Diverting the Indus ... or the Yarlung Tsangpo to Xinjiang

In January 2015, I wrote on this blog about the proposal of diverting the Indus towards Xinjiang.
Nobody took it seriously.
Now a new proposal has emerged: to divert the Yarlung Tsangpo to Xinjiang.
According to The Global Times: “Scholars mull project to divert water from Tibet to arid Xinjiang”.
The Party's newspaper adds: “Policy-makers have left plan stranded citing unfeasibility”.
The tabloid explains: “Around 20 scholars met outside Urumqi in Northwest China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region over the last weekend of July, and discussed the feasibility of diverting water from the heights of the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau to Xinjiang's lowland plains, one of the attendees revealed.”
Ren Qunluo, professor at the Xinjiang University of Finance and Economics is quoted as saying: “Water from rivers such as the Yarlung Zangbo River can help turn the vast deserts and arid lands into oasis and farmlands, alleviate population pressure in the east, as well as reduce flood risks in the counties through which the river travels downstream,"
Ren told The Global Times: “Xinjiang has 1.1 million square kilometers of plains, equal in size to all the plains in the country's east. But less than 70,000 square kilometers are arable due to a shortage of water. If all these plains are greened, another China will have been created."
The same old story.
China is obsessed with these diversion schemes (and it conveniently comes at a time of the confrontation with India at the trijunction Bhutan-Tibet-Sikkim).
Incidentally, the Indian journalists 'invited' by the Ministry if Foreign Affairs in Beijing should have asked more details about the new scheme.
The mouthpiece of the Party continues: “”The dream of massive water diversions from soaking-wet Southwest China to the thirsty north has been on the minds of engineers and scholars for decades. But some say this dream could be a nightmare of environmental damage, and these concerns mean the plateau-to-plain project has never been approved.”
India and Bangladesh are not mentioned in the scheme.
The Global Times makes three points.

• Experts want the government to reconsider diverting water from Tibet to parched northern regions
• They claim the project will help stimulate the world economy and create a "second China" in the region's arid plains
• Disagreements remain strong due to the huge cost and possible environmental damage

However the report says: "[The] pro-diversion experts are now trying to rally support for the idea."
Information Warfare is going on...  full swing.

Here is my old post of January 2015.

On Christmas Day, The New York Times reported: “Within a few days, water that has traveled more than 800 miles for two weeks in one of the world’s most ambitious, and controversial, engineering projects is expected to begin flowing through Beijing faucets.”
The objective of the scheme is to bring water from upper reaches of the Han River, a tributary of the Yangtze, through the central route of the South-to-North Water Diversion project, the second of three routes planned to transfer water from China’s wet south to the dry north. Once fully functional, the Central Diversion is expected to provide a third of the capital’s water needs.
The project is estimated at 80 billion U.S. dollars, says Xinhua, adding: “The completion of the water scheme marked major progress in the nation's enormous south-to-north water diversion project, the largest of its kind in the world.”
The official news agency boasts: “It is another engineering achievement by the Chinese,” quoting the Beijing-Hangzhou Grand Canal, the world's longest man-made river, opened in the 13th century for transporting grain.
The pro and the cons of the present project will continue to be debated in the months and years to come; in the meanwhile, some researchers in China have thought of another smaller ‘pilot’ project: to divert the Indus river towards Xinjiang. A detailed report on the scheme is posted by a blogger on the website ScienceNet.cn.
Beijing will argue that this new project is merely the product of the fertile brain of some freelance scientists, and that it has ‘nothing to do with the government’.

You may ask, what is this ScienceNet.cn? According to Wikipedia: “ScienceNet.cn is a science virtual community and science blog,” launched by Science Times Media Group (STMG) and supported by the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the Chinese Academy of Engineering, and the National Natural Science Foundation of China “with the mission of establishing a global Chinese science community.”

Since January 2007, more than 5,000 scientists and graduate students have posted their papers on ScienceNet. The editorial board of ScienceNet says that it has been ranking first among Chinese science websites.
The blogger quotes Chinese researchers who argue that the other planned 'diversions' require extremely complicated construction plans, large investments, long building periods and face a lot of engineering problems due to the complexity of the issues involved (I would add, and 'displacing millions of people'). It makes these projects difficult to undertake, while a small-scale, with low investment and a quickly realizable scheme, could be an ideal pilot project.
The ‘researchers’ propose to add a South Western segment to the Western Diversion Route (not yet started), which is the third part of the South-to-North Water Diversion project. It would involve the diversion of the waters from the Indus river in Western Tibet (before it enters Ladakh) towards the Tarim Basin in Xinjiang. According to the authors, the scheme would meet the requirements of a ‘pilot’ scheme.
In a summary, the ‘scientists’ explain that the water diversion project referred to in their paper could be called “the South Western section of Western Route Project”; water could be taken from the Tibetan Plateau in the West and brought by gravity to the Tarim Basin in Xinjiang. The text describes the preliminary survey of the South Western part of the Western Route Project. The size of the diversion program and a brief description of China’s northwest after the transfer of the Indus’ water, are given. The main conclusion is that the diversion will help maintaining long-term stability in Xinjiang. The paper explains why and suggests deepening the research before an early implementation of the South Western section.
According to the ‘researchers’, the diversion of the Indus could bring ten benefits to China:

• It could increase the total amount of water resources in the Tarim Basin, which is located in the hinterland of Taklimakan Desert and suffers from important sand dune mobility. In this highly arid region, which receives low precipitations, water is extremely valuable
• The diversion could increase the local hydropower capacity. Water would flow from the high Qinghai-Tibet plateau, at an elevation of over 3,000 [in fact 4,000] meters and at the receiving end, water would be at only 1,500 meters above sea level.
• Once this section is completed, the water could create an oasis in the desert. The Western section would transform an entire region into an oasis; it would further bring a great return on the investment.
• Once the project is fully implemented, the total amount of water resources locally available could greatly increase; it could provide a substantial increase in the amount of hydroelectric power; the desert could become an oasis, it could improve the ecological environment, which in turn could promote local economic development of the region and the living standards of the local people.
• According to some scientific hypotheses, the water brought by the diversion could also increase precipitations in the region.
• The research says that the new oasis could in turn ‘curb global warming’ [sic]. If the global warming argument is indeed correct, say the ‘scientists’, the South Western section could increase the rainfall in China; this countermeasure could help curb global warming for the entire humanity; this is why the diversion project must be able to get the global support and backing of most countries [what about India?]. China can then get a substantial increase in the local precipitation; the desert in northwest [Xinjiang] would disappear; the desert would become an oasis which would be able to grow food and have power plants; humans would be able to reduce the need for fossil fuels; after additional diversion oasis would absorb large amounts of greenhouse gases each year, thus it would achieve the goal of curbing global warming.

What an argument! But that is not all:

• It could contribute to China’s food and energy security. After the diversion, the desert turned-oasis could increase the country's arable land for China to contribute to the world food security.
• The western development could make a significant contribution by reducing regional disparities. China's population distribution is unbalanced; the development gap between China and western regions and other regions is too large; it has been extremely detrimental to the country's development.

And now the cherry on the cake:

• The diversion could strengthen China's actual control of Aksai Chin, and help to resolve the territorial dispute. Sino-Indian border has not been formally delimited in the Aksai Chin and Pangong Lake areas; there are some territorial disputes [with India]. The water diversion project, through Aksai Chin, could help the actual control of this region; the implementation of the project could also help to resolve the territorial dispute [with India].
• Finally, the project could promote national unity and maintain long-term stability of Xinjiang. This, according to the authors, is the main benefit of the South Western section: the long-term stability of Xinjiang.

This ‘easy’ pilot project does not, of course, take into account what the neighbours (including China’s all-weather friend, Pakistan) would have to say.
That may not make the pilot project so simple after all!
The question is, while Beijing is very quick to remove internet content which contests its rule, why is such a crazy and highly objectionable project allowed to be posted on a semi-governmental website?
Similarly, the website of the Yellow River Conservancy Commission of China’s Ministry of Water Resources has a 50-page report on the diversion of the Brahmaputra, and though Beijing denies any bad intention, the project remains on the ‘official’ website.
How can we trust China?

Some of my previous posts on the subject

• Why China needs to divert the Brahmaputra
• The Diversion of the Brahmaputra on the cards again (2013)
• Again diverting the Brahmaputra (2013)
• The 'feasibility' of diverting the Brahmaputra (2014)
• The mad diversion plan

How can we trust China?

My article How can we trust China? appeared in The Statesman.

Here is the lnk...

