Bihar, U.P., N.Bengal, Madras and Delhi and also the C.R.P. and which are already operating in Hyderabad, should be sufficient to deal with these internal disorders and for maintaining vital communications. It is therefore necessary to examine urgently the question of increasing the Armed Police strength in U.P., Bihar, Bengal and Assam, increasing the strength of the Assam Rifles, Tripura rifles and raising new Units as Manipur Rifles and increasing the strength of the C.R.P. The expenditure incurred on maintaining such Military Police will be much less compared to that of maintaining the same number of troops and for the purpose for which they are intended they will be equally effective. This will leave the Army to concentrate itself on its training and fighting external aggression, if that contingency arises, and for which preparations have to be kept ready. Details of these internal security forces can be separately worked out.

11. This note is not meant to be alarmist but only for the purpose of suggesting precautionary measures for meeting the dangers which are inherent in Communist China’s occupation of Tibet. As has been stressed at the beginning, international Communists can never give up their idea of drawing India within their fold and can never feel secure till they have succeeded in achieving this object and therefore they will follow every method possible, legal or illegal, conforming or not conforming to international conventions to further their aims and experience has shown in Korea and Indo-China that Chinese Communists are quite prepared to give material aid to the local Communist Parties in the latter’s attempt to seize power by force. The measures suggested are meant to resist the implementation of any such aggressive intentions. Some of the measures, suggested above, such as setting up better administration in frontier areas and efficient intelligence organizations in the frontier regions and outside our frontiers will take a long time for full implementation and therefore decision about the measures necessary may be taken immediately so that no further time may be lost in making a start with those of the suggested security measures which are approved.

When Nehru was taken for a ride by Mao

Crossing the Upper Yangtze on October 7, 1950 (http://historicaldocs.blogspot.in)

One often-asked question is: why did India not take a stronger stand on the Tibet issue in October/November 1950, when Eastern Tibet was invaded by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army?
One of the reasons is the nefarious influence that K.M. Panikkar, the Ambassador in Communist China, played on the Indian Prime Minister and the fact that Nehru chose to follow his advice against those of senior diplomats like G.S. Bajpai or politicians like Sardar Patel of Rajaji.

Some historical facts
On August 3, 1950 General Liu Bocheng, the head of the Southwest Military Command had been ‘assigned to liberate Tibet’. In a proclamation, the great strategist affirmed:”The People’s Liberation Army will soon march towards Tibet with the object of driving out the British and American aggressive forces so as to make Tibetans return to the Great Family of the Peoples Republic of China.”
The fact that there was no American and only a couple of British nationals live on the Tibetan plateau, did not bother Panikkar and Nehru.
On August 21, the Indian ambassador met Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Foreign Minister; the latter assured him that:

it was China’s earnest desire to settle the problems by negotiations and peace, and that he [Zhou] had instructed the Chinese Ambassador to India to enter into preliminary contacts with the Tibetan Delegation in Delhi and to make arrangements for their journey to Peking.

Zhou Enlai said that he greatly appreciated the view taken by India and would do everything possible to come to a peaceful settlement “on the understanding that Tibet was an integral part of China, entitled to local autonomy and to its own institutions”.
During this meeting, Panikkar, on his own, promised that India would not move in case Tibet is forcefully liberated.
On 26 August 1950, in an aide memoire submitted to the Chinese Government, K.M. Panikkar went a step further, he changed India's policy vis-à-vis Tibet. This would trigger the most dramatic consequences for India.
In his note, Panikkar described Tibet’s status as ‘autonomy within framework or Chinese sovereignty’, and not anymore ‘suzerainty’ as it had been done during the previous decades. The two words had a very different legal meaning and Panikkar knew it.
During the following months, South Block tried to revert to ‘suzerainty’, but it was too late, the damage was done.
Three days after presenting his aide-memoire, Panikkar send a Top Secret cable to Nehru to inform him that he had met the Director of Asian Section of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who had called on him on behalf of Zhou Enlai to discuss India’s (more correctly Panikkar’s) aide-memoire on Tibet.
The Chinese officials were delighted; they conveyed the gratitude of their Government

for reaffirmation that India had NO political or territorial ambition in Tibet and stated that it is earnest desire of Chinese Government to settle Sino Tibetan matters amicably and by peaceful means.

