Diverting the Indus ... or the Yarlung Tsangpo to Xinjiang

In January 2015, I wrote on this blog about the proposal of diverting the Indus towards Xinjiang.
Nobody took it seriously.
Now a new proposal has emerged: to divert the Yarlung Tsangpo to Xinjiang.
According to The Global Times: “Scholars mull project to divert water from Tibet to arid Xinjiang”.
The Party's newspaper adds: “Policy-makers have left plan stranded citing unfeasibility”.
The tabloid explains: “Around 20 scholars met outside Urumqi in Northwest China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region over the last weekend of July, and discussed the feasibility of diverting water from the heights of the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau to Xinjiang's lowland plains, one of the attendees revealed.”
Ren Qunluo, professor at the Xinjiang University of Finance and Economics is quoted as saying: “Water from rivers such as the Yarlung Zangbo River can help turn the vast deserts and arid lands into oasis and farmlands, alleviate population pressure in the east, as well as reduce flood risks in the counties through which the river travels downstream,"
Ren told The Global Times: “Xinjiang has 1.1 million square kilometers of plains, equal in size to all the plains in the country's east. But less than 70,000 square kilometers are arable due to a shortage of water. If all these plains are greened, another China will have been created."
The same old story.
China is obsessed with these diversion schemes (and it conveniently comes at a time of the confrontation with India at the trijunction Bhutan-Tibet-Sikkim).
Incidentally, the Indian journalists 'invited' by the Ministry if Foreign Affairs in Beijing should have asked more details about the new scheme.
The mouthpiece of the Party continues: “”The dream of massive water diversions from soaking-wet Southwest China to the thirsty north has been on the minds of engineers and scholars for decades. But some say this dream could be a nightmare of environmental damage, and these concerns mean the plateau-to-plain project has never been approved.”
India and Bangladesh are not mentioned in the scheme.
The Global Times makes three points.

• Experts want the government to reconsider diverting water from Tibet to parched northern regions
• They claim the project will help stimulate the world economy and create a "second China" in the region's arid plains
• Disagreements remain strong due to the huge cost and possible environmental damage

However the report says: "[The] pro-diversion experts are now trying to rally support for the idea."
Information Warfare is going on...  full swing.

Here is my old post of January 2015.

On Christmas Day, The New York Times reported: “Within a few days, water that has traveled more than 800 miles for two weeks in one of the world’s most ambitious, and controversial, engineering projects is expected to begin flowing through Beijing faucets.”
The objective of the scheme is to bring water from upper reaches of the Han River, a tributary of the Yangtze, through the central route of the South-to-North Water Diversion project, the second of three routes planned to transfer water from China’s wet south to the dry north. Once fully functional, the Central Diversion is expected to provide a third of the capital’s water needs.
The project is estimated at 80 billion U.S. dollars, says Xinhua, adding: “The completion of the water scheme marked major progress in the nation's enormous south-to-north water diversion project, the largest of its kind in the world.”
The official news agency boasts: “It is another engineering achievement by the Chinese,” quoting the Beijing-Hangzhou Grand Canal, the world's longest man-made river, opened in the 13th century for transporting grain.
The pro and the cons of the present project will continue to be debated in the months and years to come; in the meanwhile, some researchers in China have thought of another smaller ‘pilot’ project: to divert the Indus river towards Xinjiang. A detailed report on the scheme is posted by a blogger on the website ScienceNet.cn.
Beijing will argue that this new project is merely the product of the fertile brain of some freelance scientists, and that it has ‘nothing to do with the government’.

You may ask, what is this ScienceNet.cn? According to Wikipedia: “ScienceNet.cn is a science virtual community and science blog,” launched by Science Times Media Group (STMG) and supported by the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the Chinese Academy of Engineering, and the National Natural Science Foundation of China “with the mission of establishing a global Chinese science community.”

Since January 2007, more than 5,000 scientists and graduate students have posted their papers on ScienceNet. The editorial board of ScienceNet says that it has been ranking first among Chinese science websites.
The blogger quotes Chinese researchers who argue that the other planned 'diversions' require extremely complicated construction plans, large investments, long building periods and face a lot of engineering problems due to the complexity of the issues involved (I would add, and 'displacing millions of people'). It makes these projects difficult to undertake, while a small-scale, with low investment and a quickly realizable scheme, could be an ideal pilot project.
The ‘researchers’ propose to add a South Western segment to the Western Diversion Route (not yet started), which is the third part of the South-to-North Water Diversion project. It would involve the diversion of the waters from the Indus river in Western Tibet (before it enters Ladakh) towards the Tarim Basin in Xinjiang. According to the authors, the scheme would meet the requirements of a ‘pilot’ scheme.
In a summary, the ‘scientists’ explain that the water diversion project referred to in their paper could be called “the South Western section of Western Route Project”; water could be taken from the Tibetan Plateau in the West and brought by gravity to the Tarim Basin in Xinjiang. The text describes the preliminary survey of the South Western part of the Western Route Project. The size of the diversion program and a brief description of China’s northwest after the transfer of the Indus’ water, are given. The main conclusion is that the diversion will help maintaining long-term stability in Xinjiang. The paper explains why and suggests deepening the research before an early implementation of the South Western section.
According to the ‘researchers’, the diversion of the Indus could bring ten benefits to China:

• It could increase the total amount of water resources in the Tarim Basin, which is located in the hinterland of Taklimakan Desert and suffers from important sand dune mobility. In this highly arid region, which receives low precipitations, water is extremely valuable
• The diversion could increase the local hydropower capacity. Water would flow from the high Qinghai-Tibet plateau, at an elevation of over 3,000 [in fact 4,000] meters and at the receiving end, water would be at only 1,500 meters above sea level.
• Once this section is completed, the water could create an oasis in the desert. The Western section would transform an entire region into an oasis; it would further bring a great return on the investment.
• Once the project is fully implemented, the total amount of water resources locally available could greatly increase; it could provide a substantial increase in the amount of hydroelectric power; the desert could become an oasis, it could improve the ecological environment, which in turn could promote local economic development of the region and the living standards of the local people.
• According to some scientific hypotheses, the water brought by the diversion could also increase precipitations in the region.
• The research says that the new oasis could in turn ‘curb global warming’ [sic]. If the global warming argument is indeed correct, say the ‘scientists’, the South Western section could increase the rainfall in China; this countermeasure could help curb global warming for the entire humanity; this is why the diversion project must be able to get the global support and backing of most countries [what about India?]. China can then get a substantial increase in the local precipitation; the desert in northwest [Xinjiang] would disappear; the desert would become an oasis which would be able to grow food and have power plants; humans would be able to reduce the need for fossil fuels; after additional diversion oasis would absorb large amounts of greenhouse gases each year, thus it would achieve the goal of curbing global warming.

What an argument! But that is not all:

• It could contribute to China’s food and energy security. After the diversion, the desert turned-oasis could increase the country's arable land for China to contribute to the world food security.
• The western development could make a significant contribution by reducing regional disparities. China's population distribution is unbalanced; the development gap between China and western regions and other regions is too large; it has been extremely detrimental to the country's development.

And now the cherry on the cake:

• The diversion could strengthen China's actual control of Aksai Chin, and help to resolve the territorial dispute. Sino-Indian border has not been formally delimited in the Aksai Chin and Pangong Lake areas; there are some territorial disputes [with India]. The water diversion project, through Aksai Chin, could help the actual control of this region; the implementation of the project could also help to resolve the territorial dispute [with India].
• Finally, the project could promote national unity and maintain long-term stability of Xinjiang. This, according to the authors, is the main benefit of the South Western section: the long-term stability of Xinjiang.

This ‘easy’ pilot project does not, of course, take into account what the neighbours (including China’s all-weather friend, Pakistan) would have to say.
That may not make the pilot project so simple after all!
The question is, while Beijing is very quick to remove internet content which contests its rule, why is such a crazy and highly objectionable project allowed to be posted on a semi-governmental website?
Similarly, the website of the Yellow River Conservancy Commission of China’s Ministry of Water Resources has a 50-page report on the diversion of the Brahmaputra, and though Beijing denies any bad intention, the project remains on the ‘official’ website.
How can we trust China?

Some of my previous posts on the subject

• Why China needs to divert the Brahmaputra
• The Diversion of the Brahmaputra on the cards again (2013)
• Again diverting the Brahmaputra (2013)
• The 'feasibility' of diverting the Brahmaputra (2014)
• The mad diversion plan

India's Strategic Policy towards China

The recent report, Non-Alignment 2.0: a Foreign and Strategic policy for India in the 21st Century, prepared by a group of eminent Indian strategic thinkers is quite remarkably in many ways.
First, the release of the Report in Delhi was attended by the National Security Advisor and two of his predecessors (MK Narayanan and Brajesh Mishra).
This speaks a great deal about the quality of the analysis. 
Then, it deals extensively and seriously about Chinese threats and the border issue (we will come back on this in a future posting).
The strategists write: “China will, for the foreseeable future, remain a significant foreign policy and security challenge for India. It is the one major power which impinges directly on India’s geopolitical space”.
One of the most important conclusions (which should have been reached 60 years ago, at least before signing the infamous Panchsheel Agreement in 1954) is that the Dalai Lama and Tibetans can be obstacle, but also a bridge for smoother bilateral relations between India and China; therefore it is good for India, for China and for Tibet, if Delhi plays a mediatory role to help sort out the Tibetan issuue. The Report says:

