China visit and after – Undoing Nehru’s folly

In May, I wrote an article China visit and after – Undoing Nehru’s folly which appeared in NitiCentral.
It was about Nehru's rejection of a seat for India in the UN Security Council.
It occurred twice.
The first time in 1950, when the State Department made the offer and a few years later, when the Soviets were ready to sponsor India for a seat.
Both times, Nehru refused.

Since then, I got a copy of a letter from Nehru addressed to his sister, Vijaya Lakshi Pandit, then the Indian Ambassador in the United States, in which he justifies his refusal.
Here is Nehru's letter.

To Shrimati Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit,
Embassy of India,
Washington, D.C., USA.

SECRET 

PERSONAL

New Delhi,

August 30, 1950.

I have your letter of August 24th. Also Einstein’s new letter.
As far as I can see at present, I shall not be going to Lake Success, But of course there is always a possibility of some new development which might induce me to go there. I am quite sure that my going there casually will do no good to anyone. Einstein and people like him, with their simplicity and good-heartedness, think that some magic might result by a personal intervention. We can hardly plan for magic. Frankly, I do not want to make myself cheap and to get entangled in the internal controversies and debates of Lake Success.
Living in the United States, you are naturally oppressed by the atmosphere there at the present moment. You dislike it and you criticize it. Nevertheless, your view of the world situation is necessarily influenced by your environment. That environment and what happens there is of very great importance because, as you put it, the issue of war and peace may depend upon it.
It is clear that the world outlook today of the British people is markably different from that of America, even though they might be functioning more or less as allies. Western Europe again is also different in its own way. If you travel further to Russia, you are of course in a new world entirely. With new fears, new apprehensions, new ambitions. Here in India though there may not be much intelligent thinking on international affairs, there is nevertheless an instinctive reaction to them which is not at all favourable to the US.
It is no easy matter to deal with this complicated situation where each group thinks differently and where perhaps the only common feature is some kind of fear. Only today I received a letter from Panikkar from Peking together with a report on the present-day China. Both the letter and the report are very interesting and I am therefore enclosing a copy of them for you. Here also you will see an entirely different world with its own way of thinking on problems. What a vast difference there is between this and the US view of China as a stooge of Moscow!
Panikkar is a man of extraordinarily acute intelligence and powers of observation. In fact, his mind is so keen that it over-shoots the mark and goes much further ahead than facts warrant. But his analyzing the situation, apart from the time factor, is usually good. What will happen to China during the next few years is anybody’s guess. But it is a complete misunderstanding of the China situation to imagine that they function like a satellite State of Russia. Only one thing will push them in that direction to some extent. And even then this cannot go far. That one thing is isolation from the rest of the world. The US policy is the one policy which will make China do what the US least want. That is the tragedy or comedy of the situation. We grow blindly to achieve something and get something entirely different.
There can be little doubt that the Chinese Government is trying its best to be friendly to us. Apart from present day conflicts and in the long run, I am sure that it is of great importance to Asia and to the world that India and China should be friendly. How far we shall succeed in this endeavour, I cannot say.

In your letter you mention that the State Department is trying to unseat China as a Permanent Member of the Security Council and to put India in her place. So far as we are concerned, we are not going to countenance it. That would be bad from every point of view. It would be a clear affront to China and it would mean some kind of a break between us and China. I suppose the State Department would not like that, but we have no intention of following that course. We shall go on pressing for China’s admission in the UN and the Security Council. I suppose that a crisis will come during the next sessions of the General Assembly of the UN on this issue. The Peoples’ Government of China is sending a full Delegation there. If they fail to get in there will be trouble which might even result in the USSR and some other countries finally quitting the UN. That may please the State Department, but it would mean the end of the UN as we have known it. That would also mean a further drift towards war.
India, because of many factors, is certainly entitled to a permanent seat in the Security Council. But we are not going in at the cost of China.
Meanwhile, the continuance of the Kuomintang representative in the Security Council becomes more and more Gilbertian. Here is a Permanent Member of the Security Council with power of veto supposed to be a great power. In fact what we have is a Representative of the Government of Formosa having this authority and power at Lake Success. That Government of Formosa too is practically protected by a foreign power, the US.

Pakistan is busy building up a big case against us. There is of course Kashmir. They are now demanding from us a reference to the International Court at The Hague of the canal water dispute. Obviously they are going to raise this matter in the UN and are likely to do so directly on the ground that this might involve a breach of peace between the two countries. They have also written to me after many months about my proposal for a “No War” declaration in the simple and general form which I have originally proposed and which Pakistan had not accepted them.
As regards canal waters, I have not answered them yet, but I shall do so in the course of the next week. I do not propose to agree to The Hague tribunal. But we are prepared for arbitration, that is each party to nominate an arbitrator and a third to be chosen by them.
I am thinking of going to Assam for two or three days soon to confer with people there and to fly over the earthquake areas. We do not yet know the full extent of the earthquake and the damage it has caused. Many areas are completely isolated and people are marooned. It is said that the landscape of upper Assam has changed considerably. Some hills have disappeared and rivers are following new courses. Fortunately that area is not a heaily populated one, or else the damage would have been colossal.