On Christmas Day, The New York Times reported: “Within a few days, water that has travelled more than 800 miles for two weeks in one of the world’s most ambitious, and controversial, engineering projects is expected to begin flowing through Beijing faucets.”
The objective of the scheme is to bring water from the upper reaches of the Han river, a tributary of the Yangtze, through the central route of the South-to-North Water Diversion project, the second of three routes planned to transfer water from China’s wet south to the dry north. Once fully functional, the Central Diversion is expected to provide a third of the capital’s water needs.
The project is estimated at $ 80 billion, says Xinhua, adding: “The completi on of the water sche me mar ked major prog ress in the na ti on’s enormo us south-to-nor th water diversion project, the largest of its kind in the world.”
The official news agency boasts: “It is ano ther engineering achi evement by the Chi ne se,” quoting the Beijing-Hangzhou Grand Canal, the wor l d’s longest man-made river, opened in the 13th century for transporting grain.
The pros and the cons of the present project will continue to be debated in the months and years to come; in the meanwhile, some researchers in China have thought of another smaller ‘pilot’ project Rs to divert the Indus river towards Xinjiang. A detailed report on the scheme is posted by a blogger on the website ScienceNet.cn
Beijing will argue that this new project is merely the product of the fertile brain of some freelance scientists, and that it has ‘nothing to do with the government’.
You may ask, what is this ScienceNet.cn? According to Wikipedia: “ScienceNet.cn is a science virtual community and science blog,” launched by Science Times Media Group (STMG) and supported by the Chinese Academy of Scienc es, the Chinese Academy of Engineering, and the National Natural Science Foundation of China “with the mission of establishing a global Chinese science community.”
Since January 2007, more than 5,000 scientists and graduate students have posted their papers on ScienceNet. Its editorial board claims that it has been ranking first among Chinese science websites.
The blogger quotes Chinese researchers who argue that the other planned ‘diversions’ require extremely complicated construction plans, large investments, long building periods and face a lot of engineering problems due to the complexity of the issues involved (I would add, and ‘displacing millions of people’). It makes these projects difficult to undertake, while a small-scale one, with low investment and quickly realizable, could be an ideal pilot project.
The ‘researchers’ propose to add a South-Western segment to the Western Diversion Route (not yet started), which is the third part of the South-to-North Water Diversion project. It would involve the diversion of the waters from the Indus river in Western Tibet (before it enters Ladakh) towards the Tarim Basin in Xinjiang. According to the authors, the scheme would meet the requirements of a ‘pilot’ scheme.
In summary, the ‘scientists’ explain that the water diversion project referred to in their paper could be called “the South Western section of Western Route Project”; wa ter could be taken from the Tibetan Plateau in the West and brought by gravity to the Tarim Basin in Xinjiang. The text describes the preliminary survey of the South-Western part of the Western Route Project. The size of the diversion programme and a brief description of China’s north-west after the transfer of the Indus’ water, are given. The main conclusion is that the diversion will help maintain long-term stability in Xinjiang. The paper explains why and sugges ts deepening the research before an early implementation of the South-Western section.
According to the ‘resear chers’, the diversion of the Ind us could bring ten benefits to China:

1. It could increase the total amount of water resources in the Tarim Basin, which is located in the hinterland of Taklima kan Desert and suffers from important sand dune mobility. In this highly arid region, which re ceives low precipitations, wa ter is extremely valuable.
2. The diversion could increase the local hydropower capacity. Water would flow from the high Qinghai-Tibet plateau, at an elevation of over 3,000 [in fact 4,000] meters and at the receiving end, water would be at only 1,500 meters above sea level.
3. Once this section is completed, the water could create an oasis in the desert. The Western section would transform an entire region into an oasis; it would further bring a great return on the investment.
4. Once the project is fully implemented, the total amount of water resources locally available could greatly increase; it could provide a substantial increase in the amo unt of hydroelectric power; the desert could become an oasis, it could improve the ecological environment, which in turn could promote local economic development of the region and the living standards of the local people.
5. According to some scientific hypotheses, the water brought by the diversion could also increase precipitations in the region.
6. The research says that the new oasis could in turn ‘curb global warming’ [sic]. If the global warming argument is indeed correct, say the ‘scientists’, the South-Western section could increase the rainfall in China; this counter-measure could help curb global warming for the entire humanity; this is why the diversion project must be able to get the global support and backing of most countries (what about India?). China can then get a substantial increase in the local precipitation; the desert in the north-west (Xinjiang) would disappear; the desert would become an oasis which would be able to grow food and have power plants; humans would be able to reduce the need for fossil fuels; after additional diversion, the oasis would absorb large amounts of greenhouse gases each year, thus it would achieve the goal of curbing global warming. What an argument!
   But that is not all:
7. It could contribute to China’s food and energy security. After the diversion, the desert turned-oasis could increase the country’s arable land for China to contribute to world food security.
8. The western development could make a significant contribution by reducing regional disparities. China’s population distribution is unbalanced; the development gap between China and western regions and other regions is too large; it has been extremely detrimental to the country’s development.
   And now the cherry on the cake:
9. The diversion could strengthen China’s actual control of Aksai Chin, and help to resolve the territorial dispute. The Sino-Indian border has not been formally delimited in the Aksai Chin and Pangong Lake areas; there are some territorial disputes (with India). The water diversion project, through Aksai Chin, could help the actual control of this region; the implementation of the project could also help to resolve the territorial dispute (with India).
10. Finally, the project could promote national unity and maintain long-term stability of Xinjiang. This, according to the authors, is the main benefit of the South-Western section  the long-term stability of Xinjiang.

This ‘easy’ pilot project does not, of course, take into account what the neighbours (including China’s all-weather friend, Pakistan) would have to say. That may not make the pilot project so simple after all!
The question is, while Beijing is very quick to remove internet content which contests its rule, why is such a crazy and highly objectionable project allowed to be posted on a semi-government website?
Similarly, the website of the Yellow River Conservancy Commission of China’s Ministry of Water Resources has a 50-page report on the diversion of the Brahmaputra, and though Beijing denies any bad intention, the project remains on the ‘official’ website.
How can we trust China?

The Mad Mega Diversion Plan

Giving a new life to the Yellow River?

As already mentioned on this blog, on February 17, 2013, an article appeared on the website of the Yellow River Conservancy Commission of the  Chinese Ministry of Water Resources. 
It described in detail two phaoronic projects known as the Great Western Water Diversion and the Yellow River Waterway Corridor.
It mentioned a preliminary feasibility study prepared by officials of the Ministry of Water Resources. The idea of the Chinese engineers is to divert 150 billion cubic meters of water and pomp these waters in the drying Yellow River to irrigate northern China. A giant reservoir near the Yellow River 'Maqu' Great Bend would regulate the flow of the river.
I am publishing here Section 3 to 6 of the article on the 'crazy' mega project.
Of interest to us in India are Section 4 and  6 on the diversion of the Yarlung Tsanpo (Yaluzangbu Jiang) or Brahmaputra (Siang in Arunachal).
Interestingly, Xinhua has just announced the construction of the Sichuan-Tibet grid: "Construction of power lines between Tibet and Southwest China's Sichuan province got underway."
The news agency reported: "The project will cost over 6.6 billion yuan ($1.08 billion), and should be complete in the first half of 2015, solving the power shortage and transmission problems in parts of Tibet. More than 1,521 kilometers of lines will connect Qamdo [Chamdo] prefecture in Tibet and the Tibetan autonomous prefecture of Garze in Sichuan, with four substations."
It further elaborated: "The project covers some very harsh terrain and work conditions are difficult with an average altitude of 3,850 meters. Shu Yinbiao, general manager of the State Grid, said that environmental protection and safe working conditions are vital to the project's success. Medical services for construction workers include 26 health centers and four hyperbaric oxygen chambers."
This could be linked to a future mega-project.
Here is the translation of Sections 3 to 6 of the article posted on the website of the Yellow River Conservancy Commission of the  Chinese Ministry of Water Resources.

Section 3
Overall Situation of Yellow River Navigation
The Yellow River shipping waterway, with the assistance of the "western line" water diversion project, will use the existing Yellow River riverway, and will open up navigation from the Bohai Bay to Lanzhou. The riverbed of the Yellow River will be excavated and dredged, to permit passage of 50,000-ton class vessels from the mouth of the Yellow River to Lanzhou, and with that, it will become the greatest "golden" waterway of the world. The main (note: or "trunk") shipping route of the Yellow River will be 3300 kilometers in length, from Dongying (note: a city in Shandong) at the mouth of the Yellow River into Bohai Bay, all the way to the upstream area of Lanzhou. It will pass through Shandong, Henan, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, and Gansu, a total of 7 provinces, providing access for 50,000-ton class ships. The shipping route along the Weihe, a tributary of the Yellow River, will extend for 388 kilometers, from Tongguan at the mouth of the Weihe, to the midstream area of Xianyang, for passage of 50,000-ton class ships. The shipping route along the Yiluohe, another tributary, will extend 50 kilometers, from the mouth of the Yiluohe to Luoyang, for passage of 50,000-ton class ships. The shipping route along the Fenhe, yet another tributary, will extend 600 kilometers, from Hejin at the mouth of the Fenhe, to the upstream area of Taiyuan, for passage of 50,000-ton class ships. The Datong shipping route, from the Qingshui River, to Datong, and on to Tongzhou, will extend for 1000 kilometers, from the upper reaches of the Qingshui River, in the middle of the Yellow River, along the Sanggan River, through the Guanting water reservoir, to Tongzhou District in Beijing. It will pass through Datong, and connect to the northern stretch of the Beijing-Hangzhou Grand Canal in Tongzhou, allowing passage of 1000-ton class vessels. On the lower reaches of the Yellow River, the Weihe and Majiahe secondary shipping routes on the North bank, as well as the Jialuhe and Huijihe secondary shipping routes on the South bank, will all connect to the Beijing-Hangzhou Grand Canal, for passage of 1000-ton class vessels. The Beijing-Hangzhou Canal is 1700 kilometers in length, and can carry 10,000-ton class vessels. At its Northern reaches, it permits passage through Tianjin and into the Bohai Bay, whereas at its Southern end, it reaches Hangzhou, and permits passage out into the East Sea. As such, the entire marine shipping network will on one hand reach up to the Bohai, on the other down to the East Sea, and going inwards, all the way to the heart of the West, forming a super-network which will encompass half the country.