Persuading China to seek reconciliation with the Dalai Lama and the exiled Tibetan community may contribute to easing India-China tensions. The initial soundings must be discreet and exploratory. And we must be mindful of the risk of hostile reaction, particularly from conservative sections of the People’s Liberation Army. The situation vis-à-vis Tibet has been complicated by the transition to a democratically elected Tibetan government-in-exile. The Chinese had, in part, expected that the Tibetan community would continue with its traditional method of selecting the Dalai Lama—a method that was amenable to manipulation by China. The Dalai Lama’s popular legitimacy among his own people is a fact that the Chinese government must acknowledge.

It is the first time that I read about this issue so clearly articulated.
Let us hope that the new Chinese leadership to be selected in October/November will understand this.
A small critic: the report fails to mention the water issue as one of the most serious threats to India’s security, the authors should have kept in mind the asymmetric constant ‘water’ menace. It could have far serious implications than a local border skirmish.
While admitting that their previsions “takes into account both the superiority of current Chinese deployments and posture on the land boundary, and the unlikelihood of the border issue being resolved in the near future”, the use of water as a weapon is not mentioned, though it is likely to be used in case of conflict or serious tensions.
However, the Report rightly says “on the political side, our posture towards China must be carefully nuanced and constantly calibrated in response to changing global and regional developments. China’s threat perception vis-à-vis India has both a local and a global dimension. The local dimension involves Tibet. Our Tibet policy needs to be reassessed and readjusted.”
Readjustments should translate into a greater autonomy for the Tibetan plateau and a bilateral agreement on the water issue.

Extracts of:
Non-Alignment 2.0: a Foreign and Strategic policy for India in the 21st Century

29. China will, for the foreseeable future, remain a significant foreign policy and security challenge for India. It is the one major power which impinges directly on India’s geopolitical space. As its economic and military capabilities expand, its power differential with India is likely to widen.

30. As is well known, India and China have long-standing disagreements on an agreeable border. Skirmishes and incidents have occurred across the Line of Actual Control. Our strategy should be to 'hold the line' in the north on the Sino-Indian land frontier, but maintain and, if possible, enlarge India’s current edge in the maritime south. This strategy takes into account both the superiority of current Chinese deployments and posture on the land boundary, and the unlikelihood of the border issue being resolved in the near future.

31. Given that China has managed to settle many of its border issues (at least for the time being) with other, smaller neighbours, the dispute on the Indian border stands out quite prominently. It is significant that on his last visit to India, Chinese Premier, Wen Jiabao, stated that it would take a long time to settle the boundary issue. This is a departure from the earlier position that the mechanism of Special Representatives could try to achieve a political settlement of the issue, taking advantage of the fact that relations between the two countries had now acquired a strategic and global dimension—which made the early settlement of the border issue, both possible and necessary. This has evidently changed. It is important that we accelerate the upgradation of our border infrastructure (especially in terms of habitation and supply lines) to reduce the asymmetry in our capabilities and deployments. At the same time we must put in place operational concepts and capabilities to deter any significant incursions from the Chinese side (these are dealt with in the Chapter Three).

32. Currently India has the edge in terms of maritime capabilities but China is catching up rapidly. China’s current focus is on acquiring dominance in the Yellow Sea, the Taiwan Straits, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea. The Indian Ocean falls second in the present order of priority. It is in our interest that China remains preoccupied with its first-tier, more immediate maritime theatre. The retention of strong U.S. maritime deployments in the Asia-Pacific theatre, a more proactive and assertive Japanese naval force projection, and a build-up of the naval capabilities of such key littoral states as Indonesia, Australia and Vietnam: all may help delay, if not deter, the projection of Chinese naval power in the Indian Ocean. We need to use this window of opportunity to build up our own naval capabilities. Our regional diplomacy should support this include a network of security cooperation agreements with these states and regular naval exercises with them.