Sd/- Jawaharlal Nehru.

China visit and after – Undoing Nehru’s folly
Here is the link of my May article....

A few months ago, a European diplomat confidentially told me, ‘in fact, the job of Modi is just to undo the knots in which the UPA tied up India in the past’. He was probably thinking of the complex Defence Procurement Policy (DPP) put in place by A.K. Antony, the UPA’s Defence Minister, who made the DPP so complicated that it became impossible for India to arm itself or even ‘make arms in India.’ This is the sad story of the Rafale deal; finally, during his recent visit to France, Prime Minister Modi had cut the MMRCA ‘bind’ and buy a few airplanes ‘off-the-shelf’.
Unfortunately, it is not only in defence issues that the previous governments have entangled India into insolvable predicaments.
The case of a seat in the United Nations’ Security Council is a stark one.
After Modi’s meetings with President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang, I was curious to see what the Joint Statement would say on this issue and if China’s position had moved. I thought that if Beijing is truly keen to enhance the trust between India and China, it should make a gesture and sponsor India’s candidature to the Security Council. Unfortunately, it did not happen.
The Joint Statement says: “The two sides support a comprehensive reform of the United Nations, including recognizing the imperative of increased participation of developing countries in UN’s affairs and governance structures, so as to bring more effectiveness to the UN. China attaches great importance to India’s status in international affairs as a large developing country, and understands and supports India’s aspiration to play a greater role in the United Nations including in the Security Council.”
It does not say that India should have a permanent seat with veto power, like China has. This is really ingratitude from China’s side.
One remembers the 1955 Soviet offer to sponsor India’s case for a permanent seat.
Sarvepalli Gopal wrote in his 3-volume biography of Nehru: “He [Jawaharlal Nehru] rejected the Soviet offer to propose India as the sixth permanent member of the Security Council and insisted that priority be given to China’s admission to the United Nations.”
Now some ‘experts’, like A.G. Noorani have argued that Nehru did the right thing as ‘the offer was unlikely to materialize’.
Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin had told the Indian Prime Minister: “We propose suggesting at a later stage India’s inclusion as the sixth member of the Security Council”; Nehru had replied: “This is to create trouble between us and China. We are, of course, wholly opposed to it. Further, we are opposed to pushing ourselves forward to occupy certain positions because that may itself create difficulties and India might itself become a subject to controversy.”
In another letter, Nehru elaborated about India’s position and the reasons to reject the ‘proposals’: “We have, therefore, made it clear to those who suggested this that we cannot agree to this suggestion. We have even gone a little further and said that India is not anxious to enter the Security Council at this stage, even though as a great country she ought to be there. The first step to be taken is for China to take her rightful place and then the question of India might be considered separately.”
But there is more. Recently, a young scholar, Anton Harder, working on his PhD at the London School of Economics, went through the Vijayalakshmi Pandit Papers kept at the Nehru Memorial Museum & Library in Delhi.
Harder found that in August 1950, Mrs. Pandit, then posted as Ambassador to the US, wrote to her brother: “One matter that is being cooked up in the State Department should be known to you. This is the unseating of [Nationalist] China as a Permanent Member in the Security Council and of India being put in her place. …Last week I had interviews with [John Foster] Dulles and [Philip] Jessup, reports of which I have sent to Bajpai. Both brought up this question and Dulles seemed particularly anxious that a move in this direction should be started.”
Five years before the Soviet offer, Washington was ready to sponsor India for a seat in the Security. A few days later, Nehru answered to Pandit: “You mention that the State Department is trying to unseat China as a Permanent Member of the Security Council and to put India in her place. So far as we are concerned, we are not going to countenance it. That would be bad from every point of view. It would be a clear affront to China and it would mean some kind of a break between us and China.”
The Indian Prime Minister added: “We shall go on pressing for [Communist] China’s admission in the UN and the Security Council. …The people’s government of China is sending a full delegation there. If they fail to get in there will be trouble which might even result in the USSR and some other countries finally quitting the UN.”
Thus whole background is all the more shocking as at that particular time, China was preparing to invade Tibet; a position in the UN would have helped India’s prestige and influence. K.M. Panikkar, India’s Ambassador to China knew about the communists’ intention: on August 15, 1950, it had been reported from Hong Kong that Chinese troops had begun advancing towards Tibet’s borders. Nehru too was aware of the impending ‘liberation’: “This invasion of Tibet might well upset the present unstable equilibrium and let loose dangerous forces. Some of our border States will be affected. But I am more concerned with the larger issues which this involves,” he wrote.
What were the larger issues? One of them was the Chinese admission to the UN!
On October 25, when the news of the Chinese invasion became known, Nehru was unhappy, he frankly told Panikkar: “Our views regarding [the] threatening invasion of Tibet and its probable repercussion should have been communicated to them clearly and unequivocally. This has evidently not been done.”
One can still regret India’s inaction even today and though Modi can’t officially admit it, India has been suffering due to this ‘lapse’ for the past 65 years. But in October 1950, for the then Prime Minister: “The Chinese Government's action has jeopardised our persistent efforts to secure the recognition of China in the interests of world peace have suffered a serious setback.”
What to say? The rest is history, sad history.
As Prime Minister Modi arrived in Xi'an, the first leg of his high profile visit to China, I was wondering if he would speak with the Chinese leadership about Tibet. Apparently, he has not!
The ‘T’ word appears only once in the Joint Statement, when the Kailash yatra is mentioned: “The Indian side appreciated the support and cooperation by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the local government of Tibet Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China to Indian pilgrims for the Kailash Manasarover Yatra …the Chinese side would launch the route for the Yatra through Nathu La Pass in 2015.”
Note that Beijing always speaks of ‘Tibet Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China’! Delhi never speaks of ‘Tamil Nadu of the Republic of India’ or ‘West Bengal of India’. Perhaps it shows that Beijing is still unsure about the legal ground of its ‘presence’ in Tibet.
Apart from this reference, nothing on 'T'.
The fact remains that in the years to come. Narendra Modi will have a lot of work to untie the many knots left by Jawaharlal Nehru and his advisors like K.M. Panikar and V.K. Krishna Menon.
As for the Chinese, the least that one can say is that they have shown little gratitude towards India; Indian leaders should know that till today, Beijing has been unable to appreciate kindness and generosity.

