The soldier who won India's first Param Vir Chakra

Maj Som Nath Sharma, PVC on his way to Kashmir

On November 3, 2006, I wrote this piece on Maj Som Nath Sharma, PVC for Rediff.com
It was entitled The soldier who won India's first Param Vir Chakra.
On the anniversary of Maj Sharma's death, I republish the article

Lately many pleas have been made that Mohammed Afzal Guru's execution should be stayed because his death 'could fuel separatism in Jammu & Kashmir.'
The state chief minister himself has been an ardent advocate for clemency for the terrorist who attacked the Indian Parliament in December 2001 (and nearly provoked a war between India and Pakistan).
The 'secular' protagonists claim that his execution will make a martyr of Afzal. I will not enter into these fallacious arguments, but the time has perhaps come to remember a true martyr: Major Som Nath Sharma who on November 3, 1947 saved Srinagar airport (and Kashmir) at the supreme cost of his life.
Had he not sacrificed his life, Afzal's defenders would not today make front page news in the Indian press, for the simple reason that they would be Pakistani citizens living under a military dictatorship.
Our story starts during in the early days of October 1947 when Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru received a message from a former deputy commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan [one of the province's main districts] in the North West Frontier Province.
The bureaucrat warned of 'a scheme to send armed tribals from Pakistan to the Pakistan-Kashmir border; some of them had already moved towards the area in transport provided by the Pakistan government. Arms confiscated from non-Muslims had been supplied to these tribals.'
As Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir was reluctant to sign the Instrument of Accession to India, Nehru refused to take any action. Two weeks later a large contingent of Afridis, Mahsuds, Wazirs, Swathis and regular soldiers of the Pakistan army 'in mufti' began to enter Kashmir.
During the night of October 22, the 'raiders' burnt the town of Muzaffarabad. They then overran Uri and captured Mahura, the electric power station, fifty miles from Srinagar. The city of Srinagar was plunged in darkness.
In these dramatic circumstances, V P Menon, Sardar Patel's faithful collaborator, went to Jammu and got Hari Singh's signature on the printed Accession Form. He rushed back for the historic meeting in Delhi with India's governor general, Lord Mountbatten in the chair.
A young army colonel named Sam Manekshaw, who attended the meeting, recalled: 'As usual Nehru talked about the United Nations, Russia, Africa, God Almighty, everybody, until Sardar Patel lost his temper. He said, 'Jawaharlal, do you want Kashmir, or do you want to give it away?' He [Nehru] said, 'Of course, I want Kashmir.' Then he [Patel] said: 'Please give your orders.'
Everything then moved very fast.
Early the next morning, the first troops and equipment were airlifted from Palam airport [in Delhi] to Srinagar. A young major was sent on his first assignment to Kashmir. He was responsible for the logistic. His name was S.K. Sinha (today the governor of Jammu and Kashmir).
He later wrote about the first Indian jawans reaching Srinagar: 'It was indeed inspiring to see grim determination writ large on their faces. They were all determined to do their best, no matter what handicap they had to contend with. I had never before seen such enthusiasm and fervour for duty.'
They knew that all eyes in India were focused on them. At Srinagar airfield, just before returning to Delhi, Sinha met an old friend, Major Som Nath Sharma of 4 Kumaon. He had come a day earlier from Delhi with a broken arm.
Sinha found him 'rather disgusted with life.' With his 'wretched hand in plaster,' no one would give him 'an active assignment in Delhi.'
His company had now been posted to Kashmir, but he was looking to be relieved soon from his present job and given 'something really active.' His company's duty was 'only' to protect the airport.
Sinha tried to impress on Som Nath 'the vital importance of the airfield to us and in that context the importance of the task The Reconnaiassance by companies of 1 and 4 Kumaon, 3 November, 1947assigned to him,' but says the governor this 'sermonising could do little to fulfill his desire for being sent further forward.'
After spending an hour discussing and sipping a mug of tea reclining on his kitbag, Sinha left for Delhi. 'Little did I then know that within the next forty-eight hours, he was to die a hero's death and earn great renown, fighting most gallantly in very close proximity to where we then lay talking so leisurely.'
But let us spend a moment on Som Nath Sharma's life.
He was born as the eldest son of an army family. His father General A.N. Sharma, who retired as the first director general of the Armed Medical Services after Independence, was often in non-family postings.
Som, as his friends and family called him, used to spend time with his maternal grandfather Pandit Daulat Ram in Srinagar. His favourite pastime was listening to his grandfather's on the Bhagavad Gita. This influence of Krishna's teachings to Arjun were to remain with Som Nath till his last breath.
At the age of 10, Som enrolled at the Prince of Wales Royal Military College in Dehra Dun and later joined the Royal Indian Military Academy. As a young lieutenant, he chose to join the 8/19 Hyderabad Infantry Regiment.
His maternal uncle Captain Krishna Dutt Vasudeva who belonged to this regiment had died defending a bridge on the River Slim in Malaya against the Japanese. His bravery had made it possible for hundreds of his jawans to cross over to safety. The example of his uncle greatly influenced him during his career.
Som Nath fought in World War II under Colonel K S Thimmayya (later the army chief) in Burma with the British Army. An anecdote speaks tellingly about the character of the young officer.
One day, Sharma's orderly Bahadur was badly wounded in action and was unable to return to the camp. Sharma lifted Bahadur on his shoulders and began walking. When Thimmayya found his officer lagging behind under the weight of his orderly, he ordered him -- 'Leave this man, Som and rush back to the camp.'
Som Nath retorted, 'Sir, it is my own orderly that I am carrying; he is badly wounded and bleeding, l will not leave him behind.' He eventually managed to carry Bahadur back, saving his life. He was awarded a 'Mention in Dispatch' for this act of bravery.
After the Japanese surrender in Kuala Lumpur in September 1945, Som Nath returned from Malaya via Calcutta. Before landing, a small incident occurred when the British Military Police came aboard to check for contraband.
Som had an unauthorised pistol unofficially presented to him by some Japanese officer in addition to a Samurai sword (officially allotted to each officer). Som Nath refused to lie or invent a story to bluff the British officer, he immediately threw the pistol into the sea through a porthole. Such was his straightforwardness!
Two years later, India became independent, but fell prey to mad communal fighting. With his Kumaonis, Som Nath was dispatched to aid the civil administration. From his headquarters at Parliament Street police station, he spent his time extinguishing fires between the two communities -- both well armed.
To complicate the matter, streams of refugees were pouring in wave after wave to the capital. The Kumaon Regiment rose to the occasion, doing their duty honestly and impartially towards both communities. At that time, Som Nath was moving around with his broken arm and a plaster from the wrist to the elbow.
When his company was ordered to move to Srinagar, Som Nath, though technically 'unfit for active duty in war' insisted that he had to lead his company.
Before leaving for Srinagar, he spent his last night in Delhi with Major K K Tewari, his best friend and Burma companion, at the Queen Victoria Road bachelor Officers' Mess in Delhi.
They chatted late into the night. Som Nath remarked at one point that he was going to war again but alone this time (without his friend). Having probably some premonition, he asked for a memento from Tewari who told him that he could take whatever he wanted from the room. Som Nath went straight to the cupboard and took his automatic pistol, a German Luger. Quite upset, Tewari had no choice but to honour his promise.

The next morning Som Nath Sharma landed in Srinagar (where he met S.K. Sinha). The situation was fast deteriorating.
Two days later on November 3, the 'raiders' reached Badgam a few miles away from the Srinagar airfield. Brigadier 'Bogey' Sen, the commander in Srinagar, immediately dispatched Sharma and his company to Badgam.
At 2:30 pm, supported by 3-inch and 2-inch mortars, a 700-strong tribal force attacked the Indian jawans. Being outnumbered by 7 to 1, Sharma immediately sent a request to Brigadier Sen for reinforcements.
He knew that if the enemy advanced any further, the airport would be lost and Kashmir would become a province of Pakistan; the airfield was the only lifeline between the Valley and the rest of India.
His last wireless message to the headquarters stated: 'The enemy are only 50 yards from us. We are heavily outnumbered. We are under devastating fire. I shall not withdraw an inch but will fight to the last man and the last round.'
Soon after, Som Nath Sharma was killed by a mortar.

Param Vir Chakra

By the evening, when reinforcement reached Badgam; it was too late. The Kumaonis had suffered over 50 per cent casualties though they had inflicted much heavier losses to the 'raiders' who lost 200 men and the airport and Kashmir.
Major Som Nath Sharma was awarded the first Param Vir Chakra, the highest Indian gallantry award (the Indian equivalent of the Victoria Cross).
The citation read: 'Keeping his nerve, he skillfully directed the fire of his section into the ever-advancing enemy. He repeatedly exposed himself to the full fury of enemy fire and laid out cloth airstrips to guide our aircraft onto their targets in full view of the enemy. His leadership, gallantry and tenacious defence were such that his men were inspired to fight the enemy outnumbering them. Major Sharma set an example of courage and qualities seldom equaled in the history of the Indian Army.'
Three days later, Sharma's body was recovered. Though mutilated beyond recognition, a few pages of the Gita that he always kept in his breast pocket and the empty leather holster of Tewari's pistol helped to identify the body. The pistol was gone.
During the last chat with his friend before flying to Kashmir, Som Nath had joked that either he would die and win the Victoria Cross or become the army chief. It is his younger brother V.N. Sharma who in 1988 became chief of army staff.
Today, the world has gone topsy-turvy: true heroes are forgotten and terrorists become martyrs.

The Tibet factor in India-China relations

My article The Tibet factor in India-China relations appeared in The Sunday Guardian

Here is the link...