33. On the political side, our posture towards China must be carefully nuanced and constantly calibrated in response to changing global and regional developments. China’s threat perception vis-à-vis India has both a local and a global dimension. The local dimension involves Tibet. Our Tibet policy needs to be reassessed and readjusted.
Persuading China to seek reconciliation with the Dalai Lama and the exiled Tibetan community may contribute to easing India-China tensions. The initial soundings must be discreet and exploratory. And we must be mindful of the risk of hostile reaction, particularly from conservative sections of the People’s Liberation Army. The situation vis-à-vis Tibet has been complicated by the transition to a democratically elected Tibetan government-in-exile. The Chinese had, in part, expected that the Tibetan community would continue with its traditional method of selecting the Dalai Lama—a method that was amenable to manipulation by China. The Dalai Lama’s popular legitimacy among his own people is a fact that the Chinese government must acknowledge.

34. On the global canvas, China looks upon India not as a threat in itself, but as a ‘swing state’ whose association with potential adversaries could constrain China. The challenge for Indian diplomacy will be to develop a diversified network of relations with several major powers to compel China to exercise restraint in its dealings with India, while simultaneously avoiding relationships that go beyond conveying a certain threat threshold in Chinese perceptions. This will require a particularly nuanced handling and coordination of our foreign policy, both through diplomatic and military channels. If China perceives India as irrevocably committed to an anti-China containment ring, it may end up adopting overtly hostile and negative policies towards India, rather than making an effort to keep India on a more independent path.

35. India-China economic relations also present a complex and somewhat ambiguous picture. Bilateral trade is rising rapidly but asymmetrically, with a growing trade surplus in favour of China. We could respond by trying to limit Chinese penetration of our market, particularly our infrastructure market. Or, we could allow access but with various conditions that safeguard and promote Indian interests in other areas. Given the fact that India’s infrastructure market is likely to be in the region of a trillion dollars in the next few years, China would obviously have a keen interest in expanding access to it. We should see this Chinese economic interest as a point of leverage for trade-offs favourable to us in other sectors, including political concessions in areas of interest to India.

36. One of the big concerns in our economic relations is the involvement of China’s state-owned enterprises. Chinese banks are often able to offer preferential financing to Chinese companies because of their scale and because they are not driven solely by market forces. Many of China’s premier manufacturing firms are also state-run, and thus have access to such financing. This means that when Chinese companies participate in competitive bidding for open tenders, they may actually have a big advantage over other bidders, which allows them to place stronger (lower) bids. However, such preferential financing could also be a useful asset in terms of the volume of infrastructure financing we need so there are multiple questions to be considered here. How India should systematically respond to such issues is an important, open question. There is the additional problem of the potential for espionage and intelligence gathering through software means, which was evidenced by the banning of import of Chinese telecom equipment.

37. Given the asymmetry in the economic and trade relationship, we should not overestimate our bargaining power. It may be more realistic to link large orders to economic and trade concessions, including fixed investments in India-based facilities. It is also reasonable to expect that growing economic interdependence might help make the political relationship more manageable and less subject to oscillations.

38. The growing trade surplus between India and China has been a cause for concern owing both to its degree and composition. Not only is the degree of dependence of Indian industries on Chinese imports on the rise. But India’s main exports seem to be natural resources, whereas its imports are largely higher end manufactured goods. Given India’s large services sector, it should be pushing for greater market access and presence in China to correct this imbalance.

39. One area where India may be able to bargain effectively with China is the domain of technology transfer. The ability to leverage access to our markets in order to secure access to sophisticated technology, and so develop domestic capacity is something India has not been able to do as effectively as it needs to, especially with developed countries.
For example, when an airline company like Indigo signs a $16 billion deal with Airbus, technology transfer should be a part of the terms of negotiation. Even India’s defence offsets have been quite disappointing in terms of technology transfer, with only the lowest value addition activities being sourced domestically.

40. China has managed to do this quite well, mainly because the government is able to coordinate the actions of various companies (many of which are state-owned), while India does not have this luxury. It may in fact be easier to negotiate technology transfer deals with China than other developed countries, which are intensely possessive about their intellectual property. Huawei, a telecom company from China, has recently agreed to set up a research facility in Bangalore to ensure that none of its imported devices contain any kind of covert listening technologies.

41. India’s China strategy has to strike a careful balance between cooperation and competition, economic and political interests, bilateral and regional contexts. Given the current and future asymmetries in capabilities and influence between India and China, it is imperative that we get this balance right. This is perhaps the single most important challenge for Indian strategy in the years ahead.