***

Section 4
Overall Situation of Water Diversion Project
The ‘western line’ water diversion project, will draw 150 billion cubic meters of water from 6 rivers: the Yaluzangbu Jiang, the Nu Jiang, the Lancang Jiang, the Jinsha Jiang, the Yalong Jiang, and the Dadu He. The water will be sent to the Maqu Daguaiwan super-reservoir on the upper stretches of the Yellow River. Out of that water, 50 billion cubic meters will pass through man-made canals, sending 10 billion cubic meters to Qaidam Basin in Qinghai Province, 30 billion cubic meters to the Taklimakan Desert in Tarim Basin in Xinjiang Province, and 10 billion cubic meters to Lop Nur. The remaining 100 billion cubic meters will flow out along with the existing waterflow of the Yellow River, allowing many hydropower stations serving Lanzhou to operate at full capacity, as well as providing 50 billion cubic meters for diversion along the river branch at Qilihe District of Lanzhou. Those 50 billion will be carried by man-made canals, through the Hexi Corridor, sending 10 billion cubic meters to the Turpan Basin in Xinjiang, another 10 billion to the Junggar Basin, and 30 billion to boost the laggard waterflow of the Shiyang He, Hei He, and other rivers. The balance of 50 billion cubic meters will flow through the Yellow River to the ocean, boosting the river's water level to permit navigation.

***

Section 5
Construction Plan for the Shipping Waterway

5.1
The construction can be divided into 2 phases: phase 1 will include tributary river projects, discharge waterway projects, tributary shipping waterway projects, shipping canal projects, and water-supply canal projects; phase 2 will include the main/trunk shipping waterway project, water locks, reservoir, widening of the Beijing-Hangzhou canal, and water-supply canals into the Northwest.

5.2
Tributary projects: These projects will start from the highest class of tributary rivers. First, simple, temporary dams will be built to shut off the entrances of the level-3 tributaries and their large and small gullies (note: or "ditches"), and they will be drained of water. Then, the riverbed will be dredged, and the slopes on either side of the river will be leveled (note: or "graded"?). Since gentle slopes are advantageous for preventing soil erosion, a 15-degree slope is best. Then, simple, temporary dams will be constructed on the level-2 tributaries and their large and small gullies, and the same procedure as above will be followed. Last will be the level-1 tributaries and their large and small gullies, with the same procedure again. As these projects progress to the lower-class tributaries, the amount of water to be drained will be larger and larger, so if it proves necessary, low-lying land can be found for excavation of temporary drainage reservoirs, or the water can be discharged through canals into other rivers.

5.3
Discharge Waterway projects: The Weihe and Majiahe, on the North bank of the lower reaches of the Yellow River, will be blocked off with temporary dams. Then the base of the trapezoidal cross-section of their entire riverbeds will be widened to a minimum of 100 meters, with a minimum depth of 9 meters, a normal water level of 6 meters, 15-degree slopes on each side, and an average downhill slope of 0.04% or less. The Jialuhe, Huijihe, and other similar tributaries on the South Bank will be dealt with in exactly the same way.

5.4
The discharge channels on the north bank will be situated at the mouth of the Fenhe, and will flow through man-made channels to the Weihe, Majiahe, etc. The discharge channels on the south bank will be situated at the mouth of the Qinhe, and will flow into the Jialuhe, Huijihe, etc. The trapezoidal cross-section of the discharge channels will be 150 meters wide at the base, at least 9 meters in depth, with a normal water level of 6 meters, a 15-20 degree slope on either side, and an average downhill slope of 0.04% or less.

5.5
The discharge channel for the Weihe (NOTE: this is *different* from the Weihe mentioned in the previous paragraph. The 2 names are written with different characters.) can make use of the existing Luohe; man-made channels will conduct water from the mouth of the Weihe to the middle reaches of the Luohe, and further down, other man-made channels will connect the Luohe to the discharge channels on the south bank. The trapezoidal cross-section of these channels will be 20 meters wide at the base, at least 9 meters in depth, with a normal water level of 6 meters, and a 40 degree slope on either side. There is no need to pay special attention to the downhill slope.

5.6
The discharge channel in the upriver area of Lanzhou will conduct water through Lanzhou, along the West side of the Yellow River, through Jingtai County, and into the Hexi Corridor. At Wuwei it will flow into the Shiyanghe. This channel will help in transporting water through the Hexi Corridor to Xinjiang.

5.7
Shipping Canal projects: Upstream from the temporary dams at the mouths of the Wei and Yiluo rivers, a large dam with water locks will be constructed, whereas upstream from Xianyang and Luoyang, "bottom-stretching" (or "bottom-reaching"? The name seems to indicate either that the dams extend up from the riverbed, which seems trivially true of any dam, or they extend deeper down into the riverbed.) water control dams will be constructed. The trapezoidal cross-section of the river bottom will be at least 400 meters at the base, with a depth of no less than 18 meters, a normal water level of 15 meters, and a slope of 20-25 degrees at the sides, as well as an average downhill slope of 0.04% or less. The trapezoidal cross-sections of other tributary rivers will be decided based on whether, whether they will be opened for shipping, and if so, what the class of ships sailing on them will be.

5.8
Canal projects: The canal from the Qingshui river, through Datong, and on to Tongzhou will have a dam with water locks at the entrance of the Qingshui. Another dam with water locks will be located at the exit of the Guanting water reservoir. The trapezoidal cross-section and slope will be the same as the discharge channels on the North and South sides of the lower stretches of the Yellow River.

5.9
Water-use Channel projects: (note: perhaps this refers to channels used for transporting water for irrigation? The name seems to indicate the water is for human use, not simply for shipping.) The discharge channel upstream from Lanzhou, also known as the Northwest Channel. It will have a branch which will be a water-use channel, stretching from Jingtai, along the Yellow River on its Northwest side, to Hohhot.

5.10
After the phase 1 projects are completed, the temporary dams for the Weihe, Majiahe, Jialuhe, and Huijihe, as well as other discharge channels, will be dismantled. All the temporary dams constructed at the mouths of level-1 tributaries will remain. The discharge channel on the upstream side of Lanzhou will be opened up. At the exit of the Northwest Channel, near Lanzhou, a temporary dam will be built on the side toward the downstream side of the Yellow River. The portion of the channel cut off by the dam will be drained. The water can be used locally, or if it is too much, it can be diverted into the desert and used for irrigation.

5.11
Dry-river projects: At the mouth of the Yellow River, going out into the sea, a temporary dam will be built. On the downstream side of the temporary dam at Lanzhou, a "bottom-stretching" water control dam will be built. The trapezoidal cross-section of the dry river bed will be at least 500 meters at the base, with a maximum depth of no less than 18 meters, normal water level of 15 meters, sides with slope of 20-25 degrees, and downhill slope same as the shipping channels. In the canyons of the upper and middle stretches of the Yellow River, the natural features of the terrain and its green cover can be maintained, but the depth and width of the channel must be enough to permit navigation.

5.12
The entrance of the Weihe water-supply channel is directly across (note: or "facing") the exit of the Lanzhou Northwest Channel.

5.13
Water-locks projects: Three "bottom-stretching" dams with water locks will be constructed on the dry riverbed at Heishanxia (Black Mountain Gorge), Tuoketuo, and Yumenkou. They will divide the drained riverbed into 4 sections, from Lanzhou-Heishanxia, Heishanxia-Tuoketuo, Tuoketuo-Yumenkou, and Yumenkou-Dongying. All three dams will have multiple locks, including one pair for 50,000-ton class ships, one pair for 20,000-ton class ships, one pair for 10,000-ton class ships, two pairs for 5000-ton class ships, and two pairs for 1000-ton class ships. The chamber inside the 50,000-ton class locks will have effective measurements of 300 by 50 by 12 (note: meters?). The width of the water-lock dams will be about 800 meters, with a depth of about 1500 meters.

5.14
Water reservoir projects: At the Maqu Great River Turn area, there will be a water reservoir with a capacity of 150 billion cubic meters. On the inner side of the Great River Turn area dikes will be built, and will connect with the mountains surrounding the area to form a vast reservoir 30 kilometers wide, 90 kilometers long, and 60 meters deep. The cofferdam dikes built around the reservoir will be trapezoidal in cross-section, with a 45 degree incline on the inner side, and a 30 degree incline on the outer side, running for a total length of 240 kilometers, at least 184 meters thick at the base, 60 meters tall, and at least 20 meters thick at the peak. The reservoir outlet will be on the downstream side of the Maqu Great River Turn area. The dikes will be constructed using gabions, with geo-membrane on the inner side, and filled with earth dug up on site.

5.15
Widening of the Beijing-Hangzhou Canal project: When the elevated riverbed of the Yellow River comes down to ground level (note: due to many years of silting, the last ~800km of the Yellow River is elevated above ground level and is kept on its course and prevented from overflowing by dikes), and connects with the Beijing-Hangzhou canal, the original capacity of the canal to carry vessels up to 1000 tons will make for a severe mismatch with the 50,000 ton vessel capacity of the Yellow River. Therefore, the capacity of the canal can be increased to carry 10,000 ton vessels, and the elevated portion of the canal in Shandong can be lowered to the same elevation as the connections with the Yellow and Yangze rivers. As the entire course is made flat and level, it will also be deepened and widened. The trapezoidal cross-section of the canal will be at least 300 meters at the base, at least 15 meters deep, with a normal water level of 12 meters, and a 20-25 degree slope on the sides. The average downhill slope of the canal will be decided by the relative elevation of the Yellow River and Yangze River riverbeds. If the slope is excessive, then the construction of water locks must be considered.

5.16
At the point where the Yellow River (primary shipping channel) exits to the sea at Dongying, the bottom will be dredged to a depth of at least 25 meters. In the gulf port at the mouth of the Yellow River, the depth to which the mooring berths will be dredged will be decided according to the depth which the ships require.