The virus which originated in Wuhan, China and the unexpected attack by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) on Indian frontiers in Ladakh have forced India to re-look at her relations with China. After ambitious generals in Chengdu’s Western Theater Command sold the idea to Xi to advance the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh, the bonhomie between India and China has become past history; in the process, Xi Jinping has destroyed the trust built during the Wuhan Consensus in 2018 and the Chennai Connect in 2019.
Borrowing the words of Beijing’s tacticians, some in India have suggested using ‘ten thousand methods’ to tackle the Middle Kingdom.
Among the different ‘methods’, many speak of a ‘Tibet Card’.
Though the word ‘card’ may not be adequate, one can certainly speak of Tibet Factor in the India-China relations.
Since the beginning of the 20th century, the Tibetan nation had all the attributes of a sovereign State (a government, a language, a script, a flag, a (weak) army, coins, stamps, etc); for centuries, the Land of Snow had unhindered relations with India, first and foremost, in the cultural and spiritual domains (Tibetan Buddhism originates from Nalanda, let us not forget), but also economically with countless ‘silk’ roads across the Himalaya; in other words, there was a deep kinship.
All this came to a sudden end when Mao decided to ‘liberate’ Tibet.
The Great Helmsman was not interested in the civilization aspect, but purely in Tibet’s strategic assets; by invading Tibet, China gained not only a huge landmass, but access to the ‘water tower of Asia’, large mineral resources and a strategic position dominating the subcontinent. The welfare of the Tibetan masses was not the Communists’ concern.
In 1950, by weakness or idealism, the Indian government abandoned Tibet to its own fate …for the sake of world peace.
In a recently-published quadrilogy covering the period between 1947 and 1962, I described this momentous era: India became independent; China did its own revolution, resulting in the arrival of a new regime, more brutal in its approach, especially towards the periphery of the Middle Kingdom. While most of the African and Asian nations were decolonized, Tibet, a de facto independent nation came under the yoke of Communist China.
An unprepared and peaceful Land of Snows became part of the Chinese ‘Motherland’. The events that we are today witnessing in Ladakh have their origin in a series of blunders committed in the 1950s and 1960s.
In India, the tumultuous year 1950 saw the emergence of two factions: one led by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and KM Panikkar, his ambassador in Beijing, both obsessed with an imaginary friendship with New China and fixated on the ‘larger implications for World Peace’ for any decision concerning Tibet; the other, which immediately saw the strategic implications for India’s frontiers if Delhi let Tibet down, was led by Sardar Patel, the Deputy Prime Minster, with Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, the Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations as his main adviser, but also comprised of President Rajendra Prasad, C. Rajagopalachari, KM Munshi and others. They were fed with reports ‘from the ground’ by Harishwar Dayal, the brilliant Political Officer in Sikkim and Sumul Sinha, the Head of the Indian Mission in Lhasa, two sincere and far-sighted civil servants. At that time, India had a full-fledged Mission in Tibet as well as three Trade Agencies in Gyantse, Yatung and Gartok.
The dichotomy between the officers on the ground and the ‘visionaries’ in Delhi continued till October 1962, when China’s massive invasion in NEFA and in Ladakh brought the idealists back on earth.
One can trace the first blunder to December 1949 when India kept quiet after Beijing unilaterally closed down the Indian Consulate in Kashgar, Sinkiang (today Xinjiang).
By taking over Xinjiang, Mao controlled the western borders of the Middle Kingdom, he could access trade with Central Asia and block any possibility of Soviet southward advance; for the first time, he also came in contact with the Indian frontiers, particularly the Aksai Chin area, the object of today’s conflict; a few years later, Beijing built a road across Indian territory linking up Xinjiang with Tibet.
On November 7, 1950, a well-drafted appeal to the UN was sent from Kalimpong (as there were no postal facilities in Lhasa), pointing to the fact that “the Tibetans were racially, culturally and geographically far apart from the Chinese.” It also made a parallel with the situation in the Korean peninsula: “The attention of the world was then riveted on Korea where aggression was being resisted by an international force.” Similar happenings in Tibet were taking place with the world covering its eyes.
Delhi decided to bury the issue in the UN by telling the General Assembly that it would sort out the issue and find a peaceful solution. Interestingly, some years ago, a Canadian scholar, Claudia Johnston studied the issue; the outcome of her research was that the Tibetan Appeal was still a pending matter in the UN …waiting to be reopened.
Another very-little known, but consequential blunder was that Delhi accepted to downgrade its full-fledged Mission in Lhasa to a Consulate General in 1952. It was secretly done without the knowledge of the Indian Parliament. This action, initiated by KM Panikkar, practically brought down Tibet to the level of a province of China; Delhi thought it would please Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier; of course, India did not get anything in return.
Two years later, Delhi took the initiative to call a conference to discuss the trade and pilgrimage between Tibet and India.
One of the most immoral parts of what became the Panchsheel Agreement, was that Delhi ignored the existence of the Tibetan Government; Delhi only dealt with the new masters of the Roof of the World, without informing the Dalai Lama’s Administration. Strange for a government so vociferous about the decolonization of Africa or Asia, while Tibet enjoyed what the Indian Prime Minister himself described as an autonomy ‘verging on Independence’.
The “Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between the Tibet region of China and India” was signed on April 29, 1954 in Beijing. The talks would take four months to arrive at a settlement …forgetting the border in the process.
The ‘Panchsheel’ Agreement resulted in the unhindered advance of the Communist ideology and the PLA on the Tibetan plateau.
At the time, many senior Indian politicians and diplomats, educated in ‘modern’ ideas, thought the ‘old Lama hierarchy’ should be swept away and Tibet become a ‘modern’ country; they believed that the Chinese invasion was a chance to make a clean sweep of the old superstitions, beliefs or rituals. What a folly!

A New Tibet Policy
It is easier to commit a blunder than to repair its consequences, however in view of the present situation on the borders, it is necessary to take a first step and re-think what could be a new approach, not only towards Tibet and the Tibetan refugees, but also the entire Himalayan belt.
It would indeed be more advantageous to have a policy for the entire Himalaya, including Tibet, which have shared countless cultural, spiritual, strategic and economic similarities. The first step could be the creation of an Office of Northern Frontiers and Tibetan Affairs under the Prime Minister’s Office.
For the purpose, Delhi should start a dialogue with the Tibetans (for example with the present Dalai Lama’s representative in Delhi, who has a great knowledge in security issues) and the Himalayan States.
Some general principles should dictate the new policy.
First, India should look after her own interests and the security of the people living on the borders; it seems obvious, but it has not always been the case.
Another principle is that India’s policies or actions should not be dictated by what others will think or say, particularly how China will react to a particular decision. This tendency has lasted too long with no tangible gain for the country; for example, the 2018 notice circulated to all ministries/departments ordering that no Indian officials should meet the Dalai Lama had serious counter-productive effects.
It is unfortunate but it is a fact that India faces a country which still believes that power comes from the barrel of a gun; without emulating China, India needs to quietly and forcefully look after her own interests and be straightforward about it; a closer kinship between Delhi and Dharamsala is in the country’s interests.
Whatever over-all policy is adopted by the Government at a later stage, one element is critical: coordination. In view of the individualistic tendencies of the Indian bureaucracy, this is crucial in order to achieve the targeted aim of the policy between the different shareholders (Ministries of External Affairs, Defence; Home Affairs, Education, Culture, intelligence agencies, etc).
Without proper coordination, it will be just one more futile new policy.
The creation of such a Department would be the first step to strengthen the border areas, and use the goodwill of the Tibetans towards India; the rest will follow. But undoing the knots of the past will take time.

Patel-Nehru rift over Tibet & China was deep

My article Patel-Nehru rift over Tibet & China was deep appeared in the Deccan Chronicle

Here us the link...

The most serious cause of discord was the invasion of Tibet by the Chinese “Liberation Army” in October 1950.