An International Conference on Asian Rivers

A great International Conference on River Waters Perspectives and Challenges for India was held in Delhi between November 18 and 20 at the India International Center in New Delhi. 
It was organized by the Foundation for Non-violent Alternatives (FNVA).
Nobody can today doubt that 'Water' will be the next source of conflict within Nation-States or between neighouring States.
The Conference was convened to offer a common platform for countries in the region, upper riparians, middle riparians and lower riparians, to draw up a sustained plan of action to withstand the potentially disastrous effects of the impending water crisis on the basis of fair equitable utilisation of river waters originating from the Third Pole.
I said that the Conference was 'great' because for the first time, scientists/experts from Australia, Bangladesh, Central Asia, China, Finland, France, India, Mekong Region, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Sweden and the UK sat together and tried to find solutions to this sensitive issue, with main objective to establish a transparent dialogue and cooperation amongst Asian States.
It was a good beginning.
At the end of the conference the following Declaration was made:

We recognise the right of the growing economies of the region to develop energy, resources and water for their development needs. However, in view of the unquantified risks – climate change, economic uncertainty and social and ecological damage, we call for a pause to reflect on further construction of large dams until all parties take full account of the balance of ecological, economic and human impacts along the entire length of the watercourse and prioritise the rights and interests of all riparian peoples in present and future projects.
The waters of the Third Pole, its glaciers and snow, its rivers and lakes, have importance and impacts, including far downstream, and thus constitute a common heritage of importance to all humanity. Their stewardship is a shared responsibility and the benefits they bring are a right held in common by all the inhabitants of the region, from the Qinghai-Tibet plateau to the estuaries, for present and future generations of the peoples of its watersheds.
Today the waters and cryosphere of the Himalayan and Trans-Himalayan Region are threatened by over-extraction, overambitious engineering, pollution and climate change. This in turn poses a threat to the stability of the region’s weather systems and the health and livelihoods of the more than one billion people who depend on its rivers, and to the survival of the many other forms of life they support. Historic tensions and regional rivalries have impeded the full cooperation and creative thinking that is required to prevent further deterioration in the Third Pole. We urge all countries, especially the largest riparians India and China, to lead the effort, in cooperation with all the governments of the region, to institute the wide ranging and urgent collaboration that responsible stewardship and the restoration of the health of the region’s transboundary rivers now demands.
We respectfully propose to all riparian governments, scholars, experts and non-governmental organisations the following urgent steps:

• To pledge to respect and protect the region’s rich natural resources, ecological and cultural diversity   and to give priority to the equitable sharing of the environmental, social and economic benefits of the region’s transboundary rivers
• To adopt a holistic, cooperative and multilevel approach to the management of transboundary rivers, taking the health and flow of the river as the prime value. 
• To institute and support confidence building exchanges across national boundaries, between upper and lower riparians and across all relevant sectors of society in pursuit of mutually beneficial development and resource stewardship, to include official, scientific, technological and civil society exchanges. 
• To institute immediate cooperation on flood forecasting, water and soil conservation and the sharing of relevant scientific and technical data including the establishment of a cross border integrated digital platform for the Yarlung-Tsangpo/Brahmaputra basin
• To establish and develop a regional knowledge base, to include traditional, cultural, technical and scientific knowledge, open to all 
• That all governments pledge to cooperate over development planning, promote transparency and to carry out full river assessments of all engineering projects
• To establish a regional communities forum to give expression to community interests, value to local and indigenous knowledge, and to safeguard the rights of vulnerable peoples and disadvantaged communities

Program

Inaugural Session
Welcome Remarks by the Chair — Justice J.S. Verma, Patron FNVA, Former Chief Justice of India
Isabel Hilton, Editor, China Dialogue
Dr. L.M.S. Palni, Director, G.B. Pant Institute of Himalayan Environment and Development
Inaugural Address — Dr. Ashok Chauhan, Founder Amity Universities and Chairman AKC Group

Session I- Significance of The Third Pole
Chair — Ambassador Ranjit Gupta

Climate Change and Security at the Third Pole
Dr. Katherine Morton, Senior Fellow, Department of International Relations, School of International, Political and Strategic Studies College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University

Grassland Degradation and Summer Monsoon
Gabriel Lafitte, Independent Researcher, Asian Anthropology and History

Atmosphere and Water Quality over the Tibetan Plateau
Dr Shichang Kang, Institute of Tibetan Plateau Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences

Significance of the Tibetan Plateau
Tenzin Norbu, Environment Desk, DIIR, Central Tibetan Administration, Dharamsala.