1960: The views of the two Governments remain as far apart as before

Nehru, Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi, Swaran Singh (April 1960)

During the annual K.F. Rustamji lecture, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, (who is also Special Representative for the border talks with China), affirmed that while India's relations with China ‘were looking up’, but there was a need to remain at a ‘very very high alert’.
Speaking on 'Challenges of Securing India’s Borders: Strategising the Response’, Doval admitted: "We might have to see China border in a different way once the boundary is settled.”
According to PTI, he explained: “We have got a very long border, we have got 3,488-km [?] long border, a very difficult and mountainous terrain snow-clad... now for the bilateral relations with China, border is the critical and vital issue.”
After he affirmed that ‘advancement made in the relationship with China are centred around the settlement of the border’, he touched upon Arunachal Pradesh: “We are particularly concerned about the Eastern sector where the claims have been made on Tawang (in Arunachal Pradesh) which is totally in contravention of accepted principles."
Doval refers here to ‘Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question’ signed on April 11, 2005.
Article VI says: “The boundary should be along well-defined and easily identifiable natural geographical features to be mutually agreed upon between the two sides.”
And even more importantly, Article VII speaks of the ‘settled population’: “In reaching a boundary settlement, the two sides shall safeguard due interests of their settled populations in the border areas.”
Doval rightly said: “The fact is there is settled population in these areas particularly in Tawang and other areas which have been participating in the national mainstream all through.”
Apparently, Beijing has forgotten about the 2005 Guidelines!
It is a serious issue, because if an agreement is reached after a lot of efforts and time and soon after, Beijing become affected by Alzheimer disease, it is a problem.
Doval mentioned another point: he was surprised that while McMahon line was agreed till Burma by China (in 1960), the same principle was not accepted in the case of India.
He concluded: “So, these are the ticklish issues. But these ticklish issues have to be talked about, deliberated and worked out …there was a need for working out a larger plan for tackling China.”
He also admitted that the Special Representative talks between India and China on the boundary issue had not made any headway so far: “There have been a series of Special Representative level talks, about 17 rounds and they haven't reached anywhere. But it is also true that for last 30 years we have not exchanged a single bullet. But, it is also true that the number of intrusions have gone up and down. Fortunately, in the last one year the intrusions have become much less and some of the intrusions which have been made were controlled."
Beijing was quick to react.
Foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying declared:  “The Chinese side holds a consistent and clear position on the eastern section of the China-India boundary: Aunachal Pradesh is a part of Southern Tibet.”
She explained: “The Chinese government does not recognise the McMahon Line, which is illegal,” adding: “The Chinese side is ready to work with the Indian side to resolve the boundary question through friendly consultation at an early date and create more favourable conditions for the development of the bilateral relations."
Hua did not mentioned directly the McMahon Line and Burma, she just said: “it is not easy to resolve the China-India boundary question, as it is an issue left over from history. …During Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's recent visit to China, the two sides reaffirmed their commitment to a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution to the boundary question by pressing ahead with the process of the special representatives' meeting."
Minus the 2005 Guidelines!!!
It is interesting to look at China’s position 55 years ago, when Premier Zhou Enlai came to India with a large delegation to try to resolve the dispute.
As Subimal Dutt, the then Foreign Secretary wrote to the Indian Missions abroad: “The views of the two Governments remain as far apart as before.”
That was in April 1960.
The Foreign Secretary’s note makes interesting reading.
Nothing has changed 55 years later.
Will it change one day?