On October 31, the world’s tallest statue, the Statue of Unity dedicated to Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, was unveiled by Prime Minister Narendra Modi.The work on the 182-metre tall statue has been completed after round the clock work by 3,400 labourers and 250 engineers at Sadhu Bet island on Narmada river in Gujarat. Sadhu Bet, located some 3.5 km away from the Narmada Dam, is linked by a 250-metre-long long bridge.
Unfortunately, for several reasons, scarce scholarly research has been done on the internal history of the Congress; the main cause is probably that a section of the party would prefer to keep history under wraps. Take the acute differences of opinion between Sardar Patel, the deputy prime minister, and “Panditji”, as Nehru was then called by Congressmen. In the last weeks of Patel’s life (he passed away on December 15, 1950), there was a deep split between the two leaders, leading to unilateral decisions for the PM, for which India had to pay the heaviest price.
The most serious cause of discord was the invasion of Tibet by the Chinese “Liberation Army” in October 1950. In the course of recent researches in Indian archives, I discovered several new facts. Not only did several senior Congress leaders, led by Patel, violently oppose Nehru’s suicidal policy, but many senior bureaucrats too did not agree with the Prime Minister’s decisions and objected to his policy of appeasement with China, which led India to lose a peaceful border.
On November 11, 1950, the deputy prime minister of India addressed a meeting organised by the Central Aryan Association to commemorate the 67th death anniversary of Swami Dayanand Saraswati. It was to be his last speech. What did he say? The Sardar spoke of the potential dangers arising from what was happening in Tibet and Nepal, and he exhorted his countrymen: “It was incumbent on the people to rise above party squabbles and unitedly defend their newly-won freedom.” He cited the example of Gandhi and Swami Dayanand.
Sardar Patel then criticised the Chinese intervention in Tibet; he asserted that to use the “sword” against the traditionally peace-loving Tibetan people was unjustified: “No other country in the world was as peace-loving as Tibet. India did not believe, therefore, that the Chinese government would actually use force in settling the Tibetan question.” He observed that the Chinese government did not listen to India’s advice to settle the Tibetan issue peacefully: “They marched their armies into Tibet and explained this action by talking of foreign interests intriguing in Tibet against China.” The deputy prime minster added that this fear was unfounded; no outsider was interested in Tibet. The Sardar continued by saying that “nobody could say what the outcome of Chinese action would be. But the use of force ultimately created more fear and tension. It was possible that when a country got drunk with its own military strength and power, it did not think calmly over all issues.” He strongly asserted that the use of arms was wrong: “In the present state of the world, such events might easily touch off a new world war, which would mean disaster for mankind.”
Did he know that it was his last message? “Do not let cowardice cripple you. Do not run away from danger. The three year-old freedom of the country has to be fully protected. India today is surrounded by all sorts of dangers and it is for the people today to remember the teachings of the two great saints and face fearlessly all dangers.”
The deputy prime minister concluded: “In this kalyug we shall return ahimsa for ahimsa. But if anybody resorted to force against us we shall meet it with force.” He ended his speech citing Swami Dayananda: “People should also remember that Swamiji did not get a foreign education. He was the product of Indian culture. Although it was true that they in India had to borrow whatever was good and useful from other countries, it was right and proper that Indian culture was accorded its due place.” Who is ready to listen to this, even today?
Days earlier, Patel had written a “prophetic” letter to Nehru, detailing the implications for India of Tibet’s invasion. In fact, Patel used a draft done by Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, the secretary-general of the ministry of external affairs and Commonwealth relations. However, Nehru decided to ignore Patel’s letter.
Witnessing the nefarious influence of K.M. Panikkar, the Indian ambassador to China, who ceaselessly defended China’s interests, Bajpai, the most seasoned Indian diplomat, had lost his cool. On October 31, in an internal note, he detailed the sequence of events which followed Tibet’s invasion and the role of Panikkar, whose attitude was compared to Sir Neville Chamberlain’s towards Hitler.
Bajpai’s anger demonstrates the frustration of many senior officers; the account starts on July 15, when the governor of Assam informed Delhi that, according to the information received by the local intelligence bureau, Chinese troops, “in unknown strength, had been moving towards Tibet from three directions.” Not only was Panikkar unable to get any confirmation, but he virtually justified Beijing’s military action by writing: “In view of frustration in regard to Formosa, the Tibetan move was not unlikely.” During the next three months, the Indian ambassador would systematically take the Chinese side.
After receiving Bajpai’s note, Patel wrote back: “I need hardly say that I have read it with a great deal of interest and profit to myself and it has resulted in a much better understanding of the points at issue and general, though serious, nature of the problem. The Chinese advance into Tibet upsets all our security calculations. … I entirely agree with you that a reconsideration of our military position and a redisposition of our forces are inescapable.”
Some more details of the seriousness of the situation filters through Inside Story of Sardar Patel: The Diary of Maniben Patel, the daughter of the Sardar. In an entry on November 2, 1950, Maniben wrote: “Rajaji and Jawaharlal had a heated altercation about the Tibet policy. Rajaji does not at all appreciate this policy. Rajaji very unhappy — Bapu (Patel) did not speak at all.”
Later in the afternoon, “Munshi complained about Tibet policy. The question concerns the whole nation — said he had written a personal letter to Panditji on Tibet.”
Later, Patel told K.M. Munshi: “Rajaji, you (Munshi), I (Patel), Baldev Singh, (C.D.) Deshmukh, Jagjivan Ram and even Sri Prakash are on one side, while Gopalaswamy, Rafi, Maulana (Azad) are on his side.” There was a vertical split in the Cabinet; and it was not only about Tibet. The situation would deteriorate further during the following weeks.
On December 12, Patel was divested on his portfolios. Nehru wrote: “In view of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel’s ill-health it is absolutely necessary that he should have complete rest and freedom from worry, so as to be able to recuperate as rapidly as possible. …no work should be sent to him and no references made to him in regard to the work of these ministries.”
Gopalaswami Ayyangar, from the “other side”, was allotted the ministry of states and Nehru kept the ministry of home. The Sardar was only informed after the changes were made. He was a dejected man. Three days later he passed away.

In kalyug we shall return ahimsa for ahimsa, but if anybody resort to force against us we shall meet it with force

I am posting today, what is probably the last public speech of Sardar Patel.
On November 11, 1950, the Deputy Prime Minister of India addressed a meeting organized by the Central Aryan Association to commemorate the 67th death anniversary of Swami Dayanand Saraswati.
This raises a serious question: very little research has been done on the last weeks of Patel's life.
It is highly regrettable.
One of the problems is that all historical documents of this period remains classified in the MEA.
Why should the Modi Government follow a Congress policy is difficult to comprehend.

The Sardar passed away on December 15, two days after being 'shifted' to Mumbai (because 'Delhi was too cold').
What do we know about the last one month of Patel's life?
Practically nothing, except that he opposed Nehru's policy on Tibet.
His prophetic letter on Tibet written on November 7 raises further questions.
A note sent to Bajpai shows that Patel had got his information from the General Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs (Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai), who was getting regular information from Sumul Sinha, the Head of the Indian Mission in Lhasa.
Another unanswered question: did Nehru acknowledge Patel's 'prophetic' letter addressed which raised number of serious security issues for India.
Probably not.
Did Nehru inform Patel about his decision in early November, to radically change India's Tibet policy, as reflected in Nehru's note addressed to B.N. Rau, the Indian Representative to the UN on November 18.
Probably not.
Patel, by the end of November, was a dejected man and he fell sick.On December 13, after he had been 'shifted' to Mumbai, Patel was divested of all his portfolios by the Prime Minister, he was not even informed.
He was deeply hurt and he passed away 2 days later.
On that day, ministers were told to continue their business as usual.

Here is a report of his last speech.

Sardar Patel Exhorts people to stand unitedly to see conditions in Tibet and Nepal and defend their country
The Hindustan Times, 11 November 1950

"In this kalyug we shall return ahimsa for ahimsa. But if anybody resorted to force against us we shall meet it with force." 

Sardar Patel said in Delhi that the present or potential dangers arising from what was happening in Tibet and Nepal made it incumbent on the people to rise above party squabbles and unitedly defend their newly-won freedom. The path shown by Mahatma Gandhi and Swami Dayanand, he added, would help the people to tide over these none too easy times.
Sardar Patel was addressing a meeting organized by the Central Aryan Association to commemorate the 67th death anniversary of Swami Dayanand Saraswati, social reformer and thinker.
Referring to the recent developments in Nepal, Sardar Patel said: "In this country, our near neighbour, the Raja has sought sanctuary in the Indian Embassy. How could we refuse to give him refuge? We had to give it.
Those who are wielding real power today in Nepal do not accept the Raja as the head of the State. They have installed the Raja's three-year-old grandson on the gaddi. They want us to accept this position. How can we do so?"
Sardar Patel emphasized that the 'internal feud' in Nepal had laid India's frontiers in the north wide open to outside dangers. It was imperative, therefore, for Indians to be well prepared to meet any challenge that might come from any quarter.
Sardar Patel criticized Chinese intervention in Tibet and said that to use the `sword' against the traditionally peace-loving Tibetan people was unjustified. No other country in the world was as peace-loving as Tibet. India did not believe, therefore, that the Chinese Government would actually use force in settling the Tibetan question.
"The Chinese Government," he said, "did not follow India's advice to settle the Tibetan issue peacefully. They marched their armies into Tibet and explained this action by talking of foreign interests intriguing in Tibet against China. But this fear is unfounded: no outsider is interested in Tibet. India made this very plain to the Chinese Government. If the Chinese Government had taken India's advice, resort to arms would have been avoided."
Continuing, Sardar Patel said that nobody could say what the outcome of Chinese action would be. But the use of force ultimately created more fear and tension. It was possible that when a country got drunk with its own military strength and power, it did not think calmly over all issues.
But use of arms was wrong. In the present state of the world, such events might easily touch off a new world war, which would mean disaster for mankind.
In these difficult times, Sardar Patel said, the duty of the Indian people lay not in fleeing from trouble but facing it boldly. That was the real message of both Swami Dayanand and Mahatma Gandhi. "Do not let cowardice cripple you. Do not run away from danger. The three-year-old freedom of the country has to be fully protected. India today is surrounded by all sorts of dangers and it is for the people today to remember the teachings of the two great saints and face fearlessly all dangers."
The Deputy Prime Minister continuing declared: "In this kalyug we shall return ahimsa for ahimsa. But if anybody resorted to force against us we shall meet it with force." Sardar Patel said that Swami Dayanand was one of the two great saints Gujarat gave to the world. Although Swami Dayanand and Mahatma Gandhi were born in Gujarat, they had dedicated their lives to the service of mankind. Ultimately they belonged to not only the whole of India but the world. It was for the people now to understand the teachings of these two saints and follow them in their actual lives.
The greatest contribution of Swami Dayanand, he said, was that he saved the country from falling deeper into the morass of helplessness. He actually laid the foundations of India's freedom. A movement against untouchability, later to be supported by Gandhiji, was launched, and reconversion to Hinduism of the already forcibly converted persons was started. Swami Dayanand put a complete stop to the tendency in those days of preaching adharma in the name of dharma, which had made the Hindu Dharma the laughing stock of the world. ,
"Swami Dayanand wiped off," he said, "the dirt and grime that had settled on the Hindu Dharma. He swept aside the cloud of superstition shrouding it and let in light."
In the Indian Constitution untouchability had been declared a crime and Hindi accepted as the national language. It was actually Swami Dayanand, Sardar Patel said, who first propagated that Hindi be made the national language.
People should also remember that Swamiji did not get foreign education. He was the product of the Indian culture. Although it was true that they in India had to borrow whatever was good and useful from other countries, it was right and proper that Indian culture was accorded its due place.