Knowledge Gaps for a Comprehensive Water Science and Policy for Monsoon-fed Himalayan Rivers
Prof. Jayanta Bandyopadhyay, Professor and Head Centre for Development and Environment Policy Indian Institute of Management, Calcutta

Water and Security
Claude Arpi, Writer and author on India, China, Tibet and Indo-French Relations

Water perspectives – India
Chair — Mr. Ramaswamy Iyer, Former Secretary, Water Resource Ministry, Government of India

New Technologies to Solve the Present Water Resources Problems – Sutluj Case
Prof. A.K. Gosain, Professor & Head, Department of Civil Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Delhi

Cusec Deadlock: The Indus and Hydro-politics in a Fault Zone
Dr. Rohan D’Souza, Assistant Professor Centre for Studies in Science Policy School of Social Sciences Jawaharlal Nehru University

Geo-environmental Context of the Brahmaputra River basin and its Implications for Water Resources Planning
Dr. Dulal C. Goswami, Professor (Retd.), Guwahati University, Assam

Wrong Climate for Big Dams
Samir Mehta, South Asia Programme Director, International Rivers

Session II Water Perspectives – India
Chair — Mr. Ramaswamy Iyer

Dams and Environmental Governance in Northeast India
Neeraj Vagholikar, Kalpavriksh — Environment Action Group

Climate Change Impact on the Indo-Tibetan Brahmaputra basin — Trends, Precursors and Response Needs
Professor Chandan Mahanta, Department of Civil Engineering Indian Institute of Technology, Guwahati

Community based Management of Water Resources in the Himalayan Watersheds
Sejuti Basu, Pragya


Session III: Water Perspectives— China
Chair - Mr. Dipak Gyawali, Former Minister for Water Resources Nepal, Pragya (Academician), Nepal Academy of Science and Technology

Water Warriors Hydropower Politics in China
Dr. Andrew Mertha, (via Skype), Associate Professor and Director of Undergraduate Studies, Dept. of Government, Cornell University

Water Resources Distribution Patterns in the Himalayan Regions
Prof Jia Shaofeng, Chair, Water and Land Resources Research Department, Chinese Academy of Sciences

Yarlung-Tsangpo/Brahmaputra: From Resource-Capture to Cooperation
Jesper Svensson, Masters Student, Gothenburg University, Gothenburg

China’s River Protection vs Hydro Interests
Yu Xiagion, Director, Green Watershed, Kunming, China

Sino-Indian Relations: Fragile but Sustainable
Prof Zhao Gancheng, Director, Institute of International Strategic Studies, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies

Session IV: Technical Presentations
Chair — Prof Shaofeng Jia, Chinese Academy of Sciences

Gangotri Glacier – an overview
V.K.Raina, Ex. Deputy Director General Geological Survey of India

Water Quality of the Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra)
Prof. Dr. Mika Sillanpää, Professor, Head of the Laboratory at Lappeenranta University of Technology Finland

International Rivers of Western Himalayas – Hydrological Prospects and Areas of Concern
Dr. R.D. Singh, Director, National Institute of Hydrology

Climate Change Scenario in North-western Himalayas and its Influence on Hydrological Regime of River Basins
Dr. Mahendra Bhutiyani, Scientist, Snow and Avalanche Study Establishment (SASE)

SESSION V: Perspectives from Asia
Chair – Dr. Katherine Morton

BANGLADESH
State of Water Pollution and Bioassessment to Evaluate the Ecological Status of Rivers in the Hindu Kush-Himalayan Region
M. Fazlul Bari, Ph.D., Professor, Dept of Water Resources Engineering, Bangladesh University of Engineering & Tech (BUET)

BURMA
Save Burma’s Rivers
Ah Nan, Burma Rivers Network

Environmental Performance Assessment on Water Resource
Win Myo Thu, MD and Founder, ECODEV, Rangoon

CENTRAL ASIA
Conflicts over Water in Central Asia, Complexity of Managing an International River
Eelke Kraak, PhD candidate School of Geography and the Environment, University of Oxford

MEKONG REGION
Mekong Region and the Major Challenges of the River that Feeds Millions
Premrudree Daoroung, Co-Director, TERRA

Contested Waterscapes: Regional Cooperation in the Mekong Region
Kate Lazarus, M-POWER
Challenge Program on Water and Food

NEPAL
Clumsy River Handling
Dr. Dipak Gywali, Former Minister for Water Resources Nepal, Pragya (Academician), Academy of Science and Technology

NEPAL
Trans-boundary Water Processes:  Interfacing Micro and the Macro
Dr. Ajaya Dixit, Institution for Social and Environmental Transition-Nepal

PAKISTAN
Climate Change & Sustainable Management of Indus Basin: Pakistan Perspective
Dr. Shaheen Akhtar, Senior Research Fellow Institute of Regional Studies Islamabad

SESSION VI: The Way Forward
Chair– Ambassador Ranjit Gupta

Common Natural Heritage for Common Advantage
Hari Jaisingh, Author and Journalist

The Role and Relevance of the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention
Dr Alistair Rieu-Clarke, Senior Lecturer in International Law and heads the International Water Law Research Cluster at the Dundee IHP-HELP Centre.