Subimal Dutt to Heads of Missions

Premier Chou En-lai and his party left Delhi 26th morning. The Premier had seven long talks with the Prime Minister. He and Foreign Minister Chen Yi had also separate talks with Vice-President and several senior Ministers. The views of the two Governments remain as far apart as before.

The Chinese took the following stand.

(1) The Sino-Indian boundary is not delimited and has to be settled by discussion between the two Governments.

(2) The Chinese will never accept the McMahon Line as a valid boundary. The NEFA area was traditionally part of Tibet and in many parts the Tibetans had been exercising jurisdiction. Indian control has extended there during the last 20 or 30 years. The Chinese however recognise that the area is now under full Indian control. This area has always been disputed between China and India.

(3) The Ladakh area has been historically and traditionally part of Sinkiang in China and western Tibet, and has never been disputed until India tried to extend her control during the last one or two years. The dispute in this area has therefore arisen because of attempted penetration by India. Chinese have always been in control of this area which has been shown as part of China in Chinese maps.

(4) Neither side should make a territorial claim as a precondition. China is not making any such claim to the NEFA and undertakes not to cross the line upto which Indian control has extended. Similarly, India should recognise that Chinese control extends upto the line shown in the Chinese maps and should not try to cross that line. The position in Ladakh and NEFA is exactly similar in that there is a line upto which Indian control extends in NEFA and there is a line upto which Chinese control extends in Ladakh. The Indian claim to Ladakh must be treated in exactly the same basis as the Chinese claim to the NEFA.

(5) A joint committee of officials should meet, examine the material in the possession of both sides and make recommendations for border adjustments.

2. We have disagreed with the Chinese stand on every single point. In regard to point (2) we have reiterated that the NEFA area south of the McMahon Line has always been part of India by custom, tradition and exercise of jurisdiction and there is no similarity between the Indian stand in respect of NEFA and the supposed Chinese stand in respect of Ladakh. We have also made it quite clear that officials cannot be entrusted with the task of making proposals involving the sovereignty of a country.

Top Secret

3. It is quite obvious that the Chinese aim is to make us accept their claim in Ladakh as a price for their recognition of our position in NEFA. Throughout the discussions they have invariably connected Ladakh with NEFA and stressed that the same principles of settling the boundary must govern both these areas. It was also obvious that if we accepted the line claimed by China in Ladakh they would accept the McMahon Line. There might be need for minor frontier rectifications, but that would not create much practical difficulty.

4. The only substantive agreement in the joint communique is that officers of both sides should examine the maps, documents etc. in each other's possession and send a joint report to the two Governments listing the points on which they agree and the points on which they either disagree or which, in their view, need further clarification. It is not known whether the Chinese will implement this agreement sincerely. Whatever be it, it leaves the way open for further consideration of the border problem by the two Prime Ministers. It would however be entirely incorrect to give the impression, that each side appreciates the other's point of view better or that prospect of reasonable settlement is even remotely in sight. The Chinese might try to give that impression to the world.

5. You should use the information contained in this telegram discreetly for rebutting any misleading Chinese propaganda and to give a correct appraisal of the Delhi talks. 

Beijing to offer more 'gifts' to Tibet

More tourists for Tibet

As Prime Minister Narendra Modi arrived in Xi'an, capital city of Shaanxi Province, as the first leg of his high profile visit to China, analysts wonder if he would speak about Tibet with the Chinese leadership.
Apparently, he did not!
The ‘T’ word appears only once in the Joint Statement, when the Kailash yatra is mentioned:

The Indian side appreciated the support and cooperation by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the local government of Tibet Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China to Indian pilgrims for the Kailash Manasarover Yatra (Gang Renpoche [sic] and Mapam Yun Tso Pilgrimage). To further promote religious exchange between the two countries and provide facilitation for Indian pilgrims, the Chinese side would launch the route for the Yatra through Nathu La Pass in 2015.

Though it is a separate issue, it is worth noting that Beijing always says, ‘Tibet Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China’.
Delhi never speaks of ‘Tamil Nadu of the Republic of India’ or ‘West Bengal of …’. It perhaps shows that Beijing is still unsure about the legal ground of its ‘presence’ in Tibet.
But apart from this reference, nothing on 'T'.
The Brahmaputra is not even mentioned, except to say:

The Indian side expressed appreciation to China for providing flood-season hydrological data and the assistance in emergency management. The two sides will further strengthen cooperation through the Expert-Level Mechanism on the provision of flood-season hydrological data and emergency management, and exchange views on other issues of mutual interest.

The names of the Yarlung Tsangpo/Siang/Brahmaputra and the Sutlej are not cited. Does it means that Delhi has got some assurance from Beijing that China will not go for mega-dams on the trans-boundary rivers? It is possible!