Claude Arpi's book exposes India's ties with China and Tibet like never before

My book has been reviewed in Mail Today/DailyO by Utpal Kumar

Titles of the review is Claude Arpi's bookexposes India's ties with China and Tibet like never before

The book brings to fore how Jawaharlal Nehru deliberately kept Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel out of the discussions on Tibet.

Claude Arpi's latest book, Tibet: The Last Months of a Free Nation, is an original, one-of-its-kind account of how India lost the "Roof of the World" not because of the long-held notion of the great Chinese betrayal, but because of the monumental failure of former prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru and his ideological allies to see the writing on the wall for more than a decade. It's original because it, unlike other more celebrated books, refuses to look at the events through solely the Western lens. Rather, the author took the pain of going through desi papers to create a narrative that challenges the long-held notions of the event.

The book not just brings out the differences of opinion between Nehru and his deputy PM Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, who was also the home minister, on how to deal with looming communist shadow over Lhasa. In the last weeks of Patel's life, who passed away on December 15, 1950, Nehru kept him out of the Tibetan issue, citing his deteriorating health.

Nehru's differences with Patel might be a known fact, but the high point of the book is when the author exposes how several senior bureaucrats were not happy with the prime minister's handling of the Tibetan affairs, which led India to lose a peaceful northern border.

Sardar Patel had written a letter to Nehru on November 7, 1950, detailing the implications of Tibet's invasion for India. The author tells us that Patel's "prophetic" letter was actually a draft sent by Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai, eminent civil servant and diplomat. A month after the entry of the Chinese forces in Tibet, Patel sent Bajpai's note under his own signature to Nehru, who chose to ignore it.

Arpi also brings out the frustration of seasoned diplomats such as Bajpai, who had to face the slight of his junior, KM Panikkar, the then Indian ambassador to China. Panikkar ceaselessly defended the Chinese interests to the extent of being detrimental to India's, and being ideologically closer to Nehru he would on several occasions bypass his immediate bosses in the department, including Bajpai. The ambassador not just failed to confirm several intelligence reports suggesting initial Chinese military aggressive moves, but also defended them by writing: "In view of frustration in regard to Formosa, Tibetan move was not unlikely."

No wonder, when things were moving at a rapid pace in communist China, the country was in a denial mode. Nehru, blinded by his ideological obsession and wrong associates like Panikkar and defence minister VK Krishna Menon, even went to the extent of questioning the efficacy of a strong army. This mindset alone explains why, at the time of the Chinese aggression, India's gun factories were believed to be producing coffee.

The book, at another level, is also a reminder of what's wrong with our academia. When Arpi writes, "with this compilation, one can read for the first time, Tibet's tragedy from the Indian viewpoint", it makes one wonder: Why did it take Indian scholars so long to look at such easily available documents in the Nehru Memorial Museum Library and National Archives of India? It definitely wasn't an accidental failure.

Tibet: The Last Months of a Free Nation is a book that should be read by everyone who cares to know where we went wrong in our ties with China and Tibet. But given the stunning silence in the academic circles, it hardly seems to be the case. Maybe it's because we are living in the era of manufactured bestsellers. Manufactured because the bestseller list can now be rigged. One just needs to know the procedure. Remember Lani Sarem, a one-time actress, who hired a company to ensure her 2017 book, Handbook for Mortals, found a place on the New York Times bestseller list? She managed to get one, albeit for a short time. And back home, it's now an old joke in the publishing circle about a noted novelist "managing" a bestseller slot for his first book by buying thousands of its copies.

Arpi's book is definitely not worth a "bestseller" slot, but it rightly deserves an intellectual buzz. Sadly, it's not the case in the country right now.

Tragedy of Kashmir that bleeds us to this day

Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir and Sardar Patel

My article Tragedy of Kashmir that bleeds us to this day appeared in the Edit Page of The Pioneer.

Here is the link...

One fateful decision taken by Nehru seventy years ago, much against the advice of Sardar Patel, is still creating ripples in the Indian sub-continent. India continues to suffer for the Kashmir mistake

Seventy years is a long time, but a blunder which took place in the last days of 1947, is still creating ripples in the sub-continent. I am speaking of Kashmir. On October 20, 1947, the Indian State of Jammu & Kashmir was invaded by tribesmen and Pakistani nationals from bases inside the Pakistan territory.
Six days later, Maharaja Hari Singh offered to sign the instrument of accession of his State to the Indian Union. The following day, on October 27, the British Governor-General of India accepted the offer; thereafter, the State became an integral part of India.
In a separate letter to the ruler, Mountbatten expressed a wish that the people of the State should be given the right to decide whether they should remain in India or not. This was to take place at a future date when law and order had been restored and the soil of the State cleared of the invaders.
In the following weeks, the situation continued to worsen; on December 19, in a note on Kashmir, former Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru noted: “there has been a progressive deterioration and the initiative appears to have been with the enemy most of the time.”
Even the pacifist Prime Minister realised the seriousness of the situation: “What is happening in Kashmir State is not merely a frontier raid but a regular war, on a limited scale, with the latest weapons being used on the part of the invaders.” Nehru continued: “This type of operations can continue for months and months and years without bringing any result. The longer they continue the greater harm they cause to India.”
He agreed that only solution for India was a military action which meant hitting at the raiders, their bases and supply lines in Pakistan.
When Lord Mountbatten, the Governor General, realised the possibility of a change in India’s policy, he decided to act quickly. Since the beginning of the crisis in Kashmir, he had wanted to give the United Nations a say in the matter. But for India, the mere fact of appealing to the United Nations meant creating a ‘dispute’ where there was no dispute; the Kashmir maharaja, like more than 500 other rulers, had acceded to the Indian Union. The fact that Pakistan has organised an armed invasion of Kashmir was a separate issue; the accession of Kashmir was indeed legal, Mountbatten had himself accepted it in writing.
But if India was to declare a war on Pakistan, it would have many consequences for Great Britain and Mountbatten’s career. First, the British officers, serving in the armies of the two dominions, would have to resign; the ‘stand down’ order issued by London was clear on this. The British generals were not vital for India, since the indigenisation of the Army had made great strides since August 15; however, it would have serious consequences for the Pakistanis who were totally dependent on the British officers.
Another consequence was that Mountbatten would probably lose his job, it was impossible for a Briton to be the Head of a State at war against another member of the Commonwealth (ie Pakistan).
As Mountbatten started putting pressure on Jawaharlal Nehru to refer the issue to the United Nations, a distressing incident took place in Delhi. Though legally, the issue of Jammu & Kashmir was under the Ministry of States headed by Sardar Patel, Nehru decided to take over the Kashmir file. We shall see the consequences.
On December 23, using the excuse of 150 motor vehicles being sent from East Punjab to Kashmir by the States’ Ministry, the Prime Minister wrote to Patel: “I do not appreciate the principle which presumably the States Ministry has in view in regard to its work. That Ministry, or any other Ministry, is not an imperium in imperio, [a state with the State] jealous of its sovereignty in certain domains and working in isolation from the rest.”
This was totally unfair to Patel.
But Nehru argued that Kashmir was connected with international, military and others issues “which are beyond the competence of the States Ministry as such.”
Patel immediately decided to resign; he told Nehru that the latter’s letter “has caused me considerable pain …In any case, your letter makes it clear to me that I must not or at least cannot continue as a Member of Government and hence I am hereby tendering my resignation.”
Unfortunately, on Gandhi’s intervention, Patel had to withdraw his resignation, but thereafter he had no say on important decisions on Kashmir. This would have tragic consequences.
Once Patel was out of the way, Mountbatten could act; he asked the British High Commissioner in Delhi to inform Attlee of the catastrophic military situation for India and that if Uri and Naushara fell, there would be nothing he could do “to stop the Indian forces from marching in West Pakistan.”
The problem was that Mountbatten, as Chairman of the Defence Committee, was privy to all Delhi’s decisions. He could not tell Attlee, the British Prime Minister, to directly write to Nehru, by referring to plans that Attlee was not supposed to know. Mountbatten, therefore, suggested that Nehru should himself keep Attlee informed of the situation.
Naively, the Indian Prime Minister wrote to Attlee to explain to him that India had no alternative but to attack Pakistan; the last thing His
Majesty’s Government wanted to see was the end of Pakistan as Attlee knew very well that as soon as the war would break out, all British officers would have to leave both dominions.
He replied the same day to Nehru that his Government was very much disturbed by the fact that India believed it had the right to enter Pakistan, even in self-defense. Attlee knew Nehru well enough to play on a very sensitive point: That world opinion would condemn him and India.
Probably also influenced by Edwina Mountbatten, Nehru fell into the trap; he wrote a complaint to the United Nations. But by accepting Mountbatten’s suggestion to unveil India’s plans to Attlee, Nehru committed a major blunder, and Patel could not intervene anymore.
On December 28, 1947, in a letter to Lord Mountbatten, Nehru wrote: “In view of the great importance of the step we are contemplating regarding a reference to the United Nations, we had a special meeting of the Cabinet today to consider it.” A ‘draft reference’ was approved and a copy sent to the British Prime Minister.
The next day, Vallabhbhai Patel was informed “I am sending you separately a copy of a telegram sent yesterday to the Prime Minister, UK, in regard to Kashmir. We held a meeting of the Cabinet yesterday afternoon when we considered this telegram and the draft reference to UNO.”
Patel had been sidelined and the harm was done. Seventy years later, India is still suffering from the blunder then committed.
Such a tragedy!