5.17
After the phase 2 projects complete, all the tributary and dry riverbed temporary dams will be dismantled. The water-use channels and bypass channels running along the Weihe and Yiluohe will be taken out of commission, but can be left in place in case they are useful in the future. The discharge channels on the North and South sides of the lower reaches of the Yellow River will be kept and will serve as secondary river channels. The primary river channel on the lower end of the Yellow River will become its primary shipping channel, and the secondary river channels will become secondary shipping channels. The primary and secondary Yellow River shipping channels, along with the Qingshui-Datong-Tongzhou canal and the Beijing-Hangzhou canals will all connect for passage of shipping traffic, and will form the main framework (note: literally "skeleton"; perhaps translate as "backbone"?) of the new marine shipping network.

5.18
The discharge channels chosen for use during the Yellow River shipping channel project, are all preexisting riverways, which will greatly reduce the work to be done and the amount of movement required. The discharge channels used on the upper stretches of the Yellow River, however, do include some man-made channels for diversion of water to the Hexi Corridor. These discharge channels will not require too much work, will not occupy too much space, and will not require many people to be relocated.

5.19
Since the average downhill slope of the Yellow River riverbed is as high as 0.46%, the limited water volume available cannot maintain the required depth when descending such a steep slope. If we were to limit the average slope to no more than 0.06%, the height of each big dam with water-locks would have to be extended as high as 400 meters, or more. If that was the case, the work required to build each dam, and the technical difficulty involved, as well as the work involved in building dikes on either side of the riverway, would be greatly increased. The enormous dams and dikes, protruding hundreds of meters from the ground, would form huge barriers, as well as being a safety hazard. While our plan does involve a certain degree of height to the dams, we solve the problem primarily by making the base of the dams extend down below ground level, thus increasing the difference between water level behind and in front of the dam, and making it possible to flatten out the slope of the riverbed. The height of those huge 400-meter dams will mostly be *below* ground level, greatly mitigating the safety hazard, and reducing the technical difficulty of construction. This way, the above-ground height of both dams and dikes can be kept within reasonable limits.

***

Section 6
Plan for the Water Diversion Project

6.1
150 billion cubic meters of water are to be drawn from the Yaluzangbu Jiang, the Nu Jiang, the Lancang Jiang, the Jinsha Jiang, the Yalong Jiang, and the Dadu Jiang, and be diverted to the upper Yellow River. Of that amount, 50 billion cubic meters will be taken from the Yaluzangbu Jiang, approximately 30% of its yearly flow of 165.4 billion cubic meters; the Nu Jiang will contribute 24 billion cubic meters, roughly 35% of its yearly flow of 74 billion cubic meters; from the Lancang Jiang, 26 billion cubic meters, roughly 35% of its yearly flow of 74 billion cubic meters; from the Jinsha Jiang, 28 billion cubic meters, roughly 20% of its yearly flow of 143 billion cubic meters; from the Yalong Jiang, 12 billion cubic meters, roughly 20% of its yearly flow of 60.4 billion cubic meters; and from the Dadu Jiang, 10 billion cubic meters, roughly 20% of its yearly flow of 50 billion cubic meters.

6.2
The water outlet on the Yaluzangbu will be the point where the level-2 tributaries Palongzangbu and Yigongzangbu flow into the (level-1 tributary) Layue He. The diverted water will flow east along the Sichuan-Tibet Highway, from Mibo to Bashe, and will join the channel for water diverted from the Nu Jiang. The merged channel will contain flowing along the Sichuan-Tibet Highway, from Xiaya to Changdu, and will merge with the channel carrying diverted water from the Lancang Jiang. The channel, now carrying water from 3 rivers, will continue along the highway, from Jiangda to Dege, and will then merge with the channel carrying water from the Jinsha Jiang. The merged channel will will continue along the highway, past Que'er Mountain, through Manigange to Ganmu, and will then merge with the channel carrying water from the Yalong Jiang. Now carrying water from 5 rivers, the merged channel will continue along the same highway, through Huhuo, to Lianghekou, on the Dajin Chuan, a tributary of the Dadu He. There, it will merge with the water diverted from the Dadu He, and will turn North, flowing along the Aba Highway, through Rangtang and Aba. It will continue flowing to the upper Yellow River, and will cross over the Yellow River and flow into the Maqu Daguaiwan reservoir.

6.3
Previous proposals for the Western Line water diversion project, have generally recommended using natural (downhill) water flow to transport the water, so as to reduce the operating costs of water diversion. However, this would make the technical difficulty of the project very great. It would mean building highly elevated reservoirs, and excavating long, deep tunnels for the water to flow through. If we take a different perspective, and abandon the idea of natural water flow, instead using external electric power to pump the water, that extreme technical difficulty can be avoided, though the operating costs will of course be much greater. If we can bear those operating costs, then the plan described above is feasible. The difference between the Great Tongdao water project and most other water projects, is that the economic and social benefits to be reaped are far better. Most water projects take a long time to recoup the construction costs, or even never recoup them at all. In contrast, the Great Tongdao project has enormous meaning; in effect, it can turn Henan province, Shanxi province, Shaanxi province, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia province, Gansu province, and Anhui province into "coastal" provinces. At the same time, it will make Qinghai, Xinjiang, and Tibet take a giant step towards parity with central China, as if the "golden coastline" of Southeast China was extended all the way into the belly of the deep West. So the Datongdao project can pay back all the capital expenses of the entire project, it can compensate for all the damages caused, and it can pay for the high operating expenses of electric pumping. Therefore, there is no reason why this project cannot proceed by use of electric pumping for water transport, thus easily avoiding the difficulty of building elevated reservoirs and deep, long-distance tunnels. Besides, the enormous power generation capacity which the Yaluzangbu Daguaiwan power station will provide, will do much to relieve the strain on the existing power network.

6.4
If electric pumping is used all along the entire water diversion course, then when choosing the route to be taken, there is no need to worry about altitude and levelness, so a route which takes the pipes along a public highway will be simplest and most convenient for construction. The volume of the reservoirs and channels for diverted water will not be an issue for water delivery, so construction of reservoirs at the water inlets and outlets will not be required. In the high mountains and deep valleys of the Southwest, there will be no need to build dams or dig long, deep tunnels, and the need to build roads for transporting construction supplies into remote areas will be greatly alleviated. Basically, all the tricky technical parts of the Datongdao and Western Line projects will disappear. With no high-altitude reservoirs, no deep tunnels, and pipes and channels running along public highways, the quantity, difficulty, and expense of construction work will be slashed. The investment capital required to set up water pipes and channels, and the high operating expenses of pumping the water, can all be carried by the enormous economic and social dividends provided by marine shipping. The electric power generated will be seasonal, which is disadvantageous for any other use; but for water diversion, it's perfect. When the rivers are high, the hydroelectric power stations will produce at full capacity, just when the pumps for water diversion need the most power. When the rivers are at moderate level, the hydroelectric stations will generate a moderate amount of power, and the power consumption of the pumps will also be moderate. When the rivers are low, water will not be diverted. Any hydroelectric power generated during the low season, as well as any excess power during the high season, will be given to Tibet.

6.5
The great canyon of the Yaluzangbu Jiang forms a "U" shape toward the Northeast. The water reservoir which is to be built on the Yaluzangbu will be toward the end of one branch of the "U", at Paiqu town. That part of the canyon has yearly water flow of 68 billion cubic meters. The dam will be 50 meters high, and will pass 40 billion cubic meters through the generator turbines each year. The generator station itself will be located close to the other branch of the "U", will have a capacity of 35,000 megawatts, and will connect to the reservoir through a sloped tunnel 30 meters in diameter and several kilometers long. The top and bottom of the tunnel will have a 2.2 kilometer difference in elevation, and will pass enough water to generate 150 million megawatt-hours per year.

6.6
The power used for pumping the diverted water could be brought in from elsewhere, or could be transmitted from the Yaluzangbu power station. Ideally, the power generated from the diverted rivers would be used to cover the power needs of the whole diversion project, though this would increase the required investment and difficulty of construction. Even if it is deemed necessary to buy power from elsewhere, the economic benefits of the Datongdao project are still enough to pay for its operating expenses. Of course, if building the new power stations proves too difficult to do right away, the project could initially run on purchased electricity, and when the time is right, the Yabuzanglu power station could be built. Or, if China's level of engineering and construction expertise advances in the future, maybe converting the water diversion channels over to use natural water flow rather than pumps would become feasible.