India-China Water Dialogue
Nimmi Kurien, Professor, Centre for Policy Research

River Basin Management: Building Knowledge for Change
Sanjay Gupta, Senior Communications Specialist, South Asia Water Initiative, (SAWI), the World Bank

Waters of Hope: Health Innovations and interventions in tge Brahmaputra – Assam
Sanjoy Hazarika, Director, Centre for North-East Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia

Shared Water Ressources

Ms. Dai Qingli, the Press Counsellor in the Chinese Embassy in London wrote to The Financial Time to object to an article by Brahma Chellaney (“Water is the new weapon in Beijing’s armoury”) published in the same newspaper.
She wrote: "Even though the 1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses has not come into effect, China has followed its principles of equitable and reasonable utilization." 
Well, it is not really true.
Let us remember some facts. 
On 27 May, 1997, the General Assembly adopted a Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses aimed at guiding States in negotiating agreements on specific watercourses and invited States and regional economic integration organizations to become parties to it. 
The Assembly took that action through its adoption, by 103 votes in favour to 3 against (Turkey, China, Burundi) with 27 abstentions.
China is one of the three nations which voted against the 37-article Watercourses Convention which will hopefully one day govern the non-navigational uses of international rivers.
The Convention addresses issues such as flood control, water quality, erosion, sedimentation, saltwater intrusion and living resources. 
Several statements were made by the representatives of Japan, Mexico, the United Republic of Tanzania, Turkey, Bolivia, Pakistan, Czech Republic, China, Slovakia, France, India, Ethiopia, Egypt, Israel, Spain and Rwanda.
The draft framework convention was elaborated by the Working Group of the Sixth Committee at its second session, from 24 March to 4 April. It provides general principles and rules to guide States in negotiating future agreements on specific watercourses. 
The six-part convention consists of an introduction; general principles; planned measures; protection, preservation and management; harmful conditions and emergency situations and miscellaneous provisions.
The Chinese Representative Gao Feng justified the negative vote of his country by stating: "there were obvious drawbacks in the draft convention. First, it failed to reflect general agreement among all countries, and a number of States had major reservations regarding its main provisions. Secondly, the text did not reflect the principle of the territorial sovereignty of a watercourse State. Such a State had indisputable sovereignty over a watercourse which flowed through its territory. There was also an imbalance between the rights and obligations of the upstream and downstream States".
He further said China could not support provisions on the mandatory settlement of disputes which went against the principles set out in the United Nations Charter. His Government favoured the settlement of all disputes through peaceful negotiations".
He then voted against the draft resolution.
For China, the principle of 'territorial sovereignty' seemed to prime over the concept that rivers belong to all the riparian States. 
Prakash Shah, the Indian Representative spoke more on techincial grounds, expressing his regret that the Convention had not been adopted by consensus. He said that: "while a framework convention should provide general principles, the present Convention had deviated from that approach."
Further Shah pointed out said that "Article 32 presupposed regional integration and hence did not merit inclusion". 
He went on to say and Article 33, on dispute settlement, contained an element of compulsion: "Any procedure for peaceful settlement of disputes should leave the procedure to the parties. Any mandatory third-party dispute procedure was inappropriate and should not be included in a framework convention". 
In 1997, India abstained in the voting. 
It is perhaps time to have a fresh look at the Convention and push for its final ratification. 
With climate change and extensive construction of hydropower plants on rivers originating from the Tibetan plateau, some framework to settle bilateral or multilateral water issues is today badly needed. 
The examples cited by Ms Dai Qingli are only eyewash, though interestingly, she speaks of 'our shared water resources for the benefit of our peoples'. 

Here is Ms Dai Qingli's letter to the Editor of the Financial Times:

Sir, I am writing with regard to an article by Brahma Chellaney (“Water is the new weapon in Beijing’s armoury”, August 31) to set the record straight on the assertions made in this article.
China respects the right of other littoral states to reasonable utilisation of water resources in cross-border rivers. We would never take these resources as a 'political weapon' against our neighbours. Instead, China has made a huge amount of investment to improve water quality in cross-border rivers.
The assertion that China refuses to accept water-sharing arrangements is not true. Even though the 1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses has not come into effect, China has followed its principles of equitable and reasonable utilisation, obligation not to cause significant harm and international co-operation in working with our neighbours on the utilisation of cross-border rivers.
China signed agreements and set up joint commissions on cross-border water resources with Mongolia, Kazakhstan and Russia. It has also worked with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Vietnam, the Mekong River Commission and India in flood prevention and forecast, water quality monitoring, maritime management, navigation and shipping, and maritime disaster response.
According to international water law, all littoral states and peoples are entitled to equitable and reasonable utilisation of cross-border rivers. We are committed to building good-neighbourly partnership with our neighbours.
We would only continue to strengthen our dialogue and co-operation with them to ensure better utilisation and preservation of our shared water resources for the benefit of our peoples.