Why Vallabhbhai Patel strongly opposed Nehru's 'suicidal policy' of appeasement over China and Tibet

My article Why Vallabhbhai Patel strongly opposed Nehru's 'suicidal policy' of appeasement over China and Tibet appeared in Mail Today/Daily Mail (UK)

Here is the link...

For several reasons, scarce scholarly research has been done on the internal history of the Congress; the main cause is probably that a section of the party would prefer to keep the history under wrap.
Take the acute difference of opinion between Sardar Patel, the Deputy Prime Minister and ‘Panditji’, how Nehru was then called by Congressmen.
In the last weeks of Patel’s life (he passed away on December 15, 1950) there was a deep split between the two leaders, leading to unilateral decisions, for which India had to pay the heaviest price.
The most serious apple of discord was Tibet’s invasion by the Chinese ‘Liberation Army’ in October of 1950. In the course of recent researches in the Indian archives, I discovered several new facts. Not only several senior Congress leaders, led by Patel, violently opposed Nehru suicidal policy, but many senior bureaucrats too, did not agree with the Prime Minister’s decisions and objected to his policy of appeasement, which lead India to lose a peaceful border.
It is usually assumed that on November 7, Sardar Patel wrote a ‘prophetic’ letter to Nehru, detailing the implications for India of Tibet’s invasion. In fact, Patel used a draft given by Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, the Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth.
A month after the entry of the People’s Liberation Army in Tibet, Patel sent Bajpai’s note under his own signature, to Nehru, who decided to ignore thes Deputy Prime Minister’s letter. Bajpai, the most seasoned Indian diplomat, even lost his cool, witnessing the nefarious influence of KM Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador to China, who ceaselessly defended the Chinese interests.
On October 31, in an internal note, Bajpai detailed the sequence of events which followed Tibet’s invasion and the role of Panikkar, whose attitude was compared to the one of Sir Neville Hendersons toward Hitler.
Bajpai’s anger demonstrates the frustration of many senior officers; the account starts on July 15, when the Governor of Assam informed Delhi that, according to the information received by the local Intelligence Bureau, Chinese troops, “in unknown strength, had been moving towards Tibet from three directions, namely the north, north-east and south-east.” Mao was preparing to invade Tibet. The IB had reported that “one column was moving from Jyekundo in Qinghai Province, the second one from Derge in the Sikang [Eastern Tibet] Province. …The third column, which came from the Yunnan Province, had reached the Shukla Pass.”
Not only Panikkar was unable to get any confirmation, but he virtually justified Beijing’s military action by writing: “in view of frustration in regard to Formosa, Tibetan move was not unlikely.”
During the next three months, the Indian Ambassador would systematically take the Chinese side.
Sir Girja, Panikkar’s direct boss, became more and more frustrated with the Ambassador who reported to ‘Panditji’ only; after the Tibetans lost Chamdo, the capital of Kham province, Panikkar argued: “I should like to emphasise that the Chinese firmly hold that Tibet is purely an internal problem and that while they are prepared in deference to our wishes to settle question peacefully they are NOT prepared to postpone matters indefinitely.” Beijing was hinting that the Tibetans were been ready to seat at the negotiating table. It was a pure lie.
After receiving Bajpai’s note, Patel wrote back: “I need hardly say that I have read it with a great deal of interest and profit to myself and it has resulted in a much better understanding of the points at issue and general though serious nature of the problem. The Chinese advance into Tibet upsets all our security calculations. …I entirely agree with you that a reconsideration of our military position and a redisposition of our forces are inescapable.”
Bajpai then prepared a draft for Patel to write to Nehru.
Some more details of the seriousness of the situation filter through Inside Story of Sardar Patel: The Diary of Maniben Patel, the daughter of the Sardar.
An entry on October 30 shows Patel deeply disturbed by Nehru constantly interfering in his ministry: “Jawaharlalji now trying to interfere in States' Ministry! If he has no confidence, why doesn't he tell Bapu [Patel] directly to quit,” writes Maniben.
The same day, Patel tells VP Menon, the Secretary of his Ministry, "You tell Rajaji that I don't want to keep the States Ministry".
On November 2, 1950, Maniben reports: “Rajaji and Jawaharlal had heated altercation about Tibet policy. Rajaji does not at all appreciate this policy. Rajaji very unhappy — Bapu did not speak at all.”
Later in the afternoon, “Munshi complained about Tibet policy. The question concerns the whole nation — said he had written a personal letter to Panditji on Tibet.”
Later Patel tells Munshi: “Rajaji, you [Munshi], I, Baldev Singh, [CD] Deshmukh, Jagjivan Ram and even Sri Prakash are on one side, while Gopalaswamy, Rafi, Maulana [Azad] on his side.”
There was a vertical split in the Cabinet; and it was not only about Tibet. The situation would deteriorate further during the following weeks.
On December 12, Patel was divested on his portfolios. Nehru wrote: “In view of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel’s ill-health it is absolutely necessary that he should have complete rest and freedom from worry, so as to be able to recuperate as rapidly as possible. …no work should be sent to him and no references made to him in regard to the work of these Ministries.”
Gopalaswami Ayyangar was allotted the Ministry of State and Nehru kept the Ministry of Home.
The Sardar was only informed after the changes were made. He was deeply upset. Three days later he passed away.
The question is why nobody has ever research these important historical issues.

India must not forget bitter partition lessons while tackling Kashmir

19470-48

My article India must not forget bitter partition lessons while tackling Kashmir appeared in Mail Today.


Here is the link...

When Prime Minister Narendra Modi met Chinese President Xi Jinping at the G20 Summit in Hangzhou, China, he said that “to ensure durable bilateral ties, and steady development, it is of paramount importance that we respect each other’s aspirations, concerns and strategic interests.”
Later External Affairs Ministry spokesperson Vikas Swarup explained: “You can pretty well understand that when we talk of strategic interests and aspirations, it is not as if China is unaware of our strategic concerns and aspirations or we are unaware of their concerns.”
Modi had not only the Valley in mind, but also Pakistan-occupied- Kashmir (POK).

Concerns
In his August 15 speech, the Prime Minister had asserted: “The people of Balochistan, the people of Gilgit, the people of POK have thanked me in such a manner, from places that I have never been and never had a chance to meet, they have sent wishes to the people of India and thanked us... I am grateful to them.”
On the previous day, Pakistan’s Independence Day, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif had dedicated his country’s independence to the “freedom of Kashmir from Indian rule”.
During the previous weeks, Pakistan had been bringing the Kashmir issue on the world scene.
Two issues forced India to take a tougher position to defend its interests: the current unrest in the Valley, but also the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), cutting across POK, in which Beijing plans to invest $46 billion.

To get proper historical perspectives of the current situation, it is necessary to go back to the year before the British left the jewel of their empire.
The British Empire, born from a trading company, was a sea-empire.
But at the beginning of the 20th century, two new factors appeared on the strategic scene: one was aviation (whose role was masterfully demonstrated by the Japanese at Pearl Harbour in 1941) and petrol, and therefore, the importance of the Middle East.
When the British Chiefs of Staff were ordered to submit a report on the strategic consequences of the departure from the subcontinent, the generals agreed that Pakistan was more important than India; they foresaw the possibility of installing air bases in the north of Pakistan to control Russia and naval bases opening to the Arabian Sea in the south.
Another argument was that Mohammed Ali Jinnah was extremely keen to remain within the Commonwealth while the Indian National Congress had not made up its mind.
Jinnah once forcefully told Mountbatten: “You can’t kick us out.”
Subsequently, London’s policy was meticulously implemented; as the time of Independence came, while Jinnah insisted on becoming the first Governor- General of Pakistan, the Congress big-heartedly offered the job in India to the Viscount.
This was the first of a long series of blunders. Then, when soon after Independence, the issue of Junagadh and Hyderabad came up, the Cabinet had to create a defence committee.
Who became its chairman? A Britisher, the same Mountbatten. Second blunder.

Mistakes
This was a surrealistic situation: two dominions, one with a Pakistani Governor- General, the other with a British; two armies, both commanded by British generals.
The ‘Indian’ British generals took orders from the British Governor- General and not from the Indian government; the Defence Committee being chaired by a Briton, often overrode the Cabinet’s decisions and a ‘stand-down’ order stated that British officers would not fight one another.
As a result, India could not defend itself. Such was the situation when the raiders trained, equipped and directed by Colonel Akbar Khan, military adviser of the Pakistani Prime Minister, entered Kashmir at the end of October 1947.
The story is too well known to be recounted here, but the interesting point is that the British constantly played a double game.
For example, General Douglas Gracey, the Pakistani Army Commander, knew of the raiders’ attack beforehand, but he did not ‘inform’ his ‘Indian’ British counterpart.
Another mega blunder: as the Indian Army was ready to chase back the raiders and the Pakistani regulars, Jawaharlal Nehru unnecessarily referred the issue to UN… on the advice of Clement Attlee, the British Prime Minister… and Mountbatten.

Outlook
The invasion of J&K by Pakistani regular forces on May 8, 1948, was in contravention of all international laws.
Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, the Secretary-General of the Ministry of External Affairs, wrote: “When even direct aggression failed, (Pakistan) began to clamour for a plebiscite, thereby hoping to achieve by other means what she had failed to obtain by force.”
Bajpai remarked that for the first time in its Resolution of August 13, 1948, the UN “recorded one major change in the situation as contemplated by the Security Council during its deliberations in the early part of that year, namely, the presence of Pakistan troops in the state of J&K.”
In this condition, the plebiscite never took place. It is important to keep this in mind, when one goes through the recent developments in the region.
It is essential to look at these events in their historical context. The large presence of Chinese ‘workers’ on a territory that was legally part of the India Union, and also the joint patrols conducted by PLA frontier defence troops and the Pakistani Khunjerab Security Force south of the Khunjerab pass (“aiming to offer security guarantee to the construction of the CPEC”), are naturally a serious concern for India.
Let us hope that China is now aware of India’s strategic concerns and aspirations in the region.