An unusual comment
An interesting remark during Modi’s speech at Tsinghua University: the Prime Minister said that both nations needed to ensure that their relationships with other countries did not become a concern for each other: “If we are able to deepen mutual trust and confidence, we will also be able to reinforce each other's efforts of connecting Asia with itself and the rest of the world."
The South China Morning Post quotes an analyst saying: “Modi's comment was somewhat unusual as diplomatic visitors to Beijing normally called for further consolidation of bilateral ties.”
Fang Tien-sze, a South Asia study expert and a Taiwanese former diplomat in India explains: “By asking the mainland to reconsider its approach in dealing with India, Modi meant to say there is a need for Beijing to work hard with New Delhi to really find a way to resolve their border disputes if the two sides are to closely cooperate to form the Asian Century."
It is true that Beijing needs to 'work hard' to fill up the trust deficit.

A gift for Tibet?
In the meantime, Beijing is thinking of ‘what kind of gift to give to Tibet its 50th anniversary?’ China Tibet Online elaborates:

The Year 2015 marks the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the Tibet Autonomous Region, and it is reported that the Sixth Conference on the Work of Tibet may also be convened this year. Since the central government has always presented gifts to Tibet on major celebrations, we may wonder what kind of gift it will send to Tibet this year.

Will it be the genuine autonomy demanded by the Dalai Lama?
Don't be so hopeful!
The Chinese ‘Tibetan’ website reminds us that in March 2015,

Chinese Premier Li Keqiang mentioned in the Government Work Report that China is a unified and multi-ethnic country, and it is important to uphold and improve the system of the regional ethnic autonomy. It is also important to provide more support to the development of ethnic minority areas, to protect and develop ethnic cultures and characteristic towns in order to promote exchanges among various ethnic groups.

It recalls Year 2011 which marked the 60th anniversary of the so-called peaceful liberation of Tibet (Beijing does not say that it resulted in more than 1 million casualties). At that time, a delegation from Beijing, “presented the Tibetan people with essential life products, including stainless steel pressure cookers, handheld solar-powered torches, and portable solar-powered televisions.”
The website justifies the generous ‘gifts’ thus: “Although people living in developed areas might not consider these items, for those living on the high plateau, especially rural residents in remote areas, the gifts are very practical and useful.”
It was indeed useful, especially if the Tibetans were last without pressure cookers in the Middle Kingdom.

A new gift for Tibet
I have already mentioned China's next gift to Tibet on this blog, the Roof of the World will made an integral part of the New Silk Road. 
Is it better than a stainless pressure cooker for the common man on the high plateau? Not certain!
China Tibet Online asserts: "The ‘One belt, One road’ strategy is seen as an opportunity to accelerate Tibet’s development. Gifts from the central government to Tibet also include policy support in public finance and banking.”
A Xinhua article in March had quoted Xiao Gang, chairman of the China Securities Regulatory Commission, who proposed some "policies that would support an equity shares market, a bond market, and a futures contract market in the Tibet Autonomous Region as well as efforts that would broaden financing channels for businesses, support funding for small-scale businesses, which will play a role in supporting the development of a futures contract market in Tibet.”
It further commented that to promote the development of a capital market, Tibet needs to improve its own economic capacity.
Shang Fulin, chairman of the China Banking Regulatory Commission had proposed a solution to ‘improve’ Tibet’s economic capacity: “In order to improve the banking institution in Tibet and provide credit resources, China must focus on developing Tibet’s local tourism and culture, Tibetan medicine and pharmacology, and characteristic industries such as agriculture and animal husbandry.”
Instead of 15 million Han tourists, Tibet will then become a full-fledged tourist resort; the largest amusement park in the world.
The article says that China must further expand the ‘Horseback Bank’, the ‘Tent Bank’, and mobile servicing vehicles "according to the particular characteristics of Tibet."
In other words, Beijing will bring ‘development' to the countryside, to the farmers and nomads (and bring tourists along).
The conclusion of the apparently well-informed website is that these gifts will be beneficial “for accelerating Tibet’s leapfrog development and for promoting the building of a moderately prosperous society in Tibet.”
It even cites statistics from the TAR’s Taxation Bureau: in 2014 Tibet’s GDP reached 92 billion yuan, (15 billion US dollars), an increase of 10.8 percent over the previous year.
As Tibet prepares to ‘celebrate’ the 50th anniversary of the foundation of the so-called Autonomous Region, Xinhua admits: “Tibet is the country’s only region with vast concentrated poverty areas.”
What was the point of ‘liberating Tibet, if it so?
It reminds me of the words of the 10th Panchen Lama who, a few hours before his mysterious death in 1989, asked “what was the point of liberating Tibet 30 years ago, if Tibet remains so poor.”
Two points are clear: China will increase the number of Chinese tourists visiting the Roof of the World (and for the purpose will tremendous increase the construction of ‘dual-use’ infrastructure in Tibet) and then Tibet will become an integral part of the ‘One Road, One Belt’ project, so dear to President Xi Jinping.
Can all this be considered as ‘gifts’ to the Tibetan people?
To settle the border issue with India, Beijing will probably wait for Tibet to be ‘stabilized’?
Tibetans will crawling under ‘gifts’, but will they be satisfied?
After all, the 'stabilization' depends of the happiness of the 'masses', isn't it?