The Future Lost Rivers

The lost Sarasvati river

It is now fashionable to talk about climate change and its implications on our future lives. A couple of years ago, French-born and Indian naturalized scholar, Michel Danino published a book, The Lost River: on the Trail of the Sarasvati, a mind-opener on the fate of the mythic Sarasvati river. Taking into account the latest research in fields as different as satellite imagery, archeology, linguistics, paleontology or mythology, Danino says: “The Indian subcontinent was the scene of dramatic upheavals a few thousand years ago. The Northwest region entered an arid phase, and erosion coupled with tectonic events played havoc with river course. One of them disappeared.”
He further explains: “It has been accepted that the loss of the Sarasvati played a role in the dissolution of the Harappan city states. Why did this remarkable civilisation with its excellent town planning, standardised writing and weight system suddenly collapse?”
One can of course think that this ‘Sarasvati’ was a myth and that one should live in today’s reality. However, this reality tells us something.
On March 30, 2013, The Australian published an article asserting: “About 28,000 rivers have disappeared from China's state maps, an absence seized upon by environmentalists as evidence of the irreversible natural cost of developmental excesses.”
Can you believe that more than half the rivers surveyed a few decades ago, no longer exist. It is what discovered some 800,000 surveyors who compiled the first national water census in China.
Beijing is “fumbling to explain the cause”, says The Australian.
The three-year study conducted by the Ministry of Water Resources and the National Bureau of Statistics discovered that out of some 50,000 rivers catalogued in the 1990s, only 22,909 rivers still exist today.
The Chinese officials immediately put the blame on the climate change, arguing that it has caused waterways to vanish; they also say that the difference was also probably due to ‘mistakes’ by previous surveyors.
Environmental experts do not agree; for them it is the direct consequence of the ill-conceived and wild development prevalent in the Middle Kingdom.
Ma Jun, the outspoken water expert heading the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs in Beijing, believes the missing rivers are a cause for ‘great concern’.
He explained: “One of the major reasons is the over-exploitation of the underground water reserves, while environmental destruction is another reason, because desertification of forests has caused a rain shortage in the mountain areas.” He added: “Large hydroelectric projects such as the Three Gorges Dam, which diverted trillions of litres of water to drier regions, were likely to have played a role.”
Surprisingly, a few months back, Beijing announced that it had decided to go ahead with the massive controversial plans to dam the Salween (Nu) River in Yunnan province. Eight years ago, Premier Wen Jiabao had suspended the plans out of environmental concerns.
According to The South China Morning Post (SCMP): "Some environmentalists were stunned by the plan's revival, which is part of an effort by the government to promote hydroelectricity as a cleaner alternative to coal. Opponents said the decision marks a long-awaited victory for the country's mighty state-owned power companies and local governments that have been lobbying top leaders to promote the building of mega dams."
The lifting of the ban means an extra capacity of 120 gigawatts with the construction of 54 hydropower plants termed as 'key construction projects'; it may also mean that more rivers will disappear.
I was recently in Garhwal and I could witness the immediate consequences of building cascades of dams for short-term pecuniary benefits.
Local officials argue that, if the Centre does not want dams to generate power, then Rs 10,000 to 15,000 crore would have to be annually released as Central assistance. The Center wants power and the State, hard cash; it superficially looks as win-win situation, except for the rivers which have started disappearing at some places.
I was told that the projects currently underway should increase the hydropower capacity to 12,235 MW. A total of 95 hydropower projects are being built or planned on different rivers converging in the Alaknanda and Bhagirathi basin of Uttarakhand.

Srinagar (Garhwal)

Environmentalists like former IIT professor, Dr. G D Agrawal (his sannyasi name is Swami Gyan Swarop Sanand) and before him Sunderlal Bahuguna have opposed this wild contagion of new concrete infrastructures, but with little results, though it is a fact that since 2005, when the Tehri Dam’s reservoir was filled up, the flow of Bhagirathi reduced drastically.
In the years to come, global warming will radically change the face of the planet; inconsiderate human activities can only accelerate these changes for the worse. Worldwide, it will create tens of millions of ‘environmental migrants’.
The process is bound to happen in the Indian Himalayas because once the dams are built, there will no more rivers to worship and no more jobs for the local population. They will have to migrate to the cities, with other negative consequences.
Many more new ‘lost Sarasvatis’ is the making!

Pollution, pollution, pollution

Before the 2008 Beijing Olympics, Ji Lin was chairman of Chinese capital top advisory body, the Beijing Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. 
He now says that the Chinese capital is today doing far more than it did few years ago to ensure that Beijingers enjoy a blue sky.
Ji affirmed: "We went all out to improve the environment and had 'truly exceptional Games' in 2008, ...now we are addressing air pollution on a larger scale and with more investment than was possible when we prepared for the Games."
But with little results.The China Daily wrote: "In addition to capping coal consumption in Beijing, the city is seeking to get neighboring Tianjin, Hebei and Shanxi to rally behind the fight against pollution."
However a Chinese ministry report shows smog caused 1.1 trillion yuan (about 180 billion US $) in losses in 2010, though the study does not include damage to people's health and deaths.
The South China Morning Post also writes on the hot topic: "The mainland is paying an increasingly heavy price for rampant pollution, with direct economic losses more than doubling between 2004 and 2010, a recent government-backed study has found."
An estimate prepared by the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (MNP), using published BP (British Petroleum) energy data and cement production data believed that during the the 1990-2006 period, global fossil-fuel related CO2 emissions increased over 35%. 
It says: "In 2006 global CO2 emissions from fossil fuel use increased by about 2.6%, which is less than the 3.3% increase in 2005. The 2.6% increase is mainly due to a 4.5% increase in global coal consumption, of which China contributed more than two-third. China’s 2006 CO2 emissions surpassed those of the USA by 8%. This includes CO2 emissions from industrial processes (cement production). With this, China tops the list of CO2 emitting countries for the first time. In 2005, CO2 emissions of China were still 2% below those of the USA."
That was in 2006.
Today according to the data collected by the United States Department of Energy's Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC) for the United Nations, China has produced 23.5% of the world CO2 in 2012; the USA comes second with 18.27%, the EU third with  13.98% and  India, fourth with 'only' 5.83%.
Another interesting study has been published in China. 
It affirms that "about 90 per cent of glaciers in Tibet called the Third Pole region are shrinking because of black carbon pollution 'transferred from South Asia' to the Tibetan Plateau".
Yao Tandong, director of the Chinese Academy of Sciences' Institute of Tibetan Plateau Research claims that the ongoing research over more than 30 years has given scientists a better understanding of pollution on the Tibetan Plateau. 
According to him, black carbon generated from industrial production in South Asia is being taken to the Tibetan Plateau by the Indian monsoon in spring and summer. 
The China Daily quoted him saying: "The accumulation of black carbon on the plateau will accelerate the shrinking of glaciers, bringing with it persistent organic pollutants that will be deposited in the soil".
The investigation using topographic maps and satellite images revealed the retreat of 82 glaciers, area reduction by 7,090 glaciers and the mass-balance change of 15 glaciers, and for  Yao: "Systematic differences in glacier status are apparent from region to region, with the most pronounced shrinkage in the Himalayas, the south eastern part of the region. Some of the glaciers there are very likely to disappear by 2030 ...The shrinkage generally decreases from the Himalayas to the continental interior and is smallest in the western part. Some glaciers there are even growing."
Whether is assessment is correct or not will have to be checked by Indian scientists. The fact remains that China has huge problems in its metropolises.
It is high time to start calculating the true growth of a country which should include 'green' parameters and the damage caused to environment.
We will then discover that old Europe is perhaps not in such a bad shape.

Map showing CO2 emissions

1.1 tr yuan in economic losses from pollution in 2010, China report says
South China Morning Post
March 28,  2013
Li Jing
Ministry's report shows smog caused 1.1tr yuan in losses in 2010, but incomplete study does not include damage to people's health and deaths
The mainland is paying an increasingly heavy price for rampant pollution, with direct economic losses more than doubling between 2004 and 2010, a recent government-backed study has found.
An incomplete calculation of the environmental costs in 2010 showed that pollution had caused 1.1 trillion yuan (HK$1.36 trillion) in economic losses, or 2.15 times the 511.8 billion yuan loss in 2004, when the "green GDP" project was launched.
The direct cost of pollution accounted for 2.5 per cent of total economic output in 2010, but if damage to the ecosystem - including forests, wetlands and grasslands - was included, the losses added up to 1.54 trillion yuan, or 3.5 per cent of that year's gross domestic product.
The cost of pollution also grew more rapidly than GDP in 2010, up 13.7 per cent compared with GDP growth of 10.4 per cent.
The latest update of the study, led by the Ministry of Environmental Protection's Chinese Academy of Environmental Planning, was quietly posted on the academy's website in January, when about a seventh of the mainland was shrouded in smog. It said the findings were incomplete due to lack of data in some areas.
Aimed at putting a price tag on the mainland's runaway economic growth, the study has been stubbornly resisted by local governments because the findings could tarnish their political achievements. As a result, the academy had only previously released figures for 2004 and 2008, even though the study is conducted annually.
"The existing accounting system fails to reflect the true cost of resources consumption and environmental degradation, as a result the country's economic achievement has been over exaggerated," the academy said in a summary of the findings for 2010 that was posted on its website.
Government campaigns targeting major air and water pollutants since 2006 were not able to reverse the trend of rising environmental costs, it said.
A total of 558.9 billion yuan would have been needed to clean up pollution in 2010, an increase of 94 per cent from the 287.4 billion yuan needed in 2004, the study said.
The research does not calculate the health costs associated with pollution, but they would push the economic losses even higher.
A government-sponsored report released in 2006 said air pollution caused 358,000 premature deaths in 600 mainland cities each year, with an estimated health cost of 152.7 billion yuan.
The World Bank estimated in 2007 that the health costs of air and water pollution equalled 4.3 per cent of the mainland's GDP.
Premier Li Keqiang has pledged that the country will not pursue economic growth at the expense of the environment, saying "such growth won't satisfy the people", but has yet to release details of his planned remedy.
Professor Li Wei, from Beijing Normal University, said the "green GDP" project's findings should serve as a wake-up call for local governments and officials, and prompt them to reconsider their economic growth targets.
China Environmental News, the ministry's daily, said on Tuesday that the project might have regained momentum.

Damning of rivers: alarm signals from China

My article Damning of rivers: alarm signals from China was published in the August issue of Power Politics.
 
Recent reports of damning of rivers by China has caused much alarm in its neighborhood, including India. What are the implications – both economic and strategic for India? China watcher Claude Arpi seeks to find out. 

Click here...