When Nehru left the Tibetans to their fate

S. Sinha, second from the left with Gyalo Thondup
(the Dalai Lama's brother) on his right

My article When Nehru left the Tibetans to their fate appeared yesterday in the Edit Page of The Pioneer.

Here is the link...

Developments have shown just how wrong Jawaharlal Nehru had been in handling the China-Tibet policy, not just ignoring the advice of a capable IFS officer but also brushing aside Sardar Patel’s warnings

When China walked into Eastern Tibet on October 7, 1950, the Tibetan Army could offer only a minimum resistance. During the following week, the Indian governm
It is in these circumstances that a young Chinese speaking IFS officer, Sumul Sinha took over as the Head of the Indian Mission in Lhasa.
Sinha was heading for tough times: India’s Tibet policy was in the process of changing radically under the impulsion of K.M. Panikkar, India’s Ambassador in China, suddenly promoted to being Nehru’s chief advisor for Tibet affairs. To make things worse, Sardar Patel, the Deputy Prime Minister, would pass away in December.
On November 17, at the age of 15, the Dalai Lama had to assume temporal power over the Land of Snows; the same day, Delhi sent a cable to the Political Officer (PO) in Sikkim: “If danger to Mission develops, all Top Secret papers and other secret papers should be destroyed by burning.”
A wind of panic had stared blowing over the Indian capital.
It is in these circumstances that the relationship between the new Indian Representative in Lhasa and the Prime Minister started souring.
On November 23, Nehru, who also held the Foreign Minister’s portfolio, cabled Sinha: “Government of India have noticed that certain communications from Lhasa and Sikkim regarding Tibet are dogmatic, disputatious and admonitory. …Once a decision has been taken by Government [to abandon Tibet to its fate], it should be accepted gracefully and followed faithfully; any insinuation that Government have been acting wrongly or improperly is objectionable.”
Sinha’s reports did not fit Nehru’s global vision of the world, the ‘larger vision’, as he used to call it.
Sinha had expressed too much sympathy for the Tibetan people, at a time when their nation was being erased from the world map.
The cable from Delhi continues in the same vein: “While local officers may be experts in their field, they CANNOT be fully aware of the wide considerations involved and the repercussions of a particular course of action.”
This invective returned again and again in Nehru’s dealings with sincere and competent officers (whether in the civil services or the Army); particularly those who tried to warn him of the consequences of his ‘friendship at any cost’ policy with China.
The famous ‘larger vision’ was then expounded: “India’s policy is primarily based on avoidance of war and maintenance of peace, as we consider world war most terrible of calamities for humanity.”
Under the altar of this new ‘political’ dogma, Tibet was sacrificed, as were India’s national interests in this affair.
Nehru’s reaction against Sinha has to be seen with the background of Sardar Patel’s prophetic letter to Nehru written early November: “The Chinese Government has tried to delude us by professions of peaceful intention. …at a crucial period they manage to instill into our Ambassador a false sense of confidence in their so called desire to settle the Tibetan problem by peaceful means. There can be no doubt that during the period covered by this correspondence the Chinese must have been concentrating for an onslaught on Tibet. The final action of the Chinese, in my judgment, is little short of perfidy.”
Nehru could not admonish Patel the way he did for Sinha, but he chose to ignore the Deputy Prime Minister’s letter while changing India’s Tibet policy on his own.
Nehru gives Sinha the crux of his new credo: “Emergency of strong centralized Government of China, with a revolutionary urge, has been most significant fact of present generation. This affects India more particularly and future of Asia depends upon relationship of India with China.”
Twelve years later, the same China humiliated India on the slopes of the Thagla ridge, but in the meantime, Sinha, the young IFS officer was blamed for not being able to grasp India’s novel policy.
The cable continues to eulogize China’s revolution: “For this reason we tried to cultivate friendly relations with China and we believe that this became a stabilizing factor when Korean war started.”
The Korean war and the role ‘India’ (read Nehru) was eager to play as a peace maker, would become the pretext to let down Tibet and sell-out India’s borders to an aggressive, irredentist new neighbour.
Two years later, soon before the end of his tenure in Lhasa, Sinha upset the Prime Minister again. Sinha had the bad idea to ask for a loan of Rs. 2 lakhs to help the forces fighting for Tibetan independence.
Nehru was furious. In a cable sent to the Mission in Lhasa, the Prime Minister tells off Sinha; it would be “improper and unwise for our representative to get involved in Tibetan domestic affairs or intrigues”.
Sumul Sinha left Lhasa in September 1952 and was replaced by his Foreign Service colleague A.K. Sen, but his problems with the pacifist Prime Minister were far from being over.
On March 5, 1953, Nehru dictated a note in a reply to a memo prepared by Sinha, now an Officer on Special Duty in the MEA. The title of Sinha’s note was “Chinese designs on the North-East Frontier of India.”
The Prime Minister was mad at Sinha for having dared speak about Chinese ‘designs’: “I find Mr. Sinha’s approach to be coloured very much by certain ideas and conceptions which prevent him from taking an objective view of the situation. The note starts by reference to the lust for conquest of the Chinese and is throughout based on this.”
Only 6 years later, when the Chinese attacked the Longju Post in Subansiri Frontier Division, Nehru began to understand the meaning of Sinha’s analysis. By that time, it was already too late; further, India reacted by designing an ill-conceived ‘Forward Policy’ which eventually triggered a War.
But in 1953, Nehru believed ‘Communist China is our friend; it will never attack us’, all Indian officers’ analyses had been based on these same premises.
Sinha’s note, even if rejected due its ‘tone’, forced the Government to think about the policy to be pursued to take care of India’s borders. Unfortunately, no action followed for years.
Sinha’s problem was that he was not a ‘darbari’, writing only what his master wanted to hear.
He had also warned Nehru that the Chinese could infiltrate Nepal through Communist sympathizers (how true it was!). Nehru had answered: “There is danger in Nepal, but this too is due to internal chaotic conditions than to outside interference. As a matter of fact, the outside interference that is troubling us is American and not Chinese.”
Nehru concluded: “It appears that Mr. Sinha does not appreciate our policy fully. He should be enlightened.”
Thereafter, Sumul Sinha was a dejected man.
History has proved Nehru wrong and Sinha prophetically right.
A posthumous justice?
ent started to cautiously react to the invasion of its neighbour; Delhi wanted to be sure not to ‘upset’ Communist China.

Patel: why he died

I am posting today a letter from Sardar Patel to Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, the Secretary-General of the External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations Ministry.
It is dated November 4, 1950, four weeks after the Chinese had entered Eastern Tibet.
This raises a serious question: very little research has been done on the last weeks of Patel's life.
It is highly regrettable.
One of the problems that all historical documents of this period remains classified in the MEA.
Why should the Modi Government follow a Congress policy is difficult to comprehend.

  
The Sardar passed away on December 15, two days after being 'shifted' to Mumbai (because 'Delhi was too cold').
What do we know about the last 2 months of Patel's life?
Practically nothing, except that he opposed Nehru's policy on Tibet.
His prophetic letter written 3 days after the note to Bajpai (posted below) raises further questions.
From where did Patel got the information cited in his letter to Nehru?
As the note to Bajpai shows, probably from Sir Girja himself, who was getting regular information from Dr. Sumul Sinha, the Head of the Indian Mission in Lhasa.
Another unanswered question: did Nehru acknowledge Patel's 'prophetic' letter addressed which raised number of serious security issues for India.
Probably not.
The last sentence of Patel's letter says: "I suggest that we meet early to have a general discussion on these problems and decide on such steps as we might think to be immediately necessary and direct,  quick examination of other problems with a view of taking early measure to deal with them."
Was a Cabinet meeting held?
Probably not.
Did Nehru inform Patel about his decision in early November, to radically change India's Tibet policy, as reflected in Nehru's note addressed to B.N. Rau, the Indian Representative to the UN on November 18.
Probably not.
On November 23, in a cable to Sinha, the Foreign Minister (Nehru) scolded the young IFS who had arrived in Tibet just 2 months earlier: “Government of India have noticed that certain communications from Lhasa and Sikkim regarding Tibet are dogmatic, disputatious and admonitory. We want of course our representatives to give us full information and appraisals of situation and to state their views frankly. But this should be done in accordance with accepted procedure of correspondence between head of a mission and Foreign Office. Once a decision has been taken by Government, it should be accepted gracefully and followed faithfully; any insinuation that Government have been acting wrongly or improperly is objectionable.”
The decision taken by the 'Government' (i.e. Nehru without informing Patel) was that 'Tibet can not be saved'; the young officer had probably dared to 'contradict' the Prime Minister.
Was Patel's informed? Probably not.
Sinha's cable being still classified, one can only guess what he wrote: he had expressed some sympathy for the Tibetan people, at a time when their nation was being erased from the world map and highlighted the dangers for India to have a new 'neighbour'.
The cable from Nehru continues in the same vein: “Tibetan [issue] and similar problems have to be fitted into proper framework of Government’s policy. While local officers may be experts in their field, they CANNOT be fully aware of the wide considerations involved and the repercussions of a particular course of action.”
Were these wider considerations discussed by the Cabinet?
Was Patel's opinion sought?
Probably not.
The issue of 'wider considerations' will come back again and again in Nehru’s dealings with sincere and competent officers (whether in the civil services or the Army); particularly those who tried to warn him of the possible consequences of India's ‘friendship at any cost’ policy with China.
Then the cable to Sinha mentions the famous ‘larger vision’: “India’s policy is primarily based on avoidance of war and maintenance of peace, as we consider world war most terrible of calamities for humanity.”
Under the altar of a new ‘political’ dogma, Tibet was sacrificed, so were India’s national interests in this affair.
Nehru then admonishes Sinha again: “For this reason we avoid as far as possible strong language and condemnation avoid as far as possible strong language and condemnation of nations which only increases international tension.”
China had started invading Tibet, but nobody should hurt the Chinese 'susceptibilities' with strong language!That was the Indian Government's new policy. There was no question of calling a spade, a spade, even in internal or top secret correspondence.
Poor Sinha, he was not aware that only 'darbari' (courtesan) can survive.
This reminds me of a remark made in a private (handwritten) letter written by Harishwar Dayal, the Political Officer in Sikkim (Sinha's boss) at the end of December 1950; while discussing the Chinese advance towards the McMahon Line with his Indian Trade Agent (ITA) in Gyantse, Dayal informed the latter of Sardar Patel’s death, “It is a heavy blow. He was the one person in this Government who had strong realistic view of things, including on foreign relations. Now, we are left at the mercy of the visionaries.”