Mr Modi, be wary of the Chinese!

Chinese and Russian navies leaving for joint drills in the Mediterranean Sea

My article on Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to China, entitled Mr Modi, be wary of the Chinese! appeared in Rediff.com

Here is the link...

'Chinese leaders rarely receive their foreign guests in cities other than Beijing. Such respect for India!' 
'Does it mean that Modi could replicate "the warmth and unconventional way" by sending Indian troops into Tibet, as Xi did in Chumur (Ladakh) when he arrived in India? Of course, Indians are far too polite to do so,' says Claude Arpi.

‘Hello China’, Prime Minister Narendra Modi tweeted in Chinese as his first message on the Chinese microblog Weibo: “Looking forward to interacting with Chinese friends through Weibo.”
Will a few tweets help Modi, the third-most followed world leader on Twitter to tackle the issues facing the Sino-Indian relations? The answer is ‘no”.
Immediately after Modi’s ‘hello’, a Chinese Weibo shot back: “The southern part of Tibet belongs to China, and Kashmir belongs to Pakistan. Mr PM please return the lands of other countries first before we start talking about how to get along well”
The relations between Delhi and Beijing are too complicated for a few slogans to make the difference, while at every level, the balance of power tilts in favour of China.
In fact, all bilateral issues, whether it is the border dispute, the trade imbalance, the stapled visas for Kashmiris and Arunachalis, the opening of new consulates, the Tibet issue; none of these problems can be solved easily due to the economic imbalance, as well the difference in border infrastructure and military power.
But there is an imbalance of ‘vision’ too.
A few weeks ago, a PIB communique announced that the Prime Minister “will visit Xian, Beijing and Shanghai from May 14 – 16, 2015.” That was the ‘normal’ pattern for the Prime Minister’s visit; the problem is that China is not a normal country.
The Middle Kingdom dreams of dominating Asia and the World; India is only incidental to the Chinese Dream.
Further, India and China live in different worlds, with often-opposite mindsets and while adhocism is the hallmark of the Elephant, the Dragon thinks far, far ahead.
China watcher, Francesco Sisci recently wrote in The Asia Times: “China works with long terms plans, its way of thinking and its political organization is all geared for long term — and of course they do not have elections every two or four years to press politicians into daily routines.”
Sisci cites China’s New Silk Road, an extremely long term scheme: “China now wants to make some progress on the development of the Silk Road and it can do it with Russia and Pakistan, the safest bets.”
And Beijing acts fast, China and Russia have just conducted a joint naval drill in the Mediterranean; a move which extends greatly the Middle Kingdom’s sphere of influence. Though the Chinese defense ministry spokesperson Geng Yansheng said: “The aim of the drills is to deepen both countries' friendly and practical cooperation and increase our navies' ability to jointly deal with maritime security threats," Sina Military Network explained the rationale: “there is no doubt that joint military drills will always send a signal,” further admitting: “the target of the maritime exercise is obviously the US, which China feels has been interfering in China's expansion activities in the East and South China seas by strengthening ties with Japan and the Philippines.” It also mentions the economic sanctions against the Russian Federation for annexing Crimea from Ukraine.
It is clear that China will first defend its interests.
Now the question comes: how should India deal with China?
There are no simple answers, though it would be useful if the Prime Minister team starts thinking ahead (a few years to start with) and find schemes on which India’s friends and partners can rely.
In this perspective, the recently-held Varuna Indo-French naval exercises, which saw the Indian and French Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) interact in the most sophisticated naval training so far, were interesting. It is vital for Delhi to engage with ‘friendly’ navies and learn from those who have the required experience, ships and armament and there are very few!
This too will not stop China’s rise.