The Waters of Tibet
China is in transition; true, the state of affairs in the Middle Kingdom is rather unstable as we had seen with Bo Xilai affair. The former mayor of Chongqing who was supposed to have the widespread support of the top leadership to get a seat in the Standing Committee of the CCP Politburo, has been arrested while Zhou Yongkang China's Security Tsar and currently No 9 in the Party is said to have been divested of all his responsibility in China’s security apparatus.
This means that within the People’s Republic today, there are extremely divergent views about the direction China should take.
The same differences appear when it comes to ‘development vs. environment’ and more particularly, the damming of the rivers of China which has created a lot of tension and nervousness with China’s neighbours, whether it is in South-East Asia, in India or even in Central Asia.
To give an example, the Indian press recently reported that the Brahmaputra river had dried up in Arunachal Pradesh. The information sent waves of fear across the North-East.
The local press hysterically affirmed that the Siang, known as Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet and Brahmaputra in Assam, had almost disappeared in Pasighat in East Siang district. Tako Dabi, a political advisor to Chief Minister Nabam Tuki declared: “China could have diverted the water of the river or there could be some artificial blockade due to which this has happened”.
The information was thankfully denied by the Government of India. Obviously, the media had not done its homework: a diversion could not be done in one day, or even one year, and this, without the knowledge of the Indian satellites; but the fact remains that water has become an extremely sensitive issue which could inflame a region.

China, the Great Economic Power
There are however reasons for the present fear. China is the second economic power of the planet after the United States; to maintain a close to double-digit tempo of growth, the Communist regime in Beijing has become an ogre devouring energy world-wide. Most of the raw materials (such as oil, gas, wood, minerals, etc.) necessary to feed the economic engine can be bought from outside China, except for one: water.
Water is therefore critical to the survival of the Chinese model for two reasons: first, the energy generated by hydropower plants is badly needed for the economy. China's theoretical hydro-power resources have been estimated at 384 gigawatts. Most of this potential comes from the Tibetan plateau (the purported dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo/Brahmaputra itself has a potential of 38 gigawatts).
The second reason: the leaders in Beijing need to feed more than 1.3 billion people, for which water is needed.

A Water War?
In 1995, Ismail Serageldin, then the World Bank’s Vice-President wrote: “Many of the wars this century were about oil, but those of the next century will be over water.”
It is not difficult to prophesize that if a water war was to happen in the future, it would be between China and one of its neighbours.
Why? Because most of Asia’s waters originate on the Tibetan plateau, the main watershed in Asia. Tibet’s waters flow down to eleven countries and are said to bring fresh water to over 85% of Asia’s population, approximately 50% of the world’s population.
Four of the world’s ten major rivers, the Yarlung Tsangpo, the Yangtze, the Mekong and the Huang Ho (or Yellow River) have their headwaters on the Tibetan Plateau. Other major rivers such as the Salween, the Irrawaddi, the Arun, the Karnali, the Sutlej and the Indus, also have their source in Tibet.
China’s two major headaches, food and water, are closely interlinked and, if not solved, are bound to have grave social and political consequences for the country as well as its neighbours downstream.

The purported mega-damming project
The Yarlung Tsangpo or Brahmaputra, as it is known in India, has an immense bearing on the lives of hundreds of millions in the sub-continent.
One of its interesting characteristics is the sharp U turn, known as the Great Bend near Mt. Namcha Barwa (7,782 meters). The river enters India soon after in the Upper Siang district of Arunachal Pradesh, a territory today claimed by China, making any project on upper reaches of the Tsangpo vital for India’s security.
Chinese scientists have been found that the Yarlung Tsangpo gorge forms the longest and deepest canyon in the world. The Tsangpo Gorge is eight times as deep and three times as large as the Colorado’s Grand Canyon.
In the mid 1980’s, it was announced that China would build a mega-dam in the Great Bend. This pharaonic project is mind-blowing.
The Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River with a 18,200 megawatts capacity would be dwarfed by a hydroelectric plant on the Yarlung Tsangpo with a planned capacity of 38,000 megawatts.
For the Chinese engineers (and leaders), it is enough to know that the Tsangpo river tumbles down over 3,000 meters in less than 200 km. This gives the gorge one of the greatest hydropower potentials available in the world. It makes the emperors of China dream.
In recent years, the Chinese have been more discreet on the project, though one of the road blocks was removed on the day Premier Wen Jiabao arrived in India in December 2010: the last tunnel linking Metok County (a few kilometers north of the McMahon Line) to the rest of Tibet was opened, eventually paving the way for a mega-project.
The mega-dam has so far been denied by Beijing, but damming on a smaller scale is going on.

The Solution
To solve its water problems, Beijing has devised one of the most gigantic projects in the world: to divert waters from the South to the North through three ‘diversions’, the Eastern, the Central and the Western.
While the Eastern and Central section of the project are under way, the western section is still at the planning stage, but it is where India comes into the picture.
The ‘official’ western route would draw water from the Tibetan plateau via the upper reaches of the Yellow River to quench the deserts of North-west China.
Another project is the diversion of the Brahmaputra waters towards China. Some ten years ago, a Chinese engineer Li Ling and his colleague, Gao Kai, a retired PLA General seriously worked on the diversion scheme. Li Ling then published a book called Tibet's Waters will Save China in which the Chinese engineer detailed the diversion scheme, also known as Shuomatan Canal (from Suma Tan in Central Tibet, near Lhasa to Tanjing in China).
Several 'experts' denounced the plans of Li Ling and Gao Kai and in November 2006, when President Hu Jintao visited India, Water Resources Minister Wang Shucheng, a hydraulic engineer himself, affirmed that the proposal was “unnecessary, unfeasible and unscientific. There is no need for such dramatic and unscientific projects.”
However, rumors have continued to circulate, fuelled in June 2011, by the declarations of Wang Guangqian, a scholar of the Chinese Academy of Sciences saying: “Chinese experts have raised a new proposal to divert water from the upper reaches of the Brahmaputra River to the country’s northwestern province of Xinjiang. The water diversion route in the proposal, named the ‘Grand Western Canal’, is slightly different from the ‘Western Canal’ mentioned in China’s well-known South-North Water Diversion Project.”
The project would begin from a place south of Lhasa, the Tibetan capital.
Prof Wang Guangqian of the Chinese Academy of Sciences seems to say that China has no choice but to go for it when he speaks of the newly proposed route: “Brahmaputra waters are expected to be rerouted to Xinjiang along the Qinghai-Tibet Railway and the Hexi Corridor – part of the Northern Silk Road located in Gansu Province”.
His plans too were opposed by many scientists in China and denied by the Government in Beijing.

Three important factors
Three important factors have to be understood.
One, hydropower lobbies have a financial interest in ‘concretizing’ the project as soon as possible. Dams, whether in India, Pakistan or Tibet, mean big business and the large Chinese corporations will continue to lobby hard to get the projects through.
The second crucial factor is the cost-benefit perspective. The Chinese leadership is usually very down-to-earth, rational; they will choose the easier, cheaper option.
The third factor: can China afford a conflict with India? The next leadership which will take over in November will have to answer this question.

The Solution: A Water Treaty with India
The only solution seems to lie in bringing the matter to the negotiating table and reach a bilateral water agreement. If a river-water Treaty could be signed between India and Pakistan in the early sixties, why can not a similar agreement be made between China, India, Bhutan and Bangladesh, in order to assure a decent life for all in the region?
In the meantime, the succession war is raging in Beijing.
The fruition of all these mega-projects will probably depend on who will be the new emperor(s) of China.
If wise, the emperor(s) will take into account a conflict with the neighbours in calculating the cost-benefits of the mega-projects.
Let us hope for the best, while remaining vigilant!

Grid and Greed

As mentioned in this article from the National Geographic Correspondent on Water issues, India "suffers from inertia on one hand and from destructive greed on the other. It doesn’t suffer from a shortage of dams"
But there are other related issues which complicate the situation.
Of course, great is the temptation to built new dams, under the pretext to 'produce more', in reality to mint more money like in the Arunachal Pradesh case.
An article in Nature China warns us: "Climate change: Melting ice before your eyes".
Glaciologist Tandong Yao at the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing and his colleagues say: "Glaciers in the Himalayas have shrunk over the past 30 years", adding: 

The Tibetan Plateau holds one of the largest numbers of glaciers in the world. These glaciers are at the headwaters of many prominent Asian rivers and play important roles in local ecosystems. Recently, however, controversy has raged as to whether glaciers in the Tibetan Plateau are experiencing shrinkage due to global climate change.

Tandong Yao studied differences in status of 7,090 glaciers between the 1970s and 2000s using topographic maps, satellite images and on-site observations. They found that the Himalayas (excluding the Karakorum) experienced the most intensive shrinkage, and that the extent of shrinkage decreases from the Himalayas to the continental interior. 
Interestingly they warned: "if glacier shrinkage continues in the Himalayas, downstream regions could experience unsustainable alterations to water supplies and growing incidences of geohazards."
Even more worrying is the desertification of the Tibetan plateau.
According to Xinhua, as a result of global warming the Qinghai-Tibet Railway is being threatened by desertification on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau .

Photo: Nature China

Wang Jinchang, a senior engineer with the Qinghai-Tibet Railway Company told the Chinese news agency that about 443 kilometers of the 1,956-km railway are in areas affected by desertification, including 103 km that lie in seriously desertified areas.
Wang affirmed that the threat of soil erosion has grown very fast in recent years, mostly near rivers and wetlands from Golmud and Lhasa, and the amount of affected rail tracks almost doubled from 2003 to 2009.
Another expert in soil erosion control, An Fengjie, from China's State Forestry Administrations stated that the plateau region suffered from desertification long before the railway was built: "The railway did not cause the problem, but it gives us an opportunity to witness the severity and scale of soil erosion on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau." 
The Chinese will not admit that the railway line made the situation worse. It appears that sands buried rail racks and disrupted train services over 1,362 times from 1984 to 2002 on the Xining-Golmud section of the railway.
Xinhua says that one of the most prevalent theories blames global warming for the ecological deterioration in the plateau region.
According to Sun Zhizhong, from the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the temperatures on the Qinghai-Tibet plateau rose over two degrees Celsius on average over the past three years, leaving large chunks of frozen earth to defrost.
One of the consequences is that the Kokonor (or Qinghai Lake), China's largest saltwater lake keeps expanding.
For a long time, this phenomenon remained unexplained.
Xinhua reported yesterday: "The surface area of China's largest inland saltwater lake has been expanding for eight years, according to the latest remote sensing survey."
Zhou Bingrong, deputy chief of the provincial institute of meteorological sciences found out that:

The Qinghai Lake in northwest China's Qinghai province measured 4,354.28 square km, according to satellite data collected on July 19 and published on Sunday, s. The figure was 14.58 square km larger than the same time last year, and the largest in 12 years.