To come back to Patel, by the end of November, he was a dejected man and he fell sick.
On December 13, after he had been 'shifted' to Mumbai, Patel was divested of all his portfolios by the Prime Minister, he was not even informed.
He was deeply hurt and he passed away 2 days later.
On that day, ministers were told to continue their business as usual.

Letter to Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai

New Delhi
4 November 1950

My Dear Sir Girja,

Thank you for your letter of the 3rd November 1950. I am sending herewith the note which you were good enough to send me. I need hardly say that I have read it with a great deal of interest and profit to myself and it has resulted in a much better understanding of the points at issue and general though serious nature of the problem.
The Chinese advance into Tibet upsets all our security calculations. Hitherto, the danger to India on its land frontiers has always come from the North-West. Throughout history we have concentrated our armed might in that region. For the first time, a serious danger is now developing on the North and North-East side; at the same time, our danger from the West or North-West is in no way lessened. This creates most embarrassing defense problems and I entirely agree with you that a reconsideration of our military position and a redisposition of our forces are inescapable.
Regarding Communists, again the position requires a great deal of thought. Hitherto, the smuggling of arms, literature, etc. across the difficult Burmese and Pakistan frontier on the East or along the sea was our only danger. We shall now have to guard our Northern and North-eastern approaches also. Unfortunately, all these approaches-Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim and the tribal areas in Assam are weak spots both from the point of view of communications and police protection and also established loyalty to India. Even Darjeeling and Kalimpong area is by no means free from pro-Mongolian prejudices. The Nagas and other hill tribes in Assam have hardly had any contact with Indians. European missionaries and other visitors have been in touch with them, but their influence was, by no means, friendly to India and Indians. In Sikkim, there was political ferment some time ago. It seems to me there is ample scope for trouble and discontent in that small State. Bhutan is comparatively quiet, but its affinity with Tibetans would be a handicap. Nepal (we all know too well, a weak oligarchic regime based almost entirely on force) is in conflict with an enlightened section of the people as well as enlightened ideas of the modern age. Added to this weak position, there is the irredentism of the Chinese. The political ambitions of the Chinese by themselves might not have mattered so much; but when they are combined with discontent in these areas, absence of close contact with Indians and Communist ideology the difficulty of the position increases manifold. We have also to bear in mind that boundary disputes, which have many times in history been the cause of international conflicts, can be exploited by Communist China and its source of inspiration, Soviet Russia, for a prolonged war of nerves, culminating at the appropriate time, in armed conflict.
We have also so take note of a thoroughly unscrupulous, unreliable and determined power practically at our doors. In your very illuminating survey of what has passed between us and the Chinese Government through our Ambassador, you have made out an unanswerable case for treating the Chinese with the greatest suspicion. What I have said above, in my judgment, entitles us to treat them with a certain amount of hostility, let alone a great deal of circumspection. In these circumstances, one thing, to my mind, is quite clear; and, that is, that we cannot be friendly with China and must think in terms of defense against a determined, calculating, unscrupulous, ruthless, unprincipled and prejudiced combination of powers, of which the Chinese will be the spearhead. There might be from them outward offers or protestations of friendship, but in that will be concealed an ultimate hideous design of ideological and even political conquest into their bloc. It is equally obvious to me that any friendly or appeasing approaches from us would either be mistaken for weakness or would be exploited in furtherance of their ultimate aim. It is this general attitude which must
determine the other specific questions which you have so admirably stated. I am giving serious consideration to those problems and it is possible I may discuss this matter with you once more.

Yours sincerely,
VALLABHBHAI PATEL

Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, I.C.S.,
Secretary-General, External Affairs Ministry, New Delhi.

India needs pragmatic leaders not ‘visionaries’

My article India needs pragmatic leaders not ‘visionaries’ appeared in Niti Central yesterday. 

Here is the link...

A Prime Ministerial ‘candidate’ and his family have, recently, been telling the media that the ongoing elections are a choice between 2 visions of India. The history of India’s foreign affairs shows something different. Since independence, India had two choices, the so-called visionaries and the pragmatic leaders like Sardar Patel, who cared for India’s interests on the ground.
I recently came across a bunch of old ‘personal’ letters written by some Indian officers posted on the frontiers in the early 1950s. These missives are telling. In December 1950, a few weeks after the PLA entered Tibet, Harishwar Dayal, a senior ICS officer and distinguished diplomat, then posted in Gangtok as Political Officer responsible for Tibet, Sikkim and Bhutan, while discussing the Chinese advance towards the McMahon Line with his Indian Trade Agent (ITA) in Gyantse, informed the latter of Sardar Patel’s death, “It is a heavy blow. He was the one person in this Government who had strong realistic view of things, including on foreign relations. Now, we are left at the mercy of the visionaries.”
This remark came back to my mind a few days back, when I read in The Republica, a Nepali newspaper: “China has turned down India’s proposal to establish its Consulate General Office in Lhasa of Tibet.” The proposal was presented by Sujatha Singh, the Indian Foreign Secretary during the 6th India-China strategic dialogue held in Beijing.
According to The Republica, after meeting her Chinese counterpart, Deputy Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin, Singh told the reporters, “India will now plan a decisive talk with China in this regard.” It probably signifies that the outgoing Government is ready to drop the idea of reopening the Lhasa Consulate (Nepal, today, is the only country to have a Consulate General Office in Lhasa).
Why? Simply because the idea of having an Indian Consulate General irritates the Chinese!
Otherwise, the bilateral situation is rosy. Mister Liu affirmed that China is ready to work with India to advance the partnership to a new level, while Singh explained “all political parties in India share a common ground on advancing India-China strategic cooperative partnership.”
Xinhua added: “He [Sujatha Singh!!!] reiterated the Indian Government’s view of attaching high priority to its relations with China. He [sic] said that the Indian Government is working to consolidate the strategic cooperative partnership that is oriented to peace and prosperity.”
It appears that Delhi is now backing down on its earlier demand of re-opening the Lhasa Consulate and would be satisfied with another Consulate General in Chengdu (Sichuan) or Kunming (Yunnan province) instead of Lhasa. This remains to be confirmed.
While Beijing is extremely keen to open an office in Chennai, Delhi thought that it made sense to re-open the old mission in Tibet (today, India has two Consulate General Offices in Shanghai and Guangzou).

The history of the Consulate in Lhasa is truly the story of blind ‘visionaries’. India had a full-fledged Mission in Tibet till the end of 1952. Apart from the Mission in Lhasa, there were three Trade Agencies managed by ITAs in Gyantse and Yatung (in Chumbi Valley, near the Sikkim border) and a seasonal one in Gartok (Western Tibet). Till 1954, the ITAs in Gyantse and Yatung were entitled to a military escort. The Post and Telegraph Service, a chain of rest-houses and the principality of Minsar (near Mt Kailash) were also under the Indian Government’s control. Over the years, all this was ‘offered’ to the Chinese, without any compensation or even an attempt to obtain a fair settlement on the border issue.
Soon after Tibet’s invasion, the Indian Government found it increasingly difficult to retain these facilities on the ground. Visitors, traders and officials from India began to be unnecessarily and regularly harassed or put to hardship. The visionary Prime Minister was ideologically not comfortable with what he called ‘imperialist sequels’, though he knew that these ‘privileges’ were useful for trade, as was the McMahon Line which was a proper delineated agreed border between India and Tibet.
In summer of 1951, KM Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador to China, another great ‘visionary’, came to Delhi for consultations. By that time, he was already fully in love with the Communist regime in Beijing. Jawahar Lal Nehru, too, was convinced that the future of India lay with the East, “For the first time, China possesses a strong Central Government whose decrees run even to Sinkiang and Tibet. Our own relations with China are definitively friendly.”
A few months later, when questioned again on the Indian Mission in Lhasa, Nehru vaguely answered that it was dealing “with certain trade and cultural matters more or less [sic!]”. He also declared that he was not aware of “any infiltration of Chinese troops in India.”
Reports had already begun about Chinese incursions through the UP-Tibet border (today’s Uttarakhand) as well as through the Ladakh-Tibet border. The first Chinese surveys for the Sinkiang-Tibet highway cutting through the Aksai Chin occurred at that time. Though, Nehru was informed by LS Jangpangi, the ITA in Gartok, he chose to ignore it.
In June 1952, Nehru became more prudent; he explained the ‘changed circumstances’: Tibet was no longer an independent country, therefore, it was better to downgrade the diplomatic relations between Tibet and India. The Indian Representative in Lhasa was re-designated as a Consul-General.
During the same month, the smart and suave Zhou Enlai told the gullible Indian Ambassador in China that he “presumed that India had no intention of claiming special rights arising from the unequal treaties of the past and was prepared to negotiate a new and permanent relationship safeguarding legitimate interests.”
Not only did the Chinese offer nothing to India in exchange for her generosity, but Delhi accepted to open a Chinese Consulate in Bombay. Can you believe it!
A few months later, Panikkar who had been transferred to Egypt wrote: “the main issue of our representation at Lhasa was satisfactorily settled… there was no outstanding issue between us and the Chinese”.
Well, the ‘visionary’ had merely forgotten the unsettled issue of border. In April 1954, the ‘born-in-sin’ Panchsheel Agreement was signed. Though, the status of the Consulate General and the Trade Marts was confirmed, all the other privileges enjoyed by India were surrendered. Over the years, the situation became more and more untenable for the Indian officials. After Dalai Lama took refuge in India in 1959; the Chinese authorities constantly harassed the staff of the Consulate and Trade Marts. When the Panchsheel Agreement lapsed in April 1962, there was no point in renewing it. The Trade Marts were closed and China asked the officials to vacate the premises. As the building in Yatung belonged to the Government of India, the Chinese even asked India to take the building away.
Since then, there has been no Indian representation in Tibet. It is a great pity for the Himalayan areas which, for centuries, had close economic and cultural ties with Tibet.