Six weeks before the invasion, the fate of Tibet was sealed.
But Nehru and his Ambassador continued to foolishly think that the future of Tibet would depend on ‘negotiations’ in Delhi or Beijing.
It was absolutely wrong. A telegram sent by Mao on August 23, 1950, (2 days after Panikkar had met Zhou) is telling.

General He Long inspecting the preparations
(http://historicaldocs.blogspot.in/)

It is addressed the Southwest Bureau, repeated to the Northwest Bureau in Qinghai Province and entitled, ‘Strive to Occupy Chamdo This Year and Advance to Lhasa Next Year’.
Mao first refers to a communication received three days earlier from the Southwest Bureau suggesting the order of the battle (to ‘liberate’ Tibet). Mao writes:

The plan to push for occupying Chamdo this year and to leave three thousand men to consolidate Chamdo is good. You can actively make preparations according to this plan, and when it is ascertained by the end of this month or the beginning of next month that the road has reached Ganzi [also known as Kandze in today’s Sichuan province] without obstruction, the advance can go ahead.

It demonstrates that the east of the Upper Yangtze River, the Communists were not expecting (and they did not encounter later) any ‘obstruction’. Lhasa had then no control over these Tibetan-inhabited areas.
Mao continues:

It is expected that Chamdo will be occupied in October. That would be advantageous for pushing for political changes in Tibet, and marching into Lhasa the next year.

While Nehru believed that everything depended on ‘talks’ between the Dalai Lama’s government and the Communists, the reality was different. On the opposite, Mao asserts in his telegram: “Now India has issued a statement recognizing Tibet as China’s territory, only expressing hope that (the issue) can be settled peacefully, not by force.”
The Great Helmsman refers to the meeting between Panikkar and Zhou and admits that the earlier stalemate about visas for the Tibetan delegation had been sorted out: “Great Britain didn’t allow the Tibetan delegation to go to Beijing before, but now they have agreed.”
Though Mao knew that the hurdles for the ‘talks’ had been cleared, he was not interested in ‘negotiations’.
In order to understand Nehru’s mindset, let us look at a letter addressed by the Indian Prime Minister to C. Rajagopalachari, a Minister without Portfolio in his Cabinet on November 1. The Chinese had entered into Tibet 3 weeks earlier.
Rajaji had sent a note to Nehru complaining that the ‘Chinese are deceiving us’. Nehru answers: “Legally our position seems to be a weak one in regard to Tibet,” and adds that morally he finds it difficult to say that the Chinese Government has deliberately deceived India (i.e. Nehru) at any stage.
The Prime Minister explains: “We may have deceived ourselves, and they may have done wrong in the action they took, as I think they did.”
For him, the Chinese did ‘not deceive’ India:

For the last year they have been talking about ‘liberating’ Tibet as a part of the Chinese fatherland. From the 15th of July of this year there has been a great deal of talk on this, and even some Chinese troops’ movements were reported to us on the Tibetan border of China. Early in August the Chinese Government issued a text of a proclamation by the Head of their Southern Command [General Liu Bocheng], who was ‘assigned to liberate Tibet’.

The above lines show that the Government of India was well-informed about the decision of Communist China to forcefully enter in Tibet. Nehru writes to his colleague:

This proclamation stated that the Peoples Liberation Army will soon march towards Tibet etc. We sent a telegram to our Ambassador asking him to point out that any such move will be most unfortunate and that this should be settled by peaceful means. In this way telegrams have been exchanged repeatedly.

Nehru was regularly in touch with Panikkar (and Sumul Sinha in Lhasa) about the happenings in Tibet, in China and on the front; that is why Nehru could write, “at no stage did the Chinese Government say to us that they would not take any military steps.”
The Indian position was mainly the result of the foolishness of the Indian Ambassador who repeatedly informed Delhi that the Chinese would not use force.
The Communists were the worthy children of Sun Tzu and were adept of the Art of War, the ‘negotiations’ trick was just a dilatory tactic to gain time for the Chinese troops to be ready for the battle of Chamdo.
Nehru tells Rajaji:

They did say that they were always prepared for peaceful negotiations and that they had waited for a long time, but the Tibetan Delegation did not come. According to them, the Tibetan Delegation could not come because of imperialist manoeuvres.