China wants to dominate the World
While several American ‘experts’ have started talking of the ‘cracking up’ of the Middle Kingdom, Beijing does not bother much and continues with its initiative to build a ‘parallel’ new world order, centered on China and Asia.
WantChinaTimes, a Taiwanese publication mentions “new political, economic and security systems that China is setting up around the world in an attempt to realign the established international order dominated by the United States.”
During the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA), the Asian ‘Davos’, President Xi Jinping went on about his favorite topic, the ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative. Xi asserted that the scheme would ultimately benefit 'all nations'.
The scheme has different rationales, though the main objectives are clearly for China to take the leadership of Asia and reenergize its economy.
The Silk Road Economic Belt will eventually link China, Central Asia, Russia and Europe, while the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, will stretch China’s influence to Europe through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean in the West and to the South Pacific in the East.
The Silk Road projects would add more than 60,000 kilometres of road, including 4,070 km expressways, and improve the connectivity of the existing transportation network.
Both new ‘silk roads’ would involve 65 countries from three continents and 4.4 billion people. Xi spoke of an annual trade volume exceeding US $ 2.5 trillion in a decade: “cooperation and coordination of policies will be win-win for all involved”, he affirmed.
Another much-talked about initiative is the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Beijing no longer wants to be subjected to US financial controlling or monitoring.
The Chinese initiative is already considered as a success if one looks at the number of countries and territories from five continents who have applied to join the Beijing-led Bank as founding members.
Though Japan will not be immediately joining, many Western capitals, including London have declared their intention to jump into the boat. Washington, completely taken on the wrong foot, seemed to have lost a battle. In the US, former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright noted that the United State has ‘screwed up’ on the way it dealt with the AIIB.
Now take Xi Jinping’s trip to Islamabad. The enormity of the ‘gifts’ that Chinese President brought in his luggage as he landed in Pakistan, is flabbergasting.
The Washington Post remarked: “Xi arrived in Islamabad bearing real gifts: an eye-popping $46 billion worth of planned energy and infrastructure investment to boost Pakistan's flagging economy.”
It sounds like a Chinese Dream for Islamabad!
Beijing has decided to help Pakistan to develop a China-Pakistan Economic Corridor which will eventually link up the One Belt and One Road.
In other words, the Chinese-sponsored port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea will be connected through the Karakoram Highway, to the Xinjiang province in China’s Far West and Central Asia …and later Middle East, Africa and Europe.
The ‘corridor’ will have railways, roads, optical fiber cables, dams (to produce the necessary electricity), pipelines, etc!
Observers marveled at Beijing’s kindness (and wealth), but one should not be fooled by Chinese generosity: Beijing is investing for China!
With the country facing financial difficulties at home, with a slowdown of the economic engine, the leadership has devised the double Roads scheme to rebalance its own economy and perhaps more importantly, to become the sole leader of Asia.
Where is India in this scheme? Nowhere!
Does Delhi have such a ‘Grand Project’? The answer is ‘No’.

Modi’s visit to China
It was announced (in India) that Xi Jinping and his wife Peng Liyuan wanted to replicate “the warm and unconventional welcome extended to him [Xi] by Indian Prime Minister on his visit to India” by taking Modi for a trip to the ancient city of Xian, the capital of Xi's home province Shaanxi.
It will probably be enough to melt the soft hearts of the Indian delegation; the Chinese leaders rarely receive their foreign guests in cities other than Beijing. Such respect for India!
Does it mean that Modi could replicate ‘the warmth and unconventional way’ by sending Indian troops into Tibet, as Xi did in Chumur (Ladakh) when he arrived in India? Of course, Indians are far too polite to do so. Once again, the gap in mindsets is too wide.
Analyst Brahma Chellaney believes: “Indian diplomacy has long been shaped by personalities at the helm. Their propensity to act in haste and repent at leisure has been legendary, as India has ignored the sound advice of Talleyrand, Napoleon’s famous foreign minister: ‘By no means show too much zeal’.”
Without showing too much ‘zeal’, Modi could perhaps:

• Ask Xi Jinping if he knows that once upon a time, Tibetans kings ruled over China from Xi’an.
• Ask to meet the Panchen Lama recognized by the Dalai Lama and kept ‘somewhere in China’ for the past 20 years.
• Ask China to reopen the Himalayan passes which were closed in 1962, namely, Demchok (Ladakh), Mana and Niti pass (Uttarakhand) , Jelep-la (West Bengal), and a few others routes in Arunachal Pradesh like Kibithu (Anjaw district), Bumla (Tawang district), Gelling-Tuting (Upper Siang district)
• Reopen the Indian Consulate in Lhasa in exchange of a Chinese consulate in Chennai or elsewhere in India.
• What has happened of the Indian Trade Agency’s building in Yatung in the Chumbi Valley adjacent to Sikkim.
• Have a frank discussion on the Tibet issue.

It is however doubtful if the guest wants to embarrass the host.
In which case, India will have to wait for the ‘cracking up’ of the Communist Dynasty. It may take some time.

LAC not ripe for settlement

My article LAC not ripe for settlement appeared in Asian Age/Deccan Chronicle

Here is the link...


A solution probably favoured by Beijing would be to ‘exchange’ Aksai Chin against recognition of Arunachal as being a part of India... If India does agree, would the border issue be resolved? No!