India should take a lesson from what China thinks and does

My article India should take a lesson from what China thinks and does is posted on Rediff.com

'There is still no road on the last 37 km between the McMahon Line and Menchuka in Arunachal Pradesh. Ironically, during my visit, Beijing announced the opening of a 117- km highway linking Metok, located just north of the McMahon Line.'
'My local friends kept saying with some envy in their voices, "The Chinese are very much in advance on us".' Claude Arpi on a recent visit to the last large village before the McMahon Line that divides India and China.
India should take a lesson from what China thinks and does, as there is no doubt that the Chinese are better planners than Indians.

Already when he was heir apparent, Xi Jinping stated: 'We must implement Mao's strategic concept of the 'unity between soldiers and civilians" and both the army and regional civilian authorities should assiduously pool our resources in the preparation for military struggle.'
What does it mean?
It signifies that the civil administration as well as the private sector should participate in the nation's preparedness to defend its borders.
Chairman Mao was an ardent advocate of 'The synthesis between the requirements of peacetime and war.' In other words, civilian infrastructure projects like airports, roads and railways should be designed to serve both peace and war needs.
It is not that Indians are unable to think far ahead. Sardar Patel had a far-sighted vision about Indian border issues.
On November 7, 1950 (just five weeks before he passed away), he wrote to Nehru on the following requirements:

• A military and intelligence appreciation of the Chinese threat to India both on the frontier and internal security.
• An appraisement of strength of our forces; A long-term consideration of our defense needs.
• The political and administrative steps which we should take to strengthen our Northern and North-Eastern Frontier.
• Improvement of our communication, road, rail, air and wireless in these areas and with the frontier outposts.

It is sad that nothing was done then, or later, on the issue of border development, even after the tragic events of October-November 1962...

To continue to read...

Sardar Patel had vision to address needs of border States

Tibet seen from Menchuka

My artcile Sardar Patel had vision to address needs of border States appeared in NitiCentral.

Here is the link...

It was raining and cold outside. I was sitting with my local hosts around a smokeless chula installed in the center of the main room of their house.
I was in Menchuka, the remotest large village before the McMahon Line dividing India and China, in West Siang district of Arunachal Pradesh.
After watching some cricket match between India and Australia (I don’t understand anything of cricket), my hosts from the Adi community (one of the 25 main tribes of Arunachal Pradesh) switched their satellite TV to a news channel.
The Indian Prime Minister was seen with the Chief Minister of Gujarat inaugurating a large statue of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. When I asked if they were following Indian politics, my friends replied, ‘of course! We Arunachalis are the most patriotic people of the country, though the leadership in Delhi seems ignorant about this simple truth’. It is true that a few minutes earlier, they had been frantically supporting the Blue Team against the Aussies.
They were now amazed by the size of the statue and kept repeating, “We need a strong leader to rule India”. Though not particularly enamoured of the BJP, they believed Narendra Modi could be the ‘next Iron Man’ to protect them.
When I asked why they thought so, they said only an ‘Iron Man’ could bring roads and development to the border areas.
Menchuka, located some 50 km from the LAC (McMahon Line) witnessed the ‘visit’ of the Chinese 51 years ago; some old people still remember their stay for nearly one month in November 1962. I was told: “the Chinese soldiers were not aggressive; they just told us: ‘You are Chinese like us, we will never harm you; you don’t have long noses like the Indians, your eyes and skins are similar to ours’”; today Beijing still calls the area ‘Southern Tibet’.
It is a fact that while in Menchuka, the PLA did not take food or disturbs the local tribal Adis or Membas; despite this, the local population has remained loyal to India; unfortunately Delhi does not often acknowledge this.
The declaration of Narendra Modi: "Every Indian regrets Sardar Patel did not become the first Prime Minister. Had he been the first Prime Minister, the country's fate and face would have been completely different," rang true in this remote administrative Circle of Arunachal Pradesh (it takes 9 hours by car to reach Menchuka from Along, the district headquarters).
Warming up around the chula, the famous letter sent Sardar to Jawaharlal Nehru, five weeks before the Deputy Prime Minister prematurely passed away, was constantly present in my mind.
For the people of the border areas, it would have indeed been different if Gandhi had not interfered in the democratic process (Patel had been elected to lead the Interim Government in 1946, but Gandhi preferred ‘the Haddows Boy’) and if Patel had become Prime Minister.
On November 7, 1950, a month after Tibet was invaded, Patel told Nehru: “I have tried to peruse this correspondence [between K.M. Panikkar and the Communist government in Beijing] as favorably to our Ambassador and the Chinese Government as possible, but I regret to say that neither of them comes out well as a result of this study.”
The ‘Iron Man’ added: “The Chinese Government has tried to delude us by professions of peaceful intention. My own feeling is that at a crucial period they manage to instill into our Ambassador a false sense of confidence in their so called desire to settle the Tibetan problem by peaceful means. …the action of the Chinese, in my judgment, is little short of perfidy.”
Patel’s conclusion was: “from the latest position, it appears that we shall be not be able to rescue the Dalai Lama.” It was already too late.
Panikkar was not only “at great pain to find an explanation or justification for Chinese policy and actions”, but Nehru did not even have the courtesy to acknowledge Patel’s letter which suggested to review:

•  A Military and Intelligence appreciation of the Chinese threat to India both on the frontier and internal security.
•  An examination of military position and such redisposition of our forces as might be necessary…
•  An appraisement of strength of our forces …A long-term consideration of our defense needs.
•  The question of Chinese entry into UNO.
•  The political and administrative steps which we should take to strengthen our Northern and North-Eastern frontier.
•  Improvement of our communication, road, rail, air and wireless in these areas and with the frontier outposts.

It is tragic that 63 years later, there is still no road for the last 37 km between the McMahon Line and Menchuka (though I was told the construction may start soon). The situation is much worse in the adjoining sub-division of Menigong. From Tato, another sub-divisional headquarters to Menigong, it takes some 7/8 hours to cover 67 km, and then, there is no road going onward to the border.
Ironically, during my visit to Menchuka, the Chinese announced the opening of a highway linking Metok, ‘the last roadless county in China’ with neighboring Bomi town, located just north of the McMahon Line.
The Communist Party said that 117-km highway, costing 155 million U.S. dollars will make the border town accessible for 8 to 9 months a year.
My local friends kept repeating with some envy in their voices, ‘the Chinese are very much in advance on us’.
To come back to Patel's 'clairvoyant testament', it is not well-known that it was based on a Note prepared by Girja Shankar Bajpai, the Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs.
Does this Note still exist? I was recently told that some of the Bajpai Papers may have followed the fate of the CoalGate files.
Why did Nehru, then Foreign Minister not act on his Foreign Secretary's Report while it was Patel who was concerned by the issue of having an "unscrupulous, unreliable and determined power at the doors"?
It is not difficult to answer this question. Nehru saw China as India’s best friend, if not brother.
Another reason why Patel would have made a difference is that he would have surrounded himself with efficient down-to-earth officers like Bajpai and not glamourous, worthless collaborators like K.M. Panikkar.
A few years later, Bajpai compared the protests of Panikkar with Neville Chamberlain's disapproval of Nazi Germany entering Czechoslovakia in 1938, he said: "Our Ambassador has allowed himself to be influenced more by the Chinese point of view, the Chinese claims, the Chinese maps and by regards for Chinese susceptibilities than by his instructions or by India's interests.”
Nehru did it again in 1962 when he listened to an arrogant Corps Commander, ignoring the Army hierarchy’s sounder counsels.
It is not enough to be a strong man; a leader of worth should be able to surround himself with wise advisors. Patel showed, at the time of the integration of the Indian States (with V.P. Menon) or later in the case of Tibet (with G.S. Bajpai), that he was more than an Iron Man, he was also ble to find and listen to knowledgeable collaborators.
A small post-scriptum: Patel would have also made a difference in the Kashmir issue. On 23 December 1947, as Deputy Prime Minister, Patel wrote a draft letter to Nehru: “Your letter of today has been received just now at 7 p.m. and I am writing immediately to tell you this. It has caused me considerable pain.” Patel did want India to appeal to the UN: “your letter makes it clear to me that I must not, or at least cannot continue as a Member of Government and hence I am hereby tendering my resignation.”
Gandhi asked Patel to withdraw his resignation. The rest is painful history.
It is unfortunate for India that history cannot be rewritten. But one can at least learn from history.