Zhou's institute has been carrying out dynamic surveillance of the lake's surface area since 2001, when the lake was shrinking due to climate change and human activity. 
Zhou takes the credit for the increase of the lake: "We have noticed an apparent increase of water since 2005, thanks to more rainfall and sustained environmental protection efforts," but the increase in the waters filling up the lake is more likely to be due to climate change and melting of permafrost".
The Qinghai Lake had been shrinking since the 1950s, but now is increasing.

India is bound to have new black-outs, if new measures as the ones suggested by Himanshu Thakkar in the article below are not urgently taken.
But is there the will to bring out meaningful changes.
The problem is that these measures may not fill the politicians pockets, while building new dams will do. 
It may be difficult for the grid to prevail over the greed.
There is another angle to the blackout: computer hackers.
In August 2003, a blackout occurred in North America, leaving 50 million people in the dark for four days.
Bloomberg wrote: "[it] provides a glimpse of the havoc a cyber attack could inflict on the nation’s power grid." 
Adding: "Internet-based terrorists would be capable of causing blackouts “on the order of nine to 18 months” by disabling critical systems such as transformers, said Joe Weiss, managing director of Applied Control Solutions LLC, a Cupertino, California-based security consulting company."
Apparently the 2003 event was triggered when a power line touched tree branches in Ohio; it ultimately caused losses of as much as $10 billion, according to a study by the U.S. and Canadian governments.
According to Bloomberg that: "Energy companies including utilities would have to increase their investment in computer security more than seven-fold to reach an ideal level of protection."
A Bloomberg survey of network managers at 21 energy companies found that companies spend an average of $45.8 million a year on computer security and are able to prevent 69 percent of known cyber strikes against their systems.
It is quite ominous!
Though in the case of India, external hackers are not required. Undisciplined Electricity Boards will continue to do the job.


India’s Massive Blackout, and the Environmental Danger to Come
Dan Morrison
National Geographic News Correspondent in Water Currents 
July 31, 2012
An estimated 600 million Indians – more people than live in western Europe — were without electricity today, victims of a massive blackout that darkened most of the northern and eastern portions of the country.
The Great Indian Outage, stretching from New Delhi to Kolkata, comes just a day after 300 million people in northern India lost power for much of Monday.
It is a disaster that’s caused untold damage to India’s economy, its prestige, and its well-being – think of the millions of patients in hospitals, the commuters stuck on trains, and farmers in need of irrigation. Hundreds of miners in the states of West Bengal and Jharkand were trapped underground by the blackout. Some 300 trains were reportedly stalled across the country.
There’s more damage to come, I fear: Forces that have been bridling against environmental regulations and science-based activism will use the Great Outage as a cudgel to demolish future restraints on dam construction, coal mining, and other projects.
India’s humiliating power failure is sure to birth a slogan as reductive and wrong as America’s own “Drill Baby Drill.”
The irony is that this outage was likely caused in part by mismanagement at the Bhakra series of hydroelectric dams in Punjab and Himachal Pradesh states in northern India, according to Himanshu Thakkar of the South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers and People.
“Had these dams been operated more rationally, keeping in mind the emerging realities and forecasts, the situation in Northwest India would have been different,” Thakkar told me. “Higher [water] levels in these dams would have meant more power generation for each unit of water release and at the same time more water for agriculture, thus less water [for irrigation] pumped from aquifers, and thus less demand of power.”
Earlier this month, Thakkar’s organization published a short paper criticizing dam administrators for allowing water levels to become alarmingly low.
Thakkar says the answer to India’s current power crisis isn’t more hydroelectric dams, as most currently existing dams aren’t built or operated for maximum efficiency. Instead, power can be saved by harvesting rainwater.
“Since most of our water is coming from groundwater, we need to store the rainfall in aquifers that are fast depleting,” he says. “This would have multiple spin-off benefits.” With healthier aquifers, farmers wouldn’t have to run electric-powered pumps as much to adequately irrigate their crops – a major drag on the power grid.
“More dams won’t help achieve that,” Thakkar says, adding that farmers should shift to less water-intensive crops. “It is amazing that, among all the crops, [acreage devoted to] sugarcane has gone up in this drought year!”
At the Center for Science and the Environment, Chandra Bushan provides some of the hard numbers behind today’s blackout, as well as a simple cause: Indian states are taking more power from the grid than they are supposed to, even as the power system lacks the flexibility to meet seasonal spikes in demand.
In this case, a weak and tardy annual monsoon has millions of households and businesses running their air conditioners for longer than they would under normal conditions. This from the CSE:
Electricity generation for the month of June illustrates this problem:
In June 2012, India produced 8 per cent more electricity than in June 2011.
The generation from thermal power plants was 11.4 per cent higher than in June 2011. Coal-based power plants generated 16.7 per cent more electricity.
However, with low monsoon, the generation of electricity from hydropower plants reduced by 6 per cent compared to June 2011. In fact, hydropower plants produced 19 per cent lesser electricity in April-June, 2012 than the corresponding months in 2011. As hydro plants are also peak load plants, this reduction seems to have affected the peak power generation in the country significantly.
None of this logic – nor the many recent plans and ideas for improving the management and efficiency of India’s power grid – will make a difference to the contractors and bureaucrats in the “Build Baby Build” crowd that has much to gain from poorly-planned dam construction.
The debate over dams has become so silly that earlier this month a minister from the government of Uttarakhand state went on a one-day hunger strike to support more construction on the Himalayan tributaries of the Ganges River. Mantri Prasad Naithani’s constituency is in the region of Tehri Gahrwal, which was submerged a decade ago by the giant Tehri dam. Residents of the doomed town of Tehri were relocated to a “model town” higher up the valley to make room for the $1 billion, 1,000 megawatt hydroelectric dam’s reservoir.
When I visited New Tehri last year, power outages were commonplace.
But it’s brute force, not the rhetorical kind, that truly keeps this movement alive.
On June 22, the Indian environmentalist Bharat Jhunjhunwala was attacked in his home in Uttarakhand state by a gang of 40 thugs purportedly working for a contracting company. At the time of the attack, Jhunjhunwala, 62, had been hosting G.D. Agrawal, an eminent scientist turned swami who is also known as Gyan Swarup Anand. Agrawal was in the region to protest the coming submergence of the Dhari Devi Temple on the Alaknanda river by a hydroelectric project.
In full view of local police and journalists, the crowd kicked in Jhunjhunwalla’s door and blackened his face with ink. He and his wife were forced to flee the area.
“They threatened him that they will burn him alive in the house if he did not stop opposing the dams within two days,” according to an account by Jhunjhunwala’s family.
India’s power grid suffers from inertia on one hand and from destructive greed on the other. It doesn’t suffer from a shortage of dams.

Dam is Money

This article in The Hindustan Times makes it clear that 'dam is money'.
To quote from it: "From 2005 to January 2012, the Arunachal Pradesh government collected Rs 1,333 crore for as many as 199 projects as upfront premium and processing fees." 
Rs 1,333 crores without doing anything, except promises, that is easy money.
But it is  obvious that today the 'promoters' want 'their money back'.
One of the issues which is not often mentioned is the fact that this 'blue' (or 'gold') rush creates an excuse for the Chinese to build more and more dams on the upper reaches of the Brahmaputra in Tibet, the Yarlung Tsangpo. 
They will eventually divert part of the waters of 'their Tibetan' rivers quoting this precedent.
Further, there are the social and cultural implications of building so many dams.
I quote here from a report Damming the Northeast: Juggernaut of hydropower projects threatens social and environmental security of region by Neeraj Vagholikar & Partha J. Das.

With the Northeast identified as India’s ‘future powerhouse’ and at least 168 large hydroelectric projects set to majorly alter the riverscape, large dams are emerging as a major issue of conflict in the region. Although the current scale of dam-related developments far outstrips anything which took place in the past, the region has been no stranger to dam-related conflicts. 
For example, the Kaptai dam, built in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in the 1960s, submerged the traditional homelands of the Hajong and Chakma indigenous communities, and forced them to migrate into parts of Northeast India. Over the years, this has led to serious conflicts between the refugees and local communities in Arunachal Pradesh. 
In the 1970s, the Gumti dam in Tripura submerged large tracts of arable land in the Raima Valley and displaced the local tribal population, leading to unrest. Projects such as the Loktak hydroelectric project commissioned in the 1980s have impacted the wetland ecology of the Loktak lake in Manipur, seriously affecting the habitat of the endangered Sangai (the brow-antlered deer) and the livelihoods of local people. 
The impending loss of home, land and livelihood has led to many years of opposition to the Pagladiya project in Assam and the Tipaimukh project in Manipur on the Barak river. More recent times have seen major conflicts emerge in Assam and Arunachal Pradesh over the individual and cumulative impacts of over 100 dams planned in upstream Arunachal. 
Dam-induced floods from projects such as the 405 MW Ranganadi hydroelectric project in Arunachal and the intense people’s opposition to the under-construction 2,000 MW Lower Subansiri hydroelectric project on the Assam – Arunachal Pradesh border have been major triggers for what has now emerged as a major political debate on the downstream impacts of dams in the region. 
Meanwhile, in the uplands of Sikkim and Arunachal, minority indigenous communites such as the Lepchas and Idu Mishmis have expressed concern about the impacts of multiple mega projects in their homelands. The large dams’ juggernaut promises to be the biggest ‘development’ intervention in this ecologically and geologically fragile, seismically active and culturally sensitive region in the coming days.