China’s water war with India

My article China’s water war with India was published in the Sunday Magazine of The Pioneer. Click on the title to read.

A treaty on river sharing with China?

It is good if Indian officials  start batting for a 'credible' water sharing treaty with China on the lines of the Indus Water Treaty, as this article of Telhelka reported.
On May 21, 1997, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses.

The Convention "aimed at guiding States in negotiating agreements on specific watercourses and invited States and regional economic integration organizations to become parties to it. The Assembly took that action through its adoption, by 103 votes in favour to 3 against (Turkey, China, Burundi) with 27 abstentions (India is one of the nations which abstained).

The 37-article Watercourses Convention and its 14-article annex governs the non-navigational uses of international watercourses, as well as measures to protect, preserve and manage them. Viewed as a framework Convention, it addresses such issues as flood control, water quality, erosion, sedimentation, saltwater intrusion and living resources.

A number of States who abstained or voted against the text drew attention to a lack of consensus on several of its key provisions, such as those governing dispute settlement. A number of speakers said there was a lack of balance in its provisions between the rights and obligations of the upstream and downstream riparian States. Concern was also expressed that the Convention had deviated from the aim of being a framework agreement.

Statements were made by the representatives of Japan, Mexico, the United Republic of Tanzania, Turkey, Bolivia, Pakistan, Czech Republic, China, Slovakia, France, India, Ethiopia, Egypt, Israel, Spain and Rwanda.

During the debate at the UN, Indian Permanent Representative Prakash Shah explained why India abstained. He regretted that:

the Convention had not been adopted by consensus. While a framework convention should provide general principles, the present Convention had deviated from that approach. Specifically, he had reservations regarding its articles 3, 5, 32, and 33. Article 3 had not adequately reflected a State's autonomy to conclude agreements without being fettered by the Convention. Article 5 had not been drafted clearly and would be difficult to implement. The Convention had superimposed the principle of "sustainable utilization" over the principle of utilization without appropriately defining the term "sustainable". India had abstained in the voting on draft articles 5, 6 and 7 in the working group.

Article 32 presupposed regional integration and hence did not merit inclusion, he went on to say. Article 33, on dispute settlement,contained an element of compulsion. Any procedure for peaceful settlement of disputes should leave the procedure to the parties. Any mandatory third-party dispute procedure was inappropriate and should not be included in a framework convention. He had voted against the provision in the working group and would have voted against had the article been put to a separate vote today. His country had therefore abstained in the voting.

It was rather technical objections which could be certainly sorted out.
One of the solutions to solve the debate on the diversion of the Brahmaputra would be for India to sign this Convention. It would put China in a very awkward position.
Another solution would be to have a bilateral Treaty/Agreement with China like the Indus Water Treaty with Pakistan. It is quite remarkable this Treaty survived several conflicts between the two neighbours.
Unless China agrees in a legal form that the rivers of Tibet do not 'belong' to China only, suspicion will remain.

Govt bats for Indus water-like treaty with China
Iftikhar Gilani
Telhelka
New Delhi
BATING for a “credible” water sharing treaty with China on the lines of the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) India has Pakistan, government officials here admitted there was no “verifiable system” of checking or probing China’s dam building spree particularly on the on the Yarlung Tsangpo River (aka Brahmaputra). Officially, however, India on Monday said it was verifying reports of such activity.
“We are seeking details from our Embassy in China. We are trying to get more details both from the government and depending on the reports we get, we will be able to make an assessment and take appropriate steps,” External Affairs Minister SM Krishna said.
“We have no reason to believe otherwise,” the government sources said, when asked if the satellite imagery has been indicating any activity along the river.
India’s worry mostly stem from the fact, that any Chinese activity of blocking waters would spell disaster on several hydropower coming up in Arunachal Pradesh.
Of India’s hydropower potential of 150,000 megawatts (MW), 50,000 MW is in the northeast. And AP, which is mainly fed by Brahmaputra’s tributaries –Siang, Subansiri and Lohit.