None of the Chinese declassified telegrams/reports shows that the PLA was waiting for the outcome of the negotiations. In fact, it was absolutely clear for Mao and his colleagues that the 18th Army had to advance on Chamdo in 1950 itself so that Lhasa and Central Tibet could be ‘liberated’ in 1951.
Nehru admits: “When we informed them that the Tibetan Delegation was actually going to start, Chinese troops’ movement had already taken place some days before.”
This should have opened the Prime Minister’s (and his ambassador’s) mind to the true intentions and tactics of the Communists. It did not and very unfortunately, the Tibetan issue would get worse when, less than 2 months later, Patel will be gone forever.
The Indian Prime Minister was aware that the Chinese Government has decided to use force, “but I do not see how they can be accused of deception. They have been perfectly clear from the beginning.”
While understanding the rapidly-evolving situation, Nehru decided to remain passive, with tragic consequences for India.
In his letter to Rajaji, the Prime Minister tries to find excuses for the Communists:

We have to remember also that the Chinese Government and people are living in constant fear of attack by the U.S.A. That fear may not be justified but it is not wholly groundless. Prominent men in the U.S. have repeatedly state that this attack should be made.
…If we can put ourselves in China and see Chiang-Kai-shek with a powerful Army sitting nearby to attack China, supported by the U.S., and war coming over nearer and their own territories being bombed, then we can perhaps appreciate the temper and apprehension of the Chinese Government and people.

The argument has nothing to do the Chinese troops entering in Tibet, massacring hundreds of Tibetan soldiers and invading a peaceful nation. It is rather flabbergasting that the Prime Minister gives such a long justification on an unrelated topic. 
On his August telegram, Mao had stated that the Government of India has not objected to the Chinese entering into Tibet. But once again, Nehru tries to justify the Chinese actions (or his own?):

Of course, all this does not justify military operations against Tibet, but it does explain many things. Tibet for many years has been under British influence and the British Agent there was violently anti-Chinese. He tried his best to incite Tibetans against China. Previous Chinese Governments have protested against this, and indeed I have myself been told by their representatives. Tibet was thus looked upon as a place which was under British influence. That influence is now gone, but only six months ago the same British Agent was there representing us.

This is an absolutely an unfair statement against Hugh Richardson who brilliantly served the Indian interests in Tibet for 3 years (August 1947-1950). Richardson was not only a sharp-minded ICS officer, but also a great lover of Tibet and an outstanding scholar of ancient Tibetan history.
Sumul Sinha, Richardson’s successor, was himself one of the finest young Chinese-speaking diplomats; he tried to serve India as well as he could in the difficult circumstances. His services will never be appreciated by Nehru (‘Sinha does not understand our policies’). This is one of the saddest tragedies of modern India.
Nehru ends up his letter to Rajaji by saying that he just wish to point out to:

certain considerations which have to be borne in mind to understand why the Chinese Government may have developed a state of mind bordering on fear of what is going to happen, and fear leads to wrong action. I am quite sure that the Chinese Government did not intend to deceive us or to insult us deliberately.

It is necessary to come back for a moment on Mao’s cable to the Southern Bureau; Chairman Mao says: “If our army can occupy Chamdo in October, there is the possibility of pushing the Tibetan delegation to Beijing for negotiation, begging for a peaceful solution (of course there are other possibilities too). Right now we are using the strategy of urging the Tibetan delegation to come to Beijing and reducing Nehru’s fear.”
It is ironical that Nehru spoke of the Chinese fear, while Mao tries to ‘cool down Nehru’s fears’.
The second stage of the Chinese plans are explained by Mao

Map of the PLA operations
planned by Mao

When Tibetan representatives arrive in Beijing, we plan to use the Ten Points already decided as the basis for negotiation, urge the Tibetan representatives to sign it, and make the Ten Points an agreement accepted by both sides.

The Ten-Point eventually became the Seventeen-Point Agreement signed ‘under duress’ by Tibetan delegates in Beijing on May 23, 1951.
Mao concludes:

If this can be done, it will make things easier for advancing into Tibet next year. Your plan (the Southwest Bureau’s) to leave 3,000 men in Chamdo for the winter after occupying it, not to advance into Lhasa this year, and withdraw the main force back to Ganzi may be seen by the Tibetans as a gesture of good will.

This was the beginning of the Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai policy.
In the process, India lost of ‘buffer zone’ with Communist China and a friendly and peaceful neighbour.
The duo Nehru-Panikkar had been taken for a ride by Mao and Zhou.

(The translation of Mao's telegram is available on http://historicaldocs.blogspot.in/)