Let us hope that better sense will prevail over money power.
But it is not often the case in India or in China.

Arunachal dams: Despite issues, govt collected crores
Hindustan Times
Sanjib Kr Baruah,
New Delhi, April 29, 2012
Even as the mandatory public hearing for the massive 2,700MW Lower Siang hydroelectric project in Arunachal Pradesh was postponed in the face of vociferous protests by local tribes, the Arunachal government seems hell-bent on building the controversial network of 168 dams.
From 2005 to January 2012, the Arunachal Pradesh government collected Rs 1,333 crore for as many as 199 projects as upfront premium and processing fees. The amounts were paid by different private companies engaged in building a controversial network of dams in the hilly state.
It also includes fees paid by PSUs like National Hydroelectric Power Corporation (NHPC) by way of advances to the state government against free power, a RTI query has revealed.
'Upfront Premium' means one time non-refundable commitment fee to be paid by the intending power developer which is not part of the project cost.
The network of 168 dams aiming at generation of more than 63,300 MW of power, is reported to being built in brazen disregard for environmental, seismic, socio-economic and cultural issues. In seismic terms, Arunachal Pradesh lies in the Very High Damage Risk Zone, having seen 87 major and minor quakes in 67 years (1929 -1993).
More than 160 memorandums of understanding (MoU) and memorandums of agreement (MoA) have been signed between the Arunachal government and the dam builders.
A clause in one the bipartite MoU copies that is with HT, absolves the dam builders of any responsibility .
The state government is also absolved of all responsibility and accountability in a clause notified in a 2008 Arunachal government gazette.
“The State Government shall not be responsible in any manner for any losses arising out of the force majeure situation such as earthquake, flood, fire, external invasion, civil commotion; landslide etc and no claim on such accounts by the developers shall be entertained by the State Government,” the notification says.

Feverish dam building

Probe International has published an interesting report about the seismicity of Western China (Tibetan areas administered by Sichuan and Yunnan provinces).
The report says: "98.6% of the dams being constructed in western China are located in moderate to very high seismic hazard zones. The Zipingpu Dam, for example, which is now thought to have triggered the magnitude 7.9 Sichuan earthquake in 2008 that killed an estimated 80,000 people, was built in a moderate seismic zone."
Unfortunately, the study stops north of the McMahon line.
As one can see on the map, the entire area of Nyingtri district, is printed in red (very high to high seismic hazard).
Does the seismic risk stop at the border?
While the Government of India, (along with the State governments of the North East) is planning to built dams with a capacity of some 70 gigawatts in the region, nobody seems to have taken  this 'detail' into account.
In February 2010, an Inter-ministerial Group (IMG) presented a report to the Government of India and though the environment impact was discussed, nothing was said about the seismic danger.
In a chapter on Major Issues in Hydro Development in North East Region, the report mentions the "Environment and Forest Clearances":

Forest conservation Act 1980 requires that compensatory afforestation should be done in non-forest area equivalent to the area of forest diverted for non-forest use.

Government of Arunachal Pradesh (GoAP) represented that this provision posed a big constraint as state already has 81% of its area covered by forest and availability of non-forest land for afforestation is a problem. GoAP therefore suggested for providing some special dispensation under Forest Conservation Act regarding compensatory afforestation. MoEF [Ministry of Environment and Forests] informed that Forest Conservation Act, 1980 provides that if non-forest land is not. available for compensatory afforestation, the compensatory afforestation may be curried in double .the area of degraded forest. As per information provided by the MoEF, the state of Arunachal Pradesh has degraded forest area of 15 lacs hectares (as per State of India's Forest Report 2(09) which can be used for compensatory afforestation. The State Government has identified only 12,800 hectares of degraded forest in 11 forest divisions. Remaining degraded forest land will be identified by the State Government by 31.07.2010. The State Government of Arunachal Pradesh has indicated that the area of degraded forest as reported by MoEF seem to be on higher side and requires validation. The State Forest Department may therefore reconcile the degraded forest area. If non-forest lands degraded forest land is available in the state, compensatory afforestation should be. done in the state itself and only if land is not available in the state, the possibility of arranging such land in other states in NER may be explored and if that is also not available possibility of compensatory afforestation In other states such as Rajasthan may be explored. The Central Electricity Authority (CEA) has estimated an area of 19,882 hectares of forestland required to be diverted for non-forest use in respect of 18 out of 39 projects with capacity of 100 MW or more capacity in Arunachal Pradesh. Details are at Annexure-III.

Other NE States did not raise the issue of compensatory afforestation constraint in hydro power development. All the States will however prepare an inventory of available non-forest and degradable forest land which may be offered for compensatory afforestation. IMG decided that the States may complete this exercise by 31st July, 2010.
The state level environment clearance and forest clearance take a long time resulting in delay in implementation of projects. It was agreed that the State Governments shall facilitate environment and forest clearances of projects at state level.
In order to speed up the process, a Single Window Clearance Mechanism under Chief Secretary of the State may be constituted. The Committee will also monitor and expedite other issues pending with the State government. A time schedule for various steps involved in these clearances at the state level may be firmed up and implemented.
MoEF stated that in view of uniqueness of the fragility of eco- systems in the NER, due importance needs to be given to environment and forests concerns while planning the hydro power projects. It was suggested that Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) studies may be taken basin-wise in place of individual project to know the downstream impact on development of projects in cascading manner and minimum release required to maintain aquatic life downstream. This will also expedite environment clearance of projects. MoEF has already awarded such study for Lohit basin to WAPCOS (I) Ltd. It was decided by IMG that for Siang and Subansiri basin, CWC [Central Water Commission] will get the EIA [Environment Impact Assessment] studies conducted in consultation with CEA and MoEF. Studies in other basins may also be taken up subsequently by ewe. The finalized ToR for above EIA study will be given by MoEF to ewe. However, MoEF will not hold up the Environment clearance of individual projects presently under process for want of basin wise study.

The feverish dam building could certainly also trigger a tsunami in India, but it does not seem to be the concern of the Government, too much money is involved!!

Feverish Chinese dam building could trigger tsunami
Probe International
April 4, 2012

A new report finds more than 130 large dams being built in western China could trigger disaster — earthquakes, even tsunamis — due to their construction in seismic hazard zones.
More than 130 large dams that China is building in its western region, an area of high seismicity, are vulnerable to earthquakes or could induce earthquakes, according to a new report released by the Canadian-based environmental group Probe International. In a worst-case scenario, dams could collapse creating a tsunami that would wipe out everything in its path, including downstream dams, and cause untold loss of life and property.
To pierce the Chinese government’s secrecy over its dam-building, the Probe report overlays a Chinese map of dam locations with US Geological Survey earthquake data and a United Nations’ seismic hazard map. Probe also used Google Earth satellite images to confirm the state of completion of about one-half of the dams.
According to the report, 98.6% of the dams being constructed in western China are located in moderate to very high seismic hazard zones. The Zipingpu Dam, for example, which is now thought to have triggered the magnitude 7.9 Sichuan earthquake in 2008 that killed an estimated 80,000 people, was built in a moderate seismic zone. The force of that quake cracked the dam and shook it so severely that it sank one metre and moved 60 centimetres downstream.
The location of large dams near clusters of recorded earthquakes with magnitudes greater than 4.9, and especially when the earthquake focal points are also close to the surface, "is cause for grave concern," said John Jackson, a geologist and the report’s author.
Earthquakes over M4.9 have been known to damage dams and other structures. Shallow earthquakes (less than 10 km deep) indicate active faults that could be reactivated by routine practices, such as the filling of a reservoir to accommodate flood waters and its drawdown to generate power, he says.
"In addition to the hazard of high natural seismicity in western China, reservoir-induced seismicity is likely to increase the frequency and perhaps the magnitude of earthquakes in this area," he warns.
Western China is known to be a large regional stress field because of the rapid — geologically speaking — northward motion of the Indian subcontinent into western China. This "continental collision" has, for example, lifted seafloor sediments to the top of Mt. Everest and created the Tibetan Plateau. Since detailed recordkeeping began in 1973, nine earthquakes with a magnitude of 4.9 or greater have occurred in western China each year, on average.
Especially worrying in this environment, said Mr. Jackson, is the cascade-like positioning of the dams which follow one another so closely there is no terrain between them for energy to dissipate in the event of catastrophic dam failure.
"If one dam fails, the full force of its ensuing tsunami will be transmitted to the next dam downstream, and so on, potentially creating a deadly domino effect of collapsing dams," he says.
China is the world’s largest hydropower producer with some 87,000 dams and reservoirs (about one-third are hydrodams), of which nearly half are considered to be dangerous and at risk of collapse.
In the interest of public safety and a sound power sector, the Probe International report urges the Chinese government to disclose the details of its current slate of dam construction, and to ensure that a thorough and independent regional seismic risk assessment is done without delay and publicly disclosed.
Chinese citizens are becoming increasingly vociferous in their outrage over lives risked, and lost, to shoddy standards, most recently in the country’s food and high-speed rail industry. Should a dam suffer catastrophic dam collapse, says Patricia Adams, Executive Director of Probe International, that anger would spill over to the hydropower industry for threatening ordinary citizens’ lives with dangerous dams.
John Jackson is a pseudonym for a geologist with detailed knowledge of western China who must remain anonymous.