Invariably, when an Indian Prime Minister goes to China or a senior Chinese leader visits India, the Indian media goes berserk speculating, “this time” the border dispute between the two Asian giants will be resolved.
Unfortunately, it is not an easy proposition.
We have recently seen that it takes time and patience to solve differences, even for a relatively minor dispute, like the one between Bangladesh and India. The Sino-Indian divergences are major.
The Chinese are not completely wrong when they say that the border imbroglio has been “inherited from history”. But, while Beijing cites British imperialism, the facts are different: there was no “border issue” between India and Tibet before 1951 simply because the Roof of the World was a peaceful independent state. Unfortunately for India, the then Prime Minister was a romantic.
In the early 1950s, having swiftly taken control of Tibet, the People’s Liberation Army progressively stopped the age-old trade and exchanges between India and the Dalai Lama’s land. China even built a road on Indian territory (without Nehru’s government noticing it); the stakes brutally changed and the border gradually became “disputed”.
By the end of the decade, despite the Panchsheel Agreement (“on trade and intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India”) signed in April 1954, the traditional “soft” border between India and Tibet (now China) became real, concrete, tangible, sensitive and eventually the object of a “border war” in 1962.
It had not always been like this. For centuries, a constant flow of Tibetan lamas had visited the great Indian viharas of Nalanda, Odantapuri and Vikramasila, while trade across the Himalayan belt prospered. After Tibet had opted for the non-violent doctrine, Buddhism, in the 7th century, it is fascinating to look at the changes in the people of Tibet who were among the most belligerent on earth.
Their powerful empire, which had spread far and wide, suddenly turned pacifist, and another kind of conquest started — the conquest of self. Tibetan Buddhism spread its “soft” influence over Central Asia and Mongolia. The Himalaya, a most formidable natural barrier, which separates the Indian subcontinent from the Tibetan plateau, remained vibrantly porous till the arrival of the Chinese troops on the Roof of the World.
On November 7, 1959, in a letter addressed to Jawaharlal Nehru, Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai used for the first time a new terminology. He wrote that the Line of Actual Control (LAC) consisted of “the so-called McMahon Line in the East and the line up to which each side exercises actual control in the West.” The term “LAC” became a legal concept in the Sino-Indian agreements signed in 1993 and 1996, 2012 and 2013. The 1996 agreement states, “No activities of either side shall overstep the line of actual control.”
But that is not all. To complicate the issue further, another term has recently appeared in the diplomats’ jargon: “a perceptional border” because India and China have different perceptions of where their LAC lies. Moreover, China refuses to share with India the maps of its perception.
Today, the more than 4,000 km-long LAC, is divided in three sectors: the western sector (Ladakh in Jammu & Kashmir), the middle sector (Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh) and the eastern sector (Sikkim and Arunachal). All have large or small disputed areas. A solution probably favoured by Beijing would be to “exchange” the Aksai Chin area in Ladakh, vital for China, as it links Tibet and Xinjiang, against Arunachal Pradesh that is claimed by Beijing.
A few years ago, Lorenz Lüthi of McGill University in Montreal wrote a well-researched paper (Sino-Indian Relations, 1954-1962) based on archival documents. He said: “In the spring of 1960 China was ready to find a compromise settlement… the PRC usually was willing to settle border disputes with neighbors through a compromise when it was internationally isolated and internally weak.”
Lüthi wrote that when Mao’s regime was in the midst of the great famine, which followed the Great Leap Forward, “internal documentation suggests that the PRC wanted to insist on its claim to Aksai Chin for strategic reasons, but Beijing probably was willing to let the territory of NEFA (today Arunachal) go”.
China is not weak anymore; it will not make any compromise. During the several rounds of detailed talks on the border issue which followed Zhou Enlai’s visit in Delhi in April 1960, no matter what evidence India produced, it was clear that the Chinese would never relinquish the Aksai Chin artery.
If India does agree and receive from Beijing in return for such a “gift” the recognition of Arunachal Pradesh as being a part of India, would the border issue be resolved? No!
Supposing that with a magic wand, Prime Minister Narendra Modi convinces President Xi Jinping to agree to “settle” the border dispute, will the Himalayan passes return to the situation ante 1951, when trade and cultural exchanges flourished between Tibet and India? Again the answer is no.
Will China accept to reopen the Himalayan routes which were closed in 1962, namely Demchok (Ladakh), Shipka-la (Himachal Pradesh), Mana and Niti pass (Uttarakhand), Jelep-la (West Bengal), and others routes in Arunachal Pradesh such as Kibithu (Anjaw district), Bumla (Tawang district) Menchuka, Manigong (West Siang district) and Gelling-Tuting (Upper Siang district)? Again, no.
Will China agree to reopen an Indian consulate general in Lhasa and trade agencies in Gyantse, Yatung and Gartok (Ngari), all of which were functional till 1962? No!
Will the cultural and religious exchange between the Buddhist monasteries in Tibet and those in Ladakh, Himachal Pradesh, Sikkim or Arunachal Pradesh be allowed, as was the case in the past? No.
Will Beijing accept to have a frank discussion on the Tibet issue and the fate of the Tibetan refugees in India? Absolutely not.
Before a holistic settlement is found, the border agreements of January 2012 and October 2013 are probably good enough to keep the status quo and peace on the LAC (or LACs).
Why should India compromise her position for a solution that will not bring the Himalayas back as a dynamic passage between the Tibetan world and the subcontinent? Zhou Enlai cleverly said in the early 1950s, “the border issue is not ripe for settlement”. Mr Modi should say the same when he visits China later this week.